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Fellows and Friends Again Contribute More than $1.5 million to the Annual Fund

In the recently completed fiscal year, the Academy’s Annual Fund surpassed last year’s total and the $1.5 million mark for the fourth consecutive year – nearly 1,200 donors helped to accomplish this goal.

Development Committee Chair Alan Dachs noted that “every Annual Fund gift was important in achieving these results. Academy research projects and studies are having more influence and impact than ever before on informed national policy. This important work and other Academy programs and activities across the country rely on resources provided by a successful Annual Fund.”

The Academy is indebted to the Fellows, friends, foundations, and staff members for supporting its work. We are particularly grateful to a growing number of leadership donors. A complete list of contributors to the 2009 – 2010 Annual Fund will appear in the Academy’s Annual Report, which will be published in the fall.

The members of the Development and Public Relations Committee in FY 2010 were Louis W. Cabot, Robert A. Alberty, and Alan M. Dachs, cochairs; David Alexander, Jesse H. Choper, Michael E. Gelert, Charles M. Haar, Stephen Stamas, Donald M. Stewart, and Nicholas T. Zervas.
Academy Projects

The Humanities: The Case for Data

In her 2008 plenary address to the annual meeting of the Association of American Colleges and Universities, philosopher and legal scholar Martha Nussbaum spoke eloquently of how a liberal arts education conveys humanistic “abilities of citizenship” such as critical thinking, cultural literacy, and narrative imagination. She emphasized that these abilities promote human development in the broadest terms and encourage responsible engagement in a pluralistic democracy and in the global economy. Nussbaum’s case for the liberal arts, and for the humanities in particular, merits serious consideration, especially at a time when the concept of a knowledge-based society is widely embraced and policy-makers focus on economic competitiveness and Americans’ scientific and technical competencies.

How do we determine whether our colleges and universities are adequately cultivating “abilities of citizenship” in our students? How do we assess the teaching of complex literacy skills and critical thinking? What do we know about student attainment in foreign languages and cultural understanding as graduates set out to pursue careers in a rapidly changing global economy? What do we know about the humanities workforce within and beyond educational institutions? The search for answers to questions such as these would benefit from reliable, comprehensive, and ongoing quantitative information about the state of the humanities in our country. As Francis Oakley, Edward Dorr Professor of History and President Emeritus of Williams College, has suggested, “For the humanities, perhaps surprisingly, such data [have been] either altogether lacking, or were inconsistently assembled, hard to access, poorly disseminated, unwittingly ignored, and routinely underutilized.”

Scientists have long recognized the value of having statistical data to measure the scope and vitality of education, research, and workforce development in their fields. Such data support evidence-based policy discussions in professional and governmental forums. Since 1982, the National Science Board has been required by law to publish Science and Engineering Indicators (SEI), a biennial report providing a range of quantitative information about U.S. science, engineering, and technology in domestic and global contexts. With the SEI data available as an authoritative point of reference, stakeholders can engage in well-informed discussions and make consequential decisions about investments in science and technology, including STEM education and basic research in colleges and universities.

Nothing similar exists for the humanities even though the 1985 reauthorization of the National Endowment for the Humanities called for a “national information and data collection system on humanities scholars, educational and cultural groups, and audiences.” Such data are critical. Following the model of the SEI, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences initiated the Humanities Indicators (www.humanitiesindicators.org), a demonstration project to enrich public understanding of the humanities by increasing our empirical knowledge of the humanities in action, both within schools and colleges as well as in other social contexts. Supported by generous grants from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Indicators are the culmination of several years of planning and collaboration with many of the country’s leading humanities organizations, including the National Endowment for the Humanities and the American Council of Learned Societies. The project was codirected by Academy Fellows Steven Marcus, the George Delacorte Professor in the Humanities Emeritus at Columbia University; Patricia Meyer Spacks, the Edgar F. Shannon Professor of English Emerita at the University of Virginia; and Norman M. Bradburn, the Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago and senior fellow at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).

The Indicators provide a prototype for collecting data necessary to answer questions about the state of the humanities and how they are faring. For the first time, we have in one place baseline statistics about many areas of concern to the humanities community.


tors and two hundred graphs. The oversight of Norman Bradburn and NORC ensures that the Indicators conform to the highest standards of accuracy and usefulness. Since publicly launching its online database in January 2009, the Academy has frequently updated the findings. More than one million visits to the Indicators website suggest widespread interest in this portfolio of statistics. We hope to sustain and expand the project as new data, methodologies, and disciplinary questions emerge. Past efforts to collect humanities data have been episodic, with the dissemination of findings limited to occasional publications. For data to be valuable to the widest constituency, their collection and use must be ongoing, and we look to governmental agencies and the scholarly community to help sustain us in this effort.

The Indicators allow us to assess how well we are doing as a society in educating students in the competencies that the humanities foster.

The Indicators allow us to assess how well we are doing as a society in educating students in the competencies that the humanities foster. Existing and new data will help academic departments and cultural organizations understand trends, determine priorities, and measure progress in specific areas. Given enhanced capacity to interpret trends and compare results, educational leaders, policy-makers, scholars, teachers, and interested citizens can form a more complete picture of what is working and where interventions are needed. For example, at the primary and secondary school levels, Indicators on proficiency in reading and writing at different ages, as well as on knowledge of U.S. history and civics, show mixed results. On the whole, there has been a slight national improvement in basic literacy skills since 1971. But a consistent pattern of decreasing achievement as students get older is also evident, suggesting that students do not continue to develop the competencies introduced in primary school.

- More than half of the students graduating from our high schools in 2006 failed to demonstrate basic knowledge of history, and over a third of the students lacked basic knowledge of civics.
- Humanities competency is concentrated in a relatively small number of students. Only a modest percentage of the nation’s young people are leaving high school with at least proficiency – versus only the most basic skills – in history (13 percent) or civics (27 percent). [Indicators I – 3 and I – 4; see Figures 1 and 2]

Indicators on K – 12 teacher qualifications tell us that the humanities face the same issues of teacher preparedness as math and science. The lack of well-prepared teachers is especially severe in some core humanities subjects.
- In 2003 – 2004, the percentage of high school students (26.5 percent) taught by a highly qualified history teacher was lower than for any other major subject area. (The definition of “highly qualified” is a teacher who has certification and a postsecondary degree in the subject he or she teaches.) Similarly, the percentage of high school students (28.2 percent) taught history by someone lacking a certification and a postsecondary degree in history was greater than for any of the other measured subject areas.
- The percentage of least-prepared high school history teachers was more than double the percentage for mathematics (12.1 percent) and five times the percentage for the natural sciences (5.2 percent) in the same year. [Indicator I – 9a; see Figure 3]

As we set priorities for the American educational system, we should consider these Indicators in the context of how teacher preparedness relates to student performance, how our public commitment to K – 12 humanities instruction influences the educational choices that students later make, and how the curricula of our public and private colleges prepare students to become primary and secondary teachers in humanities subjects.

Data on postsecondary education confirm a decline in bachelor’s and doctoral degree completions in humanities programs over the last forty years, following peak levels in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A modest recovery starting in the early 1990s continued through at least 2004. In the three largest disciplines – English, history, and foreign languages – data indicate slight declines in absolute numbers of doctoral degrees in the first half of the past decade. As measured against the increasing number of students now enrolled in postsecondary education, however, the proportion of humanities degrees has declined dramatically.
- Between 1970 and 2004, completed bachelor’s degrees in English compared to all other undergraduate degrees dropped by about 50 percent. [Indicator II – 18]
- Comparable or even greater changes in market share can be seen in history and foreign languages and, at the doctoral level, for the humanities generally. [Indicators II – 19, II – 20, and II – 10]

These data show that, overall, the humanities have lost significant market share to vocational degrees, primarily business, as the number of students entering college has increased. The declines are relevant not just to the pipeline for future teachers and scholars in the humanities, but also to the preparation of a literate, flexible, creative American workforce and a well-informed citizenry. As Jim Leach, Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, has said, “We live in perilous times, but nothing can be more costly than shortchanging the humanities.”

The Humanities: The Case for Data

Figure 1. History Achievement of 4th-, 8th-, & 12th-Graders as Measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1994 & 2006 (Indicator I-3)

* The percentage of 4th-grade students scoring at or above the basic achievement level in 2006 was significantly different ($p < 0.05$) from 1994. This was also true at the 8th- and 12th-grade levels.


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Figure 2. Civics Achievement of 4th-, 8th-, & 12th-Graders as Measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998 & 2006 (Indicator I-4)

* The percentage of students at or above the basic achievement level in 2006 was significantly different ($p < 0.05$) from 1998.

Moreover, in a global economy, we need to be sure that our educational system develops strong competencies in reading and writing, cultural literacy, and foreign languages. Some evidence suggests that we are in fact falling behind. For instance, China is not only increasing its efforts in science and math as it rapidly develops its trained workforce, but is also strengthening education in the liberal arts. As Mark Yudof, President of the University of California system, points out, it is a “great irony” that as countries in South and East Asia are “attempting to emulate the American example of investing in world-class public higher education [the] example to which they are looking is eroding in the very place it originated.”

The Importance of the Humanities for an Educated Citizenry

At an Academy conference on “The Public Good: The Humanities in a Civil Society,” U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice David Souter made an important distinction between the transformative but occasional “epiphanies” celebrated in the humanities and the life-changing and lifelong “habits of mind” that the humanities foster. Justice Souter reminded us that these empowering habits of mind, formed when we are young, require continual nourishment. He underscored the importance of the humanities for good citizenship: without a strong grounding in history we cannot understand and protect our democratic institutions or comprehend the rulings of our courts.

The Indicators tell us that as a nation our humanistic habits of mind are not faring well. Much attention is paid to the importance of science and mathematics education as an engine for economic vitality. Ad-

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Advanced literacy, critical thinking, and civic understanding are equally important to our national well-being and our capacity to innovate. But instrumental arguments alone are not enough to convey the significance of the humanities. Don Michael Randel, President of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, defines the domains of the humanities, along with the arts, as including “the study of the values that support the production of knowledge and its proper application in society [and] the study of, contemplation of, and exploration of what it means to be a human being and why and how we should want to organize our lives in relation to one another around the globe.” To support these fundamental pursuits, we need to continue to assess the state of the humanities as we prepare students both to become active participants in a democratic society and to compete most effectively in a global economy. Until recently, our evidence for claims about the state of the humanities had been largely anecdotal. With the Humanities Indicators, we can argue with data and conviction.


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Humanities Departmental Survey

The humanities continue to play a core role in higher education. Student interest is strong. But to meet the demand, four-year colleges and universities are increasingly relying on a part-time, untenured workforce.

Those are among the findings of the Humanities Departmental Survey, conducted by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a consortium of disciplinary associations. The survey, available at www.humanitiesindicators.org/resources/survey.aspx, includes data collected from English, foreign language, history, history of science, art history, linguistics, and religion departments at approximately 1,400 colleges and universities. It is the first comprehensive survey to provide general cross-disciplinary data on humanities departments.

The survey covers a broad range of topics, including numbers of departments and faculty members, faculty distributions by discipline, courses taught, tenure activity, undergraduate majors and minors, and graduate students. The data provide new information about each of the disciplines; they also allow comparisons across disciplines. These data are especially important because the U.S. Department of Education has indefinitely suspended the only nationally representative survey providing information about humanities faculty (the National Study of Postsecondary Faculty).

According to the Humanities Departmental Survey:

- Across the humanities, but especially in English and combined English/foreign language departments, the professoriate at four-year colleges and universities is evolving into a part-time workforce. During the 2006–2007 academic year, only 38 percent of faculty members in these departments were tenured. English departments had the greatest proportion of non-tenure-track faculty (49 percent).

- When minors are included, undergraduate participation in humanities programs is about 82 percent greater than counting majors alone would suggest. For the 2006–2007 academic year, 122,100 students completed bachelor’s degrees and 100,310 completed minor degrees in the three largest humanities disciplines: English, foreign languages, and history.

- Reflecting the demands of a global economy, student interest in foreign language is strong. During the 2006–2007 academic year, foreign language departments awarded 28,710 baccalaureate degrees and had the largest number of students completing minors (51,670). Yet investment in a stable professoriate to teach and study foreign languages and literatures appears to be declining, with a significant reduction in recruitment of full-time faculty members (39 percent fewer recruitments for full-time positions in 2008–2009 than hires for 2007–2008) and fewer total graduate students than faculty members, the only surveyed discipline for which this was the case.

A version of this essay was published in Liberal Education 96 (1) (Winter 2010).
As the Academy marks its 230th anniversary, we are pleased to announce that an updated version of the *Book of Members* is now available on the Academy’s website (at www.amacad.org/publications/BookofMembers/bookofmembers.aspx). We are grateful to John Warnock (Adobe Systems, Inc.) – a Fellow of the Academy and special advisor to the Archives Committee – for his extraordinary work in realizing this searchable list of all members elected to the Academy.

In 2006, the Academy published a *Book of Members* to celebrate its 225th anniversary. The volume identified the more than eleven thousand men and women who had been elected to the Academy since its founding in 1780. Though the directory was available on the Academy’s website, it was a static and print-based document. Modifications – such as changes in living members’ affiliations, adding years of death for recently deceased members, and including new classes of members elected after 2005 – could not be made.

