DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
SUMMER 1991
$6.95

RELIGION AND POLITICS



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DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Religion and Politics

Summer 1991

Issued as Volume 120, Number 3, of the
Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Summer 1991, "Religion and Politics."
Issued as Volume 120, Number 3, of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Library of Congress Catalog Number 12-30299.

Editorial Offices: Dædalus, *Norton's Woods,*
136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Dædalus (ISSN 0011-5266) *is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Subscription rates: for individuals—$25, one year; $45, two years; $65, three years; for institutions—$40, one year; $70, two years; $100, three years. Foreign subscribers must add $5.00 per year to the price of subscription.*

All subscription orders, single-copy orders, and change-of-address information must be sent in writing *to the* Dædalus *Business Office, 136 Irving Street, Suite 100, Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. (Telephone: 617-491-2600).*

Printed in the United States of America.
Printing Office: 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, VA 23228.

U.S.A. newsstand distribution by Eastern News Distributors, Inc., 1130 Cleveland Road, Sandusky, OH 44870.

Second-class postage paid at Boston, MA, and at additional mailing offices.

Postmaster: Send address changes to DÆDALUS,
136 Irving Street, Suite 100, Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.

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Orientalists are at home with texts. Anthropologists are at home in villages. The natural consequence is that the former tend to see Islam from above, the latter from below. I remember an anthropologist specializing in a Muslim country telling me of his first encounter with an elderly and distinguished Islamicist. The old scholar observed that the Koran was interpreted differently in various parts of the Muslim world. The young anthropologist remarked that this was indeed obvious. "Obvious? Obvious?" expostulated the older man angrily, "It took *years* of careful research to establish it!"

The story has various morals, but one of them is that the diversity of Muslim civilization is now a well-established fact, amply documented by scholars and by field workers, and it no longer requires further documentation. In its day, it was no doubt a useful corrective to the simplistic view which took Islam at face value and assumed that, because Muslim life is the implementation of *one* Book and its prescriptions, therefore Muslim civilization is homogeneous. This view need no longer be fought. The time has come to re-assert the thesis of homogeneity, not so much as a thesis, but as a problem. For all the indisputable diversity, the remarkable thing is the extent to which Muslim societies resemble each other. Their traditional political systems, for instance, are much more of one kind than were those of pre-modern Christendom. At least in the bulk of Muslim societies, in the main Islamic block between Central Asia and the Atlantic shores of Africa, one has the feeling that the same and limited pack of cards has been dealt. The hands vary, but the pack is the same. This homogeneity, in as far as it obtains, is all the more puzzling in the theoretical absence of a Church, and hence of a central authority on Faith and Morals. There is no obvious agency which could have enforced this homogeneity.

Ernest Gellner
From "Post-Traditional Forms in Islam:
The Turf and Trade, and Votes and Peanuts"
Dædalus, Winter 1973

The struggle to transform a society, to effect a cultural revolution must at the same time be a significant political act. Such acts demand those special qualities of leadership, of vision, of direction and charisma, of rationality perhaps, but also those tenacious aspects of fanaticism and self-confidence which run below the surface and without which men such as Mustafa Kemal and Mao Tse-tung would not have accomplished much. Once power is firmly established, however, the reins are in hand and the passions rechanneled into more mundane problems; then with patience and with care new institutions may be constructed, new habits and ideals may be carefully cultivated. Lévi-Strauss is right in calling affectivity the "darkest side of man." These questions concerning the release, the direction, the control, and the channeling of affectivity in terms of old and new cultural forms in whole societies is an area which would repay careful anthropological observation.

Nur Yalman
From "Some Observations on Secularism in Islam:
The Cultural Revolution in Turkey"
Dædalus, Winter 1973

All societies have traditions, but only a few have traditions which are central, overpowering, and vital. These are the traditional societies, the whipping boys of students of political development. But there is a particular brand of traditional society that is known to others—and to itself—by variegated civilizations it represents. In these societies, the traditions are not merely dominant and living, but they are also sufficiently pliable, sufficiently complex, and sufficiently self-confident to accommodate, without being threatened, to the society's efforts to redesign its identity. Unlike other traditional societies, these have traditions that are not supplanted by modern structures; instead, they are given new meanings. Speaking anthropomorphically, these societies are not only difficult to surprise or threaten, but they are also almost impervious to external change. Their very cultural autonomy forces them to carry alone, even at the nadir of their strength and dynamism, both the immense burdens and advantages of their histories. We shall call them historical societies.

Ashis Nandy
From "The Making and Unmaking of
Political Cultures in India"
Dædalus, Winter 1973

Preface to the Issue "Religion and Politics"

As THE TWENTIETH CENTURY COMES RATTLING to its close, powerful intellectual forces insist increasingly on the growing homogenization of nations and societies, imagining that common technologies and an unprecedented speed of communications have together contributed to eradicate difference as well as distance. The concept of the "global village" is appealing to those who look only for uniformity when a more discerning eye would discover new and startling evidences of both unity and diversity.

If, in the aftermath of World War II, Americans and others, impressed with what they managed to achieve in industrial production capabilities, developed modernization theories to explain a phenomenon they imagined guaranteed the extinction of so-called traditional societies, with all moving forward inevitably to a common end, the differences were thought to be temporary. In creating the concept of a First World and a Second World, but most emphatically in insisting on the reality of the so-called Third World, there was never a suggestion that the three would for all time remain distinct and different. All, by various routes, were thought to be progressing toward a common destiny; modernity was the intended home of the whole human species. By the early 1970s, as was evident in many studies, not least in the publication of a *Dædalus* issue entitled "Post-Traditional Societies" (Winter 1973), questions were raised about all such economic development theories, with their too-easy dismissal of the influence of history and culture. The continued importance of what some chose to see as merely residual values, redolent of another age, represented perhaps most conspicuously in the survival of religion, challenged the idea that secularism and rationalism were universal goods, only waiting to be realized.

Today, in the aftermath of what some believe to be the demise of communism, at least in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, there is new talk of the inevitable "modernizing" and "unifying" of the globe. The "market" has been made the supreme invention of a generation less given to expatiating on the virtues of capitalism and socialism and more inclined to speak of all the advances likely to be realized when the ideological rigidities of the Cold War era are finally overcome. Economic competition and growth are today said to be incontestable goods, realizable only through the world accepting a strategy that is thought to have made the United States, Japan, the European Community, and certain smaller societies both democratic and prosperous. The triumphalism of the West is muted, if at all, by some dim recollection of all the other economic miracles once promised that have never occurred, that have not obliterated older and more traditional forms of behavior and belief.

Indeed, what makes the present so unique is precisely that while one god has indubitably failed, and while another is being relentlessly extolled, the background music, heard above the universalist din, is accompanied by a rhetoric that speaks as much of nationalism and religion, of patriotism and the sacred as it does of the need for social transformation and economic growth. The old First World/Third World dichotomy may still be useful and even necessary for those whose memories of European and American imperial political and economic exploitation are scarcely affected by the seeming extinction of the Second World, but neither today describes the complex world that has confounded all twentieth-century prophecy.

No one reading this issue of *Dædalus* will fail to note how wholly different has been the Catholic experience in Spain in this century from what it has been in Latin America. The influence of Vatican II, substantial in both places, has had consequences in one that are wholly unknown in the other. While the world speaks incessantly about the growing influence of fundamentalism, particularly in the Islamic world, the conditions that obtain in the Maghreb are substantially different from those that exist in Iran, not to speak of all that is wholly distinctive to the situation in Turkey. In the Moslem world, politics have intersected with religion in ways that cannot be explained by reference simply to an experience with European imperial domination, expressing itself uniformly over time. In black Africa, where Islam and Christianity have coexisted for centuries, the political story of the twentieth century waits to be told, and not only to explain why Marxism, for a time, took hold in certain places and not in others, but how it came to pass that the hoped-for democratic transitions have proved to be so difficult, and why the national state, assuming the frontiers of the imperial powers, has proved to have such shallow roots. While both the Church of England and that of Sweden may partake of the distinction of being an "established church," and while both may derive their claims to legitimacy from events associated with the Reformation, the religious history of the two countries in this century could not be more different. While religion does not alone account for the distinctiveness of individual states and societies, its influence is too little taken into account by those who measure only in gross national product terms.

It is not that some parts of the world are today both religious and nationalist, throwbacks to an earlier age, traditionalist in a word, and that others are more obviously secular, accepting of universal values, linked to new views on global environmental, population, and resource issues, with its own unique agenda of reform, soon to be realized, or even that the first is regressive, the second progressive, but rather that all are strangely mingled and mixed. So much has been written about the twentieth century as a time of worldwide revolution, both economic and social, that its major religious and cultural components, intimately linked to political changes, have scarcely figured. This issue of *Dædalus* raises the provocative question whether Christianity, for example, has not been as much altered by the experiences of this hard century as Islam, whether the remarkable capacity of the world religions to survive in very different social settings, and with quite new dimensions and forms, does not attest to the fact that modernity, while influencing all established institutions, cannot destroy those that continue to respond to man's deepest needs, to understand suffering, age, and death, to respond to new societal cravings, but to do so in quite distinctive and different ways.

There is little evidence to suggest that religion as a universal force is declining, that there is an ecumenicism abroad in the world today that will soon make for religious unity where none existed previously. The whole effort to pretend that religious discord is today attenuated—as between rival and competing religions as well as within most societies—is to universalize what is in fact particular to a very few, and not always to those who can claim to be most advanced economically. Nationalism, whose power Marxists scarcely understood, was despised also by those who saw the international economy as ultimately determining all belief and behavior. Memory and tradition, in fact, are not so easily erased, though both may be substantially transformed, as they have been in our own chaotic century.

For those persuaded that the coming decades will witness increased international harmony, with economic and political differences being substantially reduced, and a growing cultural uniformity generating new tolerance and mutual respect, this issue of *Dædalus* suggests at least the possibility of another prospect as well. Revolution may take many forms, in religion as in politics. If the twentieth century has been filled with surprise, in the religious and the political spheres no less than in the economic, the prospect for continued ideological turmoil—fueled by religious and political difference and linked to new expressions of nationalist self-awareness—describes a less tranquil future, characterized by even less mutual understanding and regard. If the world is a "village" today—a dubious proposition at best—the village is too little known. It is more various than has been suspected, and it cannot be subsumed under the neat categories developed by social science on the morrow of World War II, and even less so by the feigned utopianism of the moment, linked to the purported death of Marxism.

We are deeply indebted to John Wilson who heads the project on Church and State at Princeton University. He and his colleagues guided this study in its beginnings, and saw very early the necessity for an inquiry that looked at twentieth-century religious experience in a very broad frame. Thanks are due also to the Lilly Endowment for their financial support, especially to its long-term vice president for religion, Robert Wood Lynn, and his successor, Craig Dykstra.

S.R.G.

Robert Wuthnow

Understanding Religion and Politics

In many parts of the world—Africa, the Philippines, Iran, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Brazil, Poland, the United States—the relations between religious institutions and the reigning political powers have undergone dramatic change in recent years. Orthodox religious communities, once thought to have bargained away their political souls, are now the sponsors of bold new opposition movements. Alliances that would have seemed peculiar a few decades ago have been forged between religious traditionalists and secular intellectuals. Fighting—both symbolic and real—has broken out between religious factions that once stood united against other faiths and creeds.

These developments have challenged policy makers and religious leaders alike to be more attentive to the interests of religious constituencies. But they also pose challenges to the ways in which we *think* about religion. They force us to question whether our conventional theories are adequate or whether we need to conceive of religion and politics in new ways. In raising this question, these developments also point toward a deepening crisis in social theory itself. If our theories have been wrong in making predictions about religion and politics, perhaps they are misleading in other ways as well.

Realizing the dimensions of this crisis, some scholars have argued that formal theoretical frameworks should be abandoned entirely. They advise going to the field, writing up what one sees, and not trying to mold these observations to fit any preconceived theory. Social science should, in their view, be like good journalism: it should

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richly describe, but not engage in interpretation or explanation. But can the assumptions and presuppositions that go with received theoretical frameworks be so easily abandoned? Even when scholars try to be purely descriptive, they choose to write about some topics and to ignore others. These choices betray implicit theoretical assumptions. Furthermore, these assumptions continue to guide scholars as they try to determine the meaning and significance of world events. If these events have indeed left our inherited theoretical perspectives in shambles, it is high time we took stock of the damage.

Three theories have, until recently, dominated most discussions of religion and politics. The first—modernization theory—will in broad outline be familiar to most readers. Although it has been the subject of much criticism, its assumptions continue to undergird much of our conventional wisdom about religion and politics. A second perspective—which I will refer to as "world-system theory"—has emerged more recently in the writings of a number of sociologists, political scientists, and historians, partly in response to the perceived weaknesses of modernization theory. World-system theory provides some powerful insights into the changing nature of religion and politics, but it too, I shall argue, is a flawed perspective. Critical theory is a third approach that has become increasingly popular in recent years among social scientists. Its assertions about religion and politics provide another vantage point from which to assess the current crisis in social theory.

MODERNIZATION THEORY

Theories of modernization, despite the criticisms voiced by their detractors, have been so prominent in the social sciences—and have played such an important role in contemporary thinking about social change even outside the social sciences—that efforts to understand the changing relations between states and religious institutions usually begin here. A wide variety of competing arguments huddles nervously together under the conceptual umbrella of modernization theory. But these arguments share many implicit assumptions, and thus provide a relatively coherent framework in which to think about religion and politics.

The central presupposition of modernization theory is that "modern" societies can be distinguished from societies that are still "traditional" or undergoing development. Among the characteristics that might signal the presence of greater modernity are levels of industrialization, the degree to which advanced technology is used, indicators of overall economic development, literacy, scope of the education system, urban density, and administrative capacities of the state. These characteristics may be sufficiently associated with one another that it makes good empirical sense to array societies along a single continuum of modernization.

Modernization theory also suggests that a wholesale movement has been going on in the world for some time—a movement from less modern to more modern. Some societies, such as Great Britain and the United States, started along this path relatively early and thus have progressed further, while others (for example, South Korea) are relative latecomers in the process. Still others (for example, Ethiopia) have hardly started down the track at all.[1]

The shift away from tradition, say modernization theorists, has drastic negative repercussions for religion. Religion everywhere has played an integral role in traditional societies. To move toward modernity, therefore, political leaders must displace the authority of religious leaders and in other ways devalue the importance of traditional religious institutions. "Secularization" thus refers to the fact that religion comes to have a less prominent or influential position in modern societies or to the fact that it retains its influence only by conforming increasingly to such norms as rationality and relativism or by making compromises with science, economic concerns, and the state.[2] The recent phenomenon in the United States known as "creation science" provides a vivid example. Despite the fact that creation scientists are trying to fight the spread of evolutionary theory, they are in effect championing the scientific method, rather than religious faith, as the ultimate arbiter of truth.

Modernization theory attributes numerous doctrinal and organizational changes in religion to the secularization process. As societies modernize, say these theorists, religious doctrine focuses more on happiness in this life and less on otherworldly compensations. Doctrine also becomes less dogmatic, taking on a live-and-let-live orientation conditioned by the fact that people become more aware of the realities of competing worldviews. A Baptist may believe staunchly in the truth of Baptist dogma, but the operative word is "believe." Truth becomes a matter of personal opinion because of the contention among competing versions of the truth.

According to modernization theory, the gods themselves may undergo a transformation, ceasing to perform miraculous deeds, no longer reigning as unquestioned authorities, but symbolizing love and redemption or sanctioning humanistic ethical systems. More emphasis may also be placed on symbols themselves because people come to recognize the difference between religious symbols and the underlying truths these symbols represent. Religious functionaries lose their unique claim to power as a result of competition from secular professionals and a general rise in education levels and values stressing individual discretion. Religious organizations, in turn, come to focus on a narrower range of social functions and are likely to adopt marketing strategies and formal bureaucratic procedures in order to compete effectively.[3]

Modernization theory emphasizes the long-term direction of such changes. But it also makes assertions about the rate, timing, and severity of short-term change, including episodic shifts that may have important ramifications for the relations between religion and politics. A "take-off" period involving sudden economic growth, but lasting only several decades, may occur during the long march from tradition to modernity. During the late 1600s, for example, the English economy grew by quantum leaps, bringing into prominence a new mode of production and a new political regime as well. The religious consequences were severe. Old patterns were overthrown within a relatively short period, making new patterns all the more visible and controversial.

Reversals in the modernization process may also be evident, or, barring those, tradition-bound groups may at times mobilize temporary resistance to the forces of modernity. Thus, some of the turmoil seen in the religious sphere may be understandable as protests against modernization. Should industrialization spurt ahead, for instance, religious groups rooted in agrarian life-styles are likely to mobilize sentiment against these economic changes. After a rapid advance of this kind, a temporary economic setback may play directly into the hands of such opposition movements, giving them greater credibility and channeling dissidents into their ranks.[4]

Modernization theory has been applied most widely to societies in the Third World that have undergone rapid change in recent decades, experiencing religious turbulence in conjunction with this change. The secularization that took place in many Latin American countries, such as the anticlericalism that accompanied the Mexican Revolution, has been described as part of the political modernization process. In order to legitimate their new regimes, modernizing political leaders cast off, and perhaps even outlaw, the public trappings of the church. Should the modernization process falter, as it has in various African countries, traditional religions may be able to reassert themselves, at least temporarily.[5]

But modernization theory is, on the whole, a lot like late Ptolemaic conceptions of the solar system. What was once a simple and elegant explanatory framework has increasingly become a profusion of ad hoc arguments about retrograde motion, epicycles, and anomalous stellar observations. Fundamentalism in particular has caused modernization theory no end of grief and embarrassment. No sooner does a country like Iran undergo enormous modernization than a fundamentalist dictatorship takes over. Its leaders prove not to be the disadvantaged but people who benefited materially from the modernization process itself.

Even the United States has refused to obey the laws of cultural motion prescribed by modernization theorists. According to these laws, the high level of economic development achieved by the United States over the past century should have reduced its level of religious commitment to one of the lowest in the world. But among industrialized countries, the United States continues to manifest one of the highest levels of religious commitment. And, despite general declines in voter turnout and political participation in the populace at large, the religiously orthodox have become *more* politically active in recent years.

WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY

Critics of modernization theory have also chided it for treating societies as isolated units. As the world has become increasingly interdependent, this assumption makes little sense. No society moves by itself along some predetermined track from traditionalism to modernity. The societies of the world interact with one another as parts of a global system. The reason one society lags behind others, or the reason why a society suddenly takes a step toward modernity, usually involves its relations with other societies. These international relations, say the critics, must be understood if we are to make sense of changing relations between religious groups and domestic politics.

World-system theory has emerged over the past fifteen years as a leading contender with modernization theory.[6] As the name suggests, world-system theory emphasizes the larger social, economic, and political relations that link societies together. These relations began to emerge in the sixteenth century, according to world-system theorists, chiefly as a result of international trade and diplomacy among the European states. Gradually, this system became the driving force of modern capitalism, and its borders came to encompass most of the globe by the end of the nineteenth century. At present, therefore, the contours of societal change on virtually every continent, say these theorists, must be understood in terms of the dynamics of this larger system.

The intellectual origins of world-system theory can be traced to various off-shoots of Marxism, including studies of political economy, theories of imperialism, and ideas about dependent development. Also significant is the fact that this perspective emerged in the early 1970s among writers who had been critical of the Vietnam War and who saw modernization theory as one of the reasons for US involvement in that war. The oil embargo, the hostage crisis, and other international events of the 1970s contributed to the rising popularity of this perspective. To its credit, world-system theory has recognized the importance of the state—totalitarian or democratic—in ways that conventional Marxism did not. But because of its epistemological assumptions about the priority of material conditions, world-system theory has paid little attention specifically to the role of religious beliefs or religious institutions. It has been necessary, therefore, for other theorists to suggest ways in which the world-system perspective can be useful for understanding changes in these beliefs and institutions.

Applications of world-system theory to questions of religious change have focused to a great extent on the ways in which short-term changes in the world-economy may affect the stability of religious institutions. Some of the arguments that have been advanced do not differ markedly from those advanced within the modernization framework. Generally, though, world-system theory has placed greater emphasis than modernization theory on the abrupt, disruptive, and conflictual nature of changes in the world-economy. Because societies' fortunes are said to be so closely connected with the dynamics of the broader system, many things can happen over which societies themselves have little control. For instance, a periodic downturn in the business cycle can have severe repercussions for a tiny country whose economy depends heavily on exports. Or an outbreak of war may cut off trading channels, resulting in equally serious disruptions in exporting societies. Religious institutions may be caught in the middle of such changes: pro-Western religious orientations may suddenly become unpopular because of changes in trading alliances, peasants may turn to millenarian or folk religions to revitalize economically threatened communities, and communist or nationalist movements among oppressed urban workers may strike out at traditional religious organizations.[7]

World-system theory's roots in Marxism have made it particularly sensitive to the cyclical nature of modernization. Rather than modernization moving happily toward greater prosperity and enlightenment for all, its movement is depicted by world-system theorists as one of fits and starts, all within a kind of Hobbesian drama. As capitalism spreads through the world economy, it produces war, oppression, and hardship for many even though it may generate prosperity for a few.[8] Capitalism also becomes subject to its own internal contradictions. Thus, cycles of rapid expansion in economic production are likely to be followed by downturns conditioned by slackening demand; the costs of acquiring and protecting new markets through diplomatic deals and military intervention eventually outweigh the gains to be had from these markets; dominant countries gradually lose their hegemonic power; and the whole system becomes subject to the strains of realignment as new countries or new modes of production rise to prominence.

Within a single society, the social dislocations attendant upon these broader strains may look very similar to the observer who focuses only on that society and the observer who emphasizes world-system dynamics. What the world-system theorist insists on bringing into the picture is some understanding of the external forces that contribute to these dislocations. Two lines of inquiry are likely to follow. One stresses the ways in which regimes and elites in a particular society respond to these external forces. Rather than seeing religious conflict strictly as a domestic issue, the observer looks at it in terms of the military obligations, foreign debt, trade advantages or disadvantages, coup d'états, and so on that may be inspired by broader diplomatic, military, and economic considerations. The other stresses ways in which such conflicts and dislocations in particular societies may exemplify patterns of a more general or systemic nature. Rather than viewing upheavals in Central America in isolation from those in the Middle East, for example, observers are inclined to ask how both may reflect debt patterns in the world economy, or the competition among superpowers for energy supplies, or the arms race.

Perhaps the key attraction of world-system theory, overall, is that it sensitizes social scientists to the growing global interdependence that now exists among nation-states. For studies of religious and political change, this interdependence has clearly begun to be a consideration that cannot be overlooked. But world-system theory, like modernization theory, is often too mechanical and deterministic. It expects capitalism, for example, to progress in predictable cycles of upswings and downswings. Some world-system theorists go so far as to suggest that these cycles always take the same length of time—say, fifty years. To scholars trained in the culture of religious beliefs, these theories sound more like modern millenarian predictions than sound scientific hypotheses.

World-system theory is equally remiss in considering the complexities of political conditions. Books arguing that dominant countries like the United States will inevitably decline because of their military obligations also strike the skeptical reader as contemporary versions of the Tarot. What they deny is the multiple factors that make up global politics, including the role of human agency. These theories may provide interesting grist for the sherry hour at Ivy League universities, but they are mute in telling us how to understand the machinations of a Saddam Hussein.

CRITICAL THEORY

The third perspective that bears brief consideration in this context is the so-called Frankfurt school of critical theory. Emerging from the turmoil of World War II in Europe, critical theory is still more predominant there than in the United States, but in recent years it has become increasingly influential among American social scientists as well. Indeed, one reason for its growing popularity is that it has tried to adopt a critical stance toward both the totalitarianism it saw in the Soviet Union and the materialism it saw in the United States, whereas modernization theory has often appeared to be an apologetic for US imperialism and world-system theory has been overly negative toward US policies.

Critical theory has been advanced most notably in the recent work of German sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Focused at a relatively high level of theoretical abstraction, his work is often difficult to connect with concrete developments in world politics. But it has been an appealing frame of reference, especially for theologians and others concerned with the public role of religion, because it attempts to be normative (or prescriptive) as well as empirical.[9]

Habermas has drawn eclectically from modernization theory and from Marxism to create what he calls a reconstructive model of cultural evolution. In this model the modern epoch is characterized by an abandonment of the three-tiered or dualistic universe of traditional religion, by a reliance on scientific and technical reasoning, and by increasing state intervention to promote advanced industrial capitalism and to combat its ill effects on social life. We are, however, on the verge of transcending the modern epoch, he claims, and are moving into a postmodern period. Habermas regards this as a vital step that must be taken in order to better master the contingencies we face. The twin evils that beset us resemble the evils identified by Weber and Marx in the nineteenth century. From Weber, Habermas borrows a concern for the effects of bureaucratization, and from Marx, a focus on the evils of the capitalist market. The former is associated mainly with the modern state and, strategically, gives Habermas a means of criticizing his neighbors to the East, while the latter conjures up the dangers of rampant free enterprise which, to many Europeans, the United States epitomizes. Underlying both tendencies, however, is what Habermas calls *technical reason.* This is a reliance on instrumental logic as a means of adapting to the material environment. It contrasts with an emphasis on open and free debate about the goals and values of society itself—what Habermas calls *communicative action.* To gain command of our collective destinies, Habermas believes we must cultivate communicative action.

From this perspective, many of the religious movements we see emerging in various parts of the world—especially those in advanced industrial societies—can be understood as protests against the growing bureaucratization and monetization of the lifeworld. Environmentalism, home schooling, certain variants of feminist theory, and even Christian or Islamic fundamentalism may be understood as examples of such protest. Habermas suggests that we are finally becoming aware of the threats that confront our quality of life, our sense of ourselves, and our natural environment. As a consequence, we see an increasing number of movements attempting to combat these threats. He cites the various mystical and human potential groups that have arisen in opposition to the impersonality of modern life, the efforts mounted by established religious groups to advocate equality and social justice in the name of traditional or divine values, communal experiments with the reshaping and redefinition of work, and special interest groups concerned with gender roles, the family, and environmental pollution.

Habermas takes a critical view of all these movements, however, because he regards their own theoretical vision as being too narrow. The solution, he argues, must come from a better understanding of the communication process itself. Thus, some developments in theological hermeneutics attract him as examples of such progress.[10] But he believes that secular philosophy, rather than religious tradition, holds the basic key for advancing civilization to a higher level of self-mastery and rationality. In the short term, he predicts a heightening of social unrest in which various short-lived religious movements play an important role. His long-term hope for the future lies in moving beyond religious tradition, abandoning its claims on the sacred, and moving toward a culture based on rationality.

All this is fine as a prescription for an ideal world. But critical theory clearly has little to say that might help us understand the dimensions of conflict evident on every continent. Its empirical referents are limited implicitly to the superpowers and to post hoc reasoning about short-lived protest movements in industrial societies. Its normative claims are even more limited. Despite the grand pretensions of these claims, they deny the power of myth and symbolism, neglect the human need for meaning and misconstrue the intricacies of language. Critical theory may provide a model of rational communication for an elite debating society with no ties to the outside world. But its broad claims only attest to the seriousness of the theoretical malaise present in the social sciences.

THE DUAL CRISIS IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY

From this brief review, it may appear that contemporary theories of religion and politics need to be revised, synthesized, or abandoned altogether. Any of these options might result in fewer surprises when theory is confronted with fact. Like the crisis that beset Ptolemaic astronomy at the end of the Middle Ages, we are perhaps at a time when we need a new paradigm in order to make better predictions about the dynamics of religion and politics in the contemporary world. Were such a theory available, we would not have been caught off guard by the upheaval in Tehran in 1978 or the conservative movements that grew out of Lynchburg and Virginia Beach a few years later.

But we must entertain a more serious possibility: that our understanding of theory itself needs to be revised. What we perhaps need to be looking for is not a new theory of religion and politics, but a new *metatheory* for the social sciences themselves. If recent events in Eastern Europe have undermined Marxist theories, as Westerners would like to think, they have perhaps undermined the empirical positivism that grew out of the scientific revolution as well. If the Middle East continues to produce surprises, these surprises are not simply failings in the capacity of our theories to predict the location and timing of the next political crisis. They are instead surprises that betray a deeper bewilderment and confusion. We do not understand when a Muslim leader calls the United States "the infidel." Nor do we understand when a television preacher in our own society weeps publicly begging God for forgiveness. We do not understand because our theories provide no basis from which to understand. They expect rationality and produce cynical interpretations based on assumptions about self-interest. They stress cause and effect, but leave no room for meaning and significance.

For much of its history, social science has been guided by the positivist assumptions of the Enlightenment. Applied to religion and politics, these assumptions lead inevitably toward a mindset concerned with prediction and control. A good theory is one that allows predictions to be made about the next uprising, the next outbreak of fundamentalist violence, the next conflict between one group of believers and another. And good predictions can help interested parties anticipate these developments with an eye toward controlling them. But this view of the social sciences is rapidly becoming antiquated.

A growing body of literature in the social sciences is coming to regard theory as an *interpretive* exercise, rather than a predictive one. A good theory is thus an interpretive framework that helps us grasp the meaning of events. Doing so may at times help us anticipate when or where similar events will occur in the future. But the more important role of theory is to help us think. Our response to events then can be informed, not so much by knowing their timing and location, but by knowing their significance.

The first crisis in contemporary theory, then, is that we have too often failed to understand what theory is intended to do. As a result, we have paid too much attention to questions of prediction, and given too little attention to the implicit evaluative dimensions built into our theoretical perspectives. Once theory is seen as an interpretive exercise, these evaluative dimensions take on utmost significance, for the meanings we ascribe to events are contingent on how we evaluate the larger settings in which we locate these events. I can illustrate this point by referring briefly to the evaluative choices implicit in each of the three theories we have already considered.

The most consequential choice these theories pose is the evaluative stance to be taken toward economic development. Most variants of modernization theory assume that economic development is both inevitable and desirable. While the transition to modernity may be painful, perhaps especially so for practitioners of traditional faiths, the overall gains must be positive. Physical health, prosperity, greater individual freedom, and cultural sophistication are the measures of these gains. World-system theory and critical theory, in contrast, are more likely to regard economic development as inherently productive of conflict, oppression, and exploitation.

What we look for in studies of religion and the state depends greatly on the stance we take toward these two extreme interpretations of the development process. Studies conducted during the 1950s and early 1960s often took an optimistic view of economic development and, in keeping with this outlook, showed how traditional religions were adapting to Westernization and saw value in the accompanying cultural shifts toward rationalization and individual piety. More recent studies, particularly those informed by the Vietnam War and concurrent critiques of neocolonialism and dependency, have taken a more pessimistic view of economic development. It has become more common, therefore, to see analyses of the role of religion in resistance movements, of exploitative alliances between regimes and established religions, and of the political implications of millenarian, messianic, and other grass-roots religious movements.

A second evaluative choice built into these theories concerns the temporal and spatial framework we decide to emphasize. The perspective implicit in modernization and critical theory uses centuries as the appropriate time frame for understanding social change. How societies have evolved since, say, the thirteenth century is the central issue. Moreover, the spatial framework is often left unspecified, except for references to the West, Europe, or the capitalist system. Against these macroscopic designations, some studies have taken a more specific spatial and temporal orientation, focusing, for example, on a specific event such as the overthrow of the Shah in Iran or episodes such as the conflicts between Jews and Palestinians in Israel. Clearly, one is likely to view the significance of religious conflict differently if it is seen as a mere blip in some broad evolutionary scheme or if its immediate costs in human lives are emphasized.

To say that theory must focus more on interpretation than on explanation may at first glance seem like a point that should be easy to concede. But a shift in this direction, carried to its full implications, would indeed reveal the seriousness of the contemporary crisis in social theory. For the premise on which positivism has been based is that alternative theories can be tested, and they can be tested in the crucible of empirical reality. Theory, viewed as an evaluative framework, denies this premise. Alternative interpretations may not be decided on the basis of fact alone, but in terms of how they locate those facts in relation to broader meanings and values.

