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
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
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AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF ARTS & SCIENCES

Save the Date

Induction Weekend

**Saturday,
October 10, 2009**

2009 Induction Ceremony – Cambridge

**Sunday,
October 11, 2009**

Sunday Symposium – Cambridge

*For information and reservations, contact the Events Office
(phone: 617-576-5032; email: mevents@amacad.org).*

Is Information Technology a Public Good?



Butler Lampson (Microsoft), Irwin Mark Jacobs (Qualcomm), Vinton Cerf (Google), and John L. Hennessy (Stanford University)

Digital technology has created unprecedented changes in the way we live, work, and interact with the world and with each other. Its effect is apparent everywhere: President Obama's digital campaign recruited 8 million volunteers online; more than 200 million blogs have been published; Facebook surpassed 175 million users worldwide; sales of iPods topped 180 million; and one in eight couples married in the United States last year met online. At a recent meeting in Mountain View, California, the Academy convened technology pioneers, industry leaders, scientists, and scholars to examine the impact – positive and negative, planned and unanticipated – of information technology on society.

The symposium featured four Fellows whose breakthrough discoveries helped launch the digital revolution. Vinton Cerf, Chief Internet Evangelist at Google; Irwin Jacobs, Founder of Qualcomm, Inc.; Butler Lampson, Technical Fellow at Microsoft; and John Hennessy, computer industry pioneer and President of Stanford University, discussed

the past and future of computing, communications, and the Internet. Cerf commented on the speed with which people embraced the Internet, especially through social media sites. "It has been this incredible avalanche of shared information," he said. "The expression 'information is power' – I think it's wrong. It's 'information sharing is power.'"

In a series of panel discussions, *The Public Good: The Impact of Information Technology on Society* considered transformations in a wide range of areas, from governance to books, libraries, and art. A session on **Information Technology and Democracy** examined how technology has changed the way citizens interact with government and receive information. "The Web has not overcome the stratification of American politics, as some people had hoped it would," said Henry Brady, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. Speaking about the demise of newspapers, Joshua Cohen, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, observed: "We can't have a successful democratic pub-

lic sphere without the kinds of information that newspapers have supplied. I don't mean weather reports, but investigative journalism – local, national, international."

Participants in a discussion of **Alternative Futures for the Internet: Fears and Optimism** assessed what can and should be done to craft the ideal Internet. David Clark, Senior Research Scientist at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, emphasized that "the Internet is not a fixed and determined thing. It mutates rapidly. As we drive toward the future, there's more than one possible path and that raises a bunch of vague questions. Can we even predict the eventual implications of actions we take now? Should we assume that the Internet of the future is simply a random phenomenon?"

Turning to **Books, Publishing, and Libraries**, Co-Chairman of the Board of Adobe Systems John Warnock noted, "I think electronic libraries have a huge opportunity in the future because you can organize content in very unique and personal ways, which you could never think about in book form." Stanford University Librarian and Director of Academic Information Resources Michael Keller suggested that the digitization of objects on the Internet has done much to "democratize learning and intellectual exploration."

Other panels focused on how information technology has changed the way people think about art, new tools and media, and the democratization of craft.

The symposium opened with a memorial minute for James N. Gray, a Fellow of the Academy who made seminal contributions to the field of information technology and encouraged the planning of this conference. Gray was lost at sea in January 2007. C. Gordon Bell, Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research, offered personal remarks about his close collaborator: "Jim is a great friend of computing and a friend of this Academy. He was a legend when we first met in 1994,



C. Gordon Bell (Microsoft Research) describing an exhibit at the Computer History Museum



David Clark (MIT), Hal Varian (Google), Cynthia Dwork (Microsoft), and Jonathan Zittrain (Harvard Law School)

and I found we shared the same religion about building scalable computers. His research was driven by the quest for fundamental understanding yet also inspired by a search for practical applications. He built systems that are in use today, including on-line transaction systems that do our banking and reserve our airline tickets, and more recent systems like Google Earth, Microsoft Virtual Earth, and the World-Wide Telescope.”

The more than twenty presenters at the meeting included Jonathan Berger (Stanford University), Dale Dougherty (Maker

Media), Cynthia Dwork (Microsoft), Edward Feigenbaum (Stanford University), Edward W. Felten (Princeton University), Charles Geschke (Adobe Systems, Inc.), Daniel Goroff (Sloan Foundation), Pat Hanrahan (Stanford University), John Hollar (Computer History Museum), Edward Lazowska (University of Washington), Donald Lindberg (National Library of Medicine), Carl Rosendahl (Pacific Data Images), Hal Varian (Google), and Jonathan Zittrain (Harvard Law School).


The Academy is grateful to the members of the Planning Committee – C. Gordon Bell,

Jesse H. Choper, David Clark, Edward Feigenbaum, Pat Hanrahan, John Hennessy, John Hollar, and Edward Lazowska – and to Microsoft, Google, and the Computer History Museum for hosting the conference.

Audio and video coverage of the program is available on the Academy’s website at www.amacad.org/audio/mountain/mountain.aspx. The panel discussions will appear in a forthcoming publication. ■

Remembering John Hope Franklin

by Walter Dellinger



John Hope Franklin

John Hope Franklin, who died in March at the age of 94, was one of the most remarkable Americans of the twentieth century. He was the master of the great American story of that century, the story of race. John Hope wrote it, he taught it, and he lived it.

For seven years, he and I taught constitutional history together at Duke University, and I never ceased to marvel at how he managed both to embody this history and yet recount it with an extraordinarily candid honesty. Our students would fall into the deepest hush while he recounted his experiences researching his epic 1947 work, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans* (reprinted scores of times since, and still widely read), in segregated Southern state libraries and Southern university libraries. He would describe the various Jim Crow rules he was required to navigate – a separate table from white patrons, a prohibition on being waited on by white female librarians, and similar indignities – without a trace of bitterness.

After the acclaim for *From Slavery to Freedom* and his other writings brought him a place on the Howard University faculty while he was still in his 30s, John Hope thought he had achieved the final academic appointment of his life. He believed that a scholar who was a man of color could aspire to teach nowhere else. History proved him wrong. In 1956, when Brooklyn College made him the first African American to be appointed to chair an academic department at a predominantly white institution, *The New York Times* reported the story on its front page.

John Hope never compromised on principle. Well, almost never. He told and retold the story of a decision he made as a young teenager in Tulsa to see a performance by a star of the Metropolitan Opera. His parents strongly disapproved of his decision, since it entailed sitting in a segregated balcony. He later wrote, “I am not altogether proud of going to Convention Hall, and there are

times, even now, while enjoying a symphony or an opera, when I reproach myself for having yielded to the indignity of racial segregation.”

In 2007, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences joined with the American Philosophical Society to confer a “Public Good Award” on John Hope Franklin. In presenting the award, I noted that in the founding papers of both the Academy and the Society there are frequent references to “thinkers and doers.” The trajectory of our republic owes much to both kinds of participants in our national story – those thinkers whose ideas laid the foundation for our most important democratic institutions; and those doers who took aspirational concepts and made them concrete. John Hope Franklin was one of those rare individuals whose prodigious talents manifest themselves as both.

He worked on a crucial brief for *Brown v. Board of Education*, he marched in Selma, he lectured all over the world, and he taught all of America to see through his uncompromising eye. But it was not just what he did, but how he did it that marked his greatness. John Hope somehow combined a tough and uncompromising militancy with the courtly manner of an old-school Southern gentleman. He understood that the public good was not merely a set of substantive outcomes; it is also defined by how we go about reconciling our competing visions of that public good. It is about how we view one another when we peer across the great divides of policy, preference, political party, and personhood. John Hope Franklin looked at those who opposed him and saw fellow human beings.

He was no Pollyanna. He knew, as my son Drew once wrote, that we are still always crossing that bridge from Selma to Montgomery. But John Hope always looked at the state trooper blocking the bridge, the figure standing in the way of freedom, and saw

On April 28, 2007, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Philosophical Society bestowed the “Public Good Award” on John Hope Franklin.

Citation

Renowned historian and educator, ardent defender of civil rights, keen observer of American society, dedicated adviser to presidents, you have worked throughout your life to create One America. Born into poverty and burdened by racism, you responded with intelligence, insight, and integrity, creating an unparalleled body of work on African American culture.

With your books, essays, and lectures, you redefined the entire corpus of American history. Over the past sixty years, through eight editions and six translations, your landmark study, *From Slavery to Freedom*, has more than met the challenge you set for yourself: “To weave into the fabric of American history enough of the presence of blacks so that the story of the United States could be told adequately and fairly.” You have mentored thousands of students, many of them now distinguished scholars, and served as a role model for your profession as President of the Southern Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the American Historical Association, and the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa.

Beyond the classroom and the scholarly community, your influence has been profound. Your research at the Library of Congress for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was critical to the outcome of *Brown v. Board of Education*, ending the separate and unequal system of education you endured but rose above. A determined civic activist, you took to the streets with Martin Luther King in the voting-rights march from Selma to Montgomery. An adviser to presidents from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to William Jefferson Clinton, you have continued to champion the cause of racial equality with patience, determination, and dignity. We honor you tonight as the model of an American scholar-patriot, bringing statesmanship, knowledge, and engagement to one of our nation’s most intractable challenges.

You held up a “Mirror to America,” bore witness to inequality and injustice, and acted against both. Your seminal scholarship has reshaped our understanding of America, providing both blacks and whites with a new reflection of themselves and each other. As the consummate teacher, you reached out to instruct this nation and inspired millions of Americans to grasp a present and a future long owed to them. You personify the great humanitarian; a courageous and gentle man whose strong words and quiet actions are beyond measure. All of us who value freedom and opportunity stand tall in your presence.

there another child of God. He knew, as Charles L. Black Jr. said, that the tragedy of Southern race relations was drawn from that “prima materia of all tragedy: the failure to recognize kinship.”

When Barack Obama emerged as a possible candidate for president, I asked John Hope how historic it would be if Obama won his party’s nomination. He replied that the historical significance of such a thing was beyond measure. Obama’s nomination, he said, “would counter one of the most dominant narratives of the past 350 years on this continent.” Then he added the thought that it could be even more historically and culturally important “to have that family as the first family than to have Obama as president.”

When the roll was called in Denver and the Democratic convention, by acclamation, made Obama its nominee for president, I stepped outside and called John Hope. I asked him the question so many of us – particularly those of us from the South – have now asked each other: Did you ever think you would live to see this day? In his resonant baritone, John Hope responded, “Well, I never expected to live more than 90 years. But, no, even if I had, I still would not have thought that would be long enough to see this happen.” That he did live into this year seems a special gift.

Walter Dellinger is a partner at O’Melveny & Myers in Washington, D.C., and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. A version of this article appeared in “The Washington Post.” ■

Academy Meetings



Celebration in Lower Hutchinson Field, Grant Park, Chicago, IL, upon hearing that U.S. Senator Barack Obama was elected President of the United States

Image © Ron Sachs/CNP/Corbis

After the 2008 Elections: How Will They Govern?

Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann

David T. Ellwood, moderator

This presentation was given at the 1938th Stated Meeting, held at the House of the Academy on January 14, 2009.



David T. Ellwood

David T. Ellwood is Scott Black Professor of Political Economy and Dean at the Harvard Kennedy School. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2000.

The present moment is an amazing one. I realize this is a commonplace concept, that most people in any given year tend to think that the world they live in is at a major turning point. One never really knows until much later, but if ever there was a good nominee for an amazing moment, the present feels like one.

More than a year ago, before the financial crisis began, my colleague David Gergen said that the new president, whomever he or she would be, would face the greatest set of challenges since Franklin Roosevelt. That he could say this even before the current financial crisis is easy to understand. Start with the huge challenges presented by Iraq – where getting out will be really hard – and Afghani-

stan – where we seem to be struggling. Add in Pakistan, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the incredible crisis in Gaza. Consider the issues raised by climate change and energy policy. (The really inconvenient truth about climate change is that it is going to be hard, not easy. Had any of the recent presidential candidates honestly addressed the issue of climate change, they would have said, “You know, these gas prices are too low, not too high,” and “Any solution is going to involve sending a lot of money to China to help do carbon capture and other things to offset all the coal they will be burning.” But no one seemed to be running on the platform of higher gas prices and more money for China.) Consider health policy and what happened the last time it was tackled: the Clinton Ad-

ministration nearly crashed, and the Democratic Congress was thrown out. Finally, consider the issues of terror and security, education, and immigration. Looming behind all of these is the budget. Our deficits were astonishing even before the current crisis.

Besides the unique scope of the current set of challenges, the other striking thing about them is that a misstep with almost any one of them could destroy a presidency. Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, climate change, health policy – the list of things that could go wrong is enormous, and some are completely out of anyone’s control. A terrorist incident or the avian flu could derail everything. Combine those challenges with uncertainty about where the economy is headed, and the new president faces a combination of challenges unlike any we have ever seen.

The first moments of the new administration will be amazingly important. The president and his officials might feel tempted to do the impossible: do it all and do it early.

At the same time, this is an exciting moment because so many people are happy and excited about serving, about making a difference. So, as the saying goes, and as Rahm Emanuel recently affirmed, never waste a crisis.

Just after the election, I was at a dinner party that included Mayor Bloomberg of New York. He was asked why on earth he would again want to be New York’s mayor. “Nothing but hard times lie ahead. You got an A the first time around, so why not get out while the getting’s good?” He said, “It’s way more fun to lead in bad times than in good times. You can do stuff. People will put up with stuff. In fact, they want a leader. They want someone who’s strong. In good times, you can’t do anything, because people won’t put up with it.”

The other interesting aspect to the present moment is that it is like a fantasy for Democrats. Recall that when Clinton got into office, he was going to change the world, fix

health care, and so on – only he had to worry about the budget. The budget was a really big problem, and within the administration a tremendous fight was waged over budgets versus other priorities. Many people argue that the budget folks won, perhaps to good effect. Donna Shalala, my boss at the Department of Health and Human Services, used to say it’s really not fair for Democrats to be in office when there’s no money. Democrats really like to spend money. So imagine being a Democrat coming into office and being told, “You must spend a trillion dollars as fast as possible.” You actually have money to do a lot of stuff up front. This gives new meaning to the usual claims that the president’s first hundred days set the tone for the entire administration and therefore must be done right. In this case, a trillion dollars will be spent in those first hundred days. But, and this is important, Obama had better spend it wisely, because it’s probably his last trillion. Eventually he will have to start paying the bills for all of that unbelievable debt and deficit he will create. So the first moments of the new administration will be amazingly important. The president and his officials might feel tempted to do the impossible: do it all and do it early. Instead, what I hope will happen in the first year is that the new administration will make down payments – of both the monetary and critical framework sort – on a number of major projects, including health-care reform, climate change, and energy independence.

Watching the team that Obama has been putting together has been fascinating. Its members are an amazingly impressive group of people. In combination they also suggest a strikingly different form of governance. Historically the relationship between the White House and the executive departments has been a battle. In general, at the end of the day the White House wins, and the Cabinet members are annoyed.¹ A few Cabinet officials, typically at Defense or Treasury, might be unusually powerful because of where they are. But even then they tend to be somewhat

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controlled by an agent of the White House, a national security adviser, or the National Economic Council (NEC). The Cabinet Obama has assembled, however, comprises a number of exceptionally powerful figures who just might be able to turn the tide of the battle historically waged between the White House and Cabinet.

How will the White House maintain control over its agenda? How will it manage the many powerful voices and competing priorities? Rahm Emanuel, who is a highly effective, thoughtful, powerful man, will play a significant role. (I was on the wrong side of a number of battles with Emanuel back in the Clinton administration, and I can tell you it is hard to win against him.) And he is far from being the only powerful White House figure on the Obama team. The interactions between figures like Larry Summers, heading the NEC, and Timothy Geithner at Treasury will be interesting to watch. Defense, where William Gates is staying on from the Bush administration, will present fascinating challenges to Obama. How those challenges are managed amid the broader response to the current crises will provide fascinating viewing opportunities well beyond the new administration’s first one hundred days.

¹ During the Clinton Administration I was one of the people in charge of welfare reform. In fact, I thought I was one of the three people in charge. We were running the show, deciding who was on what group, writing the bill, and so on. And then the head of politics for Health and Human Services came to me and said, “You know, when the final

bill is written, and the final deal is cut, you’re not going to be in the room.” I said, “What do you mean, I’m not going to be in the room? I’m kind of in charge.” He said, “No, you won’t be in the room, because you care more about poor people than you do about Bill Clinton.” That was one of those “Oh, yeah, I guess they’re right” moments.



Norman J. Ornstein

Norman J. Ornstein is Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2004.

We have six days to go in the seventy-seven-day interregnum between Election Day and Inauguration Day. This long period during which the president-elect waits to take over is unique to the United States. During this time the president who will soon be replaced still holds power and is able to exercise the full force of that power, despite the election results. I have likened this situation to moving in with your fiancée while her soon-to-be ex-husband is still living in the house. President-elect Obama has been sensitive to this reality, and when he first met with President Bush after the election, he solemnly said, “We can only have one president at a time.” President Bush responded, “That’s not what Dick Cheney told me!”

We have witnessed some remarkable moments during the transition period, one of the most interesting being the historic lunch-time gathering of all the living former presidents with the president and the president-elect. When the bill arrived, they argued awhile over who should pay and then decided they would just pass it on to future generations. Another interesting moment occurred just today, when the Secret Service caught somebody trying to climb over the fence at the White House. They said, “Mr. President, you come back here; you’ve still got six days to go.” In a few days we’ll get to see the new presidential limousine, which makes its debut on January 20. The Secret Service calls it an armored tank. GM calls it a midsize.

All kidding aside, this really is a remarkable time. David outlined some of the difficulties Barack Obama will face, and they are not to be minimized. But Obama will also take office with a number of election-born advantages that many, if not most, of his predecessors did not enjoy. Obama won a stunning, sweeping victory, including capturing a majority of the popular vote, making him one of only four Democrats in history, and the first since Lyndon Johnson, to do so. Unlike Presidents Bush and Clinton, Obama had coattails. The Democrats picked up an impressive number of seats in both houses of Congress. Of course, Obama was not solely responsible for these gains. This was an election in which most Americans looked at the world as it has played out over the last few years and did not like what they saw. They especially did not like anything about Wash-

Obama won a stunning, sweeping victory, including capturing a majority of the popular vote, making him one of only four Democrats in history, and the first since Lyndon Johnson, to do so.

ington, and although Democrats had been in the majority in both houses of Congress since 2006, voters basically blamed Republicans. Nonetheless, a significant number of the Democrats newly elected to the House, and even a few in the Senate, know that they might not be there were it not for the superior organization – the get-out-the-vote effort, the fifty-state strategy – of Obama’s campaign. Democrats are in a remarkable position after gaining twenty or more seats in the House of Representatives and making big gains in the Senate for the second election in a row, the first time that has been done since 1932.

