The Geography of American Opportunity

Featuring Michael D. Tubbs, Katherine S. Newman, and Reid G. Hoffman
UPCOMING EVENT

**June 3, 2024**

Richard Gilder Center for Science, Education, and Innovation, New York

A New York Reception to Welcome Newly Elected Members

Featuring **Sean Decatur** (American Museum of Natural History) and **David W. Oxtoby** (American Academy of Arts and Sciences)

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ON THE COVER: Rural farmland divided by a road with powerlines. Tulare County, California, August 20, 2022.
As I write this final Bulletin message of my presidency, my thoughts about endings seem to naturally wander back to beginnings. In my first Annual Report message, I noted that upon taking on the role of president of the Academy in 2019, I quickly came to appreciate that the true essence of the Academy lies in building connections among our community of members – and the disciplines, experiences, and perspectives they represent.

What I could not conceive in 2019 was the nature of the remarkable journey on which our Academy was about to embark. Our members came together to ensure that the Academy rose to the unprecedented challenges of this era in the spirit that our founders intended in 1780.

Little more than a year into my term as president, the COVID-19 pandemic struck. Thanks to this remarkable community of members, the Academy did not merely survive – it thrived. Our virtual events engaged more members in more places than ever before, we concluded a successful $100 million fundraising campaign – exceeding the goal ahead of schedule – and we convened our members to address the challenges that the pandemic posed in education, the arts, the sciences, international affairs, and more.

Our members continued to convene to address each new challenge as it emerged. Incidents of police violence and the ensuing protests for racial justice inspired the Board to issue a rare public statement on anti-racism and to act on that statement through our membership diversity initiative and the new Legacy Recognition Program. The January 6th insurrection at the U.S. Capitol underscored the importance of the Academy’s work to help strengthen democracy by implementing the recommendations in the 2020 Academy report, Our Common Purpose. The conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza lent new urgency to the work Academy members have been pursuing in the areas of humanitarian health assistance and in exploring the implications of such conflicts for the global nuclear order. And the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic decision overturning affirmative action had far-reaching implications for many Academy members and Affiliate institutions, who have been gathering regularly to assess the situation and collaborate on ways to respond.

Not only am I proud of how our members have come together to address these crises through the work of the Academy, but I am also awed by the many ways our members have individually helped to lead America and the world through this turbulent era. Included among our members are some of the pioneering researchers who helped develop the COVID-19 vaccines; leading voices for racial justice in academia, business, and philanthropy; dedicated public servants striving to strengthen democracy and resolve global conflicts; and education leaders working to ensure that young people have access to a more hopeful future.

I, for one, do have hope – and I have many of you to thank for that. It is a hope borne not only of what we have achieved together but also of what lies immediately before us, including Academy work in the areas of artificial intelligence, climate action, economic opportunity, higher education, international affairs, and the humanities and culture.

It has been the honor of a lifetime to join you on this journey as president, and I look forward to continuing it as an active member for many years to come. Thank you.

David W. Oxtoby
By Dædalus Editorial

How do we counter implicit bias in its individual and systemic manifestations? This question is explored in the Winter 2024 issue of Dædalus by leading scholars, scientists, and policymakers who examine the science behind implicit bias—the residue of stereotyped associations and social patterns that exists outside our conscious awareness but reinforces inequality in the world.

“Understanding Implicit Bias: Insights & Innovations,” edited by Goodwin Liu and Camara Phyllis Jones, features research and perspectives from a range of areas, including antidiscrimination law, early education, neuroscience, policing, social psychology, and workforce diversity.

Stemming from a workshop convened by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, the volume highlights the work of those conducting research and leading interventions, as well as those with deep experience navigating issues of diversity, discrimination, and antiracism. Each provides models to help us understand the individual-level and structural causes of persistent inequalities.

“Understanding Implicit Bias: Insights & Innovations” is available on the Academy’s website at www.amacad.org/daedalus/understanding-implicit-bias-insights-innovations. Dædalus is an open access publication.
“Understanding Implicit Bias: Insights & Innovations” features the following essays:

Preface: Recognizing Implicit Bias in the Scientific & Legal Communities
David Baltimore, David S. Tatel & Anne-Marie Mazza

Introduction: Implicit Bias in the Context of Structural Racism
Goodwin Liu & Camara Phyllis Jones

Seeing the Unseen
Eric H. Holder, Jr.

The Case for Data Visibility
Marcella Nunez-Smith

The Science of Implicit Race Bias: Evidence from the Implicit Association Test
Kirsten N. Morehouse & Mahzarin R. Banaji

The Implicit Association Test
Kate A. Ratliff & Colin Tucker Smith

Young Children & Implicit Racial Biases
Andrew N. Meltzoff & Walter S. Gilliam

Uncovering Implicit Racial Bias in the Brain: The Past, Present & Future
Jennifer T. Kubota

Implicit Bias as a Cognitive Manifestation of Systemic Racism
Manuel J. Galvan & B. Keith Payne

“When the Cruiser Lights Come On”:
Using the Science of Bias & Culture to Combat Racial Disparities in Policing
Rebecca C. Hetey, MarYam G. Hamedani, Hazel Rose Markus & Jennifer L. Eberhardt

Disrupting the Effects of Implicit Bias: The Case of Discretion & Policing
Jack Glaser

Roles for Implicit Bias Science in Antidiscrimination Law
Anthony G. Greenwald & Thomas Newkirk

Little Things Matter a Lot: The Significance of Implicit Bias, Practically & Legally
Jerry Kang

Retooling Career Systems to Fight Workplace Bias: Evidence from U.S. Corporations
Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin

Implicit Bias versus Intentional Belief: When Morally Elevated Leadership Drives Transformational Change
Wanda A. Sigur & Nicholas M. Donofrio

Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, Who’s the Fairest of Them All?
Alice Xiang

Deprogramming Implicit Bias: The Case for Public Interest Technology
Darren Walker

Beyond Implicit Bias
Thomas D. Albright, William A. Darity Jr., Diana Dunn, Rayid Ghani, Deena Hayes-Greene, Tanya Katerí Hernández & Sheryl Heron
Understanding Chinese and Russian Views on U.S. Missile Defense

By Ottawa Sanders, Raymond Frankel Nuclear Security Policy Fellow

In today’s world – characterized by great-power competition and ongoing crises in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East – missile defense, previously a Cold War concern, has resurfaced as a prominent issue. State and non-state actors are relying on missile capabilities to achieve their military objectives. For example, in Yemen, Houthi forces have launched missiles originating from Iran against military and civilian targets in the Middle East. The missile threat plays a significant role in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza wars. North Korea’s missile program is progressing, and in recent years it has conducted missile tests in East Asia, escalating tensions with U.S. allies in the region. And China and Russia are enhancing their missile capabilities, further complicating relations between the United States and China and between the United States and Russia.

The United States allocates significant resources to address regional and global missile threats. It is developing, testing, and deploying missile defense technology designed to counter short-, medium-, intermediate-, and long-range missiles. The U.S. missile defense system utilizes a network of sensors, radars, and interceptor missiles positioned globally, alongside a command, control, battle management, and communication network to...
In April 2023, the Academy’s project on Promoting Dialogue on Arms Control and Disarmament published *Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship among the United States, Russia, and China* to address the growing tensions and worrisome trends for the security and stability of the global nuclear order. The publication features contributions from two experts: Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in the nuclear policy program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Dmitry Stefanovich, a research fellow at the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

In their respective essays, the authors discuss China’s and Russia’s concerns regarding the expansion of U.S. missile defense capabilities. Both China and Russia maintain that U.S. missile defense undermines strategic stability by compromising their ability to retaliate against a nuclear first strike. The authors offer recommendations for improving strategic relations between the United States and China and between the United States and Russia. They emphasize the importance of candid discussions as a way to resolve misunderstandings regarding the intentions and missile defense capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States.

**U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE THROUGH THE EYES OF CHINA**

In his contribution, Tong Zhao presents China’s perspective on U.S. missile defense capabilities. He explains that China is worried that future U.S. missile defense systems may undermine China’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. He notes that “China has long been concerned that the United States could launch a comprehensive nuclear first strike on China and then use its missile defenses to intercept the surviving Chinese nuclear missiles.”

However, given the tense relations between the United States and China, pursuing such cooperative measures may be difficult and Beijing may be motivated to take unilateral actions to address the perceived missile threat from the United States. These actions could include expanding China’s nuclear forces and strengthening its missile defense capabilities.

Zhao offers recommendations on how progress regarding the strategic relationship between the United States and China may be possible. His recommendations include managing the connection between strategic and regional missile defenses, addressing the overlap of missile defense and anti-satellite technologies, mitigating the impact of the North Korean threat on U.S.-China strategic relations, and reducing crisis instability. In terms of managing the connection between strategic and regional missile defenses, China is less concerned about regional missile defense systems deployed by the United States and more concerned about the potential impact that U.S. strategic missile defenses may have on China’s own strategic nuclear deterrent against the United States.

Since the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, adversaries such as China and Russia have expressed concerns about the U.S. missile defense system. These concerns have amplified in recent years, heightening U.S. tensions with China and Russia. Scholars and policymakers are actively seeking to comprehend how U.S. adversaries perceive U.S. missile defense, in an effort to foster mutual understanding and common ground. This effort is crucial for alleviating tensions and averting conflict escalation.
Washington and Beijing should discuss the best combination of capabilities that would give the United States the ability to defend against North Korea but not be too threatening toward China.

Zhao also discusses the risk that missile defense could increase crisis instability between the United States and China. He states that “the specific thinking and policies of the United States and China could affect the likelihood of conflict initiation and the risk of escalation.”

For example, China is suspicious that the U.S. left-of-launch concept, which seeks to target offensive missile threats prior to launch, may lead the United States to use missile defense as a guise for preemptive strikes. Furthermore, China’s countermeasures to U.S. missile defense may lead to inadvertent escalation during a crisis. Zhao concludes by stating that a “better understanding of each other’s thinking is urgently necessary if China and the United States are to address crisis instability.”

It is vital that U.S. policymakers gain a better understanding of China’s and Russia’s perspectives on U.S. missile defense as a way to improve U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia strategic relations and preclude armed conflict and crisis escalation.

Russia is also concerned that U.S. missile defense systems undermine Russia’s second-strike capability. “The basis of the Russian concern with missile defense,” writes Stefanovich, is that “… it is designed to minimize the effects of the strategic delivery systems still able to launch after the United States carries out a first counterforce strike.” In other words, Russia fears that U.S. missile defense would erode its ability to retaliate in response to a U.S. attack on its forces.

According to Stefanovich, hypersonic weapons, which are highly maneuverable weapons that travel at least five times the speed of sound, are an important countermeasure that Russia has developed to help overcome adversarial missile defenses. Russia’s Avangard missile system, classified as a hypersonic glide vehicle, was deployed in late 2019 and represents “the first operational strategic hypersonic weapon in the world.”

Stefanovich explains that Russian military planners are concerned about the deployment of U.S. space capabilities that enable and enhance Earth-based missile defenses. These include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as well as early warning systems. Russia is also concerned about the global nature of U.S. missile defense, especially the distribution of U.S. missile defense assets and those in positions in close proximity to Russia. Stefanovich writes that with a few exceptions, “Russia deploys hardly any missile defense assets abroad,” yet it does have a growing missile defense capability. He notes that this trend “might lead both to Russian officials better understanding the U.S. drivers of missile defense development and to U.S. officials taking a greater interest in joint limits (or at least

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transparency) on existing and future missile defenses.”