The second reason why contemporary social theory is in crisis is related to the first. In seeking to make empirical predictions, each of the three theories we have considered focuses on the broad dynamics of economic and political systems as the determining forces in the modern world. All three regard religion as something that wiggles when these controlling puppeteers pull the strings. None of the three take religion seriously.

They do not give credit to the shaping power of religious actors themselves. They do not recognize the sway religious leaders may hold over their followers or the role of faith in motivating people to take political action. They have neglected these forces because they were striving for elegant predictions based on premises about the priority of secular tendencies in modern history. But when theory shifts from prediction to interpretation, then the meaning of events can be understood only if the *religious meaning* of those events is also included.

This, too, poses a serious challenge to the premises of contemporary theory. It has been assumed, as the foregoing remarks about Habermas have indicated, that social theory can provide a privileged or authoritative interpretation of social events. Social theory is thus a kind of hegemonic discourse with respect to all other discourses. It claims to see more objectively, more rationally, more factually, and from a wider horizon than any other interpretation. But taking religion seriously means granting it parity as an interpretive framework. This is why social theory prevents us from understanding what it means to be an "infidel" civilization. That term grows out of a different framework entirely. To understand it requires abandoning social science as a privileged framework and shifting toward a view of multiple discourses, each illuminating the meaning of events in different ways.

Moving beyond the impasse in contemporary theory, therefore, requires us to adopt an interpretive stance toward the role of theory and a more appreciative stance toward religion. I do not mean that we must abandon rigor, or the desire for objectivity, or view religious fanaticism with sympathy. But we must try to interpret the significance of contemporary events in terms of the hopes and aspirations of their participants, including their hopes for salvation and spiritual renewal, rather than trying to mold these events to fit some preconceived views about the secular movement of history.

Taking into account the aims and aspirations of religious communities adds indeterminacy to our models of history. Everything becomes messier and yet truer to the world in which we actually live. At the same time, these aims and aspirations do not take place in a social vacuum. We can understand them best if we recognize how they are shaped by the social and cultural environments in which people live. There is a constant interaction, or tension, between the ways in which people pursue their objectives and the constraints their worlds impose on these pursuits.

BEYOND THE PRESENT IMPASSE

I have, to this point, deliberately neglected some of the more exciting directions in recent empirical work on religion and politics in order to emphasize the lingering biases evident in prevailing theoretical perspectives. But there are promising signs that scholarship is now moving beyond these inherited biases. Studies of the ways in which cultural meanings are shaped in (and by) religious movements are especially promising, as are studies that emphasize the episodic and discontinuous nature of changing religious patterns. In both, a new perspective that interprets religious and political change as part of a restructuring process is beginning to emerge.

The rediscovery of culture in the social sciences is forcing scholars to recognize that religion and politics are always subject to the ways in which people define them. Already, studies have been appearing in which greater attention is given to religious and political symbolism.[11] Some studies have also begun to locate symbolism more squarely in the domain of everyday social practice, including discourse, sermons, speeches, and the emergence of dialogue within and between religious communities.[12] By emphasizing culture these studies show that religious communities do not simply respond to external forces in their world, but actively shape these forces.

Scholars interested in religion and politics are also being forced to reconsider their views of social change. There is, to be sure, a lingering assumption that modern societies face unique and unprecedented challenges. The language of predicament and paradox is altogether common, as are diagnoses that stress the radical discontinuity between modernity and its past. It is significant, however, that a host of recent studies has challenged these assumptions and shown the importance of continuities with the past, even in situations of seemingly radical religious innovation. Whereas earlier studies focused primarily on questions of long-term historical movement from one point to another, recent studies also suggest more complex and erratic trajectories of change.[13] In examining the relations between religion and the state, it becomes especially important to consider what in particular has changed under certain conditions, and what in particular has not changed. Studies concerned with these questions are often particularly valuable in helping us to decide how to interpret specific episodes of change. Rather than associating them only with long-term trends, they show the complexity of our world and the degree to which its trajectory depends on our own decisions. A focus on *religious restructuring* often provides the best way to see how various conditions come together to bring about these important changes.[14]

To say that religion undergoes "restructuring" is to recognize the changing social and political roles that religious communities are playing throughout the contemporary world. As they address the major issues facing their societies, these religious communities are forced to adapt, to take on a new posture, even as they try to remain true to their heritage. At the same time, they are often successful in forcing other institutions to change as well. The result is a dynamic transition in the relations between religious communities and their social environments. In this process, it is especially important to recognize how religious leaders and their secular counterparts negotiate the cultural definitions of their respective institutions.

It is often taken for granted that religion is one thing and politics another. This assumption reinforces the hegemonic position of social theory, suggesting that religion and politics are categories that have some a priori status that only the theorist can specify. But the meaning of the two is, in fact, subject to disagreement and negotiation. A fundamentalist may view the state as a sacred entity. A secularist may regard it as something utterly separate from religion. Conflicts between fundamentalists and secularists, therefore, are not simply about "religion" or "politics," but are cultural battles over the very definition of these terms.

Sensitivity to the ways in which cultural categories are defined can provide valuable clues to understanding the dimensions and directions of religious restructuring. One can think of these cultural definitions as fissures which, when subjected to stress, become major fault lines along which changes in religion take place. A minor rift between two ethnic factions, for example, can break into open warfare when aggravated by other social changes. More subtly perhaps, ambiguities about the character of public morality can provide a basis for religious conflict when one faction chooses to take a hard line on motivations and another takes an equally hard line on results.

If cultural boundaries can be likened to the fissures that run through the social terrain, then any effort to understand religious restructuring must also pay attention to the great forces that bring pressure to bear on these fissures and that effect a reshaping of the entire landscape. At the broadest level, some of these forces are likely to be understandable only in terms of dynamics in the larger world-system. At more proximate levels, one can also focus on domestic societal dynamics and on the shifts internal to religious organizations themselves.

Changes in the larger world-system are likely to consist of shifts in overall rates of economic growth, changes that reverberate from the rise and fall of great powers, alterations in the terms of international relations, variations in degrees of uncertainty and conflict, and even modifications in the extent to which people are aware of these larger relations. As suggested earlier, many of these changes occur in the relative near term and thus may have serious repercussions on religious and other institutions. These are likely to be exogenous shocks to any particular society, and they may have especially serious fallout for religious organizations. Even though religious leaders themselves may not be in the forefront of international trade or diplomatic negotiations, religious traditions are likely to be a significant part of what separates or joins two societies' cultural orientations. Religious groups can facilitate or undermine the legitimacy of alliances, and any such alliances may spell victory, defeat, or at least minor alterations in the life chances of population segments whose identities are defined by religious commitments.

Domestic social changes are likely to comprise the more immediate conditions under which religious restructuring takes place. Many of these changes may ultimately have international dimensions as well, but it is the more proximate contexts to which religious loyalties respond. Examples include the more or less routine transitions from one regime to another that accompany the electoral process; more abrupt political transitions that may come about as a result of coups or assassinations; policy initiatives that open new jobs in certain sectors of the economy and close down others; programs designed to alleviate human suffering and satisfy demands for minimal levels of social welfare; and social changes associated with the educational upgrading, professionalization, or gender redefinition of the labor force. Too often social scientists have assumed that these issues could be understood mainly in terms of political policy, as if the state were the only way of effecting significant social change. What religious leaders have recognized is that these policies also have a human dimension, affecting how people think of themselves and their communities. Taking religion seriously means putting the soul back into these dispirited policy perspectives.

It also means recognizing that religious communities develop their own patterns and traditions and do things because these traditions carry intrinsic meaning. Political ramifications occur for reasons other than the pursuit of power itself. Sometimes they occur because religious practitioners care about the future of their own organizations or because they believe in divine truth. When writer Salman Rushdie confessed his conversion to Islam, following two years in hiding after being sentenced to death by Muslim leaders, Western scholars were quick to suggest that he had sold out and converted only to save his neck. What they might have taken more seriously is the persuasive power of religious tradition in its own right.

These considerations suggest, in the final analysis, that the relations between religious institutions and their host societies are unlikely to be static. That assumption may be more appropriate in some societies than in others. Certainly, it appears that the position of religion in a great many societies has taken new and unexpected turns in recent years. The specific turns cannot be predicted beforehand; indeed, to think they can is to misunderstand the purpose of social theory. But the factors influencing these twists and turns must be examined and interpreted if we are to grasp their meaning. This is perhaps a novel idea against the backdrop of a century of positivism in the social sciences, but it is, ironically, deeply consistent with the nature of religious tradition itself, for those traditions reminded their adherents to be mindful of the times. And they regarded their followers as a pilgrim people whose tents would always be in motion through the wilderness.

ENDNOTES

[1] For an overview, see C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

[2] The work of Peter Berger represents one of the principal foci of modernization theory as applied to matters of secularization, see especially "A Sociological View of the Secularization of Theology," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 6 (1967): 1–18, and *The Sacred Canopy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967); and for an overview, see Phillip E. Hammond, "Religion in the Modern World," in James Davidson Hunter, and Stephen C. Aiklay, eds., *Making Sense of Modern Times: Peter L. Berger and the Vision of Interpretive Sociology* (London: Routledge, 1986), 143–58.

[3] A most useful theoretical treatment of these changes remains that of Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 20–50.

[4] On the dynamics of modernization and demodernization, see Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness* (New York: Random House, 1973); see also Daniel Bell, "The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of Religion," in *The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys, 1960–1980* (Cambridge: Abt Books, 1980), 333–45.

[5] For a strongly stated argument against modernization theory's assertions about religion, see Mary Douglas, "The Effects of Modernization on Religious Change," *Dædalus* 111 (1) (Winter 1982): 1–20.

[6] In sociology the basic perspective of world-system theory is outlined in Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1974), and *The Capitalist World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); for a critical review, see Daniel Garst, "Wallerstein and His Critics," *Theory and Society* 14 (1985), 469–96. Wallerstein draws heavily on the work of French historian Fernand Braudel; see, for example, his *Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). Other contributions that have shaped this perspective include Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); and Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974). On the specific differences between modernization theory and world-system theory, see especially Wallerstein, "Modernization: Requiescat in Pace," in Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *The Capitalist World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 132–37.

[7] Examples of applications and adaptations of world-system theory to questions of religious change include Gary Nigel Howe, "The Political Economy of American Religion: An Essay in Cultural History," in Scott G. McNall, ed., *Political Economy: A Critique of American Society* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1981), 110–36; Phillip E. Hammond, "Power Changes and Civil Religion: The American Case," in Albert Bergesen, ed. *Crises in the World-System* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983), 155–72; George M. Thomas, *Christianity and Culture in the 19th-Century United States: The Dynamics of Evangelical Revivalism, Nationbuilding, and the Market* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 215–64.

[8] Without adopting the "world-system" label, other studies of the expanding world order have also focused on these disruptive consequences; for example, Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); and Peter Worsley, *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[9] Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987); for a brief critical overview of Habermas's arguments, see Hugh Baxter, "System and Life-world in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action," *Theory and Society* 16 (1987): 39–86.

[10] Habermas's work, in turn, has attracted a growing following among theologians and ethicists; see, for example, Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

[11] For an empirical study that argues strongly for mapping out the cultural terrain of religion and politics, in opposition to Marxist interpretations, see Karen E. Fields, *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[12] Studies of liberation theology have been especially cognizant of these relations between ideology and practice; see, for example, Clodovis Boff, *Liberation Theology from Confrontation to Dialogue* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); in a different setting, see the emphasis on "symbolic practice" in Jean Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

[13] These erratic trajectories receive special attention in the essays included in Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland, *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987).

[14] My own attempt to utilize a perspective of this kind is *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

N. J. Demerath III

Religious Capital and Capital Religions: Cross-Cultural and Non-Legal Factors in the Separation of Church and State

THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE is a major component of the American political system and its civil religious mythology. As an article of faith, it is widely regarded as a unique American heritage, constitutionally created and legally sustained. This paper challenges both its singularity and its legal dependence by placing the United States in comparative and cross-cultural perspective. Even within such nominally religious states as Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, and Thailand, there is far more separation than is widely supposed, as religion provides more political piety than governing influence. Since the similarities with the United States are at least as important as the differences, and since "separation" in these contexts is not a legal phenomenon, a more general sociopolitical explanation seems in order. Hence, this paper offers a series of reasons for the gap between religion and government, drawing both on the politics of the state and on the societal position of religion itself. Not to put too fine a point on the matter, religion's capital is frequently maximized when it is not a capital religion.

COMBATTING PROVINCIALISM

Every society is an enterprise of faith, and often the faith endures despite reality. It is precisely in this civil religious nexus of interpretations and idealizations that societies shape their futures while reshaping their pasts. One fundamental tenet of the American faith

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concerns a "separation of church and state"[1] that is generally portrayed as a mythically inviolable and quintessentially American product of our constitutional heritage.

Against such a background, this paper may be seen as impious and heretical. But in questioning some of the basic shibboleths of separation, it falls within the time-honored Weberian tradition of exposing "ideal types" to empirical assessment.[2] The separation of church and state is a construct of political theory rather than a description of governing reality. To what extent does the two-hundred-year-old theory coincide with a still developing reality, not only in the United States but in other nations around the globe?

Max Weber himself offered a beginning point for this assessment. In discussing the "relations between ecclesiastic and secular power," he delineates three major types: *hierocratic, theocratic,* and *caesaropapist.*[3] In the first, secular power is dominant but cloaked in religious legitimacy; in the second, ecclesiastic authority is preeminent; and in the third, secular power holds sway over religion itself. Note that the possibility of actual separation looms as a possible fourth category but is not mentioned by Weber, presumably because it lacks even the minimal empirical credibility necessary to qualify in ideal-typical terms.

Of course, Weber was writing in a quite different political and religious context. But recent American legal scholars have also expressed skepticism on the point. As Samuel Krislov has recently put it: " 'Separation' of church and state is an artificial concept not really capable of easy implementation or logical achievement."[4] Certainly any myth of *absolute* separation is scotched quickly in examining the American experience,[5] and it would be unfair to compare our shibboleths to other societies' realities. American politics have often come wrapped in religious piety. The list of exceptions to both the "free exercise" and the "establishment" clauses of the Constitution's First Amendment defies brief summary. Some reflect a lack of compliance with court decisions (for example, persistent prayer in the public schools), and others have been recently endorsed by the Supreme Court itself (for example, legislative chaplains or Christmas creches on public property). Perhaps it is not surprising that the courts have winked at some of the exceptions while specifically authorizing others. After all, the law entails a different sort of ideal-typifying, and consistency is not a virtue of even the Supreme Court's judgments in this area.

Yet asking for a pure distinction is surely asking for too much in an impure world. Even if Jefferson's "wall of separation" is not impenetrable, it remains one principle of American statecraft that is actually honored more in the observance than in the breach. Indeed, "separation" is not just a source of our civic pride but a reasonably reliable guide to our political behavior. While the gap between church and state is not sacrosanct, it is not trivial either. When religion and government are mixed, it is rarely lightly, and the results are often contested whether they involve encroachments on religious liberty or establishment entanglements.

But what of the putative uniqueness and legal grounding of America's separationism? Here we need to invoke cross-national comparisons to place the United States in proper perspective. Of course, one does not have to travel to take a cross-cultural trip. The reports of others are amply available, and some have even been submitted to comparative codification. Consider Krislov's summary of a recent survey of 142 national constitutions around the world conducted by Van Moorseven and Van der Tan:[6]

> A 1978 study of written constitutions (computer analyzed no less) indicates that forty-three (or 30 percent) of those analyzable provided for a national religion and ninety-nine (or 70 percent) did not. Thirty-three countries specified religion, most notably for the office of religious minister. All but twenty had some reference to church or religion. Sixty-one (or 43 percent) guaranteed freedom of religion, while sixty-four (or 47 percent) guaranteed both religious freedom and the right to be affiliated religiously. Only ten (7 percent) have no constitutional provision of this type. Provisions for freedom of religion are much more common than provisions for freedom of thought; indeed, the frequency is almost double that of ... "political freedoms."[7]

This suggests that the American case is not as distinctive as our self-image insists. Some 70 percent have no formal national religion, and all but 7 percent make some constitutional provision for religious freedom. In fact, our First Amendment's prohibition of an "establishment" religion is more unusual than its guarantee of "free exercise"—though, as we shall see shortly, it is perhaps an ironic comment on constitutions generally that many nations have a better record in avoiding establishments that are not constitutionally banned than in nurturing the free exercise that is constitutionally secured. Indeed, what may be most distinctive about our own constitution is not so much its content as the seriousness with which we regard it. Even Americans who know little of its specifics accord it revered status as both a source and a reflection of our political system. In many other countries, constitutions are a changing gloss, and there are some in which a nation's constitutional commitment reflects the sardonic line from a recent American automobile commercial, "[Constitutions] must be good; we've had six of them in the last twelve years."

IN QUEST OF THE RELIGIOUS STATE

Clearly one must probe behind the formalistic facade to find the true relations between a society's religion and government. With this in mind, I recently supplemented my readings in the secondary literature with research visits to several countries whose relations between religion and the state stand in apparent contrast to the United States. Specifically, I was in search of religious states with officially recognized state religions. This ruled out such countries as India, an officially secular nation whose constitutional provisions concerning religion are very similar to the United States; Italy, whose longstanding concordat with the Vatican was dissolved in 1986; and even Israel, whose Jewish identity is more a function of ethnicity and demography than of religion or legality, though there are whole areas of family law set aside for religious jurisdiction—whether Jewish, Muslim, or Christian.

I visited four countries which appeared to meet the test. In travelling through first Pakistan and then Indonesia, I found myself retracing much of V. S. Naipul's "Islamic journey" for his provocative but strangely haughty volume, *Among the Believers*.[8] Buddhist Thailand offered a window onto a quite different non-Western religious culture. Finally, while Sweden marked a return to the West and to Christianity, its state Lutheranism provides still another contrast with the United States.

Of course, cross-cultural analysis is notoriously vulnerable to distortion. However, a master of the genre, Clifford Geertz, offers some encouragement in his shimmering essay on law as "local knowledge." First, he suggests that "apologizing . . . never does any good anyhow."[9] Second, he stands another cautionary maxim on its head:

> Santayana's famous dictum that one compares only when one is unable to get to the heart of the matter seems to me, here at least, the precise reverse of the truth: it is through comparison, and of comparables, that whatever heart we can actually get to is to be reached.[10]

Elsewhere, Geertz stresses the advantages of "thick description" in any ethnographic study.[11] Alas, even a middling account is a casualty of the present format. Without pretending that this research is sufficiently thick in either its earlier uncut incarnation or possible expansion to book length, almost all of the country-by-country details have been deleted here. I am hopeful that a brief summary will serve as a bridge to the more analytic sections which follow.

Comparative scholars invariably enter the field with predispositions, including whether one is prepared to maximize differences or similarities with one's home society. Raised on a diet of liberal cultural relativism, Western social scientists are inclined to look more for contrasts than for similarities, as was I in beginning my quest for religious states. Gradually, however, I began to realize that some similarities were pressing, and that, despite manifold cultural differences among societies, there were a number of shared structural circumstances. Thus, nations are increasingly united not only by their participation in a common international political economy but also by a shared vulnerability to many of the same internal religious and political dynamics. But before pressing the point, let me provide brief introductions to the four societies at issue.

Pakistan offers a case of not only a religious state but a society undergoing religious ferment. This was especially true under the 1977–1988 regime of the late Zia ul-Haq and his campaign for national "Islamization." Yet there were widespread doubts about both the campaign's success and its sincerity. Many who credited the prime minister's private piety were cynical about his public motives.[12] Opposition came particularly from the ranks of those who stood to suffer most from a literal and inflexible reliance on the eighth-century Koran—for example, educated women and the country's economic elite. But there was also restiveness among some members of Pakistan's two dominant Muslim communities, the majority Sunnis and the minority Shiites. The two had coexisted relatively amicably since the country's bloody partition from India in 1947. But now that there was a possibility of conferring real power on the Islamic courts and mullahs, conflict quickened as questions arose concerning which Islamic group would define and wield such power. Finally, some government insiders suggested that the campaign itself was a "fraud," and that Zia himself had begun to see its disadvantages. While the "Shariat Bill" remained pending, his policy seemed to be one of keeping the pot simmering without allowing it to come to a boil. While the tension was somewhat reduced during the brief successor reign of Benazir Bhutto, the current prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, has recently raised the political fire once again by announcing renewed support for the bill and the campaign.

Meanwhile, Indonesia presents an instructively different scenario under its longtime President Suharto. Arguably the world's largest Muslim nation, it is also among the world's most religiously pluralistic societies. The paradox is rooted in the common Indonesian's self-description as "Muslim—but not like the Iranians; in fact, I'm also part Buddhist, part Hindu, part Christian and part animist." This mirrors the country's multilayered and syncretic cultural history.[13] The government reflects a similar ambivalence. While acknowledging its Islamic base, it has also sought to snuff the fires of Islamic fundamentalism, against which it has protected itself both culturally and structurally. Culturally, the government requires national fealty to the broadly integrative and panreligious principles of *pancasila,* a politically manipulated civil religion functioning as a vague tabula rasa on which only the government itself can write. Structurally, the government has developed a national political apparatus called *golkar,* which is part party machine, part civil service, and part Big Brother.[14] Here too, then, there is a considerable gap between the state and its official religious system.

Certainly there is no question of Buddhism's cultural dominance within Thailand; however, its relation to the state is problematic. As recent presidential successions have made clear, Thailand's government shares with both Pakistan and Indonesia a closer relation to the military than to religion. It also shares an asymmetry by which the state exerts far more control over religion than does religion over the state.[15] This is partly because of qualities inherent within Buddhism itself. Whereas Koranic Islam knows no distinction between religion and power (and hence is especially disadvantaged in the presence of contemporary state structures which set it aside), Buddhism has long observed such a distinction as an ideal (and hence is differently disadvantaged by current political processes). Although Thai Buddhism does have a national administrative structure in the *songha,* it lacks a powerful ecclesiastical agency or ideology. In addition, its tradition of monkish mysticism and anticharismatic humility makes Buddhism an unlikely base for a political movement.[16] Indeed, the Thai government has struck a bargain with the Buddhists which is very much on the government's terms. In return for providing a number of stipends and subventions, the state has secured powers of appointment to important religious posts as well as representation in religious councils, effective veto power over many religious policy decisions, and the right to legal intervention in instances of internal religious disputes. Both despite and because of Buddhism's position at the core of Thai culture, its political and administrative aspects are more appendages to the state than sources of power over it.

Finally, Sweden provides a kind of limiting case for this analysis. A formal religious state under the Lutheran church of Sweden, the country is simultaneously one of the world's most secular societies as measured by almost any criterion of religious behavior or belief. In many respects, Sweden's state religion is more a nostalgic vestige of the past than a vital influence in the present.[17] While the church continues to play "life and death roles," this is actually the straight line for a series of popular witticisms based on several characteristics of the church. First, the clergy earn state support partly by serving the government as census takers enumerating births and passings in their parishes; second, funerals are the one church ritual which continues to be compelling for the majority of the population, as many nonchurch members pay an annual membership tax of several hundred dollars to remain eligible for the rite; third, most active church parishioners are over the age of sixty, and as with American liberal Protestant denominations, this reinforces a moribund quality in the institution. In fact, there is now slow movement in Sweden toward religious disestablishment. This has majority support not only within the country as a whole but even among church leaders who hope separation will prove to be a stimulant. The action remains low on the political agenda, more because of disinterest than opposition.

Earlier we noted that, even in the American case, the separation between church and state is far from absolute. Now we have seen that the kind and degree of separation that exists in the United States may not be unique. Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Sweden all share more functional separation of religion and government than either their politics or their legal structures would suggest. This indicates that an explanation does not lie primarily within laws or constitutions themselves. The remainder of this paper discusses a series of nonlegal considerations which may be more important determinants. They are grouped into two categories: first, those concerning the circumstances of politics and government; second, those involving characteristics of the religious sphere itself.

SHOOTING THE GAP POLITICALLY

As much as the "separation of church and state" is ingrained in American culture, it is scarcely imaginable for any leading American politician to follow the example of the leader of Sweden's Liberal party who recently noted that he does not believe in God, though he respects those who do. Indeed, religion has seldom loomed so large in American politics as over the last decade. Beginning with "born-again Christian" Jimmy Carter, and extending through Ronald Reagan under the influence of the "Moral Majority," piety and politics became almost passionate bedfellows. But there is a major difference between religion's role in American politics and its standing within the three branches of American government. As much as the politicians protest their religious devotion, the Court, the Congress, and the Executive Branch have all been criticized for being too secular in response to religious groups and issues. The separation of church and state may seem moribund from the perspective of political rhetoric, but it is alive and kicking within the structure of government itself.

Much the same situation applies in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Thailand, though Sweden remains an ironic exception as a formally religious state in which religion has only a minor political presence. Elsewhere, it is common for political figures to cloak themselves in religious garb, much like Reagan himself. Note, however, that many of these same politicians have a quite different religious agenda once off the stump and into state administration. Here religion may be not merely irrelevant but a major liability. Absolute religious principles do not fit well in the "compromise" world of actual governance. Theological constraints on state actions do not sit well with elected officials who seek to preserve a capacity for flexible policy responses to changing circumstances. And if religion must be incorporated into law or state policy, most officials prefer very brief and very general codifications which can be variously interpreted as conditions warrant. It is true that this may leave religion as a loose cannon on the decks of the ship of state, but the politicians have at least temporary control of the fuse.

Even the smallest nation today is heavily implicated in an international political economy that requires reliability and predictability in international terms. Local religious customs such as the Islamic prohibition of financial interest introduce extraneous factors which may alienate potential partners and allies. Partly in response to this international context, Third World governments are increasingly specialized, professionalized, and bureaucratized—though not always in that order. Indeed, perhaps the single most dramatic case of a "religious state" has begun to relax its strictures largely for these reasons. Recent reports out of Iran[18] suggest that its political leadership is quietly deemphasizing the Islamic traditionalism of the late Khomeini as a necessary price for readmission into the world economy.

But even where a nation's political leadership is overtly religious, most governments depend upon a sophisticated civil service that may become a community unto itself, one that is frequently secular and sometimes cynical with respect to its nation's traditional religious patterns. Religious commitments made by political officials can be broken by bureaucratic functionaries. However, politicians are more than capable of breaking their own commitments. There is a well-known political dynamic that offers a counter to Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy"[19] in explaining the persistence of elites; elected politicians ultimately lose when "pie-in-the-sky" rhetoric runs afoul of "pie-in-the-face" reality. Politicians often promise more than they can deliver in the search for votes and/or legitimacy, and this portends an almost inevitable fall when they are later held to their own standards. At the risk of metaphoric overkill, any politician who campaigns on the basis of religion is using a double-edged sword.

Any government that seeks legitimacy through religion in the absence of other noncoercive sources may risk long-term losses despite short-term gains. And once religion is introduced into politics, it can be very difficult to pull it back. Not only do its absolute criteria clash with the politics of compromise, but religion tends to be emotionally "hot" and accompanied by its own experts who are frequently difficult to control. Finally, very few state officials relish publicly opposing religious considerations once they have been activated.

All this explains why many politicians want it both ways: that is, public rhetoric on behalf of religion in politics coupled with private efforts to stem the tide within government. This describes recent heads of Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United States. But as pointed out by Johnston and Figa, the problem may be paradoxically compounded, because the "less legitimate the regime, the more it needs the church. . . . [and] the more the church may be disposed to oppose it for moral and evangelical reasons."[20]

From the standpoint of the government, religion may be both a *source* and an *object* of administration. It is a source because it offers an institutional network whose tentacles reach both deep and wide across the society. This allows a variety of administrative efficiencies, ranging from the Swedish census to Indonesia's *golkar* apparatus. Perhaps the classic instance involves the British raj in India, during which the colonial government greatly increased the systematic rigidity of the Hindu caste system to enhance record keeping and administrative control over the sprawling country.

As this suggests, religion may also be an administrative object when it represents a potential base of countermobilization which must be dampened. As a cultural wild card in the frequently fixed game of state politics, religion poses a threat to established policies and policy makers. As we have seen, this is a major reason why "state religions" are more common than "religious states." Governments frequently "volunteer" their offices and resources to "assist" with important religious functions, including religious publication and education, pilgrimages such as the Islamic hajj to Mecca, and the maintenance of churches, mosques, and temples. Alliances between government and religion frequently smack of cooptation, and religious groups sometimes prefer to remain outside of the political establishment and state apparatus to preserve their power potential. Meanwhile, laws concerning the free exercise of religion often have explicit or implicit contingencies concerning the national interest. Such decisions rarely involve the self-conscious constitutionalism of the US Supreme Court's religious rulings and, for example, its four-step "Lemon" criteria for acceptable state religious coincidence and cooperation; they may sometimes entail the actual suppression of speech and assembly. Still, the basic logic applies in the United States as well as elsewhere.

Despite the emphasis thus far on the state's control over religion rather than vice versa, there is no question that religion may exert power in state matters. Even where religion lacks access to the political instruments of "structural power" (whether coercion, votes, budgets, or networks of influentials), it may wield considerable "cultural power," which Rhys Williams and I have defined as follows:

> "Cultural power" is the capacity to use cultural resources to affect political outcomes. These resources include symbols, ideologies, moral authority and cultural meanings. They can be used to legitimate or delegitimate political outcomes or actors, to keep some issues public and political and others out of the public eye altogether, and to frame the terms with which issues are discussed when they are public.[21]

While this kind of power is often overlooked by political analysts, it can be very potent indeed, especially for issues overlaid with moral salience. Without arguing that politicians are bereft of such power, it tends to be especially emphasized by outsiders, social movements, and religious forces lacking more direct structural levers. If it is true that religion and the state often occupy quite different realms in culture and structure respectively, religion is by no means imprisoned within its cultural sphere.

However, movements and institutions which rely on cultural power tend to be limited in the kind of influence wielded. Thus, religion is more likely to achieve some types of political outcomes than others. Here three further distinctions are important: First, religion is less apt to manifest "positive power" than "negative power," where the former involves the ability to initiate action and create change, and the latter entails blocking or vetoing an impending course. Second, religion is less likely to engage in "primary power" than "secondary power," where the former involves the capacity to seize and carry through a policy-making transaction as the prime mover, whereas the latter engages in fine-tuning from the sidelines. Third, religion is less likely to wield "public power" than "private power," where the former refers to actions on the part of the government itself and the latter refers to the actions of the citizenry as individuals. Although this boundary differs from society to society, it is rarely absent and rarely without a constraining influence on religion's legitimacy as a social force.

IRONIES OF RELIGIOUS SECULARIZATION, PLURALISM, AND AUTHORITY

So far we have examined a range of reasons why religion may be clutched to the politician's bosom for purposes of legitimacy but held at arms length in the process of actual governance. Formal religious establishments notwithstanding, the "separation of church and state" is by no means a uniquely American political reflex. But if this is so from the political perspective, what about the vantage point of religion itself? Much of this turns on the much-discussed and widely misunderstood issue of *secularization.*

Few conceits have been more enduring in the West than the notion that other societies will inevitably "evolve," "develop," or "modernize." One critical element of this perspective for Western intellectuals involves the secularization motif. Whether defined as the demystification of the sacred, the diminishment of sacred salience, or the sacred's retreat from the societal core, the process denotes a cultural change that many regard as the inevitable result of such basic developmental processes as Weberian rationalization and Durkheimian differentiation. Imagine, then, the rush to reconsider following the religious recrudescence of the last decade. As religion has seemed to reemerge as a major political force throughout the world, and as a "fundamentalist" revival (however mislabeled) has loomed within virtually every world faith, theories of secularization have been assaulted.[22]

Of course, much of this corrective was deserved; any implication that religion follows a linear course through decline to disappearance is off the mark. At the same time, religion's mere persistence—even its perfervid resurgence—is by no means a clinching rebuttal to a more reasoned secularization thesis. Paradoxically, secularization may be an actual *precondition* for religious vitality in at least three senses:

First, any religious group must continually adapt to changing secular circumstances if it is to remain relevant to its adherents. Secularization is basically an adaptive process. Many "modernist" religious groups faulted for being overly accommodating to their social contexts would only have fewer members served less meaningfully without such compromises. Indeed, this describes the single most common dynamic and largest faction of each of the world's religions—sensationalist news reporting notwithstanding. It characterizes the Islamic majority in both Pakistan and Indonesia as well as Buddhists in Thailand and Christians in Sweden and the United States.