With John’s extraordinary and generous assistance, the Academy’s archives and publications staff are now able to update the *Book of Members* on a regular basis and produce an online directory that includes members elected from 1780 to the present.

We express our warmest gratitude to John for his help with this project. His support and guidance have been invaluable.
This presentation was given at the 1945th Stated Meeting held at the House of the Academy on September 24, 2009.

Introduction

Tonight, we have the pleasure of hearing from Werner Sollors and Greil Marcus, who will discuss their new book, *A New Literary History of America*. They have done an incredible job putting together in a single volume a cultural history of the United States in the last four hundred years. They have considered a number of topics, such as fiction, drama, and poetry – but also a number of unconventional genres, such as religious sermons, children’s books, political addresses, and other topics, in order to provide a comprehensive view of the cultural currents in the United States. As Werner says in the book, the goal of the project was to produce not a comprehensive encyclopedia but a provocation.

Werner Sollors is the Henry B. and Anne M. Cabot Professor of English Literature and Professor of African and African American Studies at Harvard University. He has been called one of today’s foremost Americanists; his writings about ethnicity, literature, race, and history have broadened our understanding of what it means to be American. He was elected a Fellow of the Academy in 2001. His co-editor, Greil Marcus, is a writer, cultural critic, and acclaimed interpreter of the sound and soul of America. His 1975 book, *Mystery Train*, redefined popular music criticism.

Emilio Bizzi

*Emilio Bizzi is Institute Professor and Investigator at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has been a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1980. He served as the Academy’s 44th President.*
The idea emerged to focus on the process of making something that could hold together a volume on America.

I also think of my own students’ experiences with reading literary history. They tend to browse or look for particular information on one author or one moment. Very few students that I know read a literary history from beginning to end. Thinking of this state of affairs, I was very happy when Lindsay Waters, Executive Editor for the Humanities at Harvard University Press, asked me, almost four years ago to the day, to think of devising an American literary history that would follow the model of the histories that Harvard University Press had published before: *A New History of French Literature* (1989) and *A New History of German Literature* (2004). They are organized as assortments of essays held together by a chronological grid. Each essay is introduced with headlines and a particular date, but no attempt is made to create one period narrative or one continuous narrative from beginning to end.

The difficulty we encountered in talking about this project – in hundreds of email messages over the last four years – was the question of, what is the difference when we try to approach American literary history? Obviously, it’s a much shorter span than doing a history of German or French literature. Also, with German and French literature, one has a sense of a long-established literary tradition that precedes the emergence of a nation-state. But in the United States, you find so much emphasis on made-up things that are created under our noses: in print pamphlets, for example, we can trace a line from the first visions of what the American colonies could become to such documents as the Declaration of Independence.

We tried to get contributing authors who had not previously published books on topics they were assigned… Our slogan was always that they should surprise not only the readers but also themselves with what they were writing.

Thus the idea emerged to focus on the process of making as something that could hold together a volume on America. When we look around the world today, we see that the whole world either loves or hates America but knows American popular culture really well – much better than after World War II, when the early Americanists had to spread knowledge about writers like Melville and Hawthorne through American studies programs. Now, one can count on the whole world knowing Superman or Rambo or whatever else the popular culture industry has exported. So our idea was to include in the process of making aspects of popular culture, not just of high culture, and we had to select them in a way that would make sense for a volume in which literature is still the central organizing device.

When Greil agreed to become co-editor of the book – which was the happiest moment for me, to think of co-editing a book with Mr. *Lipstick Traces* – we had to think about the literary strand that could hold together a great variety of topics and genres that includes not only the literary genres Emilio already talked about, but also political texts, the man-made environment, technological inventions, and so forth. We decided on the aspect of literariness: of something that is textual, that can be read, that has a delineation resembling the literary. For example, an entry on Chuck Berry mentions that he wrote an autobiography, so the textual angle is given there. We have a wonderful entry on the Mergenthaler Linotype machine. (Mark Twain, of course, invested in the mechanical typesetter that didn’t make it,
the Paige Compositor, and almost went bankrupt as a result of it.) The Mergenthaler typesetter teaches you interesting things, such as why we say *uppercase* and *lowercase* (because that’s really how the typesetting worked: with a case that was higher up and a case that was lower), that, again, relate directly to the textual.

With that in mind, we could include topics that would be, in a broad sense, literary—from the first map in which the name America appeared to Obama’s election, the latter of which was actually an afterthought. When Obama was elected in November 2008, the volume’s last entry was an essay on Hurricane Katrina. It seemed important to include the 2008 election, and we thought of asking an artist to comment. It would have been too easy to have a political puff piece of sorts, of inflated hopes, of the rhetoric of the moment. We asked Kara Walker to contribute, and she did a visual piece, a series of her paper cuts with some writing in them. Again, the textual is there, but the writing includes such phrases as *WTF* and *OMG* that I think the text messagers among you can easily decode.

**The book allows you to create your own narrative by reading the essays in a particular sequence.**

The amazement at things that have been created, that have been made, that have been made up is something that permeates the volume, including not only memorable prose but also unforgettable visuals: the moments at which drip paintings, popular tunes, and technologies are created. As we thought of more and more topics, we bounced ideas off each other, saying we thought of more and more topics, we wanted rehashes of already published books on topics they were assigned; we did not want rehashes of already published writing, but writers who cared about the topics and would try to write surprising things. Our slogan was always that they should surprise not only the readers but also themselves with what they were writing.

Among the contributors are also a great number of contemporary writers who commented on authors of the past: among others, we have Walter Mosley writing on hard-boiled fiction, Bharati Mukherjee on *The Scarlet Letter*, Ishmael Reed on *Huckleberry Finn*, John Edgar Wideman on Charles Chesnutt, and Andrei Codrescu on the literature of New Orleans.

Greil and I talked about the very protracted process of editing the essays down to the right size. They’re all between about 2,200 and 2,500 words, some a little shorter, some a little longer. We also tried to “de-academicize” the book, so words like *heteronormativity* were struck (although I noticed that it appears once in the book, prefaced by “what gender theorists now call”). Greil is also wonderful in getting rid of clichés and filler words.

**The book is a response to the predicament that we’re in: trying not to devise grand narratives and yet still being able to provide something like a historical overview.**

One of the things I am particularly happy with is the great number of minority writers who are contributors but who don’t write in the book about only the minority group with which they are ordinarily associated; the essays on *The Great Gatsby*, on *A Boy’s Own Story*, on Melville, Wharton, and Dreiser, on *The Wizard of Oz*, on *Tarzan*, and on *Babbitt* offer such examples.

The formal unit that emerges from the predicament of writing cultural history today, or writing literary history, when the narrative is exhausted is a book that allows you to create your own narrative by reading the essays in a particular sequence. The book has a wonderful website (http://newliteraryhistory.com) with twelve essays that you can look at as samplers. It’s set up as a deck of cards—“Pick a card, pick any card,” as Greil has said—to offer a clue on how to read the book. You can click on a card to have an essay come up, and you can then read it in different ways. You can read the book in chronological sequences, where you read five essays that are all set in 1925, or you can read it in any genre sequence in which you’re interested. It is, in its own form, a response to the predicament that we’re in: trying not to devise grand narratives and yet still being able to provide something like a historical overview.
Greil Marcus


I would like to emphasize some other aspects of this project, namely its fluidity. We had a wonderful board of ten people who took part in two two-day, early-morning–until-late-evening marathons without the slightest hint of testiness, of turf defense, of “I know more about this than you do.” That sentiment was always absent. I think everybody who took part in this project was stunned by how much they didn’t know about what has happened in the last five hundred years in this expansive territory. People were always open.

Every one of these essays is somebody confronting the language of his or her subject and trying to find the language that will open it up.

Things were made up as we went along. We did have a heroic meeting where we cut everything down to 220 essays, maybe 240. We thought we’d lose some essays by attrition – as if that was going to happen after we’d already argued, discussed, and realized a particular essay was crucial for the book. Then came the point when Gerald Early – essayist, American culture critic, and professor at Washington University in St. Louis – said, “What about Linda Lovelace?” Everybody turned to him, and he wasn’t kidding. We said, “What do you mean?” and he said, “This was a cultural turning point. Everything changed after this, and our culture was never the same.” The basic argument was this: Here’s someone who has written four autobiographies with different “as told tos” and co-writers. Four autobiographies! Two were all about “I was a libertine. I did everything.” And two were, “I was a slave. I was forced to do everything.” She wrote – she did not invent – but she mined the confessional genre in a way that nobody else had. She both exposed everything she had to expose and hid within that genre, as writers always do. This has been the dominant form of literature in this country over the last thirty or forty years. Who better to represent this genre than Linda Lovelace?

He convinced us. We thought about who could write the piece: Ann Marlowe is a New York writer who wrote a book about heroin and a book about a love affair. She now covers Afghanistan for The Weekly Standard and The Wall Street Journal. She’s a very conservative writer politically and a very unconservative writer in every other way. But it turned out to be like my effort to find someone to do the Absalom, Absalom!/Gone with the Wind entry. For that essay, I contacted Lee Smith, who is a great Southern novelist born in Virginia and who now lives in Chapel Hill. She has written, I think, nine novels, my favorite of which is The Devil’s Dream. This is a woman in her 60s – a white woman in her 60s who is a deep Southerner. She said, “I’ve never read Gone with the Wind; I’ve seen the movie.” I didn’t believe it, but she promised she had never read the novel. You can’t really say, “I’d like you to take this on; it’s only a thousand pages.” So I called Bobbie Ann Mason, another Southern writer from Kentucky and about the same age. Again: “I’ve never read Gone with the Wind; I’ve seen the movie.” I just didn’t believe it.

In the same way, when I called Marlowe and said, “Ann, how would you like to write about Linda Lovelace?” she said, “I’ve never seen Deep Throat.” Here was this cultural illiteracy among people who we thought would be perfect for these contributions. So Ann got a copy of the movie online. It seemed to be a tenth-generation dub, and she said it was very bad, hard to watch even. But Ann dove into those four autobiographies by Linda Lovelace. She excavated those four books. She lived in those four books.

There did come a point during our brainstorming meeting when, as Werner said, we were saying, “Oh, the electric chair!” and “What about the Pez Dispenser?” (I don’t think that last one really came up, but it was heading in that direction.) That’s when David Thomson, one of the few editorial board members who is not an academic but is a great film critic and film historian, novelist, and social historian, just about pounded the table and said, “This book has got to get a lot more conventional before it gets crazy.” We turned around, and we turned back to Emerson, back to Hemingway, back to Jefferson. We began to see that there needed to be anchors before we cut the anchor. We ended up with two entries on Emerson, on “The American Scholar” and “The Divinity School Address,” and the easiest thing in the world would have been to find experts on Emerson and have them give us a cool, plain, simple account of how these addresses are touchstones in American culture. But that’s exactly what we didn’t want and exactly what we didn’t get. We got someone who read these addresses as if for the first time and asked questions like, What’s going on here? What’s happening? Why is this being said now? What does it sound like today? I remember reading those entries and feeling as if I had never before encountered the subjects of those essays. That sense of reve-

In every case, this is a matter of people attempting to talk to their subject matter and make their subject matter talk to them. It is literary in the best, most live, and least pretentious sense.
African American novelist who, in the mid-

The most frightening piece for me was
part of what was cut from that essay, though, a meat cleaver. I got it down to about 2,100
words. There is only one way to cut a 6,000-

Part of what was cut from that essay, though, was a passionate cry about Gayl Jones, an
African American novelist who, in the mid-

The majority of entries

lution happened again and again, and it’s
why the book is something you can read for
pleasure, something that engages the reader through the engagement of the writers
themselves.

The most frightening piece for me was
Robert O’Meally’s on Billie Holiday. The
pieces were supposed to be 2,500 words at
most, and O’Meally’s was clearly over 6,000
words. There is only one way to cut a 6,000-
word essay down to 2,500 words: with a meat cleaver. I got it down to about 2,100
words, and it was a very shapely essay then.

Part of what was cut from that essay, though, was a passionate cry about Gayl Jones, an
African American novelist who, in the mid-

We have had a lot of difficulty explaining
why this is called A New Literary History of
America. What does that mean? We’ve come
up with a lot of really good or not-so-good
explanations. But the best came in one of
the early reviews of the book. It said, “This
is a literary history,” stressing the literary.
Every one of these essays is somebody con-
fronting the language of his or her subject
and trying to find the language that will
open it up. In every case, this is a matter of
people attempting to talk to their subject
matter and make their subject matter talk
to them. It is literary in the best, most live,
and least pretentious sense — if we’ve suc-
cceeded. If we haven’t, we won’t have to ex-
plain what it’s about.

Question

How did you think about the audience for
this book, both your ideal audience and what
you really think the audience will be now
that it’s done?

Werner Sollors

We talked during the editing process about
removing the overly academic language, so
we had, first, a general reader in mind, a
reader who would not already be an expert
on the subject and who would not say, “Oh,
but you forgot this and that secondary es-
say.” Rather, we aimed for somebody who
would be opening to a subject as if for the
first time. We also agreed to reduce, perhaps
completely remove, references that would
imply the book was written only for an
American audience. So phrases like “in our
tradition” or “in this country,” which are
hard to translate into Chinese without de-
parting from the original, we tried to avoid.
We imagined an intelligent, curious reader
anywhere, one who is not a specialist. (I think
nobody in the world can be a specialist on
all these topics.) That was the ideal that
we were going for. I don’t know who the
real reader is, but that was certainly the
ideal we had in mind.

