AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES

CHERISHING KNOWLEDGE 225th SHAPING THE FUTURE

Bulletin

SUMMER 2005 VOL. LVIII, NO. 4

Page 6

Markets, Morals, and Civic Life

Michael J. Sandel

Page 16

Universities as Urban Planners

E. John Rosenwald, Jr., Robert Campbell, James Stewart Polshek, Omar Blaik, and Lee C. Bollinger

Page 22

Images of Power in Shakespeare

Stephen Greenblatt

Page 28

The American Classics

Denis Donoghue

INSIDE:

Gift from Ellsworth Kelly to the Academy, Page 3
Neuroeconomics by Colin Camerer, Page 12
Poetry Reading by Robert Pinsky, Page 26
From the Archives, Page 36

Contents

Academy News 1

Gift from Ellsworth Kelly 3

Academy Lectures

Markets, Morals, and Civic Life
Michael J. Sandel 6

Neuroeconomics
Colin Camerer 12

Universities as Urban Planners
E. John Rosenwald, Jr., Robert Campbell, James Stewart Polshek, Omar Blaik, and Lee C. Bollinger 16

Images of Power in Shakespeare
Stephen Greenblatt 22

A Poetry Reading
Robert Pinsky 26

The American Classics
Denis Donoghue 28

Around the Country 32

Noteworthy 34

From the Archives 36

AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF ARTS & SCIENCES

Calendar of Events

Saturday, October 8, 2005

National Induction Ceremony and Stated Meeting – Cambridge

Speakers: Eric A. Cornell, National Institute of Standards and Technology, JILA, and University of Colorado, Boulder; **Nancy Sabin Wexler,** Columbia University; **Richard P. Saller,** University of Chicago; **Elena Kagan,** Harvard Law School; **Tom Brokaw,** NBC News; **Susan Stewart,** Princeton University

Location: Sanders Theatre, Harvard University

Time: 4:00 p.m.

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

Stated Meeting – Cambridge

Speaker: David McCullough, West Tisbury, Massachusetts

Location: House of the Academy

Wednesday, November 16, 2005

Stated Meeting – New York

Speakers and location: To be announced

Saturday, November 19, 2005

Stated Meeting – Chicago

"Shapers of the New City: Cultural Institutions and Universities"

Speakers: Richard Franke, Chicago Humanities Festival; **John Bryan**, Millennium Park, Inc.; **James Cuno**, Art Institute of Chicago; **Don Michael Randel**, University of Chicago; and **Robert Campbell**, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Location: Art Institute of Chicago

Friday, December 2, 2005

Stated Meeting – Cambridge

Speaker: Robert Levin, Harvard University

Location: House of the Academy

For information and reservations, contact the Events Office (phone: 617-576-5032; email: mevents@amacad.org).

Academy News

New Officers and Councilors

The results of the ballot for the election of Officers and Councilors have been tabulated and the Academy is pleased to announce that the following Fellows will begin their terms of service in fall 2005. The positions open in 2006 are listed on page 5.

Secretary

Jerrold Meinwald, the Goldwin Smith Professor of Chemistry at Cornell University, has been elected Secretary of the Academy. A pioneer in the fields of organic chemistry and chemical ecology, Meinwald's research focuses on how plants and animals, primarily insects and other arthropods, defend themselves and communicate with one another by sending and receiving chemical messages. His chemical insights have heightened awareness of the importance of "secondary metabolites" in nature. Meinwald's research group is currently studying a new methodology for the characterization of unknown, naturally occurring compounds, and applying these methods to the isolation and identification of novel biologically active compounds from spider venoms and fireflies. Meinwald holds Ph.B. and B.S. degrees from the University of Chicago, and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. He is the recipient (along with his long-term collaborator, Thomas Eisner) of the 1990 Tyler Prize in Environmental Achievement and the 1991 J. G. Esselen Award for Chemistry in the Public Interest, and he has been awarded the American Chemical Society's 2005 Roger Adams Award in Organic Chemistry.

A Fellow of the Academy since 1970, Meinwald was a founding scientist of the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) established by the American Academy and the National Academy of Sciences. He is cochair of the Academy's Committee on Studies and co-director of a study on scientific literacy.

Librarian

Robert C. Post, David Boies Professor of Law at Yale University, is the Academy's new Librarian. Prior to his appointment at Yale in 2003, he was the Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, where he taught for twenty years. Post holds a J.D. from Yale University and a B.A. and Ph.D. in the history of American civilization from Harvard University. He clerked for Chief Judge David Bazelon at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and for Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. at the U.S. Supreme Court.

Post has written extensively on constitutional law, legal history, privacy, and academic freedom. He is the author of *Constitutional Domains* (1995), the coauthor of *Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law* (2001), the editor of *Law and the Order of Culture* (1991), and the coeditor of *Race and Representation* (1998), *Human Rights in Political Transition: Gettysburg to Bosnia* (1999), and, most recently, *Civil Society and Government* (2002). He has also served as general counsel to the American Association of University Professors and Chair of the Board of Governors of the Humanities Research Institute of the University of California.

In the mid-1990s, Post edited *Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation*, which was the report of a joint project of the American Academy, the Getty Research Institute, and the University of California Humanities Research Institute. He currently cochairs the Academy's project on Congress and the Court.

Jerrold Meinwald
Secretary

Robert C. Post
Librarian

John Katzenellenbogen
Physical Sciences

Jerome Kagan
Social Sciences

Carol Gluck
Humanities and Arts

Councilors

Class I – Physical Sciences

John Katzenellenbogen, Section 3 – Chemistry, elected 1992

Katzenellenbogen is the Swanlund Professor of Chemistry at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. An authority on the structure and function of nuclear hormone receptors, his research centers on estrogens and their role in breast cancer and menopause and on the development of estrogen-based pharmaceuticals for the prevention and treatment of breast cancer. His honors include the Paul C. Abersold Award of the Society of Nuclear Medicine and the Arthur C. Cope Award of the American Chemical Society. Katzenellenbogen also serves as Vice Chair of the Academy's Midwest Center.

Class III – Social Sciences

Jerome Kagan, Section 1 – Social and Developmental Psychology and Education, elected 1968

Kagan is the Daniel and Amy Starch Research Professor of Psychology at Harvard University. His research addresses the cognitive and emotional development of children during the first decade of life. A member of the Institute of Medicine, he is the recipient of the Distinguished Scientist Award of the American Psychological Association. Kagan is the author of *Unstable Ideas* (1989), *Three Seductive Ideas* (1998), and *Surprise, Uncertainty and Mental Structures* (2002) and the coauthor of *A Young Mind in a Growing Brain* (2005). He chairs the Academy's Committee on Publications and the Academy's Membership Committee for Social and Developmental Psychology and Education.

Class IV – Humanities and Arts

Carol Gluck, Section 2 – History, elected 1991

Gluck is the George Sansom Professor of History and Director of the Expanding East Asian Studies Program at Columbia University. Her research centers on the history of Japan from the late nineteenth century to the present, international history, and history writing in Asia and the West. She is the author of *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (1985), *Showa: The Japan of Hirohito* (1992), and *Past Obsessions: War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (forthcoming). Gluck is an editorial adviser to *Dædalus*.

Continuing Members of the Council include:

Robert Alberty (MIT)

Gerald Early (Washington University in St. Louis)

Linda Greenhouse (*The New York Times*)

Charles M. Haar (Harvard University)

Neal Lane (Rice University)

Richard Meserve (Carnegie Institution of Washington)

David D. Sabatini (New York University)

Randy Schekman (University of California, Berkeley)

and the Officers of the Academy:

President **Patricia Meyer Spacks** (University of Virginia)

Executive Officer **Leslie C. Berlowitz**

Vice President **Louis W. Cabot** (Cabot-Wellington LLC)

Secretary **Jerrold Meinwald** (Cornell University)

Treasurer **John Reed** (New York City)

Editor **Steven Marcus** (Columbia University)

Vice President, Western Center **Jesse Choper** (Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley)

Vice President, Midwest Center **Geoffrey Stone** (University of Chicago)

Librarian **Robert C. Post** (Yale University)

Gift from Ellsworth Kelly to the Academy

A new lithograph by the U.S. preeminent painter and sculptor Ellsworth Kelly now hangs in the atrium of the House of the Academy. In celebration of the Academy's 225th anniversary, Kelly donated 25 signed prints of his "Sunflower II" from a limited edition of 60 lithographs. The remaining prints have been designated by Kelly to be used as gifts of appreciation to donors who make lead contributions to the Academy's endowment and capital funds during the 225th anniversary period.

It is fitting that Ellsworth Kelly has chosen the sunflower as the subject of his gift to the Academy. As President Patricia Meyer Spacks observed, "In one of their first pronouncements, the Academy's founders set forth 'the several subjects that should engage the attention of the Academy,' including the study of 'the various soils of the country, various methods of cultivation, and the growth of vegetables.' The image of the sunflower reminds us of such subjects. Native to America, it has come to symbolize nourishment, strength, longevity, and constancy – characteristics of the Academy's enduring commitment to serve society through creative thinking and action."

According to James Cuno, President and Director of the Art Institute of Chicago, "Ellworth's generosity is matched only by the appropriateness of his gift. The elegance of his lithograph betrays the working of a clear, analytical mind; keen, observant eye; and refined good taste – all qualities shared with the founders of the Academy."

Although known for his colorful large-scale abstract paintings and sculptures, Kelly has consistently returned to nature as the inspiration for his work. He spent forty years creating a rich variety of line drawings of plants, fruits, and flowers, marked by exceptional simplicity and beauty. Last spring, the first exhibition of his complete plant lithographs was held at the Grand Rapids Art Museum; next year, the exhibit will be on tour at the Tate Gallery, St. Ives in Cornwall (January 27-May 7, 2006), the AXA Gallery in New York City (June 7-August 13, 2006), and the Centro Andaluz de Arte Contemporaneo in Seville (September 21, 2006-January 1, 2007).

Kelly's works are in major public and private collections worldwide and have been exhibited extensively in the United States. His sculpture exhibit was shown at the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York in 1982, and a career retrospective exhibit was held at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York in 1996 and traveled to the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, the Tate Gallery, and the Haus der Kunst in Munich.

He has been commissioned to create many art displays, including a mural for UNESCO in Paris in 1969, a sculpture for the city of Barcelona in 1978, and a memorial for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., in 1993. Ellsworth Kelly was elected to the American Academy in 1996.

On behalf of the Officers and Council of the Academy, Executive Officer Leslie Berlowitz expressed her deep appreciation to Kelly, noting "we hope this gift will inspire others to contribute art to the Academy. Ellsworth Kelly has established a new tradition that will enrich our surroundings and our imagination." ■

Ellsworth Kelly
Sunflower II, 2004
One color lithograph
37 x 29 inches (94 x 73.7 cm)
Edition of 60

Visiting Scholars Program

Postdoctoral and Junior Faculty Fellowships

2006–2007

Postmark Deadline: October 20, 2005

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, an international learned society and research institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, invites postdoctoral scholars and nontenured junior faculty to apply for research fellowships for the 2006 – 2007 year.

The Academy is interested in proposals that relate to its current projects in the following program areas: Humanities & Culture, Science & Global Security, Social Policy & American Institutions, and Education. For more information on these studies, please visit the Academy's website (www.amacad.org/projects.aspx). Projects that address American cultural, social, or political issues from the founding period to the present are especially welcome, as are studies that consider developments in America from a multidisciplinary and/or comparative perspective. In conjunction with its 225th anniversary, the Academy has launched a major archival initiative to preserve its historic papers and invites proposals that will draw upon these holdings as well.

Visiting Scholars are expected to participate in conferences, seminars, and events at the Academy while advancing their independent research; they must be in residence during their fellowship year.

Terms of Award: $35,000 stipend for postdoctoral scholars; up to $50,000 for junior faculty (not to exceed one-half of salary).

For details, contact: The Visiting Scholars Program, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-1996; phone: 617-576-5014; fax: 617-576-5050; email: vsp@amacad.org.

Application information is available on the Academy's website at www.amacad.org/visiting.aspx.

Fellows are asked to encourage students and colleagues to apply.

Wellesley and Yale Join the University Affiliates

Wellesley College and Yale University have joined the Academy's consortium of University Affiliates, now numbering 44 institutions. This group of colleges and universities provides support and guidance for Academy research, including the Visiting Scholars Program and a new series of studies on the challenges facing higher education, from scientific literacy to academic freedom. The Academy is grateful to Diana Chapman Walsh of Wellesley, Richard C. Levin of Yale, and all the leaders of the University Affiliates who share a commitment to advance interdisciplinary studies and the work of a promising generation of scholars. We encourage other universities to become part of the consortium. ■

Norton's Woods Conference Center

The Academy welcomes Fellows to consider booking the House in Cambridge for meetings, conferences, and receptions as well as business and personal social gatherings. From its award-winning architectural design to its spacious interior, the House provides an ideal setting for small private meetings or large receptions of up to four hundred guests.

The Norton's Woods facilities include a 250-seat auditorium, conference rooms that can accommodate groups of varying size, three separate dining rooms, a reception atrium and hearth, an advanced audiovisual/communication system, and an expert catering staff.

For more information about the facilities and services available at Norton's Woods, please call 617-576-5026 or email Nikki Fazo at nfazo@amacad.org. For a virtual tour of the building, visit http://www.amacad.org/nortonswoods/tour.aspx. ■

Reception in the Academy's atrium.

Call for Fellows' Recommendations of Candidates

AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF ARTS & SCIENCES

Dear Fellows:

The Academy's Nominating Committee is responsible for preparing the list of candidates for officers, councilors, and members of standing committees. The Committee will draw up the list when it meets in the fall. Our objective is to develop the largest possible pool of candidates, with a special concern for balancing the disciplines, institutions, and geographic areas represented within the Academy.

Among other posts, the position of President of the Academy will be open in 2006. Candidates for the presidency should have an established record of leadership in academia or the professions and should be actively involved in the Academy's work at the time of their nomination.

I encourage you to assist the Nominating Committee by recommending Fellows for the open positions indicated to the right. A list of officers, councilors, and members of standing committees for 2004 – 2005 appears in the Annual Report 2004, mailed to you last fall. Your response should be postmarked no later than October 3, 2005, so that your recommendations can be distributed to the Nominating Committee in advance of its meeting.

The Academy was founded to provide a forum for distinguished scholars and members of the professions to work together, bridging the worlds of research and public life. To enable us to serve society in this way, we need individuals willing to commit their time and energy to our programs and activities. We look forward to receiving your suggestions for filling the positions open in 2006.

