International Law and Nuclear LiabilityBack to table of contents
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) took the initiative to prepare the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention, 1960), which established the nuclear liability regime for most of Western Europe. This was one of the first nuclear conventions to deal with liability issues.
Supplementing the Paris Convention, the 1963 Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of July 29, 1960 (Brussels Supplementary Convention) was established to provide for greater compensation than is guaranteed under the original Paris Convention.
Thereafter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sought to replicate the principles of the Paris Convention within an international framework, and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna Convention, 1963) was born. The broad principles in these conventions can be summarized as follows:
- The no-fault liability principle (strict liability);
- Liability is channeled exclusively to the operator of the nuclear installation (legal channeling);
- Only courts of the state in which the nuclear accident occurs would have jurisdiction (exclusive jurisdiction);
- Limitation of the amount of liability and the time frame for claiming damages (limited liability); and
- The operator is required to have adequate insurance or financial guarantees to the extent of its liability amount (liability must be financially secured).
Today, the principles laid down by the Paris and Vienna Conventions form the bedrock of international nuclear liability law. Contracting states have the option either to transform the principles of the conventions into domestic laws or to directly implement the convention as self-executing. Many of these principles have also been replicated in the domestic laws of countries with civilian nuclear energy programs that are not party to any of the conventions. For instance, although Japan is not a party to any of the international conventions on nuclear liability, its nuclear liability law and implementing regulations largely capture the principles in the international agreements. Indonesia and Malaysia have also largely followed those principles and are the only countries in Southeast Asia to have passed such laws.
The effectiveness of the Paris and Vienna Conventions with respect to provision of prompt and adequate compensation payment to places affected by an accident has consistently been doubted. Many large nuclear energy–producing countries remain outside the two conventions, and many national laws differ from their provisions, thus impeding harmonization efforts. Further, some countries have limited liability requirements, and others have unlimited liability regimes, which also complicates the goal of achieving harmonization. Within the ASEAN region, Vietnam is considering whether to become a party to the Vienna Convention and has not yet framed its position on nuclear liability. Malaysia (with its Atomic Energy Licensing Act of 1984) and Indonesia (with its Act No. 10 of 1997) have enacted domestic laws that follow internationally accepted principles of exclusive operator liability and that place limitations on liability. However, these laws do not discuss the possibility of transboundary incidents, and the liability thresholds ($16 million for Malaysia and $93 million for Indonesia) are relatively low compared to other nuclear energy–producing countries. India, in addition to introducing the concept of supplier liability, has also placed limits on liability thresholds.
With the adoption of the Vienna Convention, two parallel conventions existed, neither of which applied to nuclear damage suffered in the territory of a party to the other convention. The accident at Chernobyl and the adoption of nuclear energy by many countries over the last few decades tested the two conventions and revealed them to be largely inefficient. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi has raised further questions about international nuclear liability. However, unlike the Chernobyl incident, which triggered a series of changes to the international nuclear liability regime, the incident at Fukushima has yet to result in further changes. This might be because of the minimal transboundary impact of Fukushima; however, the issue is evolving in light of the recent developments of radioactivity leaking into the water near Fukushima and the potential effect of radiation spreading into the Pacific Ocean. This incident has raised questions about the amount of liability and the exclusion of suppliers from any liability. The international community and regional players must now consider new models of nuclear liability for their respective regions.
The Impact of Chernobyl on the Liability Conventions
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 caused serious social and economic disruption for large portions of the populations of Belarus, the USSR, and Ukraine. The radioactive plume that resulted from the accident covered much of Europe, even reaching the United Kingdom in the first few days of May 1986.19 At the time of the incident, the USSR was not party to either the Paris Convention or the Vienna Convention and failed to notify its neighbors at the time the accident occurred.