Second, however, religious revivals are frequently direct responses to secularization itself. Every retreat into the past is inevitably a dialectic with the present. Certainly this is true of those who seek a return to some prior and purer religious alternative to the present, as in the fundamentalist case. Note that these movements generally involve persons marginal to—and not to be confused with—the cultural mainstream. Precisely because of their marginality, these groups and their leaders typically lack the broad political credibility necessary to convert sparks into fire. This is true of the leadership of both the American religious Right and the traditionalist mullahs of many Islamic societies.[23] There is a sense in which charges of fundamentalism from the secular camp resemble the charges of communist conspiracy from the political Right. Fundamentalists and secularists occupy identical positions in each others' demonology, and, as Roland Robertson has noted, fundamentalism itself is largely an inverse function of modernism.[24] However, none of this is to deny the force of such religious movements, especially if their elemental flame burns long enough to survive the secularizing tendencies which accompany their mobility into higher status ranks and the ways of conventional politics. In fact, some religious movements have had the ironic effect of increasing modernization in the surrounding society, a point that Arvind Sharma makes with regard to Hinduism in India.[25]

Finally, a third way in which secularity may produce religious vitality concerns the extent to which religious movements serve as surrogates for secular concerns. It is sometimes difficult to disentangle such overlapping causes as religion, power, ethnicity, social class, regionalism, nationalism, and even anti-Westernism. There are instances in which religion is politicized as the only permitted form of social protest, hence a serious masquerade for less "legitimate" grievances. Sometimes this is cynical on the part of protest leaders; at other points it is because religion offers the only available vocabulary and resources for such movements. For whatever reason, cases of public religious conflict may be culturally encoded with secular subtexts and agendas. Thus, some of the force behind Islamic fundamentalism in countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran represents the favored option of traditionalism generally and is akin to the political platform of the American "Moral Majority" in favoring a return to bygone familial, sexual, and economic relations. On the other hand, Islamic fundamentalism in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia serves some student activists as a permissible proxy for prohibited left-wing antigovernment and anti-Western protest. Here, as with social movements generally, recruitment may say more about local social and political networks than about religious sentiment itself.[26] Of course, a leftist political ideology also describes the "base communities" of Latin American Catholicism, where it is sometimes difficult to know which comes first, the ideology or the theology.

Yet the relationship between the secularization and politicization of religion is complex and in part curvilinear. At one extreme, a strictly traditional religion may be so otherworldly and so out of touch with secular issues as to turn its back on politics altogether. At the other extreme, a highly secularized religion may lack the galvanizing force needed for political influence despite the private political concerns of its nominal adherents. Religious groups in the middle of the continuum are most often politically implicated; here secularization has gone far enough to admit political concerns but not so far as to be politically enervating.

Secularization is related to the kind of politicization as well as the degree. In general, secularization tends to be more pronounced among those with greater education, higher status, and more contact with the West—those who are more rewarded by the status quo and hence more likely to favor it politically. Ironically, then, those forms of religion which are most likely to be allied with the state tend to be more secularized rather than less, or less traditionally religious rather than more. Conversely, politically mobilized religion is more apt to be in opposition to the state than in partnership with it.

Meanwhile, secularization is by no means the only major variable at work here; another involves *religious pluralism.* While few societies are as religiously heterogeneous as Indonesia, India, or the United States, virtually none is religiously monolithic. Even where a nation is dominated by a single faith tradition—for example, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish—major differences within the faith frequently loom large—for example, Catholic versus Protestant; Hindu versus Sikh; Sunni versus Shiite; Orthodox versus Reform. How does the degree of heterogeneity bear upon religion's relation to the state?

This issue too is rimmed with irony. In the pure case of total religious homogeneity, a religious alliance with the state would seem a structural redundancy of a cultural fait accompli. Of course, such cases rarely occur outside the imagination of Emile Durkheim. And yet a number of countries offer approximations in which the dominance of a single religious faith is so encompassing as to reduce the urgency of its governmental ties. Even when the government itself begins to undergo secularization, there is little sense of alarm over the absence of perceived religious competition, as both Sweden and Thailand attest.

But, of course, competition is key. Where there is very little, an alliance with the state does not matter; where there is a great deal, such an alliance may matter too much. Moreover, the very prospect of one religion or religious group gaining establishment status may be sufficient to activate a religious conflict that has been previously quiescent. Earlier we saw the increase in Sunni-Shiite conflict in Pakistan as talk of Islamization escalated. But perhaps the classic case involves the Hindu-Muslim rivalry on the eve of Indian independence and the partitioning of Pakistan in 1947. For centuries prior to and during British colonial rule, Hinduism and Islam had coexisted relatively calmly—indeed, there is a sense in which these two quite different religions were mutually complementary in serving India's long-term cultural development. However, once autonomous power was at stake, the conflict between the two led to bloody rupture.

Here, then, is another major consideration that favors effective separation. To put the matter slightly differently, in those cases where the political stakes of a state religion are low, at least a symbolic form may develop and persist. But in more pluralistic instances where the political stakes are high and zero-sum as the gain in one religion's influence is accompanied by the loss of another's, competition itself may ward off the eventuality. Post–World War II Indonesia and the United States are both cases in point. In the former, Islam is pitted against Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and animism with all of their extrareligious connotations; in the United States, it was not until the 1940s and the development of Catholicism as a looming threat to established Protestantism that church-state litigation began in earnest, following a period of some 150 years of litigious lassitude.

However ironic, it is not accidental that the concept of *civil religion* has its most conspicuous applications in Indonesia and the United States, two of the world's most religiously pluralistic societies. Both the American concept of a Judeo-Christian heritage and the Indonesian umbrella of *pancasila* are to some extent cultural fabrications. Each is used to impose a sense of unity over the reality of diversity; both are "civil" in Cuddahy's sense of putting a polite face on a conflicted situation. The two also share a tendency to substitute the symbols of religious influence for its reality.

Finally, another nest of factors related to religion and the state involves the matter of *religious authority*. It is, of course, Christocentric to discuss the "separation of *church* and state" worldwide, though the phrase has become a global shorthand for the generic issue. The ecclesiastical and organizational implications of a "church" are by no means the least of Christianity's distinguishing characteristics. Yet the extent of a hierarchical structure is best regarded as a variable rather than an absolute. Within Christianity itself, there are wide and obvious differences between "episcopal" top-down structures, on the one hand, and "congregational" bottom-up models of local autonomy on the other. But similar variations occur within other religious traditions. Within Islam, this is a fundamental distinction between the more authoritatively structured Shiites and the more locally autonomous Sunnis. Hinduism is more centrally organized in Indonesia's Bali than in India. Buddhism's *songha* in Thailand differs from Buddhism's organizational form in Tibet, let alone within the "greater vehicle" of China or Japan.

Meanwhile, there is a second distinction that is equally pertinent to the issue of authority, and it is encapsulated in Weber's dichotomy between "emissary" and "exemplary" prophecy.[27] Whereas the former involves ascetic activism in the search for redress and reform in this world, the latter exemplifies the passive pursuit of virtue through mysticism and contemplation. Here the Christian, Judaic, and Islamic faiths tend toward the ethical ideal, while Hinduism and Buddhism are more inclined to the exemplary. Once again, however, there is variation within each tradition.

In fact, these two distinctions can be harnessed for the purposes at hand. From the standpoint of sheer political potency, the combination with the greatest potential is ethical prophecy embedded within and protected by a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure (for example, eighth-century Islam or pre-Reformation Catholicism). Conversely, the least likely source of political power is emissary prophecy without organizational trappings (for example, the Hindu guru). Note, however, that the remaining two combinations are important. Ethical prophecy without the reinforcement of an organizational structure may amount to spitting in the political wind. And an elaborate ecclesiastical structure *without* an ethically prophetic spark is particularly vulnerable to state cooptation. After all, those who make it to the top of such ecclesiastical ladders are selectively recruited, gradually socialized, and generally rewarded for their loyalty to the political status quo.

This last scenario suggests one final irony of separation: those religious groups with the greatest organizational resources to place at the disposal of a political perspective rarely fulfill their political potential. If they retain their independence outside of the government, they are more likely to whisper than shout, for fear of being overheard. If they are taken into the hall of state itself, they may never be heard from again in anything approximating a prophetic voice; after gaining so much, they now have too much to lose. Illustrations here are widespread, for this is perhaps the most common saga in religion's continuing but ambivalent groping for secular power. From the standpoint of church and state, then, seeming power may sometimes become powerlessness, and on the other hand, religions outside the state's cold embrace can occasionally become very powerful indeed. This is a major reason why cults and sectarian movements on the fringes of society sometimes exert disproportionate influence by refusing the path of compromise and cooptation. It is in this sense that religion's capital is often maximized when it is not a capital religion.

CONCLUSION

It is with indebtedness to Thomas Jefferson and his concern for a "wall of separation" between church and state that this paper has offered a "wall-eyed" view of religion and power. In focusing on a very limited question, it has received a somewhat surprising response. Despite religion's prominence as a source of political legitimacy and campaign rhetoric, it is rarely a dominant factor in the affairs of state. The United States is less distinctive in this regard than many Americans suppose, and insofar as its own tradition of "church-state separation" continues, this may owe less to legal and constitutional requirements than to a range of social and political constraints which we share with other nations.

In reviewing a series of political and religious factors which bear on the relation between sacred agencies and secular power, this paper seeks more to begin discussion than to end it. Indeed, its most fundamental conviction is that both the subject and the style of the research are worthwhile. Religion and its relation to society have too often been explored through the dark lens of single societies treated singularly. It is only by widening our perspective that we may deepen it.

ENDNOTES

[1] The phrase itself comes not from the First Amendment of the Constitution, as is widely supposed, but from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to a friend in 1802 in which he refers to a "desirable wall of separation" between the realms.

[2] Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1949), 90–113.

[3] Max Weber, *Economy and Society,* 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1159–60.

[4] Samuel Krislov, "Alternatives to Separation of Church and State in Countries Outside the United States," in James E. Wood, Jr., *Religion and the State* (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 1985).

[5] For an elaboration of this point, see N. J. Demerath III and Rhys H. Williams, *A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Power in a New England City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[6] Hen C. Van Moorseven and Ger Van der Tan, *Written Constitutions: A Comparative Study* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publishers, 1978).

[7] Krislov.

[8] V. S. Naipul, *Among the Believers* (New York: Random House, 1981).

[9] Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 186.

[10] Ibid., 233.

[11] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[12] Cf. Henry J. Korson, "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan," in *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,* 6 (2) (1982): 71–90; Anita M. Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986); and Lawrence Zimring, "Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan's Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia ul-Haq," in *Asian Survey,* 28 (8) (1986): 795–812; Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology," in Weiss, 21–48.

[13] For a tour de force through Indonesia's cultural history in a single sentence, see Geertz, *Local Knowledge,* 226.

[14] Cf. Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia in 1985: Chills and Thaws," in *Asian Survey,* 26 (2) (1986): 141–49.

[15] For an excellent analysis of the *songha* in relation to the Thai state, see Samboon Suksamran, *Buddhism and Politics in Thailand* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).

[16] See, for example, Prasert Yamklingfung, "Family, Religion, and Socio-Economic Change in Thailand," in *East Asian Cultural Studies,* 13 (1974): 20–31.

[17] For examples, see John T. S. Madeley, "Scandinavian Christian Democracy: Throwback or Portent?" in *European Journal of Political Research,* 5 (1977): 267–86; Lennart Ejerfelt, "Civil Religion: Made in Sweden," in Bela Harmati, ed., *The Church and Civil Religion in the Nordic Countries of Europe* (Geneva: Lutheran World Foundation, 1984); and Goran Goransson, "Church and Nation: A Changing Relationship in Sweden," in Harmati, 72–78.

[18] Cf. *New York Times,* 8 April 1991, 1.

[19] Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Free Press, 1911).

[20] Hank Johnston and Jozef Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives on Mobilization against Authoritarian Regimes," in *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27 (1) (1988): 32–47.

[21] Demerath and Williams.

[22] Phillip E. Hammond, ed., *The Sacred in a Secular Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1985).

[23] Cf. Said Amir Arjomand, "Social Change and Movements of Revitalization in Contemporary Islam," in James A. Beckford, ed., *New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change* (London: Sage/UNESCO Publishers, 1986), 87–112; and Nader Saiedi, "What is Islamic Fundamentalism," in Jeffrey K. Hadden and

Anson Shupe, eds., *Prophetic Religion and Politics* (New York: Paragon House, 1986).

[24] Roland Robertson, "Considerations from within the American Context on the Significance of Church-State Tension," in *Sociological Analysis,* 42 (3) (1981): 193–208.

[25] Arvind Sharma, "New Hindu Religious Movements in India," in Beckford, ed., 20–39.

[26] K. D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Judith Nagata, "Indices of the Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia," in Richard T. Anton and Mary Elaine Hegland, *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987).

[27] Cf. Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon, 1963), 46–59.

Raymond William Baker

Afraid for Islam: Egypt's Muslim Centrists Between Pharaohs and Fundamentalists

ANWAR SADAT WAS THE ONE MUSLIM ARAB LEADER whom Americans thought they knew and understood.[1] He was the devout Muslim ruler who repudiated socialism and expelled the Soviets from Egypt. Denouncing the revolutionary radicalism that began in 1952, Sadat made peace with Israel and liberalized the Egyptian economy and polity. In place of Nasserist images of social revolution and pan-Arab leadership, he offered an Egypt-centered vision of rebirth. Sadat promised to rebuild the nation and return moderate Egypt to the Western fold by tapping individual initiative, private enterprise, and Western aid and technology.

Responding to this opening, the United States involved itself deeply in Egyptian political life, underwriting everything from the official population control effort to the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. American ties to official Egypt could not have been stronger. The US government provided the regime with over $17 billion in aid, making Egypt the recipient of the second largest US aid program in the world. During the Sadat years we supplied every conceivable technical device at a cost estimated at between $20 to $25 million to protect the life of the man awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Arab leader on whom US Middle East strategies depended.[2] The president of Egypt was *Time* magazine's man of the year, his wife the "first lady" of the Arab world.

Then Islam, or so it appeared, intruded into this American-inspired political dream in a deadly fashion. On October 6, 1981, Muslim

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extremists assassinated Sadat. On the outskirts of Cairo, in a suburb called Victory City, Sadat had arranged to review the annual military parade celebrating Egypt's performance in the 1973 October War. At 11:00 A.M. Sadat, attired in a blue and white military uniform with brown leather kneeboots, took his central seat on the bronze platform decorated with the images of Osiris and other gods of ancient Egypt. Two hours later one of the army lorries towing Russian field guns halted abruptly near the reviewing stand. A young officer leaped from the cab and raced toward the stand, while his accomplices in the back of the lorry threw grenades and provided gun cover. At point blank range, Lieutenant Khaled Islambouli pumped automatic fire into the body of the president.

Stunned, Americans asked *why*. They anticipated an outpouring of mass grief in Egypt for the slain president and revulsion for the "fundamentalists" who murdered him.[3] The expected reaction never came. Instead, Egyptians responded with disconcerting quiet to Sadat's assassination. When Gamal Abdul Nasser, Sadat's predecessor, died a decade earlier, crowds poured into the streets to grieve inconsolably at the death of a leader routinely denounced in the West as either a fascist or a communist. Following Sadat's assassination, Egyptians went about celebrating a religious holiday as though the murder of their president, hailed in the West as an apostle of peace, meant little. If anything, the streets of the capital remained unusually quiet. Interviews by American correspondents revealed that "many people in Cairo expressed less anger over the assassination than over the week's cancellation of movies, soccer games and regular television programming (including the popular series 'Dallas')." On the day of Sadat's funeral, lines of policemen "stood with arms locked as if to hold back a crowd. But there was no crowd."[4]

The apparent indifference of ordinary Egyptians to Sadat's death, so completely unexpected in America, suggested that in Egypt Americans mistook their own purposes for Egyptian politics, their own attachments for those of the Egyptian people. Had we "understood" Sadat only to the degree that the late president had reshaped Egypt in the American image? Had Americans simply seen their own reflections and heard their own voices in Sadat's Egypt? Our incomprehension in the face of the Egyptian response to Sadat's murder indicated such stunting narcissism. Despite the years of involvement and the millions in aid, we had somehow ignored the distinctive sights and sounds of Egyptian politics, especially those that drew in complicated ways from Egypt's distinctive Islamic heritage.

The murder of Egypt's president at the hands of Muslim extremists did spur an outpouring of Western media and academic commentary on Islam and politics. But the new literature, driven more by our fears than any interest in knowing Egypt better, seemed almost to deepen and refine our ignorance rather than overcome it. Traumatized by Sadat's murder, following so soon on the fall of the Shah and the loss of Iran, we saw only his successor and the assassins who threatened him—the new Pharaoh and the Islamic fundamentalists now conspiring in *his* shadow.[5] Frightened by the face of Muslim extremism as it appeared in the mirror of our own self-absorption and alarmed by the danger the radicals posed to our new interests in Egypt, we asked: What factors caused the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt and how could the threat it posed to an American-sponsored regime be contained? The question of Islam and politics in Egypt and elsewhere, for academics no less than for the media in the West, presented itself as a security dilemma. In the interest of containment, we sought to expose and analyze the factors that produced the upsurge of such dangerous forces. In theory, our efforts to understand Islam focused on the search for general theories of the underlying causes of what we called, with a worried diagnostic tone, Islamic fundamentalism, resurgence, or revival. We sought to uncover the extrapersonal forces that in some way triggered this frightening symptom—in the urgent interest of control, if not elimination.

The major research programs that followed this strategic lead can be grouped conveniently into three loose categories, according to the causal factor or independent variable identified as critical; they are the ideological, the sociological, and the structural. These orientations sought to explain Islamic resurgence by analyzing the inherited ideas, social forces, or global trends of political economy believed to cause the rise of fundamentalism. For example, analyses along these lines aimed to document the ways in which an antiquated belief system faced with modern conditions, an explosive oil boom, or unplanned migration and social mobility worked to create the strains and tensions within which Islamic political movements, especially radical and violent ones, took root.

Scholarship of this kind did usefully examine the external forces that affected the lives of all Egyptians; complexes of inherited ideas about the nature of Islam, disruptive social trends like labor migration, and powerful global economic shifts unquestionably weighed on Muslim activists, just as they pressed on other Egyptians. Moreover, framing issues in this way enabled us to rely on objective measures like textual analyses, oil revenue statistics, and census data. The inherited belief system did contribute in important ways to the cultural context within which the Muslim activists and all Egyptians moved. Few failed to notice that Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s was awash in imported capital and consumer goods attributable to seepage from the new oil wealth which Egyptians working in the oil-rich states shared. In these last years many Egyptians, Muslim activists among them, experienced a process of disorienting social mobility that undoubtedly affected their personal and political lives.

Yet, our own sense of urgency led us to claim far too much for knowledge of this kind. Our general interest in containment and control led us to construe the object of our studies in exceedingly broad terms; for example, one of the most influential definitions of the Islamic revival saw it as "the increase of political activity in the name of Islam."[6] This notion handily compresses an astounding variety of behavior in the Muslim "arc of crisis" into a phenomenon for which unitary causes might be sought. Everything from popular Islam, state-supported official Islam through Islamic mysticism, the Islam of the moderate center, and on to the proliferating radical movements came under this umbrella.

So great a simplification did break down, of course. Not even our near panic response to the fundamentalist threat could suppress the patent unwisdom of combining such enormous diversity in one generalized concept. Even so, we did not abandon the belief that, confronted with the upsurge of Islamic political activity, our first task was to understand its causes, however varied they might prove to be at different times and different places. Our causal studies became more elaborate as we searched for the general phenomenon in particular places.

Two notions lay at the heart of this excessive confidence that causal analyses could tell us what we needed to know. We assumed that others, especially those others like the world's Muslims who are concentrated for the most part in the less industrialized parts of the globe, live political lives less complicated than our own. Somehow, we accepted the idea that national and international systems or structures condition the politics of people who live in poor societies more severely and more uniformly than our own. This assumption then combined with the prevailing, though I believe mistaken, belief that scientific explanation of the human world of politics, like that of nature, requires the substitution of a simple or "elegant" picture for a complex one.[7] The unfortunate linkage of these two ideas gave an undeserved currency to rigidly determinist and grandly simplified readings of the relationship between Islam and politics.

We knew, but somehow forgot in the Muslim context, that the most precise and detailed study of an external pressure cannot reveal how particular human subjects respond to it. In our enthusiasm for ferreting out the causes of Islamic political activism, we neglected the distinction between identifying the cause of something and understanding its meaning. The creation of shared meaning is clearly related to the structural constraints built into the situation within which it occurs, but only loosely so. The forces that press on those who act politically in the name of Islam, whether derived from their own past or their present national, regional, or global situation, never determine completely. Political actors always have some room to maneuver within the constraints of history and situation. They have choices to make and it is those choices that give meaning to such otherwise empty categories as "political activity in the name of Islam."

In addition, causal studies, despite their veils of distance and objectivity, carry indirect but potent political messages. Their claims to objectivity are always suspect. The ideological, sociological, and structural orientations all advance the claim to have discovered the real causes that drive political activity. They introduce a hidden extrapersonal force that guides the outcome of events. These hidden actors and the chain of events they are presumed to set in motion have the effect of representing Muslim activists in ways that undermine their historical significance by robbing their particular stories of meaning and purpose.

This general point is best illustrated with particular reference to the literature on the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. The Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, today constitutes the heart of the moderate center of the various Islamic groupings active in Egyptian public life. Causal accounts of the "real" causes always carry the powerful message that movements like the Muslim Brothers do not understand and therefore cannot speak for Egypt's "real" needs. Each assumes that the Brothers remain so caught up in their delusory history that they do not grasp, indeed cannot understand their situation and the actual forces at work. To put the point another way, these causal explanations carry with them representations of the Brothers that act to undermine them as an alternative political project. In the ideological model that examines the ways in which inherited complexes of ideas and beliefs mesh with contemporary material realities, the Brothers stand for the irrelevance of Islam to the modern world and they do so in a particularly threatening form. From the sociological perspective the Muslim Brothers appear to be an indicator or reflex of lower-middle-class social dislocation and psychological malaise in a society undergoing rapid social change. For the structuralists, the Muslim Brothers represent the politically reactionary consequence of the blockage by the world market forces of Egypt's development effort. At no point in literature of this kind is any effort made to assess the Muslim Brother reaction to such formulations or to create the critical space within which the Brothers' refutations of such notions might be entertained. The structure of studies into extrapersonal causality blocks such possibilities.

The Brothers are in fact fully knowledgeable about these characterizations. They do contest their validity; moreover, they register their awareness that such formulations, derived from Western scholarship, are used either by the ruling group or political movements that oppose them. Intellectuals sympathetic to the Brothers conclude that recent Western scholarship, drawing no doubt on a long tradition of cultural hostility, reveals itself to be afraid *of* Islam as a political force and eager to assist in its containment.

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Important elements in Egyptian civil society responded in contrast with fear *for* Islam, caught between the violence of the radicals and the repression of the regime. At a dramatic point of confrontation between the government security forces and the youthful armed Muslim radicals, Galal Amin, an internationally respected economist and university professor, wrote an article in the mass press urging that while the regime must disarm the radicals, it must also "listen to what they have to say about their religion and their politics." This conciliatory call for dialogue, echoed by many others prominent in Egypt's intellectual and cultural life, made the telling point that although the regime had the right to protect itself, society also had the obligation to listen. Amin assumed that even the violence-prone radicals might have something to say worth hearing about the fate of public life.[8]

Viewed in the West largely through a security lens, Islam by the 1980s had achieved center stage as a powerful political as well as cultural and religious force, affecting the political thinking and feeling of virtually all elements of the population, not just the radical fringe, and not just in Egypt. Throughout the Muslim world in the 1960s and 1970s secular nationalisms and pannationalisms suffered from the political disappointments and economic failings associated with the collapse of the developmentalist vision that provided regimes throughout the area with postindependence legitimacy. Increasingly, power appeared both arbitrary and ineffectual. In Egypt Nasserism, with its pan-Arab and socialist themes, had kept Islam contained as a political force. Sadat's virulent de-Nasserization campaign weakened the Nasserists and the Marxist Left, while inviting back into public life the most important of the Egyptian Islamic movements, the Muslim Brothers. For the last two decades, political debate in Egypt, and throughout the Islamic world, has centered on the question of the moral purpose of ruling power. To this key dilemma of political life everywhere, the Islamic current has a compelling response. In Egypt, the venerable Muslim Brothers and an array of splinter groupings used the new conditions of expanded freedoms to articulate their vision of a good and just Islamic order.

And, as we have seen, just at this moment a crude reductionism, mistaken for tough realism needed to face violent provocation, captured the mainstream of Western scholarship. We were diverted from historically grounded and theoretically subtle interpretations of Islam and politics that the best of Western scholarship offered. Instead, we chose to avoid the complications of being drawn into different human political worlds.[9] In the quest for causes, we avoided encounters and dialogues—with the radicals, and perhaps of more importance, even with the moderate mainstream of the Muslim current.

As a consequence, we lost the opportunity to grapple with the real challenge posed to us by Sadat's assassination: What was the meaning of that chilling Egyptian reaction to the murder of the president? What reasons lay behind Egyptian disillusionment with the Sadat promise of peace and prosperity? What motives prompted Egyptian civil society, including its large and moderate Islamic current built around the Muslim Brothers, to withdraw support for the Egyptian ruler and to respond with more than a hint of approbation to his elimination by extremists?

These are not easy questions with simple answers; they involve political issues of what is just and what is reasonable within the context of a particular historical community. However, the fact that such questions clearly have no single general answer on the model of scientific causality should not divert us from discovering the particular, historical answers they have in fact evoked—and from looking closely at the notions of reason and the sense of justice that lie behind those answers. Western scholarship has done precious little listening of this sort and even less of the empirical work necessary to report the facts of the Egyptian answers as accurately and fairly as possible. In our frenetic search for simple causes, we have overlooked complex reasons—and have missed the compelling histories in which they are embedded. The story of the Muslim Brothers that follows provides an account of one such answer to the meaning of Islam and politics in Egypt. It opens with a critical historical event in the life of the Brothers and an account of the interpretation made of it by the Brotherhood leader, Omar Telmesany. By examining the sense the Brothers make of this pivotal event that they believe defined their relationship to the regime, we can learn something about the Islamic project they set for themselves and something about their own understanding of the way that project partakes of politics.

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When Omar Telmesany arrived, he attempted to sit in the back of the room crowded with government representatives, the national press, and Muslim notables. An official approached Telmesany, however, and insisted that he take a place in the front row, facing the president and the high government personnel who accompanied him. The occasion was a meeting in Ismailia between President Anwar Sadat and the leaders of Islamic organizations. As titular head of the movement, a survivor of seventeen years in prison, and editor of the

Islamic journal *The Call,*[10] Telmesany personified the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most influential Islamic group in Egyptian public life. Singled out from the other Muslim dignitaries present, Telmesany understood why Sadat's confidant, Mansur Hassan, summoned him to his office to insist that he personally attend this meeting: Sadat intended to deliver a personal warning to the Muslim Brothers before the national press.

In 1979 Sadat held a series of public meetings with the representatives of important corporate bodies, such as the syndicates of the lawyers, judges, and the press. On each of these occasions, the president reaffirmed his hope of containing the political energies released by his liberalization within acceptable levels by working out "codes of conduct" between the various powerful public bodies and his regime. Within this scheme of controlled liberalization, the government gave the Muslim Brothers a privileged place. To counter the perceived threat from the Left, the official formula allowed exceptional scope to the religious Right for a return to active politics in the interstices of these regulated structures. The arrangement worked well for the regime through the mid-1970s. At that point, however, the Islamic current's disillusionment with government policies, above all the opening to Israel, created strains. After Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977, the Islamic press, under Telmesany's leadership, launched a pointed criticism of what it saw as the dangerous humiliations that the Israeli interpretation of the Camp David peace process inflicted on Egypt. Stung by this domestic criticism, Sadat in 1979 decided to rein in the Muslim groups.

Speaking directly to Telmesany at the meeting in Ismailia, Sadat warned the Brothers of treason. For months the official media had been accusing the Muslim Brothers of plotting to undermine the regime. The president gave the charges authoritative statement by demanding that the Brothers abandon "their conspiratorial ways of the pre-1952 period." Sadat declared that he would not "tolerate those who try to tamper with the high interests of the state under the guise of religion." Religion, he added "must not be mingled with politics." The president condemned the Brothers for corrupting young people with the "misleading articles in *The Call*" that criticized key aspects of government policy, above all the accommodation with Israel. Pointedly, Sadat reminded Telmesany that his government allowed publication of the journal, even though it did not legally authorize the Muslim Brothers organization. In Sadat's view, such exceptional privileges carried responsibilities: "Muslim Brothers are now free people in a respectable community. Their behavior should be in line with Egypt's interests."

Telmesany requested permission to respond to the charges. "If anyone else had said what you said I would have come to you to complain," he began, "but I can only raise my complaint against you to God who is the wisest of rulers." Telmesany then briefly stated the Brothers' key strategic goal of the establishment of an Islamic social order on the basis of Islamic law, arguing that their "mission" for the 1970s served all Egyptians: "You hear from *The Call*," said Telmesany, "only demands that are the demands of the whole nation. We have no private interests." In keeping with the Brothers' belief that Egypt must return to Islamic law, Telmesany argued that the solution to Egypt's crisis required that "God's Law must be applied. It is only when you do this that the masses will be with you."

Telmesany answered the specific charge of conspiracy with a story illustrating his caution and loyalty. On June 12, 1979, reported Telmesany, the British Embassy asked him to meet with a representative of the Foreign Ministry. Telmesany told the embassy official that he would attend only if the meeting was called to discuss press matters: "If you want to ask political questions go to the president of the republic." Telmesany said that a copy of this response to the British overture was in the files of the Ministry of Interior. He added that he just as scrupulously avoided all invitations from communist and other radical groups to attend their meetings.

Telmesany tempered his forceful rebuttal by thanking Sadat for "opening the jails and releasing prisoners" when he became president. On his own release from prison in 1971, Telmesany had gone directly to Abdin Palace to express his gratitude. "My Islamic upbringing and education," concluded the spokesman for the Muslim Brothers, "do not allow me to conspire against you."

Sadat and the titular head of the Brotherhood met on one other very different occasion during the 1970s. Not long after the Ismailia conference, a second meeting took place, this time in Sadat's secluded resthouse just outside Cairo. The private meeting between Sadat and Telmesany went unreported in the national press. According to Islamic press reports of the meeting, published only after Sadat's assassination, the president offered to broaden his truce with the

Brothers. "He received me very hospitably," noted Telmesany, "and flattered me with words my modesty prevents me from repeating." The president offered to correct the anomalous legal status of the Brotherhood by registering the organization with the Ministry of Social Affairs. In addition, Sadat offered to appoint Telmesany as the representative of the Brotherhood to the government Consultative Council. In return, Sadat indicated that he would expect the Brothers to moderate their criticism of his regime. Once again, Telmesany resisted the president's desires. Registration with the ministry would accomplish little, in Telmesany's view, because the ministry would "then have the right to dissolve the society at any time, to change its board of directors, and to submit it to administrative, technical, and financial supervision." The Brothers, he indicated, preferred the ambiguity of a semilegal existence to dependence on government sanction. Similarly, Telmesany declined the Consultative Council appointment because "when I am an appointed rather than an elected member, I am in debt to the one who appointed me, a situation that makes me obligated not to clash with him."