Engaging in open discussions about present and anticipated missile defense systems could pave the way for collaboration in the future.

Stefanovich offers several suggestions for future cooperation. He calls for more open Track I discussions between the United States and Russia. At present, such negotiations are at a standstill. Russian officials maintain that missile defense must be a part of discussions concerning strategic stability, yet the United States has resisted because U.S. officials believe that missile defense capabilities are necessary to defend against “rogue states” like North Korea. Stefanovich suggests that the United States could unilaterally use less aggressive language in its next Missile Defense Review as a way of encouraging dialogue. Furthermore, Russia appears to be open to non-legally binding agreements and this could create opportunities for a new era of arms control. Stefanovich offers that while we might not see a document similar to the 1972 ABM Treaty, addressing misperceptions and misunderstandings will be crucial in future agreements.

A BROADER DISCUSSION

As the publication on Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship among the United States, Russia, and China shows, it is vital that U.S. policymakers gain a better understanding of China’s and Russia’s perspectives on U.S. missile defense as a way to improve U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia strategic relations and preclude armed conflict and crisis escalation. To further narrow the gaps in our understanding, on January 23, 2024, the Academy partnered with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to host a roundtable discussion that explored some of the broader ideas presented in the publication. The participants, who joined either online or in person, represented both the academic and policy communities. The meeting featured Tong Zhao, who shared an overview of his findings and recommendations, and Steven E. Miller (Harvard Kennedy School), chair of the Academy’s project on Promoting Dialogue on Arms Control and Disarmament, who served as the discussant. Some of the topics discussed included perceptions and misperceptions fueling mistrust between the United States and China, the potential for arms races, the significance of communication in understanding intentions and capabilities, and the impact of U.S. missile defense on China’s nuclear modernization program. The Academy is pursuing future opportunities to engage with Chinese and Russian experts and former officials on missile defense and related issues through the Track II dialogues that are a component of the Academy’s Promoting Dialogue project.

The continuing conflict in Ukraine, the potential for armed confrontation over Taiwan, and other persistent regional crises may worsen U.S. bilateral relations with China and Russia. Given that all three nuclear-armed major powers are enhancing their missile defense capabilities, it is crucial for the United States to take into account the concerns of both China and Russia with respect to its own missile defense, and for China and Russia to do so as well. This approach would foster some stability in U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations amid prolonged and potential future conflicts.

As for where we go from here, the Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship among the United States, Russia, and China publication poses several questions regarding the future of U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations in the context of missile defense.

- What domestic, regional, and international conditions need to be in place to help facilitate U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia negotiations on missile defense?
- What are the consequences of speculating on the worst-case scenarios regarding the future missile defense capabilities of the United States, Russia, and China?
- What impact do misperceptions and misunderstandings about doctrine, force posture, and capabilities have on U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia strategic relations?
- Could missile defense negotiations lead to future arms control efforts?

Answers to these questions may be uncertain. However, better managing the competition between the United States and China and ending Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine could create the kinds of
conditions needed for U.S. bilateral negotiations with China and Russia on missile defense. Yet, given the complex geopolitical dynamics between the three powers, such negotiations may not occur in the near term. Furthermore, the consequences of speculating on worst-case scenarios may further erode trust, and misperceptions and misunderstandings about doctrine, force posture, and capabilities risk conflict initiation and escalation. Yet, a silver lining is that U.S. bilateral negotiations with China and Russia, if they were to take place and succeed, could potentially lead to arms control in other areas. With that said, failure to address the missile defense concerns of the United States, China, and Russia could endanger the populations of these countries and pose a threat to the global community.

ENDNOTES

1. A missile is an offensive weapon used to strike a target. Missile defense is a weapon system designed to intercept an incoming adversary missile.


3. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a 1972 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that sought to place limits on the anti-missile systems of both countries. The United States withdrew from the treaty in 2002 because officials argued that the treaty prevented the United States from developing defenses against terrorist ballistic missile attacks. For more information on the ABM Treaty, see Arms Control Association, “The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a Glance,” https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty.


5. Strategic stability, as defined here, consists of two dimensions. The first one concerns arms race stability, defined as an absence of an action-reaction cycle to build up nuclear forces. And the second is crisis stability, defined as the absence of an incentive to initiate nuclear use.


7. Ibid., 5.

8. Ibid., 13.

9. Ibid., 18.

10. Ibid., 26.

11. Ibid., 28.

12. Dmitry Stefanovich, “The Indispensable Link: Strategic Defensive Capabilities as a Cornerstone of Arms Control and Arms Racing,” in Tong Zhao and Dmitry Stefanovich, Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship among the United States, Russia, and China (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2023), 32.

13. In addition to Russia, China has also acquired hypersonic weapons. The United States is actively pursuing the development of hypersonic weapons and it has some limited hypersonic capabilities. For more information on hypersonic weapons, see Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Fact Sheet: Hypersonic Weapons,” https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-hypersonic-weapons.


15. Ibid., 43.

16. Ibid.

17. Track I dialogues are a form of diplomacy that entails dialogue between heads of state, diplomats, and other high-ranking government officials for the purposes of building relationships and fostering peace. Track II dialogues are unofficial exchanges between nongovernmental experts. For more information on Track I and Track II dialogues, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Multi-Track Diplomacy Explained,” https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/multi-track-diplomacy-explained.


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To learn more about the Academy’s project on Promoting Dialogue on Arms Control and Disarmament, please visit www.amacad.org/project/promoting-dialogue-arms-control-disarmament.
In light of the 2023 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College and v. University of North Carolina, which bans the consideration of applicants’ racial status in admissions decision-making, the Academy’s Education program area engaged senior leaders of Affiliate institutions with the goal of supporting these leaders’ commitments to equity in higher education.

Kim Wilcox (chancellor of the University of California, Riverside) and Academy member Joanne Berger-Sweeney (president of Trinity College) cochaired this initiative. To broaden the reach and impact of this work, the Academy also partnered with the American Council on Education (ACE) and with EducationCounsel. The aim of this project was to create responsive strategies for institutions as they navigate this new legal environment so that they can continue working to expand equitable opportunities to students throughout the U.S. system of higher education.

Prior to the Court’s ruling in June 2023, the Academy hosted several virtual convenings. These virtual sessions brought institutional leaders together to discuss ways to prepare their campuses and identify best practices to address the upcoming decision and shift away from affirmative action policies in higher education.

In August 2023, following the Court’s ruling, the Academy hosted an exploratory meeting that convened more than forty university presidents, provosts, senior administrators, and experts to discuss effective policies and strategies for how to build an equitable and diverse higher education system.

The two-day event was filled with lively discussions about the challenges and successes of working toward more equitable campuses. The attendees discussed how universities have historically failed America’s most marginalized students; received a briefing on the current legal context; shared how to best make the case for equity in admissions processes and beyond to different audiences and stakeholders; and, most importantly, highlighted best practices that can aid in the goal of continuing to make higher education a more equitable space.

In April 2024, the Academy published a summary that highlights the strategies, recommendations, and approaches identified by the meeting participants that would help leaders across higher education move their institutions forward for the success of their students and society at large. These themes include centering equity throughout campus; uniting committed and collaborative university leaders for systemic change; communicating the value of equity to constituents; fostering community partnerships; and highlighting and funding the valuable expertise and contributions of Minority-Serving Institutions (MSIs) and Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). One attendee stressed that it is imperative that universities adopt an “and not or” mindset and emphasized that full systemic change is necessary and not optional, even when leaders face direct challenges to their institutions’ missions of equity in higher education.

The Academy is grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Mellon Foundation for their support, interest, commitment, and active participation in this project.

The meeting summary and more information about the project may be found at www.amacad.org/publication/leading-for-a-future-higher-education-equity.
Mental health in America is a looming crisis, silently corroding the fabric of society. Despite increased awareness, the statistics paint a sobering picture: one in five adults grapple with mental illness annually, yet access to adequate care remains challenging, especially in rural areas. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies can significantly transform mental health care by providing tailored interventions, early detection tools, and convenient therapy options if concerns about access, ethics, and equity are addressed.

These issues were at the forefront of a Mental Health and AI exploratory meeting held at the Academy on March 11–12, 2024. Chaired by Alan Leshner (American Association for the Advancement of Science) and Paul Dagum (Applied Cognition), the meeting convened computer science, medicine, psychiatry, sociology, and policy experts to discuss emerging technology’s potential and pitfalls for diagnosing and treating mental health disorders.

The participants agreed that AI has already changed the landscape...
Artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies can significantly transform mental health care by providing tailored interventions, early detection tools, and convenient therapy options if concerns about access, ethics, and equity are addressed.

of mental health. As more Americans suffer from mental illness and cost and location become more prohibitive toward treatment, a growing number are turning to AI-powered chatbots for cognitive behavioral therapy. Some practitioners are already using AI to analyze brain scans to detect physical indicators of disease. AI-driven predictive analytics can help clinicians identify personalized treatment options and anticipate potential relapses, enhancing the effectiveness of mental health research and interventions.

The future of AI is more revolutionary, and at least now, more uncertain. Several attendees acknowledged that we lack an understanding of mental health disorders, and AI could be instrumental in improving our knowledge base and allowing for better definitions and categorization of mental health disorders. However, there remained significant disagreement about its potential for treatment. Some saw AI as an aide to human practitioners, one more in a list of available tools to save time, provide more precise diagnosis, and monitor patients’ moods between sessions. Others envisioned AI as an eventual replacement for human providers, especially for individuals currently receiving insufficient care.

A mix of AI technologists and human practitioners initiated another discussion about providing treatment that was ethical and equitable. Some participants expressed skepticism about AI’s lack of humanity, asking questions like whether an entity that will never experience death can effectively provide comfort. Others wondered about the potential conflict between AI maintaining user engagement and delivering the most beneficial messages to the patient, if not most welcome. The group pondered the ultimate risk of testing AI, in which optimal outcomes are less clear than in other areas of health care, and mistakes at the treatment level can cause severe and permanent damage.

Many were quick to point out the cultural variability in reactions to treatment, showing data suggesting some users prefer chatbots to human therapists while others lie or withhold data. Some attendees noted that advanced AI features like natural language processing only work for some languages, creating issues with access for all people. Others emphasized that inequitable access already exists for many rural populations, indicating that AI-powered treatments improve the current lack of treatment. Finally, several people indicated that building and testing models must benefit current and future patients and urged for equitable design and the creation of policy guardrails.

While multiple groups are starting to develop AI-specific policies, few guardrails exist to govern the use of AI in mental health. Personal data breaches and the lack of mental health insurance reimbursements are significant concerns that cannot be ignored. Moreover, current regulations have failed to keep up with the pace of technology. However, establishing regulations and policies around data ownership and health care payer models can mitigate the risks and help ensure that the benefits of AI are accessible to all who need them.

