The World Needs an International Anti-Corruption Court

Ed. note: In August 2022, Mark L. Wolf, with Richard Goldstone and Robert I. Rotberg, published the research paper “The Progressing Proposal for An International Anti-Corruption Court,” which builds on this essay.

As the contents of this volume of Dædalus demonstrate, there is a growing international understandingthatmoreeffectivemeansareneededtocombat corruption, particularly what is coming to be called“grand corruption” or “kleptocracy.” Grand corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain by anation’sleaders.Itflourishesinmanycountriesbecause of a failure to enforce existing criminal statutesprohibiting bribery, money laundering, and the misappropriation of national resources. Impunity existsbecause corrupt leaders control the police, the prosecutors, and the courts.

In 2016, leaders from more than forty countries metin London for the Anti-Corruption Summit. They endorsedaGlobalDeclarationAgainstCorruption, committing each represented nation to the propositionthat“thecorruptshouldbepursuedandpunished.”1 TheDeclarationemphasizedthe“centrality” of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption(UNCAC),inwhich183countriespledgedtoenactlawscriminalizingcorruptionandtoenforce them even against their nation’s leaders.2 Implicitly recognizing that existing institutions and efforts have not been adequate, the participating governments committed themselves to “exploring innovative solutions” to combat corruption.3 An International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC) would be an invaluable innovation.

It is a fundamental premise of criminal law that the prospect of punishment will deter crime. Research has validated this premise, including with regard to violations of human rights.4 The absence of risk of punishment, particularly imprisonment, contributes greatly to the pervasiveness and persistence of grand corruption. The United States provides a model for a new international approach to creating the crucial, credible threat that corrupt leaderswillbepunishedfortheircrimes.Public corruption exists in the United States. Officials–most often state and local officials–sometimes abuse their public offices for personal gain. However, in contrast to many other nations, the United States has been serious about investigating, prosecuting, and punishing powerful, corrupt public officials.

Asafederaljudge,in2011,Isentencedformer Speaker of the Massachusetts House ofRepresentativesSalvatoreDiMasitoeightyears in prison for demanding bribes in connection with computer contracts worth

$17million.Thestateinspectorgeneral,ina public decision, invalidated the contractsbecause of flaws in the bidding process. A subsequentBostonGlobeinvestigationrevealedthatthesuccessfulbidderhadbeen paying the Speaker’s law partner $5,000 per month, most of which was flowing to the Speaker. Federal–not state–prosecutors and the Federal Bureau of Investigation then continued the investigation. Theyfoundhundredsofthousandsofdollars had also been paid to a friend of the Speaker. When DiMasi was charged in federal court, the case was randomly assigned to me. A jury found DiMasi guilty and I decided the sentence.

AstheDiMasicaseillustrates,theUnited States does not rely on elected state district attorneys to investigate and prosecutecorrupt state and local officials because they are often part of the political establishment that must be challenged and, in any event, typically lack the necessary legal authority,expertise,andresources.Inthe United States, independent media often expose corruption. Federal investigators areauthorizedtoconductundercoveroperations and secretly record conversations, and are adept at unraveling complicated financial transactions. Federal prosecutors are capable of trying complex cases successfully before impartial judges and juries. As a result, public officials convicted of corruption regularly receive serious sentences,whichhavethepotentialtodeter others and to create a political climate in which candidates dedicated to governing honestly are elected.

However, in countries in which grand corruption flourishes, leaders control the media and do not permit their own criminal activity to be exposed. In many countries, exemplified by Mexico, Malta, Slovakia, Turkey, and Russia, independent investigative journalists are often threatened, imprisoned, and even killed. There are no fair elections that would allow the replacement of corrupt leaders, in part because their political campaigns are frequently financed by the interests that bribe them.Becausethoseleaderscontrolprosecutors and judges, they are able to operate with impunity.