Greil Marcus

It’s a book to be read for pleasure as opposed
to enlightenment. It’s not a book that’s sup-
posed to be good for you in that sense. My
ideal reader has always been someone who
is walking down the street and trips over a
book lying on the sidewalk. After he kicks
the book for having tripped him, he picks it
up, opens it, and says, “This looks interesting.” Every essay here had to have enough
information in it so that someone who knew
nothing whatsoever about the subject not
only could follow what was being said but
also could be drawn in and engaged. That
was every writer’s job. People were not
writing for their academic peers or their
nonacademic peers. For me, it was the rev-
elation of my own ignorance that was so
thrilling. Again and again, I read essays on
subjects I know nothing about, and the
writer had to be able to suck me in, had to
leave me at the end saying, “I want to know
more about this.” The audience is anybody
who thinks this is a really great cover and
wonders what’s inside.

Question

I was struck by the impression that you were
innovating a kind of emergent process that
didn’t existed before — that your process
was almost as important as your very cre-
ative and innovative product. The hundreds
of email messages back and forth, the brain-
storming meeting, the figuring out the jux-
tapositions, and the marathon winnowing
meeting: all of that was essential in the cre-
ation of this vision of a new kind of literary
history. Could you comment more on that
and how self-conscious you were of it?

Werner Sollors

The self-consciousness went to the extent
that, in one meeting, somebody proposed
that the last entry should be about the pub-
lication of the literary history itself, which
we fortunately got rid of. But I think the
self-consciousness inherent in creating a
text such as we were — trying to be textual
and literary in approaching American cul-
ture more broadly — was certainly there,
and it created its own excitement. A num-
ber of the members of the editorial board,
the contributors, and Greil and I felt we were all in the process together. It was, in a sense, the most exciting project I’ve been a part of in my whole academic life. You had this invigorating feeling of something happening at the moment of deciding this or changing that. Removing, for example, all birth and death dates of authors was a real relief. We said we’d put them in the index, but by the time we got to the index, we forgot about them. You can go to Wikipedia and look them up; we don’t need birth and death dates. These were freeing moments in the process that I found very exciting.

Greil Marcus

Bill Clinton once said something I really liked. I don’t know how true it is, but I liked it. He referred to the old democratic principle that most people can do most jobs. (I think he was talking about putting together his cabinet.) That was pretty much the principle we went on: that most intelligent, questioning people can write about damn near anything. We did go to people who had an interest and who knew something, except sometimes people would say, “I don’t know anything about this, but I’ll give it my best.” Farah Griffin accepted the notion of writing about Edith Wharton’s The House of Mirth and Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie in one essay because these novels seem to tell the same story in very different ways at pretty much the same time. The story is about a rupture in the idea of what the country was and what it could be. Farah said she wanted to do this, and I said, “Great, Farah, this is terrific.” Afterward, she said to me, “You know, I hate Dreiser, and I’m not going to write about him.” I thought, “Okay, that was sort of the point, but what the hell.” I don’t know if she was pulling my leg, but she wrote an essay de-

scribing exactly how and where Carrie Mee-

ber and Lily Bart would have met, if they had. And you think, “I didn’t realize they met. Oh, wait a minute, they aren’t real.”

When we reached the end of the book, we realized we had a serious problem. The book was finished. Everything was in; everything was edited. Werner and I were putting each other on the back, and we realized that there were two things we didn’t have: an essay on The Sound and the Fury and an essay on Moby-Dick. I won’t go into why that happened, but that’s where we were. So we flipped a coin: he did Faulkner; I did Melville. By then, though, we knew what the book was. We knew how people had risen to an occasion we hadn’t even fully defined. We knew what we were up against, how high the bar was. People will judge whether we came up to it.

The question that runs through this book is this notion that America is made-up, that it is invented and continually remade and reinvented.

Werner Sollors

I think that was a full account of the discussion. I can only go back to the point at which we said we are not aspiring to full coverage. Representing something by a suggestive essay that’s in the vicinity should be sufficient.

Question

Can you say more about how you went about keeping those pillars, and whether you consciously crafted the book as a response to more traditional histories of American literature? Did you have the Norton Anthology in front of you to say, this is what we’re not doing?

Greil Marcus

That’s a really good question because the Norton Anthology did come up. It might have been placed on the table at some point, and I think the reaction was, “No, we don’t want to look at this. We really have to hash this out.” In terms of what you’re calling our pillars, there was never a question of Jefferson not being there. There was a question about John Adams and which of his works we were going to write about, but Adams had already broken his way into the room. This meant we had to think in a different mode for the next two hours. Who are the people or what are the works this book absolutely has to have? For the first couple of hours we focused on the “how cool would it be if” standard, and the book was getting away from us. We went back to the question, who does this book absolutely have to have? That was easy, because once you have John Winthrop, Thomas Jefferson, Hemingway, and Frederick Douglass, it becomes easier to drop other people. People begin to look small. That made our work easier.

Werner Sollors

In the four-hundred-title grid, there was always a preponderance of traditional authors, and one of the things we wanted to do was not take just the modernist canon, but take some of the writers who had been taken away: some of the genteel writing, some of the middlebrow, any of the victims of modernism. The majority of entries, even in the
larger version, was always literary and had a large substance that was that skeleton. The amazing thing was that we didn’t find authors to write about Moby-Dick and The Sound and the Fury. We had the fantasy of including many contemporary writers, so I can tell you the list of contemporary authors I asked to write on The Sound and the Fury who either didn’t grace the request with an answer at all or simply said no. Melville and Faulkner were always supposed to be in there and, indeed, are in there: Faulkner with that

The difficulty of setting fiction that followed European norms on American soil—What could an American Gothic novel be like? Should it have Indian atrocities in it to say something local?—these are the early moments in the book.

half-entry together with Gone with the Wind and Melville with his later writings. But we realized we couldn’t do without Moby-Dick and The Sound and the Fury. That’s how we ended up writing these entries ourselves. It wasn’t that we were becoming conservative at a crucial moment, just that our attempts to get contemporary writers to write about these books had failed. This surprised me, as it seemed to be easier to get contemporary writers to write on a whole variety of other works. I still think it would be a great project to put together a collection of contemporary authors writing a literary history of the past, including personal essays on the writers who meant most or least to them.

Question
Was the decision to include Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics an easy one? How did you find its place in the pantheon you were creating?

Werner Sollors
I’m very happy that David Mindell, who wrote the entry, is sitting there in the back. We wanted to have one of the tracks in the literary history be about histories of inventions, technology, and science in the United States. Wiener’s book was a perfect example of a text that created a word that created a whole field; it is clearly related to the history of technology. The entry is a fascinating one and dates the book wonderfully. It fits into this post–World War II moment. We were happy with the choice and with the essay that came from it. With the history of technology, we could have very easily had 150 essays about just that, but, again, the inclusion of a text that had enormous consequences made the difference in our selection.

Question
How are you left feeling or thinking about America?

Greil Marcus
It was Werner’s idea that the book should end with a piece that we would write together on Hurricane Katrina. I didn’t really know why he made that suggestion, but it was a challenge—and not just because we had to work together and write something in 2,500 words that wouldn’t be redundant upon redundant, given the enormous amount that had already been written about that event. As we thought about it, it raised the question that runs through this book, this notion that America is made-up, that it is invented and continually re-made and reinvented. Sometimes those inventions fail. Sometimes they blow up in people’s faces. Sometimes they produce the worst consequences with only the best intentions. Sometimes the intentions aren’t so great. Hurricane Katrina and the response, both from the federal government and, to some degree, the rest of the country itself, raised the question of whether the country really exists at all as anything more than a marketplace. And that question, we found, came up again and again. If you can make something, if you can invent something as enormous, both as an idea and as the reality of a nation that is also a continent, it can be unmade. If you can make it up, somebody can attack the premises on which you created this thing. Knock all the floorboards out, and that question is alive throughout the book. I’m not going to answer for Werner, but this book left me with a deeper sense than I ever had before of how contingent, delicate, at-risk, in jeopardy this enormous adventure has always been and remains.

Werner Sollors
I may be the more Pollyannaish and optimistic figure there, but I think the contingency of creativity is certainly something I took from reading so many essays about areas where I had no expertise whatsoever. I'll give you an example. I asked a famous writer to contribute an essay on Henry Roth’s Call It Sleep. The writer said, “I cannot do this,” and I said, “Why not? You like the book.” The writer said, “This is a man who had writer’s block; he didn’t write anything for sixty years. If I write about his book, I may catch it. I may not be able to write.” This was a joke, but the fear that as you face an empty page, as you start to create something from scratch that the creation can stop, is also very real and serious; it can lead to depression, to an implosion of whatever beautiful creativity you thought you had. The sense of contingency in the amazing variety and beauty of things that have been created, be they legal texts or poems or visual objects, and that have defined culture is very present. To see this happening in the various activities is both thrilling and intimidating because you realize the contingency is all based on man-made materials. There’s this feeling that it can stop, that the creativity can end.
Question

When did American literary history begin? You mentioned John Winthrop, but who are some of the early figures you deal with?

Werner Sollors

We start with a map that Martin Waldseemüller drew and with Matthias Ringmann, who coined the new continent America after Amerigo Vespucci (adding that since all the other continents had been named after women, he was happy to name the new one after a man). We did not want to open with Columbus because it was highly predictable, although I think the first name in the book, nonetheless, is Columbus, even under the Waldseemüller entry. We have Spanish settlers and then move to the Puritans and early Southern texts fairly quickly. Then it’s a more traditional assortment of writers—Charles Brockman Brown, James Fenimore Cooper, Irving, and Hawthorne—so we get a rich array of the early Republic writers. Intermingled are visual texts: there’s the Declaration of Independence and Winthrop’s Arbella speech. There’s also a wonderful essay on the Great Awakening that asks whether there really was such a thing, or whether it was something historians created. The book deals with many familiar topics but also some unusual ones: for example, Charles Willson Peale’s exhibition of a mastodon at his museum in Philadelphia and John James Audubon’s response to Alexander Wilson’s drawing of the bald eagle. The difficulty of setting fiction that followed European norms on American soil—What could an American Gothic novel be like? Should it have Indian atrocities in it to say something local?—these are the early moments in the book.

Greil Marcus

There’s another way of looking at it, too: if this book is successful, the different entries argue with each other over that very question. There’s no single essay in which somebody says, this is where American literary history begins; but in some ways, the essays that go up to 1800 are all staking claims. Traditionally, the earliest American literary genre is the Puritan sermon. That’s where people began to work out the language needed to describe this place and what it has to become. How to put this into new words was a tremendously struggle. In some ways, that defines the whole Puritan experiment. On the other hand, there is a shockingly original entry early on by Adam Goodhart about John Smith as a writer. Suddenly you realize that, no, it’s not the sermon. The first American literary genre is people going back with strange tales of wonder or, in the case of Smith, strange tales of perfidy, envy, and every one of the deadly sins; tales of what the colonists were like and of how the place was hell on earth. Reading this book, I know exactly where American literary history begins; it begins with the Declaration of Independence, the struggle to find the words to define this place. Somebody said, “Okay, we’ll just make it up,” and that’s what happened. When I look at this book a year from now, I’ll have a completely different answer.

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Challenges to Business and Society in the Twenty-First Century: The Way Forward

Rajat K. Gupta and Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.

These presentations were given at the 1950th Stated Meeting, held in collaboration with the New York University Pollack Center for Law & Business, on November 30, 2009, at New York University School of Law. The meeting was part of the Academy’s conference on “Challenges to Business and Society in the Twenty-First Century: The Way Forward,” chaired by William T. Allen (New York University School of Law), Rakesh Khurana (Harvard University), Jay Lorsch (Harvard University), and Gerald Rosenfeld (Rothschild North America and New York University).

“Recovery and Reform”

Presentation

The history of how business interacts with society moves in cycles.1 There are periods in which the interaction intensifies and periods in which it ebbs. The post–World War II era was the last major cycle of engagement in which the modern corporation formed a new social compact with citizens and the state, influencing a wide range of social activity, policy, and behavior.

Roughly a decade ago, prodded by rising consumer expectations and often by specific reputational threats, businesses began to launch corporate social-responsibility programs and engage with governments, NGOs, and other stakeholders on issues such as climate change and child labor. Today, a few vanguard companies have taken that engagement to the next level. By understanding the needs of all stakeholders – shareholders, employees, customers, communities, governments, and the larger society – they have been able to identify sustainable sources of value, avoid

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1 I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of McKinsey & Company experts who provided research and guidance in preparing this article: Sheila Bonini, Lenny Mendonca, Eric Jensen, and Andrew Sellgren. I also thank Kiran Rao and Geoffrey Lewis for their editorial support.
costly conflicts, reduce risks, and shape regulation in ways that benefit both society and their industries.