Many years before the Chernobyl accident, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had settled the principles of international environmental law in the Trail Smelter Arbitration (1939) and the Corfu Channel Case (1949), finding that states have a duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm and have an obligation to pay compensation for harms caused. Despite the clarity of this legal position, no country could bring a valid claim seeking compensation against the USSR for Chernobyl for primarily three reasons: (1) the ICJ’s jurisdiction is consent-based, and the USSR would not subject itself to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in this matter; (2) the USSR had veto power in the United Nations; and (3) the USSR was not party to either the Paris or the Vienna Convention.20
The ramifications of Chernobyl exposed the weakness of the extant liability framework. The nuclear accident had affected thousands over a large geographic area; yet no legal remedy was available to the affected individuals or states, and liability thresholds were low at that time.21 Thus, the international community started the process of revisiting the existing nuclear liability laws.
With both the Paris and Vienna Conventions being independent of each other, it was open to states to adopt either of the conventions. This raised the issue of coordination and harmonization because, in general, no country could be a party to both conventions, because the exact details were not consistent and could lead to potential conflict in their simultaneous application.22 Thus, at the initiative of the IAEA and the OECD, in 1988 the two main conventions were linked by the Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention (1988 Joint Protocol), which came into force in 1992. Parties to the 1988 Joint Protocol are treated as if they are parties to both conventions. Therefore, if an incident in a country bound by the Paris Convention causes damage in a country bound by the Vienna Convention, the victims in the Vienna Convention country could claim compensation under the laws of the Paris Convention country.23
Many states have not ratified the 1988 Joint Protocol, including the United Kingdom and France. The problem of nonharmonization is illustrated by Russia’s present position. In 2005, Russia ratified the Vienna Convention. But, not being a member of the OECD, it did not adopt the Paris Convention. Nor did it adopt the 1988 Joint Protocol. Thus, if a situation similar to Chernobyl were to arise, Russia may have a legitimate argument that it is not a party to the Paris Convention and the Joint Protocol, and thereby could avoid compensating neighboring Paris Convention states.24
The Vienna Convention has also undergone significant changes. In 1997, delegates from more than eighty states adopted the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1997 Protocol), which entered into force in 2003. The 1997 Protocol extends the geographic scope of the Vienna Convention, sets the possible limit of an operator’s liability at not less than 300 million special drawing rights25 (a significant increase from the previous limit of $5 million), and broadens the definition of nuclear damage to include environmental damage. To date, the Vienna Convention, which aimed at universal adherence, has attracted the membership of only forty states.
Subsequent to the Chernobyl accident, the European Union undertook a complete revision of the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Conventions. The 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy26 of 29 July 1960 (2004 Protocol) is the most important of these revisions. The 2004 Protocol extends the geographic scope of accidents, raises the amount of compensation available to the victims, and enlarges the definition of nuclear damage. The new limits of liability were fixed for operators (insured) at €700 million, for the installation state (public funds) at €500 million, and for collective state contribution under the Brussels Convention at €300 million, or a total of €1.5 billion. The 2004 amendments removed the requirement for a state to restrict the maximum liability of a nuclear operator, thus allowing states preferring an unlimited liability policy to join the convention. However, the 2004 Protocol has not yet entered into force, because a majority of EU states, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, have not ratified it. Thus, the old liability limits, enacted in 1960 (i.e., €360 million), continue to apply.
In addition to the Paris and Vienna Conventions, in 1997 at the insistence of the United States, the IAEA sponsored another international nuclear liability regime, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC). The CSC was put in place primarily to align the U.S. Price-Anderson Act with international law. The CSC provides for two tiers of compensation. In the first tier, it fixes the amount of compensation at 300 million special drawing rights. To the extent that the funds from the operators are insufficient to cover this amount, the installation state has to make public funds available to capture the difference. In the second tier, if claims for compensation for nuclear damage exceed 300 million special drawing rights, additional amounts would have to be offered through contributions by member states based on their installed nuclear capacity. These additional amounts are to be provided through contributions by member states collectively on the basis of a formula that factors in the installed nuclear capacity of a state and a UN rate of assessment.27 The amount is therefore not fixed, but depends on the number of nuclear power plants in member countries and will increase as the nuclear capacity of a state increases.28 It is estimated that if most states that use nuclear power adhered to the CSC, the amount of the second tier would be more than 300 million special drawing rights29—an amount in addition to the first tier compensation of 300 million special drawing rights.