Denis Donoghue, *Chair*
Nominating Committee

Governance: Open Positions in 2006

Fellows are asked to submit the names of recommended candidates by October 3, 2005. Please direct suggestions to Denis Donoghue in care of Executive Officer Leslie C. Berlowitz (mail: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; phone: 617-576-5010; fax: 617-576-5055; email: lberlowitz@amacad.org).

OFFICERS

President

Treasurer (Treasurer may serve successive terms)

COUNCILORS

Class II: Biological Sciences

Class IV: Humanities and Arts

REGIONAL CENTER COUNCILORS

Each year, openings occur on the councils of the Midwest and Western Centers. These centers propose and develop activities for Fellows in their areas, subject to the approval of the Academy Council. Nominations of candidates in any class are welcome and will be forwarded to the regional center nominating committees for review.

MEMBERS OF STANDING COMMITTEES

Committee on Membership
All Classes

Nominating Committee
All Classes

© Alan Schein Photography/Corbis; © Ted Spiegel/Corbis

Markets, Morals, and Civic Life

Michael J. Sandel
Introduction by Stanley Hoffmann

This presentation was given at the 1887th Stated Meeting, held at the House of the Academy on February 9, 2005.

Michael J. Sandel is Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of Government at Harvard University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2003.

Stanley Hoffmann is Paul and Catherine Buttenwieser University Professor at Harvard University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1964.

Stanley Hoffmann

It is a great honor for me to introduce my friend and colleague Michael Sandel, who is, in our complicated and sometimes fragmented department, an island of sanity, good humor, good judgment, and extraordinary productivity. He is also an amazing and legendary teacher – a man whose fairness, objectivity, and good sense are unfailing. I have known him for thirty years, and I continue to admire him for everything he has done, which has been really remarkable.

His first publication, based on his thesis, was a critique of John Rawls's liberalism. It is often described by readers as a choice for communitarianism against liberalism, which I think is a misreading. Sandel's critique was a choice of a certain brand of liberalism, one that took into account certain values that did not require it to be only a set of procedures or one that condemned liberalism to be neutral between the good and the bad. It tried to restore a kind of substantive liberalism that had existed before being somewhat abandoned.

Sandel's next book, *Democracy's Discontent*, was both a continuation of that theme and a searching examination of Supreme Court decisions. By enlarging his concerns to what capitalism has done to society and to American beliefs, it was, it seems to me, the springboard for the subject that has interested him in recent years.

It is the subject of tonight's lecture, which focuses on markets, morals, and civic life. Once again, Sandel is concerned with the limits of liberalism and of economic institutions such as capitalism, as well as with the limits that globalization and capitalism should observe – not with what money can buy without too many people objecting, but with what it is that money should not be allowed to buy. The topic falls a bit between the cracks of business school professors, who often hate to raise ethical problems, and economists, who don't always know what ethical problems are!

Michael J. Sandel

My topic tonight is "The Moral Limits of Markets." My question is: Are there some things that should not be bought and sold, and, if so, why? The proliferation of markets in recent years makes this issue difficult to avoid. Consider, for example, recent proposals to establish markets in organs for transplantation, the race among medical entrepreneurs to patent human genes and other life forms, the aggressive marketing of drugs as consumer goods, and the proliferation of for-profit schools, hospitals, and prisons. The rampant commodification, commercialization, and privatization of contemporary life give us reason to reconsider the moral limits of markets: Are there some things that money should not buy?

In order to address this question, I begin with a slightly different question: Are there some things money can't buy? Most people would agree that there are some things that money can't buy. Consider friendship. Suppose you want more friends than you have. Most of us wouldn't think of buying one. Why not? You don't have to be a moral philosopher to answer that question; buying a friend wouldn't work. A hired friend wouldn't be the same as a real one, though he or she might be a helpful therapist (which is akin to a friend, but not the same thing). Somehow, the money that seeks to buy the friendship corrupts it – or at least turns it into something else. So friendship is an example of something that money can't buy.

Take another example that may be close to the heart of this group: the Nobel Prize. Suppose you desperately want a Nobel Prize and decide, failing to get one in the usual way, to try to buy one. It wouldn't work. The Nobel Prize is the kind of thing that money can't buy; likewise the Most Valuable Player

Are there some things that money can't buy?

award of the American League. You could buy the trophy if some winner were willing to sell it to you, but you couldn't buy the award. Money wouldn't work. Why not? In the case of friendship and in the case of the Nobel Prize, the market exchange immediately dissolves the good that you're seeking. The Nobel Prize is an honorific good. If word got out that the prize had been bought, the award would not convey or express the honor that people associate with the real thing.

These fairly obvious cases help us think about the related but different question: Are there some things money can buy, but shouldn't? Consider those goods that people might want and actually be able to purchase, but that raise at least a moral controversy: for example, a kidney or another organ. Some people defend markets in organ sales; others find such markets morally objectionable. Insofar as there is something wrong with buying a kidney through the market, the problem is not, as with the Nobel Prize, that the money somehow dissolves the good. The kidney will work (assuming a good match) regardless of the monetary exchange. So we need some kind of moral analysis in order to determine whether money should or shouldn't buy kidneys.

Another example is baby-selling. Years ago, Judge Richard Posner wrote a controversial article suggesting that perhaps we should consider a market to allocate babies for adoption. Many people hold the view that children should not be subject to market exchange. As in the kidney case but unlike the friendship and Nobel Prize cases, buying a baby does not dissolve the good the buyer seeks to acquire. If there were a market in babies for adoption, people who paid the going price would still acquire a child. Whether such a market is morally objectionable is a further question.

As a way of thinking about what sorts of goods money shouldn't buy, I want to suggest that there may be a connection between the obvious cases, in which the monetary exchange spoils the good being bought, and the controversial cases, in which the good survives the selling, but is arguably degraded, corrupted, or diminished as a result.

We can explore this connection by considering some cases intermediate between the friendship case and the kidney case. If you can't buy friendship, what about tokens of friendship or expressions of personal relations? In China, the Tianjin Apology company performs such a service for money. If you need to apologize to someone – an estranged lover or business partner with whom you've had a falling out – and you can't quite bring yourself to do so in person, you can go to this company, pay a fee, and they will apologize for you. The motto of the company is, "We say sorry for you." A Chinese sociology professor told the *New York Times* that the company responds to the fact that, given the cultural complexity of apologies in China, many people are "apologetically challenged." As described in the *Times*, the company's twenty employees are all middle-aged, college-educated men and women "who dress in somber suits. They are lawyers, social workers, and teachers with 'excellent verbal ability' and significant life experience, who are given additional training in counseling."

Apologies are a good example of an intermediate case. If someone you cared about or someone you were angry with sent you a bought apology, would you be satisfied? It might depend on the circumstances, or perhaps even the cost. Would you consider a very expensive apology more meaningful than a cheap one?

Now consider an intermediate case akin to the Nobel Prize: an honorary degree. One might think that an honorary degree by definition can't be bought, for the same reason one can't buy a Nobel Prize. But some honorary degree recipients are philanthropists who have contributed large sums to the college or university bestowing the honor. Are such degrees bought, in effect, or are they genuinely honorific? It can be ambiguous. If the college's reasons were baldly stated, the transparency would dissolve the good. Suppose the citation at commencement read: "We confer honorary degrees to distinguished scientists and artists for their achievements. But we award you this degree in thanks for the ten million dollars you gave us to build a new library." That probably wouldn't even count as an honorary degree. Of course, citations are never written that way. They speak of public service, philanthropic commitment, and dedication to the university's mission – an honorific vocabulary that blurs the distinction between an

If word got out that the Nobel Prize had been bought, the award would not convey or express the honor that people associate with the real thing.

honorary degree and a bought one. So an honorary degree is an intermediate case.

Similar questions can be asked about the buying and selling of admission to elite universities. Such universities don't hold auctions for admission, at least not explicitly. Harvard and Yale could increase their revenues if they sold seats in the freshman class to the highest bidder. But even if they wanted to maximize revenue, they probably wouldn't auction off all the seats because then the honorific aspect of admission would be washed away. Suppose most of the places were allocated according to merit, but a small number of places were quietly made available – this gets close to actual practice – to "legacy" admits, or to applicants politely described as "development" admits. Several years ago, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that, as it was mounting a capital campaign, Duke University set aside a hundred seats in the freshman class for children of wealthy families capable of donating large amounts to the university. Duke acknowledged the practice and suffered some embarrassment when the story appeared. But the admissions policy apparently did help Duke complete a successful capital campaign that raised two billion dollars. The episode illustrates the double character of college admission – as a form of honor and recognition that money can't buy, but also as a form of access and opportunity that universities can sell, provided they do so discreetly. When admission is known to be bought and sold, the honorific aspect of the good is eroded. This makes it an intermediate case – a good that money can (sometimes) buy but arguably shouldn't.

This analysis of the goods that money apparently can buy but arguably shouldn't directs our attention to one moral objection to certain market exchanges – the objection that money can degrade or corrupt the good at stake. It is important to distinguish this objection from another familiar argument

against the buying and selling of certain goods, an argument that focuses on the coercive aspect of some market relations. The argument from coercion points to the injustice that can arise when people buy and sell things under conditions of severe inequality or dire economic necessity. According to this argument, some market exchanges are objectionable because they aren't really voluntary, or at least not as voluntary as market enthusiasts suggest. For example, an impoverished peasant may agree to sell his kidney or his cornea in order to feed his starving family. We may object to the sale on the grounds that his agreement isn't truly voluntary; he's coerced by the necessities of his situation.

The argument from corruption, by contrast, points to the degrading effect that market valuation has on certain goods and practices. Even where no coercion or inequality is involved, some moral and civic goods are diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for money. For example, if the sale of human body parts is intrinsically degrading, a violation of the sanctity of the human body, kidney sales are wrong for rich and poor alike. The objection would hold even if there were no crushing poverty in the background.

Are there some things money can buy, but shouldn't?

Or consider the two familiar objections to prostitution. Some people argue against prostitution on the grounds that it's rarely, if ever, truly voluntary. They argue that those who sell their bodies for sex are typically coerced, whether by poverty, drug addiction, or other life circumstances. Other people object to prostitution on the grounds that it's intrinsically degrading, a corruption of the moral worth of human sexuality. The degradation objection doesn't depend on tainted consent; it would condemn prostitution even in a society without poverty, even in cases of wealthy prostitutes who like the work and freely choose it.

Each of these objections points to a different moral ideal. The argument from coercion points to the ideal of consent and worries about consent being impaired by the necessity of someone's circumstances. It is not, strictly speaking, an objection to markets as such, only to markets that operate under conditions of inequality severe enough to create coercive bargaining conditions. The argument from coercion offers no grounds for objection to the commodification of goods in a society whose background conditions are fair. The argument from corruption points to a different moral ideal. It appeals not to consent, but to the moral importance of the goods that are said to be degraded by market valuation and exchange. The objection from corruption is intrinsic in the sense that it can't be met by altering the background conditions to make them more equal; it applies under conditions of equality and inequality alike and points to certain intrinsic goods as being somehow diminished or corrupted. We have seen how those two different arguments arise in the cases of organ sales and prostitution.

I would like to suggest that, of the two arguments, the argument from corruption, though more difficult to establish, is more fundamental. Because it appeals to the intrinsic character of certain goods and practices, it can best help us articulate what is troubling about many of the contemporary cases of excessive marketization and commodification.

Consider the debate about contracts for surrogate motherhood. In the case of "Baby M," a childless couple employed a broker to hire a surrogate mother. They signed a contract promising the surrogate $10,000 plus expenses to carry the child to term and to give the newborn baby to the couple. In the end, the surrogate mother chose to keep the child, and the courts had to decide whether to enforce the contract. A lower court held that the baby should be turned over, but the New Jersey Supreme Court, which finally decided the case, stated that the contract was invalid. Drawing on the argument from coercion, it maintained that the contract was not truly voluntary because the surrogate mother lacked full and adequate information. Since she could not have known what it would be like to carry, bear, and then give up a child, the agreement lacked informed consent. But the court also objected to commercial surrogacy on broader grounds that illustrate the argument from corruption: "In a civilized society," the court stated, "there are some things that money cannot buy."

Now why is it that babies should not be bought and sold, even with untainted consent? Underlying the court's reasoning is the notion that we should not regard ourselves as free to assign whatever values we want to the goods we prize. The claim is that certain modes of valuation are appropriate to certain goods. Treating children as commodities degrades them by using them as instruments of profit rather than cherishing them as persons worthy of love and care. Contract pregnancy also degrades women by treating their bodies as factories and by paying them not to bond with the children they bear.

There may be a connection between the obvious cases, in which the monetary exchange spoils the good being bought, and the controversial cases, in which the good survives the selling, but is arguably degraded, corrupted, or diminished as a result.

Elizabeth Anderson advances a compelling version of this argument. "By requiring the surrogate mother to repress whatever parental love she feels for the child," Anderson writes, surrogacy contracts "convert women's labor into a form of alienated labor." The surrogate's labor is alienated "because she must divert it from the end which the social practices of pregnancy rightly promote – an emotional bond with her child."[1]

Anderson's argument brings out a controversial feature of the corruption argument against commodification. To object that market valuation and exchange of a good corrupts its character is to assume that certain things are properly regarded and treated in certain ways. Thus Anderson invokes a certain conception of the proper end of pregnancy and childbearing. To know whether a good should be subject to market exchange, according to this view, we need to know what mode of valuation is fitting or appropriate to that good. This is different

1. Elizabeth S. Anderson, "Is Women's Labor a Commodity?" *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 19 (Winter 1990): 81, 83.

from knowing how much the thing is worth. It involves a qualitative, not just a quantitative judgment.

In controversial cases, of course, people disagree about how to value the goods in question. There are two ways of justifying such judgments – one is to reason by analogy; the other is to reason directly from a certain conception of the good. What would an argument by analogy look like for the surrogacy case? It would begin by asking whether surrogacy is morally analogous to baby-selling, as the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, or whether, as many of my students maintain, it is more like sperm-selling, a commonly accepted practice.

Rather than pursue the argument by analogy, I'd like to explore the argument that proceeds from a certain conception of the good. In order to do so, let's turn to two controversial cases of commodification: military service and voting. I would like to argue that there is reason to limit the role of markets in governing these practices more severely than we are accustomed to do. In each case, an excessive role for markets corrupts an ideal the practices properly express and advance – namely, the ideal of citizenship as the republican tradition conceives it.

According to the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to share in self-rule. This is more than a matter of voting in elections and registering my preferences or interests. On the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to participate in shaping the forces that govern the collective destiny. But in order to do that, and to do it well, it is necessary that citizens possess or come to acquire certain qualities of character, or civic virtues.