The Democrats’ swollen numbers should give them at least a slight pause, however. When Bill Clinton got elected in 1992, he came in with a comfortable Democratic majority in Congress: 258 out of 435 representatives and 58 out of 100 senators at that time

Obama has led a model transition and has focused on a governing style. He also believes that he can capture some Republican support by actually soliciting and incorporating Republican ideas.

were Democrats. The numbers are nearly identical to what Obama has. Despite this seeming advantage for Clinton, the first two years of his presidency were among the most difficult for a president in modern times. Republicans, after twelve years dominating the White House and now shut out of power in Washington, basically said, “All right, you won it all. You’re on your own. Don’t count on us.” True to their word, not a single Republican voted (at any stage in the bill’s progression through the House and Senate) for Clinton’s signature initial priority, an economic recovery package. The administration spent seven to eight humiliating months begging, pleading, and cajoling to get a simple majority in either house, finally succeeding by one vote in each. Instead of winning an initial big victory that would give him the momentum and the infusion of political capital to move toward other successes, Clinton’s victory looked much more like a defeat. A separate part of that economic recovery plan, a stimulus package of astounding size – all of \$13 billion – died in a filibuster in the Senate. The tugging and hauling over the Clinton economic plan was followed in the next year by the burning wreckage of his health-care plan, along with humiliating setbacks on his crime bill and in other areas. The lesson for Obama is that having Democratic majorities of the size he will enjoy does not automatically mean you can make things work.

The news is not all bad when comparing the start of the Clinton administration with the present. Back in 1993, Democrats had held the majority in the House for thirty-eight consecutive years. Not a single Republican serving in the House in 1993 had ever served

as a Republican under a majority Republican House, and only one Democrat, Sid Yates of Illinois, had served as a member of a minority Democratic House – way back in 1954. Most Democrats in Congress believed that buried somewhere in the Federalist Papers was a proviso that the Congress shall be controlled by Democrats. Their attitude was “Presidents come, presidents go, we stay. Whether they succeed or fail has little to do with us and thus doesn’t much matter.” This was their attitude in 1993, and it led to their departure from the majority two years later, followed by twelve years of wandering in the desert of the minority before recapturing the majority in the 2006 elections. Most of the current members are cognizant of the reality that their fate is inextricably linked with that of the president. That might make a difference for Obama.

Obama also has to deal with a dysfunctional political system, a public discourse that frequently consists of people at one end screaming at people at the other, and a political system where the opposition party views the success of a president of the other side as something that is not necessarily good.

At the same time, Obama has learned from the lessons of Bill Clinton, who botched his transition, paid little attention to personnel, did not put an early governing structure in place, had a disorganized White House, hit the ground stumbling in many other ways, and frittered away those initial several months that really are critical to the success of a president. Obama is not about to do that. He has led a model transition and has focused on a governing style. He also believes that he can capture some Republican support, not just by having individual

Republicans in for coffee or by making little phone calls, but by actually soliciting and incorporating Republican ideas. The Republicans in Congress represent a daunting challenge to the new president. For all of the difficulties Clinton had, substantial numbers of moderate, centrist, and even liberal Republicans sat in both houses back in 1993, and Republican senators did not regularly use the filibuster, or the threat of filibuster, as a device to retard progress on many different issues. Now, the ranks of Republican moderates form but a trace element in the House and barely more than that in the Senate, and the filibuster has become a very different vehicle.

At the same time, \$13 billion in economic stimulus seemed like a huge amount of money in 1993. Now \$800 billion is being criticized by many economists on the left and right as being too little to jump-start the economy. If the stimulus passes, the president will have money to work with instead of the fiscal straitjacket that pundits contemplated before the economic meltdown. But Obama also has to deal with a dysfunctional political system, a public discourse that frequently consists of people at one end screaming at people at the other, and a political system where the opposition party views the success of a president of the other side as something that is not necessarily good. All of those factors will be difficult to overcome. Still, Obama’s track record on the campaign trail and during the transition has been promising. He ran a sophisticated fifty-state campaign with enormous internal discipline and a focus on the outcome that was never deterred or fazed by the inevitable bumps encountered along the way. That plus the remarkable team he has assembled show that he is a natural executive.

But his governing approach is one that represents its own set of challenges. The team of rivals is a wonderful concept. Having strong-minded, accomplished people at all levels of government is something we all desire and like. Pulling their various strong voices into a single, consistent message will be a daunting challenge, however. Obama’s economic team alone will bring together the likes of Tim Geithner, a widely respected banker who spent his career in government as a protégé of Larry Summers and who will

Having strong-minded, accomplished people at all levels of government is something we all desire and like. Pulling their various strong voices into a single, consistent message will be a daunting challenge, however.

head the Treasury Department; Summers, a former Treasury Secretary who will direct Obama’s National Economic Council, holds very strong views, and probably is not afraid to play the protégé/mentor card; and Paul Volcker, a former Federal Reserve Chairman who will be kibitzing from the outside as head of Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board. Unlike on the campaign trail, where all involved share one objective – getting elected – and work closely together, often in the same building, in an administration the main players are scattered about Washington, might not have a primary goal of reelecting the president (might even see the president’s success as antithetical to their own), and might believe that working closely with other appointees could compromise their own strongly held beliefs or undermine their own power base. Whether Obama, with the unbelievable, once-in-several-generations talents that he probably possesses, can impose his will in this kind of an environment while also dealing with a Congress that is struggling to get past its own partisanship and dysfunction will be a most interesting set of issues not just for those of us who observe, write about, and analyze politics for a living, but for all of us, because the outcome will have a direct and immediate effect on our lives and those of our children and grandchildren.



Thomas E. Mann

Thomas E. Mann is the W. Averell Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993.

The start of the Clinton administration was a special time; it was an exciting time. David's Department of Health and Human Services had one of the ablest secretaries ever. She looked as good and felt as energized when she left the office after eight years as she did coming in, and she assembled an extraordinarily talented group of people. Expectations of what might be achieved were high, and some expectations were met. We saw some real achievements both during the first two years and in the subsequent years. Today we look back on the economy and the society and the state of well-being around the globe during those years, and we pine for those good times. The deficit reduction initiatives, the Earned Income Tax Credit, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and welfare reform were all real achievements. But we remember them along with the rocky start, the failure of health reform, the ever-present Whitewater and other so-called scandals, the 1994 political setback, the bitter partisan battles, the impeachment, all of which combined to limit the reach and impact of an administration that was quite skilled, electorally. Clinton was the first Democratic president to be elected twice and serve out eight years since Franklin Roosevelt. But Bill Clinton himself has said, "Good times don't make for great presidents." He ran on the economy – "It's the economy, stupid!" – but the reality is that the economy was already starting to come out of its slump by the time Clinton was

elected. George Herbert Walker Bush pointed that out, but, alas, Americans didn't see it until much later.

But the nature of the problems was of a different order, and while things were accomplished, we fell short of the expectations and ushered in one of the most difficult periods in American public life. We all remember Florida, November 2000, the days and weeks of bitter struggle to determine who our next president would be. I remember thinking, what in the world will George W. Bush say in his inaugural address to bring the country together after that thirty-six-day struggle? The editors of *The Onion* came to the rescue, suggesting that the president begin his inaugural address by recalling Gerald Ford's, "Our long national nightmare of peace and prosperity is over." Little did we

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know how prescient *The Onion* editors would prove to be and how difficult a period would follow: 9/11, the war in Iraq, Katrina, and the ravages of the economy – not to mention the deep ideological polarization of the political parties, the seeds of which were planted in the 1960s but came to fruition during this difficult period when we saw the institutional pathologies in American government and politics. The failures of Congress, the first branch of government, magnified the problems of the other branches. A nation and Congress divided 50/50 along party lines elevated the permanent campaign, and elected politicians began to ask of their every step, how will it influence the next election. Achieving any serious deliberation, any serious policy-making in Congress was hard,

The candidate offerings from both parties made for an extraordinary opportunity for the country to reengage and actually become a bit more hopeful.

and toward the end of the Bush administration the public lost faith in the country, the direction it was moving, its standing in the world. Now we can add utter fear about the financial meltdown and the economic situation we face. If ever we have gone through a difficult period in our history, setting aside the Civil War, the current period ranks right up there, which is why so many people in this country, Democrats and Republicans, as well as people around the globe, were so utterly fascinated by and engaged in this election. The candidate offerings from both parties made for an extraordinary opportunity for the country to reengage and actually become a bit more hopeful.

Now, I know you're thinking, "He sounds Pollyannaish for an academic; he's been taken in by the poetry of this opportunity for a new beginning." But I want to suggest that we fall too easily into a cynical, critical mode, that we too quickly find the prose and miss the poetry. The present combination of facts and events really is quite extraordinary. The man who will be our president, the nature of the election, a transition that has proven to be remarkably competent, the unprecedented early start to governing well before the inauguration – all increase the possibility of the president, the government, the country actually succeeding in some respect instead of falling right back into a sense of hopelessness. The conditions in the country and the nature of the political situation are significantly different from sixteen years ago, when Bill Clinton was inaugurated. Certainly, conditions are much different than in January 2001, and those differences at least open some possibilities that we have not seen in this country in a long while.

First, the magnitude of the election victory suggests that if Obama governs successfully, a realignment of the sort FDR achieved in

his 1932 election is a real possibility. As Norm said, not since FDR have we had a new Democratic president replace a Republican while winning an absolute majority of votes and carrying significant numbers of new members of his party into both the House and the Senate, nor have we had two consecutive Democratic wave elections since 1930 and 1932. Add to that the underlying demographic shifts. In 1992, about 12 percent of the electorate was nonwhite. Today that number has doubled to about a quarter. And every element of that nonwhite electorate – African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and others – is overwhelmingly aligning with the Democratic Party. Add to that the youngest cohort – which in 1992 still reflected Ronald Reagan’s popularity but is now reacting to George W. Bush and strongly supported Obama in the recent election – along with shifts in the metro area, and it all suggests something even more substantial to come.

Rather than viewing the initial time in office as a period when you must spend what political capital you have because it will soon be gone and the rest of your term is irrelevant, the point of the first few months should be to set the stage for leading throughout the term.

In addition to the demographic changes, the seriousness of the problems we face is such that the normal political hurdles may give way and provide an opportunity for action that would not otherwise exist. When Clinton came into office, he was dealing with the primacy of conservative ideas in our politics – ideas that dominated political discourse and governance for close to a quarter century. Clinton had to give that speech in which he claimed the era of big government is over, even when in effect he had proved that it was not, that he had stabilized it. Today the con-

servative ideas with which Clinton was confronted have little credibility. Tax cuts, moral traditionalism, and assertive nationalism abroad are not going to solve the problems we face. Democrats in Congress, chastened and much more experienced, are no longer the arrogant party and are actually looking to work with Republicans. Obama’s approach to governance is not ideological. He has a clear vision, a set of values, but he operates on the basis of getting something done, by whichever means seem available. He has put together an experienced, knowledgeable, and pragmatic team and is engaging with Congress in a way that I have not observed in a long time. He understands the trick is not to go over the heads of Congress or to ignore the public entirely. His administration will employ veterans of Capitol Hill who know how to make the system work. I see signs of prioritizing, of the sequencing of activities so as not to allow the agenda to be jammed and an early defeat to color the whole administration.

I happen to think the notion of the first hundred days applied to only one president in our history, Franklin Roosevelt. And yet we pull it out of the hat after every election without considering whether the current conditions match those that made FDR’s first hundred days possible: the severity of the problems facing the country and the nature of the government, a three-to-one Democratic majority and little in the way of staff on Capitol Hill. In 1933 you could really write new laws in the White House and get them enacted. Washington is so much different now. Health care will not be done in months and possibly not in a year or two; it will be a long, long struggle, probably accomplished in chunks and pieces over time. Rather than viewing the initial time in office as a period when you must spend what political capital you have because it will soon be gone and the rest of your term is irrelevant, the point of the first few months should be to set the stage for leading throughout the term. The way in which Obama has tried to deal with Congress on the release of the second installment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds and negotiate the terms of the stimulus package demonstrates that he is a skilled politician who knows where he is going but is perfectly prepared to accept the legitimacy

The seriousness of the problems we face creates the possibility of our political system operating in a way that is much more productive than we have seen in recent decades, and this possibility makes the present an exhilarating time.

of the other branch of government. Congress has decided it will no longer be a potted plant but will engage.

For all my bullishness, I still think the challenges are daunting. The ways in which Obama could fail are many. But the seriousness of the problems we face creates the possibility of our political system operating in a way that is much more productive than we have seen in recent decades, and this possibility makes the present an exhilarating time.

David Ellwood

Both Norm and Tom mentioned that Obama is coming in with astonishing expectations, not just here but around the world. Indeed, part of the brilliance of his campaign was to say just enough to give you a flavor of what is to come without filling you up. Obama is smart and appeals to an audience that has been frustrated by the almost anti-intellectual atmosphere that has pervaded politics for quite some time. But now comes the hard part, where he must fill in the details and prioritize. He can’t say, “Oh, yeah, I’m going to do that, and I’m going to do that, and I’m going to do that.” He can accomplish only a limited number of things, and I’m concerned about what gets put off. I remember being in an administration when there wasn’t much money left for projects. Obama will get one or two bites of the apple right now, and then the money will be gone.

How will Obama deal with the expectations, what will his priorities be, and what will be left undone as a result?

Norman Ornstein

First, having \$800 billion or \$1 trillion to play with is positive in a couple of ways for Obama. He can start with a lot of carrots, a lot of grease, to move things along. The domestic priorities for him are fairly clear, and we haven't even touched on the international priorities – getting out of Iraq, dealing with Iran, and other knotty issues. He will need to start by inspiring confidence, both here and around the world, that we have a plan to get out of the economic ditch, and he'll need to do this without raising expectations that it will happen quickly. He has done pretty well on that front, and the public, despite the eight-second attention span most of us have right now, seems to understand that the economic downturn is not going to end in February or March, that we've got some time to go. Substantively, coming up with something that can actually work is at least as difficult as politically getting it through.

Obama will need to start by inspiring confidence, both here and around the world, that we have a plan to get out of the economic ditch, and he'll need to do this without raising expectations that it will happen quickly.

Health care is another top priority. I'm actually more bullish on this front than Tom is. I don't think it will take two or three years, but it is also not going to happen in one go. What Obama can do in health care is push for expansion of existing programs, such as SCHIP (the State Children's Health Insurance Program). More than likely, the stimulus package will expand insurance for a lot of people who are unemployed; it could also expand Medicare to many of those between fifty-five and sixty-four and expand SCHIP (or create a similar program) to cover the parents of children in that program. We'll likely also get moving on a health information technology program, and we'll probably send more money to health-care providers,

to give them a little bit of a cushion as we try to transform the system.

Health-care reform might be doable in two or three steps. The administration is not going to push for immediate, dramatic change. Instead, change will be phased in and will require buy-in from a lot of different constituencies.

The next major priority is energy and the environment. Major steps will be taken with the stimulus package to fund research and development of alternative energy sources, encourage clean coal plants, build wind turbines, and so on. Addressing climate change will be tougher. Obama might try to implement the cap-and-trade program he wants, using authority that the courts have given to the president and regulators without having to go to Congress. However, even the most popular presidents are unlikely to attempt end runs around Congress, so I doubt this would be his first choice. One area of the stimulus package that will address energy and environmental concerns is the plan to retrofit public buildings to make them more energy efficient. This is an area where you could get people working right away, especially if commercial buildings and homes were included. The potential impact on both the economy and the environment could be significant.

Obama could make significant strides with some of his major priorities by using the stimulus package to go further than he would otherwise normally be able to go and to use the momentum that is generated to move even further onward. It's a gamble, but one where the likelihood of success is much higher than if we were not in the midst of an economic crisis with the money to hand out the first carrots (which can then be followed with sticks).

Thomas Mann

I think it would be a terrible mistake for Obama to believe that this is his one chance, his only bite at the apple, and to try to get everything into this stimulus bill, because that would almost certainly kill its macro effect, which is desperately needed. We have a serious economic problem, and we need to increase aggregate demand. Unfortunately, pushing some of Obama's longer-term ob-

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jectives in health and energy will not get spending going quickly. The programs are just not on the books yet. We can do worker training, and some transfers to states will work well, especially through programs like Medicaid and SCHIP, where monies will enter existing systems and shore up spending where there would otherwise be cuts, thus providing some stimulative effects. But the real risk is trying to jam in major policy changes in a way that diminishes the impact of the stimulus on the economy. And let's face it: for Obama to succeed, he needs to serve eight years; he needs the economy to be coming out of this serious downturn as he gears up for reelection in 2012. The well-being of the economy is central to any of Obama's longer-term goals. The stimulus package is an opportunity to have an early success on an urgent issue and to reestablish some credibility for the government's capacity to do positive things. The government will need to act on other matters in the future, when the fiscal constraints are even greater, and it will have to pay for some of these programs with dedicated revenues. Thus, Obama should be planning not to do all his great things at the beginning, but should be imagining a successful eight years of government.

Question

Why shouldn't I be worried about the following: The bailout plan already enacted has disappeared without a trace; the original amount of money has not been accounted for in any way. From that, one can possibly conclude that no due diligence was performed to assess the condition of the banks and other financial institutions receiving aid. Now we are talking about putting more money into these institutions. But we are already in debt between \$10 and \$11 trillion. The various bailouts and stimulus packages

seem likely to add many more trillions. No one is going to lend us money anymore. We are just going to start printing money, it would seem. What will prevent hyperinflation? Why should I not worry about that?

Norman Ornstein

When people ask me for investment advice, I say, invest in printing presses because they are going to be working night and day! In reality, I think we are going to look back on Hank Paulson's tenure as Treasury Secretary under President Bush and give him a sizable slap across the side of his head for one thing, for not following through with a level of accountability or with promises that were made to Congress but were not written down, particularly including doing something about

What we have seen with Obama from the start is an understanding that a different approach to governing is needed, one where decision-making is shared and involves give-and-take and sensitivity to Congress.

the mortgage problem. The Bush administration agreed to address the problem out of the first \$350 billion but did not follow through on it. These failures have left an enormously high level of distrust inside Congress. To Obama's credit, he has been burning up the phone lines with members of Congress, giving them specifics and concrete promises about what he would do with the second \$350 billion in TARP funds.

As to why we should spend those funds at all, we continue to have a serious credit problem and a lack of confidence up and down the line. To address this, we've got to get money out there and get some commitments that it will be used to free up credit to start that element of the economy moving again and to create greater stability in financial institutions.

Thomas Mann

I have never felt less confidence in the sum total of our knowledge and understanding as scholars, government officials, and as a society as I do today. I don't think much certainty exists about what happened or what to do about it. In some respects, we are flying blind, much like FDR, who tried various things out of a sense of desperation. Steve Pearlstein, whose writing on the economy has been both highly intelligent and prescient and who has been critical of how the recovery efforts have been handled, recently said, listen, we avoided a global financial meltdown the likes of which would have dwarfed what we've already seen. If the Lehman Brothers collapse had been followed by AIG and Citigroup, forget it. All bets would be off. Panic, not just in the United States but around the globe, would have spiraled out of control. Pearlstein argues that, yes, other things have to be done, but the steps already taken were critical.

I recently met with a delegation from Australia, and they said, "Whatever you do, don't scare us again, as you did when the House initially refused to pass the bailout." The only safe haven in the world today is U.S. treasury notes. People are willing to pay the U.S. government negative interest rates to have a home there. We are obliged not to allow the utter disintegration of the financial system. I don't know how much more it will take, but I know a lot of it will come back to the government as it did under comparable times in the Great Depression. Frankly, I don't think we have an alternative.

David Ellwood

If you really want to be worried, first you should worry about deflation, which will be followed by inflation. We sort of know what to do about inflation: we put ourselves into a recession and cut back on the money side. Deflation you should lose sleep over because we are not good at figuring out what to do about it. (In fairness, we have not had to deal with it in a really long time. Unfortunately, that last time was during the Great Depression. The world was wildly different then, and what we did to get out of it is still a matter of debate.) A lot of the levers – for

example, interest rates – do not work with deflation. Because we are so desperately afraid of it, we shove a lot of money out to try to make it better. I'm not saying you should go to bed feeling great, but I think you should feel better than if we had not done the TARP and taken other steps to shore up the financial system.