During the second day of the meeting, participants discussed ways to continue to develop this work. They were excited about the potential of this technology and the ways that the Academy could lead in guiding the research and policy to ensure ethical and equitable applications. The Academy is currently exploring the space of mental health and technology in greater depth.
The Geography of American Opportunity

2120th Stated Meeting | February 27, 2024 | Stanford Park Hotel, Menlo Park, CA
The gap between the richest and poorest communities in the United States has grown significantly over the last few decades. There are places where population growth has stalled, business development has slowed, jobs have disappeared, and insecurity has increased. On February 27, 2024, the Academy hosted a conversation with entrepreneur Reid G. Hoffman, sociologist Katherine S. Newman, and founder of End Poverty in California Michael D. Tubbs about the geography of opportunity in the United States. The program included an introduction by Academy President David W. Oxtoby and closing remarks from Goodwin Liu, Chair of the Academy’s Board of Directors. The event was inspired by the work of the Academy’s Commission on Reimagining Our Economy and its recommendations to build a people-first economy that ensures no Americans and no communities are left behind. An edited version of the conversation follows.
Good evening. I think it is both fitting and ironic that we are having this conversation in one of the wealthiest places in this country. As we begin our program, I am thinking about the bartender at our reception and about the folks who checked me in at the hotel. I hope we keep these individuals in mind as we talk about the geography of opportunity in our country. When we think about the economy, it is always divorced from people—the economy is doing this, and the economy is doing that. I appreciate that the Academy is focusing on people, because there is no economy without people, particularly the people whom we called essential workers just a couple of years ago.

Let me begin with a question about the Academy’s Commission on Reimagining Our Economy. Why did the Commission focus on the geography of opportunity? You could have looked at economic opportunity from many dimensions: race, gender, etc. Why is geography as a unit of analysis important as we think about economic opportunity in this country? I’ll start with you, Madam Provost.
Some of the national indicators that we hear about, like the unemployment rate, hide the enormous variation that exists around the country. If you live in Boston, you are living in a very different kind of economy than if you live in San Antonio. People don’t live in the national economy; they live in their local economy, where they have, or don’t have, opportunities. Very few are focusing on that geographic variation.

One of the things the Academy’s Commission wanted to do was to develop measures and listen to voices that would help us understand the enormous geographic variation that we are witnessing in terms of economic opportunity. We did not want to focus on the average American. There is almost no meaning to that term. Instead, we focused on Americans who experience vast levels of inequality or opportunity, depending on public investments in their well-being, with institutions supporting their mobility or not.

Having spent a number of years studying tax policy in the South, for example, I learned that if you grew up in Alabama or in Mississippi, 10 percent of every purchase you made went to the tax system because the South exists on regressive taxation. That’s not true everywhere in the country. It’s not true in the Northeast, for example. So, there’s the geography of labor markets, and there’s the geography of policy, with political differences and polarization having an impact. And we need to pay attention to all of that.
think most people here recognize that we have had a marked decrease in how talent moves around the country, and that means that you end up getting economic rigidification in regions of the United States. Raj Chetty, an economist at Harvard University, does a lot of very good work on this. Your economic destiny in the United States is highly predicted by the zip code of where you grow up. And so the reason for focusing on geography, to get back to Michael’s question, was because we were looking for a lens that a majority of people could get behind. It is an accurate, important, and hopefully in some degree unifying way to measure the well-being of the country. And it also gives a basis on which to make prescriptions for what you might do. A geo-focus is a way of tackling the problem.
The nature of poverty is one in which people can outrun some of the liabilities of poverty, but not all of them.

TUBBS: Can you define that for us?

NEWMAN: We have a vast social policy apparatus, and it provides benefits, especially to those who have either experienced unemployment or have fallen below a particular income parameter. Food stamps are an example. Medicaid is another critical example. But all of those benefit programs have cutoffs, and those cutoffs tend to be fairly rigid, meaning just one dollar above the cutoff amount and you lose everything that the benefit provides.

The nature of poverty is one in which people can outrun some of the liabilities of poverty, but not all of them. If, for example, your family depends on a Section 8 housing voucher and you can manage to support your family on your income as long as you have that voucher, then one dollar over what that voucher allows and the voucher is gone. For most people when their earnings improve, they may not improve enough for them to be able to do without that housing voucher.

TUBBS: In many places, there is this pervasive narrative that folks are poor because they are not working hard, and that if they just worked harder, they would be better off. Provost Newman, you have studied and written several books about people working harder and how in some cases that leaves them further behind.

NEWMAN: Folks working harder for less money than they should be earning can be poor, even if they work full-time and year-round. The books that I am best known for from a while back were all about the working poor. I have been trying to shift our understanding of poverty away from what was then the welfare system to the low-wage labor market, which is a huge source of working poverty. But coming back to cliff effects, if we could reconceptualize what we think of as an inadequate safety net and think of it instead as social policy, as a springboard to mobility, we would have a country in which escaping poverty is likely to be more durable than being totally dependent on the strength of the labor market. We don’t allow people to accumulate assets because we are constantly worried about the free rider problem. Wealthy people in particular are worried about the free rider problem. I don’t worry about it.

TUBBS: What is the free rider problem?

NEWMAN: You actually explained it just in a different way. It is the idea that people will somehow stop working or slow their work efforts if we provide them with public benefits. But you learned in Stockton as mayor, and you are our hero on this, that if you provide a floor under people, it doesn’t diminish their work effort at all. It just gives them more opportunity to invest in their children, to afford after-school care or whatever it is they think is important for their kids. There is a body of economic theory out there that argues that if you provide people with that level of security, they will just cut back on their work effort. And that’s just empirically not the case, as your work showed. What we need to do, in my opinion, is to relax those cliff effects, make them more gradual, provide people more time to amass assets, and not slam them for gaining those assets because those assets are what will keep them durably out of poverty if you let them.

TUBBS: Reid, before I go to you, I want to bridge what Provost Newman said to what you will talk about. I understand the cliff in terms of basic income. When people say if you give folks money, they are not going to work, I say, look at Reid Hoffman. This man is a billionaire and he works hard. He is always working. And that is my transition to your answer.

HOFFMAN: Thanks, Michael. You and I have known each other for years! The things that motivate me relate to economic opportunity. How do
we create healthy industries and economies for people in places that don’t necessarily have them?
How do we make that happen? How do you take areas that are left behind and give them new opportunity and hope? Those are obvious answers from the co-founder of LinkedIn. I also learned from the other members on the Commission about how to rebuild a sense of trust and a shared trust in our society. The discourse was vigorous, but not so much as “I am right and you are totally wrong.” It was more like our mandate is to figure out a set of things that could work. As long as you share the goal that everyone should have the American dream, then economic opportunity is not just for the top one-third, but for the whole country. So how do we help deliver that? What are the various things we can do? It wasn’t one specific recommendation but the range of recommendations that was interesting to me.

TUBBS: What role can AI play in ameliorating some of these concerns or in creating a baseline of prosperity? How could AI be used to do that?

HOFFMAN: Obviously, the general discourse around AI is that it is damaging our democracy; it is coming for our jobs, and maybe even for our lives. So why then are people using AI? The specific answer is that AI is actually a steam engine of the mind, and as such it is going to have a revolutionary impact on industries, maybe even greater than the impact of the steam engine. It is an amplifier of every single task you do with language. We are all linguistic creatures. If I am a steel manufacturer, for example, my responsibilities include sales and marketing and analysis, and these are all language tasks. AI can be very helpful. You may say that the early adopters will probably be the more educated people from certain zip codes, and that the worry is that AI will make them better off while everyone else will be left behind. But where AI is a challenge, it can also be a solution. For instance, public access to ChatGPT is available through the internet, as long as you have broadband access, which by the way is one of our recommendations. AI can be very helpful. You may say that the early adopters will probably be the more educated people from certain zip codes, and that the worry is that AI will make them better off while everyone else will be left behind. But where AI is a challenge, it can also be a solution. For instance, public access to ChatGPT is available through the internet, as long as you have broadband access, which is one of our recommendations. AI can be very helpful. You may say that the early adopters will probably be the more educated people from certain zip codes, and that the worry is that AI will make them better off while everyone else will be left behind. But where AI is a challenge, it can also be a solution. For instance, public access to ChatGPT is available through the internet, as long as you have broadband access, which is one of our recommendations. My friend’s fifteen-year-old daughter is really interested in organic chemistry. She takes organic chemistry papers, puts them into ChatGPT, and says, “explain this to a person who is fifteen years old.” You have an infinitely patient tutor.

As long as you share the goal that everyone should have the American dream, then economic opportunity is not just for the top one-third, but for the whole country.

NEWMAN: Well, this is a big audience.

HOFFMAN: What I have to say is not super-secret. I am going to be publishing some AI-generated videos of me speaking in other languages. It is one of the things that it is possible to do with AI. I have seen myself speak Chinese, Korean, Japanese, et cetera. I speak none of these languages. So AI can be used as a tool for building bridges. It is the flip side of the deep fake concern.

TUBBS: I think what I heard you say, and I want to underline this idea, is that maybe AI is not the problem; maybe it is the foundation upon which AI is built. If you have a technology that accelerates learning, and there is a group of people who are not connected, then that chasm will get bigger. We will be in a better position to harness AI
for good if we live in a country with a baseline level of security, opportunity, and mobility.

HOFFMAN: Ten thousand percent.

TUBBS: Provost Newman, in the Commission’s report, there is a recognition that race plays a role in some people’s economic security and opportunity. I also think we should consider gender, gender pay gaps, and unpaid labor. The report also talks about how work is important, that you have to contribute, that everyone has to work. Let me ask you two questions. One, when we talk about work, is that a broad definition of work that includes unpaid labor, caregiving, and all the things that ChatGPT won’t be able to do? Two, if racism and white supremacy are some of the root causes of the outcomes we see, how might we address these problems?

We will be in a better position to harness AI for good if we live in a country with a baseline level of security, opportunity, and mobility. “

NEWMAN: Let me start with an ad because tomorrow in my day job, we are having a ten-campus gathering. It is an academic congress on AI, and a member of the Academy’s Commission, Daron Acemoglu, is our keynote speaker. We will be focusing specifically on our responsibility as educators to think about how we give our students tools to make use of the genie that we can’t put back in this bottle, as well as recognizing all of the inequality effects that you mentioned. We will be talking about this in health care, in education, and in the many different dimensions of our lives that are going to be affected by AI. One of the reasons I wanted Daron to join our academic congress is that he is a masterful communicator about the question of technology’s impacts. Many different technologies have advertised themselves as revolutionary. Very often the uptake is less than what people thought. The productivity consequences are weaker until we get to the next financial crisis. And then people turn around and ask, what can this technology actually do for me? They start intensifying investment in it. I think we can learn from history and understand how technological change has actually affected people.

As a sociologist, I can say that people don’t live in aggregates. We live in geographies; we live in occupations. So, when we say aggregate employment will grow, that may well be the case. But those most impacted are not necessarily the people who will benefit from this employment growth unless we intervene and provide them with the opportunity to engage in the learning. That is partly the university’s responsibility.

As to race, we did talk about race, and again, this is my personal preoccupation with social policy. One of the recommendations that we made is that we need to extend to Black World War II veterans and their descendants the housing and education benefits that they were denied under the GI Bill. This investment, which was denied to African Americans, created huge wealth inequalities that are persistent across the generations, and we have a responsibility to address the consequences of that very affirmative social act. It was a social act to decide that Black GIs were not entitled to the same benefits as white veterans. And similarly with social security, which we denied to agricultural workers and to domestic workers and which created generations of inequality. So instead of talking about race as an identity construct or the many other ways in which one could productively talk about it, we spoke instead about specific and deliberate policy interventions that created and powered inequalities that have consequences to this very day. I think we felt that it would be possible for the country to figure out in a fairly definitive way who was denied those benefits. One of the complexities of reparations in general is figuring out hundreds of years later who exactly are the people who ought to be in line for those opportunities. But we can figure it out for World War II. So our focus was partly geographic and partly political because we knew that racial inequalities are expressed in political participation.