Therefore,anIACCisneededfortheextraterritorial prosecution and punishmentof corrupt leaders of countries that are unwilling or unable to enforce their own lawsagainst powerful offenders. The international consequences of grand corruption justify the creation of an IACC, separate from but similar to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

It is estimated that trillions of dollars are paid in bribes annually and that the cost of all forms of corruption is more than 5 percent of global GDP.5Developing regions lose ten times more to corruption than they receive in foreign aid.6Illicit outflows of funds that developing countries desperately need total more than $1 trillion per year.7

The cost of corruption is not limited to poorer countries. For example, in 2011, the third-largest outflow of illicit capital in the world came from Russia. Bribery, theft, kickbacks, and corruption cost the country $427 billion from 2000 to 2008.8 Russia’s leaders evidently contribute a great deal to the illicit capital that leaves the country. In 2016, a massive leak of documents known as the Panama Papers revealed that close associates of President VladimirPutinmoved$2billion,intransactionsinvolvingasmuchas$200million at a time, through international banks and companies created to mask their true beneficial owners.9Putin’s closest friend, a cellist who had long claimed he was not wealthy, was revealed to have almost £19 million in a Swiss bank, as well as investments in numerous Russian and offshore entities, including a 3.9 percent share of a Russianbankwithassetsofalmost$11billion.10In2017,itwasrevealedthatRussianPrime Minister Dimitri Medvedev had accumulated more than $1 billion worth of property, including vast estates in Tuscany and Russia, and owned two yachts.11

The costs of grand corruption are not exclusively economic. Grand corruption also breeds constituents for terrorists. Many supporters of the Taliban in Afghanistan andofBokoHaraminNigeriaarenotreligious fanatics. Rather, they are angry people attracted to organizations that have positioned themselves as prime opponents of their nation’s corrupt leaders.12At the same time, corruption–especially grand corruption–makes it difficult for governmentstocombatterrorismbecausefunds intended for that purpose are regularly embezzled or misspent. For example, according to the former “anticorruption czar” of Kenya, John Githongo, corruption has “opened the door to al-Shabab” in that country because bribes were paid to high officials to obtain contracts for vital security equipment, which was substandard and delivered at inflated prices or, in some cases, not delivered at all.13

In addition, grand corruption is closely correlated with the worst abuses of human rights.Asthen–UnitedNationsHighCommissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay explained in 2013:

CorruptionkillsThemoneystolenthroughcorruption every year is enough to feed the world’s hungry 80 times over. Corruption denies them their right to food, and, in some cases, their right to life.14

Grand corruption also has other fatal consequences. In Sierra Leone, one-third of the funds allocated to combat Ebola in 2014 couldnotbeaccountedfor;someofthose funds, however, were eventually found in the bank accounts of health officials responsible for administering the relief effort.15Angola claims the highest mortality rate in the world for children below age five,whileIsobelDosSantos,thedaughter of its president for thirty-eight years until 2017, is reportedly worth $3 billion.16

Moreover, indignation at grand corruption is destabilizing many countries and in the process creating grave threats to international peace and security. People aroundtheworld,particularlyyoungpeople, no longer accept grand corruption as an inevitable fact of life. The ostentatious corruption of President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich was a major cause of the 2014 Maidan protests that drove him outof office and to Russia. The flagrant illicit wealth of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia triggered uprisings in those countries.

The ousting of Yanukovich and the ensuing Russian invasion of Crimea badly damaged the United States and European Union’s relationship with Russia, impairing their ability to cooperate on vital security matters, including in Syria and Iran. The removal of Mubarak cost the United States a valuable, though corrupt, partner in the Middle East. As these examples illustrate, grand corruption creates difficult dilemmas for the United States and its allies. Secretary of State John Kerry was therefore correct when he asserted in 2016 that “the quality of governance is no longer just a domestic concern.”17

Grand corruption does not thrive because of a lack of laws. As indicated earlier, 183 countries are parties to UNCAC. Almost all of them have enacted the required statutes criminalizing bribery, money laundering, and misappropriation of national resources. Parties to the Convention also have an international legal obligation to enforce those laws against corrupt leaders. However, as explained earlier, many countries do not hold corrupt leaders accountablebecausethoseveryleaderscontrol every element of the administration of justice. Kleptocrats enjoy impunity because they are able to prevent the honest, effective investigation and prosecution of their colleagues, their friends, their families, and themselves.