Another special feature of the CSC is that 50 percent of the international funds are to be used to compensate damage suffered both inside and outside the installation state, while the remaining 50 percent is to be used exclusively to compensate transboundary damage.30 Nevertheless, the allocation of international funds may vary depending on the national compensation made available by the installation state. Therefore, if the installation state prescribes a national compensation lower than 300 million special drawing rights, then the percentage of international funds exclusively available for compensating transboundary damage is to be increased accordingly.31 However, if the installation state makes available a national compensation amount of 600 million special drawing rights or higher, then the whole amount of supplementary compensation is to be used to compensate damage suffered both inside and outside the installation state.32
For transboundary damage to be compensated using international funds, the CSC requires that such damage should have occurred within the geographical scope of the CSC, that is, within the territory of a contracting party.33 In other words, the international funds are not available to non-contracting parties. However, with respect to the national compensation amount, the CSC leaves it to the discretion of the installation state to include or exclude damage suffered in another state that is not a party to the CSC. This discretion is, however, subject to other obligations of a contracting state that may arise under other international conventions on nuclear liability.
The advantage that the CSC offers is that it is an instrument to which all states may adhere regardless of whether they are parties to an existing nuclear liability convention and regardless of whether they have nuclear installations on their territory. The CSC can be adhered to even if contracting parties enter into regional arrangements or agreements for liability. However, an important requirement is that countries should enact national liability laws that are consistent with model law described in the annex to the CSC (or amend laws that are inconsistent) or the Vienna or Paris Convention. The CSC can therefore work as a “supplemental” convention: that is, over and above an existing convention. The CSC has not yet come into force, because it requires the ratification of five parties with a minimum of 400,000 MW of installed nuclear capacity.34 Fourteen countries, including India, have signed the CSC, but most have yet to ratify it. However, India has drafted a liability law that some argue is not in compliance with the CSC model law owing to the expanded concept of supplier liability that has been introduced in the law. (This is discussed in detail in Appendix C.) Therefore, India’s ratification of the CSC is in doubt.
Table 1, prepared by the World Nuclear Association, shows the nuclear power states and the liability conventions to which they are party.
Table 1. Nuclear Power States and Liability Conventions to Which They are Party35
|Argentina||VC; RVC; CSC||Lithuania||VC; JP|
|Belgium||PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC||Netherlands||PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC|
|Bulgaria||VC; JP||Romania||VC; JP; RVC; CSC|
|China||Slovak Republic||VC; JP|
|Czech Republic||VC; JP||Slovenia||PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC|
|Finland||PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC||South Africa|
|France||PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC||Spain||PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC|
|Germany||PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC||Sweden||PC; BSC; JP; RPC; RBSC|
|Hungary||VC; JP||Switzerland||PC; RPC; BSC; RBSC|
|Japan||United Arab Emirates||RVC|
|Kazakhstan||RVC||United Kingdom||PC; BSC; RPC; RBSC|
*India has signed the CSC but has not yet ratified it. Whether India’s domestic liability law conforms to the requirements of the convention is not yet clear.
Key to abbreviations: PC = Paris Convention; RPC = 2004 Revised Paris Protocol (not yet in force); BSC = Brussels Supplementary Convention; RBSC = 2004 Revised Brussels Supplementary Convention (not yet in force); VC = Vienna Convention; RVC = Revised Vienna Convention 1997; JP = 1988 Joint Protocol; CSC = Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (not yet in force)
Several key players, such as India, China, and Japan, are not yet party to any of the key conventions. Among the ASEAN countries, the Philippines and Indonesia have signed the Vienna Convention and the 1997 Protocol.36 It therefore is clear that a large portion of the world’s nuclear reactors continue to remain outside the framework of any of these conventions.