The emphasis on civic virtue sets republican political theory apart from two other familiar theories of citizenship. One such theory is interest-group pluralism, which conceives citizens as persons who are free to identify their interests and to vote accordingly. A second theory is the liberal conception of citizenship, which emphasizes toleration and respect for the rights of others. The liberal conception of citizenship allows for the inculcation of certain civic virtues, but only those necessary to liberal principles themselves, such as the virtues of toleration and equal respect. The republican conception of citizenship, by contrast, seeks to cultivate a fuller range of virtues, including a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake, a sense of obligation for one's fellow citizens, a willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the sake of the common good, and the ability to deliberate well about common purposes and ends. With this conception of citizenship in mind, we can now consider how commodification corrupts the good of self-government in two domains of public life.

How should military service be allocated? Traditionally, there are two answers to this question: by conscription or by the labor market. During the Civil War, the Union army was raised by an interesting hybrid of the two. There was a system of conscription by lottery, but those who were called to serve and didn't want to fight could hire a substitute. Andrew Carnegie reportedly hired a substitute for about $300, which was less than he spent in a year on fancy cigars. In the face of protests such as the New York City Draft Riots, Congress eliminated use of the outright market but allowed a commutation fee: you could pay $300 to the government and be exempt from service.

Most people find the Civil War system troubling. They argue that it is unfair for the affluent to hire the less fortunate to fight and die in their place. But if that is an objectionable feature of the Civil War system, what about our all-volunteer army? From the standpoint of market reasoning, the paid, volunteer army is the best alternative, while conscription is the worst. But there are two objections to the volunteer army. One is that, in a society with unequal opportunities, the decision to enlist may not be truly voluntary. If poverty and economic disadvantage is widespread, the choice to serve may simply reflect the lack of alternatives. When Congressman Charles Rangel recently proposed reinstating the draft, he argued that those who fight in the Iraq War are disproportionally drawn from among the lower middle class and particularly from among African Americans. Sociologist Charles Moskos, an advocate of universal national service, points out that in Princeton's class of 1956, from which he graduated, 450 of 750 graduates served in the military, while last year only three of Princeton's thousand graduates served. So it's easy to appreciate the objection that the all-volunteer army is not as voluntary as it seems.

A second objection to letting people buy their way into and out of military service holds that, even in a society where the choice of work did not reflect deep inequalities, military service should not be allocated by the labor market, as if it were just another job. According to this argument, all citizens have an obligation to serve their country. Whether this obligation is best discharged through military or other national service, it is not the sort of thing that people should be free to buy or sell. To turn such service into a commodity – a job for pay – is to corrupt or degrade the sense of civic virtue that properly attends it. A familiar instance of this argument is offered by Rousseau:

> As soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens and they would rather serve with their money than with their persons, the state is not far from its fall. When it is necessary to march out to war, they pay troops and stay at home....In a country that is truly free, the citizens do everything with their own arms and nothing by means of money; so far from paying to be exempted from their duties, they would even pay for the privilege of fulfilling them themselves....I hold enforced labor to be less opposed to liberty than taxes.[2]

Even where no coercion or inequality is involved, some moral and civic goods are diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for money.

Rousseau's argument against commodifying military service is an instance of the argument from corruption. It invokes the republican conception of citizenship. Market advocates might defend the volunteer army by rejecting the republican conception of citizenship, or by denying its relevance to military service. But doesn't the volunteer army as currently practiced implicitly acknowledge certain limits to market principles, limits that derive from a residual commitment to the ideal of republican citizenship?

Consider the difference between the contemporary volunteer army and an army of

2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (1762), Book III, Ch. XV, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1973), 265.

mercenaries. Both pay soldiers to fight. Both entice people to enlist by the promise of pay and other benefits. But if the market is an appropriate way of allocating military service, what is wrong with mercenaries? It might be replied that mercenaries are foreign nationals who fight only for pay, whereas the American volunteer army hires only Americans. But if military service is just another job, why should the employer discriminate in hiring on the basis of nationality? Why shouldn't the U.S. military actively recruit soldiers from among citizens of other countries who want the work and possess the relevant qualifications? Why not create a foreign legion of soldiers from the developing world where wages are low and good jobs are scarce?

The logic of the market could be extended to challenge the notion that armies should be run by the government. Why not subcontract military functions to private enterprise? In fact, the privatization of war is a growing trend. Private corporations play an increasing role in conflicts around the world and form a large part of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

The cases we have considered pose the following challenge to the commodification of military service: If the Civil War system is objectionable on the grounds that it allows people to buy their way out of a civic obligation, isn't the volunteer army objectionable on similar grounds? And if military service is just another job to be allocated by the labor market, is there any principled distinction between the volunteer army and private military forces? All three policies – the Civil War system, the volunteer army, and the mercenary forces – offend the republican conception of citizenship. Our unease in each case is best articulated and justified by the argument from corruption, which presupposes in turn the republican ideal of citizenship.

Finally, consider voting. Nobody advocates the outright purchase and sale of votes. But why is buying and selling votes objectionable? And what are the consequences for commonly accepted electoral practices that are arguably analogous to the buying and selling of votes? What exactly is the moral difference between a Tammany Hall politician who bribes people to vote with cash and Thanksgiving turkeys and a candidate who promises the electorate a tax cut if elected? There are at least three possible answers to this question.

To know whether a good should be subject to market exchange…we need to know what mode of valuation is fitting or appropriate to that good. This is different from knowing how much the thing is worth. It involves a qualitative, not just a quantitative judgment.

First, it might be argued that the tax cut comes from public funds whereas the outright bribe comes from private funds or party coffers. But this makes the tax cut worse; if the voters must be paid off, isn't it better that it be done with private money than with taxpayer dollars? Second, it might be observed that the promise won't be kept, so it won't exert as much influence as an outright bribe. But this argument suggests perversely that the moral superiority of the campaign promise for the tax cut is rooted in the fact that the politician who makes it can't be relied upon to keep his or her word. In any case, if voters are skeptical about whether the promise will be kept, they can simply assign it a discounted value. A promise of a $500 tax cut with a 50 percent chance of being enacted would be worth $250. But this wouldn't make it justifiable. Finally, it might be argued that a campaign promise is public and available to everyone, whereas the bribe is secret and offered only to certain people. But many campaign promises are also targeted at particular groups. In any case, if bribes are wrong just because they're offered to some and not to others, why not universalize them? If there were an open market in votes, then the secrecy would fall away and everybody would be free to buy and sell at the going rate.

The reason none of these distinctions succeeds is that they share the mistaken view that the purpose of democracy is to aggregate people's interests and preferences and translate them into policy. And this brings us back to the fundamental conception of the good bound up with the republican idea of citizenship. According to the interest-based theory of politics, citizens are consumers and politics is economics by other means. But if the consumerist theory of democracy is right, then there is no good reason to prevent or ban the buying and selling of votes. Our reluctance to treat votes as commodities should lead us to question the politics of self-interest so familiar in our time. It should lead us to acknowledge and affirm the civic ideals implicit but largely occluded in contemporary democratic practice.

My argument tonight has been directed mainly against those who think that freedom consists of the voluntary exchanges people make in a market economy, regardless of the unequal background conditions that may prevail. My primary targets are libertarian philosophers and laissez-faire economists. But I also mean to challenge those liberal consent theorists who believe that if only we made society more fair, so that market choices were free rather than coerced, we would no longer have to worry about commodification. Both groups are wrong, because both overlook the dimensions of life that lie beyond consent, in the moral and civic goods that markets do not honor and money cannot buy. ■

Stanley Hoffmann and Michael J. Sandel (Harvard University)

Robert Mann (MIT) and Alan Morse (Brookline, Massachusetts)

Warren Kantrowitz (Brookline, Massachusetts), Bruce Mazlish (MIT), and Gerald Holton (Harvard University)

Lucian Pye, Robert Bishop, and Dick Williams (MIT)



Image © Ralph Adolphs

Neuroeconomics

Colin Camerer

These remarks were given at a campus reception for Fellows and guests at the California Institute of Technology on February 15, 2005.

Colin Camerer is Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics at the California Institute of Technology. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2003.

Neuroeconomics is a rapidly emerging area of study that brings together two very different fields to further understanding of decisions, game theory, and trading in markets. Until recently, economists have been content to treat the human brain as a "black box" and to express what the brain is doing in a "reduced form" mathematical equation. Lacking detail about brain mechanisms, most empirical studies of economic behavior have relied on measuring inputs, like prices, and predicting outputs, like how much people will buy. Now advances in genetics, brain imaging, and other techniques have made it possible to observe detailed processes in the brain better than ever before. The brain scanning that we carry out at the Broad Imaging Center at Caltech shows which parts of the brain are active when people make economic decisions. The results of this research will eventually enable us to replace the simple mathematical ideas that have been used in economics with more neurally detailed descriptions. The approach should also inform neuroscience by expanding the range of cognitive activities that are studied. To illustrate the kinds of experiments we undertake in neuroeconomics, I will describe several research projects conducted with my colleague Ralph Adolphs, Dan Tranel at Iowa, and two intrepid Caltech graduate students, Meghana Bhatt and Ming Hsu.

Let me begin with a few definitions. By economics, I mean precise, very stylized mathematical models of choice under scarcity. With only so much money and only so much time, how do you decide what to do? The trade-offs between goods and money are central, but more interesting are the trade-offs involving time and risk (the focus of one of our current studies, which I will talk about later). In economic theory, we assume that people act as if they can attach a number, called a "utility," to everything they might want, and they choose the goods with the highest utility number.

What gives economic models of aggregate behavior their precision is the concept of equilibrium, a word borrowed from physics. In what we call a "competitive equilibrium," prices adjust until they equalize supply and demand. In game theory, we use the term "equilibrium" in a somewhat different way, to mean accurate (or "rational") expectations. Players are in equilibrium when they have correctly guessed what others are planning to do and are making the best choices given their accurate guesses.

Neuroeconomics uses details of neural mechanisms to inform these ideas in economics of how we make choices under scarcity, and how equilibrium comes about. Neuroscientists are very opportunistic about using different tools: single neuron recording, the animal model, computational models, psychophysical measurement like skin conductance and EEGs, fMRI, and behavior of human patients with brain lesions. These tools enable you to be very precise about how brains might be computing something like a numerical utility. For example, some studies recording single neurons in monkey parietal and frontal cortex areas suggest that utilities are expressed by neural firing rates.

Game theory is a mathematical language for describing strategic interactions among players who choose strategies in order to get the outcomes they like most. Game theory has been applied to everything from biological competition among genes, to international politics where the players are nations. Despite the rapid growth of game theory as an analytical tool at many social levels, we know almost nothing about how the human brain operates when people are thinking strategically in a game. To study this we present people with a game, in the form of a matrix that shows how much two players earn if the row player picks one button representing his choice and the column player picks another button representing her choice (see Figure 1). We have lots of theories about which strategies they might pick, including the idea of equilibrium strategies that dominate most analytical game theory. Many studies show that players can learn to guess correctly what others will do, and

Neuroeconomics is a rapidly emerging area of study that brings together two very different fields to further understanding of decisions, game theory, and trading in markets.

choose equilibrium strategies themselves, but it takes learning for them to do so. So if equilibration takes trial-and-error learning, then when players think about a game for the first time they will probably *not* make equilibrium choices – that is, some players won't guess correctly what others will do. One behavioral theory is that people give up trying to guess what other players will do, and just choose a strategy that gives a high average payoff across all the other player's possible moves. This is called "one-step thinking." "Higher-order" thinkers might guess that other players will choose one-step strategies, and choose strategies that are the best responses to those. In brain circuitry, there is neural activity that may or may not correspond with these hypothesized processes.

In the normal form matrix, each player who is in the fMRI scanner picks a row, and another player, outside the scanner, picks a column. (This design also gives us a chance to see whether the experience of being in the scanner changes their behavior; it does not in our study.) In the example shown in Table 1 (one of the games our subjects actually played), the row player's strategy A is "dominated" by strategy B – that is, regardless of what the column player does, choosing B always gives a higher payoff than choosing A. If you are trying to earn money for yourself, there is no good reason to pick row A, and very few did. What will the column player do? A one-step column player will see that BB gives payoffs of either 86 and 47, while AA gives 41 and 74. The average payoff from BB is higher; so a one-step thinker will choose BB. This is not a bad choice (e.g., the one-step rule will never pick a dominated strategy like A for the row player). The one-step choice of BB is also a common one – 40 percent of the subjects chose it. But a player who chooses BB hasn't figured out that a rational row player will *rarely* choose A. So the idea that BB will pay "either 86 or 47" is wrong – the column player rarely earns the payoff of 86. In fact, if the column player "deletes" strategy A – that is, guesses the row player will never choose it – then the likely payoffs from AA and BB will be 74 and 47, respectively. AA now effectively dominates BB. Thus, in this game, the equilibrium strategies are to choose B, and to choose AA. But choosing AA requires the column player to think the row player will choose rationally.

	Row player payoff		Column player payoff	
	AA	BB	AA	BB
A	21	62	41	86
B	45	74	74	47

Table 1: A two-player "dominance-solvable" matrix game (Bhatt and Camerer, 2005).

The game in Table 1 is the simplest game we studied. Others require two or three steps of deleting dominated strategies one at a time, which requires many steps of iterated thinking. Before this study, we knew nothing about how the brain worked when making guesses about other players' guesses. To find out, the subjects actually perform three tasks for each game: The row player, for example, chooses a row, guesses what the column player will choose, and guesses what the column player will say that *she* – the row player – will choose.

Now think about how the brain might make these computations. Choosing a strategy requires looking at your own numerical payoffs, making a guess at what the other player will do (probably by looking at the other player's payoffs), making calculations of very low or high payoffs, or averages, and so on. If you are thinking strategically, and guessing the other player's choice correctly (i.e., in equilibrium), these same processes will be used to guess what the *other* player will do, by simulating their choice process. That is, if there is general choice circuitry in the brain, then when players are in equilibrium (because they are guessing correctly what others do) there should be a substantial overlap between activity during the task of choosing your own strategy and the task of guessing another player's strategy.

This is precisely what we see. Figure 1 shows areas of the brain that are *differentially* active when the row players made strategy choices, compared to when they made guesses about the column player's choice. The top "slice" of the brain shows that there is very little differential activity between choosing and guessing when they are mathematically in equilibrium (i.e., their guesses are correct); the only extra activity when they are choosing for themselves is in the ventral striatum, an all-purpose anticipated reward area (probably encoding the additional payoff in the choice task). The bottom slice of the brain shows differential activity when they are *not* in equilibrium. Here there is a lot more activity, in dorsolateral [top and side] prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and paracingulate cortex. The fact that there is more activity suggests that when players are not guessing accurately, they are putting more thought into figuring out what to do than into figuring out what the *other* player will do. The figure shows precisely where this extra thought is occurring.