These front-runners offer a new and powerful template for private enterprise to engage with society. For these companies, engagement is not simply about philanthropy or reputation-building or governance; it is enlightened self-interest, based on the recognition that the success of their businesses depends on the health of the society in which they operate. When a global candy maker commits to using sustainable cocoa, for example, it is not just a huge win for the NGOs that are trying to protect rainforest environments or for subsistence farmers, it is also a strategic victory for the company, which needs a reliable supply of a vital ingredient.

Roughly a decade ago, prodded by rising consumer expectations and often by specific reputational threats, businesses began to launch corporate social-responsibility programs and engage with governments, NGOs, and other stakeholders on issues such as climate change and child labor.

Increasingly, CEOs of major corporations grasp the value of this type of social engagement: McKinsey surveys show that 55 percent of CEOs say that balancing the obligation to contribute to the broader public good with generating shareholder value is “the right thing to do.” Twenty-nine percent say that they pursue these twin goals because it provides competitive advantage through improved customer loyalty, the ability to attract and retain talented employees, and positive media coverage. Twice as many executives say that contributing to the public good increases shareholder value as those who say it detracts.

The current economic crisis provides an important test for this new vision for business in society. The downturn is widely viewed as the result of corporate greed and malfeasance, and public trust in business has fallen to new lows. Meanwhile, surveyed business leaders acknowledge that the crisis has increased the public’s expectations for the role of business in society.

Yet productive public-private engagement is missing where it is most needed—in tackling the most critical problems facing business and society. For example, in health care and climate change, many stakeholders are pushing narrow, self-serving agendas, delaying action, and guaranteeing suboptimal solutions. In the case of regulatory reform in financial services, the private sector’s credibility with large segments of the public and political leadership is so low that it risks losing a seat at the table. Another challenging global issue is the rapid urbanization of emerging economies such as China and India, where governments are struggling to develop effective models to encourage the urgently needed participation of multinational and domestic businesses in urban development.

I believe we can do better. I believe we can harness enlightened self-interest to solve intractable problems that neither the public sector nor the private sector can tackle alone. Only this higher form of engagement can achieve the breakthroughs we need.

Before we turn to the role of enlightened self-interest in the solution to those extraordinary problems, it is important to understand why this novel form of engagement is so promising. We know that this approach works; it has proven its value in mining, plastics, and other industries, where it has solved difficult problems, removed threats, and unlocked new sources of value.

Consider the story of the plastics industry. In the late 1980s, the image of truckloads of plastic bottles being tipped into landfills became the popular symbol of environmental disaster in the United States. Regulators considered outright bans on plastic beverage containers, which would have been devastating for the plastics industry. Industry leaders organized a response and, working with environmental groups and local governments, devised a solution. They re-formulated their products to be recyclable and collaborated with municipalities to design the logistics of bottle recycling. In a stroke, the plastics industry saved one of its largest markets, improved its image, and helped municipalities by reducing solid waste.

Another example is mining. Leading companies have redefined their relationships with host countries, communities, and environmental NGOs, reducing the risk of being denied access to resources and warding off labor and community problems. By bringing a relevant “social offer” to the table, such as improving schools, partnering with health NGOs, and building water infrastructure, some mining companies ensure government and community support and prevent costly work interruptions. Moreover, because the new relationships help bring projects on-stream more rapidly, they have contributed to top-line growth and near-term earnings.

Similar opportunities to apply these lessons may be found in some of the biggest challenges straddling business and society: health care, climate change, urbanization, and financial-sector reform. Although all are vastly different, these issues share important traits. They must be solved to ensure that business and society can thrive; they involve entrenched public and private stakeholders; and in each case, long-standing approaches have not yet delivered satisfactory solutions.

On health care, the strengths of the U.S. health care system include innovation and rapid access to new treatments and technologies; world-class academic medical centers; higher cancer survival rates; and overall convenience. On the flip side, the
U.S. system has the highest expenditure of any developed country. According to the federal government, the United States spent more than $2.4 trillion on health care in 2008, or twice the amount Americans spend on food and more than the total expenditure for goods and services for all Chinese consumers. Two decades of efforts to curb health care inflation have had little effect. Despite the expense, the United States is not statistically ahead on most measures of health outcomes, and in measures such as infant mortality, it lags behind other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Also, the number of uninsured Americans has risen to 16 percent of the population. While two-thirds of these uninsured choose not to participate, a third simply do not have access to affordable insurance.

**I believe we can harness enlightened self-interest to solve intractable problems that neither the public sector nor the private sector can tackle alone.**

Identifying the underlying problem is not difficult. Incentives in the system are misaligned. Supply is not value-driven, nor is consumption value-conscious. Costs tend to ripple through the supply chain, passing from makers of medicine and equipment to physicians and hospitals, to payers, and ultimately to employers and patients. Each stakeholder absorbs a share of the cost increase and attempts – if possible – to pass on even greater cost to the next player in the chain. Consumers (employers and patients) have little interest in constraining costs and even less leverage because they lack any objective metric of value received for the cost. Meanwhile, the prevalence of costly lifestyle-induced chronic conditions such as obesity and diabetes continues to rise, placing additional burdens on the system.

The threat that unchecked health care inflation poses to U.S. economic vitality and competitiveness becomes more visible every year. According to an analysis by the McKinsey Global Institute, in 2006, Americans spent $650 billion more than one would expect on a normalized basis, even controlling for U.S. health and demographics compared with other wealthy nations. This expenditure equates to a 30 percent premium. No single stakeholder seems willing or able to reverse the pattern. The solutions to controlling costs and changing incentives – such as outcomes-based medicine and reimbursement, value-conscious consumption, and improvements in administrative efficiency – can only be applied through a concerted effort by all stakeholders: health care businesses, policy-makers, employers, and the public. However, a mechanism to bring all these stakeholders together is sorely lacking. Congress is considering legislation that will likely expand care to more people, which is important, but it may not substantially address excessive spending. Passage of the bill would put the United States on a trajectory to spend an extra $1 trillion by 2015.

On the issue of climate change, although there is virtual consensus on the science, there is nothing close to agreement on solutions. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 35 percent by 2030 (compared with 1990 levels) would give us a good chance of holding global warming below a critical threshold (2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels).

The debate about how to achieve this goal – or whether it should be pursued – continues. McKinsey research finds that this reduction target can be met while sustaining economic growth. The measures to reduce greenhouse gases are well known, and three-quarters of them – mostly those involving conservation – could be deployed today. To move forward on conservation initiatives, we need new policies, regulatory frameworks, and market-based incentives for energy efficiency as well as research on carbon capture and storage and more efficient biofuels.

If executed at scale, energy efficiency improvements would yield gross savings worth more than $1.2 trillion to the U.S. economy, a handsome return on the $520 billion needed through 2020 to fund efficiency measures; this savings equates to the discovery of a vast, low-cost energy resource.

Successful solutions will involve a portfolio of approaches to unlock the full potential of energy efficiency. Those strategies include: developing new energy sources that eliminate or vastly reduce carbon use, identifying up-front funding, and aligning incentives between utilities, regulators, and consumers to implement solutions like smart-grid technology and to manage demand. The obstacle is the lack of an adequate engagement model that would bring stakeholders together to agree on how to proceed.

**In the United States, financial reform represents perhaps the greatest challenge for deploying effective engagement by the private sector.**

Urbanization in China, India, and other fast-growing economies presents such an enormous challenge that it is almost impossible to imagine. In China, migration to urban areas will create fifteen super-cities, with average populations of twenty-five million by 2025. In India, a doubling of urban populations (by as many as seven hundred million people in the next twenty-five years) will require a tripling of the water infrastructure, twenty-seven million affordable housing units, new roads, sewers, and rail lines. India’s cities will need to increase capital investments by a factor of ten to fifteen times present levels; the total cost, McKinsey estimates, will be $2.5 trillion over twenty years. To put this estimated cost into perspective, India’s GDP is about $1.1 trillion today.

Bringing private-sector talent and resources to bear on these challenges will make a huge difference. There is a tremendous opportunity for investment. McKinsey estimates that proper infrastructure investments to support rapid urbanization could generate additional GDP growth of 1 to 1.5 percentage points annually.
Without doubt, the scope of the effort will require the capital, capacity, and capabilities of the private sector. Yet those factors are largely absent. The solution is stronger collaborative leadership on the public side. Indian officials must set up conditions under which private enterprises that have the knowledge and innovations to help India’s cities leapfrog into the twenty-first century can participate.

In the United States, financial reform represents perhaps the greatest challenge for deploying effective engagement by the private sector. What little mutual respect existed between the financial sector and its regulators has all but evaporated in the wake of the recent crisis, leaving little room for collaboration. The Senate bill introduced by Senator Christopher Dodd, which would rework large parts of the regulatory landscape, was written with little direct input from the sector. This is a missed opportunity – not because of the bill itself, but because the process does not include all stakeholders. As with health care, there is no mechanism to mediate diverse interests, which raises the odds of producing ineffective legislation, suboptimal results for society, and new risks.

We must do better. We all understand the extraordinary pressures that business leaders face today. However, the long-term success of businesses and that of society at large depends on the active engagement of business leaders and their problem-solving expertise. We need business statesmen to put their companies on a productive path of engagement and to participate in deliberations to solve these thorny issues. We also need a political climate in which such engagement is encouraged and sought by political leaders.

What are we asking business leaders to do? What should public leaders do?

1) **Find your enlightened self-interest.** CEOs should start by thinking about where the interests of the enterprise and society converge. The resulting engagement can be close to home, such as helping improve schools in the communities from which the company recruits employees. It can be a global initiative. For example, Novo Nordisk, the world’s leading supplier of diabetes drugs, has funded efforts to prevent diabetes in developing nations, a program that builds its profile in new markets, even if it reduces the number of potential consumers.

2) **Mobilize other business leaders and engage regulators.** I have shared examples of companies partnering to attack social or environmental problems. Think about whether your industry associations are really pursuing the long-term interests of their members, or if they exist simply to block regulation. The process of rule-making in an industry should be about companies and government working toward common goals – rather than seeking a zero-sum victory. This principle applies equally to those sitting on the government side of the table. Regulators and politicians would benefit from a more nuanced view of business stakeholders. Understand what creates long-term success for business, and business will continue to generate the economic growth that society needs, too.

3) **Stand up and be counted.** Consider what John Browne, the former CEO of British Petroleum, accomplished when he stood up in 1997 and said something his colleagues regarded as treason: that climate change is real, it is caused by greenhouse gases associated with hydrocarbons, and it is in the interest of the global energy industry to help solve the problem – and, in the process, create a role for itself in a lower-carbon future. Today, other major oil companies are following Browne’s lead.

These are important steps but they are not impossible. Take them and we will get the energy and talent we need to help solve our crises. By working in partnership across sectors, we can begin to create the reforms that our society truly deserves. ■

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Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.

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“Long-Term Financial Security”

Presentation

The title of our meeting is Challenges to Business and Society in the Twenty-First Century: The Way Forward. In order to determine the way forward, we must first know where we stand. Today, the relationship between businesses and individuals – consumers, borrowers, investors, and employees – is strained. In the wake of the global economic crisis, the American public holds a cynical view of business and Wall Street.

As we look to recover from the worst recession in seventy years, we must be mindful of the far-reaching structural changes that have altered the macroeconomy.

As a nation, we are contemplating regulatory reform because our existing oversight system has not evolved with the financial services industry. We are rethinking health care; in Congress and across the nation, people are grappling with what could be the most significant overhaul of the health care system in forty years.

These are fundamental issues with the potential to shift our society. As New York Times columnist David Brooks wrote in a recent op-ed, we are in the midst of “a debate about what kind of country we want America to be.” What role will business play as society tries to right itself? How can we as Americans achieve a more balanced state to ensure long-term financial security for our society?

In proposing answers to these questions, I will focus on:

- Our opportunity to revisit the social contract;
- Measures we can implement to help businesses adopt a more prudent, long-term view; and
- Steps we can take to help individuals enjoy sound financial health over the long run.

The Social Contract

Over the past few decades, employees have assumed greater responsibility for their careers, professional development, advancement, and retirement. The workforce has become more mobile as it has adapted to the global economy. In an age of “employment at will,” corporate loyalty has waned. We know that lifetime employment is no longer an option. But lifetime income should be our objective as we rethink and renew the social contract.

New research from McKinsey & Company finds that the average American family will face a savings gap of $250,000 at the time of retirement. Even with payments from Social Security and pensions, as well as from personal savings in 401(k) and other retirement plans, the average family will have only about two-thirds of the income it will need. Moreover, according to the McKinsey study, for every five years we wait to address the issue of retirement security, we will see a 10 percent decline in the typical retiree’s standard of living.

Regulatory reform can help to reemphasize long-term thinking.

That is one reason why TIAA-CREF and others are calling for a holistic system that ensures Americans will have the retirement income they will need. A holistic system would:

- First, ensure full participation and sufficient funding by enrolling employees automatically on their first day of work and offering incentives for employers and employees that encourage total contributions between 10 percent and 14 percent of pay – roughly double the average contribution today. Automatic IRAs, which President Obama has proposed, could provide a tax-favored saving opportunity to those without a workplace retirement plan – currently, about half the American workforce.
- Second, help employees manage risk by offering a menu of fifteen to twenty investment options. This menu would provide sufficient diversification without presenting an overwhelming number of choices.
- Third, give workers financial education and objective, noncommissioned advice to help them build a portfolio that reflects their goals and risk tolerances.
- Fourth, provide opportunities and incentives for employees to save for retirement medical expenses.
- Fifth, provide lifetime income through an affordable fixed annuity option.