To his followers, Telmesany explained the meaning of these encounters with the regime by appealing to the Brothers' self-understanding of the history they were making. His interpretation was as important as the meetings themselves for the collective history of the Brothers. Telmesany based his explanation on the Muslim Brothers' self-image as actors in an Islamic movement with roots not only in Egypt but in the comprehensive story of Islam as well. Thus, in the Islamic press Telmesany first rationalized his meetings with Sadat by relating them to the specific political situation in Egypt. He then went on to show how these entanglements with power in one Islamic country also advanced Islam's design for human life on the universal plane.

In the first instance, Telmesany made sense of his meetings with Sadat by placing them in the context of the Muslim Brothers' efforts to achieve the Islamic social ideal in Egypt's special circumstances of time, place, and human need. In the 1970s, writers for *The Call* advanced the Brotherhood's alternative as a practical strategy to realize the goal of a new Islamic order in Egypt and throughout the world.

Through the Islamic press, the leadership called on the Brothers to make maximum use of the peaceful means that the liberalization of the Sadat regime made available to them in order to work for an Islamic society. The reconciliation of the mainstream current and the state flourished in the early years of Sadat's rule until 1977 and the strains of Sadat's peace with Israel. Even in the difficult years of 1977 to 1981, however, the Brothers strived to avoid open conflict with the government. During this final period of Sadat's rule, radical Islamic groups such as the Jihad, the Takfir W'al Hijra, and Shebab al-Muhammad spearheaded active opposition to the state through radicalized student unions, direct and at times spectacular militant actions, and participation in sectarian strife. The militant actions of the radicals culminated in the murder of the president and the uprising in Assiut in 1981. State repression eroded the power of the militants, while the centrist Brothers gathered strength.

The strategic decisions of the Brothers' leadership in the 1970s for limited cooperation with the regime laid the intellectual and practical foundations for their legal expansion in the 1980s into nearly all aspects of public life. Particularly after Sadat's assassination, the Brothers reaped handsome rewards for their decision to move toward acceptance of democratic rules. They participated in national elections in shifting alliances with major opposition parties, played a leading role in the doctors' and the engineers' syndicates, achieved a substantial presence in parliament, and created an economic base of Islamic companies and banks. Thus, while the eyes of the outside world focused on the Islamic militants and radicals with their violent means, the Muslim Brother centrists achieved the greatest successes for the Islamic current since the 1940s by accepting the concept of working through government. In the Sadat years they began the tactical elaboration of an approach that transformed the face of civil society in the 1980s.

A key element in laying the groundwork for the early and formative cooperation of the Brotherhood with the state was the effort in the Sadat years to oppose Nasserism, which the Brothers saw as the most potent force standing in the way of the attainment of an Islamic society. They did so because they judged the Nasserist current to be the strongest political force opposing their own movement. During this same period, the Brothers also sought to prevent the Islamic radicals from contesting their leadership of the Islamic current. To achieve these broader aims, the Brothers supported the regime's campaigns to discipline the members of the radical Islamic fringe. The Brothers sought to prevent the radicals from contesting their leadership of the Islamic trend and from precipitating a premature confrontation with the regime. Underlying both of these partisan maneuvers was the struggle to live in conformity with the Islamic social ideal in the face of hostile internal and external pressures. In the context of Sadat's Egypt, these pressures took the specific form of the multifaceted threat that Westernization posed to the Islamic heritage of Egypt. By sustained and forceful criticism, they aimed to show the regime's limitations in meeting civilization's challenge to Islam while taking advantage of any opportunities it afforded to build the strength of their movement.

Telmesany believed that an extended truce with the Sadat regime made the 1970s a time of renewal for the Brothers. Sadat released many of the Brothers from prison and rehabilitated them personally and professionally. Although many critics, especially those on the Left, charged that the Brothers made an explicit political deal as the price for their freedom, Telmesany argued that throughout the 1970s Sadat "never asked for anything *in particular*" in return for releasing the Brothers. Telmesany cited his own experience to demonstrate that no explicit deals had been made; he claimed that he did not meet with Sadat or his representatives prior to his release from prison. As evidence that the Brothers did not have any particular arrangements, Telmesany cited the Ismailia confrontation. "We Brothers were viciously attacked," he commented. "If there had been any contacts between us or cooperation with the Sadat government, we would not have been attacked in this manner."

To appreciate the full meaning of his meetings with Sadat, Telmesany urged his readers to recognize the "threats and temptations of power" that confronted the struggle for Islam. Although he sought to counter charges that the Brothers collaborated with the Sadat regime, Telmesany did not claim political innocence. In fact, the Muslim Brother leader openly acknowledged the Brothers' growing implication in regime politics because Telmesany wanted his supporters to understand the political and moral complexities of the Brotherhood's involvements with the government. Telmesany's contrasting accounts of the two meetings showed that the Sadat policy was a carrot and stick operation. The Brothers resisted both. This was neither defiance nor an acceptance of state authority; in both cases, Telmesany's objective remained the same and his desired relationship with the state did not change. According to Telmesany's reading, the two meetings clarified this relationship to power. The first meeting, as Telmesany interpreted it, showed that the regime was not an ally, but that it could not be defied openly; the second meeting showed that the regime needed the Brothers' help, but that the Brotherhood could not become too close to the government. Thus, Telmesany's readings of the two meetings provided a working definition for the Brothers of their complex and uncertain—but ultimately extremely fruitful—relationship with state power.

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In the 1970s the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood realized that both the regime and their own organization had distinct but powerful reasons to act in parallel fashion against the Nasserist Left. The Brothers believed that as long as Sadat saw the Left as the main challenge to his power, he would seek a tactical alliance with them to control that threat. In 1971 Sadat claimed to have faced down a challenge from a procommunist coalition of party and internal security officials inherited from Nasser. Again in 1972 and 1973 the specter of a Nasserist Left hostile to Sadat's rule rose when demonstrating students and workers shouted Nasserist slogans. The Brothers judged that the regime recognized the value of their support in the face of such challenges. Only their organization, with its strong ties to the middle- and lower-middle-class urban elements, could act as a political counterweight to the radical students and workers who had fallen under the influence of the Left.

The Muslim Brothers had their own particular reasons for assisting in the containment of the Nasserist Left. In the 1950s and the 1960s, thousands of Brothers were brutalized in Nasser's military camps and jails. In the 1970s, the Islamic press, led by *The Call* (*al-Da'wa*), mounted an unrelenting attack on all aspects of the Nasserist legacy, including Arabism, the industrialization drive, and socialist measures. Nasser's Arabism, the Brothers charged, contravened the universalism of Islam. Despite Egypt's place in the Arab world, they reasoned that the essential basis of community should be the spiritual one of Islam rather than the racial one of an Arab nation. The Brothers argued that the Nasserist era had weakened Islam in Egypt. Some Brothers went so far as to celebrate the loss of the war in 1967 because the defeat by Israel revealed the corruption of an atheistic regime and weakened the power of the official tormentors of true Muslims.

Nasser's industrialization effort had been flawed, the Brothers charged, by indiscriminate nationalizations and sequestrations that were motivated less by economic criteria than by "personal hatred and revenge." The private sector, services, and agriculture were all neglected, while state funds poured into large-scale projects that were often corrupt and badly conceived. The public sector, moreover, proved to be the breeding ground for a "new class whose wealth exceeded that of the pashas." Telmesany summed up the Brothers' indictment of the Nasser years with the charge that "the era of Gamal Abdul Nasser was characterized by evil and wrongdoing." Telmesany argued that "the bad effects of nationalization and sequestration are still suffered by the Egyptian nation to this day. The communist economy brought us to these deadly crises from which everyone is trying to save the country."

The joint attack on the Nasserist legacy proved to be the high point of agreement between the Sadat regime and the Brothers. Differences over foreign policy eventually strained the cooperation. Even before Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem, however, the difficulties of collaboration were becoming apparent. In their attitudes and actions toward the Islamic university student groups, the Brothers clearly revealed their divergence from regime policies. In its first years the Sadat government fostered the Islamic student groups in order to break the hold of the Left on university youth. When the government attempted to rein in the Islamic student movement, the Brotherhood leadership demonstrated its political realism by openly cooperating in disciplining the religious students. Telmesany, for example, frankly acknowledged assisting the ex-Minister of the Interior Nabawy Ismail. "Whenever anything happened," reported Telmesany, "he used to call and take my advice. The Minister," Telmesany continued, "used to send me to some university faculties. When I spoke to the students, they responded to me . . . they accepted my arguments against violence, demonstrations, strikes, and sabotage."

Despite their arguments against the more extreme student actions, the Brothers never went as far as the regime in criticizing the university groups. From the Brotherhood's perspective, the strong appeal to youth of the Islamic groups was potentially a great resource. To the degree that the religious students looked to the Brotherhood leadership, they provided the Muslim Brothers with a popular base in the student masses. The problem of control, however, was serious. Because the Brothers were not organized as a party, they found it difficult to incorporate the students into their society. The leadership also suspected that the regime deliberately encouraged the rise of militant groupings in order to fragment the Islamic trend and to weaken the ability of the Muslim Brothers to assert leadership over it. Telmesany charged "that someone deliberately allowed this thought scope in order to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood." He alleged that one of the leaders of the Islamic groups received 150 feddans in Liberation Province to establish a community. According to Telmesany, the same figure was also given an apartment in the populous quarter of Sayyida Zeinab from which to spread his ideas. The Brothers responded to these government maneuvers by acting to contain but not crush the student groups. On the one hand, they did assist the regime in keeping the student activism within bounds. On the other, they chided the regime for treating the Islamic elements too harshly while unwisely sparing what they took to be the much more dangerous activists on the Left.

Despite their pragmatic engagement in partisan politics, the Brothers were neither so opportunistic nor so malleable as Sadat judged. The Brothers were unable to accept the complete identification with the regime that Sadat asked of them in his second meeting with Telmesany. They understood that the failure of Sadat's promise of peace and prosperity drove him to suggest replacement of implicit cooperation with an explicit understanding. The Brothers realized that Sadat was being hemmed in by external forces, and that he hoped to save his position by leaning more heavily on them. Nevertheless, the Brothers were unwilling to provide this degree of support. The role they could play was shaped more by their own distinctive history than by the immediate political opportunities open to them.

The Muslim Brothers' self-image as "sufferers for Islam" set limits that could not be transgressed. On social and national issues the Brothers stood for a practical program of national resistance and social reform. The Muslim Brothers staked the claim that the Islamic trend in public life was the most authentic means by which Egyptians had historically sought renaissance and independence. By their reading, the link between Islam and the contemporary movement for national community reached back to the early nineteenth century and the rule of Muhammad Aly, the founder of the last dynasty to rule Egypt. By the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century political Islam was eclipsed by Western secular nationalism. The floundering of the secular nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s, however, paved the way for the emergence of the Brotherhood as the most effective modern expression of national self-assertion. The Brothers first established themselves as a mass movement in the 1940s by responding effectively to the needs of large numbers of Egyptians who were affected adversely by the disruptions of the war and the British occupation. During these war years, the established political parties lost touch with the social and economic needs of the people. In contrast, the Muslim Brothers acted vigorously to realize a program of social reforms that addressed the needs of the poor. The Brothers' vision at that time overlapped with that of the Left nationalists. They distinguished themselves, however, by their practical readiness to tackle social and national problems with an impressive network of mosques, educational institutions, hospitals, and clinics to meet the needs of the poor and the disaffected.

The Brothers acted with similar vigor against the external threats to Egypt. When the government abrogated the Treaty of 1936, the Muslim Brothers took a leading role in the confrontation with the British in the Canal Zone. The Brothers earned even greater nationalist credit for their bold and decisive opposition to the Zionist movement in Palestine. The Brotherhood sounded the alarm about the colonizing thrust of Zionism, and they mobilized public support in Egypt for the Palestinian Arab Strike of 1936 to 1939. When the strike collapsed, Muslim Brother activists collected funds and weapons to support the Arab military resistance.

When the first Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1948, Muslim Brother volunteers fought the Zionist forces even before the regular Arab armies entered Palestine. They also campaigned in Cairo for more volunteers to aid the Arab resistance. The Brothers played an especially heroic role in the celebrated battle of Faluja, where an outnumbered and encircled Egyptian force, in which Gamal Abdul Nasser served as a staff officer, refused to surrender. In that battle, the Brothers braved Israeli fire to run supplies to the trapped Egyptians. By such actions the Brothers earned the respect and the admiration of many Egyptian officers fighting in Palestine. In contrast to the active support offered by the Muslim Brothers, however, these officers believed that the Egyptian monarchy had betrayed them and the cause they were defending.

When the conspiracy of Free Officers erupted into the coup d'état of July 23, 1952, the Brothers actively supported the military uprising. When the army moved, the Brothers rallied support for the coup in the streets. The supportive relationship was signalled by the close personal ties of Sayyid Qutb, the most important ideological leader of the Brothers, with the new military rulers. In the fall of 1952, the Muslim Brothers issued a comprehensive statement of their desired objectives for the new order in Egypt. The document anticipated the most successful elements of the reform program that Egypt's military rulers implemented over the course of the next decade. Land reform, industrialization, and welfare measures were all part of the Brothers' program. Initially, the military rulers welcomed this support. After the military seized power in Egypt, the new rulers erected a monument in the Palestine cemetery listing Muslim Brother martyrs in Palestine.

By the mid-1950s, however, this cooperation collapsed and the regime and the Brothers were locked in deadly combat. The Brothers' commitment to their beliefs, their willingness to fight for these beliefs against external enemies, and their ability to organize their supporters were the factors that made the Brothers successful in Palestine, that drew the admiration of the Free Officers, and that made them welcome supporters of the new regime. The personal ties between the two movements and the common goals of social and economic reform also drew the groups closer together. What then turned them into bitter rivals?

From the Brothers' perspective, the answer was the very strength which initially attracted the Free Officers. The Brothers' commitment to Islam made them a threat to the secular, pan-Arab goals that the military rulers announced after taking power; the activist and aggressive nature of the Brothers' commitments meant that they posed a real threat to the officers; and the organizational skills of the Brothers provided the resources necessary to back up their threat. Thus, from the Brothers' point of view, the rivalry with the regime and the subsequent repression were the product of the government's fears of the Brothers' superior commitment, activism, and organizational strength. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the regime treated the Brotherhood as its most dangerous opponent. Major Muslim Brother thinkers and activists, including Sayyid Qutb, were assassinated or executed; thousands of followers were held in political detention camps.

Long years of repression undoubtedly weakened the organization of Muslim Brothers, but the spokesmen for an Islamic alternative survived the harsh repression with their social vision intact. Some of the Brothers were radicalized by the prison experience, and many moved to the fringes of the Islamic trend. During the 1970s, however, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood reappeared in public life to reclaim their past, to express what they had learned from their ordeal, and to stake their claim to Egypt's future. The Brothers renewed their call for a new Islamic order. Although many of the old slogans and phrases returned, there was a decidedly different emphasis in the 1970s. From their jailers, the Brothers learned some essential lessons. They began to understand, for example, that Islam had dangerous internal as well as external enemies. The Brothers realized that the threat from the military rulers was heightened because they appropriated many of the issues the Brothers regarded as central, without, of course, the primary commitment to Islam that was the organizing center of the Brothers' own movement. The military officers spoke the language of anti-imperialism, and they did so in the plebeian accents of their origins. Moreover, the new rulers acted on their nationalist convictions, most dramatically at Suez in 1956, and on their economic and social concerns, most effectively with the land reform measures.

Two decades of interaction between the military regime and the Brothers clarified the issues on which the two agreed such as anti-imperialism, land reform, and a commitment to the poor. At the same time, it became clear that the basis of support for these issues was radically different. The Brothers, for example, supported moderate land reform because of their notion that a harmonious community should minimize disruptive social cleavages, while the Free Officers pushed for a more radical reform because it weakened class forces in the countryside that opposed their rule and created new allies for them. The Brothers opposed Israel as a threat to Islam, whereas the officers emphasized the Israeli danger to Arab nationalist goals.

The fundamental source for all of the Brothers' objectives was Islam. The lack of centrality of this issue in the project of the officers was enough to upset any durable alliance. As the Brothers saw it, Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s had drifted from Islam. At the heart of the military regime, they saw a void. The Brothers judged that for all the movement by the military rulers on concrete social and national issues, the Free Officers had no clear sense of where Egypt and the Egyptians were going. The military rulers, the Brothers argued, were chasing other peoples' modernity at the price of the Islamic heritage. The Free Officers failed to create a civilizational project that was authentically Egyptian and Islamic. Egypt's defeat by Israel in 1967 confirmed the Brothers' sense of the inadequacies of the military regime. Initially, they responded guardedly to Sadat's assumption of power, although they soon actively welcomed the new ruler's de-Nasserization campaign and the opportunity he gave them to return to public life. The liberalization enabled the Brothers to outline their vision of a different future. The coherence and power of the Islamic future for Egypt that they envisioned drew the Brothers into a critical stance toward the status quo. In this sense, the elaborate critique that the Brothers developed of state policies in the 1970s was part of their social vision, but it is important to stress that it was not the origin of the vision. The Brothers were not simply a disgruntled opposition who defined themselves in reaction to the regime. Rather, they had their own concept of what their society should look like and they had specific projects that would achieve their ideal; one of these projects (but only one) was their belief that the current policies of the regime would not lead toward the achievement of the collective good life and therefore required criticism.

In their journal Muslim Brother writers spelled out a penetrating and explicit critique of the grand policy prescriptions of Nasser's successor. The power of the critique was enhanced by the alternative Islamic way of living in society that the Brothers consistently posed. The success of the Brothers in both the theory and the practice of their critical stance made them, alongside the military, the most cohesive social force in Egypt of the 1970s and set the stage for their extraordinary legal involvements in public life under Mubarak.

Initially, the tacit alliance with the Sadat regime appeared to require that the Brothers restrict their commentary to the concerns of the faith. In exchange the Brothers were to enjoy the first opportunity since the 1940s to openly reestablish themselves as a presence in public life. The lessons of repression in the 1950s and 1960s convinced the mainstream Brothers that a nonviolent strategy to achieve their social ends was best. Eschewing force, however, did not mean foregoing criticism. The Brothers judged that the nonviolent path required that they offer "guidance" to the mass of followers and "advice" to the rulers. In the years from 1977 until the journal was shut down in 1981, *The Call* offered the most vigorous and widely disseminated public criticism of the Sadat orientation in Egyptian public life. They declared Sadat's grand reorientation of the 1970s a failure, attacking the American global connection, accommodation with Israel, and key aspects of the economic and political liberalization. The Brothers judged the combination of these elements to be a deadly threat to the integrity of Egypt's Islamic civilization.

As part of their definition of a truly Islamic society, the Muslim Brothers declared that the freedom of organization and expression would be guaranteed to all groups. These rights would not depend on the character of the regime in power; Islamic law and custom would guarantee these rights. During the 1970s, although the Brothers welcomed the advances in personal security that Sadat's liberalization made possible, they quickly joined with other regime critics in charging that the democratization efforts were halfhearted. As Muslim activists, they objected to the denial of a political role for Islamic societies and the repeated persecution of the various Islamic groupings. The Brothers pronounced Sadat's slogan of "no religion in politics" un-Islamic and manipulative. Muhammad Abdul Kudus, one of the most astute political analysts writing for the Islamic press, pointed out that Islam does not make the sharp distinction between politics and religion that is characteristic of the Western Christian experience. He also noted that when religion served the regime's purposes, the slogan was not raised: "When the Shaikh of al-Azhar issued a statement glorifying the peace treaty, it was published on the front page of *al-Ahram*. No one dared charge that religion was involved in politics."

Kudus argued that refusal to grant full recognition to Islamic groups distorted the political arena. The real political forces in Egypt such as the Nasserists and the Islamic trend were not represented, according to Kudus. He viewed the official opposition parties as simply artificial regime creations, with leaders taken from the ranks of former "cabinet and ASU members." In a defiant article, Kudus protested the abusive treatment by the authorities of the Islamic current and charged that mistreatment of the Islamic elements revealed the hollowness of Sadat's democracy. Kudus concluded that there could be no genuine democracy as long as the regime circumscribed the participation of organized Islamic groups in public life.

To face Egypt's economic crisis, the Brothers urged greater self-reliance, selective nationalizations, increased emphasis on production rather than consumption, and extended welfare protection for the poor. In addition, their economic program decried the general moral corruption that the Sadat era economic policies caused. They also insisted on some purely Islamic economic policies such as the replacement of interest by profit-sharing arrangements.

In the Brothers' view, the Open Door policy moved Egypt decisively away from the failed socialism of the Nasser years. The Brothers welcomed it as such. Nevertheless, they raised important questions about the adequacy of the new approach in terms of their own economic vision, and they expressed grave doubts about the way the new policy was implemented. Especially after the riots of January 1977, the Islamic press attacked the inefficiency, corruption, and injustice that marked implementation of the liberal economic strategy. "Couldn't the vast fortunes of the rich have been used to ease the hardships of the needy rather than wasted in ostentatious display?" asked Omar Telmesany. The Koran, he noted, urged that one take from the rich to give to the poor. In Telmesany's view "the Open Door could have helped in solving part of our serious crisis had it been devoted to productive enterprises rather than luxury items that only make the situation worse."

The Muslim Brothers left their particular stamp most clearly in analyses of the social and cultural impact of the new economic orientation. One of the strengths of the Brothers was the integrated character of their social vision. At the root of the Brothers' conception was an ideal of Islamic community, in contrast to Sadat's concept of a collection of individuals pursuing their self-interest. With a clear notion of what Egyptian society should look like in terms of Islamic values, the Brothers assessed the developments of the 1970s. Thus, one Brother pointed out that there was no "purely economic" policy. The impact of economic decisions always spilled over on society as a whole. He pointed out that the new materialist values invaded social spheres like education where they had no proper place, according to the standards of a good Islamic society. In the 1970s the practice of teachers offering supplemental "private lessons" to their students for a fee became widespread. Such payments for preferential treatment effectively undermined the social ideal of equality and tarnished the proper role of a teacher. Education became a consumer commodity like cooking oil or soap whose "price is determined by the laws of the market."

Articles in *The Call* charged that the Open Door policy also created "false needs" that damaged the population. The circulation of foreign consumer products, the Islamic press stressed, entailed "changing peoples' ideas so that they will aspire to live in the Western style, as they are made more aware of the way of life in the West." One commentator warned that the new economic climate created "a new group of people who know the rules of the game and enter into it on this basis." Increasing numbers of Egyptians were working with foreigners as the representatives of Western multinational companies. The large profits they made as intermediaries gave them a material stake in the foreign presence in Egypt and the economic ties that sustained it. Moreover, the high wages these Egyptians earned distorted the essential moral tie between productive effort and material gain. The Brothers charged that their "success" pointed to connections and influence peddling rather than hard work as model behavior for the young.

Brotherhood intellectuals did not exhaust their efforts in these criticisms of government policies. The Islamic trend in public life reserved impressive intellectual and organizational resources for the task of energizing Egyptian society to meet what they saw as the greatest danger: an assault on Islam. In the Brothers' eyes the essential struggle to preserve Islam took precedence over social goals like development, revolution, or democracy that other Egyptians regarded as essential. The Muslim Brothers concluded that the basic world conflict in the twentieth century was between competing cultures. In the global battle, as one Brother put it, each bloc seeks "to dissolve the character of the other nation—its thought, religion, language, and heritage." The powerful cultures of both the secular West and the atheistic East threatened Egypt's Islamic heritage. The Muslim Brothers believed that both power blocs were waging an ideological battle against Islamic countries like Egypt under the banner of "modernity." The attack aimed to deprive Muslims of their history, their identity, and, ultimately, their capacity to resist. The Brothers warned that both East and West sought first to plunder the resources of the Islamic world and then to destroy Islam, the only power able to challenge their present hegemony. In despair, the Brothers drew parallels between the role of the Americans and Israelis in the destruction of Lebanon and the ravages of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The Brothers urged Muslims to draw on their faith and their history to strengthen the Islamic alternative. The founder of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, explained that Muslims must "rebuild our lives on our own foundations and according to our background, without copying from others." Before they could hope to develop their own distinctive future, Egyptians and all Muslim people had first to know who they were. Above all, the Brothers insisted that Egyptians learn to distinguish between what they inherited from their own Islamic past and what was imposed on them from the outside. According to the Brothers, Islam was the core of the inheritance and the key to all authentic expressions of Egyptian collective life. The rule of Islam, the Brothers argued, could provide communal identity and systems for organizing all facets of life. The Brothers worked to build a consensus around Islamic faith, history, and culture. "When the people have become true Muslims," wrote one Brother, "an authentically Islamic nation will naturally evolve."

The Brothers recognized that the general character of this call to Islam left persistent ambiguities on political, economic, and constitutional issues. However, they considered these unresolved issues secondary. Muslim Brother analysts judged that a secure spiritual and cultural identity for the community would be more decisive in the global conflict than the final form taken by the economy or the polity. Despite the prompting of critics, the movement never offered an authoritative projection of the character of the political system or the organization of the national economy. The Brothers asserted only that Islam was compatible with a variety of institutional arrangements provided that certain basic requirements were met, such as application of Islamic law and adherence in some form to the larger Islamic community. As the Brothers saw it, the essential purpose of their society was not to compete for the allegiance of the people with detailed policy proposals, to court votes or win popular gratitude by performing social services. The Brothers did not seek, therefore, to advance a political program. They also judged that their movement was more than the sum of its social projects.

The Brothers believed that their principle task was to educate Egyptians to Islam, understanding "education" in the fullest sense of cultural and spiritual formation. In the 1970s the Brothers displayed the fruits of their efforts along these distinctively Islamic lines in *The Call.* Their journal reported developments that showed how Islam was to be lived in Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s. In their personal quest to live the truth of Islam, individual Muslim Brothers strived to create institutions that would allow them to practice these Islamic ideals. These practical efforts of the Brothers concentrated on transforming such basic social institutions as the mosque, the school, and the family into anticipations of the new Islamic society.

The Muslim Brothers in the 1970s were more than a critical voice for a theoretical Islamic alternative. The way they lived their lives in their schools, mosques, and families prefigured the Islamic order their movement envisioned. Moreover, demonstrations of the power of Islam to shape lives were not restricted to the pages of the vibrant Islamic press of the Sadat years. They spilled into the streets. The Society of Muslim Brothers gave ordinary Muslims the sense that they could make a statement about the imperfections of Egyptian society and the need to parry the external threats to Egypt. Through participation in the world the Brothers were struggling to bring into being, they could join themselves to a larger Islamic destiny. The Brothers consciously made small acts part of a larger drama. For example, the Islamic press always gave extensive coverage to the thousands of average Egyptians who responded to calls by the Brothers to public prayers in the open squares of Egypt's cities on Islam's holiest days. On these occasions no overt political platforms nor social programs were presented, yet the prayers, nevertheless, demonstrated that the military was not the only organized force in Egypt. The Islamic press pronounced them "anticipations" of the true Islamic order they were struggling to achieve. Others, like the president of Assiut University, wondered "if the thousands who were moved for prayer might not be moved for other purposes, too."

On a Saturday in August 1981 one such prayer drew Egyptians to a huge public square in Cairo. Signs appeared from nowhere to blanket Cairo; the outline of a mosque, traced delicately in green on a white background, indicated a call to prayer:

> Brother believers, you are called to prayer on the occasion of the Prayer Holiday in Abdin Square. There is a place set apart for women. Bring your children.

Respondents to the call to prayer come by the thousands, primarily from the poor quarters of Cairo. Starting at 5:00 A.M., they moved on foot and in small groups toward Abdin Square. They set themselves apart by the outward signs of the community of Muslim believers. They passed through the city to Abdin Square, moving at the distinctive pace between walking and running that is prescribed for the procession to prayer. Everyone dressed in the traditional long white robes, with many wearing embroidered white skull caps. For an hour, an estimated quarter-million Egyptians prayed in the square, and then they quietly dispersed. Their assembly showed the potential of the Islamic trend, best represented by the Muslim Brothers, to fill the public spaces in Egyptian life.

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Narratives from the history of particular groups like the Muslim Brothers cannot give us the "truth" of Islam and politics in Egypt. Careful attention to the public traces of their story and a disciplined attempt to place those facts in the context of their history can provide an intelligible record of one human effort, however imperfect and incomplete, to realize a specific vision of an Islamic political community. Knowledge of this kind brings out the humanity of the Brothers as they cooperate and struggle with others who offer a different Islamic vision or others still who reject the very notion that Islam should play so large a part or even any part at all in public life in Egypt. By hearing from the Muslim Brothers in this way, we cannot learn what Islam means in some general sense to Egyptian political life. But we can come to appreciate normatively what the Brothers think it means now and should mean in the future; we will also have a more reliable empirical record of what they have said and done to make their vision of Islam in politics real. Explanatory understanding of this kind will give us a far better chance to anticipate the likely future projects of the Brothers or their reactions to future events. And we might just discover possible points of contact, areas in which agreement and even joint projects might be possible.

Such attunement to the purposes of the Brothers and familiarity with what they are up to in their political lives does not, of course, necessarily imply approval or fruitful dialogue or common projects. Once having listened to the Brothers' story in this way, we may accept or reject it as edifying or hopeful on the basis of our own values and ways of living. But surely, we who live in the industrially developed world are not so confident in our own resolutions of the problems of human community in the modern world that we can ignore the chance to know something of the experience of other human communities from which we just might learn.

This story of the Muslim Brothers reminds us that Egyptians are more than the objects of diverse external pressures, more than the sufferers of multiple internal problems and dislocations, more than reflex reactions to underlying causes. They are also political actors with stories to tell about their efforts to transform themselves and their country in the face of all these obstacles. Egyptians do feel the pressures of external forces; they are plagued by terrible poverty and do not enjoy full freedom. These unhappy facts, however, do not reduce their political history to victimization by backwardness or dependency. The meaning of their political lives cannot be read from the forces that constrain them. The answers that Egyptians have given to questions about their religious tradition and the challenge of political community in the last years of the twentieth century are embedded in the histories of their alternative political practices, histories that must be considered in ways at once empirical and interpretive if we are to learn from them. To discover these answers we must be willing to look beyond Pharaohs and those who lurk in their shadows.

ENDNOTES

[1] Portions of this article are reprinted by permission of the publishers from my recently published work *Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: Copyright © 1990 by Raymond William Baker.*

[2] See David Hirst and Irene Beeson, *Sadat* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), 11.

[3] To my knowledge, no Muslim group accepts the term *fundamentalism* as a reasonable self-description. In Egypt, the Islamic press carries frequent commentaries on the misleading implications and hostile character of such a characterization. The related notions of *resurgence* and *revival* are reacted to in much the same way.

[4] *Newsweek,* 19 October 1981; and Hirst and Beeson, 13.

[5] Fouad Ajami gave this conventional wisdom its most eloquent statement; he also provided the powerful imagery, used for other purposes here, that reinforced it. See, "In the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt" in James Piscatori, ed., *Islam and the Political Process* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1983).

[6] See Daniel Pipes, "Islam in Iraq's Public Life," in Cyriac K. Pullapilly, ed., *Islam in the Contemporary World* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Crossroads Books, 1980).

[7] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 34.

[8] For a detailed assessment of Amin and his important role in Egyptian civil society, see Baker, *Sadat and After,* esp. chap. 7, 204–42.

[9] A recent and reassuring work along these lines is Richard T. Antoun, *Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspectives.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). For an earlier classic, more directly related to the topic at hand, see Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[10] *The Call (al-Da'wa)* was published from 1976 to 1981 as the official organ of the Muslim Brothers. A second Islamic periodical *Perseverance (al-I'tisam),* initially restricted to theological issues, began after the mid-1970s to follow the Muslim Brother lead on issues of current policy. Many of its writers were regular columnists in *The Call.* The journal, published by the Holy Law Society, had a circulation roughly equal to *The Call* until it too was closed in 1981. These two journals were the heart of the Islamic press in the 1970s.