Again,Russiaisillustrative.In2008and2010, respectively, the multinational corporations Siemens AG and Daimler AG admitted, in prosecutions in New York for violatingtheUnitedStatesForeignCorrupt Practices Act (FCPA), to paying millions of dollars in bribes to Russian officials, as well as to officials in many other countries.18The FCPA authorizes the prosecution of companies and individuals that pay bribes, but not of the public officials who demand or receive them. In their plea bargains, Siemens and Daimler each agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of the Russian officials they had bribed.19 The evidence,includingthenamesoftwelveofficials bribed by Siemens, was turned over to the Russian government.20Then-PresidentMedvedev promised to pursue the cases, yetnoRussianofficialhaseverbeenprosecuted for taking a bribe from Siemens or Daimler.21

Instead, in countries ruled by kleptocrats, those who expose corruption are oftenpunished.RussianlawyerSergeiMagnitsky was probing the theft by Russian officials of companies worth $230 million from his client, Hermitage Capital, when he was arrested for alleged tax fraud, tortured, and denied medical care in prison, where he eventually died.22Similarly,AlexeiNavalny,apoliticalopponentof Putin, has been repeatedly prosecuted after exposing corruption in Russia involving government-owned energy company Gazprom, VTB Bank, Russia’s chief prosecutor, and Medvedev, among others.23

Russiaisnotuniqueor,indeed,unusualin persecuting those who expose grand corruption. In 2016, Hisham Geneina, Egypt’s“anticorruption czar,” revealed that endemic graft had cost his country about $76 billion.24As a result, he was removed fromofficeandprosecutedfordisturbing the peace.25 In 2013, prosecutors in Turkey who developed corruption cases against members of then–Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan’s cabinet were removed and prosecuted for allegedly attempting a coup.26ATurkish businessman, Reza Zarrab, who was cleared in Turkey of bribing some of those cabinet members, pled guilty in New York, in 2017, to doing just that.27 A TurkishbankerwasconvictedinthesamecaseforconspiracytoviolateU.S.sanctionson Iran, and several Turkish officials Zarrabclaims to have bribed are evading prosecution, while being protected by Erdoğan inTurkey.28Oneoftheprosecution’switnesses in the New York case was a former Turkishpoliceofficerwhohadbeenjailed in Turkey in retaliation for leading its investigation of Zarrab and who eventually fled to the United States with evidence he had obtained.29

Internationaltreaties,includingUNCACitself, require the good-faith enforcementof criminal laws enacted pursuant to the Convention against a nation’s leaders. However, those laws have been widely ignored. UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism is weak, and the international community has focused excessively on whether the statutes required by UNCAC have been enacted and insufficiently on whether they are actually enforced.30

Imyself experiencedavividexampleofthisinSt.Petersburgin2014.Iwasonapanel with diplomats from the United Nationsand the European Union who praised Russia because it had enacted the statutes required by UNCAC. Citing substantial evidence of continuing grand corruption, I questioned whether the “progress” being praised was real or rather, like the proverbial“Potemkinvillage,”allfaçadeandnosubstance. The positive reaction to my remarks by the many Russians in the audience confirmed that they were not fooled by the official charade that we had witnessed.

While criminal laws that could punish and deter corrupt leaders are not being enforced,thereareotherefforts beingmade to combat grand corruption. However, the fact that grand corruption continues to flourish demonstrates that the current means alone are inadequate and something new is needed.