I believe we have an obligation to help our colleagues, neighbors, and fellow citizens move safely to and through retirement.

Promoting Financial Security in Business

As we look to recover from the worst recession in seventy years, we must be mindful of the far-reaching structural changes that have altered the macroeconomy, including the globalization of capital, labor, and production and the evolving role of national governments in driving growth and expanding regulatory oversight. These forces may have a moderating effect on inflation, particularly given the rise of unemployment and the strongest productivity growth rate we have seen over a six-month period since 1961.\(^5\)

**Well-conceived reforms can ensure that financial services firms are able to innovate, develop new businesses, and take reasonable risks within an appropriate supervisory framework that promotes overall long-term stability and protects market participants.**

But these structural changes may also create favorable conditions for asset bubbles by encouraging sudden price increases in discrete sectors of the market. Commercial real estate in the late 1980s, the dot-com equity market of the late 1990s, and the housing market in the present decade are a few examples of financial bubbles that ultimately burst.\(^6\) In such an environment, businesses must resist the temptations of a short-term outlook and focus instead on sustainability.

A group of financial and academic leaders convened by the Aspen Institute has posited that “a healthy society requires healthy and responsible companies that effectively pursue long-term goals.”\(^7\) Citing the insidious nature of the problem, the group noted that “many college savings, 401(k), and related retirement funds engage in behavior that is inconsistent with their investors’ goals, as they trade securities, pay their managers, and engage in (or support) activism in pursuit of short-term financial objectives at the expense of long-term performance and careful analysis of fundamental risk.”

Regulatory reform can help to reemphasize long-term thinking. Indeed, Congress is considering comprehensive financial regulatory reform. Led by the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee, both congressional chambers have been working actively on this issue.

Well-conceived reforms can ensure that financial services firms are able to innovate, develop new businesses, and take reasonable risks within an appropriate supervisory framework that promotes overall long-term stability and protects market participants. In fact, at a New York University (NYU) conference on regulatory reform in September 2009, I participated in a panel discussion with Eric Dinallo, former New York superintendent of industry and visiting professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business, in which we discussed the creation of an Optional Federal Charter (OFC) for the insurance industry. This measure, which TIAA-CREF supports, would provide life insurers with the choice to be regulated by a single federal entity or to continue to operate under the current state-by-state regulatory structure. An OFC could increase the efficiency of the life insurance industry, maintain product safety and soundness, and make U.S. life insurers more competitive on a global scale.

Proper reform will take time. But there are steps businesses can take immediately to operate more prudently.

Proper reform will take time. But there are steps businesses can take immediately to operate more prudently, such as strengthening their risk management programs and ensuring – through good corporate governance – that their strategies and compensation are aligned with the long-term interests of shareholders. These long-term-planning strategies can drive corporate performance and help strengthen the market overall.

Furthermore, shareholders in the United States should be given greater rights, including access to the proxy to nominate directors, majority voting in director elections, and a shareholder vote on executive compensation. Shareholders and companies have a common goal of long-term wealth creation and must work toward that goal together.

Encouraging businesses to adopt a more rational, long-term approach will enhance the health and financial security of the country’s economic system. Individuals need similar help and guidance to achieve personal financial security.

Helping Individuals Achieve Financial Security

Since the mid-1980s, the ratio of household debt to disposable income has more than doubled, increasing from 65 percent to an unsustainable, all-time high of 133 percent in 2007.\(^8\) Americans have been living beyond their means. Two-thirds of the U.S. GDP was driven by consumer spending, and easy credit helped fuel its growth.

That scenario is changing out of necessity. The personal savings rate, which was around

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6 Brett Hammond and Martha Peyton, “Economic and Market Scenarios: Sea Changes, Inflation and Bubble Bias” (TIAA-CREF Internal Research, September 4, 2009).
7 “Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to Investment and Business Management” (The Aspen Institute, September 9, 2009).
10 percent of income in the 1970s and fell to zero in 2005, has risen to roughly 5 percent. Households are focused on paying down their debts. This deleveraging will have a dampening effect on consumer spending in the short term, but it bodes well for long-term economic stability in the United States and globally. Moreover, encouraging individuals to save more money will help restore their personal balance sheets. One way to assist individuals to achieve this end is with financial education.

**Encouraging businesses to adopt a more rational, long-term approach will enhance the health and financial security of the country’s economic system.**

In a recent study, Americans over the age of fifty were asked three questions involving interest rates, the effects of inflation, and the concept of risk diversification:

1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per year. After five years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102?
2. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1 percent per year and inflation was 2 percent per year. After one year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this account?
3. Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.”

Only half of the respondents were able to correctly answer the first two questions; only one-third of the respondents were able to correctly answer all three. These are Americans over age fifty—individuals who are either close to retirement or in retirement. As it turns out, the ability to solve a few basic math problems can significantly influence an individual’s financial security. Researchers have established a correlation between financial literacy and retirement planning, which in turn is a powerful predictor of wealth accumulation. People who plan for retirement have more than double the wealth of people who do not plan. Conversely, individuals with a lower degree of financial literacy tend to borrow more money, accumulate less wealth, and select mutual funds with higher fees; they are less likely to invest in stocks, more likely to experience difficulty with debt, and less likely to know the terms of their mortgages and other loans.

If we are to strengthen the long-term financial security of our society, we must do more to improve financial literacy; financial services firms can (and should) lead the way.

To promote long-term financial security, we need to strengthen the relationship between businesses and individuals. We must align the interests of employers and employees, sellers and consumers, issuers and investors. We need to wean ourselves off of unchecked consumerism and focus on exports and investments to drive growth. We need to save more and consume less. We need to think about what kind of country we want America to be.

A new social contract should include a holistic system to help ensure that all Americans can enjoy a more secure retirement; eschew short-termism in favor of long-term performance, sustainable value creation, and prudent risk management; and advocate a balanced approach to saving and investing by raising the level of financial literacy. By seizing these opportunities, we will strengthen our economy and create a more vibrant, financially sound society.© 2010 by Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund, New York, NY 10017

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10 The views described above may change in response to changing economic and market conditions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The material is for informational purposes only and should not be regarded as a recommendation or an offer to buy or sell any product or service to which this information may relate.
A Conversation on Evolving U.S. Policy toward Russia

Robert Legvold and Thomas Graham

Welcome by Leslie Berlowitz

This presentation was given at the 1952nd Stated Meeting held at the House of the Academy on January 28, 2010.

Leslie Berlowitz

Leslie Berlowitz is Chief Executive Officer and William T. Golden Chair at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has been a Fellow of the American Academy since 2004.

Welcome

In 1971, in a talk at the Academy, Fellow and statesman William Averell Harriman spoke about the long arc of U.S.-Russia relations, in which he played a pivotal role. Reflecting then on his years of experience with Russian leaders, he told his audience, “Competitive coexistence with the Soviet Union is likely to continue for some time. However, bilaterally, we can reconcile our differences on a number of specific issues, and each agreement we reach will make the next one easier.” Much has changed in the almost forty years since Ambassador Harriman’s observation, but one thing has not changed: the vital importance of the complex relationship between our two countries. Our speakers tonight well understand the importance of continuing those conversations so that that arc will continue to be achieved.

During the past year, the new administrations in Washington and Moscow as well as Carnegie Corporation of New York encouraged the Academy to reexamine U.S.-Russia relations. Under the leadership of Robert Legvold, a member of the Committee on International Security Studies (CISS), the committee members prepared a strategic assessment of the bilateral relationship and created a blueprint for conceptualizing a twenty-first-century policy toward Russia. In recent months, the committee has shared its perspectives with policy-makers in the U.S. administration and in Congress, as well as with the media and other interested groups. The report that they have put together is available on the Academy’s website at http://www.amacad.org/russiapolicy.aspx.
Tonight’s speakers are Robert Legvold and Thomas Graham. Robert Legvold is a leading expert on Russia and former Soviet states. He is the Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University and served as Director of the Harriman Institute from 1986 to 1992. Before joining the Columbia faculty, he held positions at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and at Tufts University. He has authored or edited numerous books, most recently a collaborative volume, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past* (2007). A foreign member of the Russian Academy of Social Sciences, he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy in 2005 and has been an important guiding spirit for our work in security issues.

Thomas Graham is a Senior Director at Kissinger Associates. Before joining the firm in 2007, he served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council staff. In these roles, he was a key White House interlocutor with the Putin government. His government service includes assignments as the Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and, earlier in his career, a Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Moscow and in Washington. He was a Senior Associate in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which published two of his books: *Russia’s Decline and Uncertain Recovery* (2002) and *U.S.-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century* (2000).

I want to thank both of our speakers; we couldn’t have two more knowledgeable people with us this evening to speak on U.S.-Russia relations. For a number of us at the time – some in government but a number of people on the outside, especially those in the Russian field – this was not only a regrettable and dangerous state of affairs, it was also in some important respects an unnatural and even illogical circumstance given where we thought relations were headed at the end of the Cold War. I say unnatural and even illogical because there was no deep, ideologically driven animus to sustain or support enmity between the two countries. There was no vast gap in the core international security issues that both countries faced (at least, not in theory) and there was no comparability in power between the two countries that would sustain a wide-ranging strategic rivalry. Yet there we were in January 2009, after everything that had happened, especially the events of 2008.

**The question, then, is why the Obama administration prioritized U.S. relations with Russia given the other problems that it faced in foreign policy coming into office.**

I think we are now at a different place; it is ambiguous in many respects, it is uncertain in other respects, but it’s a different position. The difference is for two basic reasons. First is the impact of the financial/economic crisis, and second, the election of Barack Obama. I believe it’s the second – that is, the new directions in U.S. foreign policy, particularly toward Russia – that is the more important of the two. For those of us involved in the project and a lot of other people in the United States and in Europe who follow the U.S.-Russia relationship, it was clear that if the trend line from Fall 2002 through 2008 was going to be broken, if that inertia was to be transformed, it would have to be because of U.S. leadership. It wasn’t going to occur on the Russian side. There was too much skepticism, too much paralysis, and too great an unwillingness to try even to think about what would be necessary in order to change relations.

So it did require initiative on the part of the Obama administration. The question, then, is why the Obama administration prioritized U.S. relations with Russia given the other problems that it faced in foreign policy coming into office. In my view two reasons explain the changes undertaken by the Obama administration.
Obama administration. The first may be subconscious; it was never articulated by the president or his team before or after the election. But, if you think about U.S. relations with major powers, the relationship that was in greatest disrepair was with Russia. If the administration was going to begin turning around the dynamic of U.S. relations with all the great powers, particularly following the deterioration after 2003, Russia would be the hard case and, thus, the tough test case.

The core reason, however, which was quite conscious and which was articulated, was managing a nuclear world. For those of you who followed the positions Obama adopted during his campaign, he was quite clear that the single most important issue he would face as president was managing a nuclear world. He did not articulate a Russia policy during the campaign, though a working group was developing one. Each time he talked about the need to address the nuclear question, both in terms of potential proliferation and managing weapons among those that already have them, he underscored Russia’s important role in making progress on those issues.

What, then, did the Obama administration do once in office? I think several things. First, the president made Russia a priority—and in a way that surprised virtually everyone, including those on his Russia team. (I know this from direct contact with them at the time.) He gave as much time to Russia in those first months as he did to the problems of Iraq or Afghanistan. The first strategic reviews prepared by the administration were of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Russia.

Second, the administration stressed the importance of Russia in U.S. foreign policy—something no prior administration had done. That has been one of the key weaknesses of U.S. policy since 1991: the failure of national leadership to articulate how ramified and substantial the stakes are in the U.S. relationship with Russia. In April, when William Burns, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, spoke in Washington, he said there is no country in the world that has a capacity to affect the success of U.S. foreign policy in more areas than Russia. He didn’t say that makes Russia the most important country for the United States, but he was arguing that no other country touched as many issues of concern to the United States.

Third, the Obama administration started by changing the tone of the relationship. That’s what the speech Vice President Biden made at the Munich Security Conference was all about, the famous metaphor: the “reset.” Each time President Obama talked about the need to address the nuclear question, both in terms of potential proliferation and managing weapons among those that already have them, he underscored Russia’s important role in making progress on those issues.

Fourth, the administration decided to focus on a number of core problems, which have been at the very center of U.S. foreign policy since. The first was to move quickly on a follow-on agreement for START 1, which was scheduled to expire in December 2009. The other immediate issues were the war in Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear issue, and the need to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime heading to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Those issues then became part of an extensive agenda that the U.S. administration had outlined and negotiated with Russia in Obama’s first meeting with President Medvedev in London in April 2009. The two presidents signed on to a very ambitious agenda in their joint statement, one that addressed not just START, nonproliferation, and nuclear terrorism, but everything from European security architecture to progress on the Middle East, from transnational security threats such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and corruption, to stability in South Asia, including Afghanistan, to increased economic ties. By July and the Moscow summit, genuine progress had been made on a number of these issues, enough to justify moving forward with the new policy. Indeed, a framework agreement for negotiating the follow-on agreement for START I was in place. There continue to be delays in concluding the agreement, but the understanding of what the agreement was going to look like had been achieved by July 2009.