Norman Ornstein

Tom is absolutely right. We have no alternative. But we can proceed with or without accountability. We did the first half of the bailout without; we need to do the second with.

David Ellwood

Yes, we can do things with accountability and actually have a strategic plan. In fairness, at the time the bank bailouts were being arranged, the situation did feel like an immediate crisis. Some measure of the initial response can be forgiven as being a bit like what test pilots are instructed to say as they're going down: "I've tried A; I've tried B; I've tried C; I – " In our case, we ended, fortunately, with "We're still up!" The ground still looks awfully scary, but we haven't crashed yet. However, accountability has now got to be part of our response, and, in fact, more thought is going into how we can ensure just that – which is not to say we know where we are headed.

Norman Ornstein

On the issue of deflation/inflation, I find it commendable that we have bipartisan leaders in Congress – including Kent Conrad and Judd Gregg in the Senate and Frank Wolf and several Democrats in the House – who are trying to couple the stimulus package with an administration commitment to focus down the road on addressing the big three entitlement programs (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid). If we cannot figure out now a way to build in budget discipline for those times when things are going better, then the problem of hyperinflation becomes much more severe because of how deep a hole we're starting from and how many trillions of dollars deeper it will soon get.

Question

About thirteen years ago, a clever *Boston Globe* reporter named Charles Sennott wrote an interesting article called “Armed for Profit.” The article was about the U.S. defense industry and how much money it makes off us and off the rest of the world. As of 9/11, we were spending – I believe this is right – \$388 billion a year to support this corrupt business. I want to know, yes or no, do you think the Obama administration will be strong enough to stand up to the military industrial complex?

Thomas Mann

No. Actually, the problem with answering yes or no is that it presumes we accept the entire premise of your question, and I’m uncomfortable with it. Have we had scandals and corruption in the defense contracting business? You better believe it. Do we waste dollars? Yes. Do we have a long-term problem with projected defense outlays because

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we have so many obligations to restore equipment? Yes, and we are going to have to do something about the next generation of major weapons systems. (By the way, replacing equipment, getting more troops on the ground, and covering the health-care costs of the injured from Iraq and Afghanistan would make a great stimulus.) But I am uncomfortable with the idea that a cabal of evil people in the defense industry is setting the agenda of the Defense Department. I think the reality is much more complicated than that.

Question

Given the voters’ repudiation of the arrogant yet inept Bush presidency, what might happen to executive power and executive privilege? I’m worried about our civil liberties.

Norman Ornstein

We will see a significant change in attitude at the White House on things like signing statements. President Obama is not going to abandon signing statements, but they will look more like those of earlier presidents. They will explain why he is signing a bill or will discuss why he would like to move in a particular direction. They will not be statements to the effect of “I refuse to enforce these provisions because they infringe on my power as the unitary executive.” We will see more openness and less arrogance, less willingness to claim executive privilege at every turn. We will not get a unilateral disarmament in the presidency, however. Strong-minded individuals moving to the White House want power and will want to exercise that power. What we have seen with Obama from the start, though, is an understanding – partly because he comes out of the Senate and will be surrounded by former senators and representatives – that a different approach to governing is needed, one where decision-making is shared and involves give-and-take and sensitivity to Congress. How this new approach will play out on the international stage will be interesting to watch.

Already we are starting from a premise that is distant from the Bush administration, which came in with an unrealistic notion of executive authority that ignored American history and turned the Constitution on its head. To this the Bush presidency added the premise that whatever the inherent authority of the executive it is always greater during wartime. They then defined the war as one that would go on forever. However, Obama, who is starting to get the daily security briefings that show the dozen threats, some serious, some not, thwarted in the previous twenty-four hours, will still need to figure out how to deal with the reality that evil people really are out there trying to kill us. How will he deal with Guantánamo? He has pledged to close it but has also open-

ly acknowledged that a lot of dangerous people are there whom we must figure out where to put. What will he do when surveillance issues come up, when somebody on his intelligence team briefs him on, say, a serious threat of an imminent transfer of nuclear material? The real, live answers to those questions are tough to deal with, but at least with Obama we start with a completely different attitude.

Thomas Mann

Norm is right. The posture and attitude of the Obama/Biden team certainly is different from that of the Bush/Cheney team. The latter had the most capacious conception of presidential authority of any administration in American history. But the framers of the Constitution did not depend upon having good guys in the White House. They set up competing institutions, and it was Congress’s failure to question, to insist on information during the recent period of unified Republican government. Congress during the Bush years was utterly supine, and that permitted the very abuses that many people have observed. I do not think you will see similar behavior from this Congress. Even though we have a unified Democratic government, we can already see signs of institutional patriotism and loyalty, of challenging, of expecting certain things. Obama will have to take that into account. Interaction between the branches is what will preserve our civil liberties.

David Ellwood

Remember that the oath of office is a promise to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. The man about to take this oath is a lawyer who did very well in law school; whose heroes, many of them, are Constitutional scholars; and whose administration is being stocked with both people he admires and people who admire him – people who actually believe the Constitution has meaning. I think they understand that the Constitution is a document that will force them at times to make choices they would prefer not to make, but as lawyers they believe it is a document that constrains as well as empowers. I think they will respect those constraints because they will have a

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different attitude about where power comes from and a historical recognition that the Constitution's limits, frustrating as they are (and all presidents are enormously frustrated by them), were carefully drawn up by the framers as part of their elaborate series of checks and balances.

Question

Do you think the public engagement that Obama's campaign inspired can continue its momentum into his administration? Will the public have a greater voice in government in the future?

David Ellwood

To that I would add: Will this administration's governance really be fundamentally different? More grassroots in some fashion? Or will it quickly turn out to be like most administrations, sending out the occasional missive, and so forth?

The Constitution's limits, frustrating as they are (and all presidents are enormously frustrated by them), were carefully drawn up by the framers as part of their elaborate series of checks and balances.

Norman Ornstein

I think they have every intention of extending to their governing the social networking that became such a critical part of the campaign, and they also have every intention of being more transparent, which will also unleash the public. One of Obama's proudest accomplishments as a senator was a bill he got through with Tom Coburn, one of the two or three most conservative Republicans in the Senate, that puts every government

contract online. Now he is pushing Congress to put every significant bill online so that the public has an ample amount of time to review and study it. The additional eyeballs would allow for a level of scrutiny simply not achievable by Congressional staff and the Government Accountability Office. Some people have a lot of time on their hands and would be only too happy to pore over legislation, looking for problems, flaws, seams, or even corruption.

The administration would also like to figure out how to keep the 4 or 5 million people on the Obama campaign list engaged and how to use them as a weapon. David Plouffe, Obama's campaign manager, has been tasked with figuring out how to do this. Most likely it won't be done from inside the government, which would be tricky, but through the Democratic Party or some independent entity. One of the challenges will be handling the many among those 4 or 5 million people whose expectations of Obama are much greater than what he can actually deliver.

I think the Obama administration is also going to try to use new technologies to figure out better ways of governing. We live in a network age, but our government is not networked. One of the most interesting things I have seen in the last decade is something called Intellipedia. The intelligence community, across sixteen agencies, has created its own proprietary version of Wikipedia to allow for the sharing of intelligence cases and information that can then be updated and commented on. For the first time, the intelligence agencies have actually moved past the stovepiping that was notorious in the intelligence world. The Intellipedia model is one that could find wider application in helping to cut across some of the antiquated boundaries that crisscross government.

Thomas Mann

We are going to be intently watching and studying how the digital revolution changes campaigning and governing. The changes will likely be massive and profound.

David Ellwood

The issue is whether the power hitters throughout the administration, most of whom are used to hanging around Washington and playing Washington games, will be able to adapt. Watching to see whether Plouffe and others can make it happen will be fascinating, because if they succeed it will mean a revolution in governance. ■

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Reflecting on the Election and Its Consequences

David Brady and Pamela S. Karlan

Introduction by John L. Hennessy

The panel discussion took place at the 1934th Stated Meeting at Stanford University on December 1, 2008.



John L. Hennessy

John L. Hennessy is President of Stanford University. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1995.

Introduction

Pamela Karlan joined the Stanford Law School in 1998 after serving on the faculty at the University of Virginia and, before that, serving as a law clerk to Supreme Court Jus-

stice Harry Blackmun. Currently she is the Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law and the founding Director of the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic. This clinic, one of the first of its kind to be established in the United States, exposes students to the workings of the Supreme Court and gives them the opportunity to work on cases currently before the Court. Professor Karlan has also distinguished herself as a teacher. In 2002, she received from the law school the John Bingham Hurlbut Award for excellence in teaching. She is known as an outstanding scholar in the area of voting and the political process and has coauthored three leading textbooks on constitutional law and related subjects, including the first law casebook on the 2000 presidential election, entitled *When Elections Go Bad: The Laws of Democracy and the Presidential Election of 2000*. When the *Stanford Report* asked her to describe the process of writing *When Elections Go Bad*, she said, "It was a blast." She has also made numerous media appearances to comment on the 2000 and 2004 elections.

Professor Karlan was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2007.

David Brady's research is focused on the U.S. Congress, its political history and decision-making process, as well as the U.S. party system and the history of U.S. elections. Twice, in 1995 and 2000, he was awarded the Congressional Quarterly Prize for "the best paper on a legislative topic." In the classroom, he specializes in public policy and leadership and is recognized as one of Stanford's most outstanding teachers, having received both the Lloyd W. Dinkelspiel Award for excellence in undergraduate teaching and the Phi Beta Kappa Award for the best teacher on campus. Professor Brady joined the Stanford faculty in 1987, the same year the Academy had the good sense to elect him a member. Over the past decades, he has played many roles. Currently, he is the Bowen H. and Janice Arthur McCoy Professor of Political Science and Leadership Values at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, Professor of Political Science in the School of Humanities and Sciences at the University, Deputy Di-

rector and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. In 2004 the Stanford alumni honored him with the Richard W. Lyman Award for exceptional volunteer service to the university in recognition of his excellence as a teacher and as a commentator on current topics in elections.



David Brady

David Brady is Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Bowen H. and Janice Arthur McCoy Professor of Political Science and Leadership Values at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1987.

Presentation

Those of us who do political economy approach elections a bit differently than do the chattering classes and news people. We ask what would the vote be if the candidates and the issues were more-or-less equal? Such a baseline can then be used to build models to predict the outcome of elections. In establishing the baseline, the assumption that works best is that elections are retrospective events. That is, when people walk into a booth to vote, they are voting on the performance of the president and/or the president's party. "Performance" really means the economy. Has it grown over the last three or sixteen quarters? (Economists and political scien-

tists disagree over the exact length to be used in their models.) The bottom line is that these models are successful. The one I most prefer, called the Fair model – Ray Fair, an economist at Yale, developed it – predicted that the Republican candidate for president in the 2008 election, whoever it would be, would get about 47.5 percent of the vote.

These models work least well during wartime. For example, in 1968, when the economy was performing reasonably well, Hubert Humphrey, the incumbent vice president, lost his bid to replace President Lyndon Johnson because of the Vietnam War. In 1952, a time when the economy was growing at an annual rate of about 2.5 percent and the models would normally have predicted reelection of the incumbent, the Korean War brought Eisenhower to victory over Truman.

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In the recent election, a colleague and I examined the predictions of the twenty leading models used by economists and political scientists. Only one model predicted a Republican victory, and it was created by Jim Snyder, a Republican at Syracuse University. The other nineteen predicted a Democratic win, and that the Republican candidate would get about 47 percent of the vote.

Does that mean any Democrat would have won the election? The answer is, yes, that was the prediction. When I explained this at a recent talk in Australia, the audience was quite surprised because they believed there was something special about president-elect Obama (which is not to say there isn't something special about Mr. Obama). However, the facts are that 2008 was a year in which one could expect the Democratic candidate to do well. In addition to the butter and guns issues of the economy and the war, another

measure, public opinion, specifically the president's popularity, predicted the outcome of the election. Normally I don't like to use public opinion too much in these cases, because reasonable public-opinion data goes back only to 1940, whereas economic data is accurate back to 1876. But going into the last election cycle, we had a sitting president who owned the five highest disapproval ratings ever measured by Gallup. Given the public's historic dislike of President Bush, the basic economic data, and the fact that the country was at war, a Democratic win was the most likely outcome.

The models used to predict congressional outcomes are more complicated. The economy still figures in, but a second part of the equation involves making estimations about which representatives and senators are most out of step with their constituencies. For example, is the representative too conservative for his or her district or state? Despite this added level of complexity, the models for predicting the post-election composition of the House and Senate were within one or two seats in the House. The average prediction for the Senate was 58.7 seats for the Democrats, and they appear to be headed toward 58. In short, nothing was unusual about the 2008 election – at least in terms of the models we normally use.

What about the campaigns? Do they make a difference? They do, but how much of a difference is hard to figure out most of the time. In the 2008 election, John McCain's campaign, which you now hear was not very good, actually was good prior to about September 15 and the economic crisis. In spite of all I've just said about why the Democratic candidate should have been ahead, going into the economic crisis the election was still surprisingly competitive. After the Democratic National Convention, which you would expect to give Obama a bump in the polls, he in fact led by about six to seven points. Then, after the Republican Convention, McCain led by two or three points for about a week. Then the race went to dead even. Why was the election so surprisingly competitive? In my view, it was because of the very issues that Hillary Clinton had raised against Obama; that is, he was not experienced, was not a friend of blue-collar workers, and so on.

The set of voters Clinton had targeted with her message – the white, blue-collar workers; white, blue-collar women; and middle-class women who won Pennsylvania and nine of the last thirteen primaries for her – had not yet come over to Obama, thus keeping the election much closer than the guns and butter models were predicting. Then came the stock market crash, and polling

2008 was a year in which one could expect the Democratic candidate to do well.

showed that after seeing the two candidates' responses to the crisis the American public started to have less and less faith in McCain, who was saying things like, "I'm going to quit the campaign; I'm going to go back and do this; I'm not going to debate," while Obama seemed relatively steady.

What impact did Sarah Palin have on the two campaigns? She was useful for the Republican campaign for about ten days. Her nomination was announced the day after Obama gave his acceptance speech at Invesco Field in Denver. The timing shifted the news media's focus away from Obama's speech. Palin was in the headlines, and for about seven to ten days she was viewed as a reformer because of her handling of the oil industry in Alaska. She also gave an outstanding speech, but shortly thereafter things fell apart. For ten days, the Palin nomination had worked well for McCain because one of McCain's fundamental problems was how could he run as a maverick or reformer when his party had been in control for the previous eight years? Sarah Palin made the Republican base happy enough that McCain could reach out to the other side and explain the various ways he had worked to be bipartisan. In the end, however, the economy did McCain in. From the start of the economic crisis in mid-September until Election Day, Obama's lead in the polls was never less than six points.

Are Obama's victory and the Democrats' gains in the House and Senate the start of a movement or just a passing moment? On the Republican side we see a lot of gnashing

of teeth: who's to blame? Blame Palin, blame McCain, blame them all – plenty of blame to go around. But the real question is whether the 2008 election is the start of something. Or will it be like 1964, when the demise of the Republican Party was forecast after the huge Goldwater defeat? Two years later the Republicans made huge gains in Congress, and in 1968 a long trend of Republican presidents started. In 1980, when Ronald Reagan was elected president, the Democrats lost their lead over Republicans. That is, prior to about 1978 – 1980, polls consistently showed that the percentage of Americans who considered themselves Democrats was 8 – 10 percentage points higher than the number who said they were Republicans. From 1980 on, a third of the country said they were Democrat, a third said Republican, and a third said Independent.

What about the campaigns? Do they make a difference? They do, but how much of a difference is hard to figure out most of the time.

Did Obama convert people from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party, because all the major polls now show that the Democrats are at about 34 – 35 percent and the Republicans are at 26 – 27 percent? It's too early to tell. For these changes to become permanent, Obama and the Democrat-controlled Congress will need to enact policies that actually make things better. President Reagan was able to make the 1978 – 1980 shift toward Republicans relatively permanent by implementing policies that showed success in dealing with the economy and the Soviet Union.

The polling data I work with at Polymetrics suggest the news for Republicans is not terrible, but it's not good either. Our data show that since 2004 about 6 – 7.5 percent of the population has switched their party allegiance. Most of that movement was Republican to Independent, with a smaller percentage moving from Republican to Democrat. Those who moved from Republican to Dem-

Are Obama's victory and the Democrats' gains in the House and Senate the start of a movement or just a passing moment?

ocrat tended to support traditionally Democratic issues, such as universal health care, and their shift is probably permanent. But among the Republicans who became Independents, the shift was almost totally related to dislike of George W. Bush. The bottom line is that the American public has shifted toward the Democratic Party. The question is what will the Obama team do? Will their policies be successful? If they are successful, the recent party shifts will likely harden, and the Republicans could be a minority party for the long term. If Obama's policies are not so successful, many of those Republicans who switched to Independent might be votes that the Republicans could win back.



Pamela S. Karlan

Pamela S. Karlan is the Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law at Stanford Law School. She has been a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 2007.

Presentation

I was asked to do a lot of panels in August and September by people who were hoping – betting – that the 2008 election would be a disaster like 2000. That’s not to say this election is over, though. The filibuster-proof Senate is still up for grabs: Georgia is holding a runoff election between Saxby Chambliss and Jim Martin for a Senate seat, and the recount goes on and on and on in Minnesota, where Al Franken, having taken over from Tina Fey as the most popular comic seeking national office, is also vying for a seat in the Senate. A lot of the problems of 2000 reappeared in the 2008 election. They have just gone unnoticed for the most part because Barack Obama’s margin of victory was higher than the margin of error at the polls.

After the 2000 election, we tried to do some election reform. Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which has roughly the same relationship to helping Americans actually vote that the USA Patriot Act has to safeguarding Americans’ patriotism. One problem with HAVA has to do with its requirement that states provide a provisional ballot to anyone who shows up at the polls and whose name is not on the official rolls. HAVA requires that states give out these ballots but says nothing about whether they

should be counted, an issue that is being litigated even as we speak. So we didn’t solve the underlying mechanical problems of the 2000 election very well. We replaced some of the election systems that were out there with ones that are more accurate, but accuracy hasn’t solved one of the key problems we experienced in Florida in 2000: as we are seeing with the recount in Minnesota, optical-scan ballots can apparently also be counted an infinite number of ways.

The 2008 election was a wide-open election in a different way than previous elections. Not since 1952 have we had an election in which neither of the major parties was running a sitting president or vice president. This was an interesting election in the sense that both sides could proclaim their maverick status or promise change in a way that had not been done in the recent past.

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We are all familiar with the red state/blue state maps and the shifts that occurred this time around. But most of the country is actually purple. That is, not many areas are pure blue or pure red at the state level. (Nonetheless, blue is probably the appropriate color for Democrats, because almost every area that votes “blue” is on a body of water. The bluest parts of the country tend to be along the East Coast, the West Coast, the Rio Grande River, the Great Lakes area, and the Mississippi River. The more parched parts of the country are red, which is also appropriate.)