TheUnitedStatesenactedtheFCPAintheaftermath of Watergate, and the statute hasbeenenergeticallyenforcedinthepastdecade. However, the FCPA only applies to companies that do business in the United States. Forty countries in the Organisation forEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment (OECD) Convention Against Bribery have undertaken to enact counterparts to the FCPA, but those statutes are rarely enforced.31Moreover,asexplainedearlier,theFCPA,anditscounterpartsaswell,permit only the prosecution of individuals and organizationsthatpaybribes,butnotthepublic officials who often demand them.32

Another approach to attacking grand corruption is civil litigation to recover and repatriate illicitly obtained assets from the former rulers of many countries. However, asset recovery is legally complex, forensically difficult, and ponderously slow. For example, funds unlawfully obtained by former President Ferdinand Marcos were frozen in 1986 but not returned to the Philippine government until 2004.33Efforts torecover illicitly obtained assets from Marcos’s wife are still ongoing.34

In any event, even expedited asset recovery would not be effective in deterring highofficials from engaging in criminal corruption. At best, only a fraction of looted assets and bribes are ever recovered. For example, in a highly publicized case, the United States alleged that Teodorin Obiang, son of the president and himself the second vice president of Equatorial Guinea, had corruptly received $100 million and laundered it in the United States by, among other things, buying a mansion, sports cars, and Michael Jackson memorabilia. After several years, the Department of Justice settled the case for $30 million and never recovered a coveted crystal studded glove worn by Jackson that Obiang was supposed to forfeit.35

As the Obiang case indicates, corrupt leaders can correctly calculate that they are unlikely to be caught and, at worst, risk being forced to return only a fraction of what they have illegally acquired. This is not sufficient to alter their corrupt conduct.

TheObiangcasealsoillustrateshowtheenormous wealth corruptly obtained by high officials is typically laundered through a series of complex financial transactions and invested abroad. Some of the loot is usedtobuylavishpropertiesinthenames of shell companies or straw owners in appealingplacessuchasLondon,Paris,New York City, and Palm Springs. The sources ofcorruptlyobtainedfundsaredifficulttotrace,andthetruebeneficialownersofassets acquired with that money are difficult to identify.

The countries that participated in the 2016 Anti-Corruption Summit in London pledged to improve the transparency of beneficialownershipandtheinternational community’s capacity to cooperate in investigating the flow of the fruits of corruption.36Theseareworthyendeavors.However, it should be recognized that greater transparencyof beneficialownershipand improved ability to follow the money are not ends in themselves. Rather, they are only means to discover evidence of criminal activity. There must be a forum in which evidence of corruption by a nation’s leaders can be honestly and effectively presented toanimpartialtribunalcapableof imposing prison sentences on powerful people.

In 2002, the evils of genocide and other intolerableabuses of human rights led to thecreation of the ICC. The comparable consequences of grand corruption now justify the creation of an IACC. As indicated earlier, the proposed IACC should be similar to butseparatefromtheICC.Thereareprincipled reasons for not diffusing the ICC’s singular focus on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In addition, the statute that created the ICC cannot be properly interpreted to give the ICC jurisdiction over cases of grand corruption. Reopening the statute in an effort to expand the court’s jurisdiction could lead instead to the demise of the ICC.

Obtaining evidence for potential prosecutions in the IACC would be challenging. However, an International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre was recentlyestablishedbytheUnitedKingdom,theUnitedStates,andseveraltrustedalliesto investigate allegations of grand corruption and to facilitate joint decisions concerning where cases should be prosecuted. As the examples of the Siemens and Daimler bribery of Russian officials illustrate, it would often be futile and, indeed, foolish to rely onthecountriesinwhichthecrimeswerecommittedtoprosecutethem.AnIACCis essential to realizing the potential of improved international investigations.