Let me mention another product of our Commission—the CORE Score, which Jacob Hacker developed. The idea behind the CORE Score, which is an index of American well-being and I hope some of the social scientists in this audience will use it because it is a very rich tool, was to drive all the way down to the county level and look at political participation, the ease with which people can actually get to the polls and vote, the efficacy of political representation, how accurately do political representatives vote the attitudes and beliefs of their constituents, as well as economic security and economic mobility. There is no way to
think about those questions of political representation without thinking about race. There is a very clear racial element to voter suppression. Those are things in which there is a documented history. The opportunity to rectify those things is certainly something we are advocating for.

TUBBS: I appreciate your answer. Part of what prompted my question was some of the research that I did in preparation for our conversation. I played around with the CORE Score. And what I found was that the scores for Black and Hispanic counties in this country are the lowest. For example, if you look at Black and Latino scores in San Mateo County, they are terrible and worse than Nashville. If you look at some of the low opportunity areas, you find the same thing. I thank the Commission for its leadership on the CORE Score, and for giving us the ability to drill down to data at the county level.

My last question before we go to the audience Q&A. There are a lot of good reports out there, and they are great intellectual exercises, including the Commission’s report. But how do we take what is in the report and commit ourselves to making the changes that are necessary?

HOFFMAN: Our country is facing huge problems, and their solutions seem to be beyond even very powerful individuals. The reason for the CORE Score, for our focus on geography, for our focus on people instead of GDP scores was to provide a conceptual architecture to the people who want to act on these problems. They may be government people, businesspeople, philanthropists. Part of the reason why the Commission is having events like this one is to try to get the conceptual infrastructure out there. And it’s an effort. I don’t know how many people in the tech world are here tonight, but it is similar to being given some open-source code and told go use it. Now, obviously if we put the Commission’s report on the shelf, we won’t succeed. So it is not enough to write the report. We need to talk to the folks who are active participants in trying to make the next version of our society, and to give them the conceptual tools by which they might make a real difference.

NEWMAN: Let me add some optimistic notes here. We cut child poverty by one-third in about three months when the federal government stepped in and created a massive childcare tax credit. So we know how to do this. It is not a mystery. We invested heavily in keeping people on company payrolls rather than have them cut loose during the COVID-19 recession. And that helped to lay the groundwork for the most extraordinary labor market we have ever had. We are now two years into below 4 percent unemployment. I wrote a book this year about tight labor markets, and what tight labor markets do for poor people. But the point is we had many social policy instruments. We invoked them all.

In New York City, where I spent many years educating four-year-olds, creating pre-kindergarten relieved families of a huge burden of childcare and started their children on their way through the education system. We know how to do this. It is not a mystery. The challenge is generating the political will that we need. We hope reports like the Commission’s will make a difference.

Our country is facing huge problems, and their solutions seem to be beyond even very powerful individuals. The reason for the CORE Score, for our focus on geography, for our focus on people instead of GDP scores was to provide a conceptual architecture to the people who want to act on these problems.

Mayor Tubbs, you created the most remarkable experiment in guaranteed income. Researchers who have studied what you have done have shown the extraordinary benefits of your program to the people of Stockton, and to the other mayors who are working toward the same. We know how to do this and we know what those benefits are. We know if we invest in children and provide them with a rich education, it will pay off for the rest of their lives. And it will pay off for the rest of us too. When we have tight labor markets, and when people who have been in prison for years get jobs, they know that they have something that is extremely valuable to them and they hold onto it for dear life. When you talk to employers as I have
about what that means for them, they suddenly start to recognize there is a source of labor here I never even thought about. It is not just that Joe over here turns out to be a really good egg. It is that there are thousands of Joes and I’m going to offer them jobs and give them training. They don’t have the skills when they walk in the door, so the great American job machine turns into a human capital investment. The optimist in me says we know how to do this. We just need the political will not only to pursue it, but not to let go of it. We just let go of that Child Tax Credit and plunged millions of families back into poverty. It does not have to be that way. I hope that reports like ours, as modest as the contribution may be, will help generate some of that political will to take those policy steps and stick with them once we can empirically show they work.

TUBBS: Let’s now turn to some questions from our audience. But before that, let me express my thanks. Tonight is the culmination of two years of conversations and hard work by the Academy’s Commission on Reimagining Our Economy. One of the things I learned as a student at Stanford is that you can find talent and intellect anywhere, but what is not distributed equally or equitably are the resources and opportunities. I think this report will actually get us to the point in which every kid in this country is given a fair shot and a chance to be a CEO or provost or mayor.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I heard two things tonight. One is we need to change policies. And if we change policies, it will change how people react and that in turn may change how companies react. It can create a virtuous cycle. And two, we need to create the political or the public will to actually change policies. I noticed that Anna Deavere Smith and Tom Hanks are on your Commission. So let me ask, what is the role of the arts and artists to change hearts and minds? And if we know what needs to be done, how do we get the public will to do these things?

NEWMAN: There are people in this room who are more knowledgeable than I am about how to cope with political polarization and the moment we find ourselves in, especially with an election coming up. But I would say on behalf of the Commission that it was not accidental that we produced a photojournal with photographs of Americans across the country, or if you tune into the interviews that were done that you can hear the voices of the people we spoke with. I think we recognize that a report by itself will matter to an audience like this one. But for other people, the photographs bring home that there is a real person sitting at that lunch counter and that there are real lives on Indian reservations. As somebody who has done years of fieldwork, that is the reason for doing fieldwork. It is not just to illustrate something; it is to pull the reader in and make the reader feel the pain and the opportunity, the optimism and the possibilities. How do we get them to think about it? Well, audiences like this are influential. We hope that you will talk to people about what you have learned tonight.

HOFFMAN: We are obviously at a moment of intense political division in our country. And one of the things we are trying to do in the report is to offer recommendations that could be part of the conceptual frameworks that sidestep much of that polarization. Getting that political will involves trying to rebuild some trust so we can work on these problems together.

Last night I was on a different stage with the UK home secretary, who asked me how should they talk to their constituencies about these technological benefits? And I said the way that it normally happens is you enable the companies to take risks. You stay in dialog with them, you try to nudge them some, and then you see the products and services that come out of it. What is disheartening is trying to figure out how to foster this trust and get the dialog going. It is one of the reasons why the Academy is very important and a good voice here.
TUBBS: From my work in local government, I am convinced that policy only moves at the speed of narrative. Until we tell a different story of origin in terms of how the problem came to be, it will be hard to get a political actor to make a different solution. If the dominant narrative, and perhaps not the narrative held by folks in this room, is this idea that effort alone equals outcome; that if you pull yourself up by your bootstraps, you will be okay; and that some people are endowed by God with intelligence and others are endowed by God with laziness, then we will keep getting these solutions that are more focused on individuals and structure. I do think storytelling, arts, and culture can help transcend some of the polarization we are seeing. Provost Newman mentioned some of the guaranteed income work that we did. Two year ago, we produced an hour-long documentary following people in four different cities who were receiving guaranteed income, and that documentary premiered at the Tribeca Film Festival. Since then, it has become easier to have conversations because it is not you arguing with a political figure whom you may or may not like. It is you arguing with your neighbors or with the bus driver in St. Paul or with the worker in Massachusetts who looks like you and talks like you. I think any political power building agenda has to have a storytelling culture component. That is the only thing that seems to transcend the noise.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have two questions. First, I thought the expanded Child Tax Credit passed the House, and the Senate just hasn’t taken it up yet. And the second question goes to the points we have all been making about how to get this really good message out and actually get the political buy-in. On the foreign policy side that I come from, there is an organization that brings people together across the political spectrum, from the business community, and from the religious community, and they go state to state and city to city to talk about the importance of giving aid internationally. Something similar could be successful here. How are you thinking about the rollout and is there a plan to take the show on the road beyond Menlo Park?

NEWMAN: The expanded Child Tax Credit is not dead, but it has been dramatically reduced. Still, it is better than nothing, but it could be what it used to be. And I think this is the road show, but probably the best thing that we could do is get this report to Taylor Swift! I want to second the mayor’s point that telling this history and these impacts through real lives is the most impactful way to get people to pay attention. And my hat is off to the Commission for pulling people from different political corners together. There were many things that we talked about that some of us would have liked to see included in the report but we couldn’t convince our more conservative colleagues. But there were many elements that transcended those political boundaries, and we had to discuss them and debate them in order to include them in the report. For example, reducing barriers to employment, reducing licensing requirements that have been a mechanism for excluding disadvantaged people, and equalizing investments in education because when they are state by state and county by county, they lead to vast inequalities. These are not easy things to do, but I think there are ways to persuade people in different political corners that there is some value to this.

When I finished my book on tight labor markets, I wrote a piece about how tight labor markets and policies that continue to keep labor markets tight reduce the need for public benefits. If you are earning enough, you don’t need some of those public benefits. And that is an idea that appeals to conservatives because they tend not to be happy about those benefits anyway. But it actually turns out that people can build their own safety net if they are consistently employed at higher wages, which is what happens in tight labor markets. I think when we consciously try to persuade people who are not initially in our political corner, there is some hope that other people will be listening besides the usual suspects. And maybe we can get to Taylor Swift too.

TUBBS: Let me give a shout-out to the wonderful staff who worked with the Commission to produce this report. We appreciate your work and insight.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I love the premise that there is a report that says the economy is nothing unless you consider its workers. And then the secondary premise that if we want to equalize opportunities across our workers, we need to equalize neighborhood amenities. Are the recommendations in this
report able to actually equalize the amenities that neighborhoods offer? There is a recommendation about inclusionary zoning policies that would increase the housing supply. But is it enough? At the end of the day, if all the recommendations were implemented, would we end up with neighborhoods with equal amenities? Or were there recommendations that hit the cutting-room floor that could do that?

What are we each going to do today so that fifty years from now, we have all the great things called for in this report: like redesigning safety nets, adopting inclusionary zoning policies, extending benefits to the folks who have been denied help, expanding broadband connectivity, creating a training and financing program to assist working-class Americans, etc. We know we can't do everything today, but that is not an excuse for doing nothing.

NEWMAN: Some of the things that hit the cutting-room floor that I think personally would make a difference had to do with enabling unionization more aggressively because even now we can see that the wave of strikes that have happened in the United States are starting to push up the bottom of the income distribution, just like tight labor markets do. And there are some recommendations in this report that I think are enormously important and probably will never happen, like funding schools out of local taxation, which would make a huge difference because schools are such an important aspect of human capital formation. Some other things that we left on the cutting-room floor are more aggressive attention to the minimum wage and to tax policy in general. I always worry about regressive taxation and its consequences. Too much of the country is fueled on regressive taxation, and that has a huge impact throughout the South in particular. Here in California since Proposition 13, we have heavier sales tax, which has a tremendously dampening effect on income equality. So, the list is long. But I think this is a good beginning when you consider that there are members of the Commission who are very strong conservatives and they were willing to endorse what you see in the report. Part of the purpose of the Commission was to try to reach across that divide. And I haven't been in too many settings where that was the goal.

HOFFMAN: I think it is a mistake to think that any individual effort at any time will solve everything. I think it is much better to think of yourself as a renovator, as someone who makes something happen, and then you move on to other renovations. Some of the recommendations will not be adopted, but the renovations' approach is a better way to think of it.