Figure 1: Equilibrium as a state of mind: differences in strategizing and guessing when game players are guessing accurately (in equilibrium, top) or guessing inaccurately (out of equilibrium, bottom) (Bhatt and Camerer, in press).

The point of this study is that when the brain is in equilibrium – which is a purely mathematical restriction on accuracy of beliefs about other players' choices – we can detect it in a pattern of neural activity. So equilibrium

Advances in genetics, brain imaging, and other techniques have made it possible to observe detailed processes in the brain better than ever before.

is not just a behavioral condition in which choices are optimal and beliefs rational; it is also a "state of mind" in a neural sense.

Let me turn to another study involving the question of trust. Large complex economies rely on trust every day. Studies indicate that trust of this sort seems to be highly correlated with economic growth. In Scandinavia, if you ask people whether "in general, people can be trusted," a vast majority say yes. Other countries, such as the Philippines and much of West Africa, are at the low end of the scale – only a small fraction say people can be trusted. Furthermore, the answer to this simple question is strongly correlated with economic growth across countries. So how trust works and how it's cultivated and understood is an important concept in the economy.

My colleagues and I have been analyzing a trust game in collaboration with Read Montague and other researchers at Baylor Medical School. A first player, who we call the investor, starts out with twenty currency units that are converted to actual dollars at the end of the game. (We always pay people actual money because it focuses their attention, and we often use very large sums of money to be sure they are seriously motivated.) Let's say the player invests fourteen units and keeps six. Whatever he invests triples. In this case, fourteen become forty-two, representing the return on a productive investment. The tripled amount rests in the hands of the second player, the trustee, who decides how much to keep and how much to give back. He can keep it all if he wants, so it is like investing in a foreign country with no legal protection against contractual breach.

The amount the first person invests is a measure of how much he expects the trustee to repay. The amount the trustee repays is a measure of trustworthiness. If the trustee repays less than fourteen out of the forty-two that was created by the investment, then the investor's trust did not quite pay. If the two players trusted one another, the original twenty would have become sixty. But if the first player thinks the second player is selfish, there's no reason to trust him.

We've been scanning the brains of two individuals: one at the Broad Imaging Center at Caltech, and the other at the Baylor Medical Center in Houston. They are actually playing with one another through an Internet connection and having their brains scanned as they play. This is the first time in fMRI scanning that anyone has ever taken two brain activity patterns and tried to correlate across them. The fact that the two brain activities could be correlated is not that surprising. For example, as I'm talking, you're listening. Language areas of our brains are both active, so naturally there would be some interesting correlations. However, what we found in our study is that something is going on in the two brains that is distinct from what is going on in one brain at a time. A kind of social brain pattern has occurred. The two brains are generating activity simultaneously in two different regions: a conflict resolution area called the cingulate and an expected reward area called the caudate (also seen in Figure 1). This correlation indicates that the two players are simultaneously thinking about what to do, and what it will pay.

Another interesting question to ask concerns how trust spreads. If one CEO does something terrible, do people think all CEOs do something terrible? Do they associate lack of trust with CEOs in a given state, or with a given skin color, or with an MBA from a particular school? How does trust generalize across social categories? Understanding exactly how this process works is very important for measuring and restoring trust. We know almost nothing about it, but can learn from behavioral experiments and imaging the brain.

Turning to another study, we've been interested in "known unknowns," or what decision theorists call "ambiguity." These are simply choices in which people can take a sure amount of money, or can make a bet on an actual event to win more than the sure amount. A typical event was whether the high temperature in New York on November 7, 2003, was above 50 degrees Fahrenheit. We picked 50 degrees because it is close to the average New York temperature on that day, and thus the players would likely have a fifty-fifty chance of winning the bet. Since the Caltech students in the study know something about temperatures in New York, this was a case of betting with the benefit of a lot of available information, just as an insurance company does when it uses a large sample. In another gamble – the known unknown – the player bets on the temperature in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, which they usually know very little about. Suppose people are often reluctant to bet that Tajikistan was warm on a particular day. In standard decision theory, events have crisp probabilities associated with them, so if you won't bet that Tajikistan was warm, you should believe it was cold and be willing to bet that it was cold. But interestingly, many people are unwilling to bet on *either side* of a low-knowledge ambiguous event. Our interest was the special brain activity occurring when players are evaluating these low-knowledge gambles. Our studies showed that when probabilities are ambiguous, there is additional activity in the amygdala. The amygdala is an area that is important in emotional learning and in expressing "vigilance" in the face of fear or discomfort. It is like a watchdog in the brain that responds rapidly, but rather stupidly, by barking whenever there is a threat. Seeing fearful faces rapidly activates the amygdala; when the amygdala is damaged, a person loses the ability to detect fear in the faces of others.

Despite the rapid growth of game theory as an analytical tool at many social levels, we know almost nothing about how the human brain operates when people are thinking strategically in a game.

In our study, when the player is betting on New York, there's not much fear; the player is just trying to weigh the odds. But when the player is betting on Tajikistan, the amygdala signal warns, "Be careful betting; you don't know anything about it." We see this as a neural way of resolving a longstanding debate in decision theory about the importance and source of "fear of the economic unknown."

Many decision-theorists have argued that you should talk yourself into not worrying about ambiguity. You should say, It's either

When the brain is in equilibrium – which is a purely mathematical restriction on accuracy of beliefs about other players' choices – we can detect it in a pattern of neural activity.

warm in Tajikistan or it's not warm. These are two separate events. If you don't know anything about temperatures there, you should treat it like a coin flip, and you should be just as willing to bet that the temperature is high as you would bet on a coin flip. The amygdala says be careful, we might be making a mistake. Talking yourself into treating these situations like coin flips requires a triumph of logic, probably in the frontal cortex, over the highly evolved "be careful" position that enabled organisms to survive danger for millions of years. Ironically, we identified a group of individuals who were immune toward the fear generated by ambiguity, as decision theory prescribes. They are not brilliant decision-theorists; they are but people with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (just above the eye sockets). The amygdala projects neurally to the orbitofrontal cortex. These brain-damaged people do not receive the normal biological signals that transmit fear of the economic unknown, so they treat bets on Tajikistan like bets on New York. The fact that they behave "rationally" calls into question whether rationality should be defined as adherence to logical axioms (the traditional approach in economics) or as biological adaptation. More broadly, asking and answering questions like these has the potential to link biological and social sciences, which is the great promise of synthetic areas like neuroeconomics. ■

David Baltimore and Colin Camerer (California Institute of Technology)

Louis W. Cabot (Cabot-Wellington, LLC), Margo Marshak (California Institute of Technology), and Colin Camerer

John O. Ledyard, John D. Roberts, Herbert Bishop Keller, Rudolph Arthur Marcus, Paul C. Jennings, and John D. Baldeschwieler (California Institute of Technology)

© Morningside-heights.net

Universities as Urban Planners

E. John Rosenwald, Jr., Robert Campbell, James Stewart Polshek, Omar Blaik, and Lee C. Bollinger

This presentation was given at the 1888th Stated Meeting, held in New York on February 28, 2005.

E. John Rosenwald, Jr. is Vice Chairman and Senior Managing Director at Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2001 and is a member of the Academy Trust.

Robert Campbell is an architect and a writer. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993.

James Stewart Polshek is Founder and Senior Design Principal of Polshek Partnership Architects LLP. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2002.

Omar Blaik is Senior Vice President of Facilities and Real Estate Services at the University of Pennsylvania.

Lee C. Bollinger is President of Columbia University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1992.

E. John Rosenwald, Jr.

The role of universities as city planners is a critical issue for all of us concerned with the relation between academic institutions and their neighboring communities. In addition to my day job at Bear Stearns, where I've been for the last fifty-one years, I've had the privilege of serving on the boards of a number of educational and cultural institutions, including New York University, Carnegie Hall, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and, my alma mater, Dartmouth College. All of these institutions have physical facilities and, in some cases, large, sprawling campuses. All face the complex set of challenges that are posed by the need to grow and expand while maintaining harmony with their neighbors and their neighborhoods. Many of us have been involved on one side or the other of the inevitable growth pangs of an institution and its host community. Of course, every case is unique. But are there some overarching principles that govern how universities and other large, nonprofit landholders manage their growth?

The Academy's interest in the question of universities as urban planners demonstrates its concern with topics that call upon the expertise, experiences, and insights of individuals from many fields. As a businessman with a deep interest in the arts, higher education, and public policy, I believe that programs like this one exemplify the thoughtful, cross-disciplinary exploration of subjects at which the Academy excels.

Robert Campbell

As a preface for our discussion, I want to take a brief look at the city planning profession. The profession flourished in the 1960s and early 1970s in many cities, but it existed largely for the purpose of administering an influx of federal urban renewal funds. Today city planning agencies are in decline, not only because of decreased federal and municipal spending but also, in my view, because of a loss of faith in the ability of people to plan better cities.

To some degree, New York is an exception. Several major planning initiatives are in progress: the far West Side, the Brooklyn piers and waterfronts, and the Second Avenue subway, to name a few.

But in most cities, planners are no longer proactive. Rather than take the lead, they often can do no more than look for ways to spin off public benefits from private initiative. Thus they may say to a developer, "You can have ten more stories than the zoning allows, as long as you build a school or a park in the neighborhood." Fan Pier, a beautiful piece of land on Boston harbor, is a case in point. Some years ago the city said to potential developers, "You may build a generous amount, but you will also have to build all the streets and maintain them forever; put in all the utilities and maintain them forever; construct underground parking and maintain it forever; and build and maintain the parks." In the past, the municipality would have done most or all of these things. Given such constraints and conditions, a private developer finds it difficult to make a profit – and so far no one has volunteered.

Thus there is a planning vacuum. My hypothesis is that universities have moved into this vacuum by becoming *de facto* planners. They are the dukes, the "Bedford Estates" of our time, planning whole chunks of the city much as Bloomsbury was planned in the eighteenth century.

Universities are acting as planners in two entirely different ways. Some are expanding into new territory and redeveloping large pieces of land; for example, Columbia is growing north into Manhattanville, and Harvard is growing across the Charles River into the neighborhood of Allston in Boston. Manhattanville, a one-time fishing village, occupies a low site on the Hudson River, a valley between the bluffs of Morningside Heights to

In most cities, planners are no longer proactive. Rather than take the lead, they often can do no more than look for ways to spin off public benefits from private initiative.

the south and Hamilton Heights to the north. Now inhabited by only seventy people, at least legally, it has been used by the City as a dumping ground for infrastructure. Now it offers new opportunities for Columbia.

The impact of universities can be summarized by the fact that Columbia has the least land area per student of any of the Ivy League colleges, yet it is already the third largest landowner in New York City, after NYU and the Catholic Church. We'll learn more about Columbia's plans from President Bollinger.

At the same time, other universities are acting as planners not by expanding but rather by reconfiguring their surroundings. The University of Pennsylvania and Yale, for example, some years ago found themselves situated in the midst of depressed and disinvested neighborhoods, neighborhoods that were beginning to affect each university's ability to attract faculty and undergraduates. In the case of Penn, the neighborhood had deteriorated so badly that it was literally felt that the university might not survive. Both universities responded by undertaking joint initiatives with local groups, in order to upgrade the quality of city life for both university and nonaffiliated residents.

We can take Penn as an example of the importance of universities in today's urban economy. Penn is the largest employer in Philadelphia. It imports raw material in the form of eighteen-year-old minds and bodies, and four years later ejects a finished product that is ready for the market. It has, thus, replaced traditional industry with a new kind of industry. We'll hear more about Penn's planning from Vice President Blaik.

Of course, there is an overlap in these cases: Columbia is very much concerned about its immediate neighborhood, and Penn has acquired a large piece of land for future development. Nonetheless, there are two prototypes – the university aiming to expand, and the university aiming to regenerate its surrounding area – and they provide a framework for our discussion.

James Stewart Polshek

As practicing architects, my colleagues and I have, in the past thirty years, worked with some forty institutions of higher education, both as planners and as designers. Speaking on this topic makes me feel a bit like a war correspondent who's been asked to comment publicly about various world powers, some of which hold his children as hostages. This crude metaphor refers to my thirty years of complex professional relationships with research universities, three of which I shall speak of in some detail.

Given this experience, and in particular having served as a dean for fifteen years at Columbia, I've seen both sides of the challenges faced by institutions attempting to expand or to replace obsolete buildings. Whether on the perimeter of a campus or in a new precinct, a number of often conflicting elements have to be reconciled: alumni memory, and its implications for the development office; institutional history; public identity (which is related to the question of memory); student and faculty aspirations; and, of course, trustee fiduciary responsibility. Finally, there are the local communities and the special interest groups that represent them. This last challenge hardly existed before the late 1960s, but it is now a major political factor.

I demonstrate some of these issues by reference to several academic institutions. First, Columbia with its turn-of-the-century classically ordered campus by the distinguished firm of McKim, Mead, and White. But over the course of a hundred years, the campus grew and expanded and not always benignly. As with many other universities, particularly in the 1960s, Columbia made some avoidable planning and architectural errors. East of Amsterdam Avenue, it's not difficult to see what those mistakes were. I refer here, specifically, to the School of International and Public Affairs and the Law School. Having made a significant addition to the latter building, I hope we have demonstrated that it is possible to heal a retrograde structure's deficits.

Columbia, New York University (with its "accidental" campus), and other similar urban campuses such as the University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, and Harvard University historically failed to recognize the interdependence of community and university. Their acts of indiscriminate expansion created a negative memory bank that affects decisions even in the relatively enlightened planning environment of today.

A very different example of a university's relationship to both its internal and external community is the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. Our firm was selected to design a major expansion of the campus to serve the College of Arts and Sciences. Here there exist internal organizational complexities that are both statutory and emotional. Thomas Jefferson, in creating the university, established a formal Board of Visitors that is appointed by the Governor. One of their obligations is to approve the design of new buildings and expansion plans. This board, once purely honorific, has in recent years become more active in assuring that the Jeffersonian tradition is being respected and "replicated." A former member of the Board of Visitors stated in a meeting at which I was present something close to the following: "I don't care what you fellas do on the insides of the buildings but they better be pure Jefferson on the outside!" I assumed that such a threat would soon be forgotten and that we would be spared from confronting the Hobson's choice between vacuous imitation or resignation from the commission. But the Board of Visitors is only one of the power centers that is concerned with image. Another is the Office of the President. Here, there is a sophisticated understanding of design, but there is also great pressure to raise money for the university – often from alumni who see themselves as protectors of UVA's "Jeffersonian" traditions. There is also a College Foundation – charged with financially supporting the Arts & Sciences, the Dean's office, the University Architect whose mandate is the protection of the physical integrity of the campus, the Facilities Office concerned with budgetary and schedule issues, the State Office of Historic Preservation, and the naturally self-interested adjacent residential neighborhoods.