Inaddition,after9/11,theUnitedStatesTreasury Department established an Officeof Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, whichhasbecomeexpertintracingsourcesofterroristfinancing.Inviewofthenational security implications of grand corruption, robust use of its resources to develop evidence for use in the IACC would be fullyjustified.ItwouldalsobeappropriatetoaddgrandcorruptiontothemandateoftheFinancialActionTaskForce–anindependentintergovernmentalbodythatdevelops policies to protect global financial systems against money laundering, and the financing of terrorists and sale of weapons. In any event, the IACC should employ elite prosecutors from around the world with the experience and expertise necessary to develop and present complex cases effectively.Inaddition,theCourtshouldbeledby able and impartial international judges.Importantly,liketheICC,theIACCshouldoperateontheprincipleof complementarity. National courts would have primary jurisdictionovercrimesbycorruptleadersintheircountries.TheIACCcouldonlyexercisejurisdictionifanationprovedunwilling or unable to make good-faith efforts toinvestigate, prosecute, and punish its leaders and their accomplices for corruption. The IACC would therefore be a court of last resort, to be relied upon only in cases inwhichnationalenforcementofexisting domestic criminal laws against a country’s leaders is not possible.

Byoperatingontheprincipleofcomplementarity, the IACC would give countries a significant incentive to improve their capacity to enforce their criminal laws, and to punish and deter corruption, especially grand corruption. Study of abuses of humanrightsprovidesevidence“thatpressurefromtheoutside,includingtheexerciseofextraterritorial jurisdiction by other states under universal . . . jurisdiction, inspires domestic trials in response.”37 The Spanish prosecution of former dictator Augusto Pinochet, his arrest in London, and his subsequenttrialinChileisaprominentexample of this phenomenon. The IACC would havethepotentialtocatalyzecomparable national responses to grand corruption.

The IACC should have jurisdiction to prosecute any head of state or of government,anyoneappointedbyaheadofstate or government, and anyone who conspires with one of those officials, if they violate a statute required by UNCAC. The IACC would therefore not require the creation of any new legal obligations. Rather, it would only provide a venue for the enforcement of existing norms that are codified in the laws of virtually every country.

The IACC’s jurisdiction should include casesconcerningcorruptleadersof countries that join the Court but prove to be unwilling or unable to enforce their domestic anticorruption laws against them. The IACC should also have jurisdiction concerning leaders of countries that do not join the Court in certain circumstances. For example, a leader of any state who used the financial system of an IACC member to launder the proceeds of a bribe should be subject to prosecution in the IACC if the member state is unwilling or unable to prosecute. In addition, the United Nations Security Council should be authorized to refer the leader of any country for prosecution in the IACC, as it can refer for prosecution in the ICC citizens of states that have not joined the court.

Since I first proposed the IACC in two articles published in 2014, the concept has been questioned and criticized, and also gained significant support.38A common criticism of the IACC is that it would violate the sanctity of national sovereignty.39However, any country that agreed to join the IACC would delegate to the court the authority to enforce its domestic laws if necessary. Therefore, prosecution of its leaders in the IACC would not be a violation of national sovereignty, but rather a vindicationofthewillofitspeople.Inany event, as grand corruption has substantial international consequences, there is a compelling justification for an IACC to enforce a nation’s laws against its corrupt leaders when they themselves are the obstacle to domestic enforcement.

Itissometimessaidthatcreatinganother court comparable to the ICC, which costsabout$160millionayear,wouldbetooexpensive. However, corruption is estimatedtocosttrillionsofdollarsannually,and grand corruption contributes greatly to that cost. The IACC would reduce corruption and thus save many nations enormous sumsofmoney.Moreover,aconvictionin the IACC could result not only in a prison sentence, but in an order of restitution to the victimized country as well. Fines imposed by the IACC could be used to defray,if notcover,thecostsof itsoperation. Therefore, an IACC would be cost-effective. Some argue that the ICC is weak, unfair in itsprosecutorialpolicies,andnotamodel worthy of emulation. Although 124 nations have joined the ICC, its jurisdiction is not universal. Major powers–including China, Russia, India, and the United States–haverefusedtojoin,largelyimmunizingthemselves from prosecution in the ICC.