TUBBS: I would add that baby bonds would be an interesting recommendation to have in terms of any wealth gaps for the next generation. I think a right to housing is important. We know that evictions drive real poverty, and people struggle to recover. And of course, universal basic income, like guaranteed income. The research tells us that it is not the panacea for everything, but it is the panacea for one issue with poverty, which is the lack of cash. There is recent polling that says that 60 percent of Americans, including 42 percent of Republicans, support some sort of guaranteed income. So, I think there is some room there to grow. And with that, let me thank Reid Hoffman and Katherine Newman for their insightful comments and terrific work on this Commission. And let me express my gratitude to the Academy. As we think about next steps, and as Provost Newman mentioned, we know what to do. So what are we each going to do today so that fifty years from now, we have all the great things called for in this report: like redesigning safety nets, adopting inclusionary zoning policies, extending benefits to the folks who have been denied help, expanding broadband connectivity, creating a training and financing program to assist working-class Americans, etc. We know we can’t do everything today, but that is not an excuse for doing nothing.

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Los Angeles
ARTS AND CULTURE

By Maysan Haydar, Carl & Lily Pforzheimer Foundation Fellow at the Academy
Los Angeles is globally renowned for its cultural institutions and communities, and attracts some of the world’s most creative and artistic talent. While the film industry and Hollywood tend to draw the most attention, numerous other institutions in the region have made significant investments in places and projects that support and promote cultural production in the city. On March 3, 2024, the Academy’s Los Angeles Program Committee hosted a gathering at The Getty Center with local members to discuss the evolution of this larger cultural infrastructure. It was the Academy’s 2121st Stated Meeting and a Morton L. Mandel Conversation.
The evening featured Katherine Fleming (President and Chief Executive Officer of The J. Paul Getty Trust), Michael Govan (Chief Executive Officer and Wallis Annenberg Director of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art), and Sandra Jackson-Dumont (Director and Chief Executive Officer of the still developing Lucas Museum of Narrative Art) in conversation with Academy President David W. Oxtoby about their museums’ growth, their collaborations with other institutions, and their commitments to their neighborhoods. Throughout the discussion, the speakers imagined the future cultural landscape of Los Angeles, given the city’s continued expansion and global importance ahead of the 2028 Olympics.

President Oxtoby began the discussion by asking the panelists to describe how their museums fit into Los Angeles’s cultural landscape. Michael Govan set the template for the evening’s conversation by highlighting the influence of the city’s people, communities, and education centers in their cultural institutions’ growth. The panelists agreed that the institutional growth in the city was relatively recent, and in some ways lagged behind a naissance of arts in the 1990s. Given the rare, near-unanimous positive opinion Americans hold of libraries, museums, and other cultural institutions, they described the great care and attention required to remain a place for the entire community.

The panelists credited Los Angeles’s reputation for community and engagement for attracting other kinds of creatives, besides those already associated with established institutions, and pointed to public enthusiasm for new galleries, new capital projects, and major new efforts, such as The Hammer Museum’s “Made in LA” biennial. And they also described their efforts to serve and support their city and their communities. Jackson-Dumont spoke about her commitment to the South Los Angeles neighborhood surrounding the new Lucas Museum, and of the museum’s commitment to its schools and to the community’s character, observing that she encourages all new staff members at the museum to walk the neighborhood.

During the Q&A portion of the event, the audience and panelists discussed whether museums and cultural institutions could ever truly be politically neutral, even if they avoid making statements on current events. The panelists described...
the challenges involved in maintaining their commitment to serve every member of the community, while balancing that against the need to make decisions every day about what will be collected and what will be displayed to the public. They generally agreed that those decisions have political implications, and as museum leaders they constantly need to walk a very fine line.

One member of the audience asked about the potential impact of AI on arts and culture, fearing an impending “assault” by artificial intelligence on culture and the arts. The panelists noted that AI relies on already-existing art and creative works, and that the question was not new, as the influences of computers and coding on art were already present in the 1980s. They pointed to existing artists who have been making interesting uses of AI because the derivative aspects were inspirational of its source materials and in how the human hand reworks it. Another audience member encouraged the Academy to hold a follow-up meeting devoted specifically to these issues, citing the need for a larger discussion about AI by the community.

Following the conversation, Los Angeles Program Committee member Louise Bryson offered a tribute to David Oxtoby for his extraordinary presidency of the Academy. Bryson described the evening’s synthesis of arts, culture, and science as symbolic of Oxtoby’s dedication to the Academy’s broad range of interests, thanked him for his “forward-looking leadership,” and observed that the evening’s event was a fitting tribute to Oxtoby’s affection for both art and science.

After the program, members gathered for a reception under the Mercedes Dorame exhibit, “Woshaa’axre Yaang’aro (Looking Back).” Dorame’s sculptures of abalone – an endangered mollusk and important cultural resource for coastal California Native peoples – are inspired by her Tongva heritage, and will be on display in The Getty’s Entrance Hall through July 28, 2024.

In the coming year, the Humanities, Arts, and Culture program area at the American Academy will be exploring the current state of cultural spaces and their evolving relationships with the publics that create and sustain them. Katherine Fleming set an excellent framing for this new Academy endeavor: “An institution is made up of the people who have conjured it into existence.”
Anti-Globalism’s Past and Present

2122nd Stated Meeting | March 20, 2024
David Rubenstein Forum at the University of Chicago and Virtual
A Jonathan F. Fanton Lecture

On March 20, 2024, the Academy’s University of Chicago Program Committee hosted an evening with historian Tara Zahra. Informed by her archival research and the themes in her most recent book, Against the World: Anti-Globalism and Mass Politics Between the World Wars, Professor Zahra discussed how the forces of early-twentieth-century global instability – the Spanish flu, the Great Depression, ethnonationalism, the development of both democracies and dictatorships – can help us better understand our own contemporary political moment. Following her presentation, she joined Academy President David W. Oxtoby in a conversation about the past, present, and future of our interconnected, yet increasingly divided, world. John Mark Hansen, a member of the Academy’s Board of Directors, opened the program. The event was organized as a Jonathan F. Fanton Lecture, in honor of the past president of the Academy whose career has been dedicated to solving global issues. Jonathan F. Fanton and his wife Cynthia were in attendance. An edited version of Professor Zahra’s remarks and her conversation with President Oxtoby follows.
Thank you for the honor of being invited to speak to you this evening. It is really a huge privilege. I’m grateful to all of my colleagues and friends who have come, and to all of you in the virtual audience who have tuned in as well.

I’m going to be talking mostly about my recent book, *Against the World*: *Anti-Globalism and Mass Politics Between the World Wars*, which was published a year ago. I’m assuming that most of you have not read the book so I thought I would tell you a little bit about why and how I wrote it and what it’s about, and then I think we’ll have an opportunity in the Q&A to bring the conversation more into the present.

Historians come up with topics for books in many different ways. We might be inspired by a source we find in an archive. Sometimes it’s a story. Sometimes it’s a theoretical intervention. For me, my book was inspired by contemporary events. I began my research in 2016. There was a refugee crisis in Europe, Donald Trump had been elected, British citizens had voted for Brexit, and right-wing populist regimes were on the rise everywhere, but especially in the part of the world that I study, Eastern Europe. I could not have predicted when I began my research that it would be massively interrupted by a disruption in global travel or that the COVID-19 pandemic would stop globalization in its tracks in a way that nobody could have imagined. Nor could I have predicted a war in Ukraine that would disrupt global supply chains and bring a new focus on energy independence. As in the interwar era, anti-globalism has recently been resurgent on the left and right, in democracies and in authoritarian states alike.

As a historian, however, I see this as a story not only about what the past can teach us about the present, although of course I think that is important. But I have been even more struck by the ways in which the present has reshaped my own understanding of the past—everything from the effects of World War I and the Great Depression to the rise of fascism. As a historian who writes about twentieth-century Europe, I have been reading, writing, thinking, and teaching about the 1920s and 1930s for two decades now. But the events of the past years have really made me see things differently—to see the interwar period not just as a story about a contest between fascism and democracy or left and right, as it has typically been told, but also as a struggle over globalization, between globalists and anti-globalists.

So the first question I had to answer, and you might have the same question, was what is a globalist or globalism or even globalization? Many definitions are possible, but I chose to use the term “anti-globalism” to refer to movements that sought to insulate societies from policies, people, and institutions that they associated with globalization or internationalism. And one of the tricks of this project is that I’m talking both about a real process and an imagined process, and at times the two come together and at times they’re very different. Sometimes these movements produce deglobalization: the actual slowdown or curtailment of transnational flows of people, ideas, goods, and capital. But people in the 1920s and 1930s did not use the terms globalization or deglobalization or even globalism and anti-globalism. They spoke instead of freedom versus dependence on the global economy, nationalism versus internationalism, sovereignty and its violation. They sought self-sufficiency, economic insulation, and autarky.
In these Google Ngrams, it is interesting to see how in three different languages—German, English, and Italian—the term “autarky” peaks right at the onset of World War II. So the terms I’m using, globalism and globalization, are consciously anachronistic, but I chose to use them anyway because I think they best capture the process of accelerating connection and disconnection that I’m trying to describe and also because I haven’t found a better term, although I spent quite a bit of time thinking about it.

I also had to make some important choices about geography in writing this book, which is focused primarily on Europe and the United States. I made those choices based on a desire to do research with primary sources, but also a desire to show the diversity of anti-global movements: that anti-globalism was a force both in small and large countries, in fascist countries as well as in democracies, and in empires as well as in anti-colonial movements. I wanted to show also that while anti-globalism was a global phenomenon, it varied tremendously based on local context. Central Europe has a special place in this account, not only because that has been my own focus as a historian, but also because I believe it really was at the epicenter of anti-global politics in this interwar period.

In writing this book I also really wanted to focus it around particular characters, some of whom appear throughout the book. I began with Rosika Schwimmer, a Hungarian-Jewish feminist, pacifist, and internationalist who was at the height of her powers before World War I (see her photo on page 35). One of my colleagues claims she is my alter ego, but I hope that is not true. In 1913, Schwimmer felt that the world was moving in her direction, toward greater peace, prosperity, and equality. And that was an assumption shared by many progressive internationalists at the time. World War I shattered that illusion. During the war she teamed up with none other than Henry Ford to charter a ship, which they called the “Peace Ship,” to sail from Hoboken to Europe to convince European leaders to end the war. It was a fiasco that was ridiculed by the press. Ford snuck off the ship in the middle of the night and went home, and some people claimed it was the origins of his anti-Semitism. He never spoke to Schwimmer again. Ford was anti-Semitic long before that, but I think his prejudice didn’t get better after this incident.

Ford became a kind of globalizing anti-globalist. His cars were sold everywhere in the world, but he was notoriously anti-Semitic, anti-finance, and he actually attempted to achieve autarky within his own firm by creating a company town and rubber plantation in Brazil called Fordlandia. Schwimmer, meanwhile, had to flee the right-wing counterrevolutionary government in post-World War I Hungary. She came to America, but was denied.
citizenship in a case that reached the Supreme Court because she refused to pledge to bear arms in defense of the United States. Never mind that she was a diabetic woman in her fifties. It was the principle that counted, and she died still stateless in 1948. She never succeeded in getting her citizenship. I see her trajectory as emblematic of the history of globalism in this period, and you could see why I wouldn’t want her as my alter ego because it didn’t end well.

The book is divided into three parts because there were three major phases of this anti-global turn of the interwar wars. I quickly realized that I couldn’t just start in 1914, which was my original idea. Instead, I see anti-globalism as a product of two developments that coincided in the late nineteenth century. First was the acceleration of globalization itself, and that is a point that I try to make throughout the book. Just because this is a book about anti-globalism doesn’t mean that I’m denying that there was still globalization. The two were inextricably intertwined. And the second was the rise of mass politics, which meant that people negatively affected by global integration, or who felt like they were negatively affected, had the ability to talk back at the ballot box or in the streets.