The presence of a burgeoning health-science complex at UVA represents a further complication. These various stakeholders and self-appointed guardians do not always share a common point of view, nor should they be expected to. Nevertheless they must develop sound working relationships if the University is to expand progressively into the twenty-first century without depending

Clearly, the great research universities of this country have an opportunity and, I believe, an obligation to themselves and to their surrounding communities to harmonize planning processes and consequent architectural realizations.

upon retrograde architectural pastiche. Indeed, even Jefferson was concerned about this. In 1810, in a letter to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson stated, "I am not an advocate for frequent changes in law and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors."

Fortunately, at many universities, there are promising signs of greater cooperation among their different schools and an increased recognition that excellence in architecture is achievable in a university context. Health care is one aspect of UVA's expansion challenge that it holds in common with Columbia, NYU, the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, Stanford, and many others. For a long time, there were two worlds on these college campuses: the undergraduate and graduate schools on the one hand, and the medical school on the other. Often the one did not inform the other of its plans. When I was Dean at Columbia, this was certainly the case. The Morningside campus and Presbyterian Hospital uptown were separate in every way. Now at a time when the expansion of health-care facilities is increasing exponentially there is an urgent need for planning processes that will recognize the environmental and intellectual interdependence of all disciplines. In each of the schools noted there have been positive steps that recognize this.

Another encouraging development is the role of the arts in both undergraduate and graduate education as catalysts for ideas about and responsibility for rational planning and the sponsorship of progressive design. Here I can point to the University of North Carolina, Stanford University, and Yale University, where we are currently expanding arts facilities in areas on the edge of the campus precincts. In these cases, the Chancellor at UNC, the President at Stanford, the President of Yale, and the former President of Stanford see the performing and visual arts as magnets that can attract students in medicine, business, and law. The arts initiatives of these three less urban universities also are intended to attract members of local communities as well as tourists. Here lies the opportunity to open what once were closed intellectual sanctuaries to a broad culture-consuming public.

Clearly, the great research universities of this country have an opportunity and, I believe, an obligation to themselves and to their surrounding communities to harmonize planning processes and consequent architectural realizations. Hopefully, these efforts can become models for government initiatives as well.

Omar Blaik

Today, as we talk about universities as planners, community builders, and economic drivers, we must address several questions that pertain to the topic:

- What is the difference between campus planning and urban planning?
- How can you integrate community development with institutional processes?
- If you accept the proposition that universities should engage with their surroundings, how do outside constituents, such as a neighboring community, contribute to a process of strategic planning on campuses that is inherently internal and bureaucratic?
- Lastly and most importantly, can urban universities succeed without engaging in comprehensive urban planning for both the campus and the community?

Let me first give you some context. The University of Pennsylvania was founded on the principle of teaching what is useful and what is ornamental, on integrating undergraduate education with professional graduate studies, with an emphasis on both theory and practice. Penn is unique in that it is one of a handful of large urban universities in one of the largest cities in America. It experienced its largest expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, during which six million square feet were added. Federal urban renewal programs facilitated and financed most of this growth. Through eminent domain, the Redevelopment Authority acquired and then demolished many residential and commercial city blocks to accommodate Penn's expansion. Having destroyed the fine urban fabric around it, Penn proceeded to physically expand with massive, institutional, super-block-like development.

The institution that promoted the values of service, engagement, and integration found itself physically insular and detached. The physical disconnection from its surroundings eventually caught up with Penn, as the neighborhood deteriorated and started a downward cycle that threatened its academic status and risked its core mission. The cycle is all too familiar to many cities: homes were abandoned, services were cut, residents migrated to suburbs, crime became rampant, and streets were left unattended. In short it was a cycle of divestment. It reached a new low when a Penn graduate student and a professor became victims back in the mid 1990s.

A crisis instigated a rethinking. A new leadership took the helm and decided that Penn must adjust its attitude toward the city and neighboring communities and embarked on a unique integrated approach toward community revitalization known as the West Philadelphia Initiatives. It encompassed five distinct strategies:

Clean and safe: Penn would increase the size of its police force and would create a special services district devoted to public space maintenance and safety.

Homeownership: Penn would provide incentives to its employees to purchase homes, or improve homes, in the adjacent neighborhood, and today more than four hundred faculty and staff have moved into the community.

Commercial development: Penn would convert its land at the edge of campus into lively retail and mixed-use space, mitigating the invisible walls of the campus border by adding three hundred thousand square feet of retail and over forty new businesses serving both the campus and the community.

Economic inclusion: Penn would create a "Buy West Philadelphia" program that supported local businesses in the trade and professional services, adding approximately $50 million to the local economy, resulting in higher employment and increased economic stability.

Investing in public education: Penn would partner with the Philadelphia School District to construct a new public elementary neighborhood school and then support it through curriculum and resources.

Most of these strategies can be traced back to community demands discussed and debated over the prior decade. Rather than starting from scratch, Penn listened to the community to understand its needs, aspirations, and concerns.

These initiatives were formulated at a time when Penn was beginning 3.5 million square feet of newly planned construction representing more than $1.5 billion in capital investment. The convergence of the initiatives with an intensive capital program elevated the effort from community development to a full-fledged urban plan. The campus-built environment and its surroundings represented the fabric on which Penn knit these initiatives together.

By engaging in community and urban planning, universities are preserving the values of our democracy.

We took on the challenge of creating a campus plan that would guide growth and development for twenty-five years. After a two-year process that included participation from our faculty, students, staff, and community, we established a vision for creating a coherent identity for the entire campus by reintegrating the campus with the city of Philadelphia – its streets, sidewalks, and residents. The vision and values from our West Philadelphia Initiative and Campus Development Plan began to converge and something remarkable happened. We realized that updating the campus did not require alienating the community. In fact, integrating the West Philadelphia Initiative and our campus plan improved the community, and an improved community would no doubt enhance the quality of life on campus.

If the sins of our past were building walls, now we had the chance at redemption, to build again, but this time through integration and transparency reflected in architecture, prudent land use planning, and smart development. The goal of integration has been met and is spreading energy into the community through art galleries, theater, community centers, locally owned retail, and economic development. The new cafes and restaurants are bustling; the newly designed pocket parks are filled with people, live music, and pick-up soccer games. Our built environment today is one of the key factors in our ability to recruit and retain a world-class faculty and student body. Penn finally reclaimed, in a physical way, the values to which we as an institution had always aspired.

In conclusion, I would like to answer one question I raised earlier: Can universities, especially urban ones, remove themselves from the exercise of community and urban planning? The answer is no: this is a core mission. Cities large and small are dependent on higher education and the health-care industries as economic engines. Our metropolitan areas depend on the economic, job creation, and intellectual capital of such institutions. In a post – 9/11 society, cities, with their mixed population and rich ethnic and cultural heritage, are our window to the world. By engaging in community and urban planning, universities are preserving the values of our democracy.

Lee C. Bollinger

Today there are two primary forces at work with respect to the role of universities in city planning. The first is that universities, which by any measure are extraordinarily successful institutions, have a kind of imperative for growth. As knowledge expands, so does the need for space. And the second is that communities are actually interested in being near universities and in growing with them. Over the past fifty years, these two converging forces have brought about striking changes in our universities and our cities.

Let's begin with universities and with Columbia University in particular. Columbia just celebrated its 250th anniversary. There are few institutions that have been in existence that long. But, equally remarkable, is the steady expansion of the university over that period of time, especially in the last century. One hundred years ago Columbia had four thousand students; today the number is twenty-two thousand students and it's not unthinkable that a century from now it could be double or triple that number. The expansion of any single major American university is also matched by the increase in the number of universities. The University of California at San Diego did not even exist as a university until the 1960s and is now one of the very fine universities of the country. The fact is that the growth in knowledge, together with the growing interest in knowledge, has produced a need for physical space as a kind of imperative. As a working rule, the experience of the last century shows an increase of one to two million new square feet every decade.

Universities have a kind of imperative for growth. As knowledge expands, so does the need for space.

These forces obviously can have an impact on communities that also want to grow. For needy communities, people naturally look to universities for help and assistance, since over the past twenty years we have had less government action focused on our inner cities. In actual fact, universities have offered extraordinary, if often unheralded, services to their surrounding neighbors. In the case of health care, Columbia runs Harlem Hospital as well as the major medical facilities in Washington Heights. We help provide legal services, business counseling, and urban planning. Many universities probably have their own police force, either deputized or not, which helps keep communities safe. All this is in addition to the contribution universities make to create a stimulating environment in which to live and work.

This has not always been the state of affairs. Many will recall the demonstrations that occurred in the wake of Columbia's plan to build a gymnasium on public parkland in the late 1960s. To my mind this controversy was one of many that represented a collision between a Robert Moses view of city planning and a Jane Jacobs effort to uphold citizen rights and control over the environment. Since then, much has been done on all sides to ameliorate the sources of tensions and enhance the chances for mutual benefits from growth.

What does this mean, practically, for our current plans for a new campus just north of the famous McKim, Mead, and White campus on Morningside Heights? There are many answers to that question but here are a few: Unlike the brick and stone of a McKim, Mead, and White design, today's world calls for glass, transparency, and color. It is not acceptable to build, literally or figuratively, a gate through which community people must enter; you need open streets, setbacks with vistas, retail shops to draw in the community, and a quadrangle that is welcoming to all. Everything must be worked out in detail to reflect a campus working with a community.

It remains to be seen whether we can create this kind of "university city." At least two major questions will need to be answered over time: First, can we incorporate community and city planning and still retain the sense of a campus, a place dedicated to students and faculty? Second, will we inevitably disappoint communities by not being able to fulfill their hopes and expectations? Our answers to these questions will determine how effectively universities can serve their own needs *and* those of surrounding communities. Whatever the outcome, it is a new historical moment. ■

Omar Blaik (University of Pennsylvania) and James Stewart Polshek (Polshek Partnership Architects LLP)

E. John Rosenwald, Jr. (Bear Stearns Companies, Inc.) and Lee C. Bollinger (Columbia University)

William T. Golden (New York, New York) and Joel E. Cohen (Rockefeller and Columbia Universities)



Robert Campbell (Cambridge, Massachusetts), John Brademas (New York University), and Conrad Kenneth Harper (Simpson Thacher & Bartlett)

Louis Boulanger, "King Lear and the Fool in the Storm," 1836, oil on canvas. Photo credit: Réunion des Musées Nationaux/Art Resource, NY

S. T. Lee Lecture in the Humanities: Images of Power in Shakespeare

Stephen Greenblatt
Introduction by Denis Donoghue

This presentation, the second annual S. T. Lee Lecture in the Humanities, was given at the 1889th Stated Meeting, held at the House of the Academy on March 9, 2005. An excerpt from Stephen Greenblatt's talk follows Denis Donoghue's introduction.

With appreciation to the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) for its support of the S. T. Lee Lecture in the Humanities and other humanities activities and research at the American Academy. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in these lectures, publications, humanities activities, and research projects do not necessarily represent those of the NEH.

Stephen Greenblatt is Cogan University Professor of the Humanities at Harvard University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1987.

Denis Donoghue, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1983, is University Professor and Henry James Professor of English and American Letters at New York University.

Denis Donoghue

I deem it an honor to introduce Stephen Greenblatt on the occasion of his giving the second annual S. T. Lee Lecture in the Humanities. He is the Cogan University Professor of the Humanities at Harvard University. He is also the author of several fundamental studies of Renaissance English literature – or rather of the literature we are now admonished to call Early Modern. The central figure in this literature is Shakespeare, whom Professor Greenblatt sees in diverse relations to Sir Thomas More, John Donne, Sir Walter Raleigh, and other writers. As if this were not enough, Professor Greenblatt is the chief scholar in what is called the New Historicism.

A few weeks ago I read a book I should have read when it was published in 2000, *Practicing New Historicism*, by Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt. I read the book in the hope of discovering the theory that issued in such practice. As you know, for the past twenty or thirty years, students of the humanities have been preoccupied with – or beset by – what we are accustomed to call Theory. At various times in this period, Theory has manifested itself under other names, notably Structuralism, post-Structuralism, and Deconstruction. Adepts of these theories have also been the most vigorous combatants in what some have designated as the Culture Wars. It is my understanding that none of the combatants can claim victory; on the other hand, none has been compelled to admit defeat. Most of them appear to have withdrawn into an aggrieved state of silence, either because of exhaustion or because their particular war has come to seem, even to themselves, hardly worth the cost in sweat and acrimony.

The only remark I would make about Structuralism, post-Structuralism, and Deconstruction on this occasion is that they obliged their adepts to become amateur philosophers and amateur linguists, or at least to maintain the semblance of a relation to those disciplines, a semblance one might devise by reading selected passages from Nietzsche, Saussure, Husserl, and Heidegger. Insofar as I tried to keep up with my more athletic colleagues during those years, I often find myself recalling the passage in *Sincerity and Authenticity* in which Lionel Trilling said that it was "characteristic of the intellectual life of our culture that it fosters a form of assent which does not involve actual credence" (Lionel Trilling,

Sincerity and Authenticity [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973], 171). I assume that assent in this distinction is merely notional, a willingness to entertain a set of notions without undertaking to hold them as values, to live by them, or otherwise to take them seriously. Credence is a commitment.

The book I mentioned, *Practicing New Historicism*, turned out to be an occult pleasure. For one thing, it was impossible to discover whose voice I was listening to at any moment, Catherine Gallagher's or Stephen Greenblatt's. That was no doubt the intention of the authors, dual authorship being a piquancy of the book, and ventriloquism a method of holding the reader's bewildered attention. I was especially intrigued by the passage in which someone – either Professor Gallagher or Professor Greenblatt – said:

> Our pleasure in Hamlet's vividness . . . comes from knowing – and marveling – that he is an invention. An invention, moreover, with a strangely diffuse source, for the relative obscurity of Shakespeare's life, the scantiness of his biography, even the tenacity of crackpot theories about his real identity have made him a figure for both the ineffability of individual genius and the creativity of the species as a whole. (Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, *Practicing New Historicism* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000], 168)

Reading that book, I felt that it would make an interesting difference to my experience of it if I were to take those sentences as Professor Gallagher's rather than Professor Greenblatt's, or the other way around. The fact, further, that I could deduce no developed theory to sustain the scholarly practices was also an evident intention of the authors. The New Historicism was apparently meant to be a practice exempt from the consequences of a theory. How it differed otherwise from the old Historicism – or from the versions of Historicism that were disputed thirty or forty years ago – was hard to see. The several chapters differed in their procedures from what we call "history of ideas," but in ways not at all easy to describe. Readers of the book are not required to become amateur philosophers or linguists, but to open their minds to the bearing of an irregular or unofficial history upon the poetic, fictive, or dramatic forms being attended to. It is not the kind of history in which historians find themselves saying "And now we come to 1066."