It is, however, premature to declare the ICC a failure. The federal courts in the United States were also weak at a similar stage in their development. In 1832, the SupremeCourtissuedanorderthatirritated President Andrew Jackson, who ignored it and famously (but probably apocryphally) issaidtohaveresponded,“[Chief Justice] John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”40However, by 1974, Richard Nixon knew that the American people and Congress would not tolerate a president who defied a Supreme Court order.Therefore,heturnedoverthetapesof conversations in the Oval Office concerning crimes and cover-ups, and resigned in disgrace instead.41

It is true that major powers on the UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilhaveattimesblockedinvestigationsoftheirallies,such as China’s protection of North Korea. It is also true that the ICC has achieved only fiveconvictions,andallhavebeenofAfricans.However,theICChasfocusedonAfrica for legitimate reasons. Thirty-three AfricanstatesjoinedtheCourt–themost from any region; crimes against humanity have occurred repeatedly in Africa since the ICC was established; and most of the ICC investigations in Africa were opened at the request of the African governments themselves.42

In addition, the ICC has been broadeningitsfocus.In2017,itconductedtenpreliminary examinations, only four of which involved African countries. Ukraine, Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are among the nations still being investigated.43The preliminary examination of ICC member Afghanistancouldactuallygenerateprosecutions of United States and British nationals if there is sufficient evidence that they committed war crimes in Afghanistan, and their governments are shown to have been unwilling to conduct genuine investigations and make good-faith decisions concerning whether to prosecute.

Some objections to the ICC actually indicate that the Court is developing credibilityand having an impact. President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines objected to the ICC after a warning that his country might be investigated for the extrajudicial killings of drug dealers and addicts. Similarly, Russia denounced the ICC after the United States and the United Kingdom urged the court to investigate Russian bombings in Syria.44

Perhaps one of the most significant arguments in favor of the ICC is that there is increasing evidence that prosecutions of human rights abuses in that court, as well as in domestic courts, are deterring violationsofhumanrights.45Asexplainedearlier, the principle of complementarity provides an incentive to states to improve their own institutions and efforts. ICC investigations have already catalyzed reforms in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Guinea, Georgia, and Colombia.46 In addition, there is evidence that both the former president of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebelsfactoredthepossibilityofICCprosecution into their negotiations to end a fifty-yearcivilwar.47Suchexampleshave prompted some scholars to conclude that

ICC investigations, indictments and convictions or those triggered by complementarityare likely to encourage actual or potential perpetrators to reassess the risks of punishment–relative to the status quo, which is often impunity–and to moderate their behavior.48

The deterrent effect of an International Anti-Corruption Court on grand corruption should be even greater than the ICC’s impactonviolationsofhumanrights.War crimes and related human rights abuses typicallyoccurduringarmedconflict,when perpetrators may view the ends as justifying the means. In contrast, grand corruption involves discretionary crimes of calculation. When there is no risk of sanctionbecause the official controls all power to prosecute and punish, there is nothing to inhibit an avaricious leader from enriching himself corruptly. However, when the credible threat of extraterritorial prosecution and imprisonment is established, the calculation–andtheconduct–shouldchange. Finally, the most common criticism of the proposed IACC is that it represents an impossible ideal. Some argue that if China, Russia, India, and the United States refused to join the ICC, corrupt leaders of other countriesareevenlesslikelytoallowtheir nations to join an IACC in which they could be prosecuted. However, submitting to the jurisdiction of the IACC could be made a requirement of being a party to UNCAC and a member of the World Trade Organization. Itcouldalsobemadeaprerequisiteforreceiving bilateral foreign aid and loans from the World Bank and other development organizations.