The 2008 election brought about some further geographic alignment shifts, such as the defeat of the Republicans’ last representative from the Northeast, Chris Shays, who lost his House seat in Connecticut. We also saw a resurgence of the Democrats in the Upper South – Virginia and North Carolina – reversing four decades of Democratic Party declines in those areas. And we saw

some Democratic strength in the interior West – New Mexico, Colorado, and Nevada. This ties in with a broader point, which is that much of the change in voting patterns involves not how people who voted in 2004 or 2000 or 1996 voted in 2008, but rather the entry of voters who were either new to the system altogether or new to the states in which they voted. Rather than individuals drastically changing their positions, the composition of the electorate is changing.

One of the elephants in the room during the 2008 election was the role of race. Overall, Barack Obama outperformed recent Democratic presidential candidates, John Kerry in particular, among white voters. In the South, however, Obama’s performance was curiously mixed. Maybe yellow-dog Democrats are all dying, but in the Deep South – Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana – Obama’s share of the white vote was significantly lower than even Kerry’s share four years before. That is a shocking shift. In the Upper South, however, in places like North Carolina and Virginia, Obama significantly outperformed Kerry.

Presidential campaigns take a lot of money, and this has led to years of legal concern about influence and equality. Watergate created a regime under the Federal Election Campaign Act that is one of the most incoherent regimes anywhere in the law. The way the Act has been set up and interpreted by the Supreme Court, candidates cannot be limited in how much money they spend, but contributors can be limited in how much money they contribute. So, expenditures are unlimited and contributions tightly capped. The situation is analogous to being at an all-you-can-eat buffet where teaspoons are used to serve the food and you have to return to your table after each (teaspoon-size) helping. The system is incoherent.

Many people point to the amount of money being spent as the real problem. The 2008 election was the most expensive in American history. The Center for Responsive Politics has estimated that about \$1.3 billion was spent by the presidential candidates, which is roughly double the amount that was spent in 2004, which itself was more than double the amount spent in 2000. Like college tui-

tion, spending in presidential elections outpaces the general rate of inflation. But to me the problem is not the *amount* of money: \$1.3 billion is still less than half of what General Motors spends on advertising every year for its cars; it's less than Proctor & Gamble spends to market soaps. If about 125 million people went to the polls in 2008, the campaigns expended roughly \$10 per vote, which doesn't seem an excessive amount for getting one's message across and staffing get-out-the-vote efforts and the like. What really troubles people is the sense that the candidates either spend all of their time thinking about raising money and none of their time thinking about anything else, or that particular groups, because of their wealth, have more influence on the outcome of elections and the policies elected officials enact.

This was an interesting election in the sense that both sides could proclaim their maverick status or promise change in a way that had not been done in the recent past.

Thus, one of the things that is most interesting and different about this election is the way some of the money was raised. To say that Obama, who opted out of the federal financing system so that he could spend more than he would have gotten from the government, raised most of his money from small contributors is an overstatement. About 80 percent of his money was raised from people who gave \$1,000 or more. But Obama did raise more money from small contributors, and had more small contributors contributing to his campaign, than all of the candidates who ran in 2004. Amazingly, the Obama campaign raised \$150 million from donors who did not even have to be identified, because the total amount they gave over the course of the campaign was less than \$200. This reflects the influence of technology: Obama raised an awful lot of this small-donor money on the Internet. In addition, the last campaign cycle saw many more repeat small donors than in the past – people

who started out giving less than \$200 but gave numerous times and eventually had to be identified as donors. Many of the people who gave more than \$1,000 likely did not give it in one shot. They gave repeatedly on the installment plan. People like me who signed up for Act Blue (or the Republican equivalent) received regular emails reminiscent of the Sally Struthers's "save the orphans" advertising campaigns – only the cause would be some wide-eyed congressional candidate from someplace you had never seen – telling us, "If only you would give a little money to this person, you could push him over the top." If you had donated before and your credit card information was in the system, you could just press a button and away the money went. The Obama campaign perfected this kind of repeat small-donor solicitation. Combined with the fact that more and more voters were getting their information from technologies other than the broadcast media, this new approach to campaign fundraising raises interesting questions about how politics will be conducted in the future.

Those of us who came to California not as newborns but somewhat later in life are often shocked by the number of initiatives on the ballot, by their range and scope. Initiatives, after all, are the means by which elections most directly make law. What do the initiatives voted on in the last election tell us about politics going forward?

California's Proposition 4 involved parental notification for minors having an abortion and was one of two closely watched ballot initiatives involving abortion this year. The other one, South Dakota's Proposition 11, was an attempt to ban all abortions within the state that were not necessary to save the life of the woman. Colorado had a related initiative, Amendment 48, which sought to define life as beginning at conception. All three of these initiatives were defeated. The South Dakota initiative lost by a margin of 55 percent to 45 percent, which is significant because the same initiative minus the exception to save the life of the woman was on the ballot in 2006 and was defeated by a similar margin, 56 percent to 44 percent. Even though supporters tried to make South Dakota Proposition 11 a more attractive initiative, the margin of defeat barely moved. California's

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Proposition 4 went down 52 percent to 48 percent, and the Colorado initiative went down overwhelmingly.

What does this mean going forward? Obama's election means that the substantive composition of the Supreme Court is not going to change dramatically over the next four years and certainly is not going to move to the right. So, conservatives' strategy of putting abortion restrictions on the ballot and hoping that by the time one of the initiatives gets to the Supreme Court the Court will have changed and will reverse *Roe v. Wade* is dead, at least for the next four years and probably beyond. The fact that these three initiatives went down to defeat suggests that, for the conservative base, abortion may not be the galvanizing, red-meat issue that it has been in the past.

That honor now goes to same-sex marriage and gay rights, which leads us to California's Proposition 8, a proposition to constitutionalize a rule that says that marriage consists only of one man and one woman. Proposition 8 passed 52 percent to 48 percent, but what was especially interesting to me was the distribution of votes. Much as the country has red states and blue states, California has red counties and blue counties. The entire coast of California, from Humboldt County down to Monterey County, voted overwhelmingly against Proposition 8. All of the inland counties, with the exception of two small counties in the Sierras and a bedroom suburb from which you might commute either to San Francisco or to Sacramento, voted in favor of the initiative.

Proposition 8 also revealed huge demographic differentials in how people voted. According to exit polls, among people eighteen to twenty-nine years of age, 61 percent voted against the initiative. Among people over the age of sixty-five, 61 percent voted in favor of the initiative. Sixty-two percent of first-time voters – that is, people just being brought into the political process, either because they have just become citizens, have just turned eighteen, or have just become interested in politics – voted against the initiative. Most racial groups were relatively evenly split, with one major exception. Thus, 51 percent of whites and 51 percent of Asians voted against Proposition 8, and 53 percent of Latinos voted in favor – although among Latinos under the age of thirty, 59 percent voted against. The major exception was African Americans, a substantial majority of whom voted in favor of the proposition. These differentials in the Proposition 8 vote paint an interesting picture of some of the demographic changes that are occurring in California.

Rather than individuals drastically changing their positions, the composition of the electorate is changing.

Arizona passed a ban on same-sex marriage by a much wider margin, 56 percent to 44 percent, but its age skew was quite similar to California's. Florida passed an amendment constitutionalizing a definition of marriage, 62 percent to 38 percent, and Arkansas passed a ban on unmarried couples adopting children or being foster parents. The Arkansas initiative did not say it was about gay couples, but it was understood that way, and it passed 57 percent to 43 percent. Over the short term, I expect same-sex marriage and gay rights will be a galvanizing issue for both conservatives and liberals.

Finally, Proposition 11 in California: Proposition 11 will change the way Californians select their state legislature by shifting from legislators to an independent commission

the responsibility of drawing legislative districts. In recent years, it was probably more accurate to say that every ten years the legislators went into a back room and picked the voters by drawing districts with clear partisan complexions than that every two years citizens went into a voting booth and picked their legislators. That process has been changed by the redistricting commission, which will be made up of randomly selected citizens with an ideological balance of five Republicans, five Democrats, and four citizens who are not members of either of the two major parties. The initiative was partly a reaction to prior initiatives, to the fact that the California state legislature is itself the product of a pathological initiative process that has led to term limits (no one in the legislature has any experience); a budgetary process that is almost completely controlled by expenditures required by other initiatives (the legislature has no money to spend and thus cannot do much); and general dislike of the legislature by a public that has noticed that legislators are more likely to be forced from office by indictment or to die in office than they are to be defeated in an actual election. (California has basically the same retention rate as the North Korean parliament.)

Whether people's hopes for Proposition 11 will actually be realized will prove interesting to watch. One of the problems I foresee is that although the citizens of California have changed who will be voting on what the legislative districts will look like, they have not said anything about what criteria the commission should use. Other states' experience with legislative redistricting commissions suggests that the criteria matter in some sense almost more than who applies them. A second potential problem relates to California's red county/blue county divide, because to ensure competitive elections in the California state legislature, districts would need to resemble thin bands drawn from the coast through the middle of the state (imagine a thin strip running from San Francisco to Fresno). This is the only way you can create districts that would be up for grabs in the general election. Unfortunately, such districts would make no sense for anything else.

One of the elephants in the room during the 2008 election was the role of race.

Discussion

John Hennessy

What is the prospect of changing our weird system for national elections, for addressing the distortions created by the Electoral College, which encourages some politicians to leave some states alone (we in California were blessed not to be getting constant robo-calls) while lavishing attention and funding on others? With so much focus placed on just a handful of states (say, Ohio and Pennsylvania), the likelihood is increased that something unusual will happen.

Pamela Karlan

The very short answer is no, we have no prospect of changing the Electoral College. The Constitution dictates that we will have one, and enough small states and swing states consider themselves beneficiaries of this system that they are not going to give up on it. The longer answer is that we could do a work-around. The so-called national popular vote movement encourages states to pledge that they will cast all of their electoral votes for whichever candidate wins a plurality of the national vote, regardless of the vote in their state. So, for example, if every state had agreed to this system prior to the last election, every state's electors, even those from states like Texas or Alaska, would have cast their electoral vote for Obama because he won the national popular vote. Will this idea get much traction? Perhaps. If we were to experience a couple of elections in a row where the Electoral College winner was not the popular vote winner, then popular pressure might build. But I actually don't think the Electoral College is the real outrage. If we really want to talk about outrages, the U.S. Senate is a much better example than is the Electoral College.

David Brady

But you only need nineteen states to agree to the work-around.

Pamela Karlan

That is true. If the nineteen states with the most electoral votes signed onto the national popular vote movement, their votes would form the majority of electoral votes needed to become president, so it would not matter how the other states voted.

David Brady

The constitutionality of such a work-around would undoubtedly be challenged. In the 1950s, two bills failed in the Senate because big states, which, like the Electoral College, draw more attention from candidates, aligned with little states like Wyoming, which would have nothing without the Electoral College. I doubt that the Senate has changed enough in the last half-century for similar legislation to have a different outcome.

Question

Professor Brady mentioned that the economy had a big effect on the election. Is the new president's popularity doomed because of the one-to-two-year period of economic misery we are about to enter?

David Brady

The economy always affects the presidential elections; it's not just that a bad economy hurts the incumbent. How long does President-Elect Obama have once he takes office? My read of history is that you get two years, and then you are held responsible. Consider that Ronald Reagan won in 1980 under a high misery index. In 1982, the Republicans did not do well in the House elections, losing twenty-six seats. Until the economy began to turn around in mid-1983, Reagan's approval ratings were 47, 46, 43 percent. Only when the economy turned around did his approval ratings go up. My best guess is that Obama has two years, although given the severity of the current economic crisis he might have a bit longer.

Question

Let's go back to 2000, when Gore was running after eight years of relative prosperity. Why didn't Gore win?

Pamela Karlan

I think absent a couple of major problems in Florida, he did win. That is, if you asked the people in Florida who had problems casting their vote, "For whom did you think you cast your vote when you went into the voting booth?" – Al Gore won. A kind of perfect storm of events in Florida explains why he did not pick up the electoral votes there.

David Brady

What Pam said is true, but the point is that the models all predicted that Gore should have won 56 – 57 percent of the Florida vote. My view is that he ran a strange campaign. He tried to run to the left, when all he really

The economy always affects the presidential elections; it's not just that a bad economy hurts the incumbent.

needed to say was, "If you liked the last eight years economically, elect me. We'll have four more years, and I'll keep my pants zipped." That's a campaign that would have won. He, of course, did win the popular vote, but his bad campaign probably cost him about four percentage points.

Question

You mentioned that the white vote in the Deep South was much less for Barack Obama than it was for John Kerry. Is this an example of the Bradley effect?

Pamela Karlan

Whether the Bradley effect is even real is unclear. For those of you who don't remember Tom Bradley's 1982 California gubernatorial race, here's what the term "Bradley effect" refers to. Pollsters asked people prior

to Election Day, "For whom do you intend to vote?" The predictions, based on those polls, were that Bradley would do much better than he did. People have since hypothesized that what happened is that respondents to polls were reluctant to say, "I'm not going to vote for him because he's black," and therefore said they were going to vote for him and then did not. John Stuart Mill made the point 150 years ago that the secret ballot comes at a cost, which is that people can go into the booth and vote for bad and ignoble reasons. But political scientists disagree on whether the Bradley effect was real. And when it comes to a presidential election, the likelihood of seeing a Bradley effect is extremely low because people who do not want to vote for a candidate have so many reasons other than race that they can give to pollsters. Where you might actually see a major effect is in what are called low-salience elections, ones where people know little about the candidate other than his or her race. I don't think we saw a Bradley effect in the Deep South. I think these are people who were just not going to vote for Barack Obama. The polls captured that fairly accurately.

David Brady

Before the election the one question I was sure to get at every talk was "What about the Bradley effect?" The Bradley effect is an interaction effect. When Bradley was running, most polls were done face-to-face, so you could have a situation in which the interviewer was African American and the respondent was white, and the respondent might be unwilling to tell the African American pollster that he or she would not vote for the African American candidate. We could have tested for a Bradley effect in the 2008 election by having African Americans ask whites whom they were voting for, but the variable of face-to-face contact is largely absent from today's polling practices. For example, the Rasmussen poll was absolutely devoid of human contact. A computer dialed random phone numbers, and when someone answered the phone it said, "If you are voting for Barack Obama, press one; if you are voting for John McCain, press two." Without an interaction bias, the largest Bradley effect we would expect to see in

such a poll would be 0.8 percent. So, I agree with Pam: despite being on everyone's mind, the Bradley effect was never a factor in the 2008 election.

Question

How can we standardize voting so that the same methodology is used throughout the country? I am a precinct worker, and I have been amazed at how many different types of ballots are used. If we had a national standard, it might make voting easier and the results more valid.

Pamela Karlan

We *could* standardize. Congress could pass a law tomorrow requiring a specified voting method to be used in any election in which a federal candidate is on the ballot. The main barriers to this type of change are political. Most elections in the United States are run at the county level, although some states have a little bit of standardization at the state level. For example, in California, the California secretary of state certifies which machines can be used but does not require that any particular one of them be used.

David Brady

The politics differ from state to state. For example, in Connecticut, which is a pretty strong party state, party-line ballots are allowed. A voter can literally pull a tab or make a mark and vote for every Democrat or Republican on the ballot. In Texas, in 1972, when it was pretty clear that George McGovern was not going to carry the state, the Democrats designed the ballot so that Richard Nixon's name was at the top. Voters would vote for Nixon and then be confronted with a gigantic space in the middle of page, as if to say, "Okay, you voted for Nixon, now let's get back to voting for Democrats. Here's Dolph Brisco's name." The Democrats' strategy worked. Nixon won the state overwhelmingly, but Brisco won the governorship.

Question

Are we beginning to do away with categorizing? In your analysis, everything is done by categories: black, white, older women, younger women, and so on. I'm old enough to remember Al Smith, who could not get anywhere in national politics because he was Catholic. Then John Kennedy dealt with that. Among the last four secretaries of state, two were women and two were black. We have now had a woman on the vice presidential ballot in both parties, and a woman almost won the Democratic presidential nomination. Now we have a black president-elect. Why can't we say, "Gee, something good is going on with the American public"? Why are we still categorizing when some of the categories are beginning to fall away?

David Brady

I don't disagree with the assessment, but I think we need to keep some categories – for example, age is becoming an important one given the generational changes in voting we have been seeing. The African American leaders and the leaders of the women's movement that we are most familiar with are all in their sixties and seventies and are fading out. For the new generation of voters, many of the categories pollsters commonly look at no longer mean what they do to people who were raised in my generation. A genuine generational change is occurring, and we should be trying to track that change in our surveys.

Pamela Karlan

We have seen tremendous change. This is not 1928, and it's not 1960. We have not reached the kumbaya moment yet – at least not according to the Southern data with which I've been working. We will soon get to see this played out in a really interesting way because some special provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that protect black and Latino voters in the South and the Southwest were renewed by Congress in the summer of 2006, and the Supreme Court is going to decide in the next two weeks whether to hear a case challenging the constitutionality of those provisions. The Supreme Court is closely divided on issues of racial justice, and Justice

Each party sees the major threat to the integrity of American elections differently. The Republicans fear fraud, votes being cast by people who should not be voting. Democrats fear exclusion, people who should be allowed to vote not being able to do so.

Kennedy, who is usually the fifth vote on these issues, may well conclude that because Barack Obama has been elected we don't have a problem anymore. While that might be true in many parts of the country, it is not yet true in Alabama or Mississippi or Louisiana. Likewise, in some counties in the country, anti-immigrant sentiment means that black/white issues are not nearly as salient as they once were. Instead, Anglo/Latino issues are more salient. A number of anti-immigration measures appeared on ballots in the 2008 election. Still, I think it is fair to say, with respect to most kinds of people in the United States, that a parent could look at his or her child today, if the child is young, and reasonably say, "You have a chance to grow up to be President." However, groups are not all voting the same way in elections, at least not yet.

Question

In 2004, exit polling on Election Day suggested irregularities in battleground states. Were similar studies done in the 2008 election?

Pamela Karlan

Everybody lawyered up early on in this campaign, which led to a huge amount of litigation. According to Ohio State's wonderful Election Law @ Moritz website (<http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw>), forty to fifty lawsuits were brought around the country, many of them over questions of irregularities in how the registration rolls

were put together. A lot of problems occurred during the primaries. For example, in Maryland, they had changed to a smart-card system. The cards might have been smart, but the people running the system – not so much. They did not send the cards to the polls; so, many of the polling places did not open on time, which led to hugely long lines. In other places, potential voters faced challenges based on badly maintained voter rolls or failures to present adequate identification, or the like. At the national level, the election just was not that close; so, the media have not given a huge amount of attention to problems and irregularities. Local elections, however, saw tremendous problems. For example, in Indiana, which recently adopted the most draconian voter ID law in the country, votes are still being counted in one congressional district, and a serious challenge has been raised about whether a lot of the students at Purdue University, which is in the district, will have their votes thrown out because they lacked the appropriate kind of government-issued ID to cast ballots. All in all, I'm not sure that this election was a whole lot better across the board, even though it did not have outcome effects like those in the 2000 election or allegations of irregularities as in Ohio in 2004.

David Brady

President Clinton had a commission on electronic voting, of which I happened to be a member. The upshot of the commission was that Democrats wanted a nationally uniform voting method that would eliminate butterfly ballots and machines that make mistakes.

A genuine generational change is occurring, and we should be trying to track that change in our surveys.

MIT scientists were working pretty hard on a sort of ATM machine that would meet the need. In exchange for this, Republicans wanted to cleanse the voting rolls, to purge every district's rolls of people who no longer voted there. The Democrats would not agree to this.