A comparative table highlighting key features of the three conventions has been included as Appendix A. While many of the principles in the three conventions are similar, there are differences in some of the provisions, including those in relation to the amount of liability, the time period within which a claim can be made, the geographical scope of application of these conventions, the definition of “nuclear damage,” and the approach to how compensation must be dispersed, among other issues. These differences in themselves highlight the need for a uniform framework.
Some believe that the lack of progress in attaining harmonization and consensus is owing to the different approaches subscribed to by two of the most important players: the United States and France. Whereas France supports the Paris Convention and the Joint Protocols, the United States is pushing for the CSC framework. However, in a joint French-U.S. statement from August 28, 2013, France indicated its support of the CSC framework and its desire to bring the CSC into force.37 Japan has recently indicated that it is proposing to introduce legislation to ratify the CSC. This ratification would be a major step toward bringing the international convention into force.38
The CSC framework would require more nuclear power countries, like China, India, France, and Japan, and possibly more European nuclear energy countries that are party to one of the liability conventions. The reason for this is because the installed capacity required for the CSC to come into effect requires the inclusion of major countries with high installed nuclear capacity. Furthermore, the participation of these countries is also imperative in making the CSC an effective framework, as it would increase access to the amount of funds that may be available in the case of a nuclear accident.
The robustness of all the existing conventions was considered in great detail in 1999 at an International Symposium in Budapest, organized by the OECD and the IAEA, on the issue of reform of civil nuclear liability.39 It was noted that the traditional opinion was that the special regime for nuclear liability developed in the 1960s, and it represented a fair compromise between the obligation to ensure the protection of the public and the economic and legal interests of the nuclear industry. It also noted that this traditional view was now beginning to be questioned to a certain extent, and that the issue of reform of nuclear liability was an evolving one.40
In the aftermath of Fukushima, the questions challenging this traditional view are increasing, and the issue of reform needs to be revisited, keeping in mind new and evolving challenges facing the nuclear industry and the public good.
The Impact of Fukushima on the International Liability Framework
The incident at Fukushima has underlined the lack of a reliable universal liability framework, reflecting the inability of the international community to achieve a universal harmonized regime.41
Major Japanese industries such as agriculture, fishing, and tourism were heavily affected by the incident at Fukushima.42 However, because the accident occurred on the eastern side of Japan, bordering the Pacific Ocean, the transboundary impact on other countries has been insubstantial. Nevertheless, the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation suggests that the full impact may not be known for years.43 At this stage, though, liability and compensation issues have been limited within the jurisdiction of Japan.44 Japan has not acceded to any of the international nuclear liability conventions but has its own domestic legislation, which, again, does not provide recourse to people affected outside the territory of Japan. Had the accident occurred in the western region of Japan, it might have caused considerable damage in South Korea. The Fukushima nuclear accident emphasizes the need to undertake reforms that are acceptable to more countries. With total costs estimated at well over $100 billion,45 the Fukushima accident is also a reminder of the low caps on liability in extant liability laws and the corresponding obligation of the government to pay compensation, as well as the potential impact such an incident could have on neighboring countries.
Many experts now conclude “that the need to revisit and revise regulations regarding financial responsibility for nuclear accidents has been clear and compelling for at least a quarter of a century (since Chernobyl) and has been made overwhelmingly obvious by Fukushima.”46 And many now hope that the Fukushima accident will serve as a catalyst for real progress in the nuclear liability regime.47
The IAEA has responded to the accident by emphasizing the need to achieve a “global” nuclear liability regime. In June 2011, the IAEA adopted a “Draft Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.” On the matter of the nuclear liability regime, the action plan states:
Member States to work towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing appropriate compensation for nuclear damage. The IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) to recommend actions to facilitate achievement of such a global regime. Member States to give due consideration to the possibility of joining the international nuclear liability instruments as a step toward achieving such a global regime.48
Responding to the action plan, INLEX recommended actions to achieve such a global regime.49 Overall, the recommendations advise states to participate in the existing international regimes in order to take advantage of the higher level of flexibility offered by these conventions. Repeated requests to states to adhere to the international conventions have, however, not yielded concrete results.