In Moscow, the two sides also established a Binational Presidential Commission. I believe this is the only presidential-level commission the United States has with any of the major powers. The commission is chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State and Russia’s Foreign Minister. It has sixteen working groups, as well as subcommittees whose agendas include counterterrorism, business development, energy, nuclear energy and nuclear security, public health, management of emergencies, and other civil society issues. In fact, a civil society working group is led by one of the hardliners on the Russian side, Vladislav Surkov, and by Michael McFaul, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council.

There is a final element of the Obama administration’s policy that has not been featured much in the press, or even noticed within the expert community. That is, from the moment they took office, the president and his team have worked to engage Russia on a multilevel basis, not just government to government, but also in terms of civil society and the business community. This approach is based on the notion that until we begin to engage business communities in both countries and create stakeholders in the relationship, it will be very difficult to build a foundation that has durability and stability during moments of difficulty. In July 2009 there were actually three summits: the government to government summit; the business summit, with more than two hundred representatives from the U.S. side; and the civil society summit. Since then, there has been a continued effort to follow up on these initiatives.

So, what’s happened in U.S.-Russia relations? What are the shadows and potential pitfalls? Developing the relationship is a
difficult and impacted process, and in many respects a disappointing process to both sides. But genuine, if very slow, progress has been facilitated by several factors. First, the effects of the economic crisis, which have been bracing for the Russian leadership, have shifted discourse in Moscow toward patience, sacrifice, and modesty; no longer is there boasting about Russia becoming the world’s fifth most productive economy and one of the world’s new financial centers. There is also reserve in Russia’s recent external behavior, particularly in the way Moscow has reengaged with Europe.

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Second, the U.S. administration’s decision to alter the Bush administration’s approach to ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe has facilitated change. That said, the plans the administration have substituted are clear: not only or even primarily to please the Russians or grease the tracks of the relationship. But genuine, if very slow, progress nonetheless. The more serious obstacle for the United States, in my view, is the failure to deliver on a number of high-priority items the administration had said would be addressed early in its term, including the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and moving

Until we begin to engage business communities in both countries and create stakeholders in the relationship, it will be very difficult to build a foundation that has durability and stability during moments of difficulty.

The administration’s focus is primarily on START I, Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear program, and nonproliferation as the test for whether U.S.-Russia relations can advance. The working group on business development in Russia, for example, which is critical to the multilevel approach I discussed, had its first meeting this week at MIT under the chair of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke and Elvira Nabiullina, Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade. Also, a major conference led by Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Igor Shuvalov and a set of U.S. counterparts was recently held to explore how, in the United States, collaboration among universities, entrepreneurs, companies, and financiers helps bring technology (nanotechnology in particular, an area that Russia is especially interested in) from the laboratory to the market.

The focus throughout this period has been on the immediate issues outlined earlier: the follow-on agreement for START I, Afghanistan, Iran, and nonproliferation. The START I agreement, as I understand it, is almost complete. National Security Advisor James Jones and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen were both recently in Moscow and are satisfied with the progress made on a couple of the remaining, very difficult issues. For example, there is an issue around telemetry and a technical set of issues surrounding verification of missile defense and active defense as well as the question of how the BMD issue is to be handed off to future negotiations. On Afghanistan, the issue has been the transit route, both for lethal and nonlethal supplies, in the air and on the ground. While the press has reported the effort as troubled because Russia had supposedly dragged its heels, in fact, the transit route is now up and running, and the administration is satisfied that this agreement is going to be important and productive in the near term.

On Iran, William Burns has recently declared the U.S.-Russia relationship to be working well, particularly the degree to which the United States and Russia were key in developing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) program offered to Iran for the export of low-enriched uranium in return for the eventual supply of fuel rods. The IAEA initiative, however, has not been successful to this point, and the issue becomes the imposition of sanctions. The Russians blow hot and cold on sanctions, but since Fall 2009, Medvedev has put Russia on record as saying that in circumstances where there appear to be no alternatives, Russia would support sanctions on Iran. The Obama administration is preparing to present a set of sanctions at the UN Security Council.

Therefore, in three of the four areas of U.S.-Russia relations, there has been slow progress, but real progress nonetheless. The administration also hopes to see results on the fourth issue, nuclear nonproliferation, at the Nuclear Security Conference that will be held in April 2010 under President Obama’s auspices. Thus far, Russia has been cooperative and supportive of this initiative, according to White House reports. At the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, we’ll see what the two sides are able to accomplish in the area of nonproliferation.

The Presidential Commission mentioned above has been very slow to start, but the administration has not used this part of its agenda as the primary measuring stick for judging whether the process is working.
forward on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement. From the Russian side, progress has been complicated by its vacillation over joining the World Trade Organization as well as its uncompromising attitude on conventional arms control in Europe following the suspension of its participation in the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe and, with it, its refusal to be part of the data exchange or monitoring arrangements set up under that agreement, among other issues.

Finally, where are the shadows and potential pitfalls of U.S. policy toward Russia? I think first and most imminent will be the focus on START I, the U.S.-Russia relationship (the follow-on to START I, Afghanistan, Iran, and non-proliferation) are not embedded in a larger strategic vision that will give broader guidance to the relationship. It is important for the U.S. administration to develop a strategic plan if they really do mean to put the relationship on a different footing. However, because the administration did not set out to do this at the outset, given the pressures and the normal rhythms of Washington, the prospect of moving in this direction now is probably not very good.

Third, deep, underlying sources of tension remain unattended in the relationship, in particular, the interaction between the United States and Russia within the post-Soviet space. This is the great unaddressed problem – the large elephant in the room – and until the United States and Russia directly and frankly begin working out a modus vivendi for their respective roles in this region, progress on all other aspects of the relationship will be impeded. This inattention, in turn, also delays efforts to address the improvements that need to be made to the European security architecture.

Fourth, what I would call Russia’s strategic ambivalence, or uncertainty about where it stands in relation to the outside world, has increased. On one day, Russia recognizes the importance of Europe and Russia’s economic stake in the relationship with Europe. The next day, Russia talks about Europe’s diminished importance in international politics and the need to disengage Europe and the EU and move on to other things. Russians wrestle with the question of how they think about their relationships with the new rising powers, particularly with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC).

An emerging subcategory within Russia’s rapport with BRIC is the Russia-China relationship. Russia is not treating this as a fundamental strategic choice – not toying with the idea of aligning with China as an alternative to alignment with the West or the United States. Rather, more important is the extent to which a significant part of the Russian political establishment grows increasingly attracted to the Chinese political model. We have seen over the last year an increasing interest even on the part of Russia’s dominant political party and others in and around Putin’s circles in the way China organizes itself politically, including the role of its dominant political party. This obviously bears on the degree to which one can expect Russia to move its domestic policy in directions that will support a Western option and closer relations with the United States.

**A series of very significant factors will continue to constrain how far and fast the U.S.-Russia relationship will move.**

Russia’s domestic orientation recalls a favorite cocktail conversation: who’s up and who’s down in the Medvedev-Putin diarchy. Here, the struggle between a greater orientation toward the West or toward Asia plays out. I don’t want to oversimplify by arguing that Putin represents the Asian option, Medvedev the Western. But the more that power hierarchy tilts toward Medvedev, the less likely it will be for Russia to explore the Chinese political model; the more it tilts or returns entirely to Putin, the more that option will begin to open up.

A series of very significant factors will continue to constrain how far and fast the U.S.-Russia relationship will move, but we ought to be thankful that it has moved as far as it has, and that the two countries have reversed the sharply negative and unhappy state of affairs as they stood a year ago.

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**The U.S. administration’s focus is primarily on START I, Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear program, and nonproliferation as the test for whether U.S.-Russia relations can advance.**

It is present at least implicitly in Senators McCain and Kyl’s censure of France’s tentative decision to sell the Mistral helicopter carrier to Russia. It would appear a partial motivation in the proposal of the usually moderate Senator Richard Lugar to provide defense equipment to strengthen Georgia’s capacity to deal with a future Russian assault. In some quarters of the U.S. government, support for a neo-containment policy toward Russia is still very much alive. For Russia’s part, the process has been impeded by strong resistance and mistrust within security circles, including parts of the military, and by either the inability or the unwillingness of Russia’s national leadership to crack bureaucratic heads.
Thomas Graham

Thomas Graham is Senior Director at Kissinger Associates and former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council staff.

Presentation

I agree with Bob that the current administration has begun to turn the relationship around. The tone is different, and we are engaging Russia with an intensity we haven’t seen since the first year of the Bush administration. However, I also think that the relationship has not progressed as far as the administration. However, I also think that the relationship has not progressed as far as the administration anticipated that it would when they took office a year ago.

While the current administration has thought through how to approach U.S.-Russia relations, neither they nor the Russian administration has provided a clear, public articulation of the strategic framework in which the two parties are conducting their relationship.

Late an agenda will be increasingly problematic as we try to put real flesh onto the structure of a “reset” relationship.

Neither country has publicly articulated why the other country is important to its own national interest in a positive way. Russia knows what it doesn’t want, which can be summed up in a series of “no”s: no to NATO expansion; no to missile defense in Eastern Europe; no to increasing U.S. influence in the former Soviet space; no to American interference in Russian domestic affairs. From the American standpoint, there is a much broader idea of what the positive relationship could look like, but for various reasons, including the president’s own agenda, the focus is very narrow. Senior officials in Moscow (as opposed to those who are intimately involved in managing day-to-day relations with the United States) say that the United States is not really interested in engaging Russia on most of the issues that aren’t important to the United States but are important to Russia.

The way we talk about common interests and shared threats can provide a foundation for a relationship going forward, but not until we clarify each country’s priorities. That shared interest is not currently part of a common agenda and does not underscore the extent to which the countries will need to work together in the real world. Iran is a prime example of this lack of clarity in national priorities. For the past eight years, even when I was working in the Bush administration, the line on Iran has been, “Russia and the United States share a strategic goal in preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” We just haven’t been able to agree on the tactics of getting that done in the real world.

Part of the reason we haven’t been able to agree on a strategy is that we look at this problem in different ways. For the United States, you could argue that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is the top foreign policy priority, one that is linked in our minds to the role that Iran has played in supporting terrorist organizations, particularly in the Middle East, and also to what we see as a fairly hostile regime inside Iran. This is not a top priority for Russia. Russia’s interest in preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is countered by the positive role that Iran has played in not challenging Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It’s also balanced by the lucrative contracts that a segment of the Russian political elite have had in selling arms to Iran; by nuclear cooperation with Iran; and by Russia’s interest in tensions between the United States and Iran, because the resulting sanctions would preclude the shipment of Iranian gas into the European markets, where Russia sends almost all of its gas and where it derives a considerable part of its federal revenue.

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This is not to say that we can’t agree on a policy toward Iran; but it underscores that working collaboratively will be much more complicated than simply talking about shared threats and common interests. The United States has to consider a range of Russian interests in Iran and provide incentives for Russia to prioritize the part of the relationship that is most important to us.

I think the United States and Russia have struggled to develop a strategic vision for their relationship for several reasons. First, both sides realize that we have entered a
The way we talk about common interests and shared threats can provide a foundation for a relationship going forward, but not until we clarify each country’s priorities.

period of tremendous upheaval, of uncertain duration, in international affairs. We talk about the shift in global dynamics from Europe to Asia; the historic struggle in the Middle East between forces of modernity and tradition; and the positive and negative impacts of globalization that have become more prominent over the past several years. Neither country really knows where the global system is headed and what role it will play in that system, let alone what the relationship between the United States and Russia will be.

Second, the U.S.-Russia relationship is increasingly part of a multilateral system. We’re well beyond the era when U.S.-Soviet relations defined the international system. During the Cold War, we had confidence that if the United States and the Soviet Union could agree, we could get certain things done in the world. In a multilateral context, it’s much more difficult for each side to calculate what the other will contribute to current international challenges. For example, although it helps the United States to have Russia on board in managing the global financial crisis, more of the U.S. administration’s attention is focused on Europe, China, and India. Another question is where Russia fits into the conversation on climate change. And although Russia may be the critical “other” in U.S. nonproliferation efforts (given its nuclear arsenal, experience in nuclear weapons, and the history the United States and Russia share in managing this relationship), that fact doesn’t provide the basis for a broader strategic vision of how the two countries should work together in the future.

Third, domestic policy is the top priority for both countries. In his first State of the Union Address, President Obama talked about jobs, the economy, and the financial sector. In November 2009, President Medvedev talked about infrastructure renewal, demographic decline, diversification of the economy, and a modernization program that he said was critical to Russia’s survival as a major power in the twenty-first century. You also have two presidents who came to office (one elected, one selected) to deal with domestic reconstruction in their countries. Thus, building strategic relationships in a global context is secondary.