When I read *Will in the World*, his biography of Shakespeare, I wondered whether Professor Greenblatt had taken a vacation from the obligations of the New Historicism to write a book in the best sense popular. But I don't think he has. The book is not a straightforward biography, if we accept that there is such a thing. It is a clarification of the cultural practices which an actor-dramatist, William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon, negotiated in London and by which in a few years he turned himself into the extraordinary institution we call Shakespeare. The book by Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, *Practicing New Historicism*, speaks of cultural practices as texts to be studied warily and perhaps skeptically, and again of the New Historicists as choosing for concentrated attention what Ezra Pound called "luminous detail." How Professor Greenblatt chooses such detail depends, of course, on his remarkable tact and intuition.

It is with italicized pleasure that I invite Professor Greenblatt to deliver the S. T. Lee Lecture in the Humanities: "Images of Power in Shakespeare."

Stephen Greenblatt

. . . in Shakespeare *no* character with a strong desire to govern has an ethically adequate object. This is most obviously true of Shakespearean villains – the Macbeths, the megalomaniac Richard III, the vengeful Tamora in *Titus Andronicus*, the bastard Edmund (along with the ghastly Goneril, Regan, and Cornwall), and the like – but it is also, more surprisingly true of Joan of Arc, on a mission to liberate France but actually, as Shakespeare depicts her, in the service of demons, or Julius Caesar, caught up in his own cult of personality and poised to destroy the tottering liberties of Rome. The conspirators who assassinate Caesar do perhaps adhere to a moral principle: "I was born as free as Caesar," Cassius tells Brutus; "so were you" (1.2.99).* But it is not clear that they themselves have the will to govern; after all, Brutus makes clear in his oration that is precisely the manifestation of this will in Caesar that prompted his murder:

. . . in Shakespeare no character with a strong desire to govern has an ethically adequate object. This is most obviously true of Shakespearean villains.

> As Caesar loved me, I weep for him. As he was fortunate, I rejoice at it. As he was valiant, I honour him. But as he was ambitious, I slew him. (3.2.23 – 25)

If the conspirators do aim to wield power in the newly restored Roman republic, that aim, as the play shows, is doomed by their own internal disagreements and their fatal errors of judgment. At the close the triumphant Antony briefly pays homage to what he calls Brutus' "general honest thought," that is, his ethical motivation –

> All the conspirators save only he
> Did that they did in envy of great Caesar.
> He only in a general honest thought
> And common good to all made one of them. (5.5.68 – 71) –

before he and Octavius turn to the serious business of carving up the Roman state.

Even victorious Henry V – Shakespeare's most charismatic hero – does not substantially alter the plays' overarching skepticism about the ethics of wielding authority. To be sure, in *1 Henry IV*, Shakespeare depicts Prince Hal as already planning his moral "reformation," but the terms betray moral confusion:

> So when this loose behaviour I throw off
> And pay the debt I never promisèd,
> By how much better than my word I am,
> By so much shall I falsify men's hopes;
> And like bright metal on a sullen ground,
> My reformation, glitt'ring o'er my fault,
> Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes
> Than that which hath no foil to set it off.
> I'll so offend to make offence a skill,
> Redeeming time when men think least I will. (1.2.186 – 195)

This is redemption difficult to distinguish from the betrayal of friends and the cynical manipulation of the public.

* Parenthetical references refer to act, scene, and line.

It is those who attempt to pull back from power who fascinated Shakespeare at least as much as those who strive to exercise it.

When Hal becomes king, he makes good on his promise to throw off his old cronies, but he himself is shown to have been cunningly manipulated by cynical prelates in his court and to have launched the invasion of France on the flimsiest of pretexts. No one is more aware than he that there is something deeply flawed in his whole possession and wielding of power, and in a strange speech on the eve of the battle of Agincourt, he queasily negotiates a settlement with God.

> Not today, O Lord,
> O not today, think not upon the fault
> My father made in compassing the crown . . .
> Five hundred poor have I in yearly pay
> Who twice a day their withered hands hold up
> Toward heaven to pardon blood . . .
> More will I do.
> Though all that I can do is nothing worth,
> Since that my penitence comes after ill.

Evidently God is at least temporarily won over – at the end of the play Henry proclaims the death penalty for anyone who denies that the victory was God's alone – but, as the epilogue makes clear, the king's son and successor soon lost everything that his father had won. And the irony is that this son, Henry VI, is virtually the only Shakespearean ruler with a high-minded, ethical goal: a deeply religious man, he is passionately committed to bringing peace among his fractious, violent, and blindly ambitious nobles. Unfortunately, this pious king has no skills at governance whatever. The nobles easily destroy him and plunge the realm into a bloody civil war.

If one wants to find genuine skills at governance in Shakespeare, they are most attractively on display in Claudius, the fratricidal usurper in *Hamlet*. The treatise on the ethics of authority that was most esteemed in Shakespeare's time, Cicero's *De officiis*, argued strenuously that expediency is always inseparable from moral rectitude. As a schoolboy Shakespeare had certainly read *De officiis*, but the playwright went out of his way to demonstrate the opposite, by showing the wily Claudius's remarkable sure-footedness in the con- duct of foreign policy:

> Thus much the business is: we have here writ
> To Norway, uncle of young Fortinbras,
> Who, impotent and bed-rid, scarcely hears
> Of this his nephew's purpose, – to suppress
> His further gait herein; in that the levies,
> The lists and full proportions, are all made
> Out of his subject: and we here dispatch
> You, good Cornelius, and you, Voltimand,
> For bearers of this greeting to old Norway;
> Giving to you no further personal power
> To business with the king, more than the scope
> Of these delated articles allow.
> Farewell, and let your haste commend your duty.

This is the real voice of authority in Shakespeare: business-like, confident, decisive, careful, and politically astute. And it is, of course, the voice of a murderer, the festering source of all that is rotten in the state of Denmark.

It is those who attempt to pull back from power who fascinated Shakespeare at least as much as those who strive to exercise it: the spoiled dreamer, Richard II, who seems to embrace his fall from the throne, the love-crazed Antony who prefers embracing Cleopatra to ruling the world, Coriolanus who cannot abide the ordinary rituals of political life, and old Lear who hopes

> To shake all cares and business from our age;
> Conferring them on younger strengths, while we
> Unburthen'd crawl toward death.

What all of these very different characters have in common – and we could add Duke Vincentio in *Measure for Measure* and Prospero in *The Tempest* – is the desire to escape from the burdens of governance. And in each case and every case, the desire leads to disaster.

For if Shakespeare was deeply drawn to those who want to walk away from positions of authority, he was at the same time convinced that this attempt is doomed. Power exists to be exercised in the world; it will not go away, if you close your eyes and dream of escaping into your study or your lover's arms or your daughter's house. It will simply be seized by someone else, someone probably more coldly efficient than you are and still further away from an ethically adequate object: Bolingbroke, Octavius Caesar, Edmond, Angelo, Prospero's usurping brother Antonio.

"Rapt in secret studies," Prospero loses his dukedom, but, even in exile, he does not escape the authority to which he was culpably indifferent. Instead he finds himself, together with his daughter, on an island that serves as a kind of experimental space for testing the ethics of authority. Prospero possesses many of the princely virtues that the Renaissance prized, but the results of the experiment are at best deeply ambiguous: one of the island's native inhabitants is liberated only to be forced into compulsory servitude; the other is educated only to be enslaved. Prospero does make one crucial ethical breakthrough:

It would be possible, I believe, to argue that Shakespeare's pessimism was the consequence of the political defects of his age.

though he has his hated brother and his other enemies in his absolute power, he chooses not to exact vengeance upon them. Instead he simply takes back the dukedom he had lost twelve years earlier and returns to the city from which he had been exiled.

It would be possible, I believe, to argue that Shakespeare's pessimism was the consequence of the political defects of his age. The absence of any conception of democratic institutions and the rule of a hereditary monarch with absolutist pretensions left little or no room to formulate an ethical object for secular ambition. Yet Shakespeare's own skepticism seemed to extend to the popular voice, so ironically treated in *Julius Caesar* and *Coriolanus*. That is, when he tried to imagine electioneering, voting, and representation, he conjured up situations in which people, manipulated by wealthy and fathomlessly cynical politicians, were repeatedly induced to act against their own interests. Perhaps the manifest power of Shakespeare's work in our own times suggests that his skepticism has some continuing relevance.

Rule in Shakespeare is the fate of those who have been born to it. It is the fate of those as well who have been driven to exercise it out of desperation, forced, like Richmond in *Richard*

III, Edgar in *Lear*, or Malcolm in *Macbeth*, to confront an evil so appalling that they have no other choice but to act. A relatively small number of other characters, generally born in the proximity of power but not its direct heirs, actively seek to seize the reins of government, and a few of these are ruthless or lucky enough to be successful, but Shakespeare inevitably depicts them as eventually broken by the burden they have shouldered. Perhaps this was for him a peculiar form of consolation or hope.

Governance, as Shakespeare imagines it, is an immense weight whose great emblem is the insomnia that afflicts the competent, tough-minded usurper Bolinbroke, after he has become Henry IV:

> O sleep, O gentle sleep,
> Nature's soft nurse, how have I frighted thee,
> That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down
> And steep my senses in forgetfulness? . . .
> Wilt thou upon the high and giddy mast
> Seal up the ship-boy's eyes, and rock his brains
> In cradle of the rude imperious surge . . .?
> Canst thou, O partial sleep, give thy repose
> To the wet sea-boy in an hour so rude,
> And in the calmest and most stillest night,
> With all appliances and means to boot,
> Deny it to a king? Then happy low, lie down.
> Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.
> (2 H 4 3.1.5 – 31) ■

Bruno Coppi and Emilio Bizzi (MIT)

Robert Pinsky (Boston University) and William McFeely (University of Georgia)

Vice President Louis W. Cabot (Cabot-Wellington, LLC), Denis Donoghue (New York University), and Stephen Greenblatt (Harvard University)

A Poetry Reading by Robert Pinsky

Introduction by Richard Wendorf

This presentation was given at the 1890th Stated Meeting of the Academy and Joint Meeting with the Boston Athenaeum, held at the House of the Academy on April 6, 2005. Two of the poems that Robert Pinsky read at the meeting are reprinted below.

Robert Pinsky is Professor of English at Boston University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993.

Richard Wendorf is Stanford Calderwood Director and Librarian of the Boston Athenaeum.

Richard Wendorf

I have often thought that the best way to introduce a truly distinguished poet would simply be to read from his or her work, but I'm not going to follow up on that line of thought today for three reasons. First, Robert Pinsky is a superb reader of his own poetry, and I'm sure you would rather hear him than hear me. Second, Robert Pinsky is also a distinguished literary and cultural critic. It's important for us to pay tribute to that critical voice, which has found articulation in a series of books ranging from *The Situation of Poetry*, published in 1977, to his most recent volume, *Democracy, Culture, and the Voice of Poetry*, published by Princeton University Press in 2002 and just issued as a paperback. Third, it is important for us to acknowledge the role that Robert Pinsky has played in championing the relevance and importance of poetry in everyday life. In his three years as Poet Laureate, he changed the nature of what is often viewed as an honorific post to that of cultural activism, especially through his creation of The Favorite Poem Project. His goal has been to "make a record establishing the place of poetry in the United States, outside of the professional microcosm of poetry itself." The participants in this audio and video archive range from laborers to congressional representatives, from the woman who runs a corporation to local parole officers. Robert Pinsky's anthology of these poems, coedited with Maggie Dietz, was published by Norton in 1999.

Robert Pinsky has received or has been a finalist for virtually every prize that can be bestowed upon a poet, translator, or critic. As fellow poet Louise Glück has said of him, "Robert Pinsky is one of the few literary artists working in our language whose work is unquestionably major work. The genius for public forms, lucidity and succinctness of the critical prose, the reinventions that are his amazing translations – these exist because of the kind of poet he is: restless, daring, endlessly curious."

Robert Pinsky

Book

Its leaves flutter, they thrive or wither, its outspread
Signatures like wings open to form the gutter.

The pages riffling brush my fingertips with their edges:
Whispering, erotic touch this hand knows from ages back.

What progress we have made, they are burning my books, not
Me, as once they would have done, said Freud in 1933.

A little later, the laugh was on him, on the Jews,
On his sisters. O people of the book, wanderers, *anderes*.

When we have wandered all our ways, said Ralegh, Time
Shuts up the story of our days – beheaded, his life like a book.

The sound *bk*: lips then palate, outward plosive to interior stop.
Bk, *bch*: the beech tree, pale wood incised with Germanic runes.

Enchanted wood. Glyphs and characters between boards.
The reader's dread of finishing a book, that loss of a world,

And also the reader's dread of beginning a book, becoming
Hostage to a new world, to some spirit or spirits unknown.

Look! What thy mind cannot contain you can commit
To these waste blanks. The jacket ripped, the spine cracked,

Still it arouses me, torn crippled god like Loki the schemer
As the book of Lancelot aroused Paolo and Francesca

Who cling together even in Hell, O passionate, so we read.
Love that turns or torments or comforts me, love of the need

Of love, need for need, columns of characters that sting
Sometimes deeper than any music or movie or picture,

Deeper sometimes even than a body touching another.
And the passion to make a book – passion of the writer

Smelling glue and ink, sensuous. The writer's dread of making
Another tombstone, my marker orderly in its place in the stacks.

Or to infiltrate and inhabit another soul, as a splinter of spirit
Pressed between pages like a wildflower, odorless, brittle.

Immature Song

I have heard that adolescence is a recent invention,
A by-product of progress, one of Capitalism's

Suspended transitions between one state and another,
Like refugee camps, internment camps, like the Fields

Of Concentration in a campus catalogue. Summer
Camps for teenagers. When I was quite young

My miscomprehension was that "Concentration Camp"
Meant where the scorned were admonished to concentrate,

Humiliated: forbidden to let the mind wander away.
"Concentration" seemed just the kind of punitive euphemism

The adult world used to coerce, like the word "Citizenship"
On the report cards, graded along with disciplines like History,

English, Mathematics. Citizenship was a field or
Discipline in which for certain years I was awarded every

Marking period a "D" meaning Poor. Possibly my first political
Emotion was wishing they would call it Conduct, or Deportment.

The indefinitely suspended transition of the refugee camps
Must be a poor kind of refuge – subjected to capricious

Kindness and requirements and brutality, the unchampioned
Refugees kept between childhood and adulthood, having neither.