Perhaps the approach needs to shift from looking for international consensus on issues of nuclear liability to focusing on how various regions decide to approach nuclear liability. For example, the EU has called for greater harmonization through involvement of the EU. A communication from the European Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament–Nuclear Illustrative Program (NIP), presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty, makes clear that because a majority of new EU states follow the Vienna Convention, the Commission is seeking to harmonize nuclear liability rules within the Community; and that in order to finalize and improve the proposals already made, the discussion should focus on developing a harmonized liability scheme and mechanisms to ensure the availability of funds in the event of damage caused by a nuclear accident.50 Further, in its July 12, 2007, opinion to NIP, the European Economic and Social Committee states that for greater acceptability of nuclear power, the current system (liability insurance of €700 million) is inadequate.51 Arguments calling upon further EU involvement through a European Nuclear Liability Directive are also being advanced.52
Regional cooperative structures similar to those advocated by the EU may also prove useful for South Asian countries and countries within the ASEAN region.
The Impact of the International Conventions on Asia
The IAEA estimates that Asia may well be the engine of the world’s nuclear energy growth. The energy requirements of Asian countries are already significant and continue to grow. Despite the Fukushima incident, the IAEA estimates that the majority of global expansion of nuclear power will be in Asia.53
Because of the potential transboundary impact of nuclear incidents, countries within the region must have a clear mechanism for how to react in the event of a Fukushima- or Chernobyl-type incident. Apart from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Philippines, and Indonesia, none of the Asian or Asia-Pacific countries that have a significant stake in nuclear energy or are committed to a nuclear energy program are parties to any of the international liability conventions that are in force. This position seriously compromises the efficient operation of nuclear power plants in this region. In the event of a cross-border incident (such as Chernobyl), avoiding liability would not be difficult.
Unlike Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, most Asian countries do not have a domestic nuclear liability law, and the few such laws that do exist do not address transboundary issues. However, concerns have been voiced within the South Asia region about nuclear power plants that are sited close to international borders. Considering the scale of nuclear power expansion and new plans, such issues will only escalate in the future.
Sri Lanka in 2012 raised serious concerns about India’s Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). Located on the Tamil Nadu coast, the plant is 250 kilometers from the island nation, which has continually raised safety concerns throughout the construction process. Further, Bangladesh’s proposed nuclear power project, which is 50 kilometers aerially from the Indian border, may result in India raising concerns about the siting of this project. Similarly, future nuclear power plants within the ASEAN region could also pose serious concerns for all neighboring countries within the region, irrespective of whether such countries are pursuing a nuclear energy program.
International momentum on framing a universal nuclear liability regime has been slow. The reforms following Chernobyl have largely been ineffective. For example, the 1997 Vienna Protocol has only ten ratifications, and the 2004 Paris Protocol has only two (Norway and Switzerland). Europe, which bore the brunt of the Chernobyl disaster, still does not have a harmonized liability regime; and many countries in Europe continue to adhere only to the original Paris or Vienna Convention.
The slow progress on transboundary principles of international nuclear liability law should be kept in mind by countries in the ASEAN and South Asia region. Early engagement on the issue of international nuclear liability is necessary so that effective regional frameworks can be put in place before more nuclear power plants become operational in these regions. The difficulty of a truly international framework such as the CSC or the Vienna Convention is the sheer number of countries and interests involved. Regions such as the EU, South Asia, and Southeast Asia might find that focusing on achieving regional agreements is a more effective way of building a robust liability regime.54
Challenges Faced by Countries in Which the Operator Will Be from a Different Country
The situation of liability on a foreign operator is likely to be seen more and more, as countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Vietnam—new entrants to nuclear power—come to rely extensively on foreign technology, material, and expertise. None of the international conventions or domestic laws of countries address the possible challenges that such a scenario may raise.