Neither side would give an inch, so nothing came of the commission.

Pamela Karlan

Each party sees the major threat to the integrity of American elections differently. The Republicans fear fraud, votes being cast by people who should not be voting. Democrats fear exclusion, people who should be allowed to vote not being able to do so. The two parties look at exactly the same problems and see them completely differently. That is why the Help America Vote Act turned out to be such a mess; it gave a little bit on participation and a little bit on fraud but did not actually solve either set of problems from the point of view of either political party.

Question

Are electronic, touch-screen voting machines still a concern?

Pamela Karlan

That problem has gone away in part because many states have decertified electronic voting machines and have gone back to optical scan, which leaves more of an audit trail. If necessary, you can hand-count the physical ballots; you can look at them and see what happened. Some countries do a much better job with electronic voting machines than the United States does. Brazil has one that you can put in a canoe and paddle up the Amazon; it provides a three-way audit trail. Still, people are worried about electronic voting. David Dill here at Stanford has spent a lot of time over the last couple of years investigating whether the integrity of electronic machines can be guaranteed. Canada has a wonderful system for presidential elections: they use paper ballots. The paper ballot is a great way to go if you can do it (Canada's ballots are uniform across the provinces and do not include four hundred offices and thirty propositions), because you get absolute reliability and absolute audit trails, and everybody can see exactly how the votes were cast.

Question

Do any data suggest that money was an important part of the reason why the Democrats – who greatly outspent Republicans at the national level – won in 2008?

David Brady

I would not look at just one election, so the short answer is no. If you look at the role of money over time, however, you first need to divide it by the consumer price index. If you do that, you find that spending on presidential elections has remained pretty flat, with no huge increases. Second, so long as twice

We have reasonable data on presidential campaign funding back to 1896, and, despite quite a few Democratic presidents since then, 2008 was the first year that a Democratic presidential candidate out-raised his Republican opponent.

as much money is being spent on advertising for lipstick as on presidential elections, I won't be worried about money in politics. For candidates to be successful, they have to reach a threshold. They have to have x amount of money, because otherwise no Democrat would ever have been elected president. We have reasonable data on presidential campaign funding back to 1896, and, despite quite a few Democratic presidents since then, 2008 was the first year that a Democratic presidential candidate out-raised his Republican opponent. Yes, Obama's huge pool of money allowed him to run ads in Indiana, forcing McCain to respond, and to run ads in Montana, forcing McCain to spend time doing things he did not want to do to make sure that the states that should have been red stayed that way. McCain was hurt by not having as much money as Obama,



John L. Hennessy, Pamela S. Karlan, and David Brady

because he was forced to reallocate his resources. But the difference in funding was not determinative. That is why I believe the political economy models of elections are so important. In any close election, you can always attribute the election to anything. In 1960 Jack Kennedy got a haircut; it made


Age, education, and income level are the best predictors of whether somebody is going to vote.

him look older and that accounted for his victory. In some sense the claim is true, but if you don't have a baseline for what the election would be like, then it's just talk. The economic models are important because they tell us, everything else being equal, what we should expect. The 2008 election was not a surprise to the models. The models predicted it well.

Pamela Karlan

One place where money does make an important difference is in who votes. That is, the correlation between people's income and their political participation is very high. Age, education, and income level are the best predictors of whether somebody is going to vote. This is why, for example, we have tremendous support for Social Security and Medicaid but have virtually nothing in the way of early childhood education funding. Little kids and poor people don't vote, but rich people and people with high levels of education do. Thus, the interactive effect of money and politics is best seen not in which party's candidates win, but in which policies and programs the government implements at the end of the day. ■

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The New Pragmatism: Coping with America's Overwhelming Problems

Daniel Yankelovich

Introduction by Jeffrey Elman

This presentation was given at the 1936th Stated Meeting, held at the University of California, San Diego, on December 3, 2008.



Jeffrey Elman

Jeffrey Elman is Dean of the Division of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor in the Department of Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego.

Introduction

I am honored to introduce today's speaker. Dan Yankelovich is a man of tremendous vision and also of many accomplishments. He has been very important to the University, in particular to the social sciences. Dan did his undergraduate and graduate work at Har-

vard. He then went on to complete further graduate studies at the Sorbonne. His academic achievements include being a research professor of psychology at New York University, a professor of psychology at the New School for Social Research, a distinguished scholar at the University of California, Irvine, a senior fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, and, most recently, a visiting professor in the department of political science at the University of California, San Diego.

Dan has a compelling vision of what he calls the public intellectual. He has argued that scholars and scientists have both the opportunity and the obligation to play a special role in society. This role is not only to serve as custodians and creators of knowledge, but to illuminate and help us understand important and complex public problems. Dan himself has played this role, creating enterprises such as the research firm Yankelovich, Skelly, and White and *The New York Times/Yankelovich Poll*, which then evolved into *The New York Times/CBS Poll*. In fact, he has been called the dean of American pollsters. He is the founder and chairman of three organizations: Viewpoint Learning, a firm that ad-

vances dialogue-based learning as a core skill in newer forms of leadership; DYG, a market research firm that tracks social trends; and Public Agenda, a nonprofit organization that he cofounded in 1975 with Cyrus Vance. The common thread in all of these activities is that they reflect Dan's own commitment to find ways to analyze and present complex public issues.

Over the course of his career, Dan has held directorships at CBS, Loral, and the Meredith Corporation, and has served as trustee of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Education, the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Brown University, and many others. He is the author of ten books and hundreds of articles and speeches.

At the University of California, San Diego, Dan serves on the Social Science Dean's Advisory Council. Because of Dan's generosity, we recently were able to create an endowed chair, which we are pleased to call the Yankelovich Chair in Social Thought. Less tangible, but perhaps more important, Dan's commitment to the ideal of the public intellectual has energized and inspired many of us.



Daniel Yankelovich

Daniel Yankelovich is Founder and Chairman of Public Agenda, Viewpoint Learning, Inc., and DYG, Inc. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1999.

Presentation

Prior to the 2008 presidential election, more than 85 percent of the American public felt our society was on the wrong track – an impressive, unprecedented cry of public frustration that was reflected in the outcome of the election. My presentation today describes one possible strategy for getting the country back on the right track.

I.

Serious Problems. American society is confronted with many severe and overwhelming problems:

- a major financial crisis that is international in scope;
- a staggering national debt that swells as the nation ages;
- global warming made worse by the policies of the United States and those of the largest country on earth, China;
- an unprecedented transfer of wealth for importing oil from nations hostile to our interests;
- a severe loss of prestige and credibility in the world;
- a poorly understood and dangerous conflict with the Muslim world; and

- the inexorably rising costs of health care and education that threaten the unwritten social contract at the heart of American democracy.

The United States has overcome equal or greater threats in the past. In my own lifetime, I have witnessed the crash of 1929 and the Great Depression, World War II, the McCarthy period, the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis, the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., the Vietnam War, and 9/11. This is not the first time the country has lurched from one major problem and crisis to another and somehow managed to cope, and even to prosper.

Erosion of problem-solving capability. Our problems are solvable. We have extraordinary resources – human, capital, corporate, technological, and scientific. We have the potential to restore our world leadership status and a long tradition of pragmatic problem solving. But – and there is a big “but” – *our nation’s problem-solving gift seems to be badly eroded.*

We see many symptoms of this erosion in our survey data: massive denial, people grasping at straws, ideology instead of practicality, leadership pandering, polarization instead of cooperation, growing public mistrust, and *resentment*, a technical term from political science signifying a particular kind of political resentment. Political scientists feel that it is the second most powerful political emotion after instability. Growing resentment, *resentment*, is what really corrodes societies.

What I find extraordinary and unusual is that the reasons for the erosion are mainly cultural, which makes them particularly difficult to deal with. Some of the cultural forces at work are familiar. For the last thirty or forty years, we have seen:

- a growing expert/public gap, with an elite point of view that does not understand the public or take it seriously,
- a public that mistrusts our nation’s institutions and elites, and
- severe political polarization that is emotional and passionate because of culture wars over core values.

Most of the cultural sources of the erosion of our problem-solving abilities, however,

We have the potential to restore our world leadership status and a long tradition of pragmatic problem solving. But our nation’s problem-solving gift seems to be badly eroded.

are less familiar. One that we are especially conscious of is the public demand for a stronger voice. This demand would ordinarily be seen as an asset in a democracy. However, in today’s culture, the demand is unaccompanied by any awareness that having a stronger voice involves taking responsibility for the points of view it expresses. Unfortunately, the public assumes that simply having a passionate conviction makes one’s point of view correct. And when people’s passionate convictions collide, the result is polarization and bad decisions.

The demand for a stronger public voice traces back to the cultural revolution that took place in our society in the 1960s and 1970s and has strengthened over the last thirty to forty years. If people are unwilling to take responsibility for their strong opinions and are impulsive and opinionated instead of thoughtful and responsible, then a stronger public voice is in fact a drag on our democracy, an invitation to pandering.

II.

Blindsided by computer models. Another new cultural factor that interests me particularly is a new form of “technological hubris” that I believe led to some of the worst Wall Street abuses of the current financial crisis.

Some months ago, a front-page article in *The New York Times* featured a quote from Joe Cassano, the former head of AIG’s London-based Financial Products Division. This was the division that managed its catastrophic credit default swap business. Cassano actually said: “It is hard for us to even see a scenario within any realm of reason that would see us losing one dollar in any of our transactions.” More than \$170 billion later (first the government had to put in \$85 billion; it

REASONS FOR EROSION ARE MAINLY CULTURAL



has since added another \$85 billion to the AIG bailout), we realize that Cassano was assuming that AIG's computer-based risk models were protecting AIG against every conceivable risk.

The *Wall Street Journal* recently interviewed the man who developed the risk models for AIG, a professor of finance at Yale named Gary Gorton. In the interview, Gorton explained that AIG management had confined his model to only one form of risk and excluded the most serious ones. (For example, it totally excluded AIG's contracts that permitted counterparties to demand more collateral under certain conditions.) Gorton also said that his model was based on a period of past history when credit rating agencies almost never downgraded bond ratings.

Because his model left out counterparty demands for collateral and was based exclusively on the past, the probabilities of failure were unacceptably high. AIG management took on faith the assumption that because gifted mathematicians were creating the models, they had to be valid. Their wishful thinking is overloaded with naïveté and hubris.

The example of AIG may be extreme, but it is far from unique. The naive infatuation with technology it illustrates, although hardly new, is responsible for many of the worst problems of the current financial crisis.

There are other unfamiliar cultural causes of the erosion of our collective problem-solving abilities. One is the growth of self-isolating communities, as reported in a recent book by Bill Bishop called *The Big Sort*. Bishop points out that not only do people self-select media that agree with their own views, leading to groupthink, but they also self-select

If people are unwilling to take responsibility for their strong opinions and are impulsive and opinionated instead of thoughtful and responsible, then a stronger public voice is in fact a drag on our democracy, an invitation to pandering.

communities where they can find like-minded people. With so many forces in society strengthening groupthink in so many different ways, dealing with this cultural issue becomes truly formidable.

Finally, there is the cultural obstacle represented by the reality that the baby boom generation and its offspring are unaccus-

tomed to sacrifice or to postponing gratification. Notoriously, they buy what they want when they want it with scant concern for saving or the future. The baby boom generation does not bear the scars of my generation, the Depression generation, which is fortunate for them but may leave them less prepared to deal with the current downturn in the economy.

When you add up the full range of these causes for the erosion of our problem-solving abilities, you realize that the familiar kinds of solutions, the ones that lie within our traditional comfort zone, are not designed to work against cultural forces. We are comfortable throwing money at problems. We are comfortable with legislation and regulation of the sort being considered for the current financial crisis. We are comfortable with technological fixes and with applying specialized knowledge. And we are comfortable with media coverage and PR. But all of these familiar strategies simply don't work against cultural obstacles.

Thus, we face a culture-driven erosion of our problem-solving capabilities, and we lack the tools for dealing with it.

What *would* work best against this wide array of cultural obstacles?

It seems to me that you have to fight culture with culture. You can't fight it with money or regulation or technical magic or putting a clever PR spin on our problems. The domain of culture is a matter of ethics, values, belief systems, philosophies, traditions, group practices, habits of the mind and heart, and social norms. To change the culture you have to change its norms.

III.

Reviving an American cultural tradition. I propose that we attempt to revive a traditional American philosophy and habit of thought. Our problem-solving capabilities can, I believe, best be revitalized through what I call "the new pragmatism." Restoring our American pragmatic tradition is one of the few strategies available to us that has the potential to overcome the kinds of cultural obstacles I've been describing.

Pragmatism is a distinctively American philosophy, cited by historian Henry Commager

as America's only major contribution to philosophy. In the first decades of the 1900s, it enormously strengthened our nation's problem-solving capabilities. Pragmatism transcends polarization and heightens cooperation. In recent years it has enjoyed a vigorous revival in our universities.

Let me give you a quick thumbnail sketch of what I mean by the "new pragmatism." Pragmatism is a one-hundred-year-old tradition of philosophy developed by four bold American thinkers: Charles Peirce; William James, who introduced the term *pragmatism* during a 1907 lecture at Berkeley; John Dewey, who best personifies pragmatism in practice; and sociologist George Herbert Mead. From 1900 to 1930 under James's and Dewey's influence,

We face a culture-driven erosion of our problem-solving capabilities, and we lack the tools for dealing with it.

pragmatism was key to America's social reforms. After World War II, however, it was brushed aside, particularly in academic philosophy departments, as being outmoded, old-fashioned, and naive.

Interestingly, around 1980, pragmatism began to be updated and revived in a number of academic disciplines. The American philosopher Richard Rorty and the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas were major agents of change. Their influence led to a renewal of pragmatic philosophy not only in academic philosophy departments, but also in literature, ethnic studies, management studies, and, to some degree, the social sciences. Its vitality in the universities makes it somewhat easier to disseminate, because so often ideas and trends start in the universities and then move out into the larger society.

What then is pragmatism? The popular understanding of pragmatism is correct, though limited. To be pragmatic, according to the popular understanding, is to be practical and action-oriented rather than theoretical; it means being experimental, willing to try things out and see if they work.

Being pragmatic also means opening yourself to compromise, to incremental solutions, to focusing on the art of the possible, and to being more concerned with solving concrete problems than with spinning grand visions.

As far as it goes, this popular understanding of pragmatism is correct. But if pragmatism meant nothing more than this, it would not have the potential power to do what I hope it can do. Pragmatism has two other important dimensions that can potentially produce the right kind of cultural change.

1. *A set of core values.* Pragmatic philosophy is strongly value-driven. John Dewey summed up the relevant pragmatic values in one of his favorite phrases: "Democracy as a way of life." The core values of democracy as a way of life are:

- freedom of thought and action;
- the opportunity to develop one's own gifts and capabilities;
- trusting the judgment of the public;
- a spirit of optimism;
- faith in hope and cooperation;
- strong resistance to all forms of authoritarianism, ideology, and fundamentalism; and
- a strong utopian reformist strain.

2. *A theory of knowledge.* The second dimension of the "new pragmatism" consists of its methodological/epistemological side, which includes the following elements:

- a commitment to social experimentation as a fundamental way of knowing;
- a commitment to "communities of practice";
- a constantly evolving, rather than static, culture;
- an acceptance of uncertainty and contingency rather than absolutes;
- a strong emphasis on context and circumstances such that problems are examined from a variety of points of view; and
- a radical theory of truth that defines truth-concepts as tools for coping rather than mirrors of reality.

How can this broad sweep of pragmatic ideas, attitudes, and values spread beyond the academy and restore important lost ele-

If the public learning curve does not advance in keeping with the urgency of the problem, the consequences can be disastrous for the country.

ments in our culture? It will take innovative thinking at all levels of society, encompassing individual, commercial, public, non-profit, private, and institutional efforts, all fitting together in interlocking, interacting ways. Government is one part of the process, but just a small part of it.

IV.

To ground our discussion in concrete realities rather than abstractions, let me present you with two examples of pragmatism in action.

Reducing energy dependency. My first example relates to several strategies for reducing our dependency on foreign oil. One is the T. Boone Pickens Plan and the other is the GE/Google Plan.

As context for these plans, here is a quick overview of our nation's dependency on imported oil.

- The United States now imports 70 percent of our oil, compared with 24 percent in 1970.
- We consume 25 percent of the world's oil demand yet comprise only 4 percent of the world's population.
- World oil production peaked in 2005. The United States has only 2 percent of the world's oil reserves.
- Our dependency on foreign oil represents the greatest transfer of wealth in human history, \$700 billion a year to oil-producing nations, some of whom are quite hostile to our interests.
- This transfer of wealth will lead to an inevitable decline of U.S. power, influence, and leadership in the world. We cannot transfer this kind of wealth – unprecedented in world history – and maintain a position of world leadership and influence.

To alleviate the problem, the Pickens Plan substitutes wind power for natural gas in generating electricity and then uses natural gas, which we have in abundance, as a transportation fuel instead of oil.

The GE/Google Plan, which is even bolder and more far-reaching, is to generate all electricity from renewable sources, using wind, solar, geothermal, and nuclear fuels, and to transform the entire automotive fleet to plug-ins.

These two plans are not trivial efforts. They do not nibble at the edge of the problem, but represent serious efforts at a solution.

The benefits of the two plans are considerable. They would:

- wean the United States off of fossil fuels, especially oil and coal;
- cut energy costs;
- create new industries and millions of new jobs;
- improve our national security;
- reduce the transfer of wealth to other nations; and
- help reverse global warming.

Accelerating the public's learning curve. These are bold pragmatic plans with significant benefits. But the American public is not ready for them, and that brings me to the second example of pragmatism in action. It relates to the development of a new research tool to accelerate the public's learning curve on urgent issues such as the energy problem. The Public Agenda and Viewpoint Learning (organizations with which I am affiliated) are conducting the research project.

The new tool, called the "Public's Learning Curve," is designed to cope with a subset of urgent issues that we refer to as "time-gap" issues. A time-gap issue is one where the amount of time the public would ordinarily require to make the necessary changes and sacrifices involved lags badly behind the urgency of the problem. The energy problem is a clear example of a time-gap issue.

One reason the public's normal learning curve is slow on this particular issue is that it is so complex. Our dependence on foreign energy sources poses a triple threat to our society: an *economic* threat in the form of the

rising price of oil, a *national security* threat because major energy exporting countries are hostile to our interests, and a *global warming* threat because oil and coal are major sources of the carbon emissions that are creating climate change. Adding to its complexity is the fact that policies to address one of these three threats tend to undermine one of the others. For example, the United States has plenty of domestic coal that could help reduce our dependence on imported oil, but coal seriously exacerbates the global warming threat.

Countering the triple threat demands huge changes on the part of institutions and the public. Yet, some special interests have the incentive and the means to retard the public's learning curve through obfuscation.

The cultural impediments eroding our problem-solving abilities are formidable, and we cannot deal with them one at a time. We need an overall approach.

For example, up to recently, Exxon paid scientists to take the contrarian side on debates about climate change, so when one scientist warns the public about the reality of global warming, an Exxon-paid scientist will claim that the threat is not real, and if real, not man-made. Even though the first scientist may represent the thinking of 99 percent of the scientific community, the debate is presented as if the two points of view were evenly balanced. The result is to confuse the hell out of the public. People throw up their hands in frustration. They say: "If the experts can't agree, how can you expect us to agree on something so technical?"