Before World War I, it was already clear to many people that the gains from free trade, imperial expansion, and mass migration were not being shared equally. Restrictions on migration and trade were multiplying. But World War I greatly intensified skepticism about the rewards and risks of global interdependence. Many progressive internationalists at the turn of the twentieth century believed that the globalization of the economy would make people so interdependent that it would be impossible to go to war. That illusion turned out to be false. The war also brought transatlantic migration to a halt and produced, to use today’s terms, unprecedented supply chain issues. Most famously, the Allies blockaded the Central Powers, preventing food and crucial supplies from reaching civilians. The number of Germans and Austrians who starved to death is still being debated by historians, but what’s undeniable is that many Central Europeans blamed that blockade for their defeat and vowed that they would never again be dependent for their security or survival on imported food.

Food, and the desire for what we would today call food sovereignty, plays a huge role in the rise of anti-globalism in this period and in the story I tell. After the war, the reaction to left-wing forms of globalism, both real and imagined, was immediate and intensely violent. In Budapest and in Munich, counterrevolutionary paramilitary groups hunted Jews like Rosika Schwimmer in the street, because anti-Semites linked Jews to global capitalism and international Bolshevism. In the United States, there was a Red Scare. The Klan was on the rise, targeting immigrants as well as Blacks. Prohibition reflected animosity toward Catholic immigrants. The so-called “Spanish flu” pandemic, which is something I hadn’t really thought about before 2020, intensified popular xenophobia, as migrants were associated with disease. New laws passed in the 1920s further restricted mobility in the name of protecting America’s racial stock.

Anti-global movements were also closely linked to the collapse of continental empires and new challenges to overseas empires in this period. One of the most obvious parallels to interwar movements for autarky in Europe was the Swadeshi movement in India, in which anti-colonialists boycotted foreign goods and urged women in particular, but everyone really, to spin

their own cloth. Yet anticolonial advocates of self-sufficiency in interwar India, such as Gandhi, preached a self-consciously globalist political agenda. It is a good illustration of how flexible and malleable these ideas really were. Gandhi argued that more economic independence would produce a more genuine form of internationalism based on cooperation rather than exploitation. The problem was that while anticolonial nationalists were demanding an end to Empire, many states began to see the expansion and consolidation of Empires as the best route to achieving what they called their own freedom from the global economy. “Empire Shopping” became a mass movement in Great Britain, with stores selling supposedly only goods from the Empire. Women were encouraged to purchase, cook, and eat only foods grown in the Empire, which often really meant supporting white farmers in places like Canada, Australia, and Kenya.

The revolt against globalization was also closely linked to the collapse of continental empires. It was particularly fierce in states that had either lost their empires at the end of World War I, like Germany and Austria, or felt as though they had lost, like Italy. Austria-Hungary had once been the largest free trade zone in Europe. It was a kind of mini global economy, and its dissolution at the end of the war left consumers cut off from producers in successor states that erected high tariffs against one another. Austrians insisted that their new rump state was not viable. Historian Quinn Slobodian has done a recent study in which he argues that the kind of liberal economic ideas that we associate with the Chicago School originated in Austria as economists attempted to prevent this kind of thing from ever happening again, to insulate markets from democracy, and to prevent these types of protective regimes from coming into place.

This led, in turn, to a movement for what was called “settlement” or “internal colonization.” Or another term you may have heard is “back to the land” movement. The basic idea is that all these
unemployed workers would go back to the land, grow their own food, and contribute to the self-sufficiency of both the individual, the family, and the nation – a very unpractical idea for a country like Austria. You can predict that it didn’t go so well.

In the early 1920s, many Austrian Socialists, such as Otto Neurath and Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky, developed a utopian vision of settlers’ lives in modern, healthy, well-planned homes and communities.

Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky was the first female architect in Austria, and she is most famous for what is called the Frankfurt Kitchen, which is probably a little like your kitchen if you live in a small apartment. This was a revolution in kitchen design, with everything close together and in one space. She designed this type of kitchen originally for a settler’s home in Austria. It became famous in Frankfurt, I think in 1926, and the rest is history.

In reality, however, the settlement movement – and the broader movement for autarky – required a lot of sacrifice of convenience, luxury, choice, and variety for the sake of independence. One settlement advocate suggested that settlers should trade their traditional Austrian diets of meat and potatoes for a local diet consisting solely of chestnuts, goat’s milk, and apples. These projects had mixed results. Settlers on the outskirts of Vienna had no schools, no doctors, no public transportation, and no gas, electricity, or sewage in the 1930s. Settlers who were interviewed decades later recalled hunger and cold due to the lack of real heating in the winter. Female settlers, and I did try to keep women at the forefront of the story throughout the book, in part because histories of globalization tend to leave them out, had a particularly rough life. This whole idea of the self-sufficient family farm relied on the unpaid labor of women and children.

One of the threads that I try to draw throughout the book is to show how these anti-global movements in some ways were about reversing some of the progress women had made in the previous decade. Female migrants became symbols of globalization’s potential evils, much like Jews, and in some ways the settlement movement tried to reverse that dispersion of people through migration and anchor women in the home and on the land.

The third part of the book centers on the 1930s and the consequences of the Great Depression. The lesson millions of people learned from the Depression was that globalization was highly risky. People had to reckon with the fact that the collapse of a bank in Vienna or New York would result in the loss of jobs and fortunes for people on the other side of the world. Self-sufficiency became the name of the game. You had to insulate yourself from this global economy.

In fascist Italy, Mussolini’s relentless propaganda instructed Italians, and particularly women, on the value of autarky. Italy had long maintained a global presence through the millions of emigrants who settled in Europe and North and South America beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing into the early twentieth century. Emigration had been the dominant solution to the chronic problems of poverty and underemployment in Italy. Until the fascist era, the Italian government sought to transform emigrant communities into a diasporic empire that would substitute for formal colonies. One of the reasons Italian Americans developed such a cohesive sense of identity and community is that the Italian
government invested a huge amount of money and resources into maintaining ties between Italians abroad and those in Italy to keep them feeling Italian in the hope that they would eventually return. But in the 1920s, the United States passed severe restrictions on immigration, particularly for people from Southern and Eastern Europe, basically closing the safety valve of immigration. Mussolini sought to cope with that problem by deglobalizing Italians. He wanted to actively prevent emigration and resettle potential migrants internally or in his own formal empire in Africa.

Anti-internationalism was always part of the Nazi Party platform. The Nazi ideal of Blood and Soil was formed in opposition to Jewish cosmopolitanism, migration, liberal internationalism, and the global economy. Yet, the regime conveyed contradictory messages to the German public in the 1930s. German women were flooded with propaganda urging them to cook and eat only local foods, boycott chain stores, and take up spinning to knit their own textiles. Nazi leaders continued to promote settlement in their propaganda, but behind the scenes, experts admitted that it was an unrealistic goal. One expert said, “Even if we had 20 million sheep, we would only be able to produce 20 percent of the wool we consume domestically.”

The solution they came up with to this conundrum was imperial expansion, which the Nazi regime called Grossraumwirtschaft, meaning a large regional economy. The idea was basically we are going to dominate Europe with Germans in control.

After 1939, Nazi policymakers shifted from seeking autarky for the German nation toward achieving autarky for continental Europe, dominated of course by Germany. This was an idea that was inspired first and foremost by the United States, which was the only country in the world at the time that was capable of feeding itself. For Hitler, since the Americans had their empire and the British had their empire, he wanted his in the name of achieving self-sufficiency. It was also an idea that was being pursued by Japan in East Asia at the time.

This interwar quest for greater self-sufficiency ultimately justified racist forms of imperial conquest. But it was never only a far-right fantasy. People rushed back to the land in democracies as well as in dictatorships. For example, in the United States during the Great Depression, more people moved from the city to the countryside than from country to city, reversing a decades-long trend of urbanization. A 1933 Wall Street Journal ad urged readers to “Buy an abandoned farm and live on trout and applejack until the upturn!”

During the Great Depression, Henry Ford required his workers in Michigan to cultivate subsistence gardens. His idea was that all of his men should keep one foot in industry and another on the land. He was a fierce opponent of the New Deal and saw subsistence farming as an alternative to welfare.

The back-to-the-land movement in the United States was also popularized by lifestyle reformers like Ralph Borsodi. On his farm in upstate New York, Borsodi, his wife, and two children produced everything they needed. Their diet consisted entirely of foods they grew themselves. Borsodi, like Ford, saw homesteading as an alternative to the welfare state. Borsodi and Ford were both staunch opponents of the New Deal, but FDR actually agreed with many of their ideas. One New Deal initiative involved resettling tens of thousands of unemployed workers on what were called “subsistence homesteads,” where they were supposed to grow their own food. This wasn’t about autarky for the nation, but for the individual.

The image below and the one on page 38 are one of the most famous of these settlements: Jersey Homesteads. They took Jewish textile workers from New York City and put them into a collective farming community in New Jersey. It was very unsuccessful as a farming community, but quite successful as a new version of the suburbs.

The long-term consequences of anti-globalism are unpredictable. We still don’t know what new forms of globalism and internationalism might emerge from our current anti-global moment.

In some ways, the Great Depression was not the beginning of a mass return to the land or to farming in the United States, but may have accelerated a population shift toward the suburbs.

Interwar anti-globalism had many unexpected, long-term consequences. Often it produced new forms of globalization or internationalism. In the 1930s, for example, companies like the Czecho- slovak Bat’a Shoe Company and the Ford Motor Company responded to anti-foreign sentiment and high tariffs by moving production overseas and using local labor. They exported factories instead of shoes and cars and advertised themselves as “local firms.” Bat’a’s advertisements in India in the 1930s boasted that Bat’a shoes were all “Made in India” by Indians. Many Indians I meet today still think Bat’a is an Indian company. It was in some ways the beginning of the multinational corporation as we know it.

There were many other lasting consequences of anti-globalism, both big and small. New technologies and products were developed in this quest for self-sufficiency, from synthetic fabrics like ray-on to Chinotto, which is a beverage that was supposed to replace Coca-Cola in Italy, to the synthetic rubber that was unsuccessfully manufactured at Auschwitz.

Meanwhile, internationalists did not simply pack up and go home. Experts in organizations like the League of Nations developed new initiatives to aid the victims of deglobalization, namely, minorities and stateless people. League of Nations economists in the 1930s also promoted new ideas that they hoped would spread the benefits of globalization more equally, by addressing poverty and increasing consumption. So I think in many ways they set the stage, with the Bretton Woods Agreement in particular, for the construction of the postwar welfare state and institutions for economic development.

Since this is a history with presentist origins, I will end with some thoughts about comparisons with the contemporary moment. In addition to the many obvious similarities, there are some important differences that are worth highlighting. For example, many anti-globalists on the left today are motivated by environmental concerns, and as far as I can tell these concerns were absent in the 1920s and 1930s. Anti-globalists today have targeted the movement of people and goods, but not the mobility of capital, which continues to flow freely. Finally, today’s anti-globalism is different because of the events of the 1930s and 1940s and because of postwar decolonization, which prompted efforts to reform and restructure the architecture of the global economy, to make it more stable and more fair. Arguably, the most important similarity between then and now may be the fact that the long-term consequences of anti-globalism are unpredictable. We still don’t know what new forms of globalism and internationalism might emerge from our current anti-global moment. I’ll end there on that somewhat hopeful note.
DAVID OXToby: Thank you, Tara, for your very thought-provoking presentation. I have a few questions and then we will save some time at the end for questions from our audience. In your work, you feature the voices of real people, some of them famous, but some less so. In recent years, the Academy has been trying to incorporate the voices of America, and the faces of America too, in some of our projects. We have been going around the country and listening to people. What is your research methodology for identifying the people you feature in your work?