The central character in the historical narrative is Omar Telmesany who explained his role in this way: in the absence of the "guide" or leader for whatever reason, "the eldest member of the group was to take up his duties. I am not the leader of the Society," he continued, "but I am its representative." *The Masses (al-Ahaly),* 29 Sept. 1982. Telmesany was representative of the Brothers during the Sadat years with which this chapter deals. He died in 1986.

All of the quotations in the account that follows draws primarily from the Egyptian Arabic language press, the mainstream press (including *al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, Sabah al-Kheir, al-Musawwar,* and *Rose al-Yusuf*), and the opposition press (primarily *al-Ahaly).*

H. E. Chehabi

Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic Is the Islamic Republic?

ALMOST ALL SOCIETIES HAVE HISTORICALLY HAD separate spiritual and temporal authorities. When this dual structure disappears and the religious institution takes over temporal power as well, the political system is termed a theocracy. In its purest form, "God is recognized as the immediate ruler and His laws are taken as the legal code of the community and are expounded and administered by holy men as His agents."[1]

In Iran, a powerful clergy emerged when the Safavid dynasty (1502–1722) made Shi'ism the official religion. Due to the vagaries of subsequent Iranian history, Iran's Shi'ite clergy acquired a degree of independence from the state that allowed individual clerics to play an important role in the country's affairs.[2]

To understand the political involvement of the clergy in contemporary Iran, one has to keep in mind that it does not, strictly speaking, constitute a church in the sociological sense.[3] Most important, there is no strict hierarchy with centrally ordained promotion procedures: as Shi'ite clerics like to say, "the order of the clerical hierarchy is its disorder." Also, not all areas of religious activity are controlled by the clergy.[4]

At the highest level are the *marja*'s, or sources of imitation. Every believer has to follow one; the *marja*'s are also usually the recipients of religious tithes. However, believers freely choose their *marja'* from among the most learned clerics, which means that there is usually more than one *marja'*. Also, the most learned of the clerics are not allowed to follow another from among their ranks in religious

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matters, a rule which has prevented the emergence of a strict pecking order. This lack of a clear and institutionalized hierarchy made Khomeini's attempt to create a theocracy problematic, for, in a true theocracy, the religious institution as a whole exercises power. To succeed, Khomeini would have had to reform the inner workings of the clergy so as to create a genuine "church."

But before analyzing Iran's postrevolutionary attempts to do away with the separation of church and state, it is important to remember that the connection between religion and politics does not date from 1979.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN PAHLAVI IRAN

In the wake of the constitutional revolution of 1906, the clergy, many members of which had taken an active part in the revolution, withdrew from politics after it became clear that secularism had triumphed. An important exception was Seyyed Hassan Modarres from Isfahan, who was one of Iran's major political figures in the 1920s. He was repeatedly reelected to parliament and opposed Reza Shah's dictatorship until 1929, when he was arrested and later probably killed.

After Reza Shah's forced abdication in the wake of the Allied invasion of Iran in 1941, competitive politics returned to the country for twelve years.[5] In this period, the clerical establishment's official position was abstention from politics. At a conference on the subject of politics and the clergy, held in Qum in early 1949, it was concluded that "those who chose to wear clerical garb . . . should abstain from intermingling in the affairs of politicians and political parties or becoming tools for their goals."[6]

This position, of course, could not be strictly enforced, and consequently we find in this period a number of politically active clerics. Chief among them was Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani, who was an important ally of Mohammad Mossadegh, this period's last prime minister (1951–1953). Kashani organized mass support for Mossadegh's Nationalist government until he broke with him in late 1952. Also active in this period were the Devotees of Islam, a small extremist organization led by a junior cleric named Navvab Safavi. This group carried out a number of political assassinations, and thus gained greater importance than the number of its sympathizers would suggest.[7]

The electoral appeal of some clerics was considerable: in the 1952 parliamentary elections, for instance, a slate of pro-Mossadegh candidates supported by Kashani outperformed both secular National Front and conservative candidates in the Tabriz area; the two top vote getters were clerics.[8] Even after Kashani's break with Mossadegh, most other Nationalist clerics remained loyal to Mossadegh.

After Mossadegh was ousted by a Western-backed coup,[9] some of his followers formed the underground National Resistance Movement (NRM), in which men with religious inclinations dominated. Ideologically, they were modernists who tried to reconcile Islam and liberal democracy. Critical of the clergy for its apolitical stand, support for the Shah, and general backwardness, they took the courageous step of writing a letter to Ayatollah Borujerdi, then the highest authority in Shi'ite Islam, in May 1954, in which they reminded him that the Iranian constitution put the ulema in charge of guarding over its application, and that it was therefore the clergy's duty to help rid the country of illegitimate government.

In the early 1960s, when for a few years the Shah somewhat liberalized his regime and allowed parties to form, the veterans of the NRM founded a party with a religiously inspired program—the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI). This party soon became the most popular of the opposition groups, but its leaders were arrested and jailed in early 1963. In the tradition of men like Na'ini and Modarres, the LMI, led by Mehdi Bazargan and Seyyed Mahmud Taleqani, demanded the application of the constitution and expressly opposed any political privileges for the clergy.[10]

Three points should be noted. First, the religious institution, led by Ayatollah Borujerdi, frowned upon political activism and deemed it undignified. Second, of those clerics that defied this rule, most—by running for parliament and, in some cases, by becoming involved in party politics—worked within the existing institutions of the state. Third, religiously motivated laymen formed a party that also worked within the constitutional framework; furthermore, they had strained relations with much of the clergy. Had Iranian politics been allowed to develop in a pluralist direction, the LMI and clerics that supported it could have become an Islamic equivalent of Christian Democracy, a political current separate from the religious institution. Instead, the Shah's regime became even more autocratic after 1963, and this trend limited the appeal of the constitutionalist opposition, which had failed in its methods, and added to the appeal of revolutionary alternatives, both on the secular and on the religious side of the opposition.

In January 1963 the moderate political opposition was disarmed in Iran as the Shah prepared for his "White Revolution." In that year Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini first burst into the consciousness of Iranians, as an opposition movement inspired by him replaced the moderates as the main opposition against the Shah's autocracy.

Khomeini was a somewhat atypical member of the clergy. He had been politically active as early as the 1940s. In 1944 he published a book in which he demanded that the clergy exercise ultimate control over the secular government without running it,[11] but during the 1950s he abstained from politics. After Ayatollah Borujerdi's death, the clergy as a whole became more critical of the Shah, partly because of agrarian reforms that many clerics deemed contrary to Islam. In this context Khomeini rose to the position of *marja'* and began speaking out against government policies and abuses. After he had harshly criticized the security forces' violent attack on the Qum seminaries in March 1963, he was arrested in June 1963. News of his arrest led to riots all around the country in which an unprecedented number of people were killed.[12] His opposition, in 1964, to the granting of diplomatic immunity to all American military experts in Iran further enhanced his image as a principled opponent of the Shah who spoke up when everybody else had been cowed into silence.[13] The Shah exiled him to Iraq, where he stayed until October 1978.

KHOMEINI'S RISE TO PROMINENCE

It was during his Iraqi exile that Khomeini elaborated his new political doctrine. Until the late 1960s he had not called for the overthrow of the monarchy or the abolition of the constitution, but, rather, had insisted that the Shah and his government respect religion and the constitution. In 1971, however, as the Shah was celebrating the 2,500th anniversary of the Iranian monarchy with great pomp and circumstance, Khomeini published a set of lectures in which he set out to prove that, in the absence of the twelfth Imam, his authority devolved on the clergy, and that therefore all secular government was illegitimate. This doctrine, called *velayat-e faqih* (mandate of the jurist), had its antecedents in Safavid times, where it had been a distinctly minoritarian view among the clergy. In the early nineteenth century Mulla Ahmad Naraqi had elaborated on it, but for him the clergy's authority was to be judicial rather than political.[14] Khomeini extended Naraqi's analysis to include the actual exercise of political power *strictu sensu* among the clergy's prerogatives.[15] It represented a clear break with the past: Khomeini argued that the reasons for the twelfth Imam's occultation were beyond human understanding, therefore Muslims should not wait for him to reveal himself but try to establish Islamic government even in his absence.

None of the other six or seven *marja*'s shared Khomeini's doctrinal views, but dissatisfaction with the regime spread among the clergy, so that by the mid-1970s procourt mullas were a distinct minority. But the political abstinence of the other *marja*'s allowed Khomeini's views to triumph politically. The Shah had tried to limit Khomeini's appeal as a *marja'* by maintaining good relations with other *marja's*: after Borujerdi's death the Iranian government had treated Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim as his successor, since, from the Shah's point of view, Hakim had had the advantage of being an Arab living in Iraq, which limited his political role in Iran. Upon Hakim's death in 1970, the Shah had addressed his condolences to Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari in Qum, signifying his preference for him. As late as 1978 Empress Farah went on a pilgrimage to Najaf, where she was received by Ayatollah Abolqasem Kho'i. Given the growing illegitimacy of the Shah's regime, however, the combined effects of these contacts was to weaken Khomeini's rival *marja*'s, as they could be seen as men who compromised with the Shah.

Khomeini was very critical of his apolitical peers: "The gutless people who now sit in the religious centers are certainly not capable of establishing and maintaining a government, for they are so gutless that they cannot wield even a pen or undertake any activity at all." In the teaching centers one saw "negligent, lazy, idle, and apathetic people who do nothing but discuss points of law and offer their prayers." As for those ulema who actually cooperated with the regime, they should be "exposed and disgraced so that they may come to lose whatever standing they enjoy among the people"; their "turbans . . . must be removed."[16]

Khomeini's popularity grew as the Shah's legitimacy declined.[17] During the 1970s a vast network of religious associations sprang up in Iran, many of which became the loci of oppositional activity.[18] Khomeini thus disposed of a grass-roots support network that penetrated far more deeply into society than the secular opposition against the Shah, given that the latter had been severely repressed between 1963 and 1977. His lieutenants in Iran were the group of younger ulema who had also had a secular education and who sought to reform the clerical institutions. When the revolution began in 1978, Khomeini soon eclipsed secular political leaders. Modern communications, that is, long-distance telephone lines and cassette recorders,[19] brought his incendiary messages to the farthest corners of Iran.

In the early 1960s religiously motivated Iranian politicians pursued their aims within the confines of the constitution, but by 1978 the existing political system had lost its legitimacy for most people; this crisis of legitimacy is the context in which Khomeini's charismatic authority grew. While in 1978 he seemed to retreat from his theocratic blueprint, we now know that this was a tactical maneuver destined to hold the anti-Shah coalition together. It was as a result of the political decay characterizing the Shah's regime after 1963, therefore, that Khomeini gained ascendancy over the hearts and minds of growing numbers of Iranians. The religious activism that led to the revolution was a symptom of what Samuel Huntington has called "Praetorian politics," that is, a politics where social forces confront each other directly, without the mediation of institutions,[20] all political institutions having been destroyed by the Shah.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Given the extreme personalization of power in the last years of the Shah's regime,[21] his departure in February 1979 took place under conditions that precluded an orderly transfer of power, and a last-minute attempt to provide constitutional continuity by replacing the Shah with a regency council failed. The provisional government that Khomeini installed was headed by Mehdi Bazargan, a Muslim liberal, and included both religiously inclined and secular moderates. This government, attacked by the Left and by the fundamentalists for being too moderate and pro-Western, and by secular Iranians for being too deferential toward Khomeini, was not able to consolidate its position in the face of the multiple centers of power that had mushroomed in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Shah's regime. Mehdi Bazargan and his cabinet resigned in the wake of the seizure of the American hostages by radical students in November 1979.[22]

The Islamic movement that dominated the revolution of 1978–1979 was by no means ideologically or socially homogeneous. On the lay side, it included the socialist Mojahedin and the liberal LMI.[23] On the clerical side, it included open-minded and relatively progressive ulema like Ayatollah Motahhari and Ayatollah Taleqani, both close friends of Bazargan's, constitutionalists like Ayatollah Shariatmadari, and the radical clerics around Khomeini.

A few days after the triumph of the revolution five younger clerics, who had been influenced by Motahhari's ideas and who had enjoyed sustained intellectual contact with secular academics at Teheran University, Mohammad Beheshti, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Khameneh'i, Javad Bahonar, and Ayatollah Abdolkarim Musavi Ardabili, founded a new political party: the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). The original party program called for a centralizing reform of the clergy, but in the face of clerical opposition the IRP soon limited itself to spelling out a vision of the new state. While all these groups had been united in their opposition against the Shah's dictatorship, their ideas concerning the shape of the future political system diverged. These differences of opinion surfaced over the issue of Iran's new constitution.

Khomeini's 1971 blueprint for Islamic government was simple: experts would run the day-to-day aspects of government but would be supervised by a *faqih*. There would be no need for a true parliament, although some sort of assembly would assist the government: "If laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need . . . , after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up laws."[24] In January 1979, he said in a private interview that the role of parliament was to supervise government, not to legislate. At most, it could concern itself with matters that are beneath the dignity of Islam to concern itself with, such as urban planning and traffic regulations.[25]

Publicly, however, Khomeini seemed to endorse liberal democracy—at least as long as he was in Paris trying to gain international sympathy for his anti-Shah movement. Thus, in the autumn of 1978 he told a French newspaper interviewer: "We are for a regime of total liberty. The future regime of Iran has to be one of liberty. Its only limits will be, as in any other state, the general interest of society, but also considerations of dignity."[26]

Perhaps Khomeini himself did not believe in the immediate feasibility of his original scheme, or perhaps he had not given any thought to the problem of concretely translating his political thought into institutions, for when, after his triumphant return to Iran, a number of French-educated lay Islamic figures, led by Hasan Habibi, produced the draft of a semipresidential constitution in June 1979 that borrowed heavily from that of the French Fifth Republic, he accepted it and called for a quick plebiscite to ratify it. This draft was hotly debated in Iran, as secularists found its deference to Islam as official religion too burdensome, while Islamists deemed it too secular. To resolve these debates, an assembly of experts was elected in the summer of 1979 to amend it.

Given the organizational weakness of Iranian secularists, the vast majority of successful candidates in these elections were clerics, and among these founding members of the Islamic Republican Party were the most active. In his inaugural message to this Assembly, in August 1979, Khomeini said that he expected it to create "a 100 percent Islamic constitution."[27] Militant Islamists had claimed before the revolution that the idea of separating religion and politics was a Western imperialist plot to weaken Muslim societies. Moderate Muslims had not dissented, interpreting this separation as a prohibition of *religiously* inspired *political* action. To the dismay of both the moderates in the provisional government (weakened by the deaths in mid-1979 of their clerical allies, Ayatollahs Motahhari and Taleqani) and their secular opponents, the IRP-led majority in the Assembly of Experts now eliminated the separation of religion and politics by joining state and church: the principle of *velayat-e faqih* was superimposed on the basically secular semipresidential draft, with Khomeini himself as supreme religious leader who oversaw the work of the other branches of government but was not institutionally responsible to anybody. The Islamic republic became a dyarchy: while popular sovereignty was affirmed and given concrete expression in such institutions as a popularly elected parliament and president, Khomeini's personal political vision, in which a *faqih* was the only legitimate successor to the Prophet and the Imams, was enshrined as well.[28] The new constitution placed the judiciary under the exclusive control of clerics chosen by the religious leader and contained provisions for the extensive revision of the legal codes to render them Islamic.

The linchpin of the theocratic component of the constitution was the position of supreme religious leader. According to Article 109 of the constitution, he had to be a *marja'*, possess leadership qualities, and be accepted by the majority of the population as their leader. Iran's constitution was thus tailor-made for Khomeini: since the other *marja*'s did not espouse Khomeini's doctrine of *velayat-e faqih,* these qualities fit only him. Khomeini's leadership had emerged informally, like that of other *marja*'s, but for his successors the framers of the constitution provided for an elected assembly of experts that would choose a leader (or council of leaders) possessing the listed qualities, in case no popular consensus would emerge. This attempt at formalizing the process whereby the supreme leader is chosen represents a clear attempt at church building, as the Assembly of Experts would act more or less like a popularly elected cardinals' conclave. To function as such, however, the clergy as a whole would have to change its traditional informal ways and, for example, run in the elections to the assembly. This would necessitate a bureaucratizing reform of the clerical institutions, a reform that the new regime, aware of the traditional clergy's resilience, did not attempt. In practice, therefore, the constitution of 1979 left out a large part of the ulema, including all of the highest authorities except Khomeini.

The other *marja*'s were not enthusiastic about the constitution. Ayatollah Shariatmadari repeatedly stated his opposition to having popular sovereignty restricted. Arguing that "members of the clergy, whose role is a spiritual one, should not interfere in affairs of state," he would accept a political leadership role for the clergy only when the state passed anti-Islamic legislation, or in the event of a temporary power vacuum.[29] When a referendum was held in early December 1979 to approve the constitution, Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who had been the highest religious authority in Iran until Khomeini's return, called for a boycott of the vote. A few days after the referendum Shariatmadari's followers rioted in Tabriz and briefly took over the city, but when Shariatmadari wavered in his challenge to Khomeini, the movement was quickly defeated.

In the crucial year of 1979 two basic trends impeded the establishment of a true theocracy in Iran. First, Iran's long constitutional tradition left a legacy that could not be ignored by the founders of the Islamic Republic. They had elaborated their ideology in competition with other groups—Marxists, liberals, secularists. This rhetorical competition meant that they were obliged to prove they were not "reactionaries" who merely wanted to turn the wheels of history back. Their constant claim that Islam is not outdated, that—if properly understood—it has all the answers to the problems of the contemporary world, precluded any too blatant backtracking on the achievements of the constitutional revolution.[30] This meant, that in order to establish their rule, the theocrats had to use the language and procedures of constitutionalism: hence the grafting of a theocratic component on the semipresidential draft prepared by the intellectuals in early 1979.

Even this theocratic component did not engage the entire clergy, but only a part of it. This segment of the clergy claimed the right to oversee all aspects of public life in Iran since they constituted a learned class. To distinguish them from the clergy in general, I call this group *clerisy*.[31] The attempt to establish a theocracy in Iran could therefore not completely succeed because of the unwillingness of the clergy as a whole to assume political power. But as long as Khomeini was alive, the rule of the clerisy was sanctioned by his being a *marja'*.

Given these multiple contradictions, it was only natural that, contrary to the wishes of the radical Islamists, religion and politics did not merge. Instead, politics became religious and religion became politicized.

THEOCRACY AND ITS LIMITS

Soon after its installation, the provisional government faced interference by individual clerics,[32] who penetrated all institutions. The multiplicity of power centers created a chaos which ended in late 1979 when the new republic's institutions were put into place. What Iran needed after the fall of the monarchy and the convulsions of the revolution was a system of institutions that could foster stable government and create a degree of predictability in public life. Yet the doubly hybrid semipresidential and quasitheocratic constitution of 1979 was least capable of providing a framework for stable governance. In his definitive discussion of semipresidential systems, Werner Kaltefleiter concludes that this type of constitutional construct does not have a predictable effect on political conditions in a country.[33] President Abolhasan Banisadr, a modernist Islamic layman elected in early 1980, faced a hostile IRP majority in parliament and became, in effect, the leader of the opposition. He claimed the right to govern since he was the electorate's chosen, not realizing that "the manner of the head of state's election is irrelevant for his real power position."[34] As Maurice Duverger has shown, a semipresidential system in which the president lacks a parliamentary majority functions like a parliamentary system.[35] At first Khomeini remained above the fray, thereby allowing the institutions to shape the power struggle, but in the spring of 1981 he began siding with the IRP and removed Iran's first elected head of state from office in June 1981. This paved the way for the clerisy's total assumption of power, which they achieved by using force to eliminate other political forces or to prevent their participation in politics, in total disregard for the constitution.

The clerisy's efforts to reshape Iranian society began as early as 1980. Ministries and educational establishments were purged, which had the added advantage of creating employment and creating upward mobility for revolutionaries and their relatives.[36] An educational reform was launched in April 1980 and was touted as an Islamic cultural revolution. Islamic ideology, with a heavy emphasis on the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih,* became a compulsory subject in schools.[37]

Legal reform was the most important aspect of the endeavor to Islamize society, and the regime did indeed try to make God's law the "legal code of the community"; the party program of the IRP defined an Islamic society as one in which "Islamic values, rules, and laws govern all social relations," even if not all of its members are practicing Muslims.[38] But this effort ran into problems that stemmed from the very nature of Islamic law.

Early in 1981 a new penal code was introduced which codified the law of the talion with its gruesome punishments. Its critics pointed out that these laws were meant to be applied only, and if at all, in a society in which justice reigns and the social causes of delinquency have been eliminated, but for the clerisy the establishment of an Islamic order had to come first.

The major problem in implementing the divine law (*shari'a*) is that, while its theoretical foundations are beyond dispute, there is great disagreement among jurists about its particulars. The fact that no *mojtahed* is allowed to follow another perpetuates disagreement. Premodern Iran was characterized by a decentralized administration of law, where state-appointed judges, applying both religious and customary law, and different independent *mojtaheds* were available for the settlement of disputes; the law of the land was not coextensive with the *shari'a*. The clerisy's task of Islamizing the centralized judiciary that it had inherited from the Pahlavi state could therefore not be accomplished by simply going back to the old system. For the purpose of a modern nation-state, the *shari'a* had to be codified. But even among the ruling clerisy there were disagreements as to what the codes should be. This shifted the burden of creating laws to parliament, which thereby did become the legislative body it was not originally supposed to be.

Nowhere have these disagreements been more paralyzing than in the crucial field of agrarian property relations. The Islamic Republic, as a revolutionary regime, had an ideological commitment to social justice, which would necessitate distribution of the land to those who tilled it. At the same time, Islam safeguards property, meaning that land cannot be seized arbitrarily, either by the peasants or by the state. In fact, of course, both happened in the chaotic aftermath of the revolution, but giving property relations a permanent legal framework has been an elusive task. Parliament on a number of occasions passed laws, but these were rejected or modified by the more conservative Council of Guardians, which, according to the constitution, has to ensure the conformity of legislation with Islam.[39]

These disagreements were one reason for the emergence of factions within the clerisy, a development that gave rise to a small cottage industry among Western observers who tried to identify the "moderates" with whom the West could "deal." These attempts tried to identify ideological, doctrinal, regional, or class-interest related cleavages to explain the disagreements, but what they generally missed was the strong personalistic component of factionalism, a typical feature of the Shi'ite clergy inherited by the clerisy. This personalism alone can explain the shifting alliances that so confuse observers.

By the end of 1987 disagreements within the regime, exacerbated by institutional deadlock between parliament and the Council of

Guardians, had reached proportions that increasingly paralyzed government decision making. In response, Khomeini took two initiatives. First, he issued an edict which gave unconditional authority to the Islamic state to make decisions regarding the affairs of the country. Dismissing the idea that an Islamic government could exercise its authority only within the bounds of the Sacred Law, he stated that a government in the form of a God-given absolute mandate (*velayat-e motlaq*) was the "most important of the divine commandments and has priority over all derivative divine commandments . . . even over prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca."[40] This was meant as a doctrinal vindication for *raison d'état*, but was nonetheless quite incongruous coming from a man who had made his career criticizing secular rulers for disregarding divine law. Khomeini thus undermined the very foundations of the theocracy he had hoped to establish in Iran. Instead of a society governed by Islamic laws, citizens were now given the duty to obey an absolute ruler.

Within the narrow range of tolerated opinion, the institutions of the Islamic republic have allowed for a certain degree of pluralism and dissent—more so, at any rate, than under the Shah. Parliamentary debates have been vigorous, motions of censure have been deposited against prime ministers, and several ministers' nominations have been refused by the members of Parliament. The practice of the Islamic republic bears a certain resemblance to Mao Zedong's idea of nonantagonistic contradictions among the "people," which are to be tolerated. Where Mao excluded the formerly exploiting classes, the Islamic republicans place all those who question *velayat-e faqih* beyond the pale. This limited pluralism makes the Islamic Republic more an authoritarian than a totalitarian regime.[41] Often in authoritarian regimes, the religious sphere maintains a certain independence from state interference; this holds even for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

The clerisy's attempts to constitute a church and to rule theocratically met with resistance among the clergy. In early 1981 Ayatollah Reza Zanjani, one of the leading clerical supporters of Mossadegh, issued a statement which read:

> The monopoly of judicial and theological decision-making established in Iran is contrary to Islam. The titles of guide and supreme guide are not Islamic. No comparison can there be between the Catholic Church, with its hierarchy and structure, and the leadership of Shi'ites. Any pretention of this sort is not Islamic.[42]

Ayatollah Hasan Qomi, the religious leader of Mashad, criticized the government in April 1981 for being un-Islamic and had this to say about the regime's harsh revolutionary methods:

> The real clergy does not want power . . . , it does not approve of those clerics who govern us. The real task of the clergy is to advise and enlighten the people. Real Islam is the religion of forgiving and of compassion.[43]

The high point of the traditional clergy's opposition to the regime came in 1982, when Ayatollah Shariatmadari was "defrocked" (stripped of his turban) and deprived of his title of Grand Ayatollah, following allegations that he was involved in a conspiracy to topple the regime. Such a move was unprecedented in Shi'ite history, as it implied a degree of compulsory organization that the ulema in Iran had never had. Khomeini finally acted on his hostility to the traditional clergy.

The opposition of the traditional clergy to the rule of the clerisy is not coterminous with opposition to the principle of *velayat-e faqih*. Part of the clergy accepts the principle, but objects to the personalization of power, arguing that the clergy as a whole are invested with the right to rule in the absence of the twelfth Imam. Other, more conservative clerics opposed the regime primarily on account of its arbitrary actions such as expropriating the rich. On the other hand, some opponents of *velayat-e faqih* have collaborated to a greater or lesser degree with the regime, on the assumption that, despite all its faults, the Islamization of public life represents an improvement over the monarchy. Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani of Qum is the most visible example of this tendency.

It is a sign of Khomeini's distrust for the traditional clergy that soon after returning to Iran, he began appointing *imam jom'ehs* to lead congregational Friday prayers in Iran's cities. Acting also as Khomeini's personal representatives in each city, they would preach *velayat-e faqih* and submission to the ulema. After Shariatmadari's "defrocking" there were attempts to give these prayer leaders a centralized administration.[44] This attempt to build up a bureaucratized parallel clergy met with the hostility of provincial cities' local ulema, leading at times to armed conflicts between the supporters of each religious leader. It is ironic that the Islamic Republic's attempt to overcome the separation of religion and politics led to the emergence of a political and a "purely religious" clergy. The former, which I have called the clerisy, have been, because of their closeness to power, increasingly subjected to the same type of criticism that the procourt clerics had to face under the monarchy, except that they now exercise power directly as theocrats.

The proclamation of the principle of absolute mandate of the jurist in 1988 alienated many more members of the clergy, even within the ranks of the clerisy, for whom the idea of subjecting Islamic tenets to the test of political expediency is nothing less than heretical. Religious modernists, too, have sharply attacked the principle and equated it with polytheism.[45]

The question arises as to why the clergy have not spoken out more forcefully against the clerisy, why they have not contested the clerisy's claim to represent Islam. On the most basic level, not opposing the regime brings with it the advantages of belonging to the ruling stratum of society, a temptation difficult to resist. Doing so, by contrast, is dangerous: the regime has not hesitated to execute oppositional clerics. The clergy's own justification is that they are not interested in politics, be it under the Shah or now. Sooner or later, they argue, the people will realize the spuriousness of the clerisy's theocratic enterprise. More cynical observers point out that the regime is in fact keeping the clergy silent by blackmail, since it inherited the files established by the Shah's secret police on individual clerics and their dealings.[46]

On the lay side, too, religious opposition to the Islamic regime has manifested itself. Modernists like Mehdi Bazargan and his friends criticized Khomeini not only for his policies (refusing to end the Iran-Iraq war, for example), but also for his despotism. They increasingly question the very institution of *taqlid* and espouse "protestant" positions.[47] Their collaboration with the clergy is impeded by their suspicion of all clerics, and occasionally even by a sort of gallow's humor on the part of sympathetic ulema. When, in 1987, a number of veterans of the provisional government founded a new liberal umbrella organization—the Society for the Defense of Freedom and the Sovereignty of the Iranian People—they approached Ayatollah Abolfazl Zanjani and invited him to become a founding member; he refused on the grounds that there should be one organization in Iran without a mulla in it.[48]

As long as Khomeini was alive, his charismatic authority overwhelmed whatever resistance the clergy might offer, and at the same time endowed the regime with a degree of traditional legitimacy deriving from his undoubted position as a *marja'*. His passing from the scene, however, changed matters, as his succession was fraught with ambiguities.

POST-KHOMEINI DEVELOPMENTS

Charismatic authority is by nature exceptional, and therefore ineluctably faces the problem of routinization. Weber has identified various ways this can be accomplished. In the case of Iran, routinization was first attempted by "designation on the part of the original charismatic leader of his own successor and his recognition on the part of the followers."[49] Khomeini chose Ayatollah Montazeri, a former student with impeccable revolutionary credentials. Montazeri was a border-line case: not yet a full *marja'* with a following of his own, he was nonetheless more learned than most members of the clerisy, who often spent little time in the seminaries. The regime made a concerted effort to lend importance to Ayatollah Montazeri's stature by calling him "Grand Ayatollah," addressing him as "esteemed jurist," and so on, in an attempt to manufacture a *marja'* contrary to custom. The Assembly of Experts elected in 1982 met annually but could not agree on a successor until Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Speaker of Parliament, declared Montazeri "elected" while the Assembly was not in session—another example of the clerisy's disregard for the rules they themselves made. For a while it seemed as though the succession was assured. But Montazeri became increasingly critical of the regime and its arbitrary policies, and, as a result, by the spring of 1989 his enemies succeeded in forcing his resignation. Within the clerisy, no one was left who could fulfill the constitutional conditions for the position of supreme religious leader. This, plus the unwieldiness of the constitution, led to a constitutional revision in the summer of 1989 which streamlined institutions.

Most important, the constitutional provision that required the supreme religious leader to be a *marja'* was eliminated. This paved the way for a less qualified member of the clerisy to assume Khomeini's mantle, but by the same token seriously diminished that person's religious authority. Also eliminated was the position of prime minister, which strengthened the presidency that Rafsanjani coveted. The structure of Iran's executive became a new variation on the dual leadership so prevalent in today's world.[50]

When Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, the regime was prepared. The Assembly of Experts quickly moved to elect President Ali Khameneh'i to the position of *faqih;* Rafsanjani later became president. While the transition was smooth in political terms, it raised a lot of questions in terms of religious authority. It was clear that Khameneh'i could not inherit Khomeini's religious authority as *marja'*, the regime's decision to make him an instant Grand Ayatollah notwithstanding. Therefore, a nonagenarian cleric of whom very few people had heard before, Ayatollah Araki, was presented to the people as the new *marja'*. This bifurcation of Khomeini's authority raises two interesting points. First, it is an implicit admission that state and church are separate, as Khomeini's political authority was vested in Khameneh'i and his religious authority in Araki. Second, the regime now "designated" the *marja'* much more blatantly than the Shah had ever done with his discreet hints as to his government's preference on this matter. Iran's new duumvirate acts, in fact, like a secular government. This point is not lost on many members of the clerisy. Recently Ahmad Azari Qomi, a key member of the proregime Society of Professors of the Qum Seminaries, said that Ayatollah Khameneh'i was not a *marja'*, that obedience was due to him only in his political rulings, and that the society had decided to recognize Ayatollah Golpayegani as *marja'*.[51] There could thus be a rapprochement between certain members of the clerisy and the clergy.