On this and on many other issues, if the public learning curve does not advance in keeping with the urgency of the problem, the consequences can be disastrous for the country.

The three stages of coming to judgment. In more than a half-century of studying public opinion I have learned that on important issues

of this sort, people do not form sound judgments speedily or on the basis of objective factual information. Information alone is not enough. The process is not only cognitive; it is emotion-laden and value-driven. Before people make up their minds and come to judgment, they must pass through three stages of an extended process.

The first stage is *consciousness-raising*. Factual information is important in this stage in making people aware of the problem and its urgency. But mere awareness is hardly enough on issues that call for the kind of change and sacrifice that can easily be frustrated by wishful thinking and denial.

A second stage follows consciousness-raising as people struggle with and *work through* the conflicting complexities of the issue. This is by far the longest and most difficult stage.

Only after it is complete do people reach the third stage of *resolution*, when their minds are firmly made up.


The length of time it takes to move through the three stages of the learning curve varies hugely from issue to issue. Some issues zip through the three stages in a matter of a few months. At the other extreme, issues can get bogged down for years and years. Indeed, the time required can vary by issue from mere weeks and months to decades and even centuries. For example, issues such as slavery and women's rights have taken centuries to resolve.

The key factor determining the length of time for an issue to reach resolution is the degree of emotional and political resistance it encounters. If the resistance is minimal, the issue can sail through the three stages. If the resistance is fierce, the issue can be stalled indefinitely. On some proposals for policies to deal with the energy issue (such as raising taxes on gasoline) the public's emotional and political resistance is powerful.

How then can we accelerate the learning curve on urgent issues like energy, where the need to move expeditiously through the three phases is critical?

Our new research tool starts by monitoring the public's position on the learning curve as it evolves over time. The research shows that the public has made progress over the

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In summary, the cultural impediments eroding our problem-solving abilities are formidable, and we cannot deal with them one at a time. We need an overall approach.

The new pragmatism is a powerful way of approaching problems to transcend the negative forces operating in today's culture. I believe it provides the common ground we need to revitalize our national gift for problem solving.

Since Barack Obama was elected President, the word *pragmatic* keeps cropping up. I believe it symbolizes a new feeling in the country that it is time to move away from partisanship, ideology, and magic fix-its. The mood suggests that Americans have decided that it is time to get down to work and start to cooperate to deal with our problems.

We are, hopefully, at the beginning of the era of the new pragmatism. ■

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past few years in the first consciousness-raising stage (with considerable help from the media's coverage of the issue).

It is just beginning to confront the difficult conflicts and changes called for in the second stage. At this present stage of the learning curve, a majority of the American public says that it is willing to support a wide array of incentives to improve energy efficiency, to reduce gasoline usage, and to encourage the development of alternative forms of energy. But the public is not yet prepared for the trade-offs and challenges needed to make these proposals a reality. In other words, the public is just beginning to engage the conflicts inherent in adopting new energy policies to ward off the triple threat.

Our new research tool is designed to help the public encounter and work through the key impediments to climbing this second critical stage of the learning curve. Those impediments include:


- wishful thinking and denial;
- a lack of understanding of the complexity of the problem;
- a lack of practical choices (people need to have concrete choices with which to wrestle);
- deliberate obfuscation;
- a tendency to grasp at straws;

- a feeling of lack of urgency;
- normal resistance to change; and
- a great deal of mistrust.

These are not trivial obstacles, so the working-through process will take an enormous amount of time and effort. Our California-based research organization, Viewpoint Learning, Inc., has designed a series of experiments to accelerate the learning curve with small groups of people. We do this through intensive eight-hour dialogues with cross-sections of the public. In these dialogues, average Americans engage the energy issue in great depth and struggle with the various obstacles and impediments. At the end of each dialogue session, we gather insights into how policy-makers can assist the public to deal constructively with the obstacles the issue presents.

Based on these insights, we brief leaders on how to keep the public's expectations realistic and how to overcome, step by step, the major obstacles to change.

In addition to briefing leaders, we also contribute to advancing "explanatory journalism," which is a way of assisting the media to give the public a better understanding of the context of the energy issue.



Andrei Sakharov: The Nuclear Legacy

*Matthew Bunn, František Janouch, Evgeny Miasnikov,
and Pavel Podvig*

Welcome: Emilio Bizzi

Introduction: Paul M. Doty

This presentation was given at the 1930th Stated Meeting, held at the House of the Academy on October 24, 2008.

Image © Bettmann/Corbis



Emilio Bizzi

Emilio Bizzi is the 44th President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Institute Professor and Investigator at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 1980.

Welcome

The Academy is pleased to be the site of the International Andrei Sakharov Conference and to collaborate with its sponsors: the Department of Physics, Harvard University; the Sakharov Program on Human Rights at the Kathryn W. and Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University; and the Andrei Sakharov Foundation. Andrei Sakharov was an esteemed Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy. Soon after his important essay “Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom” was published in 1968, a Stated Meeting of the Academy discussed it, and when Sakharov left the Soviet Union for the first time in November 1988, his first press conference was held at the Academy.

Much of Sakharov’s work parallels the Academy’s longstanding focus on arms control, nuclear energy, and nuclear weapons. This work continues with the Academy’s new project, the Global Nuclear Future, led by Steven Miller of Harvard University and Scott Sagan of Stanford University. The project aims to identify ways to ensure that the global spread of nuclear energy does not result in corresponding increases in nuclear proliferation.

I want to acknowledge Professor Richard Wilson, who was instrumental in conceiving this conference, and introduce Professor Paul Doty, who will chair this evening’s program. Paul’s career has developed along two tracks. One has been in biochemistry – he

Academy Meetings

founded the Harvard University Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology – and the other in science policy and international security studies. Paul founded the Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government in 1974 and is now the Center’s director emeritus. At the same time he has been a major player in the creation of the Academy’s Committee on International Security Studies. As a graduate student he was assigned to the Manhattan Project, an experience that inspired his lifelong work aimed at averting nuclear war. He served in government as Special Assistant to the President on National Security and as a member of the President’s Science and Arms Control Advisory Committee.



Paul M. Doty

Paul M. Doty is the Mallinckrodt Professor Emeritus of Biochemistry and Director Emeritus of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1951.

Introduction

The session this evening is on the nuclear legacy, and no one has a greater legacy than Sakharov. The catalyst that generated Sakharov’s clarion call for a new world order, committed to respect for human rights and intellectual freedom, was, of course, the hydrogen bomb. The climax of his bomb design was, in 1961, the largest bomb ever built and tested. With a yield of more than 50 mega-

tons, the bomb destroyed everything within a twenty-five-mile radius and set fires and broke windows a hundred miles away. The explosive yield far exceeded that of all wars that had ever been fought.

Seven years later, he wrote in his essay that we celebrate at this conference:

The technical aspects of thermonuclear weapons have made thermonuclear war a peril to the very existence of humanity. These aspects are: the enormous destructive power of a thermonuclear explosion, the relative cheapness of nuclear-armed long range missiles, and the practical impossibility of an effective defense against a massive missile-nuclear attack.

At that time the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States numbered 30,000; the Soviet Union, 10,000.

Now, forty years later, what is the situation? There has been some progress, but also there are new dangers. The numbers of weapons in the arsenals and the means of delivery have dropped from their peak by a factor of five, and the yield of the weapons has been much reduced. Most importantly, with the end of the cold war the threat of a large-scale U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange has greatly diminished. However, it is not gone, as witnessed by the thousands of weapons still on hair-trigger alert. An exchange at this level still would risk ending the civilization that has taken thousands of years to build.

But there are new dangers, caused by the nuclear capability of new countries, albeit countries with minute stockpiles compared to those of the United States and Russia. These dangers are seen as much more likely to lead to nuclear use – perhaps by the new possessor countries, but more likely by terrorists who have gained possession and are not subject to being deterred by threats of retaliation. Moreover, with urban centers increasingly interdependent, the consequence of just one being destroyed would resonate farther; rebuilding may not be possible.

It is in this context that we turn to our speakers to hear what is being done to reduce these current risks. We hope that they may convey a flavor of and an update on many aspects of what has been done to alleviate this remarkable danger.



Matthew Bunn

Matthew Bunn is Associate Professor of Public Policy and Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Presentation

It is very humbling to be speaking at a conference celebrating Andrei Sakharov.

In a fairly well-known *Science* article from a few years ago, Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow argued that if we want to stabilize climate, we need seven “wedges” of growing contribution of carbon-free energy or efficiency. To provide even one of those wedges, nuclear power would have to grow from about 369 gigawatts today to some 1,100 gigawatts in 2050. Providing two wedges is probably unobtainable given where the nuclear industry is today.

For the last several years, even though we have gone through the beginnings of a nuclear energy revival in a number of countries, the number of actual reactors getting attached to the energy grid has been about four a year. That number needs to grow to twenty-five a year, every year from now until 2050, if we want nuclear power to be even one-seventh of the answer to the climate problem. In order to do that, nuclear power would have to become dramatically more attractive to governments and utilities than it has been in recent years. And any major disaster, either by accident or from terrorism, would doom the realistic prospect for that.

If nuclear power is attractive to developed countries, it’s very likely that it will be attrac-

Several issues will have to be addressed – economics, safety, terrorism, proliferation, waste – in order for nuclear power to grow enough to be interesting with respect to climate change.

tive to developing countries as well. Large-scale growth, therefore, implies spread. Several countries have expressed interest in recent years in nuclear power plants but haven't gotten them yet. The Middle East in particular is a hotbed of interest at the moment.

Several issues will have to be addressed – economics, safety, terrorism, proliferation, waste – in order for nuclear power to grow enough to be interesting with respect to climate change. I'm going to focus on safety, terrorism, and proliferation, which are some of the key risks that growth of nuclear energy on a large scale might pose.

First, how do we reduce accident risks even as we grow nuclear energy? This clearly was a major concern for Sakharov in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. Nuclear power today is considerably safer than it was in the years of Three Mile Island or Chernobyl; many different quantitative indicators make clear that's the case. Nonetheless, there are continuing issues. Some of you may have heard of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Ohio, where a nuclear reactor was allowed to run without inspections for a long period. Boric acid dripped onto the pressure vessel head and ate a football-sized hole in it, leaving only a quarter inch of steel to contain the pressurized water in that reactor and avoid a massive loss of coolant.

To avoid increasing the risk of accidents such as this, as you put more and more nuclear power plants online, you need to strengthen institutional approaches to finding and fixing problems. Most reactors are very safe, but there's a small number of reactors that aren't. I would argue that there are today somewhere in the range of twenty to forty reactors that are providing something like 80 percent of the total global risk of a major reactor accident.

Safety has to be strengthened worldwide. Currently the international safety regime is really not up to the task. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reviews the safety of reactors, but they have inspected only a fraction of reactors in the world because they review only the ones that nuclear states have asked them to. All power reactors today are members of an industry group called the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). But there are serious questions about the quality of the reviews by some of the regional groupings of WANO. Recently the IAEA put together what they call the Commission of Eminent Persons, with which I was associated. The Commission has recommended that we need binding global standards for safety and IAEA safety review for all power reactors.

Nuclear terrorism is also a very real danger. Some people wonder how guys in caves could do what the Manhattan Project did. The reality is that Mother Nature has been kind to us in that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons don't exist in nature and are hard to make; but she's been cruel to us in that once you've gotten hold of them it's not as hard to make a nuclear bomb as we would like it to be, especially if you have highly enriched uranium. Al-Qaeda, for example, has been very focused on attempting to get nuclear weapons, and has also considered sabotaging nuclear reactors. I put out an annual report, available online, on how we're doing around the world in locking down nuclear stockpiles that might be used in a nuclear weapon.

We need to move quickly to reduce the risk of terrorists turning a modern city into another Hiroshima. We need a fast-paced global campaign to put effective security in place for every spot where there's a nuclear weapon or a significant cache of nuclear weapons and materials, whether that's in a developing country, a transition country, or advanced developed states. There are some advanced developed states where, for example, it is still against the rules to have armed guards at a nuclear facility, even if hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium are there. We need to establish effective global nuclear security standards. Today there are no binding global standards for how secure nuclear weapons and materials should be. We need to consolidate nuclear materials at the smal-

lest practicable number of sites. There are efforts underway to do that, but we need to expand the number of facilities those efforts cover, the kind of materials they cover, and the policy tools they use.

Ultimately we should seek over time to eliminate the civil use of highly enriched uranium, or at least, when used, to have the highest practicable levels of security that we demand in the military sector for civil use as well. Today that is certainly not the case.

We need a fast-paced global campaign to put effective security in place for every spot where there's a nuclear weapon or a significant cache of nuclear weapons and materials, whether that's in a developing country, a transition country, or advanced developed states.

We also need to deal with sabotage risks. We need to upgrade rapidly the security of all high-consequence nuclear facilities, including power reactors, spent-fuel pools, and reprocessing plants. Some of these today still do not have any armed guards on site. Many of them do not have the kind of design that makes it impossible for one explosive to take out both of the redundant safety systems, because they were designed with safety rather than sabotage in mind.

If I had to guess – and I admit that this is a guess: I don't have the numbers to back it up – I would argue that we have done enough on safety that today the probability of a really big, Chernobyl-scale release happening purely by accident is lower than the probability of it happening because somebody wanted to make it happen – that is, from sabotage. And if that's true then we need a profound transformation in how the industry handles this kind of thing. In the industry today, everyone is trained every single day, from the day they enter the industry, on

safety. They hear maybe a half-hour briefing once a year on security. The level of thinking about security, and the level of security measures already in place, is not remotely comparable with safety training and precautions. These must be brought in line because fostering a security culture matters.

Another key issue is nuclear proliferation. We want to make sure that large-scale growth of nuclear energy doesn't lead to large-scale spread of nuclear weapons. And it's not only that nuclear energy poses a risk of proliferation: proliferation poses a risk to nuclear energy as well. If people equate increasing numbers of nuclear power plants with an increasing chance of the construction of nuclear bombs, they're not going to back the number of nuclear power plants that would allow nuclear energy to be a significant player in addressing climate change.

We need to upgrade rapidly the security of all high-consequence nuclear facilities, including power reactors, spent-fuel pools, and reprocessing plants.

There are major challenges to the nonproliferation regime today, but the regime has been a lot more successful than many people realize. Today there are nine states with nuclear weapons; twenty years ago there were nine states with nuclear weapons. That's an amazing public policy success. Think about it: we got through the collapse of the Soviet Union and all the chaos that followed; the secret nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, Iran, and Libya; and the whole period of activity of the A.Q. Khan network with no increase in the net number of states with nuclear weapons – an amazing public policy success.

There are more states today that started nuclear weapons programs and verifiably agreed to give them up than there are states with nuclear weapons. That means our efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons succeed more often than they fail. Yet there's enor-

mous fatalism out there that says, "Oh, states that want nuclear weapons are going to get them eventually; there's nothing we can do." It's not true. We have been very successful over the years. There's a chance, if we take the policy steps that we need to take now, that we can continue that success. It's not going to be easy: the world has changed through globalization and the spread of technology. But there is a chance, and we can't be fatalistic. Otherwise we will fail to take the necessary action that will help reduce risk.

Recent proliferation crises have taught us lessons about which actions we should take. First, we need to engage the hard cases. Our failure in the Bush administration to engage with North Korea and Iran in any real way has led North Korea to quadruple (at least) the amount of plutonium that it has available for nuclear weapons; it's led Iran to go from zero to almost 4,000 centrifuges operating at Natanz.

We need to beef up nuclear security, to make sure that every nuclear weapon, every cache of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, is secure and accounted for. We need to strengthen nuclear safeguards. It's remarkable that today the IAEA's budget for safeguarding all nuclear material worldwide is about the same as the budget of the Indianapolis Police Department. And the authority of the IAEA is remarkably limited as well.

We need to take new steps to stop black-market nuclear networks. The A.Q. Khan network was operating in some twenty countries for twenty years before it was taken down, making clear that the global export control system is, in the words of the Director General of the IAEA, broken. There's a lot we need to do with international policing, intelligence cooperation, and establishing export controls. We've never worried before about export controls in countries like Malaysia or Dubai, which were key nodes of the A. Q. Khan network.

We need to do what we can to stem the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. This needs to be done carefully because the non-nuclear weapon states will not tolerate dividing the world again into haves and have-nots, into countries that are allowed to have enrichment and reprocessing and countries that are not.

We want to make sure that large-scale growth of nuclear energy doesn't lead to large-scale spread of nuclear weapons.

But I think there's a great deal that can be done in providing reliable assurances of fuel supply and assurances that spent fuel can be managed if sent away to someone else through a fuel leasing program. That gives countries incentives to choose voluntarily not to invest in their own enrichment and reprocessing plants; those are the key technologies for making nuclear bomb material.

We need to toughen enforcement. When the North Koreans first were found to be in fairly stark violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the early 1990s, the Security Council did almost nothing until many years later. Even now, Iran continues to ignore the Security Council's legally binding requirement to suspend its enrichment program.

All of the steps I have just outlined, though, only slow things down. What we really must do is reduce demand. Convincing states that it was in their interest *not* to have nuclear weapons has, today, yielded more states that started nuclear weapons programs and then gave them up than states with nuclear weapons. Yet there's a lot more work to be done. For a start, stopping our habit of reserving the right to invade sovereign states would, in my view, be a good place to make headway toward reducing demand. There was a senior Indian general who remarked that the lesson of the Iraq war was if you think you might end up on the wrong side of the United States, you'd better get nuclear weapons.

And, fundamentally, we need to keep our end of the nonproliferation bargain, which involves disarmament. It is very unlikely that we will get the support that's needed from the non-nuclear weapon states, for all the sorts of things that involve more inconveniences, increased costs, tougher export controls, and more stringent inspections, if we are not willing to accept some constraints on our own nuclear policies.

But if we do all this, if we put the right policies in place, I believe there's a realistic hope that in twenty years from now we may still have only nine nuclear weapon states – and maybe fewer.

If people equate increasing numbers of nuclear power plants with an increasing chance of the construction of nuclear bombs, they're not going to back the number of nuclear power plants that would allow nuclear energy to be a significant player in addressing climate change.

That brings us to the challenge of disarmament. States that have nuclear weapons aren't going to give them up unless they think it's in their security interest to do so. We need to build a structure of international security that makes it in their interest. We need to rethink the risks of the status quo, of indefinite maintenance of large stockpiles of nuclear arms.

This is going to require a lot: detailed analyses of how we get there from here; questions of how we do the verification, including societal verification – not just satellites and inspectors and so on. That ultimately gets us back to Sakharov because it calls for an unprecedented level of openness, international cooperation, and freedom of thought. People are going to have to say, "Even though it's my own country that's doing wrong, I have to report it." That's an attitude that today doesn't exist in many countries and will have to be built over time.

In short, we need a new nuclear order that involves more transparency, more openness, more international cooperation, stronger international institutions, and reduced numbers, roles, and readiness of nuclear weapons. I'd like to see all nuclear weapons taken off quick reaction alert. I hope that if we can put

all of those institutions in place we can enjoy a growing contribution from safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear energy. I think we don't know yet whether we can or cannot solve the climate problem without nuclear energy. But it would certainly be a lot harder if we didn't have a contribution from nuclear energy. It is the largest source of baseload low-carbon electricity supply that can be readily expanded and that is available today.