My final point (something that I find increasingly curious as you talk to Russians about this relationship) is that each country thinks the other is in decline. For the United States, the question of whether Russia really matters has been implicit since the breakup of the Soviet Union. While this sentiment may not be true of the president and his chief advisors, if you get down into the bowels of bureaucracy and the people who are supposed to implement policy, the conviction that Russia genuinely matters to U.S. national security is absent; people are not inclined to devote a lot of time to this relationship. In Russia, the view that the United States is in decline originated much more recently. It’s a consequence of what Russia regards as the failed policies of the Bush administration; the economic crisis and the failure of what they see as the American capitalist system; and doubts about the current U.S. administration’s efficacy. However popular and even strategically appropriate the decisions on Afghanistan and Iraq might be from our standpoint now and in the future, the Russians see troop withdrawals in Iraq and the desire to draw down troops in Afghanistan next year as an abandonment of international responsibilities, a retreat in the face of a failed policy conducted by the previous administration. The question for Russia becomes: To what extent are we prepared to risk our relationship with Iran if the United States plans to remove itself from both Iraq and Afghanistan? To what extent do we want to be involved with the United States in dealing with the problem in Afghanistan if the United States is leaving in a year-and-a-half? These are real questions about the United States’ commitment to the hard issues in international affairs that Russia believes define the global security environment.

I believe we can deal with these challenges, but it’s important to recognize the existing barriers. The argument for better U.S.-Russia relations is future-oriented. It’s about where we think the world is heading over the next ten or fifteen years, what the challenges will be for the United States, and how and under what circumstances Russia can help us over the long term in dealing with those challenges.

The argument for better U.S.-Russia relations is future-oriented. It’s about where we think the world is heading over the next ten or fifteen years, what the challenges will be for the United States, and how and under what circumstances Russia can help us over the long term in dealing with those challenges.

Robert Legvold

I think Russia’s interaction with its neighbors is the key issue that has not been frankly or directly faced by any U.S. administration in policy toward Russia. There has been any number of positions taken in response to specific Russian actions, whether it’s in the...
context of color revolutions, a Georgian war, dueling pipelines, or a host of other things. But we haven’t really addressed the underlying question of what kind of modus vivendi the United States and Russia need to implement as Russia deals with its neighbors and the outside world, whether it’s NATO, the EU, the United States, or Turkey. This is a kaleidoscopic relationship that has many different pieces, continually changes, and varies enormously depending on the ways in which Russia relates to its neighbors.

I think Russia’s interaction with its neighbors is the key issue that has not been frankly or directly faced by any U.S. administration in policy toward Russia.

There are several categories of relationships between Russia and the states around it. First, there is the quasi-partnership, the marriage of convenience or failure of alternatives, such as aspects of the Russian-Armenian relationship because of Armenia’s generally secure environment; the Central Asians, beginning with the Kazakhs, which have chosen a close working relationship with the Russians without doing Russia’s bidding; or Belarus, which for much of the time casts its lot with Russia by rejecting any Western options.

Other states, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and, at times, Uzbekistan, have been very uncomfortable in the face of the Soviet legacy and the ongoing Russian effort to maintain a dominant influence and a droit de regard over the states’ actions. That picture, however, is continually changing. In the upcoming Ukrainian election, Russia has not been an issue because either of the candidates who wins will attempt to build a constructive and working relationship with Russia that will deemphasize Western relations in terms of NATO membership and the EU.

At the same time, some of the countries that have been very close to Russia have grown restless and resistant and have refused to cooperate with Russia on new initiatives. Russia and Belarus are in the middle of a tug-of-war over oil. Moreover, the Russian-Belarus relationship was key in Russia’s plans for a “Collective Security Treaty Organization” that included a cooperative military enterprise among several of the post-Soviet states. As of last summer, the Belarusians have boycotted one important piece of that alliance.

There is a tendency in the outside world to oversimplify Russia’s relationship with its neighbors by assuming that Russia’s fundamental motivation is a neo-imperialist objective to reestablish its sway within the region, using energy or arms if necessary (as the Georgian war proved, according to this line of thinking). That’s the way we should analyze Russia’s relationship with this region: to what extent it is succeeding or failing in this neo-imperialist agenda. This is not to say that the Russians don’t believe they ought to be the most dominant power within the region, but the question is the extent to which they exclude the outside world in their agenda and, conversely, the extent to which they are willing to work with other countries that are engaged in the region.

Question

What kind of broader agenda do you think might actually lead the Russians to be more cooperative on dealing with Iran?

Thomas Graham

Part of the challenge is to establish a modus vivendi with Russia in the former Soviet space, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia, an area where the Russians believe Iran has played a more or less positive role, and where the United States, over the past eight to ten years, has played a largely negative role. Demonstrating that we can find a way to manage the relationship productively in that part of the world lessens Iran’s advantage.

We need to understand that Russian gas will be an important part of Europe’s energy equation in the future.

We also need to move forward much more rapidly on civil nuclear cooperation. The 123 agreement that was negotiated toward the end of the Bush administration, submitted to Congress, then withdrawn in the wake of Russia’s war with Georgia needs to be resubmitted. It provides a framework that allows the United States to facilitate working together on civil nuclear energy, both bilaterally and also, presumably, in developing countries. If we were able to put together a joint venture between Rosatom on the Russian side, and Westinghouse or General Electric on the U.S. side to build nuclear reactors as part of the nuclear renaissance in developing countries, this initiative would also give Russia an alternative to broadening its nuclear relationship with Iran.

Also, we cannot continue to present the great dependence Europe has on Russian gas as a major threat to Europe’s security and the transatlantic relationship. We need to understand that Russian gas will be an important part of Europe’s energy equation in the future, and we need to assure Russia that if the relationship with Iran does improve, Russia will play a role in the development of Iranian resources and the export of those resources to European markets.

Finally, the extent to which the current U.S. administration can engage Tehran directly raises concern in Moscow about where Iran’s interests are headed, which I think is helpful in encouraging Russia to think more creatively about how it works with us. In crude terms, if we normalize our relationship with Iran, Iran is more likely to look to the West and the United States for nuclear cooperation and arms (as the Shah did thirty or forty years ago) than they are to Moscow. Together, these considerations change the matrix that Moscow calculates from and begin to increase the chance that Russia will work with us on dealing with Iran’s supposed nuclear weapons program.
Question

Given the backsliding on democracy-building and human rights in the Russian Federation and throughout the former Soviet space today, is there anything the United States can do to nudge Russia toward a more reasonable path?

Thomas Graham

The Obama administration’s efforts to set up a working group on civil society as part of the bilateral presidential structure brings our civil societies together to discuss issues that are of common concern to us and to reach out to a broader segment of the Russian population and Russian political elites in a way that is not seen as lecturing, but as an exchange of experience that helps each country deal with current crises.

I would like to see this working group identify a set of issues for American NGOs and Russian NGOs to work on together. I would like to see them think about immigration, the role of the press, and corruption, all of which, we can argue, are problems in both societies that need to be addressed by experts so that each country can provide for a more productive and open society. I think the U.S. administration is off on the right foot on this effort.

Question

What is the impact of the rise of China as a major power on the relationship between Russia and the United States, and how has it affected Russian foreign policy?

Robert Legvold

China’s emergence as an economic power is critical to Russian foreign policy. Russia’s relationship with China, though semi-independent, is, in an important respect, a function of the relationship with the West. At the outset of an independent Russia, you had a Yeltsin/Kozyrev orientation toward the Atlantic community called the “pro-Atlanticist” position. During that period of time, Kozyrev was prepared to go to China in the context of this pro-Western policy and lecture China on how it should change domestically. In 1993, greater cooperation with China began to occur at the same time that undulating curves appeared in Russia’s relationship with the West during the Clinton administration: up and down from the beginning through NATO enlargement, to some improvement, before Fall 1998, and so on. At each of the low points, the Russia-China relationship moved to the next stage, from friendship, to strategic partnership, to, ultimately, the treaty the two countries signed. Improvements in the relationship were accompanied by media reports that depicted Russia as turning toward China and potentially creating an alignment against the United States. I don’t think the Russians ever believed that it would be wise, let alone feasible, for them to draw the Chinese into an alternative strategic alignment against the West.

A relationship with the West is critical to Russia’s interests in Europe, the United States, and Japan, and it also affects Russia’s options with respect to China.

But what did happen over that period of time was the emergence of what I would call parallel foreign policies. There is no country with which Russia has more common positions in international politics than China. And frankly, among the major powers, there is no country with which China has more common interests, whether it’s dealing with rogue states, attitudes toward NATO, security ties between the United States and Japan, or parallel issues in the cases of Russia/Chechnya and China/Tibet, or even Taiwan. But convergence of foreign policy and economic interest stops short of strategic alignment.

The new factor is the degree to which, within an important part of Russia’s political establishment, there is an affinity for the way China conducts its affairs, particularly managing its system at home.

Even with Russia’s ambivalence about whether the United States is a fading power and whether Europe can be dismissed, the West is still the dominant force in international politics. A relationship with the West is critical to Russia’s interests in Europe, the United States, and Japan, and it also affects Russia’s options with respect to China. China is now part of a three-way game.

Thomas Graham

China’s ability to invest in the Russian economy has changed rather dramatically over the past couple of years. Ten years ago we made the argument that if Russia wanted to modernize, it needed the investment, expertise, and know-how it could find only in the West. That’s no longer true: China invests in the development of resources in Siberia and far eastern Russia, and you can find Chinese businessmen in Moscow. Changes in the economic relationship could have long-term implications for how Russia deals with China and how China decides to deal with Russia as part of its broader foreign policy stance.

Question

Does Russia have a policy toward North Korea as a participant in the six-party talks?

Thomas Graham

The Russian position on North Korea is “talk to the Chinese.”

Robert Legvold

In the last years of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev literally wrote off the North Koreans; he didn’t renew the bilateral security treaty and he made an arrangement with South Korea at North Korea’s expense. It was quite clear, given the direction of Gorbachev’s Westpolitik, that the Soviet Union had chosen South Korea over North Korea. But in the late-Yeltsin and particularly the early-Putin years, there was an effort to restore the relationship with North Korea, though North Korea remains suspicious of Russia. There’s no question that the dominant player among the six parties is China. Russia’s response to the nuclear issue in North Korea parallels China’s; China has the lead and Russia is its partner in dealing with North Korea on the nuclear issue, including in the context of the six-party talks and in the UN Security Council.
Question
This question is on behalf of the youngest members in the audience. When did you become interested in studying the Soviet Union and Russia, and how would you advise our students?

Thomas Graham
I came of age in the late 1950s and early 1960s, so the Cold War and Sputnik are the things I remember from my childhood that initially sparked my interest in the Soviet Union and Russia. The first exchange programs set up under the Eisenhower administration with Khrushchev let us reach out to the Soviet Union and Russian citizens in a way we hadn’t previously. In addition, I was fortunate to go to one of the few high schools in the United States in the early 1960s (in Princeton, New Jersey) that offered Russian as a foreign language.

I think it is extremely important to focus on the language, culture, and history – this is where the real richness of Russia is, in any event, and this provides a foundation for understanding how Russians think. When they understand that you appreciate their culture and history, that appreciation is reciprocated. In graduate school in the 1970s, a lot of people my age made the mistake of becoming Soviet experts, and in 1991, they had an entire library of books that were basically useless. I studied political science at Harvard University and wrote my dissertation on a Russian existential philosopher (which I managed to justify as a political science dissertation); and that project led me into Russian thought and

the much broader understanding of the history and culture that became important after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

My advice would be to study the language, literature, and culture. If you have the opportunity to travel, take advantage of it. It’s a fascinating society, and it’s going to be an important country for the United States going forward.

Robert Legvold
I was much less prescient or thoughtful as a high school student than Tom was. My interest began to emerge when I was in college, in a rather conventional and not very imaginative way, because the Soviet Union was at the center of U.S. foreign policy and international relations. (Were I a sophomore in college right now, I would almost certainly have chosen to study China.) My initial aspiration was to go into the Foreign Service; I changed my mind once I found out there was a way to be a permanent student. Even those of you who have not made Russia or the U.S.-Russia relationship an important part of your career have most likely been exposed to it, and have either studied the Russian language, literature, or culture, or have traveled there. Travel in particular gets it in your blood. There is something enormously engaging about Russian culture and society, and maybe also because U.S. relations with that country have long been as complex – and at times tension-filled – as they have been important. But I have never for a day regretted the career choice that I made.

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As of press time, several Fellows of the Academy, listed below, have been nominated to serve in senior roles in President Barack Obama’s administration.

**Lawrence S. Bacow** (Tufts University): Member, President’s Board of Advisors on Historically Black Colleges and Universities  
**Stephen L. Hauser** (University of California, San Francisco): Member, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues  
**Richard H. Jenrette** (Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette): Member, Committee for the Preservation of the White House  
**James McNerney, Jr.** (Boeing Company): Chair, President’s Export Council  
**Donald M. Stewart** (University of Chicago): Member, Commission on Presidential Scholars  
**Carl Wieman** (University of British Columbia; University of Colorado): Associate Director for Science, Office of Science and Technology Policy

In addition, President Barack Obama has nominated three Fellows for posts listed below:

**Peter Diamond** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): Member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve  
**Elena Kagan** (United States Department of Justice): Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States  
**Janet Yellen** (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco): Vice Chairwoman, Federal Reserve

**Select Prizes and Awards**

**National Medal of Arts, 2009**  
Maya Lin (Maya Lin Studio)  
Jessye Norman (New York, NY)  
Michael Tilson Thomas (San Francisco Symphony)  
John Williams (Los Angeles, CA)

**National Humanities Medal, 2009**  
Robert A. Caro (New York, NY)  
David Levering Lewis (New York University)  
William H. McNeill (Colebrook, CT)  
Philippe de Montebello (Metropolitan Museum of Art)  
Elie Wiesel (Boston University)

**Other Awards**

David Botstein (Princeton University) is the recipient of the 2010 ACM Distinguished Service Award. William H. Gates III (Microsoft Corporation) is the recipient of the 2010 Common Sense Media Award.