TARA ZAHRA: The research for this project was incredibly interesting and fun. But of course since I am working on the era of the 1920s and 1930s, I can’t just go out and ask people how they felt about globalization. So as I was seeking to capture the less known voices and opinions, I looked in some of the places that are really common for historians to use, places like diplomatic archives. You may expect diplomatic archives to have only records about negotiations between foreign leaders, but in fact in the archives of consular offices, you can find hundreds of letters written by local migrants in those towns, complaining about the conditions or talking about their problems.

I think the same goes for government archives. One of the most interesting sources that I came across was in a Nazi archive, where I found hundreds of letters complaining to the Nazi regime that they hadn’t done enough for the small businessperson, that they hadn’t closed down the department store or the chain store as they had promised to. Also, the Homestead Act in the United States produced thousands of letters by people who wanted their own subsistence homesteads, and they wrote to the government asking to be a part of the program. Those are some of the ways in which I was able to capture some of those perspectives.

OXToby: In 2022, we published a volume of Dædalus that explored the loss of trust in institutions and in experts. Was there a loss of trust in the interwar period? How did the people in the United States but also in Europe think about the institutions in their countries?

ZAHRA: That’s a great question and not one that I have really thought about before. But I would say...
no, there wasn’t a loss of trust. Populism obviously involves some kind of skepticism toward elites and you can certainly see that. But the dominant voice is the one that is trying to harness the government to do the things that you want it to do. The reason I could find all those letters in the archive is that people actually believed that if they wrote to the Department of Labor they might get a subsistence homestead or that the Nazi Party was going to listen to them. Lots of experts were involved in these projects. It is not a part of the story that I focus intensely on, but as I alluded to, there was a focus in the sciences – from agricultural science to chemistry to biology – on the development of synthetic resources and products. Auschwitz had a garden and there were women who were trying to grow a plant that could substitute for rubber.

OXTOBY: In a more critical vein, there were also movements in the first part of the twentieth century, such as race science and eugenics, that came from experts, particularly from people in universities. How did universities position themselves as experts?

I think that there’s a story to be told about the history of communication from the past and present and it’s worth thinking about. The 1920s and 1930s were an era for huge advancements in propaganda and in the spreading of falsehoods of all kinds.

ZAHRA: I know more about what was going on in Europe than in the United States, and certainly universities were largely controlled by the government. In the Nazi case, the dissenters were thrown out and all of these ideas were promoted from within. The science and expertise that went toward thinking about autarky was also often rooted in universities. Some of the practical implementation went to factories and concentration camps, but the scientific ideas were certainly developed in universities.

OXTOBY: How do issues of communication connect with globalization? I think the assumption before World War I was as we communicate more, we will become more global. But some of this goes in the opposite direction. Do we have lessons for the present day about the effects of globalization on communication and the media?

ZAHRA: Before World War I, a telegram message from the United States to Australia would take about two days. After the war, it took more than two weeks because the telegraph lines had been destroyed. So there was a massive disruption of communication as well as of trade and migration. I think that in many ways censorship and false information can pose the same kinds of threats as broken telegraph lines. The fragmentation of information that we’re dealing with today is unprecedented in many ways, but I do think that there’s a story to be told about the history of communication from the past and present and it’s worth thinking about. The 1920s and 1930s were an era for huge advancements in propaganda and in the spreading of falsehoods of all kinds.

OXTOBY: You talk about anti-global sentiment connecting to diminished empathy. People don’t care about what is happening to others – whether they are starving, suffering, and the like. What is the role of the arts and the humanities to bring those issues to people in a more personal way than just reading about statistics? Did any of the literature in the 1920s and 1930s have an impact on making people more empathetic and concerned about global issues?

ZAHRA: The historical literature of the interwar period has focused largely on the rise of internationalism and humanitarianism. I wouldn’t say that empathy was completely lacking. In fact, there was a massive growth of organizations devoted to promoting empathy in various ways through humanitarian endeavors. But the arts and the humanities, I think, were imagined to be a part of the story, that by fostering cultural exchange through literature and music, you could create empathy that would lead to a more global or peaceful world. I believe that the arts and the humanities have a role to play, but I’m not sure that that idea was institutionalized back then.

OXTOBY: There’s an American faith in democracy that if you let people vote, things will get better. But we have seen many cases, and I’m sure there are some in the era that you have studied, in which voting and democracy do not always lead to positive changes. Is there anything in your research that relates to what we are seeing today?
ZAHRA: Mass politics has always fascinated me, but I think mass politics is not always the same as democracy. Democracy involves institutions of certain kinds. But I don’t want to say mass politics isn’t democracy either. What I have been most drawn to are those moments when democracy or mass politics doesn’t necessarily lead to the outcome that I like. And in my own research what I’ve tried to do is understand that. As a historian, I don’t know that I have the tools or the ability to solve the problem, but I can shed light on why. One of the things that was really important to me in my book was not just to say, “Here are a bunch of people who were against globalization,” but to really get at their perspectives and experiences and to include the voices of people who felt threatened or harmed by globalization. So I think the best I can do on that question is really just to say I’m going to continue to think about why, but I don’t know that I’ll ever have the answer either.

OXTOBY: We have a question from someone in our virtual audience. “From your historical insight, how do you think the series of recent wars affected attitudes toward globalization? Consider Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza.”

ZAHRA: For the war in the Middle East, large numbers of people are mobilized politically on all sides about an issue and a place that is far from home. In Ukraine, and you see this time and time again in history, there was an initial wave of enthusiasm or support that dwindled with time pretty quickly. So it’s hard to predict where it’s going to go. But it was incredibly heartwarming when the war in Ukraine broke out and all of these countries opened their doors and welcomed the Ukrainians in. But that represented a very limited form of empathy. Poland and Hungary had not welcomed the Syrian refugees who were also knocking on their door, so there was a kind of affinity based on an imagined white European Christian identity. And from what I’m hearing about what is going on in Poland, some of the empathy is starting to fade.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you comment on externalities? I’m thinking about things like the Dust Bowl in the United States during the 1930s or some other events.

ZAHRA: I think it’s an important insight. I mentioned briefly the work of a colleague, Quinn Slobodian, and his argument is precisely that economists recognized the threat that democracy posed to globalization; there was an inkling of that idea in the interwar period to insulate markets from democracy. So how do you repair that? That’s a great question. I wish I knew. The youth in Europe felt loyalty to or identified with the European project. So I don’t think it’s impossible to create affinities. I hope some of the political scientists in the room will be able to solve this question.

OXTOBY: My last question before we turn to some Q&A with our audience. You end on a somewhat hopeful note about the postwar realization that we need to work together. As a historian it may be hard to project, but are those organizations that were set up in that postwar period still viable at the present time? Or do we need to rethink how those basic organizations are carrying forward into the future?

ZAHRA: The Bretton Woods system famously broke down, but aspects of it remained, like full employment, consumer-driven economies, economic development, and the welfare state. These ideas have been under attack or threatened. I think we need a new Bretton Woods. I don’t think globalization is actually going to end, but I think the architecture of globalization is going to be restructured. That is a hopeful reading.

OXTOBY: We have some time for a few questions from our audience.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m curious about how the linkages between people on the ground and with very broad institutions can be supported.

ZAHRA: The Bretton Woods system famously broke down, but aspects of it remained, like full employment, consumer-driven economies, economic development, and the welfare state.
other climate change events. How does that affect the global response? Ukraine would be a good example. Another example would be the problems that occurred in Africa in the Sahel and starvation that occurred in Biafra. We don’t as human beings necessarily have control over those things.

**Whether it is the Dust Bowl or the Sahel or climate change today, human decisions and political decisions produced those crises. But once they are set in motion, the people who are affected by them often are not individually responsible and don’t have control.**

**ZAHRA:** I think a lot of what you’re talking about are issues that my colleagues who focus more on environmental history are deeply engaged in. I think what they might say is that none of those issues were out of our control. Whether it is the Dust Bowl or the Sahel or climate change today, human decisions and political decisions produced those crises. But once they are set in motion, the people who are affected by them often are not individually responsible and don’t have control. What is so interesting about the current moment is that you have a global issue that can only be solved through global cooperation, though it may be solved in part by pulling back from globalization. In my own research, I neglected the environmental story because I didn’t see environmentalism as a motivation at the time, but I do think that these moments had serious environmental consequences and those would also be very interesting.

**AUDIENCE MEMBER:** I was impressed by the way you started with a feminist, and I want to follow up on that a bit. Did you look into demographic factors during your research? The question of a women’s movement and of reproductive rights is now very much on the front burner for all of Europe and the United States. And so too is the fear of population loss. I was wondering how that fed into what you found in your research.

**ZAHRA:** I think you’re right to notice those echoes in contemporary discussions. The land movement was also a push for bigger families because you needed huge families to work on these self-sufficient farms. Pronatalism and eugenics were dominant ideas in the 1920s and 1930s, and the solution was never to have more immigrants to increase your population. The right kind of people had to reproduce and if you gave them land, then maybe they would do that. But the evidence, as many of you know, is that even in Nazi Germany, where there were huge incentives like marriage loans to increase family sizes, it didn’t work. Birth rates continued to go down.

**AUDIENCE MEMBER:** How do human rights and international treaties, going back to Eleanor Roosevelt, affect attitudes toward globalization and anti-globalization?

**ZAHRA:** I’m very interested in the history of human rights, and I haven’t really thought about it in relationship to this topic. Off the top of my head, I would say that a lot of people see the origins of international human rights movements to be at least partly in the interwar period. I don’t know if the international organizations devoted to humanitarian causes had quite that language of human rights yet, but their mission was to aid the victims of de-globalization: that is, minorities, stateless people, and victims of famine—the people who were most deeply affected by this change in the world order. It is possible that today there may be more organizations that are devoted to those kinds of issues, although as someone who teaches the history of human rights, I think among undergraduates at the University of Chicago the language of human rights has been somewhat supplanted by a language of social justice.

**OXTOBY:** I hope everyone has enjoyed this program as much as I have. I would like to thank Tara for her stimulating presentation and thoughtful comments. And let me thank our audience for joining us today. This concludes the 2122nd Stated Meeting of the American Academy.

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To view or listen to the presentation, visit www.amacad.org/events/anti-globalism-past-and-present-jonathan-fanton-lecture-in-person.
San Diego Program Committee cochair M. Margaret McKeown (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit), Judy Gradwohl (San Diego Natural History Museum), and Margaret Leinen (University of California, San Diego) enjoy a reception at the Ida and Cecil Green Faculty Club following “Inspiring Collective Climate Action in California and Beyond,” a discussion on February 13, 2024, led by David Victor (University of California, San Diego), cochair of the Commission on Accelerating Climate Action.

Members Neal Lane (Rice University), David W. Oxtoby (American Academy of Arts and Sciences), Ramamoorthy Ramesh (Rice University), and Reginald DesRoches (Rice University) at the March 18, 2024, conversation and member dinner on “Accelerating Climate Action Across America,” hosted by the Houston Program Committee in collaboration with Rice University.