In the Holy Land for example, or in Mother Africa.
At that same time of my life when I heard the abbreviation

"DP" for Displaced Person I somehow mixed it up with
"DT's" for Delirium Tremens, both a kind of stumbling called

By a childish nickname. And you my poem, you are like
An adolescent: confused, awkward, self-preoccupied, vaguely

Rebellious in a way that lacks practical focus, moving without
Discipline from thing to thing. Do you disrespect Authority merely

Because it speaks so badly, because it deploys the lethal bromides
With a clumsy conviction that offends your delicate senses? – but if

Called on to argue such matters as the refugees you mumble and
Stammer, poor citizen, you get sullen, you sigh and you look away.

Richard Wendorf (Boston Athenaeum)

Vice President Louis W. Cabot (Cabot-Wellington, LLC), Executive Officer Leslie Berlowitz, and Robert Pinsky (Boston University)

Daniel Bell (Harvard University), Benson R. Snyder (MIT), and Louis Menand III (MIT)

Image © Jodie Coston.

The American Classics

Denis Donoghue

This presentation was given at the 224th Annual Meeting and 1891st Stated Meeting, held at the House of the Academy on May 11, 2005. At this meeting Alan Brinkley, Allan Nevins Professor of History and University Provost at Columbia University, also spoke. His remarks on civil liberties will appear in a forthcoming publication.

Denis Donoghue is University Professor and Henry James Professor of English and American Letters at New York University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1983.

I started thinking of writing a book called *The American Classics* in the autumn of 2003 when I taught a graduate course at New York University called, perhaps rather coyly, "Five in American Literature." The books I chose to teach, if they didn't choose themselves, were *The Scarlet Letter*, *Moby-Dick*, *Leaves of Grass*, *Walden*, and *Huckleberry Finn*. I assumed that these were the American classics and that I didn't need to make a case for reading them; they could be taken for granted, subject to the risk entailed by that status of their not being taken at all. I thought it would be worthwhile to discuss them with a group of graduate students, on the understanding that they had read these books in high school and might welcome an occasion to read them again in a different moral and political setting and with different issues in view. A classic, I was content to think, is a book one reads at least twice. I needed all the information I could get about the presence of these books in American education and culture. I came to the United States in my middle years to take up an appointment at New York University, so I have not attended an American primary or secondary school, college or university. I

A work is a classic, according to Eliot, only if three conditions are fully met: the manners of the civilization that it articulates must be mature, the language of that civilization must be mature, and the imagination of the particular writer must be mature.

wanted to discover what it meant that these five books have been accepted by American culture as the cardinal books. What does this acceptance say of the culture? How do American readers use them; in the service of what causes?

It is no offense to the students to report that they did not help me much to answer these questions. It turned out that none of the students had read all the books. Some of them had read one or two of them, but only in excerpts, two or three of the more agreeable chapters of *Walden*, the "Custom-House" chapter of *The Scarlet Letter*, a few anthology poems from *Leaves of Grass*. When I pressed the matter, I was allowed to think that Ayn Rand had a more palpable presence in their high schools than Whitman or Melville. The students did not dispute that the five books are somehow privileged in American culture, but so are the heads on Mount Rushmore, stared at rather than otherwise appreciated. I gathered from the students that the five books had little provenance in their early education. *To Kill a Mockingbird* meant more to

them during those years.

So I couldn't – and can't – answer the questions I posed about the books and their bearing on American culture. I can only read them as they seem to me to ask to be read. To be read now, that is, at a time when "the violence without" – Stevens's phrase – makes it nearly impossible to exert "the violence within," the force of intelligence and imagination, in response to it. What is the point of reading books at such a time, when reality is defined as military power, vengeance, "the war on terror," "the spread of democracy," and oil? But what else can one do but read books?

I have called these five books classics. The word is often used casually, seldom stringently. Casually, as in referring to a classic detective story, cookbook, or silent film; stringently, when we mark the boundary within which we intend using the word and fend off rival meanings. T. S. Eliot's use of the word is exemplary in this respect, though it may be contentious in other ways. In 1944 he gave the Presidential Address to the Virgil Society under the title "What Is a Classic?" He acknowledged that the word has "several meanings in several contexts," while he claimed to be concerned with "one meaning in one context." He used the word so strictly that, reading the printed lecture for the first time, you would wonder how he could find a single work to answer to his definition. A work is a classic, according to Eliot, only if three conditions are fully met: the manners of the civilization that it articulates must be mature, the language of that civilization must be mature, and the imagination of the particular writer must be mature. Eliot explained at length what he meant by "maturity," mainly by associating the word with cognate words and phrases. Maturity is characterized by a balance between tradition and the individual talent: it depends on the ripeness of a language, "community of taste," and possession of "a common style." A common style "is one which makes us exclaim, not 'this is a man of genius using the language' but 'this realizes the genius of the language.'" The marks of immaturity are provincialism, a limited range of sensibility, and eccentricity. A theory of the impersonality of the work of literature sustains Eliot's idea of the classic and of the maturity that characterizes it: what he fears is the willfulness of a writer who flouts the genius of the language. The three criteria are fulfilled, so far as European literature is in question, only in Virgil's *Aeneid* and Dante's *Divine Comedy*. The critical value of considering these poems as classics is that they provide a criterion, they make us take seriously the question of critical evaluation when other poems and works of literature are in question. Eliot did not consider in that lecture, as he does in "The Dry Salvages," the status of *Bhagavad-Gita* or any other work that may have classic force in cultures beyond Europe. For the time being, he is concerned only with Europe and with a strict designation of a classic in that context. In that sense, English literature does not contain a classic; nor does French. Goethe's poetry is a classic, but not what Eliot calls a *universal* classic:

> We may speak justly enough of the poetry of Goethe as constituting a classic, because of the place which it occupies in its own language and literature. Yet, because of its partiality, of the impermanence of some of its content, and the germanism of the sensibility; because Goethe appears, to a foreign eye, limited by his age, by his language, and by his culture, so that he is unrepresentative of the whole European tradition, and, like our own nineteenth-century authors, a little provincial, we cannot call him a *universal* classic.[1]

This entails a distinction "between the relative and the absolute classic," between a work that, to become what it is, has had to exclude many possibilities of the language in which it is written and a work that has not had to make any such exclusion. The sacrifice of some potentialities of a language in order to realize others, Eliot says, "is a condition of artistic creation, as it is a condition of life, in general." Nonetheless, a certain wholeness is possible in literature:

> We may come to the conclusion, then, that the perfect classic must be one in which the whole genius of a people will be latent, if not all revealed; and that it can only appear in a language such that its whole genius can be present at once.
>
> We must accordingly add, to our list of characteristics of the classic, that of *comprehensiveness*. The classic must, within its formal limitations, express the maximum possible of the whole range of feeling which represents the character of the people who speak that language. It will represent this at its best, and it will also have the widest appeal: among the people to which it belongs, it will find its response among all classes and conditions of men.[2]

The classics of American literature are by definition relative classics: there is no possibility of maturity, comprehensiveness, universality.

Eliot does not claim – it would be meaningless – that Virgil and Dante are the greatest poets, but that the *Aeneid* and *The Divine Comedy* are the works, within the European tradition, that embody most comprehensively the particular qualities of the classic.

"There is no classic in English," Eliot says. Not that this is cause for tears: it is merely a statement that the particular relations among a people, a language, and a writer which constitute a classic are not to be found in any period of the English language. Eliot does not mention the American language in this lecture, but there is no reason to think that any work of American literature meets his three requirements of the classic. So if we speak of the American classics, as I do, we must use the word more liberally than Eliot does, and remind ourselves from time to time that our use of it is indeed concessive. This may guard us against overvaluing a work merely because it satisfies our social prejudices. It may also help us to understand why some books are privileged in a society and others are not.

It follows from Eliot's argument and the descriptions that accompany it that it is no longer possible to write a classic: the conditions can't be met. Eliot did not say this, but the classic is precisely and comprehensively what is no longer possible.[3] Goethe exemplifies what was no longer possible even for Goethe. Provincialism is Eliot's word for the disability, as it was Matthew Arnold's word. The tone of the center, in Arnold's phrase, was not possible: there was no center. After the classics, there are only books, films, TV shows, and the Internet. The classics of American literature are by definition relative classics: there is no possibility of maturity, comprehensiveness, universality. But it may be useful to

1. T. S. Eliot, *On Poetry and Poets* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 69 – 70.

2. Ibid., 69.

3. Cf. Slavoj Zizek, "Preface: Burning the Bridges," in *The Zizek Reader*, ed. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999), vii.

What distinguishes a classic, at least in a concessive sense of the word, is that, to use a phrase of Whitehead's that Frank Kermode has adapted, a classic is "patient of interpretation in terms of our interests."

change the terminology, not in the hope of removing the disability but of introducing another perspective. In *L'Etre et l'événement* Alain Badiou distinguishes between the positivity of mere being and the actuality of events. A human life becomes an event when its action is radical or inaugural; it impels and enables everything that follows. The classics in American literature, relative classics as they are, are events, distinct from the mere being and succession of other books, good, bad, and mediocre. As events, they are privileged, even if the privilege is equivocal. What I mean by equivocal may be indicated by a linguistic point. Slavoj Zizek has remarked that the Russian language often has two words for what we Westerners would consider the same referent: one word designates the ordinary meaning, and the other a more ethically charged or 'absolute' use:

> There is *istina*, the common notion of truth as adequacy to facts; and (usually capitalized) *Pravda*, the absolute Truth also designating the ethically committed ideal Order of the Good. There is *svoboda*, the ordinary freedom to do as we like within the existing social order; and *volja*, the more metaphysically charged absolute drive to follow one's will up to self-destruction. . . . There is *gosudarstvo*, the state in its ordinary administrative aspects; and *derzhava*, the State as the unique agency of absolute Power.[4]

Lionel Trilling's distinction between sincerity and authenticity comes into a similar context: sincerity is the ordinary decent practice of one's life; authenticity is a far more demanding criterion. The difference is hardly clear in a dim light: it arises only if you invoke the supreme perspective. A similar distinction is operative in other languages, as between *tempus* and *aevum*, and between *futur* and *avenir*. But the situation is equivocal because one is, at any given moment, hovering between the ordinary meaning and the exalted or absolute meaning. Ordinary life is not respectful of absolutes, but there are some occasions – of crises, or even of anniversaries – when the higher question can't be put off.

Any one of the American classics is a cultural event, in Badiou's terms; it impels other events only less radical. And it is such an event, regardless of the aesthetic judgment one might make upon it. *Leaves of Grass* is an event, even though Quentin Anderson and (I suppose) other readers think it is a sinister book. The attitude a particular reader takes toward a classic may be reverent or impious. Reverent – here Zizek's note on the Russian language comes in – if the reader subscribes to the aura that surrounds the book, even among those who have not read it. Impious if the reader rejects every instance of aura precisely because he or she suspects the imputed force of radiance, as one might detest the State while continuing to obey traffic lights and pay one's taxes.

What distinguishes a classic, at least in a concessive sense of the word, is that, to use a phrase of Whitehead's that Frank Kermode has adapted, a classic is "patient of interpretation in terms of our interests." Kermode made much of the phrase in his T. S. Eliot Memorial Lectures at the University of Kent, published as *The Classic* (1975). Whitehead had in mind that "Nature is patient of interpretation in terms of Laws which happen to interest us." The sentence comes in the chapter called "Cosmologies" in Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas*, where he considers various doctrines of the laws of Nature and concludes the chapter with a description of the Doctrine of Conventional Interpretation:

> This doctrine certainly expresses the procedure by which free speculation passes into an interpretation of Nature. We elaborate a system of ideas, in detachment from any direct, detailed observation of matter of fact. For example, such detachment from detailed observation seems, on the surface, to be characteristic of Plato's *Dialogues*. They do not bear the aspect of patient induction from the facts. They are dominated by speculation and dialectics. Also Mathematics has developed, especially in recent years, by a speculative interest in types of order, without any determination of particular entities illustrative of those types. But Nature has subsequently been interpreted in terms of such mathematical laws. The conclusion seems to be, that Nature is patient of interpretation in terms of Laws which happen to interest us.[5]

If we say, with Kermode, that a classic is patient of interpretation in terms of our interests, we impose a test not at all as severe as Eliot's. Kermode means that such a work persists through the many different interpretations of it:

> I think there is a substance that prevails, however powerful the agents of change; that *King Lear*, underlying a thousand dispositions, subsists in change, prevails by being patient of interpretation.[6]

It makes a difficulty that this is an essentialist argument, requiring a distinction between the work in its presumed essence and the force of manifold dispositions in which it is found from time to time and from person to person. It also implies that another work – it is a mark of its not being a classic – demands to be interpreted in a particular way and does not survive the rough magic of different interpretations. I think that is true. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is not a classic: it asks to be read in a particular spirit. If you read it in a different spirit, it becomes an absurd book, though its historical impact in its time is still to be acknowledged. Saul Bellow's *The Adventures of Augie March* is a robust novel, but you have to read it with a particular set of sympathies. If you don't, you'll find it sullen. Thoreau's *Walden* doesn't ask to be read in any special way. You don't need to subscribe to his ideology – his assumption that the nature to be found in Walden Pond and human nature ~~obey the same laws – to appreciate the book.~~ It is patient of whatever interpretive interests you bring to it. ■

4. Slavoj Zizek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real* (London: Verso, 2002), 80.

5. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 173 – 174.

6. Frank Kermode, *The Classic* (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), 134.

Denis Donoghue (New York University) and Helen Vendler (Harvard University)

Francis Bator (Harvard University) and Academy President Patricia Meyer Spacks (University of Virginia)

William C. Kirby (Harvard University), Steven Pinker (Harvard University), and Rebecca Goldstein (Trinity College)

Lionel McKenzie (University of Rochester)

Alan Brinkley (Columbia University), Lochi Glazer, and Nathan Glazer (Harvard University)

Around the Country

"Constitutionalism and the Global War on Terrorism" was the subject of a panel discussion on May 12, 2005, at the third in a series of Washington, D.C. meetings organized by the Academy's Committee on Congress and the Court. **Stephen J. Trachtenberg**, President of George Washington University, welcomed Fellows and guests to the campus, noting that "over the past 225 years, the Academy has continued to uphold its mission to 'cultivate every art and science' with a commitment to increase public understanding of the critical issues of the day. The constitutional questions raised when democratic governments seek to balance civil liberties with national security concerns is the kind of issue that requires the knowledge and insight the Academy is able to provide."

Moderator **Robert C. Post** (David Boies Professor of Law at Yale University) noted that the evolving nature of the Academy's Congress and the Court study exemplifies how Academy projects can broaden their original mandate in response to changing circumstances: "In this case, an initial concern with the tension between the federal legislature and judiciary has expanded to include the stress imposed on constitutional forms of government by the events of 9/11 and their aftermath."