This evolving issue can already be seen in the UAE. On the recommendation of the IAEA, the UAE established a Nuclear Energy Program Implementation Organization, which in turn established the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) as an Abu Dhabi public entity, initially funded with $100 million to evaluate and implement nuclear power plants within the UAE. Consequently, bids were invited from foreign companies including AREVA, GDF Suez, and a Korean consortium.55 The Korean consortium was led by Korea Electric Power Co. (KEPCO), and included Samsung, Hyundai, Doosan, and Westinghouse. In December 2009, ENEC announced that the KEPCO-led consortium had been selected.
Importantly, one of the KEPCO subsidiaries, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. Ltd., will play the key role of engineering, procurement, and construction contractor as well as be the operator of the proposed nuclear power plant.56 Further, Korea Power Engineering Co. Inc. will provide the nuclear power plant design and engineering service, while Korea Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd will provide the fuel. Korea Plant Service and Engineering Co. Ltd will be involved in plant maintenance.57
Therefore, the UAE has now embarked on a nuclear power program that depends on almost all the material, technology, and expertise being imported from South Korean entities. While the UAE has drafted a law on nuclear liability that is completely in sync with the provisions of the Vienna Convention, and accordingly provides for exclusive channeling of liability to the operator,58 it is important to note that the operator in this instance will be a foreign entity. The liability limit is set at roughly 450 million special drawing rights (approximately $694 million), higher than that prescribed under the Vienna Convention.
While the provisions of the UAE law in themselves are sufficient to channel the liability to the operator, this situation does raise a few challenges. For instance, the nuclear regulator in the UAE is the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation, whose board must consist of citizens of the UAE.59 However, the senior management, including the director general and other senior scientists, are experts from other countries. Further, as already noted, the operator and key suppliers will also all be from other countries. In the event of a nuclear incident, the host country would have to determine compensation claims and the extent of liability. In the absence of a dedicated domestic team of experts in the field of nuclear energy, this would presumably raise significant challenges in the exercise of such jurisdiction and the determination of liability issues that may arise.
Another issue is in relation to the possibility of disputes arising out of enforcement of court awards against a foreign entity. While the UAE liability law does provide that the operator would be under an obligation to obtain and maintain insurance and guarantees as available in the financial markets,60 the practical considerations of enforcing these obligations against an entity that is not based in the home country need to be factored into any discussions on changes to new international or regional liability arrangements. Further, from the perspective of a foreign operator, it may consider incorporating a local subsidiary company within the jurisdiction of the country in which it will operate and seek to insulate its parent company from the impact of any liability that may arise.
These are only a sampling of some of the possible conflicts that can arise in cases involving a large portion of a country’s nuclear industry being operated by foreign entities, with the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms being handled by domestic entities. The IAEA and countries newly entering the field of nuclear energy need to consider these issues as well in framing a new liability regime.
19 A. V. Lowe, Colin Warbrick, and John Woodliffe, “Chernobyl: Four Years On,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 (2) (1990): 461–471. See also L. A. Malone, “The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution” (1987), Faculty Publications, Paper 590, http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/590.
20 Malone, “The Chernobyl Accident.”
21 For an indication of the costs of the Chernobyl accident, see Belarus Foreign Ministry, “Chernobyl Disaster: Why are the Consequences Still Observed and Why is the International Assistance Still Critical?” available at http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/docs/belarus_23_anniversary.pdf.
22 World Nuclear Association, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Liability-for-Nuclear-Damage/#.UbgEHfYY3I8.