What is the future of the clergy in Iran? The clerisy's rule has not succeeded in eliminating it. Khomeini was aware of this, as he showed in his political testament. The clerical institutions of Qum were still liable to be infiltrated by charlatans, he wrote, and "the thesis of 'order is in disorder' is one of the sinister inspirations of these . . . conspirators." He ended with a warning that alluded to conservative Bazaar merchants and their allies among the clergy:

> My advice to that group of clerics and pseudo-clerics who, with [a] variety of motivations, oppose the Islamic Republic and its institutions; spend their time trying to destroy it; help the conspirators and political game players; and make large financial contributions, as is reported, to these groups for this purpose from the money they receive from the capitalists who have no concern for Allah, is that you have not been, and I don't believe you will ever be able to, accomplish anything.[52]

As if to underline his contempt for the clergy, he wrote mystical love poems in his last months that mock traditional religiosity:

> Freed of the self I claimed "I am the Truth" as mine
> Just like Mansur, I bought the secret of the gallows tree.
> My lover's grief set fire to my soul, it drove me wild
> And I became the scandal of the marketplace
> Swing wide the tavern door before me, day and night,
> For I've grown weary of both mosque and [seminary].[52]

As long as Khomeini was alive, the traditional clergy seemed to have no future. The principle of *marja'iyyat* seemed to have been superseded by the mandate of the jurist, the remaining *marja*'s but relics of the past. When the regime made Ayatollah Montazeri Khomeini's successor in 1985, Ayatollah Sadeq Rowhani objected to this designation from above and stated: "My duty is to say that I see Islam in danger, that the *marja'iyyat* is in danger."[54] *Velayat-e faqih* had triumphed, and one observer wrote: "It is futile, and missing the point entirely, to refute the doctrinal basis of a revolution after its successful accomplishment."[55]

Khomeini's death, however, complicated matters, for he was survived by a few traditional *marja* without leaving a successor of his own religious stature. This means that the legitimacy of the Iranian regime is now in doubt on its own terms. Today most pious Iranians follow Ayatollah Kho'i in Iraq, while the constitutional supreme religious leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khameneh'i, is clearly subordinate in terms of actual power to President Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. At the same time, a new generation of clerics, both in Najaf and

Qum, are positioning themselves to assume the role of *marja'* after the passing of Ayatollahs Kho'i and Golpayegani.

CONCLUSION

The attempt to found a theocracy in Iran has been only a superficial success. Only a sector of the clergy took power in 1981, and the establishment of divine law has run into many problems, as the Iranian regime had to face the resilience of both the centuries old clerical institutions and a society that had decades of secularization behind it. These contradictions seemed surmountable as long as Khomeini was alive, but the unsatisfactory manner in which his charisma was routinized means that they can no longer be ignored.

At the heart of Iran's political system lies a doctrinal aporia, which will sooner or later lead to a legitimacy crisis. This does not mean that the Islamic Republic is unstable, for a regime can survive a long time without legitimacy if there is no credible alternative.[56] Neither the monarchists, nor the Left, nor the liberals seem in any position to pose a threat to the ruling clerisy; for better or worse, changes will come from within the regime. So far, a social and economic liberalization has taken place, but there are no signs of a political opening.[57] There has been a certain laicization of the regime, as technocrats have increasingly replaced clerics in key positions. Iran's first vice president, for example, is Hasan Habibi, principal author of the first draft of the 1979 constitution. Rafsanjani's gamble seems to be to stake the future of the regime on economic recovery and on promises of future prosperity, while referring to legitimacy formulas that fewer and fewer Iranians take seriously.

The regime faces a dilemma. To attract the cooperation of the professionals and induce at least some exiles to return and invest their capital and their technocratic skills in the country, the Islamization of public life has to be relaxed. But such a policy creates two foci of discontent: first, all those who benefited from the elimination of the monarchy's ruling class; and second, all those ulema who, while disagreeing with the regime's doctrine, did not oppose it because it at least imposed Islamic norms on society. If these ulema link up with marginalized, and therefore resentful, members of the clerisy, the stage could be set for a renewal of tension between state and church. The repercussions of such a tension for society are difficult to gauge, for the degree of religiosity in a society is not constant; one should not automatically assume that religious issues will play as important a role in the lives of Iranians in the 1990s as they did in the 1970s.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Ahmad Ashraf, Ali Banuazizi, Cosroe Chaqueri, Hamid Dabashi, Roy Mottahedeh, Said Saffari, Amir Soltani, Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, and Ashutosh Varshney for their help and advice.

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[4] See Michael M. J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 136–37.

[5] On this period see Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy, 1941–1953* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

[6] Majid Yazdi: "Patterns of Clerical Political Behavior in Postwar Iran, 1941–53" *Middle Eastern Studies* 26 (July 1990): 286.

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[10] On the NRM and the LMI see H. E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[11] Azar Tabari, "The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics," in N. R. Keddie, ed., *Religion and Politics in Iran* (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1983).

[12] On this episode see Mohsen Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988), 68–102.

[13] See James Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 156–61.

[14] On Naraqi see Hamid Dabashi, "Early Propagation of *Wilayat-i Faqih* and Mulla Ahmad Naraqi," in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, eds., *Expectation of the Millennium: Shi'ism in History* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), 288–300.

[15] On Khomeini's doctrine, see Hamid Enayat, "Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurisconcult," in James Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[16] Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, "Islamic Government," in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,* translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan, 1981), 138, 141, 143, 145.

[17] The causes and stages of the revolution have been analyzed extensively and cannot be expanded upon here. For details, see Milani; or Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[18] Said Amir Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," *Government and Opposition* 16 (Summer 1981).

[19] See Majid Tehranian, "Communications and Revolution in Iran: The Passing of a Paradigm," *Iranian Studies* 13 (1980), esp. 12–23.

[20] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[21] On this point see Khosrow Fatemi, "Leadership by Distrust: The Shah's *Modus Operandi,*" *The Middle East Journal* 36 (Winter 1982).

[22] For a history of postrevolutionary Iran, see Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

[23] On the former see Ervand Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojahedin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). On the latter see footnote 10.

[24] Khomeini, 137–38.

[25] Quoted in Arjomand, *Turban,* 148–49.

[26] Interview in *Le Figaro,* 15 October 1978, as quoted in *Pensées politiques de l'Ayatollah Khomeyni* (Paris: A.D.P.F., 1980), 42.

[27] Quoted in Arjomand, *Turban,* 138.

[28] There is an interesting parallel here with Portugal's semipresidential constitution of 1976. Here, too, the social force that had dominated the (1974) revolution, in this case the military, institutionalized its influence by creating a powerful military-dominated and largely unelected "Council of the Revolution," which made Portugal a dyarchy until the constitutional revisions of 1982. And here, too, the early years were characterized by power struggles between president and

prime minister. See Thomas C. Bruneau and Alex Macleod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1986), 12–20.

[29] David Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies," *Iranian Studies* 13 (1980): 126. The latter view is not unprecedented in European history, to wit Cardinal Mindszenty's claim in 1945 to be, as Primate of Hungary, the "highest constitutional authority" in the absence of legitimate political leadership. See József Cardinal Mindszenty, *Memoirs* (New York: McMillan, 1974), 36–37 and 257–59.

[30] Two examples are the treatment of women and of religious minorities. As late as the 1960s the clergy had opposed women's suffrage; in 1979 it was written into the constitution. On religious minorities, even though some clerics had virulently opposed their emancipation during the constitutional revolution, the Islamic Republic did not change their official status. In 1979 Khomeini said that minorities would not have to participate in the defense of the country (*Le Monde Diplomatique,* April 1979). But they did fight in the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), and the term "martyr" was extended to those non-Muslims killed in action. A number of streets in Teheran were renamed after Armenian and Jewish martyrs. The theocratic principle of Islamizing society and the constitutionalist principle of treating citizens equally were brought into harmony by treating non-Muslims as Muslims; at least dead non-Muslims.

[31] The term is borrowed from S. T. Coleridge, who, of course, used it in a somewhat different sense. See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *On the Constitution of the Church and the State,* ed. John Colmer, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 42–54.

[32] For details, see Oriana Fallaci's interview with Mehdi Bazargan, "Everybody Wants to Be Boss," *The New York Times Magazine,* 28 October 1979.

[33] Werner Kaltefleiter, *Die Funktionen des Staatsoberhauptes in der parlamentarischen Demokratie* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970), 185.

[34] Ibid., 187.

[35] Maurice Duverger, *Bréviaire de la cohabitation* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986).

[36] For an analysis of the new elites' social bases, see Ahmad Ashraf, "Theocracy and Charisma: New Men of Power in Iran," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 4 (1990).

[37] S. A. Arjomand, *Turban,* 154. Before the Islamic revolution, "White Revolution" was an independent subject in ninth and eleventh grade. *Plus ça change* . . . .

[38] Hezb-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami, *Mavaze'-e ma* (Teheran, n.d.), 26.

[39] On this question see Shaul Bakhash, "The Politics of Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran," in R. K. Ramazani, ed., *Iran's Revolution: The Search for Consensus* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990).

[40] Quoted in Arjomand, *Turban,* 182.

[41] As defined by Juan Linz in "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, eds., *Handbook of Political Science,* vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975).

[42] From a document quoted in Houchang Nahavandi, *Iran: anatomie d'une revolution* (Paris: S.E.G.E.P., 1983), 123.

[43] *Le Monde,* 11 April 1981: 4.

[44] See Arjomand, *Turban,* 167–68.

[45] *Tafsil va tahlil-e velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih* (Teheran: Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran [LMI], 1988).

[46] This point was made to me by Mehdi Bazargan, personal interview, Teheran, 6 January 1991.

[47] In 1983, for instance, Mehdi Bazargan published a book about the role of the Catholic church in medieval Europe, which was a thinly disguised attack on clerical hegemony in Iran. Mohandes Mehdi Bazargan, *Gomrahan* (Teheran: Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran, 1983).

[48] Mehdi Bazargan, personal interview, Teheran, 6 January 1991.

[49] M. Weber, *Economy and Society,* 246–47.

[50] Jean Blondel, *World Leaders: Heads of Government in the Postwar Period* (London: Sage, 1980), 63–73.

[51] *Iran Times,* 26 April 1991, 5.

[52] *Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament* (Washington, D.C.: Interest Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran, n.d.), 39 and 56.

[53] *Resalat,* 15 June 1989, quoted in Ashraf, 116. See also *The Economist,* 9 September 1989, 109.

[54] Arjomand, *Turban,* 181.

[55] Dabashi, 299.

[56] Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[57] *Le Monde,* 7 May, 1991, 3.

Lisa Anderson

Obligation and Accountability: Islamic Politics in North Africa

THE POPULAR WESTERN VIEW OF ISLAM TODAY is remarkably unchanged from that of twelfth-century European Christendom: as both a civilization and a religion, Islam appears menacing, recalcitrant, corrupt. For the medieval Christian, the Muslim's embrace of Muhammad's message was adherence to a patently false prophet. Today, the religion in whose name the peace-loving Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat was killed and the pro-Western Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi overthrown seems no less profoundly perverse.

This apparent continuity in Western views of Islam conveys the impression not only that Islam is fundamentally wicked but also that it has an essential, primordial, unchanging character. Newspaper editorialists, foreign policy analysts, and textbook writers all speak of Islam as essentially uniform and timeless, unvarying in time and space. Of course, by force of circumstance, Americans have been made aware of the existence of sects in Islam—the Shi'a of Iran are understood to be somehow different from the Sunnis of most of the Arab world, for example—but this merely permits attribution of two rather than one permanent character to the religion and its adherents.[1]

As we examine the political expressions of religious commitment, however, we profit from adopting not only a less value-laden but also a less unyielding and determinist characterization. Religious identities are not necessarily best understood as ascriptive or primordial

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loyalties that exist "in nature." Indeed, like race, gender, and ethnicity, religious affiliation may usefully be viewed as "socially constructed." Social meaning and political significance are attached to biological or historical facts to create the accepted understanding of religious, racial, sexual, or ethnic characteristics.

Religious dogmas and movements are conventionally construed either as enduring reflections of essential truths, constantly reinterpreted to suit the times, or as singularly revealing reflections of the preoccupations of the times themselves. The first approach characterizes almost all the current writings within and about the contemporary Islamic revival. Both Muslim activists and Western critics advocate a return to the Koran for those who wish to understand the true meaning of Islam. Yet quite apart from the question of its essential virtues or vices, the most cursory review of the historical record illustrates the compatibility of Islamic religious precepts with varied cultural expressions and political arrangements. Merely the fact that it is not Saudi Arabia or Iran but Indonesia that is the largest Muslim country in the world suggests the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity Islam has encountered and accommodated. For the analyst of political Islam it is not the putative essence of Islam itself that requires examination but the institutions and relationships that shape the interpretation and expression of what it means to be a Muslim.

This perspective makes no claim to any insight about the true nature of Islam—indeed, it suggests that the enduring truths of Islam, like those of all other systems of belief, may be comprehended principally in their dialogue with the immediate and everyday preoccupations of the believers. Thus, the few principles of Islamic political theory that are set forth below are necessarily approximate, profoundly influenced as they must be by the agendas of contemporary political debate.

The modern Islamic political movements of North Africa have been shaped by the specific economic and ideological frameworks of modern politics in North Africa. Of particular significance are two characteristic features of the region's modern history. In the first place, they are products of and responses to the varied but always important role played by Islam in the nationalist movements that protested European rule and provided the postindependence governments. They are also, and equally importantly, a reflection of a peculiar feature of the political economy of the region: the relative independence of the governments from reliance on domestic sources of revenue.[2] For reasons to be examined later, the postindependence regimes, like their colonial predecessors, have not been wholly or even principally dependent upon revenues extracted from their citizenries. This has diminished the importance of economic issues and identities in politics in favor of domains, such as that of religion, that provide other rationales for demanding government responsibility and accountability. Claims to and critiques of government virtue replace disputes about tax policies and government budget allocations as the idiom in which debates about state-society relations take place.

ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY

By and large, the varied theories of legitimate government that prevailed in Europe to justify regimes as different as monarchy and democracy shared one important characteristic: they were intimately linked to property. Not only is private property an essential element in both modern democratic thought and its socialist critique, but even in the European past, according to Reinhard Bendix,

> the exercise of governmental authority was an aspect of family and property. The various functions of government were appropriated on a hereditary basis by a governing class consisting of a king, his high officials, the magnates of the realm, and privileged corporations which controlled their respective territories and thus ruled the country.[3]

This emphasis on property is in marked contrast to the Muslim past. Since the coming of Islam in the seventh century A.D. and its subsequent dispersion across Asia and Africa, political authority has been justified not as an aspect of family or property but on religious grounds.[4] The sole accepted rationale for rule was the welfare of the community of the faithful. Unlike a merely secular ruler, the *khalifa* (caliph; deputy or successor of the Prophet Muhammad) or imam ([prayer] leader) is responsible for the well-being of his charges. Islam provides a model of political authority that emphasizes preservation of the community. Albert Hourani has described the ruler thus:

> The ideal of the absolute ruler, standing apart from the society he rules, responsible only to God or to his own highest self; regulating the

> different orders of that society in the light of the principles of justice, so as to enable each to act in accordance with its own nature, to live in harmony with others, and to contribute its share to the general good.[5]

As may be apparent, this sort of political theory is not entirely alien to non-Muslim religious thought; Roman Catholic political teaching has also emphasized the desirability of harmonious regulation of the different orders of society. Islam, however, goes well beyond merely advocating such rule to virtually requiring it. How that might be accomplished was variously interpreted through the fourteen centuries since the death of the Prophet, and the standards for selection of and fidelity to the ruler were not uniform from time to time or place to place. Unquestioned, however, was the religious obligation of the ruler: there could be no separation of the realms of God and Caesar if the purpose of human society was the fulfillment of religious imperatives.

The notion that the ruler's responsibility to God could only be met by fulfillment of his responsibility to safeguard the community contributed to several of the characteristic features of politics in the Muslim world before the coming of European imperialism. The ruler's assumption of the office had to be ratified; for example, the *bay'a,* or pledge of allegiance by the community or its representatives—usually the religious authorities, or ulema—was an integral part of the installation of a new ruler. Similarly, the ruler was enjoined to seek the advice of those same representatives of the community in a process called *shura,* or consultation.

Virtually since the inception of this system, Western observers have assumed that religious authorities constituted a weak constraint on the arbitrary powers of the ruler: their moral authority appeared to be no match for the military force exercised by the ruler. Thus, for example, did Max Weber make "sultanism" and "qadi justice" synonymous with the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. In fact, however, the primacy of the ruler was by no means a foregone conclusion. Because, unlike Christian canon law, Islamic law regulates the ordinary life of the believer, one of the primary responsibilities of the ruler is to ensure application of the *shari'a,* as the legal system is known, in both the public and private lives of the believers. As a result, the political power and social prestige of the religious officials as the educated elite and the judiciary often allowed religious authorities to exercise control and demand accountability from the secular rulers.

Nonetheless, the shifting fortunes of the secular and religious authorities began to tilt decisively in favor of the former by the time of the establishment of the gunpowder empires in the sixteenth century, and the limits on the rulers imposed by the religious authorities eventually waned.[6] This had several important consequences. In the first place, the nature of religious organization altered somewhat, as religious brotherhoods (*tariqat* or *zawaya*) appeared more frequently, often as mystical and quietist but sometimes quite explicitly political alternatives to the more staid and increasingly dependent religious establishment of jurists and scholars, the ulema. Simultaneous to this, the weakening of mechanisms to monitor government performance, the actual or potential anarchy surrounding battles over political succession, and the increasing remoteness of the rulers from the ruled provided occasions and rationales for the early European imperial incursions into the Muslim realms.

IMPERIALISM AND THE REMAKING OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

It is well to remember that the countries of much of the Islamic world, including North Africa, are creations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are substantially expanded and reorganized versions of provinces of the Ottoman Empire and, although the Moroccan monarchy reigned independently for several centuries before the French established its protectorate in 1912, the country over which it rules still very much reflects the imposition of a European political template.

During the nineteenth century, the French and British nibbled away at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, all the while claiming fidelity to its integrity and independence. Having been chased from Egypt by the British twenty-five years earlier, the French began occupying Algeria in 1830. For the next fifty years, the British remained primarily concerned with access to India but by the 1880s the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was severely compromised with the British occupation of Egypt and the French declaration of a protectorate in Tunisia. In both cases, local dynasties that were formally representatives of the Ottoman sultan were retained to be "protected" by the foreign power. Ottoman Libya was occupied by Italy in 1911, the year before the Moroccan Sultan agreed to French protection.

Among its many consequences, European colonialism had the effect of dramatically increasing the ruler's arena of arbitrary prerogatives. Obviously, the colonial governments themselves would not be bound by any obligations to the people of the colonies, except the very vague and largely neglected responsibilities of the *missiȯn civilatrice.* Colonial rule in North Africa was far more despotic than anything that had preceded it. Not only was the government less accountable, but its capacity to affect the daily lives of ordinary people now drawn into new labor markets, trade networks, educational systems, and military obligations was far greater and more taxing than that of previous regimes.

Moreover, whether because of the anti-Islamic sentiments of the imperialist Right, the antireligious opinions of the imperialist Left, or merely the conviction of imperial technocrats that church and state are better separated, the Muslim religious establishment in North Africa was systematically undermined by the colonial powers. By and large, the religious brotherhoods, though they were often important in the early resistance to colonial incursions, eventually threw in their lot with the European rulers, only to be discredited as collaborators at independence—the principal exception having been the Sanusiyyah in Libya, which was probably saved from the same fate only by the brevity of Italian rule. The ulema found their traditional prerogatives progressively narrowed. Secular educational facilities replaced the Koranic primary schools and the mosque-based institutes of advanced study staffed by the ulema; secular legal codes supplanted Islamic law and Western judicial institutions overtook *shari'a* courts. Even fluency in classical Arabic gave way as a sign of education and influence to command of French or Italian.

ISLAM IN THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

It is perhaps not entirely surprising that Islam, so long the refuge, voice, and defender of the ruled, became a symbol of refusal to capitulate to European demands as well. Islam became not only a faith but an ethnicity and ideology as well. Thanks in part to the absence of the indigenous Christian communities that played such an important role in elaborating the secular ideology of Arab nationalism in the Middle East and the presence of substantial non-Arab populations who shared the Arab adherence to Islam, nationalism borrowed from and built upon Islam throughout North Africa.

In Morocco the French protectorate lasted a mere forty-five years (1912–1956). The sultan they protected retained his title as Commander of the Faithful throughout its tenure and Islam remained an important element of the rationale of government. Thus, when, in 1930, the French administration declared its intention to formally recognize the "customary law" of the Berbers, the decree was greeted with virtually unanimous horror. The Berbers are an ethnic and linguistic group said to be descended from pre-Islamic inhabitants of North Africa. They constitute over half the population of Morocco and are a clear majority in the rural areas. (They are also a substantial proportion of the population of Algeria while constituting smaller minorities in Tunisia and Libya.) The French believed them to be less hostile to colonial French rule than the Arabs and less attached to Islam. Whatever the truth of the issue on the eve of the promulgation of the Berber *dahir* (decree), the effort to remove the Berbers from the jurisdiction of Islamic law was seen by Arabs and Berbers alike as a shameless device to divide and rule them and to undermine Islam. The ensuing protests created the framework of the subsequent nationalist movement; national unity was equated with defense of Islam.

In Algeria the equation of Islam and nationalism was also important, although for very different reasons. By the 1930s Algeria had been under French rule for a century—indeed, it was legally a province of France—and the jurisdiction of both Islamic and local customary law had been reduced to the residual (if important) realm of personal status—aspects of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. For no less a reformist than Farhat Abbas, later to become a significant figure in the Algerian liberation movement, non-European Algerians seemed to have no distinctive feature: "If I had discovered the Algerian nation I would be a nationalist . . . but this nation does not exist." In response to this observation the president of the Algerian Association of Ulema replied:

> We too have searched in history and in the present, and we have discovered that the Algerian Muslim nation does exist. . . . This Alge-

> rian Muslim nation is not France, cannot be France, does not want to be France.[7]

It would be Islam that ultimately permitted the Algerians to distinguish themselves from the *colons,* to endow themselves with a positive identity, to envision themselves as independent, and to organize the nationalist movement that led to independence in 1962.

In Tunisia Islam also permitted a conceptual distinction between the French and the "native" Tunisians and provided a source of solidarity. In contrast to the Algerians, however, the Tunisians were not completely reliant on Islam. The legal framework of French rule was a protectorate (1881–1956), as in Morocco, and therefore the indigenous administration remained, albeit weakened, as a once and future alternative to that of the French. For the leadership of the Tunisian nationalist movement, Islam was not important ideologically—for them, the French lost their right to rule simply by failing to live up to their own liberal, republican standards—but it was a crucial organizational device. Members of the nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, swore their allegiance on the Koran; for many of its adherents among the masses, the party resembled nothing so much as a religious brotherhood.

In Libya Italy played yet a different role. Libya was an Italian colony, modeled on the Algerian type, and stitched together from three former Ottoman provinces. It lasted only thirty years (1911–1942), however, and as a result, the early resistance led by Ottoman military officers and the religious brotherhood, the Sanusiyyah, though it ultimately failed to turn back the Italian invasion, nonetheless provided the framework for what national political identity there was in Libya on the morrow of its United Nations-sponsored independence in 1951. Islam, in both its universalist guise—represented by the Ottoman Empire—and its local version in the Sanusiyyah, whose head became king of Libya at independence, served as an alternative to rather than a defining element of Libyan national identity.[8] In the absence of a successful nationalist struggle—it was the Allied campaigns of World War II that had defeated the Italians, not a Libyan nationalist movement—there was little local patriotism. Most residents of Libya thought of themselves either as members of local tribes or of the Islamic community as a whole.

Thus, Islam was not irrelevant for any of the newly independent governments of the 1950s and 1960s, even the avowedly secular and socialist regime of Tunisia. The temptations and challenges posed by Islamic formulas for political legitimacy were quite different, however, from one country to the next. From the Tunisians' evocation of the brotherhoods of the past to the Libyans' embrace of the community of the faithful as an identity of first resort, from the Moroccan king's posture as the Commander of the Faithful to the Algerian party's role as vanguard of a Muslim people, Islam constituted a powerful mechanism by which political loyalties were defined and mobilized. Yet for all of these governments the advantages of Islam in providing a rationale for rule were accompanied by the dangers of real or potential accountability. Islam suggests standards to which rulers may be held and provides authorities—religious scholars—who may do the holding. Thus, for each of these governments, relations with the religious establishment were a critical issue at independence.

THE CREATION OF STATES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF OPPOSITIONS

As the rulers spent their early years in power consolidating control, eliminating opponents, and installing and strengthening ambitious public administrations, they took the existence of a popular following for granted. In Morocco King Hassan II emphasized his dynastic claims to authority and allegiance, while other rulers emphasized their credentials as leaders of nationalist movements and popular revolutions to justify their control.

Like virtually all other rulers in the Islamic world, those in North Africa took advantage of the ideological and structural dictates of modernization to undermine the independence of what religious establishments had been left them by their colonial rulers. Even the conservative monarchies of postindependence Morocco and Libya, who failed to embrace the secularization of politics advocated so vocally by the ostensibly socialist regimes of Algeria and particularly Tunisia, took pains to limit the financial independence of the religious establishment. Soon religious officials were salaried employees of the state. Their traditional sources of income in the inalienable pious endowments known as *waqf* or *habous* were taken over by the state either to be directly administered or to be dissolved altogether as archaic impediments to economic modernization.

The progressive weakening of the independent role of the religious authorities was initially accompanied by policies that won the regimes wide support. As a result, although the consolidation of state control was intended to make the rulers of the region freer of constraints imposed by social organizations and institutions than at any time in the past, few voices were raised in protest. The regimes were generally and genuinely well liked. Not only were the causes with which they were associated widely popular, but they were also beneficiaries of important economic windfalls, which they used to broaden and solidify their support.

In fact, it would ultimately be this specific character of the political economy of state formation and development in North Africa that would foster the expression of opposition in religious terms. These were not, either at independence or for the several succeeding decades, states reliant on their citizens for revenues. At independence, the governments profited from the nationalizations of foreign-owned properties. In the 1960s, thanks to the Cold War, they enjoyed generous foreign aid allotments. By the 1970s and 1980s they found willing lenders in public and private international banking circles. These external revenues supplemented natural resources—hydrocarbons in Algeria and Libya, phosphates in Morocco and Tunisia—and financed many ambitious domestic projects without requiring that governments make significant demands on their own populations.

The countries of North Africa became, in essence, preindustrial welfare states, borrowing against their natural resources and strategic positions to feed and clothe their growing populations. The disproportionate share of government budgets derived from sources outside domestic production permitted governments to pursue policies without consulting the domestic interest groups that would ordinarily be the source of government financing, like tax-paying wage earners or property owners. The governments were obliged only by moral responsibility or ideological commitment—not by fiscal requirements—to increase the national wealth.

There were two important consequences of this political economy. First, the governments were relatively insensitive to the changing character of the domestic population (its increasing youth, for example, or its higher level of education and growing rates of unemployment) and to the sometimes deleterious results of the policies they did advocate. For example, by the beginning of the

1980s, Tunisia had reached the end of twenty-five years of growth by expansion. Per capita income rose more than fourfold in the thirty years after independence despite the doubling of the population, but during the 1970s and 1980s, income distribution worsened and unemployment grew to an estimated 50 percent among men under twenty-five years old. In Algeria, similar economic problems were obscured by revenues from oil and gas exports but, despite a generous agricultural endowment, the country imported half its food. Indeed, by the mid-1980s, the economic growth rate was little better than 2 percent, well below the 3 percent annual population increase. In both Tunisia and Algeria the once popular ruling parties had grown conservative, elitist, and corrupt.

In Morocco conspicuous consumption by the wealthy was encouraged by the king, himself one of the richest people in the world, while in the early 1980s, the World Bank estimated that well over 40 percent of the Moroccan people lived below the absolute poverty level. The king's campaign to regain the former Spanish territories in the Western Sahara in the mid-1970s provided a focus for nationalist enthusiasm and served to divert attention from the staggering income disparities at home. In Libya generous and egalitarian distribution policies won Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi widespread support after he ousted King Idris in 1969, but continuing inefficiency and growing corruption led to substantial waste of the country's $8,000 annual per capita income. Thus, when the oil market downturn of the 1980s caught the government unprepared and required it to resort to foreign borrowing, Qaddafi preferred the drama of confronting the United States on the world stage to domestic coalition building.

In addition to the relative insensitivity of the governments to the damaging results of their policies, the divorce between the rulers and the ruled—or, perhaps better, the financial independence of the rulers—created the conditions for the making of mutual claims on noneconomic grounds. The absence of both taxation and representation enhanced reliance on moral suasion and religious exhortation. As the governments continued to demand sacrifice for the good of the nation, the ruled began to reexamine the prerogatives and obligations of righteous rulers in Islam.

Thus, during the 1970s, despite concerted government efforts to rid themselves of religiously based limitations, faint voices began to urge greater respect for and adherence to Islamic precepts on the part of the governments. The labor unions, as representatives of constituencies whose contribution to the government coffers was minimal, played a relatively minor role in the conflicts over government policy. The Islamists, by contrast, challenged the regimes where they needed and wanted support—the realm of symbolic production.[9] The regimes therefore responded in ways that reflected less the economic resources of the respective movements than the role religion had played in the nationalist movements. The critical resources were ideological or symbolic, and only secondarily economic.

In part, of course, this renewed interest in religion was also a reflection of changes in the international political economy. The oil price rises of the 1970s gave an enormous boost to the visibility, prestige, and patronage of the conservative monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. To counteract the influence of the leftist ideologies and movements that had bedeviled the monarchies, they used some of their new wealth to support what seemed at the time to be more conservative causes. Not only did the Saudi government, for example, build mosques and provide religious training for imams throughout the Muslim world, they also provided discreet support for increasingly political "study circles" and discussion groups. By the end of the decade the success of the Iranian revolution gave an enormous boost to the Islamist political cause, serving as proof of both the righteousness and the feasibility of imposing religious standards in politics.

By and large, however, the movements reflected the local circumstances in which they had developed. The increasing remoteness of the governments elicited demands for greater accountability. Because the regimes had never relied heavily on domestic sources of revenues, however, the threat of widespread defections from domestic coalitions based on economic relations was weak; indeed there were few such coalitions and they had relatively little power. In fact, as has been the case in other distributive states, the organized responses to government policy were not based on economic or functional criteria at all but on the very grounds the governments themselves put forward as their own rationales: moral responsibility and ideological commitment. Thus did religious movements appear, decrying the impropriety of the personal lives of the rulers and the inequity of their governments' policies. In Libya, Colonel Qaddafi attempted to preempt the issue by declaring Islam an integral part of his Third

Universal Theory in 1979 and then arresting numerous Islamic militants. In Morocco, the king's efforts to retain control of Islamic political symbols led to an equation of the two: in 1983, hundreds of Islamic activists were arrested in Morocco and charged with plotting against the monarchy. In Tunisia, rumors that illegal and extremist Islamist groups were plotting against President Habib Bourguiba contributed to his ouster by his prime minister, Zine Abdine Ben Ali, in 1987. Only the Algerian regime was prepared to permit Islam an autonomous place in the political realm; in 1989, among the first of the parties to win recognition in Algeria's new multiparty system was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which promptly embarrassed the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) in municipal elections. Though the movements in each of these countries shared much the same rhetoric and many of the same external sources of financing, they had been and would continue to be profoundly influenced by the circumstances created for them by government policy.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES: COOPTATION, RECOGNITION, REPRESSION, PREEMPTION

Of the rulers of the Islamic world, the king of Morocco has been among the most adept at retaining a claim on religious legitimacy and balancing or combining religious and nationalist formulas. The Moroccan dynasty is not only sharifian (that is, it claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad), it has also produced several quite astute politicians during this century, notably the present king, Hassan II, and his father, Muhammad V. As early as the mid-1930s Muhammad V had established ties with the principal nationalist movement, the *Istiqlal* (Independence) party, and together they not only crafted the rationale and organization of the nationalist movement but undermined the symbolic and material control of the ulema and the brotherhoods over the discourse of Islam and its financial infrastructure in Morocco.