The four panelists offered a variety of perspectives on the state of constitutionalism, taking into account both international and historical perspectives. **Geoffrey Stone**, Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, argued that historically the United States has overreacted to perceived and actual dangers during wartime. Citing examples from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the prosecution of suspected Communists during the Cold War, Stone urged that courts resist the highly deferential approach they have traditionally adopted in times of war and instead assert their critical role as a check against the constriction or the violation of civil liberties.

The **Honorable Patricia M. Wald**, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, discussed the constitutional protection of individual rights in the context of the global war against terror. As an example, she considered the U.S. government's practice of detaining persons captured in Afghanistan and Iraq for lengthy periods and without trial. Noting that national crises are opportunistically manipulated to overcome constitutions, the **Honorable Charles Fried**, Beneficial Professor of Law at Harvard University, suggested that greater concern should be focused on the myths of constitutional crises that are manufactured for political ends. He cited McCarthyism and the war against terror as two examples of such mythmaking. **Kim Lane Scheppele**, John J. O'Brien Professor of Comparative Law and Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, observed that as a direct result of the war on terror, the world has experienced the marked retreat of "constitutionalism," a political value that includes the principles of constrained government, separation of powers, the protection of individual rights, and the distinction between domestic policing and military functions. In her view, the process is most evident in the fragile democracies of Pakistan, Colombia, and Russia.

The full text of these remarks will be printed in the Winter 2006 issue of the *Bulletin*. ■

Moderator Robert C. Post (Yale University)

Kim Lane Scheppele (University of Pennsylvania)

The Honorable Charles Fried (Harvard University) and the Honorable Patricia M. Wald (Washington, D.C.)

Geoffrey Stone (University of Chicago)

Supreme Court Justice David Souter, Executive Officer Leslie Berlowitz, and George Washington University President Stephen J. Trachtenberg

Noteworthy

Select Prizes and Awards

Antonio Damasio (University of Iowa) received the 2005 Prince of Asturias Award for Scientific and Technical Research, given by the Prince of Asturias Foundation.

James E. Gunn (Princeton University), **P. James E. Peebles** (Princeton University), and **Martin J. Rees** (University of Cambridge) have been awarded the Crafoord Prize in Astronomy.

Stephen C. Harrison (Harvard Medical School) is the recipient of the 15th annual Bristol-Myers Squibb Freedom to Discover Award for Distinguished Achievement in Infectious Diseases Research.

George Harry Heilmeier (Telcordia Technologies, Inc.) is the recipient of the Kyoto Prize in Advanced Technology, given by the Inamori Foundation.

Simon Levin (Princeton University) has been awarded the Kyoto Prize in Basic Sciences by the Inamori Foundation.

Sally Falk Moore (Harvard University) is the recipient of the Harry Kalven Prize, awarded by the Law and Society Association.

Paul Talalay (Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine) was awarded the 2005 Linus Pauling Institute Prize for Health Research.

New Appointments

Robert A. Brown (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) has been named president of Boston University, effective September 1, 2005.

John P. Holdren (Harvard University) has been appointed president and director of the Woods Hole Research Center.

John Peter Huchra (Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics) has been appointed vice provost for research policy at Harvard University.

Paul A. Marks (Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center) has been appointed chairman of the scientific advisory board of Nanoviricide, Inc./EDot.com, Inc.

Randy W. Schekman (University of California, Berkeley) and **Susan S. Taylor** (University of California, San Diego) have been appointed to the scientific advisory board of KAI Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Theda Skocpol (Harvard University) has been named Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University.

Robert Jeffrey Sternberg (Yale University) has been named Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences at Tufts University.

Select Publications

Fiction

Margaret Atwood (Toronto, Canada). *Writing with Intent: Essays, Reviews, Personal Prose, 1983 – 2005*. Carroll & Graf Publishers, March 2005; *Penelopiad: The Myth of Penelope and Odysseus*. Canongate, November 2005; *The Tent*. Nan A. Talese, January 2006

Ann Beattie (University of Virginia). *Follies: New Stories*. Scribner, April 2005

Joan Didion (New York City). *The Year of Magical Thinking*. Knopf, October 2005

E. L. Doctorow (New York University). *The March*. Random House, September 2005

Louise Erdrich (Minneapolis, Minnesota). *The Painted Drum*. HarperCollins, September 2005

Elie Wiesel (Boston University). *The Time of the Uprooted*. Knopf, September 2005

Nonfiction

Bruce Ackerman (Yale University). *The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy*. Harvard University Press, October 2005

Svetlana Alpers (University of California, Berkeley and New York University). *The Vexations of Art: Velazquez and Others*. Yale University Press, September 2005

Omer Bartov (Brown University). *The "Jew" in Cinema: From the Golem to Don't Touch My Holocaust (The Helen and Martin Schwartz Lectures in Jewish Studies)*. Indiana University Press, January 2005

John C. Bogle (The Vanguard Group, Inc.). *The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism*. Yale University Press, October 2005

William H. Chafe (Duke University). *Private Lives/Public Consequences: Personality and Politics in Modern America*. Harvard University Press, November 2005

Marjorie B. Cohn (Harvard University) and **Jean Sutherland Boggs** (Montreal, Canada). *Degas at Harvard*. Yale University Press, August 2005

Andrew Delbanco (Columbia University). *Melville: His World and Works*. Knopf, September 2005

Thomas Eisner (Cornell University), Maria Eisner (Cornell University), and Melody V. S. Siegler (Emory University). *Secret Weapons: Defenses of Insects, Spiders, Scorpions, and Other Many-Legged Creatures*. Harvard University Press, November 2005

Roger Fisher (Harvard Law School) and Daniel Shapiro (Harvard Medical School, Harvard Law School). *Beyond Reason: Using Your Emotions as You Negotiate*. Viking, October 2005

John Hope Franklin (Duke University) and Loren Schweninger (University of North Carolina at Greensboro). *In Search of the Promised Land: A Slave Family in the Old South*. Oxford University Press, August 2005

Michael S. Gazzaniga (Dartmouth College). *The Ethical Brain*. Dana Press, April 2005

Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria (Yale University). *Love and the Law in Cervantes*. Yale University Press, September 2005

Peter A. Gourevitch (University of California, San Diego) and James Shin (Georgetown University). *Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance*. Princeton University Press, October 2005

Charles M. Haar (Harvard Law School). *Mastering Boston Harbor: Courts, Dolphins, and Imperiled Waters*. Harvard University Press, March 2005

Albert Henrichs (Harvard University), ed. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. 102. Harvard University Press, December 2005

Ada Louise Huxtable (New York City). *Frank Lloyd Wright*. Lipper/Viking, November 2004

Fredric Jameson (Duke University). *Archaeologies of the Future*. Verso, September 2005

Jerome P. Kassirer (Tufts University). *On the Take: How Medicine's Complicity with Big Business Can Endanger Your Health*. Oxford University Press, October 2004

Peter Katzenstein (Cornell University). *The World of Religions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. Cornell University Press, September 2005

William C. Kirby (Harvard University), Robert S. Ross (Boston College), and Gong Li (International Strategic Research Center, Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party), eds. *Normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations: An International History*. Harvard University Press, January 2006

Marc W. Kirschner (Harvard Medical School) and John C. Gerhart (University of California, Berkeley). *The Plausibility of Life: Resolving Darwin's Dilemma*. Yale University Press, October 2005

Gerda Lerner (University of Wisconsin – Madison). *The Majority Finds Its Past: Placing Women in*

History. New edition with a foreword by **Linda K. Kerber** (University of Iowa). University of North Carolina Press, April 2005

Catharine MacKinnon (University of Michigan Law School). *Women's Lives, Men's Lives*. Harvard University Press, February 2005

Douglas S. Massey (Princeton University). *Return of the "L" Word: A Liberal Vision for the New Century*. Princeton University Press, March 2005

David McCullough (West Tisbury, Massachusetts). *1776*. Simon & Schuster, May 2005

Vernon B. Mountcastle (Johns Hopkins University). *The Sensory Hand: Neural Mechanisms of Somatic Sensation*. Harvard University Press, November 2005

John T. Noonan, Jr. (U.S. Court of Appeals, San Francisco). *A Church that Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching*. University of Notre Dame Press, January 2005

Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago). *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership*. Harvard University Press, January 2006

Elinor Ostrom (Indiana University). *Understanding Institutional Diversity*. Princeton University Press, October 2005

Richard Pipes (Harvard University). *Russian Conservatism and Its Critics: A Study in Political Culture*. Yale University Press, January 2006

Richard A. Posner (U.S. Court of Appeals, Chicago). *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11*. Rowman & Littlefield, July 2005

Lisa Randall (Harvard University). *Warped Passages: Unraveling the Mysteries of the Universe's Hidden Dimensions*. Ecco, September 2005

Michael J. Sandel (Harvard University). *Public Philosophy: Episodes and Arguments in American Civil Life*. Harvard University Press, November 2005

Richard Sennett (London School of Economics). *The Culture of the New Capitalism*. Yale University Press, January 2006

Ian Shapiro (Yale University). *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences*. Princeton University Press, October 2005

Eric J. Sundquist (University of California, Los Angeles). *Strangers in the Land: Blacks, Jews, Post-Holocaust America*. Harvard University Press, November 2005

Garry B. Trudeau (New York City). *The Long Road Home*. Andrew McMeel Publishing, June 2005

Helen Vendler (Harvard University). *Invisible Listeners: Lyric Intimacy in Herbert, Whitman, and Ashbery*. Princeton University Press, October 2005

Kurt Vonnegut (New York City). *A Man without a Country*. Seven Stories Press, September 2005

Garry Wills (Northwestern University). *Henry Adams and the Making of America*. Houghton Mifflin, September 2005

Daniel Yankelovich (Viewpoint Learning, Inc.) and Norton Garfinkle (George Washington University), eds. *Uniting America: Restoring the Vital Center to American Democracy*. Yale University Press, January 2006

Exhibitions

Anselm Kiefer (Barjac, France): "Anselm Kiefer: Heaven and Earth" exhibit at the Modern Art Museum of Fort Worth, Fort Worth, Texas, September 25, 2005 – January 8, 2006.

Brice Marden (New York City): Featured in "A New Narrative: Marden, Fitzpatrick, Stella & Warhol" at the Muskegon Museum of Art, Muskegon, Michigan, September 11 – November 6, 2005; "Brice Marden: Etchings to Rexroth" exhibit at Wellesley College's Davis Museum and Cultural Center, Wellesley, Massachusetts, September 14 – December 18, 2005.

Gerhard Richter (Staatliche Kunstakademie, Germany): "Gerhard Richter – Editionen" exhibit at the Museum der Moderne, Salzburg, Austria, July 23 – October 16, 2005.

James Turrell (Flagstaff, Arizona): Featured in "Design „Art: Functional Objects From Donald Judd To Rachel Whiteread" exhibit at the Aspen Art Museum, Aspen, Colorado, August 5 – October 2, 2005; "James Turrell: Light Projections 1968 and Light Works 2005" exhibit at Pac Wildenstein, New York, July 14 – September 24, 2005.

Bill Viola (Bill Viola Studio): "Bill Viola: The Passions" exhibit at The National Gallery of Australia, Canberra, Australia, July 29 – November 6, 2005; *"The Crossing (1996), 'A Kind of Magic'"* exhibit at the Lucerne Museum of Art, Lucerne, Switzerland, August 6 – November 20, 2005.

We invite all Fellows and Foreign Honorary Members to send notices about their recent and forthcoming publications, scientific findings, exhibitions and performances, and honors and prizes to bulletin@amacad.org. ■

From the Archives

Elected to the Academy in 1832, Charles Babbage (1792 – 1871) is widely regarded as the "Father of Computer Science." His calculating engines, including the Difference Engine, are among the most celebrated icons in the prehistory of computing. Although never completed, his Analytical Engine possessed all of the essential futures of the modern general-purpose computer. During his travels in Europe in the early 1820s, inventor and Academy Fellow Daniel Treadwell (1791 – 1872) visited Babbage and described his impressions of the calculating machine in letters to his collaborator in Boston, Dr. John Ware.

> I have spent several hours at Babbage's looking at his machine. It is exceedingly ingenious as a mechanical invention, but perhaps more striking considered with regard to the evidence it furnishes of Babbage's knowledge of the theory of numbers. (London, April 1, 1835)
>
> In my last letter to you I promised to write particularly of Babbage's calculating machine. . . . It is thirteen years since Mr. Babbage commenced making the drawings for it, and the calculating part of the machine now built does not extend to more than one quarter of the places of figures that he intended it to do, that is, it has but one quarter of its work in, and instead of counting, say 1,000, it counts but 250, but it works right as far as it goes. Nothing, or almost nothing, has yet been done to the part that is to stamp the figures on the copper. . . . These difficulties are not, in my opinion, likely to be overcome, and would not be, even if Babbage were fresh in the harness, and the money were at his disposal; but this is not the case. Babbage indeed does not tire, (for he has lately commenced the drawings of a machine of greater powers than that partly made,) but the government have stopped the supplies, and the men on whose opinions the money was before given "begin to doubt," so that there is no chance of the work being taken up at present; in a word, the wonder of the machine has passed, and it is considered as laid upon the shelf. . . . But I honor Babbage for his ingenuity, as I consider the machine one of the greatest pieces of intricate conception ever put into form. (London, April 22, 1835)

Reprinted from the *Memoirs* of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1888, volume 11, part 2.



Credit: Science Museum, London, United Kingdom.

Charles Babbage's Difference Engine No. 1. The engine was begun in 1824 and assembled in 1832 by Joseph Clement, a skilled toolmaker and draughtsman. It was a decimal digital machine – the value of a number represented by the positions of the toothed wheels marked with decimal numbers.

The roster of the Academy has included a number of distinguished computer scientists, among them John von Neumann and Grace Hopper. In the Academy's membership listings, computer scientists were categorized as mathematicians or engineers until the early 1990s when a new section was created recognizing the increasing prominence of computer science and technology in industry, academics, and society. Under the leadership of David Clark (MIT), the Academy is now conducting a study of Internet security focusing on the social, political, economic, and legal implications of choices that are being made in the development of this global resource. ■

AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF ARTS & SCIENCES

Norton's Woods, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
telephone 617-576-5000, *facsimile* 617-576-5050,
email aaas@amacad.org, *website* www.amacad.org

Bulletin Summer 2005
Issued as Volume LVIII, Number 4

The Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (ISSN 0002 – 712X) is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Periodicals rate postage paid at Boston, MA, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to *Bulletin*, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

PHOTO CREDITS

Steve Rosenthal	inside front cover
Martha Stewart	pages 1, bottom; 2, middle; 11; 25; 26 – 27; 31
Robert George	page 2, top
Columbia University	page 2, bottom
Gail Oskin	page 4
Robert J. Paz	page 15
Wendy Barrows	pages 20 – 21
Julie Woodford	pages 32 – 33