James B. Milliken (University of Texas System), David W. Oxtoby (American Academy), and Austin area members gather on March 19, 2024, for a luncheon at the Bauer House, the University of Texas System Chancellor’s residence.
**Select Prizes and Awards to Members**

Laurence F. Abbott (Columbia University) was awarded the 2024 Brain Prize. Professor Abbott shares the prize with Haim Sompolinsky (Harvard University) and Terrence Sejnowski (Salk Institute for Biological Studies).

Terence Blanchard (New Orleans, LA) was elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters.

Kristin Bowman-James (University of Kansas) received the Joseph G. Danek Award, given by the EPSCoR/IDEA Foundation.

Mary C. Boyce (Columbia University) was awarded the 2024 Benjamin Franklin Medal in Mechanical Engineering by the Franklin Institute.

Ronald Breaker (Yale University) was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology.

María Magdalena Campos-Pons (Vanderbilt University) received the 2024 SEC Faculty Achievement Award.

Deborah Duen Ling Chung (University at Buffalo) received the UB President’s Medal from the University at Buffalo.

Titia de Lange (Rockefeller University) received the 2024 Peczoller Foundation–American Association for Cancer Research International Award for Extraordinary Achievement in Cancer Research.

Michel Devoret (Yale University) was awarded the Comstock Prize in Physics, given by the National Academy of Sciences. Professor Devoret shares the award with Robert Schoelkopf (Yale University).

Aaron Dworkin (University of Michigan) received the President’s Award for National and State Leadership from the University of Michigan.

Andrea Ghez (University of California, Los Angeles) received an Alumni Medal from the University of Chicago.

Claudia Golden (Harvard University) received an Alumni Medal from the University of Chicago. She was also named a TIME Woman of the Year for 2024.

Jeffrey I. Gordon (Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis) received the 2024 Mechthild Esser Nemmers Prize in Medical Science from Northwestern University.

Joy Harjo (Tulsa, OK) received the Frost Medal from the Poetry Society of America.

Nancy Hopkins (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) was awarded the 2024 Public Welfare Medal by the National Academy of Sciences.

William Kaelin Jr. (Dana-Farber Cancer Institute; Harvard Medical School) received the Stanley P. Reimann Honor Award from the Fox Chase Cancer Center.

Sandra Knapp (Natural History Museum, London) was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society, awarded an OBE in the King’s New Year Honors in 2023, and received the Engler Medal in Gold from the International Association for Plant Taxonomy.

Gary Koretzky (Weill Cornell Medicine) received the American Association of Immunologists’ Lifetime Achievement Award.

Robert Landick (University of Wisconsin–Madison) received a 2024 Hilldale Award from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Luciano Marraffini (Rockefeller University) received the 2024 Vilcek Prize in Biomedical Science from the Vilcek Foundation.

Tracey Meares (Yale Law School) was named a 2024 Fellow of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

Richard A. Meserve (Carnegie Institution for Science) received the Lauristin S. Taylor Medal from the National Council of Radiation Protection and Measurements.

Peter Narins (University of California, Los Angeles) received the 2023 Hugh Knowles Prize for Distinguished Achievement from Northwestern University.

Priyamvada Natarajan (Yale University) was elected a Fellow of the American Astronomical Society.

David Nirenberg (Institute for Advanced Study) was awarded the 2024 Leopold Lucas Prize from the University of Tübingen’s Faculty of Protestant Theology.

Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago) received the 2024 Norman Maclean Faculty Award from the University of Chicago.

Julio M. Ottino (Northwestern University) was elected to the American Institute for Medical and Biological Engineering’s College of Fellows.

Kimberly Prather (University of California, San Diego) received the 2024 NAS Award in Chemical Sciences, given by the National Academy of Sciences.

Thomas Rando (University of California, Los Angeles) was elected to the American Institute for Medical and Biological Engineering’s College of Fellows.

Charles Ray (Los Angeles, CA) was elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters.

Dietram Scheufele (University of Wisconsin–Madison) received a 2024 Hilldale Award from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Robert Schoelkopf (Yale University) was awarded the Comstock Prize in Physics, given by the National Academy of Sciences. Professor Schoelkopf shares the award with Michel Devoret (Yale University).

Terrence Sejnowski (Salk Institute for Biological Studies) was awarded the 2024 Brain Prize. Professor Sejnowski shares the prize with Laurence F. Abbott (Columbia University) and Haim Sompolinsky (Harvard University).

Paul Simon (New York, NY) received the PEN/Audible Literary Service Award.
Haim Sompolinsky (Harvard University) was awarded the 2024 Brain Prize. Professor Sompolinsky shares the prize with Laurence F. Abbott (Columbia University) and Terrence Sejnowski (Salk Institute for Biological Studies).

Jacqueline Stewart (Academy Museum of Motion Pictures) received the Society for Cinema and Media Studies’ Distinguished Career Achievement Award.

Teresa A. Sullivan (University of Virginia) received a Professional Achievement Award from the University of Chicago.

Arthur Sze’s (Institute of American Indian Arts) The Glass Constellation: New and Collected Poems (Copper Canyon Press) was selected by the National Book Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation as a 2024 selected title of the Science + Literature program.

Rosemarie Trockel (Brandenburg, Germany) was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters.

E. John Wherry (University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine) was named a 2024 Fellow of the American Association for Cancer Research Academy.

Avi Wigderson (Institute for Advanced Study) is the recipient of the 2023 A.M. Turing Award from the Association for Computing Machinery.

John Williams (Burbank, CA) was elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters.

Hao Wu (Harvard Medical School) was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology.

Kevin Young (National Museum of African American History and Culture, Smithsonian Institution) was awarded the 2024 Harvard Arts Medal.

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**New Appointments**

Danielle Allen (Harvard University) was appointed to the Board of Trustees of the Thomas Jefferson Foundation.

Lawrence D. Bobo (Harvard University) was elected as Chair of the Board of Directors of the American Institutes for Research.

Karl Eikenberry (Stimson Center) was appointed a member of the National Security Education Board.

Richard A. Epstein (New York University School of Law) was appointed to the Board of Directors of the Liberty Justice Center.

Scott Fraser (University of Southern California) was named Vice President of Science Grant Programs at the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative.

Kenneth C. Frazier (Merk & Co.) was elected a member of the Harvard Corporation.

Elena Fuentes-Afflick (University of California, San Francisco) was named Chief Scientific Officer of the Association of American Medical Colleges.

David Grain (Grain Management) was elected a member of the Board of Trustees of Dartmouth College. Mr. Grain was also appointed a member of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council.

Stephen Heintz (Rockefeller Brothers Fund) was appointed as Chair of the Governing Board of the Quincy Institute.

Kaye Husbands Fealing (Georgia Institute of Technology) was selected to lead the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences at the National Science Foundation.

Erika Lee (Harvard University) was appointed as the Carl and Lily Pforzheimer Foundation Faculty Director at the Harvard Radcliffe Institute’s Schlesinger Library.

David Leebron (Rice University) was named President and Chief Executive Officer of Texas 2036.

Jonathan Levin (Stanford Graduate School of Business) was appointed President of Stanford University.

John F. Manning (Harvard Law School) was named Interim Provost of Harvard University.

Jennifer J. Raab (Hunter College) was named President and Chief Executive Officer of the New York Stem Cell Foundation.

Thomas Rando (University of California, Los Angeles) was elected President of the Board of Directors of the American Federation for Aging Research.

Andrew Read (Pennsylvania State University) was named Senior Vice President for Research at Pennsylvania State University.

Beth Shapiro (University of California, Santa Cruz) was named Chief Science Officer of Colossal Biosciences.

J. Marshall Shepherd (University of Georgia) was appointed to the Board of Directors of the National Center for Science Education.

Ruth Simmons (Harvard University; Rice University) was appointed to the Board of Directors of the Barbara Bush Houston Literacy Foundation.

James Spudich (Stanford University School of Medicine) was appointed to the Scientific Advisory Board of Quince Therapeutics, Inc.

George Triantis (Stanford University) was named Dean of Stanford Law School.

Dawn Wright (Environmental Systems Research Institute) was selected to serve as a 2024 U.S. Science Envoy.
Select Publications

FICTION


Jane Smiley (Carmel Valley, CA). Lucky. Knopf, April 2024

Colm Tóibín (Dublin, Ireland). Long Island. Scribner, May 2024


NONFICTION

Derek Bok (Harvard University). Attacking the Elites: What Critics Get Wrong—and Right—About America’s Leading Universities. Yale University Press, February 2024

Lawrence Buell (Harvard University). Henry David Thoreau: Thinking Disobediently. Oxford University Press, October 2023

Judith Butler (University of California, Berkeley). Who’s Afraid of Gender? Farrar, Straus and Giroux, March 2024

David Clary (University of Oxford). The Lost Scientists of World War II. World Scientific, February 2024


Nicholas B. Dirks (New York Academy of Sciences). City of Intellect: The Uses and Abuses of the University. Cambridge University Press, February 2024

Anthony S. Fauci (Georgetown University). On Call: A Doctor’s Journey in Public Service. Viking, June 2024

Renée Fleming (McLean, VA), ed. Music and Mind: Harnessing the Arts for Health and Wellness. Viking, April 2024


Stephen Greenblatt (Harvard University) and Adam Phillips (University of York). Second Chances: Shakespeare and Freud. Yale University Press, May 2024


Mary Dana Hinton (Hollins University). Leading from the Margins: College Leadership from Unexpected Places. Johns Hopkins University Press, February 2024


Sandra Knapp (Natural History Museum, London, United Kingdom). In the Name of Plants. University of Chicago Press, November 2022


Nicholas D. Kristof (Yamhill, OR). Chasing Hope: A Reporter’s Life. Knopf, May 2024


Sonny Rollins (West Hurley, NY) with Sam V. H. Reese (York St John University). ed. The Notebooks of Sonny Rollins. New York Review Books, April 2024

Daniela Rus (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Gregory Mone (Popular Science). The Heart and the Chip: Our Bright Future with Robots. W. W. Norton & Company, March 2024


Natasha Trethewey (Northwestern University). The House of Being. Yale University Press, April 2024

We invite all Fellows and International Honorary Members to send notices about their recent and forthcoming publications, new appointments, exhibitions and performances, films and documentaries, and honors and prizes to bulletin@amacad.org.
Within the Academy Archives is an illustrated book with over eighty hand-colored illustrations of native plants of the Netherlands. This book was received through the Academy’s publication exchange with other academic and state societies.¹ A record of these exchanges can be found in the Academy’s letterbooks.²

The Academy received the first installment of the *Flora Batava* in 1803 from the Secretary of the Interior Council of the Republic of Batavia, which would later become part of the Kingdom of Holland and then part of the Netherlands. The King of the Netherlands sent later issues to the Academy.³ The correspondence concerning the sending and receiving of issues of the *Flora Batava* dates from 1803 and 1822.

The Academy’s library was sold to the Linda Hall Library in the 1940s, but a small portion of the books was not included in that sale because of its significance to the history of the Academy. The *Flora Batava* was one such book.

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1. For more on the Academy’s publication exchange, visit https://www.amacad.org/news/pubexchange-florabatava.
When Faith Ringgold died in April 2024 at the age of 93, articles commemorating her life celebrated her as a remarkable and highly prolific artist. However, there is no substitute for hearing her words and seeing her art, so the Academy shared the video of her illustrated talk from Induction 2017 in which she discussed her life and art with images from nearly 70 years of creativity. The video, “At Work - Faith Ringgold,” is available at YouTube.com.

Follow the Academy on social media to keep current with news and events.

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- www.linkedin.com/company/american-academy-of-arts-and-sciences
- www.youtube.com/americanacad