Tradeagreementsareanothermeansofpromoting membership in the IACC. For example, the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has the “strongest anti-corruption and transparency standards of any tradeagreement,”accordingtotheOffice of the U.S. Trade Representative.49 Among other conditions, the TPP requires signatoriestobecomepartiestoUNCAC,andto enact and enforce anticorruption laws.50 It also creates a mechanism to sanction violations of those requirements.51 Unfortunately, missing from the TPP sanctions is accountability for failure to enforce the TPP’s required anticorruption laws. However, joining the IACC could be a condition for becoming party to major trade agreements such as the TPP.

Thereareseveralmodelsforaprocesstocreate the IACC. One is the ICC, which wasfounded in 2002 as a result of efforts that beganafterWorldWarII.Thevictoriousallies created courts to try Germans and Japanese for alleged war crimes. Those courts wereintendedtoestablishtheprincipleof individual accountability under the law, and to deter future wars and war crimes. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide declaredgenocidetobeacrime.However, for fifty years there was no forum for the prosecution of individuals who committed genocide.

About twenty-five years ago, this deficiency became obvious and urgent. In the wake of atrocities in the former YugoslaviaandRwanda,theUnitedNationsSecurity Council established ad hoc tribunals to tryperpetratorsofgenocide.Acoalitionof2,500 civil-society organizations from 150 countries then led a successful campaign to create the ICC.52 In 1998, a conference was convenedinRometoexplorethecreationofapermanentinternationalcriminalcourt.Atreatywasendorsedby120countries.Therequiredsixtycountriesratifiedthetreatymuchsoonerthanexpectedand,onlyfour years later, the ICC was established.53

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides another model for how to establish the IACC. ThistreatyemergedfromtheInternational Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which was launched by six nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)in1992.The NGOs partnered with a core group of countries,includingCanada,Norway,Austria, and South Africa, to conduct the campaign. By 1997, a treaty had been signed by 122 nations,becomingbindinglawwithunprecedented speed.54

As the leader of the ICBL, Nobel Peace Prize recipient Jody Williams, explained:

[I]t is possible for NGOs to put an issue . . . ontheinternationalagenda,[and]provokeurgentactionsbygovernmentsandothersIt is [also] possible to work outside of traditional diplomatic forums, practices, and methods and still achieve success multi-laterally.55

Williams’s view has been validated by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). ICAN was formed in Australia in 2007 to work for the adoption of a convention to eliminate nuclear weapons after decades of unsuccessful efforts to regulate them. Emulating the ICBL, ICAN involved 468 organizations in 101 countries, led by a few medium-sized nations,includingAustriaandCanada.In2017,aTreatyontheProhibitionofNuclear Weapons was adopted at the United Nations by a vote of 122 to 1. While the treaty is not supported by any of the states that now have nuclear weapons, it reflects a significant evolution of international norms and is a meaningful milestone. Although viewed by many in 2007 as a quixotic quest, ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017.56

The IACC is still only a concept, and doesnot yet constitute an organized campaign.However,itisaconceptthatmanypeople

around the world find clear and compelling. They now know that grand corruption is extremely expensive, creates constituents for terrorists, is closely correlatedwiththeworstabusesof humanrights, and is destabilizing many countries and the world. They understand that something new is needed to hold kleptocrats accountable for their crimes.

Therefore, conditions comparable to those that led to the creation of the ICC are emerging for the IACC. The proposed Court is supported by: prominent officials, including the United Nations High CommissionerforHumanRightsandNobelPeace Prize recipient President Juan Manuel Santos,whomadeColombiathefirstcountry to endorse the IACC; leading NGOs, such as Transparency International, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch; and courageous young people, including leaders of the Maidan uprising in Ukraine.

In short, there is a growing legion of advocates for a simple idea with enormous consequences: the IACC is urgently needed to end impunity for corrupt leaders, and to deter and diminish grand corruption.