Francis S. Collins (National Institutes of Health) is the recipient of the 2010 Benjamin Franklin Medal in Computer and Cognitive Science.

Paul E. Gray (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) was awarded the 2010 IEEE Founders Medal.

Paul Greengard (Rockefeller University) is the recipient of a Dart/NYU Biotechnology Achievement Award.

Lily Jan (University of California, San Francisco) and Yuh Nung Jan (University of California, San Francisco) are the joint winners of the 2010 Edward M. Scolnick Prize in Neuroscience, awarded by the McGovern Institute at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Leonard Kleinrock (University of California, Los Angeles) was named a 2010 Dan David Prize laureate. He shares the prize with Michael O. Rabin (Harvard University) and Gordon E. Moore (Intel Corporation).

János Kornai (Collège Budapest) was awarded the Leontief Medal. He was also presented with the Grand Cross Order of Merit of the Republic of Hungary.

Eric Lander (Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the 2010 ACM Distinguished Service Award.

Edward Lazowska (University of Washington) received the 2010 ACM Distinguished Service Award.

George Lucas (Lucasfilm Ltd.) is among the recipients of the 2010 Common Sense Media Award.
Robert Mahley (The J. David Gladstone Institutes) is the recipient of the Research America’s 2010 Builders of Science Award.

Andreu Mas-Colell (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) is the recipient of the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award in Economics, Finance and Management. He shares the prize with Hugo Sonnenschein (University of Chicago).

Robert C. Merton (Harvard Business School) received the Kolmogorov Medal from the University of London.

Gordon E. Moore (Intel Corporation) was named a 2010 Dan David Prize laureate. He shares the prize with Michael O. Rabin (Harvard University) and Leonard Kleinrock (University of California, Los Angeles).


John Murdoch (Harvard University) was awarded the Sarton Medal from the History of Science Society.

Eiichi Nakamura (University of Tokyo) is the recipient of the 2010 Arthur C. Cope Award of the American Chemical Society.

Peter C. Nowell (University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine) was awarded the 2010 Benjamin Franklin Medal in Life Science.

Stuart L. Pimm (Duke University) was awarded the 2010 Tyler Prize for Environmental Achievement.

Steven Pinker (Harvard University) was awarded the George A. Miller Prize in Cognitive Neuroscience.

Alejandro Portes (Princeton University) is the recipient of the W.E.B. Du Bois Career of Distinguished Scholarship Award from the American Sociological Association.

Adam Przeworski (New York University) was awarded the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science.

Michael C. J. Putnam (Brown University) was awarded a Centennial Medal by the American Academy in Rome.

Michael O. Rabin (Harvard University) was named a 2010 Dan David Prize laureate. He shares the prize with Leonard Kleinrock (University of California, Los Angeles) and Gordon E. Moore (Intel Corporation).

Martin Raff (University College London) is the recipient of a Dart/NYU Biotechnology Achievement Award.

Phillip A. Sharp (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the fourth annual American Association for Cancer Research Margaret Foti Award for Leadership and Extraordinary Achievements in Cancer Research.

Hugo Sonnenschein (University of Chicago) is the recipient of the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award in Economics, Finance and Management. He shares the prize with Andreu Mas-Colell (Universitat Pompeu Fabra).

Jack Strominger (Harvard University) received the AAII Excellence in Mentoring Award by the American Association of Immunologists.

JoAnne Stubbe (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the 2010 Benjamin Franklin Medal in Chemistry.

Dennis Sullivan (Stony Brook University; CUNY Graduate Center) was awarded the 2010 Wolf Foundation Prize in Mathematics. He shares the prize with Shing-Tung Yau (Harvard University).

Axel Ullrich (Max-Planck-Institut für Biochemie) was awarded the 2010 Wolf Foundation Prize in Medicine.

Peter K. Vogt (The Scripps Research Institute) is the recipient of the 5th Annual Szent-Györgyi Prize for Progress in Cancer Research.

E. O. Wilson (Harvard University) was awarded the Thomas Jefferson Foundation Medal in Architecture by the University of Virginia.

James Wright (Dartmouth College) received the New England Board of Higher Education’s Eleanor M. McMahon Award for Lifetime Achievement.

Xiaoliang Sunney Xie (Harvard University) is among the recipients of the 2009 E. O. Lawrence Award.

Shing-Tung Yau (Harvard University) was awarded the 2010 Wolf Prize in Mathematics. He shares the prize with Dennis Sullivan (Stony Brook University; CUNY Graduate Center).

New Appointments

Fellows Appointed to the Advisory Board of Project Reason

Jerry Coyne (University of Chicago)

Daniel C. Dennett (Tufts University)

Rebecca Goldstein (Harvard University)

Ian McEwan (London, United Kingdom)

Steven Pinker (Harvard University)

J. Craig Venter (J. Craig Venter Institute)

Steven Weinberg (University of Texas at Austin)

Other New Appointments

Arden L. Bement, Jr. (National Science Foundation) has been named to lead the Global Policy Research Institute at Purdue University.

Elizabeth H. Blackburn (University of California, San Francisco) was named President of the American Association for Cancer Research.

Jeffrey A. Bluestone (University of California, San Francisco) has been appointed UCSF Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost.

Paul G. Falkowski (Rutgers University) was elected to the governing council of the National Academy of Sciences.

David S. Ferriero (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) was confirmed as the 10th Archivist of the United States.

Gerald D. Fischbach (Simons Foundation) was appointed to the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee.

Zvi Galil (Tel Aviv University) was named Dean of the College of Computing at Georgia Tech.

Arthur Levinson (Genetech, Inc.) has been appointed to the Board of Directors of Amyris Biotechnologies, Inc.

John S. Reed (Citigroup) has been elected Chair of the MIT Corporation.

Jehuda Reinharz (Brandeis University) was named President of the Mandel Foundation.
Select Publications

Poetry
Anne Carson (McGill University). Nox. New Directions, April 2010
Charles Simic (University of New Hampshire), ed. and trans. The Horse Has Six Legs: An Anthology of Serbian Poetry. Graywolf, May 2010

Fiction
Ann Beattie (University of Virginia). Walks with Men. Scribner, June 2010
Robert Coover (Brown University). Noir. Overlook, April 2010
Gish Jen (Brandeis University). World and Town. Knopf, October 2010

Nonfiction

Alan Brinkley (Columbia University). The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century. Knopf, April 2010
Karen S. Cook (Stanford University), Margaret Levi (University of Washington), and Russell Hardin (New York University), eds. Whom Can We Trust? How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible. Russell Sage Foundation Publications, November 2009
Paul Farmer (Harvard Medical School; Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston; Partners In Health). Partner to the Poor: A Paul Farmer Reader. University of California Press, April 2010
Margot E. Fassler (Yale University). The Virgin of Chartres: Making History through Liturgy and the Arts. Yale University Press, April 2010
Renée C. Fox (University of Pennsylvania). In the Field: A Sociologist’s Journey. Transaction Publishers, July 2010
Hsuan L. Hsu (University of California, Davis; Academy Visiting Scholar, 2004–2005). Geography and the Production of Space in Nineteenth-Century American Literature. Cambridge University Press, June 2010

Jurgen Kocka (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung). Civil Society and Dictatorship in Modern German History. Brandeis University Press, July 2010
Gerhard Loevenberg (University of Iowa), ed. Parliaments in Perspective. Transaction Publishers, April 2010
Ajay K. Mehrotra (Indiana University; Academy Visiting Scholar, 2006–2007), Isaac William Martin (University of California, San Diego), and Monica Prasad (Northwestern University), eds. The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press, July 2009

Gary B. Nash (University of California, Los Angeles). The Liberty Bell. Yale University Press, May 2010
Jehuda Reinharz (Brandeis University) and Yaacov Shavit (Tel Aviv University). Glorious, Accursed Europe: A Modern Jewish Experience. Brandeis University Press, July 2010
Frances Rosenbluth (Yale University) and Torben Iversen (Harvard University). Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality. Yale University Press, June 2010


Alice Waters (Chez Panisse Foundation; Chez Panisse). In the Green Kitchen: Techniques to Learn by Heart. Clarkson Potter, April 2010


We invite all Fellows and Foreign Honorary Members to send notices about their recent and forthcoming publications, scientific findings, exhibitions and performances, and honors and prizes to bulletin@amacad.org.

Remembrance

It is with sadness that the Academy notes the passing of the following members.*

David Ernest Apter – May 4, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1966

Robert Harza Burris – May 11, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1975

Barton Childs – February 18, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1974

Lucille Clifton – February 13, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1999

Saul G. Cohen – April 24, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1956

Kenneth James Dover – March 7, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1979

Samuel James Eldersveld – March 5, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1977

Herbert Federer – April 21, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1962

William Edwin Gordon – February 16, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1986

Norman Arthur Graebner – May 10, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1990

John L. Harper – March 22, 2009; elected to the Academy in 1992

Harvey Akio Itano – May 8, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1998

Carl Kaysen – February 8, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1954

Nathan Keyfitz – April 6, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1971

Ian R. MacNeil – February 16, 2010; elected to the Academy in 2001

Angus Maddison – April 24, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1996

Walter Francis Murphy – April 20, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1977

Charles Muscatine – March 12, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1974

Douglas Llewellyn Oliver – October 30, 2009; elected to the Academy in 1953

Edmund P. Pillsbury – March 25, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1997

Robert Vivian Pound – April 12, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1952

Helen Margaret Ranney – April 5, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1975

Albert Joseph Rosenthal – March 17, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1983

Charles Andrew Ryskamp – March 29, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1990

Manfred Robert Schroeder – December 28, 2009; elected to the Academy in 1986

Joanne Simpson – March 4, 2010; elected to the Academy in 2006

Horton Guyford Stever – April 9, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1953

Boris Peter Stoicheff – April 15, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1989

William Willard Wirtz – April 24, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1964

Markley Gordon Wolman – February 24, 2010; elected to the Academy in 1981

* Notice received from February 1, 2010, to May 13, 2010
Colloquium on Religious Faiths and World Ethics, 1958

On August 1–2, 1958, the Academy convened a “Colloquium on Religious Faiths and World Ethics” at its House in Brookline, Massachusetts, to “provide the opportunity for a limited group of some two or three dozen representatives of religious thinking in the Eastern United States to explore with the help of some of these visitors how the religions of the world might cooperate to provide a more effective moral base for world order and peace.”

Organizing Committee of the Colloquium on Religious Faiths and World Ethics. Left to right: Dr. S. van der Woude, University of Amsterdam; Dr. Joseph P. Bishop, Church of the Covenant, Boston; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Edward Murray, Sacred Heart Rectory, Roslindale, Massachusetts; Dr. Kirtley F. Mather, President of the American Academy; Mr. Ralph W. Burhoe, Executive Officer of the American Academy; Rev. Swami Akhilananda, Vedanta Center, Boston; Dr. Dana McLean Greeley, American Unitarian Association, Boston; Rabbi Beryl D. Cohon, Temple Sinai, Boston; Rev. Charles A. Engvall, Council of Churches, First Parish, Medford, Massachusetts; Dr. James Luther Adams, Harvard Divinity School.

A new web-based feature, From the Academy Archives, has been launched to mark the 230th anniversary of the Academy’s founding on May 4, 1780. It features notable studies and events drawn from the newly created Academy archives. It is available on the Academy’s website at http://www.amacad.org.
Notice to Fellows

• Call for Nominations
The Nominating Committee, chaired by Emilio Bizzi, is seeking recommendations for anticipated open positions on governing bodies and committees including Board, Council, Trust, Midwest and Western Regional Committees, and Audit and Budget Committees. All candidates must be Fellows of the American Academy and interested in being actively engaged in Academy work. Please submit recommendations via email to secretary@amacad.org or in writing (postmarked by July 1, 2010) to the Nominating Committee, c/o Jerrold Meinwald, Secretary, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138.

• Academy Dues
The Executive Committee in consultation with the Academy Council approved a $300 dues assessment for all Fellows this year. Dues account for only a small portion of the Academy’s budget, but they are critical in helping to cover the rising costs of meetings and symposia throughout the country; membership activities, including the election process; the development of new research projects and publications; and ongoing efforts to inform members about the Academy’s work.

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Bulletin Spring 2010
Issued as Volume LXIII, Number 3
© 2010 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

The Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (ISSN 0002 – 712X) is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Periodicals rate postage paid at Boston, MA, and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Bulletin, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

The views expressed in the Bulletin are those held by each contributor and are not necessarily those of the Officers and Fellows of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.

PHOTO CREDITS
Steve Rosenthal inside front cover
Martha Stewart pages 6 – 8, 10, 22 – 23, 27
Wendy Barrows pages 15, 19