By the time Hassan II came to power at the death of his father in 1963, the political and organizational independence of the religious establishment had been effectively destroyed and the struggle turned into a battle for political primacy between the king and the political parties that had grown out of the *Istiqlal.* To this end, the king appropriated religious functions that had been the preserve of the religious establishment and the brotherhoods. Thus, every March 3, the *bay'a* is renewed as all the ministers, party leaders, and senior government officials pledge their allegiance to the monarch. This is a modernization of the notion of *bay'a* that permits the king, as Jamal Benomar suggests,

> to underline his traditional role, not only as head of state but also as a hegemonic religious actor who determines, according to his own interests, the position of other subordinate actors, such as the political parties, the unions, the *zaouaya* [*zawaya*] and the *ulema*.[10]

Thus, the Islamist challenge to the Moroccan government has been late, fragmented, and—given the opulence of the king's life-style and the inequity of the monarchy's economic policies—remarkably ineffective.

In Libya the religious opposition to the Qaddafi government has also been divided and weak for here, too, in appropriating part of the symbolic realm of Islam the regime has removed some of the planks in the platform of the religious opposition. As in Morocco, the regime's ability to do this reflected the country's history. King Idris, the monarch who presided over the transition to independence in 1951, based his claim to rule on his leadership of the Sanusiyyah brotherhood. After having led the brotherhood during its resistance to the Italians in the early years of their occupation, Idris took refuge in Cairo where he developed the close relations with the British that would eventually propel him to the head of the new state. For the twenty years he was out of the country, the Italians did what they could to destroy the order and to create a docile and cooperative religious establishment. By the time the country became independent, neither the *zawaya* nor the ulema had strong independent networks within the country but, because the resistance had not prevailed, neither was there a nonreligious rationale for government. Thus, when the monarchy was overthrown in a nationalist army coup in 1969, the officers added to their nationalist formulas frequent reference to Islamic precepts; indeed, before the Iranian revolution, the government of Colonel Qaddafi was considered the principal example of Islam in power.

In taking an activist stance in religious discourse, the revolutionary regime not only bid for the early support of the non-Sanusi ulema and undermined the position of the Sanusiyyah, it defined the boundaries of acceptable religious activity as well. Hence, alcohol consumption, forbidden by Islam but permitted under the monarchy, was banned, the Muslim calendar was made mandatory for all public communications, and Koranic criminal punishments were returned to the statute books. When, by the end of its first decade in power, the revolutionary regime began to face increasing domestic opposition, it held the religious establishment accountable. Thus were the masses instructed to "seize the mosques" and the ulema were accused of "propagating heretical tales . . . which distort the Islamic religion."[11] The orthodox ulema soon found themselves in the opposition, more cowed than defiant, while the regime preempted the reformist religious discourse.

In Tunisia the ruling Neo-Destour party and particularly President Habib Bourguiba, who ruled from 1956 until 1987, actively campaigned against any role for Islam in public life. Although Bourguiba had permitted his followers to evoke Islam in organizing the nationalist movement against the French, this had been a tactical appeal to the poor and ill educated. Once in power at the head of an independent country, he had no patience for what he viewed as the obscurantist and archaic influence of organized religion. He won considerable notoriety with his public campaigns in the 1960s against the month-long fast of Ramadan—he argued that it diminished productivity and drank orange juice at a public rally—and thereby left his regime open to criticism from religious circles. By the end of the 1970s, the illegal and barely tolerated Islamic Tendency movement had appeared to contest the legitimacy of the single-party regime. By the time Bourguiba was ousted in 1987, the government had recognized a number of other political opposition parties, and much was made of the far less hostile stance toward Islam of Bourguiba's successor Ben Ali. Hopes that the Islamic Tendency movement would be permitted legal existence as a political party were dashed, however, after several years of informal discussions with the government. Soon Ben Ali again had a number of prominent Islamists in prison and it was apparent that no substantive concessions would be made to Islamist sentiment. The Tunisian regime had chosen the path of repression.

The Algerian posture, by contrast, would look quite different. Until 1989 Algeria was also ruled by a single-party regime, and the ruling party, the FLN, also drew on its past as leader of the national liberation movement for much of its legitimacy. Although its principal orientation, like that of the Tunisian ruling party, was a non-aligned socialist posture that owed far more to European models than to Islam, in both the 1976 and 1985 Algerian National Charters "Islamic values" were declared to be a "fundamental constituent element of the personality of the Algerian people." Thus, when in the aftermath of bloody riots in October 1988 the government of Chedli Benjedid decided to authorize competing political parties and contested municipal elections, Algeria became the first country in North Africa (indeed, in the Arab world) to recognize an Islamist party. Perhaps even more surprising was the willingness of the government to concede the numerous electoral victories won by the FIS in the municipal elections of June 1990.

THE GULF WAR AND PROSPECTS FOR THE MOVEMENTS

As the last decade of the twentieth century opened, the world's attention was focused on the dramatic consequences of the end of the Cold War, including the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the futile and costly Iraqi effort to rearrange the political alignments, not to say the borders, of the Middle East. For North Africans, as for nearly everyone else, these international developments seemed fraught with both great opportunities and great risks, for it was not clear whether a unipolar world dominated by the United States would favor greater government accountability in the name of liberal values or even less government responsiveness in the name of international stability.

The conjuncture of the two series of events in the international arena did demonstrate, however, the fragility of political movements whose strength is based on command of symbols. The Islamist movements across North Africa, most of which had been recipients of Saudi financial aid, declared support for the Saudis and Kuwaitis in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In doing so they proved to have seriously misread popular opinion. For the ordinary citizen in North Africa, the challenge by ostensibly "revolutionary" Iraq to the notoriously arrogant, selfish, and inequitable Kuwaiti government was a compelling dramatization of their own grievances against unresponsive, corrupt, and arbitrary rulers.

Wherever and for as long as the Islamists could articulate the longing of the disenfranchised for responsive and responsible government, they found a ready audience. They did not have complete control over, or even dominance of, the religious discourse in either Morocco or Libya and, as a result, in neither were they major figures on the political landscape before the war. Both governments reflected the ambivalence of their constituents in their failure to wholeheartedly embrace either side in the Gulf war, and neither Islamist reform movement effectively distinguished a position independent from that of the regime.

In Tunisia and Algeria the Islamists were far more important in political movements before the war. Their revealing obedience to "foreign paymasters" in their early opposition to the Iraqis and their awkward reversals during the following months, however, played into the hands of their progovernment critics and raised questions about their sincerity.[12] This the Tunisian government was quick to exploit in characterizing the Islamists as "foreign" to the Tunisian political landscape. Indeed, in an ironic reversal, the government and its supporters argued that the Islamists' lip service to the values of tolerance and law and order was merely tactical and that the movement leaders spoke in very different terms when addressing their own supporters. This suspicion had particular resonance among the followers of the ruling political party which had launched its own no less "tactical" appeals to Islam during the struggle for independence and had been accused by the French authorities of the same sort of duplicity. Whatever the truth of the accusations, the Islamist movement in Tunisia divided in the aftermath of its miscalculation on the war and in the face of continuing government repression. As it splintered into increasingly violent factions, the Tunisian government, in supporting Iraq, reclaimed a position as responsive if not genuinely accountable to popular opinion.

For the Algerians, the fact that Islamist municipal councils were no more successful at balancing their budgets than their FLN predecessors was a far more important indictment than the Islamists' failure to provide wholehearted support to Iraq in the early days of the Gulf dispute. Indeed, FIS mismanagement contributed to the founding of a rival, more liberal, Islamist party, the Islamic Alliance, in the fall of 1990. Islamist sentiment was divided, not so much over dramatic foreign policy questions but over the mundane questions of local political strategy and public administration. The Tunisian repression ensured that the Islamists would remain outside the political arena; the Algerian recognition might ultimately permit their incorporation and domestication.[13]

* * *

Islam is a flexible, responsive system of beliefs and source of identity. Its political significance in the North Africa of the last quarter of the twentieth century has reflected both a common political economy, which has contributed to the underlining of noneconomic constructions of identity and protest, and the varied modern political histories of the particular countries, which have created very different terms for the debates between rulers and ruled. The association of Islam with Moroccan nationalism in the person of the king, the importance of Islam in defining the Algerian revolution's constituency, the minor and largely organizational role accorded Islam by the Tunisian nationalists, and the subordination of Libyan nationalism to broader pan-Islamic appeals during the anticolonial movement all saw their varying profiles silhouetted against the backdrop of postindependence politics. The light that focused attention on noneconomic debates, on questions of moral authority, was fueled by the common postindependence political economy; the individual patterns of those debates and questions in each country were reflections of their individual modern histories. From the Moroccan king's appropriation of Islamic discourse to the Libyan revolutionary government's reinterpretation of Islamic precepts, from the Tunisian stance of principled refusal to the Algerian position of pragmatic recognition, the governments of North Africa responded in historically conditioned ways to the couching of claims against them in religious idioms.

In very few of these debates about political and moral authority, however, was the question of establishing and maintaining institutions by which governments might be held accountable for the policies they raised, much less resolved. The terrain of symbols, of reciprocal moral obligation, may be a passionate, complex, and potentially dangerous one, but it has the singular advantage of being cheap to government and opposition alike. Far more taxing, literally and figuratively, is the construction of the tangible, material means of guaranteeing popular representation and government accountability, and this battle has only just been joined.

ENDNOTES

[1] See, for example, the argument that Muhammad's model is the pattern for political leadership today in James Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990); or Fouad Ajami's striking observation (for which citation I thank Majed Halawi) that "The Sunnis are homicidal and the Shi'ites are suicidal." US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Islamic Radicalism,* 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985, 154. More generally, on views of Islam see William R. Roff, ed., *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

[2] Jacques Delacroix, "The Distributive State in the World System," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 15 (3) (1980), makes this observation particularly about the oil producing states of the Arab world.

[3] Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 228.

[4] As should be apparent, the argument that hereditary monarchy based on property ownership is a Western European tradition should not suggest that dynastic rule was unknown in the Islamic Middle East. As Ibn Khaldun pointed out six centuries ago, dynastic rule was the norm. As he also pointed out, however, the group or family solidarity required to establish a new dynasty was enhanced by religious feeling and undermined rather than reinforced by individual property ownership. See Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah,* trans. Franz Rosenthal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[5] Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 3. That this kind of political theory is not unique to Islam but shared, at least in part, by other religious traditions as they seek to advise on regulation of social life in this world is suggested by the parallels with Catholic political theory as described by Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[6] Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam,* vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

[7] These quotations are cited in Leon Carl Brown's prescient essay, "The Role of Islam in Modern North Africa," in Leon Carl Brown, ed., *State and Society in Independent North Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1966), 105–6.

[8] On Tunisia and Libya, see Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

[9] As the impotence of the Tunisian labor movement suggested. See Hassine Dimassi, "La crise économique en Tunisie: une crise de régulation," and Elbaki Hermassi, "La société tunisienne au miroir islamiste," *Maghreb-Mashrek* 103 (January-

March 1984); and Susan Waltz, "The Islamist Appeal in Tunisia" *Middle East Journal* 40 (4) (Autumn 1986).

[10] Jamal Benomar, "The Monarchy, the Islamist Movement, and Religious Discourse in Morocco," *Third World Quarterly* 10 (2) (April 1988): 551.

[11] Cited in Lisa Anderson, "Qaddafi's Islam," in John Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 143.

[12] By November, the Algerian FIS was issuing statements denying that it then or ever supported the Saudi position, but it was not until shortly before the war started in January that it was described as "for the first time emerged from the reserve that have been observing since the beginning of the Gulf crisis" to call for a holy war against the United States. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) NES-90–229, 28 November 1990, and NES-91–009, 14 January 1991.

[13] Daniel Brumberg, "Islam, Elections, and Reform in Algeria," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (1) (Winter 1991).

Şerif Mardin

The Just and the Unjust

ISMET ÖZEL, ONE OF THE PREMIER YOUNG POETS of Turkey, reflects in his recent autobiography on the processes that brought him to abandon Marxism and to integrate his Islamic inheritance. He finds no religious training or systematic encouragement of religiosity in his childhood that could account for this conversion. It is an unexpected factor—the privileges which he acquired as the son of a minor official—that explains the change. Indeed, this is how he speaks of it:

> My mother was the daughter of a sharecropper. It is said that my father's family were cart drivers. The air I breathed could be described as that of the scores of financial difficulties encountered by a minor official with many children. That is, I never was immersed in a life-style that should have caused me to bear feelings of privilege. But there was a state structure outside my self which added meaning to my existence. The Republic of Turkey had enveloped society with a military-like authority it had granted its bureaucracy. To be the representative of the Republican regime created the feeling that one had a special place in society. If one added to this the distant attitude of the local population towards the officials the result was a picture of a false aristocratic status. Throughout my childhood I tasted the bitterness of this falsehood. Schools, official bureaus, libraries, cinemas, newspaper columns, Westernized attitudes that had filtered through God knows how many generations were appanage. . . .
>
> As years went by my . . . insubordination began to be directed not towards individual persons but towards social institutions. My uninherited nobility also changed direction—I did not anymore consider myself a part of the society, I was in—but as a candidate for the courageous and uncompromising defense of the cause of the just.[1]

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What then is this "cause of the just," which seems to be so central for Özel? An important aspect of the social relations of the Ottoman Empire is encapsulated in this expression; the lingering modern feeling that the folk are part of a "team of the just" tells much about the modernization of the Ottoman Empire as well as the rise of Islamic ideology in modern Turkey.

An established view of the social structure of the Ottoman Empire maintains that the Empire consisted of two well-defined groups: an elite stratum of military and civilian establishment and a "folk" stratum of the administered. The theme I present here focuses on the linkages between these groups and on the attempts to follow the changes that intervened in the relation between upper and lower tiers of Ottoman society during the process of modernization from the late eighteenth century to the present. These involve the transformation of a common "idiom," an aspect of social change that has important implications for the contemporary scene. Paradoxically, the effect of the group of reformers who worked to "modernize" Turkey has been to create two universes of discourse out of one which was once shared by upper and lower classes. Some strands of this shared discourse have survived, however, and I surmise that the relative cohesiveness of Turkish society is in some manner causally related to these survivals.

This dichotomous classification of the Ottoman Empire, while somewhat mechanical, has been useful because the duality it underlines reappears in a number of guises. One parallel that comes to mind is that used by Turkish historians of literature. The theory is that Muslim Ottoman culture was also two-tiered, consisting of "high" or "palace" culture, the culture of the elite (and those who aspired to take part in it in order to be identified as "elite") on the one hand, and the "little" or "folk" culture on the other. The perceived idea about palace culture has been that it was "esoteric both in language and subject matter . . . comprehensible to but a selected few . . . unconcerned with the happenings of day to day life,"[2] whereas folk culture is considered to have been constructed with the demotic vocabulary of everyday Turkish—less stilted and more spontaneous as well as more clearly related to the everyday concerns of the "people."

A third classification also reinforces the two-tiered view of Ottoman society—the two sources of law in the Ottoman Empire. The first of these was the Şeriat (*sharia*), the primordial underpinning of Ottoman society drawn out of the Koran: a guide for behavior in all walks of life whether political, social, or economic. The second source of law was the ***kanun,*** the secular law determined by sultanic fiat.

A similar dichotomy appears to have already characterized earlier Islamic states where the divergent and sometimes radical definitions of orthodoxy by successive caliphs were countered by a constantly renewed but enduring tradition of folk piety.[3] Notice that an idea promoted by this third (latitudinarian-pious) dichotomization is that the religious axis of piety/latitudinarianism is one which was constitutive of group formation in Islamic society, and that this pattern follows the line of cleavage set by the political and cultural two-tiered models.

The dichotomous structuring of society appears in the Ottoman realm with greater saliency than in previous Muslim states because of the peculiarities of Ottoman "sultanism." The unusually well-defined boundaries of the Ottoman political establishment achieved this neat separation between Ottoman political society and what may be termed Ottoman civil society. In the grossest terms this boundary was constituted by the fact that officials did not pay taxes and that, with few exceptions, everyone else did. An additional boundary-forming mechanism was that the Ottoman Muslim common folk lived by the principles of the Şeriat and saw themselves as a moral community as opposed to the political community of the sultan's servants who lived by an ideology of the preservation of the state or dynasty.

The ramifications of Ottoman sultanism have been fully examined by Professor Halil Inalcik.[4] Summarizing these findings we may say that the Ottoman systematization of government practice had two roots, the Sassanid and the Mongol. From the Sassanids the Ottomans derived a theory of imperial fiat. They thus gave legitmacy to the command of the sultan which in some respects went beyond what Islamic laws allowed. In addition, because they were insulated from attack by the idea of sultanic command, an area of administrative law and procedure developed which reflected the practices of the Mongols. This sphere of executive fiat still referred to Genghis Khan insofar as it was known as *Yasağ-ı Padişahî* (sultanic *yasa* pronouncements). Ottoman administrative practice which developed on this basis had only been vaguely adumbrated by the Islamic practice of extraordinary executive (*mazalim*) commissions/courts. In practice, Ottoman administrative law took its starkest form in the extent to which Ottoman civilian and military officials depended directly on the sultan. This group was recruited as a "slave" force, that is, cut-off from family ties at a tender age and made servants of the state. The sultan's officials were given full powers to execute policies that were legitimized by local usages with no basis in religious law as such.

The administrative code which emerged from this practice also controlled the lives of the officials, the sultan's servants. Although no clear and explicit set of regulations existed, in practice officials were at the mercy of sultanic fiat: neither their lives nor their property were protected. On the other hand, the comprehensiveness of Islam's reach—its regulation of civil as well as religious life—gave it the means to protect the life and property of ordinary citizens. It was a much rarer occurrence for the sultan to confiscate the property or take the lives of his subjects as compared to his officials.

The pragmatism of Ottoman statesmen had its source in the methods of training which they received. The *medrese*, the religious "seminary," trained Muslim Ottoman subjects as judges, jurisconsults, professors, and, for a while, keepers of state records. A rival institution, the Palace School functioned on a different model; here, religious studies were less in evidence and the arts of war and government were taught more intensely. This double, diverging educational stream gave rise to two distinct groups which eyed each other suspiciously from some distance: one consisted of the Doctors of Islamic Law, or ulema, and the other of the sultan's servants.

Trained in the religious schools (the *medrese*), the ulema had to endure a period of a practical apprenticeship to assuage their shock as they discovered that the rule of Muslim law did not cover all cases brought before them, and that there existed an Ottoman reason of state which operated independently of Islamic values.

Şehzade Korkut, an heir apparent in the sixteenth century who was sent on administrative duty, is known to have expressed, in a report to his father, his own distress at the conditions he had found in the field and how far they diverged from what he knew as the Islamic code of justice.[5] Prince Korkut's remarks indicate that he could identify those trained with *medrese* ideals and their pious followers as well as the administered, the ordinary subjects of the sultans, as a potential "team of the just," while the sultan's servants and their application of sultanic fiat could be considered the "team of the unjust." Across centuries and dissimilar circumstances, the teams of the just and the unjust continued to be reformed and, in the new circumstances of modernity, the basic rift between the two was widened.

In the fifteenth century there existed as yet no sharp demarcation between the career of a Doctor of Islamic Law and that of the scribes; ulema often filled the functions of chancery. By the end of the eighteenth century, a dividing line had appeared: the volume of chancery work increased; the Grand Vizier took the most important part of the record keeping and communication work under his own supervision and moved into new quarters separate from the Palace. The entire scribal profession became functionally differentiated. Scribes were now trained increasingly in the embryonic bureaus of the Porte. These "men of the pen" seem to have evolved into a bureaucracy which controlled records, bookkeeping, finances, and most important, the increasing contact with the West. It is from their ranks that, in the nineteenth century, the first self-conscious *group* of modern reformers of the Ottoman Empire arose. Modeled by the pragmatic tradition of the Ottomans, their ideas were easily influenced by the practice of enlightened despotism and Western European cameralism. The fiat of the sultan was replaced by a policy of reform carried out according to precepts taken from the Austria of Joseph II. This was the *tanzimat* which reshaped Ottoman institutions during the period from 1839 to 1876.

However, it is necessary to introduce an element that effectively reverses the dichotomous image of Ottoman political and social arrangements. While the two-tiered explanation of Ottoman society is a satisfactory *gross* classifying scheme, it neglects a fundamental dimension of Ottoman structure; the latent ideal of an "Islamicly" organized society no doubt also played a role as a vector in the totality of forces at play in the Ottoman social dynamic, within the administration as well as among the folk. Even though the practice of statesmanship among Turkish groups was quite pragmatic it was not entirely unambiguous; the political theory of the administrators reflected a long-established, pre-Ottoman search for a political theory which would formally safeguard the principle of the supremacy of the Şeriat and the function of the caliph—the leader of all Muslims—as its upholder.

> The dilemma was finally resolved by recourse to another theory, which had arisen in philosophical semi-Shiite circles, and so had not hitherto found much favor among the theologians. This was the adaptation of the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king to the Islamic Imam, administering the Sharia under the guidance of divine wisdom.[6]

This theory regularly appeared in the Ottoman *Mirrors for Princes*. In slightly modified form it also appeared in a major source of Ottoman literature about politics: the governmental reports which take up practical issues of rule.[7] Even in the more secular theories of Ottoman government then, we have an input that harks back to the Islamic ideals of justice.

The comprehensiveness of Islam—the bedrock of the Ottoman social system—also presents a new set of advantages if one views it as an idiom. The operational rules of this idiom were shared by many Ottomans of both low and high status and allowed those with knowledge of these rules to accomplish a wide range of goals: from organizing their family relations, to devising strategies to win friends and defeat enemies; from becoming sensitized to Islamic public opinion, to engineering conspiracies, and promoting commercial success.

We may point to three levels at which such an "Islamizing" idiom linked the two tiers of Ottoman society. First, there was the constant presence of Islam as an ideal of and for society. Second, Islam was a "discourse" which enabled persons of high and low standing to have recourse to the same fund of concepts in organizing their life strategies. Finally, there existed a latent element of permeation of social relations by role models that gave direction to the social action of Muslim Ottomans as it filtered through a standard *imaginaire*[8] reproduced among the elite as well as in the folk culture.

In examining semantic linkages between "high" and "low" culture we may refer to the work of Walter Andrews who uncovered the linking function of the Ottoman literary *imaginaire*. Andrews shows that the foundation of this literary idiom shared by palace and folk culture went back to earlier Islamic societies. It can be recaptured by examining the classical statement of the mystic's worldview, the *Mishkat-al-Anwar* of al-Gazali:

> The exoteric and esoteric aspects of life are the reflection of the existence of two worlds: the world that is accessible through the senses

> (*alem ül-hiss*), also known as the base, nether world (*dünya*) or the world of generation and decay (*alem-i kevn-ü fesad*), and the celestial world (*alem ül-melekut*) or the world of analogy (*alem üt-tensil*) that is accessible only through the power of intuition or insight. . . .
>
> The two worlds are causally related, the invisible world being the primary fact and the sensible world only existent by virtue of the prior existence of the other world. . . .
>
> Thus, this world is seen as a reflection of the unseen world, a reflection distorted by being perceived through the senses which, because they can only perceive material objects and their effects are bewildered and confused by accident, plurality and inessentials.
>
> At the root of this view is the belief that this world is a metaphor for that other world. Just what this metaphoric quality means in terms of this worldly behavior, obligation and reward was, however, a matter for some vital disagreement. . . .
>
> In the more moderate view, that espoused by al-Gazali and most mystics and reflected generally in the Ottoman social tradition, both aspects of the metaphoric relation (the this-worldly vehicle and the that-worldly tenor) were equally important. Al-Gazali says, "Whoever abstracts and isolates the outward from the whole is a Materialist and whoever abstracts the inward is a spiritualist [batini, esoteric], while he who joins the two together is catholic, perfect."[9]

Andrews argues that this foundation of literary discourse is common to both the elite and folk cultures in the Ottoman Empire. With regard to the *gazel* form of poetry associated with *divan* (palace) culture, he states:

> The heretical view proposes that we look at the *gazel* as part of a continuous spectrum of poetry, including both *divan* and folk poetry, emerging from the needs and motivations of a single cultural entity. . . . Both share the characteristic of being syntactically in harmony with the rhythms and patterns of ordinary speech. On the one hand the *gazel* reflects certain institutionalized patterns of urban life, whereas on the other hand, the folk poetry reflects parallel patterns in rural life. The themes are much the same: emotion . . . the danger of emotion, separation, loss of control and so forth.[10]

The feature of the *imaginaire* which unifies this idiom is that of communality, a feature which disappears in modern literature. In Andrews' words:

> On the one hand, we are accustomed to a literary and general artistic tradition that operates to expand the limits of the communal or

> accepted understanding of life. Art constantly generates new symbols, images and characters in order to create new perspectives on fundamental problems of human existence. Thus a Wallace Stevens for example, fixes on a jar on a hill in Tennessee as the central metaphor for a poem. The jar is not a part of any communal fund of poetic images. It is derived from the experience of one individual, and its use is peculiar to this one poem. It is not a link to a communal understanding but is a vehicle of thought to explore the cosmic implication of what would ordinarily be seen as an exceedingly mundane object. . . .
>
> On the other hand, communal art as exemplified by Ottoman art, appears to operate almost entirely *within* the limits of accepted understanding. Its purpose is not to expand the limits but to expand awareness of the relatedness or integratedness of existence within these limits. In such a context, the generation of new symbols is counterproductive.[11]

Mustafa Tahralı has shown how the introductory speeches in the shadow play *Karagöz* subtly refers to the mystics' view of reality.[12] Shadow plays are one of the most popular forms of folk entertainment and are but one way in which abstract conceptions were considered to be disseminated among the sultan's humbler subjects. The Sufi orders were an institution which often facilitated the creation of a bridge between the elite and the folk cultures. Mysticism was also a means of bridging elite Islam with popular beliefs in the occult.[13] By and large what we have here are models operating by intimation rather than by explanation. Explanation did exist, as may be seen in the works on Islamic *adab,* or gentlemanly conduct, but for the uneducated, what may be described as the resonance of the subliminal was very central in building a frame of behavior. Another characteristic of the priming of folk culture was the vivid descriptions of the feats of Muslim heroes. The military institutions of the Ottoman Empire, which were central to that society, also promoted Muslim fighters as role models.

Propelled by the earlier tradition of secular administrative codes, the early nineteenth-century bureaucrat-statesmen who initiated the nineteenth-century movement of reform and modernization known as the *tanzimat* gave much of their energy to the task of secularizing Ottoman institutions. They opposed new schools based on the model of French secondary education and the *grandes ecoles.* New secular courts for commercial and criminal cases assumed the duties of the religious courts. The far-reaching local powers of the *kadi*, the judge who could take on a variety of executive tasks, were stripped away, and a new type of government employee appeared: the administrator who had graduated from the School for Political Sciences which was established in 1854. A cursory look at the curriculum of this school shows how modern its fare was. But this modernizing movement also erased the earlier common referents.

In fact, all three levels of the common discourse were disrupted. The force of the Islamic ideal among the chancery personnel became much weaker. The life-strategies of this group were structured by a new secular idiom. The Muslim-Ottoman *imaginaire*, which promoted the reproduction of existing social relations, was gradually displaced by the Western reformist *imaginaire*, which was based on a view of society as made of individuals. This new worldview perceived society as operating according to the mechanical concept of a machine (it was no coincidence that the reform movement was known as the *tanzimat*, the regulation). This new ideal of society functioned with such novel impulses as change—a new social value which replaced stability as a central concern. New actors—youth—became the operators of the machine for change and the relations between "things" became the basis for an understanding of the workings of society. The folk culture, however, changed much more slowly, and, in particular, the Islamic ideals of a just community acquired increasingly ideological dimensions and became an integument, a "social cocoon," within which the folk sought protection from the changes introduced by Western-oriented reform.

The secularization of Ottoman institutions brought with it an inability to deal with the changed institutional setting, an inability to adapt to the disappearance of the discourse that had been used to articulate and express everyday experiences. The expansion of a commercial nexus, now increasingly controlled by non-Muslims (and by officials anxious to consolidate their position by establishing the legal protection of private property), was, once again, an area over which the folk lost control and where communal values lost their force.

Edmund Burke III[14] studied how the reaction of Middle Eastern common folk to modernization could be compared to the eighteenth-century bread riots in England using E. P. Thompson's argument that riots were caused by the rejection of the popular norm of a "moral economy" by the ruling powers. This explanation certainly applies to the transformation of the Ottoman economy in the nineteenth century. An upper-class example of a person who maintained his support for the Ottoman moral economy is illustrated by the historian and statesman Cevdet Paşa. Cevdet did not mince words about the "scandalous" expenditures of the Turco-Egyptian class who had acquired new wealth during the American civil war due to the rise of the price of cotton.[15] In addition, a sector of the Ottoman officials of the *tanzimat,* led by conservative Muslims, began to identify with a folk attempt to recapture the pre-*tanzimat* understanding of social ideas and transactions.

By the mid-1860s a group of young intellectuals, the Young Ottomans, had positioned themselves against the bureaucrats who forged the Western-oriented reform policy. They drew their ammunition from the armory of communal discourse—the armory of the just—not by promoting constitutional government, but by writing about it as a necessary adjunct to Islam. They were successful to the extent that they attracted some of the prominent ulema to their side. They also convinced an Ottoman general sympathetic to their goals to join a cabal of the military and bring in the military cadets to unseat Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1876. What is most interesting, however, is that they did not realize that the promotion of novelties other than that of constitutional government effectively undermined their own project of bridging elite and folk discourse.

The outstanding contribution of these young intellectuals was that they were the founders of Turkish journalism; they established a new journalistic critical-analytic style constructed around the reporting of facts. Their journalistic prose brought in a new construction of meaning as compared to the "general understanding of the readily accessible common symbols of the Ottoman and Islamic tradition."[16] They had now legitimized a new "stock of knowledge" and the methods for acquiring it, which, to the extent that they could, they held aloof from metaphors, conceits, and the embellishments which in earlier times in their structured form had served as a latent code of conduct. This new code of conduct was manifest; it had to be explained. This was a much more circuitous route than receiving messages by intimation. The latent function of the old style was disappearing; the place that tacit Islamic knowledge had occupied in earlier times was devalued.

The relative naïveté of the Young Ottoman's views appears intensified in a critique voiced by a general sympathetic to Young Ottoman aims who had engineered the dethronement of Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1876:

> Following Sultan Abdul Aziz's succession to the throne the Ottoman Empire was shaken by many destructive influences. . . . For the reins of government had fallen into the hands of an ignorant despot who considered both the religious and the civil law as no more than playthings. Since, in general, he preferred persons of his own character, the officers and the state officials whom he appointed were, with a few exceptions, incompetent. They did not have the necessary qualifications for the positions to which they were appointed; and even if they had attended primary and secondary school, they had not studied such basic courses as arithmetic, geography, zoology, botany and geology.[17]

This new demand for modern knowledge as a legitimator of rule was to become one of the strongest leitmotifs of modern Turkish history. Much of the secularizing reformism of Kemal Atatürk is explained by the same attitude. What should also be noticed is that a new emerging positivism found its most fertile soil among the military. By the 1870s interest in "positive" science had already advanced to the point that a graduate of an Ottoman military school was able to publish the book *Beşer* (humanity)—a book that provided a popular explanation of the physiology of the body and that implicitly linked life to physicochemical processes. This book was considered a landmark in the new directions sought by progressive Ottoman intellectuals of the time.

In the 1890s the newly established Ottoman professional schools such as the Military Academy, the Schools of Medicine, and the School of Political Science became suffused with positivism. One characteristic of this new positivistic stance was its intolerance, its impatience with the stock of knowledge of those who had retained their traditional worldview constructed with elements of the religio-mystical tradition. This led to an estrangement between the scientifically minded reformist progressives and the religiously educated, a rift which is best described as "cognitive." The fact that Ottomans who still received a *medrese* education clutched at the remaining pieces of the old culture may be seen in the many editions of old manuscript works on mysticism which appeared in print around this time. As representatives of the military professions, officers nevertheless retained their prestige as leaders of Ottoman society among all Ottomans. In the 1890s the view of the world that the military had introduced seemed increasingly alien and godless, but their prowess was still cause for celebration, as was seen in the short Greek-Ottoman conflict in 1897.