František Janouch

František Janouch was a Professor of Physics at the Manne Siegbahn Institute of Physics (Royal Institute of Technology) in Stockholm, Sweden, and a senior scientist at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Rez near Prague. He is currently the Chairman of the Charter 77 Foundation in Prague, Czech Republic, and the Czech Government Coordinator of the European Nuclear Energy Forum, which convenes every spring in Prague.

Presentation

Let me begin with a little background about myself: for several years, I was unemployed in Prague for political reasons. In 1975, with an invitation from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, I came to Sweden; later that year I was stripped of my Czechoslovak citizenship.

My first article published in Swedish was entitled "Energy, Freedom and Independence." I had a lot of discussions with my Swedish friends and with Swedish politicians about its content – they could not grasp how energy could be linked with such "abstract" terms as freedom and independence.

Thirty years later, the situation has changed dramatically: politicians and people in the West now understand much better that both our freedom and political independence are very much related to the energy needed to keep our societies running normally. Links between energy and independence are now much better understood in the West, and the relationship between energy and economic and political independence is no longer questioned. What still is questioned, however – at least in some countries – is where to get our energy: coal, LNG, wind, sun, or nuclear.

Politicians and people in the West now understand much better that both our freedom and political independence are very much related to the energy needed to keep our societies running normally.

When I came to the West I was invited by many leftist and environmental groups to lecture about energy. In the mid-1970s, many of these leftist or green environmental groups assumed that I, a dissident, would support their struggle against nuclear power. When I didn't, they assumed that I was not a proper dissident and that Sakharov's attitude toward nuclear energy would be different from mine. "We did not expect a dissident to defend nuclear energy. That may be your opinion, but what would Andrei Sakharov say about nuclear energy?" My answer: "Andrei Dmitrievich is a physicist, so he would certainly have views similar to mine. But I cannot speak for him."

This is why, in 1976, I contacted Andrei Sakharov through our "dissident post." I explained why it was important for him to formulate his attitude toward nuclear energy in a short article, understandable to both the general public and to politicians. I told him that a statement about his position on nuclear energy would be very important to Western countries. In December 1977, I received a four-page paper from him. At the

end, he added a note that has become very important: “For František, with best wishes and with feelings of solidarity. You should publish this paper in many countries. Andrei Sakharov.”

In 1977, Westerners, and especially U.S. “dissidents” – by that I mean protesters against the war in Vietnam – suddenly felt themselves unemployed and useless. The Vietnam War was over. They did not know where to direct their tremendous social power: hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of young people, full of energy and enthusiasm, believing in freedom, justice, and a better, socially just future.

Unfortunately, with the encouragement of Jane Fonda and individuals from Greenpeace, the young “unemployed” started to direct their energy against the peaceful use of nuclear power. It was not against the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, at that time consisting of tens of thousands of nuclear bombs, many of which were a thousand times stronger than the Hiroshima bomb!

Andrei Sakharov is very clear about the importance of nuclear energy; he connected nuclear energy with freedom in the West.

I translated Sakharov’s paper and sent it to *Der Spiegel*, one of the largest and most respected journals in Germany, and simultaneously to the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. I knew the editors-in-chief of both journals personally. To my great surprise and disappointment, both publications were infected with anti-nuke ideology. They refused to publish Sakharov’s article because they did not believe it was written by Andrei Sakharov. Only after I sent a copy of Sakharov’s manuscript with his handwritten note to me did both journals change their mind and publish his paper: in fact, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* printed it as a front page story and chose a green color for the front cover. It is interesting that thirty years later nuclear power would be considered, at least by most reasonable and educated people, as one of the “greenest” energy sources. Sakharov’s

paper was subsequently published, almost exactly thirty years ago, in many leading newspapers and journals around the world.

Andrei Sakharov is very clear about the importance of nuclear energy; he connected nuclear energy with freedom in the West. Today, this wisdom and knowledge are slowly returning to Europe and to the United States. Many people do not fully understand that nuclear energy provides much more security and safety than oil, natural gas, and coal – the supplies of which can be blocked very easily.

Many years ago, the European Parliament established the Andrei Sakharov Prize for Human Rights, which is awarded yearly to distinguished human right activists. The European Union also provides support, with billions of Euros, to another large international project that is closely related to Sakharov: namely, research of the fusion reactor, based on Sakharov’s Tokamak idea.

In spite of Sakharov’s fame (and his Nobel Prize), for almost thirty years the West neglected Sakharov’s clear warning that nuclear energy provides a certain degree of freedom and security for the West. Most European and American politicians do not understand that energy in nature is produced only by fission or fusion – even geothermal heat is produced by the decay of radioactive nuclei dissipated inside the earth.

By 1986, Sakharov’s paper had been published in at least ten countries. The paper caused a conflict between Heinrich Böll and Andrei Sakharov, with Böll writing an open letter to Sakharov, Sakharov answering with one, and so on. At the time, Western Europe was hesitating whether or not to go nuclear – the USSR and Eastern Europe were going nuclear. In 1986, two months after the Chernobyl disaster, the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute published a booklet of mine on nuclear power in the Soviet Union and Europe entitled “In the Shadow of Chernobyl”; my original title had been “East Goes Nuclear.”

Andrei Sakharov left us prematurely in December 1989. In May 1991 a large international Andrei Sakharov Memorial Congress was convened in Moscow. Richard Wilson and I co-chaired two or three sessions on nuclear energy at the Memorial Congress. Before the Congress, Dick and I met in Kiev

Many people do not fully understand that nuclear energy provides much more security and safety than oil, natural gas, and coal – the supplies of which can be blocked very easily.

and visited Chernobyl. We spent a night there, and we were even allowed to go inside the Sarkofag. (Dick had a dosimeter with him and was frequently taking measurements; I also remember we had to shower carefully afterward.) We had a number of enlightening discussions with nuclear specialists in Chernobyl. In Moscow, we tried to persuade the Sakharov Congress that nuclear energy is an important part of the world energy supply.

It is difficult now to split Europe into East and West, new and old. The European Union is today the largest producer of nuclear power; it produces eight times more nuclear-generated electricity than North America, three times more than Japan, and almost seven times more than Russia. Only four EU countries use nuclear power plants for more than 50 percent of their total electricity production. In the EU overall, 35 percent of electricity production is from nuclear power.


Nuclear power is attractive for several reasons: nuclear reactors are safe; nuclear power is the cheapest way to produce electricity; investments in built reactors are mostly amortized; nuclear energy has a very stable cost structure; nuclear power plants can be and are modernized at very reasonable cost; and plant lifetimes are on the order of sixty to seventy years.

Thirteen countries in Europe are using nuclear energy: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, Hungary, The Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece, Great Britain, and Switzerland. (Switzerland is not in the EU, but closely cooperates with it.) Four countries in the EU are planning to phase out nuclear energy. (There were five countries, but Great Britain has changed its mind and is collabo-

rating with France.) It is conceivable that Sweden and other countries will have to reconsider stopping or canceling their commitment to phase out nuclear energy. In any case, we have four EU countries plus Turkey ready to join the nuclear club and begin building nuclear power plants.

The European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) was established recently by the European Commission to promote nuclear power in Europe. At its first meeting in Prague in May 2008 there were more than 250 participants, among them six prime ministers. All of the participants received Sakharov's paper, along with background stories and a facsimile of his original text. The Forum will meet twice a year in Prague and in Bratislava. I was nominated by the Czech government as a coordinator of the Prague session. I believe that these regular meetings will support the renaissance of nuclear power in Europe.

I think that the plans to increase the use of nuclear energy are impressive in Eastern Europe, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, India, and especially in China. Thirty years later, Sakharov's prophecy is on its way to being understood and fulfilled in Europe.



Evgeny Miasnikov

Evgeny Miasnikov is Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

Presentation

It is well known that Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov understood well the consequences of a global nuclear war. In his 1968 paper he gave primary importance to this disastrous threat. In order to avoid the disaster, he urged, mankind must overcome its divisions as an initial step from the nuclear brink.

I think Sakharov's ideals are still key to finding solutions on the way toward a nuclear-weapons-free world today.

Sakharov wrote that certain changes must be made in the conduct of international affairs. He believed in systematically subordinating all concrete aims and local tasks to the basic task of actively preventing the aggravation of the international situation. He wanted to pursue and expand peaceful coexistence. He championed a level of cooperative policy-making whose effects, immediately and in the long term, would neither sharpen tensions nor create difficulties that would strengthen the forces of reaction, militarism, nationalism, fascism, and revanchism for either side. I think Sakharov's ideals are still key to finding solutions on the way toward a nuclear-weapons-free world today.

There is a danger that deterioration of transparency will spoil U.S.-Russian relations with more distrust and suspicion, and will kill many future mutually beneficial cooperation projects.

Where were we forty years ago and where are we now in terms of reducing the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia? It took two decades from when Sakharov's paper came out in 1968 to reverse the nuclear arms race and begin reduction. This was accomplished through the painstaking work of diplomats, politicians, and scientists who managed to establish a bilateral process of arms control negotiations. By the end of the 1980s, these mutual efforts brought both sides to the understanding that there are too many nuclear weapons and that significant, irreversible, and verified reductions would be beneficial for both sides. This was also the time when the United States and Russia signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated the total class of land-based missiles of medium and short range. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) reduced strategic nuclear forces of both sides by almost half.

In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush announced deep cuts of non-strategic nuclear weapons. At almost the same time the sides stopped nuclear testing and producing fissile materials for weapons purposes. Most importantly, serious cooperation began between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. Perhaps the most significant achievement was the Russian-U.S. highly enriched uranium purchase agreement. Under this agreement, 500 tons of excess weapons – highly enriched uranium – are being blended down to low enriched uranium and shipped to the United States for making power reactor fuel.

Though nuclear reductions have been a bilateral process, perhaps most dramatic are the changes in the Russian arsenal. Russia

has significantly reduced its strategic nuclear forces over the period of two decades, and this is due mostly to START. Though START was negotiated and signed during the cold war, it continues to play a significant role since the Treaty has a robust and efficient verification system, which includes, among other things, twelve types of inspections, notifications, data exchange, and cooperative measures. START's verification mechanism provides a basis for retaining predictability and maintaining stability in U.S.-Russian relations. If START ends in December 2009, as it is slated to, its verification mechanism and transparency will be lost.

Russia's stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons was never officially declared. According to our estimates, that stockpile doesn't exceed 3,000 to 4,000 warheads, and it's diminishing. Russia also never released numbers on the quantity of highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium it produced. The best estimates put the figure for the time being at about 945 tons of highly enriched uranium, plus or minus 300 tons. Russia's weapons-grade plutonium stock is estimated at a level of 145 tons, plus or minus 20 tons, of which 34 tons were declared by Russia as excessive for weapon purposes.

Nuclear arms reduction still has some momentum. Nevertheless, the environment for this reduction is going to change. U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are going to be smaller, but much less transparent. And there is a danger that deterioration of transparency will spoil U.S.-Russian relations with more distrust and suspicion, and will kill many future mutually beneficial cooperation projects.

Why is this happening now, when neither Russia nor the United States is interested in beefing up its nuclear forces? Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov raised a rhetorical question. Of course it would be wiser to agree now to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons and to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. But is that possible in a world now poisoned with fear and mistrust? I think a similar question can be raised these days. You may argue that in the late 1980s, when the Soviet Union and the United States concluded several arms reduction agreements, there was an even deeper mistrust than now. This is true. But at that time both sides felt like they

had too many nuclear weapons and both thought that they had more to benefit than to lose if they made cuts to their arsenals. This doesn't seem to be the case these days with respect to the Russian side. Almost 90 percent of Russian nuclear forces are still the legacy of the cold war and the heritage of the Soviet Union. The current rate of retirement of strategic systems is significantly higher than the rate of new production. And this trend is going to last for at least the next ten years. Russian policy-makers feel more and more concerned about the survivability of future remaining forces. This is why there is such strong opposition to U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses in Europe and why Russia is so concerned about U.S. reluctance to set up limits on development of conventional precision-guided strategic weapons.

Almost 90 percent of Russian nuclear forces are still the legacy of the cold war and the heritage of the Soviet Union.

Russia perceives both of these U.S. actions as building up counterforce capability aimed at depriving Russia's nuclear forces. In this context, it is interesting to recall the views of Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov toward ballistic missile defenses, conventional capabilities, and the nuclear arms reduction process. It is well known that Sakharov was very skeptical about ballistic missile defenses; he urged for limiting their deployment. But what I find interesting is that Sakharov also advocated for the importance of counting conventional weapons in order to achieve nuclear reductions. Sakharov was a proponent of a balanced approach in nuclear reductions. In fact, attempts to ignore these principles will make deeper cuts to nuclear weapons impossible. This is already happening these days as the United States and Russia discuss the future of START.

We know that discussions are going on, but at a very slow pace. Though these discussions are confidential, from the leaks to the press it is quite straightforward to find out the areas of disagreement. The hardest problem,

I think, is to define the scope of the Treaty. For example, should it include only operationally deployed nuclear warheads, as the U.S. side insists? Or should it also limit all deployed strategic systems, as START did and as the Russian side wants?

Before I finish, let me say a bit about negotiating attitudes. For the time being, Russia plays an active role in stimulating the dialogue. In fact, the Russian side still wants to discuss a broad agenda with the U.S. side, covering the whole list of issues of strategic stability, which includes limits on strategic delivery systems, missile defenses, conventional precision-guided weapons, antisubmarine warfare, and space weapons. This is about renewing a dialogue that was cut short after the current Republican administration came to power in 2000. For well-known reasons, the Bush administration was not interested in discussing this broad agenda with the Russians. What the U.S. side perhaps is still interested in is separating the verification system of START (leaving aside its limitation) and linking this system to the Moscow Treaty. But this is exactly what the Russian side wants to avoid.

Will the new U.S. administration be interested in reviving the arms-control dialogue with Russia? There is hope, but this is an open question. There is, however, another difficult question that is rarely asked: Will the Russian side keep its positive attitude toward arms-control dialogue with the United States in the future? In my opinion there is a strong possibility that Russia will lose its interest in such a dialogue. Its nuclear forces will be smaller than now, but survivability of the smaller force will be ensured by minimizing transparency. Russia might take a similar approach as China has, for example. If this happens, certainly we have to forget about mutual inspections, notifications, and limits on deployment. At best, with regard to strategic forces, the situation will become similar to that of tactical weapons. But there is a prominent difference. Strategic forces will be on high alert, ready to eliminate the other side within minutes.



Pavel Podvig

Pavel Podvig is Research Associate and Acting Associate Director for Research at the Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Presentation

I would like to focus on Sakharov's role in the missile defense debate. As you know, the subject just doesn't want to go away. Missile defense is a fairly complex, challenging issue if you take it in the context of the nuclear confrontation. It is only appropriate that Sakharov was part of that discussion.

Sakharov's involvement in this particular issue began in the late 1960s, and it wasn't the first time he took a strong position on the issue. We know that he was very active in the issue of atmospheric nuclear tests, too. But when the missile defense issue came forward around 1967, his involvement was a bit different.

His particular contribution at that time was a letter he wrote in 1967 to the Politburo on missile defense, arguing that the Soviet Union should take the U.S. offer that was on the table at the time (or was discussed at the time), which would limit missile defenses. If you step back a bit and look at the context of this, it was the time when there was a very heated debate between the Soviet military and military industry and Soviet leadership about military strategy and the way the Soviet Union should build its nuclear forces.

What is interesting is that scientists were actively involved in that debate. Sakharov himself referred to his colleagues Khariton

and Zababakhin in the discussion. It was a closed discussion, though, and as far as I can tell, the problem was that while the scientists apparently were quite skeptical about the potential of missile defenses it was clear that the scientists' impact on the debate was not as large as they probably hoped for – and not as large as they saw in earlier discussions of military issues. Part of the reason for that was that by the late 1970s the military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union was taking over these issues and was growing stronger.

Conventional wisdom in Soviet diplomatic and military circles was that as long as the SDI was out there the Soviet Union couldn't limit or start reducing its offensive nuclear forces.

In that discussion, scientists made a strong case that the Soviet missile defense program at the time was very problematic. But leadership and the industry were not particularly interested in taking any steps to limit defenses. As far as we can tell today, what was important for Sakharov and for some of his colleagues at the time was that the leadership was not very interested in taking the opportunity to start limiting the offensive nuclear forces and begin nuclear disarmament that would reduce the danger of nuclear war. That was probably one of the reasons why Sakharov tried to extend his case beyond that closed discussion, limited to the military-industrial complex. But his open letter on the subject of missile defense was not published. Mikhail Suslov, the addressee of the letter, said there was no interest in publishing it, and, in turn, reinforced the perception that the leadership and the military-industrial complex were not particularly interested in reducing the danger of nuclear war. Maybe that wasn't the main reason for Sakharov to become more public about these issues, but it certainly was one of the reasons. Then in 1968, in his essay "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexis-

tence, and Intellectual Freedom," the anniversary of which we celebrate today, he specifically mentioned the dangers of a nuclear arms race and the role that missile defense could play in that process.

Now let's skip quite a few important years and go to the next step in the missile defense debate, namely the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Star Wars program that appeared in 1983. By that time Sakharov was no longer an insider. He was in Gorky, in exile, but he was a very visible outsider. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he saw that the Soviet military complex was very happy about Star Wars, and there was a very strong push to have a similar Soviet program. Conventional wisdom in Soviet diplomatic and military circles was that as long as the SDI was out there the Soviet Union couldn't limit or start reducing its offensive nuclear forces. Gorbachev attempted to counter that by trying to limit the SDI and trying to convince Reagan that the SDI should be discontinued. He failed, most spectacularly perhaps in Reykjavik in October 1986.

It is not entirely coincidental that Sakharov was released briefly after the Reykjavik Summit, because human rights issues were an important part of the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. Importantly, Sakharov was, to the extent that he could be, skeptical about the missile defense system. He was skeptical about the impact that that system could make, to the extent that it could be useful militarily.

Sakharov saw value in nuclear deterrence and in strategic balance.

In fact, Sakharov was skeptical about all of the fancy directed-energy weapon technologies even before Reagan announced them in March 1983. Sakharov criticized the idea of defense, specifically the illusion that defense could solve any problems. At the same time, Sakharov was very critical of the Soviet position that linked the issue of missile defense to reductions of offensive forces, which he saw as counterproductive. He criticized both sides, and he was very open about that.

I should say that Sakharov was certainly not a pacifist at that time. Indeed he saw value in nuclear deterrence and in strategic balance. At some point in his letter to Sid Drell in 1983, he basically said that if preventing nuclear war would require fifteen more years of a nuclear arms race, so be it. Preventing nuclear war was a very important issue for him.

On some occasions, he advocated putting pressure on the Soviet Union to force it to restrain its nuclear programs or their expansion. But what's interesting – and what's important – is that he never really advocated using missile defense as a bargaining point of that pressure. As far as I can tell, he never said that the United States should build up missile defense (or at least the rhetoric behind missile defense) to influence Soviet decisions at the time.

Sakharov advocated putting pressure on the Soviet Union to force it to restrain its nuclear programs or their expansion.