24 Mulavana Parameswaran Ram Mohan, “Transboundary Nuclear Liability Regime: A Case for South Asian Nuclear Energy Risk Community,” Ph.D. dissertation, Indian Institute of Technology at Kharagpur, 2012. See also 1997 Vienna Convention, Article 1A (2) & (3).
25 Approximately US $455 million.
26 The 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy.
27 See IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Articles III and IV, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html.
28 See Ben McRae, “The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: Catalyst for a Global Nuclear Liability Regime,” available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlb/nlb-79/017-035%20-%20Article%20Ben%20McRae.pdf.
30 See IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Article XI (1) (a) and (b).
31 Ibid., Article XI (1) (c).
32 Ibid., Article XI (2).
33 Ibid., Article V.
34 Ibid., Article XX.
35 World Nuclear Association, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Liability-for-Nuclear-Damage/#.UbgEHfYY3I8.
36 Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.
37 Joint Statement on Liability for Nuclear Damage amongst France and the United States, available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Joint%20Statement%20Signed_0.pdf.
38 “Japan Looks to Ratify Liability Accord,” World Nuclear News, December 13, 2013, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Japan-looks-to-ratify-liability-accord-1312134.html.
39 Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability, International Symposium, Budapest, Hungary, May 31–June 3, 1999, available at https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/nea2188-liability.pdf.
40 See ibid., foreword by Patrick Reyners, 5–7.
41 Ram Mohan, “Transboundary Nuclear Liability Regime.”
42 Eri Osaka, “Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 21 (3) (June 2012): 433–459.
43 UNSCEAR 2012, Interim Findings of Fukushima-Daiichi Assessment presented at the Annual Meeting of UNSCEAR, available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2012/unisous144.htm.
44 OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, “Fukushima Press Kit” (2012), http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/press-kits/fukushima.html.
45 Kyoko Hasegawa, “Fukushima Operator Warns Clean Up May Cost 125 billion,” available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jbDwBCdfyO8lz4LNAYPgqVNPO0RQ?docId=CNG.9394a22b87c85b55c6e1f77e575fb76d.5e1. See also Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yasumasa Song, “Fukushima $137 Billion Cost has TEPCO Seeking More Aid,” Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-07/fukushima-137-billion-cost-has-tepco-seeking-more-aid.html.
46 Mark Cooper, “Nuclear Liability: The Market-Based, Post-Fukushima Case for Ending Price-Anderson,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 5, 2011, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-liability-the-market-based-post-Fukushima-case-ending-Price-Anderson.
47 Patrick Reyners, “A New World Governance for Nuclear Safety after Fukushima?” International Journal of Nuclear Law 4 (1) (2013): 63–77.
48 IAEA 2011, Draft IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/Documents/gc55-14.pdf.
49 IAEA, IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety—Nuclear Liability (Vienna: IAEA, 2012), http://ola.iaea.org/OLA/documents/ActionPlan.pdf.
50 Commission of the European Communities 2007, Nuclear Illustrative Programme: Presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, discussed in “Legal Study for the Accession of Euratom to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,” available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/132800046/2009_12_accession_euratom.
52 Jakub Handrlica, “Euratom Powers in the Field of Nuclear Liability Revisited,” International Journal of Nuclear Law 3 (1) (2010): 1–18.
53 IAEA, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050, IAEA Reference Data Series no. 1 (Vienna: IAEA, 2011), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/RDS1_31.pdf.
54 For a detailed analysis on the merits of regional agreements, see Mohan, “Transboundary Nuclear Liability Regime.”
55 World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Arab-Emirates/#.UiV2fmQY3cw.
58 Articles 3 and 4 of UAE Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012, available at http://www.fanr.gov.ae/En/AboutFANR/OurWork/Documents/Federal-Law-by-Decree-No-4-of-2012-Concerning-Civil-Liability-for-Nuclear-Damage-English.pdf.
60 Article 8.