There is another interesting document of around that same time. Two months after Sakharov was released, there was a forum against nuclear war in Moscow. In his apartment, Sakharov met with Frank von Hippel and Jeremy Stone, and there is a KGB transcript of the conversation. (I guess that for any of you who ever had conversations with Sakharov in his apartment, there probably is a KGB transcript of those conversations as well.) Stone and von Hippel tried to convince Sakharov that the Soviet Union should drop the link between the SDI and offensive forces. Sakharov didn't really need any convincing, but he gave von Hippel a very hard time, questioning him on details of his model of nuclear exchange and his numbers on casualties during a nuclear war. Sakharov had some very interesting remarks about such topics as acceptable damage, showing his strong technocratic side. But again, he was very clear on the point that the SDI was not worth the hype that was around it. His remarks were very important, and the transcript of his meeting with von Hippel and

Stone was sent to Gorbachev, who read it and made notes. What is interesting is that was how Gorbachev actually learned about those issues. There were not very many ways that he could do that, so that transcript was an important contribution of Sakharov's as well.

I think what is important in Sakharov's position is that he recognized very early on that missile defense is a problem, not a solution. The only effect of missile defense is that it disrupts stability and order, and it prevents real steps toward nuclear disarmament, which Sakharov believed was the real goal and the real necessity. This is true still today. We should be working on the current missile defense system, stepping back and looking at Sakharov's attitude toward missile defenses and applying it to the current solution.

Question

What would development of thermonuclear energy do to concerns about the safe use of nuclear energy? Which steps that have been described would still be necessary or applicable? Of mechanisms developed to safeguard nuclear energy, which would still be important and applicable in the case of thermonuclear energy? What kind of new issues might arise?

Matthew Bunn

I think that fusion has for so long been "50 years out" that analyses of those subjects are at a much more primitive stage than they are for the nuclear power that's here today. There were some fairly detailed analyses done jointly by U.S., Soviet, and European scientists, including Wolf Hafele and Evgeniy Velikhov, comparing a thermonuclear-fueled future versus a future fueled by fission breeders and plutonium. I think that there are a lot of potential advantages on the safety front, the waste front, the terrorist risk front, and the proliferation front. But of course fusion, like fission, is a potential source of neutrons. So a country that wanted to use a fusion plant to produce plutonium would probably find a way to arrange to do that. However, it would probably be very easy to design a fusion plant so that you couldn't do that without being obvious and requiring some significant modifications to the facility. So my guess is, while

the analyses between fusion and fission have not been done on the same level of detail, there would be quite a few advantages ultimately with fusion. But there are a lot of technological and economic challenges to go before we're in a world powered by thermonuclear power.

Question

There is a type of nuclear peril that our first two speakers ignored: the fact that if you want to build – as we need to – fission reactors, they don't exist on the market. You all speak as if you could get them off the shelf. There are basically two reactors that you could, let's say, order. One, the AP1000, is from Westinghouse, and the first prototype has yet to be built. Another one is from AREVA in France, and is called the EPR – which they're barely building. If you want to make a pressure vessel there is only one company in the world, in Japan, that can do it. I think this is a real peril that should be taken into account since we need nuclear power.

Matthew Bunn

I wouldn't describe it as a peril so much as a bottleneck. There are actually four major companies that you can get modern nuclear reactors from, not just two: there are the

We don't have the nuclear inspectors that we are going to need to carry out the kinds of measures that are required for the nuclear future we'd all like to have.

Russians after all. But all of the major companies have constraints on their capacity. There's no way that we can go to twenty-five reactors a year any time in the next few years. That would mean building forty or fifty reactors a year toward the end of the period in order to reach an average of twenty-five a year throughout the period. There are companies that are soon to compete with Japan Steel Works on making the pressure vessels, but it'll take time.

There is the people issue as well, not just the bottleneck on the pressure vessels. There are a lot of people in this industry about to retire or already retired, and the new generation coming along is much smaller. They won't be enough for a growing nuclear energy enterprise or a growing disarmament enterprise. More than half of the inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency will reach the mandatory retirement age in the next five years. This is a crisis. We don't have the nuclear inspectors that we are going to need to carry out the kinds of measures that are required for the nuclear future we'd all like to have.

Question

When you think about the cost of nuclear reactors, based on the French experience of spending an estimated \$4 billion on each one, it seems to me, if you were to build five, six, eight, or ten a year to meet the energy demands that we have, it's actually cheaper, better, safer from all points of view to put those billions of dollars into solar, wind, and wave energy, which are decentralized and not subject to the threats of terrorism. Senator McCain talked about building forty-five reactors in the United States, and Rosatom wants to build one hundred reactors all by 2030; this amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars. One last comment: there is one other state that generates more than half of its energy from nuclear power, and that's Vermont.

Matthew Bunn

The climate challenge is so big and daunting to a world 85 percent dependent on fossil fuels that we need every technology we have available. We cannot yet rule out any of the things that we have available; we need to work as hard as we can on efficiency, solar, wind – and nuclear power.

František Janouch

The net increase in the global population is about 250,000 a day. Every day the average consumption of electricity or production capacity grows by two kilowatts. Every second day we need to build an additional 1,000 megawatts just to maintain the present sup-

Letter of Acceptance from Andrei Sakharov

Mr. Raymond A. Bauer, Secretary
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
280 Newton Street, Brookline Station, Boston
Massachusetts 02146

September 30, 1969

Dear Mr. Bauer,

Thank you for informing me that I have been elected to the Academy of Arts and Sciences as its foreign member. I accept this honour with gratitude and regard it as a sign of trust not only in myself, but in may of my colleagues, Soviet scientists, as well. The fact that the distinguished Soviet writer, A. Soljenitsin, was elected at the same time as myself, has given me particular satisfaction.

I have profound respect for the American people and American science. All the more reason to feel pain, as probably you do too, because of certain matters, that cannot be reconciled with – the napalm war in Vietnam and some inner problems. I hope you will forgive me those bitter notes at this joyful moment, but I think I have some right to friendly candour and believe that the American scientists is a force that can accomplish a great deal.

Sincerely yours,

A. Sakharov (A.D. Sakharov)
P.N. Lebedev Physical Institute
of the Academy of the Sciences
of the USSR

ply of energy. Wind power is a maximum of 10 or 15 percent effective, and I cannot imagine that you can get this amount of energy from wind power. Remember that at present 80 percent of energy produced globally is used by only 20 percent of the world's population. And vice versa: 80 percent of the global population is using only 20 percent of the energy produced. ■

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Noteworthy

As of press time, several Fellows of the Academy, listed below, have been invited to serve in senior roles in President Barack Obama's administration. They are in addition to the Fellows listed in the Winter 2009 issue of the *Bulletin*.

Rosina Bierbaum (University of Michigan): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

Rebecca M. Blank (Brookings Institution): Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce

William F. Brinkman (Princeton University): Director of the Office of Science, Department of Energy

Shirley Ann Jackson (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

Harold Hongju Koh (Yale Law School): Legal Adviser, State Department

Steven E. Koonin (BP, plc): Under Secretary for Science, Department of Energy

Richard Levin (Yale University): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

William Press (University of Texas at Austin): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

Barbara Schaal (Washington University in St. Louis): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

Eric Schmidt (Google Inc.): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

David E. Shaw (D. E. Shaw Research): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

Ahmed Zewail (California Institute of Technology): Member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

Select Prizes and Awards

Robert Alter (University of California, Berkeley) is the recipient of the 29th annual Los Angeles Times Book Prizes' Robert Kirsch Award for lifetime achievement.

Kwame Anthony Appiah (Princeton University) was awarded the Joseph B. and Toby Gittler Prize by Brandeis University.

John Ashbery (Bard College) is the recipient of the 2009 Harvard Arts Medal.

Ruzena Bajcsy (University of California, Berkeley) was awarded the 2009 Benjamin Franklin Medal in Computer and Cognitive Science by the Franklin Institute.

Stephen J. Benkovic (Pennsylvania State University) is the recipient of the 2009 Benjamin Franklin Medal in Life Science, given by the Franklin Institute.

Veena Das (Johns Hopkins University) was awarded a 2009 Guggenheim Fellowship.

John R. David (Harvard School of Public Health) is the recipient of The NYU School of Medicine Biotechnology Faculty/Alumnus Award.

Mildred Dresselhaus (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the 2009 Vannevar Bush Award, given by the National Science Board.

R. Lawrence Edwards (University of Minnesota) was awarded a 2009 Guggenheim Fellowship.

Leon Eisenberg, a member of the Harvard Medical School faculty since 1967, was honored when Children's Hospital Boston announced the establishment of the Leon Eisenberg Chair & Professorship in Child Psychiatry.

David T. Ellwood (Harvard University) was awarded the 2009 Daniel Moynihan Prize by the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

Sandra Faber (University of California, Santa Cruz) is the recipient of the 2009 Bower Award and Prize for Achievement in Science, given by the Franklin Institute.

Susan Fiske (Princeton University) was awarded a 2009 Guggenheim Fellowship.

Peter Galison (Harvard University) was awarded a 2009 Guggenheim Fellowship.

Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (Harvard University) was named the 2009 winner of the Frank E. Taplin, Jr. Public Intellectual Award by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation.

Laura Greene (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) was awarded a 2009 Guggenheim Fellowship.

Mikhail L. Gromov (Institut des Hautes Études Scientifiques) was awarded the 2009 Abel Prize.

Allen Grossman (Johns Hopkins University) was awarded the Bollingen Prize in American Poetry.

Leonard P. Guarente (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of The NYU School of Medicine Biotechnology Study Center Award in Applied Biotechnology.

Donald L. Horowitz (Duke University) received the 2009 Distinguished Scholar Award of the Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Section of the International Studies Association.

Gwen Ifill (WETA) is the recipient of the Goldsmith Career Award for Excellence in Journalism, given by the Shorenstein Center at Harvard University.

Arthur Kleinman (Harvard University) is the recipient of the George Foster Practicing Anthropology Award from the Society for Medical Anthropology.

Neal Lane (Rice University) is the recipient of the Karl T. Compton Medal for Leadership in Physics, given by the American Institute of Physics.

Andrew E. Lange (California Institute of Technology) was awarded the Dan David Prize by the Dan David Foundation. He shared the prize with **Paul Richards** (University of California, Berkeley) and Paolo De Bernardis (University La Sapienza).

Barbara Liskov (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the 2008 Association for Computing Machinery's A.M. Turing Award.

Richard Losick (Harvard University) was named one of the Canada Gairdner International Award winners by the Gairdner Foundation.

Arno G. Motulsky (University of Washington) is the recipient of the American College of Medical Genetics Foundation Lifetime Achievement Award.

Mark S. Ptashne (Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center) is the recipient of The NYU School of Medicine Biotechnology Study Center Award in Basic Biotechnology.

Steve Reich (New York, NY) was awarded the 2009 Pulitzer Prize for Music for "Double Sextet."

Paul Richards (University of California, Berkeley) was awarded the Dan David Prize by the Dan David Foundation. He shared the prize with **Andrew E. Lange** (California Institute of Technology) and Paolo De Bernardis (University La Sapienza).

Lucy Shapiro (Stanford University) was named one of the Canada Gairdner International Award winners by the Gairdner Foundation.

Gary Snyder (University of California, Davis) was awarded the UC Davis Medal.

Wayne Thiebaud (University of California, Davis) was awarded the UC Davis Medal.

Samuel Weber (Northwestern University) was awarded the Ordre des Palmes Académiques by the French government.

George M. Whitesides (Harvard University) was awarded the 2009 Benjamin Franklin Medal in Chemistry by the Franklin Institute.

Peter Zumthor (Haldenstein, Switzerland) was awarded the 2009 Pritzker Prize.

New Appointments

Kwame Anthony Appiah (Princeton University) was named President of the PEN American Center.

Thomas R. Cech (University of Colorado, Boulder) was named to the Board of Directors of Merck & Co., Inc.

David Ginsburg (University of Michigan) was appointed to the Scientific Advisory Board of Catalyst Biosciences, Inc.

Philip S. Khoury (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) was named Chair of the Board of Trustees of the American University of Beirut.

Cherry A. Murray (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) was selected as the Dean of the Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, effective July 1, 2009.

Venkatesh Narayanamurti (Harvard University) was named Director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

David Romer (University of California, Berkeley) was named co-editor of the *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*.

John Shattuck (John F. Kennedy Library Foundation) was elected President and Rector of Central European University in Budapest, effective August 1, 2009.

Ray Stata (Analog Devices) was named to the Board of Directors of Lilliputian Systems Inc.

Christopher T. Walsh (Harvard Medical School) was named to the Board of Governors of the American Academy of Microbiology.

Select Publications

Poetry

Rita Dove (University of Virginia). *Sonata Mulattica: Poems*. W.W. Norton & Co., April 2009

Michael S. Harper (Brown University). *Use Trouble*. University of Illinois Press, April 2009

Michael Hofmann (University of Florida). *Selected Poems*. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, May 2009

Susan Stewart (Princeton University), trans. *Love Lessons: Selected Poems of Alda Merini*. Princeton University Press, May 2009

Fiction

Amos Oz (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel). *Rhyming Life and Death*. Harcourt, April 2009

Nonfiction

Bernard Bailyn (Harvard University) and Patricia L. Denault (Harvard University), eds. *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500 – 1830*. Harvard University Press, June 2009

Rebecca M. Blank (Brookings Institution) and Michael S. Barr (University of Michigan Law School), eds. *Insufficient Funds: Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking among Low-Income Households*. Russell Sage, April 2009

Archie Brown (Oxford University). *The Rise and Fall of Communism*. Ecco, June 2009

James Carroll (Boston, Massachusetts). *Practicing Catholic*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, April 2009

James Cuno (Art Institute of Chicago), ed. *Whose Culture? The Promise of Museums and the Debate over Antiquities*. Princeton University Press, April 2009

James Cuno (Art Institute of Chicago), Paul Goldberger (*The New Yorker*), and Joseph Rosa (Art Institute of Chicago). *The Modern Wing: Renzo Piano and the Art Institute of Chicago*. Yale University Press, May 2009

John Felstiner (Stanford University). *Can Poetry Save the Earth? A Field Guide to Nature Poems*. Yale University Press, April 2009

Renee C. Fox (University of Pennsylvania) and Judith P. Swazey (The Acadia Institute). *Observing Bioethics*. Oxford University Press, July 2008

William Gates, Sr. (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). *Showing Up for Life: Thoughts on the Gifts of a Lifetime*. Doubleday, April 2009

Russell Hardin (New York University), ed. *Distrust*. Russell Sage, May 2009

Russell Hardin (New York University). *How Do You Know? The Economics of Ordinary Knowledge*. Princeton University Press, June 2009

Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (Winters, California). *Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding*. Harvard University Press, April 2009

Philip S. Kitcher (Columbia University). *Living with Darwin: Evolution, Design, and the Future of Faith*. Oxford University Press, May 2009

Gerda Lerner (University of Wisconsin-Madison). *Living with History/Making Social Change*. University of North Carolina Press, March 2009

Phillip Lopate (Hofstra University). *Notes on Sontag*. Princeton University Press, May 2009

Alasdair MacIntyre (University of Notre Dame). *God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition*. Rowman & Littlefield, June 2009

Edmund S. Morgan (Yale University). *American Heroes: Profiles of Men and Women Who Shaped Early America*. W.W. Norton, May 2009

Gregory Nagy (Harvard University). *Homer the Classic*. Harvard University Press, June 2009

Robert Pinsky (Boston University). *Thousands of Broadways: Dreams and Nightmares of the American Small Town*. University of Chicago Press, April 2009

Kenneth Pomeranz (University of California, Irvine) and Edmund Burke III (University of California, Santa Cruz), eds. *The Environment and World History*. University of California Press, April 2009

Richard A. Posner (U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit). *A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of '08 and the Descent into Depression*. Harvard University Press, May 2009

Robert C. Post (Yale Law School) and Matthew W. Finkin (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). *For the Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom*. Yale University Press, April 2009

Reynolds Price (Duke University). *Ardent Spirits: Leaving Home, Coming Back*. Scribner, May 2009

Michael C. J. Putnam (Brown University), trans. *Latin Poetry: Jacopo Sannazaro*. Harvard University Press, The I Tatti Renaissance Library, May 2009

Stephen J. Pyne (Arizona State University). *Voice and Vision: A Guide to Writing History and Other Serious Nonfiction*. Harvard University Press, May 2009

Simon Schama (Columbia University). *The American Future: A History*. Ecco, June 2009

Frederick Schauer (University of Virginia School of Law). *Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning*. Harvard University Press, April 2009

Ian Shapiro (Yale University), ed. *The Federalist Papers: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay*. Yale University Press, April 2009

Charles Simic (University of New Hampshire). *The Renegade: Writings on Poetry and a Few Other Things*. Braziller, April 2009

Robert Wuthnow (Princeton University). *Boundless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches*. University of California Press, May 2008

We invite all Fellows and Foreign Honorary Members to send notices about their recent and forthcoming publications, scientific findings, exhibitions and performances, and honors and prizes to bulletin@amacad.org. ■

From the Archives

When the Academy's principal founder, John Adams, took office as the second President of the United States in 1797, Academy members composed an address that they sent to him as a tribute to his leadership.




Image © Bettmann/Corbis

Nineteenth-century engraving of John Adams

“An Address, presented by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, to the President of the United States,

August 23, 1797.

Sir

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, founded when their country was struggling for freedom and independence, which your exertions have so greatly tended to establish, ask leave to offer you their congratulations on your election to the office of First Magistrate in a nation where the rights of men are respected and truly supported.

They are led to pay this tribute to your virtue, because you have for several years presided over their institution with honour to yourself, and advantage to them.

Their pursuits are literary. They wish to add to the knowledge which their country already possesses, and to use their correspondence with foreigners, engaged in the same pursuits, so as to answer this valuable purpose.

They cannot, however, be indifferent to the peace and happiness of the land in which they live, nor to the preservation of those invaluable constitutions of government, which distinguish it from all other nations. They know that these constitutions will not answer the important purposes for which they were formed, unless they are well administered. With pleasure they find their President, whom they have so long known and so highly esteemed, called by the free suffrages of his fellow-citizens, to the arduous task of guiding the counsels, preserving the honour, and supporting the prosperity of the United States, in succession to the man whose distinguished integrity and disinterested patriotism his fellow citizens have so universally attested. Their aid in accomplishing these desirable purposes cannot be greatly effective; but you may be assured that their influence will always be exerted to promote the measures of a government founded on the basis of true liberty and administered with wisdom and firmness. They feel high satisfaction when they find these virtues marked on the measures which you have hitherto adopted; and they ardently pray that the Infinite Source of Light, and of Power may always direct you, and crown with success your efforts to promote the welfare of your country, and the happiness of mankind.”

Fellows and Friends Again Contribute More than \$1.5 million to the Annual Fund

In the recently completed fiscal year, the Academy's Annual Fund slightly surpassed last year's total and the \$1.5 million mark for the third consecutive year – 1,212 donors helped to accomplish this goal.

Chair of the Academy Trust and Vice President Louis W. Cabot noted that “in a challenging year, Annual Fund gifts are more important than ever in helping to achieve these results. Academy research projects and studies are having an important influence and impact. This work and other Academy programs and activities across the country rely on resources provided by a successful Annual Fund.”

The Academy is indebted to the Fellows, friends, foundations, and staff members for supporting its work. We are particularly grateful to a growing number of leadership donors. A complete list of contributors to the 2008 – 2009 Annual Fund will appear in the Academy's *Annual Report* to be published in the fall.

The members of the Development and Public Relations Committee are Louis W. Cabot and Robert A. Alberty, cochairs; Jesse H. Choper, Alan M. Dachs, Michael E. Gellert, Charles M. Haar, Stephen Stamas, and Nicholas T. Zervas. ■

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES

Norton's Woods, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
telephone 617-576-5000, facsimile 617-576-5050,
email aaas@amacad.org, website www.amacad.org

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