Although the practice of the unjust had not often followed the desiderata of the just, both had shared in Ottoman-Turkish Muslim culture. By the turn of the century, an emerging rift had been transformed into one between two qualitatively different stocks of knowledge and the rules for the practical uses of these realms of knowledge. *Ilm,* traditional orthodox knowledge, placed the stamp of morality on knowledge and its application to human relations. What progressive late nineteenth century Turkish intellectuals named *fünûn* (Western scientific knowledge) classified human relations as a scientifically observable process and a part of the realm of "things"; this explains the ease with which, a few decades later, the philosophies of the French sociologist Émile Durkheim were able to so strongly influence Turkish intellectuals.

A second level existed at which the culture of those with a secular education was rapidly moving away from the Islamic culture of the majority of the population. Secular culture was book culture in the sense that it introduced the private possession of books that brought in new, Western literary genres. The novel and the play were most important here since they required the reader to place himself in the situations faced by characters, by individuals with meaningful life histories. This was particularly true of the influence of romanticism which permeated Young Ottoman writings. The reader was now asked to identify with the idiosyncratic "interior states" of the characters of this new literature rather than a set situation with a given denouement as was required by the earlier Ottoman literature. This role taking through literature was probably the source of an interesting characteristic described by Turkish literary historian Mehmet Kaplan, namely that the world depicted by books became more real for this generation than their own ambient world.[18] A further stage of book learning that accompanied the interest in science, which was prevalent in the 1890s, was that a speculative, utopian, projective mentality which dwelled on the internal consistency of an imagined modern world began to appear among those who were educated in the Western secular stream. These intellectuals became doubly uncomfortable with Ottoman society; they did not like the present and they furiously worked on blueprints for the future. All this took the new intelligentsia far from the world of "praxis," the nonbook world of the more humble subjects of the sultan.

The emerging Turkish positivist generation of the 1890s was also a nationalist generation. Here another strand of the common discourse snapped. Turkish, or "Turkic," nationalism, which cohered in the period from the mid-1890s to 1918, took as its ultimate reference and cultural legitimation the Central Asian, partly pre-Islamic *Urkultur* of the Turks. This development rode roughshod on the earlier discourse in several ways: First, it had reference to skygods and other "pagan" items of Central Asian culture as positive elements; it fastened on personalities like Genghis Khan, whose name was an anathema to Anatolian Turks who still remembered the Mongol occupation of Anatolia of the fourteenth century. It used a "purified" Turkish which self-consciously rejected the existing vocabulary and tropes of the unifying discourse.[19] Finally, it promoted a celebration of Turkic rather than Muslim characteristics, which Muslim opponents were quick to label as tribalism.

The positivist-nationalist generation had an instrumental view of Islam as a lever for social mobilization which often disguised, as in the case of the Young Turk leader Ahmed Riza, deistic or atheistic beliefs. The rift between the two diverging worldviews did not emerge very clearly during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) since the sultan underlined the "Islamicness" of his rule. But, in fact, the net effect of the governance of the sultan was clearly expressed by a Turkish conservative cleric in the 1920s who looked back upon the nineteenth century and expressed his views:

> Even though the secular school system did not in the end turn out to be as useful as had been expected, it did serve to extinguish the *medrese* with which it was competing. Insofar as I know the *medrese* has been left to its own devices. When governments took time from their official duties to deal with these schools it was to scoff at them. There is also no warmth in the hearts of the people, and especially the people of Istanbul, towards these institutions—the members of the upper classes and the rich never send their children to those schools. The student in the *medrese* had to bear the burden of the adjective *softa* [a term

> equivalent to "seminarian" that came to mean narrow minded, bigoted]. The children who carry the title of "students of religious sciences" are mostly children of the poor and the pure-hearted sons of Anatolian [i.e., provincial or village] Turks.[20]

The reforms of the young Turks after their victorious revolution of 1908 and those of Kemal Atatürk, each in their own way continuing the reforms begun in the nineteenth century, once more demanded that the "*correctly* instituted order" they were establishing be accepted. This replaced what the Islamic stock of knowledge had to offer with regard to leading a "good and just" life. There was a short distance from this estrangement of the two discourses to the identification of the Kemalist secularizers of the 1920s with the rule of the unjust.

With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 the office of the caliphate, held by Ottoman sultans since 1519, was abolished in 1924. Other steps taken to secularize Turkish society was the abolition of the religious courts (1924), the proscription of the fez and other "strange" headgear (1925), the dissolution of the dervish orders (1925), the reform of the calendar (1925), the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (1926), the disestablishment of Islam which had remained the religion of the Turkish state in the Turkish constitution of 1924 (1928), the adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928), and the "Turkification" of the Islamic call to prayer (1932). Law number 430 (1924) gave the Ministry of Education of the Turkish Republic control over all educational institutions functioning in Turkey. The *medrese* were closed; the functions of the Suleymaniye *medrese,* which provided higher education for religious personnel, were transferred to the Faculty of Theology of the University of Istanbul, which in 1933 was transformed into an institute for Islamic research.

The government defined its attitude toward religion as "laicism," an intellectual inheritance from the French Third Republic. In its statement of 1923 the Republican People's party, the single political party which had founded the Republic and had remained in power until 1950, cited as one of its most important principles "to separate religion and the world in matters relating to the state and the nation."[21] This principle was introduced into the Turkish constitution in 1937.

In fact laicism disguised the remaining suspicion that the Republicans had toward the religious establishment which was disestablished in 1924—no "Doctors of Islamic Law" remained except in the Directorate General of Religious Affairs, a "laic" organ of the state. The secularizers saw themselves as bringing into Turkish society the principles of toleration and religious freedom which prevailed in the West. They also considered the ulema to be obstacles in the task of educating the Turkish nation in the path of positive science and of opening a door for the grounding of civil liberties in the more general sense. The erasure of the discourse linking "upper" and "lower" now forged ahead—it was part of official policy. Arabic and Persian roots were purged. The alphabet was latinized. The gray wolf was the symbol of the new nationalism. It is true that the wolf lived an uneasy existence since it was paired with the crescent. But the crescent had to live with the motto flashing on the frontispiece of the Faculty of Letters of Ankara: "Science [that is, positive science] is the truest guide in life." The new leaders of Turkey did not realize that in a country pervaded by Islamic culture, the popular use of Islam as a means of coming to terms with the everyday world provided individuals with facilities for adaptation that the Republican regime could not fill. Their suspicion of the influence of the clerics on a surviving group of the lower-class pious, who also regarded themselves as the just, was therefore well founded.

The Republic, however, kept its links with the past: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, known in his early days as the "Gazi" (fighter for the faith), in his role as liberator of Turkey from Greek occupation, made an important traditional cord vibrate. The lower-class urban and provincial populations followed the Gazi rather than the modernizer.

But the discourse of the just also changed in the early twentieth century. The premier charismatic Islamic leader of modern Turkey, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, is a case in point. The collected works of Said Nursi, the *Epistle of Light*, a masterful mix of mystic resonances, presents the thesis that, in the twentieth century, "explanation" is a necessary dimension for the revival of religion among the Muslim masses. All of this is combined with a sense of grievance which is characteristic of the just.

Ismet Özel's ability to bring up the problems of the just is a result of the conditions which have evolved since 1950 when the single-party rule of Jacobin secularism came to an end. This new climate is a consequence of the fact that individuals from the ranks of the just have emerged from the secular schools of the Republic armed with degrees, and that many have been propelled by multiparty politics to seats in parliament. They have occupied these positions with a cultural knapsack in which the items of Muslim discourse enable them to communicate with village or provincial town dwellers, that is, with their constituencies. Nevertheless, they have also become increasingly sophisticated in their use of the Western Enlightenment.

In the case of Özel, the influence of the educational program established by the secular, Jacobin founders of the Turkish Republic has gone one step further. Özel's autobiography is entitled *Waldo, sen Neden Burada Degilsin?* (Waldo, why aren't you here?). This does not refer to the history of Islam but to the intellectual history of the United States. It is an exclamation that Thoreau expressed when his friend Ralph Waldo Emerson came to visit him in jail. Özel therefore, represents a version of the discourse of the just which is different from what it originally was. The persistence of the structural foundations of Ottoman society through time—but also their modification—and the new elements of a foreign culture which have been made viable in contemporary Turkey seem to fit the pattern of what we know as social change.

ENDNOTES

[1] Ismet Özel, *Waldo, Sen Neden Burada Degilsin* (Istanbul, 1988) 22–23.

[2] Walter Andrews, *Poetry's Voice, Society's Song* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), 16.

[3] Marshal S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 248–56.

[4] See Halil Inalcik, "Osmanlı Hukukuna Giris: Örfi-Sultanî Hukuk ve Fatih Kanunları,"*Siyasal Biligiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 13 (1958): 102–26.

[5] Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 102.

[6] H. A. R. Gibb, "Some Consideration on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate," in Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk, eds., *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 144.

[7] Fleischer, 102.

[8] Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institutions of Society*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1987).

[9] Andrews, 66–68.

[10] Ibid., 179–80.

[11] Ibid., 184–85.

[12] Mustafa Tahrali, "'Zıll-ı Hayâl' in Esrarı," *Dergâh* 1 (March 1990): 1.

[13] Uri M. Kupferschmidt, "Reformist and Militant Islam in Urban and Rural Egypt," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23 (4) (October 1987): 403–18.

[14] Edmund Burke III, "Understanding Arab Protest Movements," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 8 (4) (Fall 1986): 333–45.

[15] Tezâkir, 1–12, 20.

[16] Andrews, 186.

[17] Robert Devereux, "The Feeling of Revolution," *Middle Eastern Studies* 15 (1976): 3–35.

[18] Mehmet Kaplan, *Tevfik Fikret ve Şiiri,* (Istanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1946) 19.

[19] Urial Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem: Oriental Society, 1954).

[20] Mustafa Sabri *Dinî Müceddidler,* Latin character ed. (Istanbul: Sebil, 1969), reproducing the original in Arabic characters, (Istanbul, A. H. 1341), 230.

[21] Gotthard Jäschke, *Yeni Türkiyede İslamlık* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1972); a translation of "Der Islam in der Neuen Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams* I (1951) 1–176; II (1953) 276–85; quote, 96.

Margaret E. Crahan

Church and State in Latin America: Assassinating Some Old and New Stereotypes

FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD WELL UP INTO THE twentieth century the Roman Catholic church[1] in Latin America was widely regarded as the chief ally of the state. This perception was largely a result of the existence of the Patronato Real in the Spanish colonies and the Padroado Real in the Portuguese possessions[2], both of which contributed to the implementation of concordats between the Catholic church and most of the new Latin American republics after independence. It was presumed by Iberian monarchs that ecclesial officials would be faithful servants of the crown and the Catholic church would legitimate imperial control. Analysts have focused on this role of the church with some justification but at the expense of comprehending the degree to which the church and churchpeople pursued goals that sometimes undercut royal interests. The very structuring of the empire, with its complex system of vertical and horizontal checks and overlapping jurisdictions involving both civil and ecclesiastical officials, helped to generate tension and conflict. In addition, from the outset of the colonial enterprise some church leaders, most notably the friars Bartolomé de Las Casas and Bernardino de Sahagún, enunciated objectives that diverged from those of metropolitan and colonial elites. Throughout the imperial period disputes arose between royal and ecclesiastical officials, particularly over the exploitation of the Indian.[3] The image of the Catholic church as an unflagging supporter of imperial control is, therefore, not an entirely accurate one.

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At the outset of the conquest and colonization of America, Spain was in the early stages of state building, a process stimulated to a considerable degree by the expansion of mercantile commercialism. The acquisition of an empire reduced pressures for a rational royal bureaucracy in the Weberian sense, thereby allowing for the emergence of a theoretically absolute monarchy that lacked the capacity to closely regulate far flung possessions. In North and South America distance from the metropolis gave colonies considerable autonomy, which allowed for the pursuit of local interests. Colonial elites were quick to interpose themselves between the crown and the masses, emerging as the principal beneficiaries of the exploitation of colonial land and labor. This was facilitated, and legitimated, by the imposition of a neomedieval corporate view of society which placed whites at the pinnacle with the mixed population between them and the Indians and blacks at the base.

While whites considered themselves superior to the other groups, they also recognized an organic interdependence in society as a whole. They exercised a degree of paternalism and discouraged the expression of organized group interests among the masses. Indians were, in fact, considered a different commonwealth. As such they had their own laws and magistrates, as well as limited rights and obligations commensurate with their inferior station.[4] Mestizos, mulattoes, as well as impoverished Spaniards, were categorized as *gente de razón*. They enjoyed some of the rights and responsibilities of citizens but were prohibited from holding royal office unless they could document "purity" of race. They had no guaranteed rights to land and could be subjected to forced labor. Nevertheless, this group enjoyed some limited social mobility, although this did not result in the substantial expansion of their participation in political and economic decision making as a group. Because the colonial state was based on a highly stratified society in which the vast majority did not enjoy full rights of citizenry nor access to land or other sources of wealth, the populace was greatly limited in its capacity to generate effective claims on the state. This situation also diminished the strength of the masses' feelings of indebtedness to the crown.

In addition, the highly personalistic and theoretically centralized nature of the Spanish, as well as the Portuguese monarchies, placed a premium on access to upper echelon officialdom, which was impossible to achieve for the vast majority in the colonies. While colonial officials were theoretically responsible for their constituencies, the crown attempted to exact total allegiance. Competition was largely between the crown and colonial elites and within the latter. This contributed to the development of clientelistic and exclusionary patterns of government in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Latin America.[5] It also encouraged a desire for a mediator to deal with competing interests. During the colonial period the crown and its representatives attempted to exercise this role. After independence Simón Bolívar sanctioned the need for a mediating instrumentality by incorporating a fourth branch of government, the Poder Moderador, into the constitution of Gran Colombia. This authority was superior to the executive branch, the legislature, and the judiciary and was to be called upon when there was an insoluble conflict within society. The creation of the Poder Moderador reflected a lack of faith in the ordinary processes of tripartite government, as well as a belief in a more enlightened, honest, and powerful authority. By the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the military increasingly visualized itself in this role. More recently, the Catholic church has attempted to interpose itself between conflicting sectors of society, basing its authority on its historical role as the prime moral legitimator in society. Church documents increasingly insist on the necessity of conciliation and reconciliation within society, especially given the high degree of conflict in contemporary Latin America.

Playing the role of conciliator or mediator is particularly difficult given the church's assertion of a preferential option for the poor. While some within and without the church have interpreted the latter as implicitly accepting a Marxist concept of class warfare, the church insists that the universalism of its goals remains. As expressed at the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) and subsequently reaffirmed at the Latin American bishops conferences at Medellín, Colombia (1968) and Puebla, Mexico (1979), the church's objective is the salvation of all via the recreation of the Kingdom of God on earth, that is, the realization of societies characterized by peace, justice, and respect for human rights. Admittedly emphasis on the latter has sometimes seemed to place the Catholic church in opposition to many Latin American political and economic elites. Nevertheless, ecclesial officials insist that the promotion of peace, justice, and human rights can only benefit the common good, thereby producing more stable and less conflictual societies which will not be inclined toward radical options from either the Right or the Left. Within the Catholic church there is, however, no substantial agreement as to which political, economic, or social systems or structures are most likely to produce peace, justice, and the enjoyment of human rights. In contemporary Latin America, therefore, the church appears not as an institution monolithically supporting the status quo but rather as a prime challenger. This is partially the result of developments within Catholic social doctrine since the late nineteenth century which increasingly emphasized socioeconomic justice, as well as the need to respond to the moral exigencies of the masses in societies wracked by exploitation and violence.

Increasing Catholic emphasis on socioeconomic justice dates to Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) which criticized both capitalism and socialism for exploiting workers. By the 1920s and 1930s the Catholic church in Latin America faced escalating pressures from the working and middle classes to respond to societal needs. Reformism grew among some ecclesial, political, economic, and military elites resulting in considerable experimentation aimed at promoting economic development and political stability. The Catholic church became involved principally through such reformist groups as Catholic Action, Young Christian Workers, and Young Christian Students, as well as Christian Democratic parties. Other churchpeople opted for conservative movements such as Opus Dei and Action Française which would contribute to experimentation with fascism in the 1930s and 1940s and the emergence of national security regimes in the 1960s and 1970s.

Increasing pressures for change, particularly in the post–World War II period, helped to stimulate both societal conflict and fear of chaos. The latter partially explains initial ecclesial support for military coups in Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, as well as Argentina in 1976. The repressive nature of these regimes and their extensive violations of human rights, however, transformed the Catholic church into the prime defender of human rights in contemporary Latin America. This repositioning of the church is in line with the evolution of Catholic social doctrine and is also a response to the desire of the Catholic church to assert its moral leadership more strongly in the modern world. In doing so, the Catholic church has inserted itself into political and ideological struggles that are perhaps nowhere as intense as in Latin America. It is extraordinarily difficult under such conditions to maintain an image of political neutrality sufficient to serve as a mediator and reconciler of contending forces. Yet that is precisely what the Catholic church in contemporary Latin America is attempting to do. An analysis of specific church positions on major political and economic issues in Latin America today demonstrates the difficulty of the church's undertaking.

CATHOLICISM AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

The prelates gathered at Vatican II asserted that the legitimacy of all political and economic systems was determined by the degree to which they promoted the enjoyment of human rights. However, they consciously avoided proposing any specific political or economic models which would be most supportive of human rights suggesting, as one commentator phrased it, that

> Human rights norms do not lead to the prescription of any single economic, political, or ideological system as the natural law ethic which dominated past thought . . . often claimed to do. Rather, basic human rights set limits and establish obligations for all systems and ideologies, leaving the precise form in which these systems will be organized undefined.[6]

Given the increasing ideological competition within post–World War II Latin America, as well as the rising criticism of the impact of international capitalism in the area, Catholic acceptance of political and economic pluralism caused considerable ferment. Its tolerance helped to diminish the historical image of the Catholic church as a monolithic supporter of the status quo and stimulated political debate and activism among priests, nuns, brothers, and laypersons.

Vatican II was also concerned, as were the drafters of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), with establishing a "consensus on the normative basis for international justice and peace"[7] that would transcend differences in ideologies, cultures, and societies. The acceptance of political, economic, and religious pluralism in the modern world did not mean the abandonment of the belief that the Catholic church held the one true faith. It did open the way to working with those regarded as individuals of goodwill committed to the common good. All this caused the Catholic church as an institution and churchpeople as individuals to increasingly participate in the struggle for change and in debates over the best strategies and models to accomplish it. In Latin America this meant evaluating the merits of a broad spectrum of political and economic systems including liberalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. The Catholic church attempted to do this while continuing to claim that it was politically and ideologically neutral within increasingly conflictual societies. The difficulties of this task became patently clear in the late 1960s and 1970s, leading the Latin American bishops to conclude at the 1979 general conference in Puebla, Mexico that special care had to be taken by the church to avoid any appearance of taking partisan stands, either politically or ideologically, both as an institution and through individuals.

The Catholic church in Latin America has attempted to deal with this by struggling to establish and apply principles that transcend societal and systemic differences. To do this, the church has emphasized the necessity of guaranteeing human dignity and the common good, rather than supporting particular political, economic, and social structures. This has contributed to considerable tension both within and without the church, as individuals have interpreted Catholic positions as either for or against particular systems. The identification of individual churchpeople, pastoral forms, and theological currents with authoritarianism, liberalism, capitalism, or socialism has further complicated the situation. The Catholic church in Latin America has attempted to cope with this by evaluating the impact of past and present political and economic structures on human dignity and the common good, praising those that have appeared to promote the enjoyment of greater rights by its people and criticizing those that have produced systematic violations.

The result has been a constant refining of the Catholic church's stances on the legitimacy of political, economic, and social systems together with regular reassertions of the principles deemed necessary to guide just societies. The specific conditions within countries and the degree of consensus, as well as the intellectual strength and political openness of church leaders, has also influenced church positions. All this has created, at times, an appearance of conflict within the church and a struggle, not always successful, to avoid identification with particular systems. This has been a difficult task, especially given the historical identification of the Catholic church with the status quo in Latin America, although the reality has been more complex.

Since the 1960s the Catholic church has attempted to suggest that alternative political, economic, and social systems and structures be devised via critiques of defective ones and the enunciation of overarching principles. This has led the church to be sharply criticized by defenders of specific models both within and without the church. Ecclesial criticism of particular governments has, at times, resulted in repression of churchpeople by authoritarian states and irritation by democratic ones. The latter have tended to see such criticism as destabilizing and ultimately lacking in an appreciation of the difficulties of governing societies characterized by sharp political, economic, and social cleavages. To counter these reactions, Catholic leaders have generally urged a greater commitment on the part of public officials to justice and participation. More specifically, they counsel that respect for civil/political rights is directly related to fulfillment of social, economic, religious, and cultural rights. Violations in one area, they argue, promote violations in the other. Broad-based popular participation in political and economic decision making is seen as the most effective way to guarantee that no one set of rights will be given priority to the detriment of another. Such an argument presumes societies are open to change and have high degrees of toleration of political and ideological pluralism. Thus, the Catholic church sees its task as encouraging participation, the integral development of individuals,[8] and greater pluralism in highly conflictual societies fraught with national and international impediments to change. The difficulty of this is suggested by a closer examination of the specific positions of the Catholic church in Latin America on political and economic issues and their consequences.

The Catholic church in Latin America has, in recent years, justified its taking positions on political issues as flowing from its mission to struggle for the realization of the Kingdom of God commencing here on earth. This means the achievement of a society characterized by peace and justice arising out of generalized respect for human rights. In order to accomplish this, the church clearly admits the necessity for individuals to create political, economic, and social structures in order to guarantee the common good.[9]

The definition of the common good in contemporary Latin American Catholicism reflects not only the traditional social doctrine of the church, but also contemporary realities. As the Argentine episcopacy expressed it in 1976, the common good is

> not the simple and sometimes chaotic sum of individual interests (often obtained and defended in practice by questionable means), as liberal individualism proclaims. Neither is the welfare of the State itself to be considered superior to the legitimate rights of individuals, families and others, as is the claim of dictatorships of both left and right. The common good should rightly be the aim of all—collectively, and individually considered; it is "the conjunction of conditions of social life which make possible to associations and each of their members the fullest measure of success and the easiest means to their achieving perfection" (*Gaudium et Spes,* no. 26).[10]

Echoing this, the Brazilian episcopacy the same year held that the "common good is that combination of specific conditions which permit all people to reach standards of living compatible with human dignity. Thus the essential characteristic of the common good is that it be the common good for everyone, without discrimination of any kind whether it be cultural, social, religious, racial, economic, political, or partisan."[11]

The function of the state is to realize the common good by striving to provide the conditions necessary for the integral development of all, that is, each individual's realization of his or her physical, moral, intellectual, and social potential to the degree permitted in justice. This requires that the state have some coercive authority and that individuals respect the rule of law and discharge their duties as citizens:

> Thus, the common good becomes the principal underlying factor in the maintenance of society, the ultimate criterion of political life, the strict norm of authority, the "raison d'etre" for law, and the touchstone for all legislation. The common good must never be achieved at the expense of the rights of the individual, not even the unjust infringement of such rights, but, on the contrary, must act as the very safeguard of such rights, because, just as a part of the whole being protects and preserves itself, so also does preservation contribute to the perfection of the whole to which it belongs. As in the human body, the welfare of the social organization depends on the good health of each and every one of its organs.[12]

In short, in the eyes of the Catholic church, it is the responsibility of the state to promote the common good and human rights to the degree necessary for individuals to achieve human dignity. In doing this, the state must defend human rights, but is not their source, nor does it confer them as privileges. Rather, rights are considered claims by the individual not only on the state but also on every other member of society. The church's role is to use moral suasion and the granting or withholding of legitimacy to states and societies to the degree that they promote the common good and enjoyment of human rights. Again, the church sees itself not as engaging in politics, nor attempting to exercise political power, but rather in promoting the Kingdom of God on earth.

According to the church, the principal obstacle to the achievement of the common good in Latin America is the magnitude of poverty and exploitation which means being

> kept outside on the margin; it is to receive an unjust salary. It is to be deprived of education, medical attention, and credit; it is to be hungry and live in sordid huts; it is to be deprived of land by inadequate, unjust agrarian structures.[13]

Such conditions make it difficult not only to meet one's basic needs, but also to participate in political and economic decision making and to contribute creatively to one's national culture. Historically, in Latin America these conditions have caused the individual to be regarded not as the subject of rights, but as an object to be manipulated via political and economic favors and hence unable to fully participate in the determination of one's individual and national destiny.[14]

This reasoning led the Latin American bishops to enunciate at the 1968 Medellín conference a preferential option for the poor. That is, the church would attempt to identify and accompany those afflicted with poverty and exploitation in their struggle for justice and human dignity. To do this it was deemed imperative that the Catholic church more actively condemn human rights violations and injustice, as well as the structures that caused or permitted them. This stance was reaffirmed at the Latin American bishops' conference at Puebla, Mexico in 1979, as well as by Pope John Paul II on various occasions.[15]

The enunciation of a preferential option for the poor of Latin America gave rise to charges that the Catholic church was, or could be interpreted as, sanctioning concepts of class warfare which were in opposition to the universality of the church's mission. However, Catholic leaders, including Pope John Paul II,[16] have insisted that the option is inclusive not exclusive. They argue that it is a call to the church to accompany the poor and evangelize the rich to encourage their support for a more just society. Furthermore, the Catholic church has repeatedly reaffirmed that the preferential option for the poor excludes the use of violence to achieve socioeconomic justice, except in the most extreme cases of state terror.[17]

The Catholic church in these countries has attempted gross violations of rights by both the Right and the Left, as well as by states and their opponents. In some countries, such as Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay, the armed forces and the military have been repeatedly identified by national and international human rights monitors as the chief instigators of violations. In other countries, such as Colombia and Peru, violations have flowed from the violence engendered by such phenomena as drug trafficking and guerrilla movements, as well as state repression. The positions of the Catholic church in these countries have attempted to take such factors into account, calling on all sides to respect human dignity. In recent years, an increasing preoccupation of the church has been the spread of human rights violations resulting from warfare, particularly in Central America. As a consequence, the Catholic church has assumed a major role in the search for peace in the region. However, an examination of the church's action in particular situations in Latin America reveals diverse attitudes in the face of such phenomena as state terror, guerrilla movements, and regional warfare.

Of particular concern to the Catholic church has been those governments or movements that have attempted to justify violations of human rights on the grounds that they are defending Western Christian civilization or the true gospel message. The military government of General Augusto Pinochet, installed in Chile on September 11, 1973, is often cited as an example of the former, while the guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso, initiated in Peru in 1980, is regarded as an example of the latter.

Church authorities have repeatedly admitted the right of governments to use coercive force in the pursuit of the common good and order within society. They further admit the right of a nation to protect itself from foreign attack or subversion of a legitimate government. What they strongly object to are attempts to eliminate subversive terrorism through state terrorism whose "principal victim is always the people."[18] The defense of national security, it is argued, must be accomplished within the parameters of a country's constitution and laws, as well as according to human rights criteria. Hence, while the Catholic church accepts the necessity of the suspension or limitation of some rights under extraordinary circumstances, it insists that this not involve violence. Furthermore, it has repeatedly condemned structural violence, that is, gross violations of rights resulting from the nature of societal structures. In the face of such violence, the Catholic bishops at Medellín affirmed the right of individuals and communities to resist in defense of their lives and dignity.[19] Nevertheless, the official position of the church is one of opposition to violence. As the Paraguayan Federation of Religious phrased it in 1987:

> We don't believe in the efficacy of violence, but rather in the transforming power of love. We reaffirm our faith in the efficacy of "active non-violence" as a courageous and Christian expression of the divine and human love in the construction of a fraternal world.[20]

Although this has been the official Catholic policy, there are a few churchpeople who have found strict adherence to nonviolence to be exceptionally difficult within highly repressive societies. Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador stated in 1978 that "when a dictatorship seriously violates human rights and attacks the common good of the nation, when it becomes unbearable and closes all channels of dialogue, of understanding, of rationality, when this happens, the church speaks of the legitimate right of insurrectional violence."[21] Romero, shortly before his assassination in March 1980, also called for Salvadoran soldiers and police to disobey orders that would cause them to commit grave violations of human rights.

Clearly the issue of the moral response to structural violence has dominated many discussions of church positions toward states since the 1960s. The emergence of the theology of liberation at that time and its utilization by some to justify guerrilla movements has led some commentators to conclude that liberation theology promotes violent revolution. The appearance of a handful of "guerrilla priests," such as Camilo Torres in Colombia in the mid-1960s, has been used to confirm this. It should be noted, however, that there have been few such clerics in the last twenty-five years in Latin America. The vast majority of priests and other churchpeople continue to strongly support reform rather than revolution, even though they may at times question whether justice can be achieved without a radical transformation of structures.

This issue was a prime focus of discussion at the Latin American bishops' conference at Puebla in 1979, particularly in terms of the limits of political action for clerics in promoting change. To those who had argued that Christ himself was a revolutionary, Pope John Paul II replied in his opening address:

> This idea of Christ as a political figure, a revolutionary, as the subversive man from Nazareth, does not tally with the church's catechesis. By confusing the insidious pretexts of Jesus' accusers with the—very different—attitude of Jesus himself, some people adduce as the cause of his death the outcome of a political conflict, and nothing is said of the Lord's will to deliver himself and of his consciousness of his redemptive mission. The Gospels clearly show that for Jesus anything that would alter his mission as the servant of Yahweh was a temptation (Luke 4:5). He does not accept the position of those who mixed the things of God with merely political attitudes (cf. Matthew 22:21; Mark 12:17; John 18:36). He unequivocally rejects recourse to violence. He opens his message of conversion to everybody without excluding the very publicans. The perspective of his mission is much deeper. It consists in complete salvation through a transforming, peacemaking, pardoning, and reconciling love.[22]

Thus, since the late 1970s the emphasis increasingly has been on evangelization of all to promote societal reconciliation, particularly in those countries afflicted by warfare such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia. The working out of this thrust within conflictual societies has caused church leaders to attempt to balance denunciations of violence, whatever the source, with calls for reconciliation. This has resulted in criticism of the Catholic church from all sides, with authoritarian governments accusing the church or churchpeople of being subversive and guerrilla leaders castigating the church for abandoning the poor and the exploited.

The situation is extraordinarily complicated when societies are engulfed in intense political and ideological struggle as in Chile during the government of Salvador Allende in the early 1970s and in Argentina under Isabel Perón in the mid-1970s. In these countries the historical preference of the church for order and its fear of chaos tended to assert itself. Hence, the episcopacy admitted that they accepted Allende's overthrow on September 11, 1973, by the military under the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet. The prelates had become alienated from the Popular Unity government by Allende's Marxism, the alleged superficiality of government efforts to assist the poor, sectarianism in education, increasing loss of faith among youths, political rhetoric, and growing public disorder. The Chilean hierarchy was also preoccupied with what they regarded as the attempt of Chilean Christians for Socialism to establish a parallel magisterium within the church.[23]

The gravity and extent of human rights violations in the immediate aftermath of the coup caused the Chilean episcopacy within a month to establish, together with the Lutheran and Methodist churches as well as sectors of the Jewish community, the Committee of Cooperation for Peace. Until it was disbanded in December 1975, in part, as a result of pressure from the Pinochet government, the Committee provided over 100,000 individuals with legal, medical, and economic assistance. Local offices were established in fifteen of twenty-five Chilean provinces to provide similar services. Together with its successor, the Vicariate of Solidarity, which was established in 1976, it served not only to provide human rights assistance for tens of thousands of people, but also to raise consciousness within and without the Catholic church concerning the relationship between respect for human rights and the preservation and promotion of democracy.[24]

Direct church involvement in human rights work increased popular esteem for the Catholic church in Chile. It also helped to identify the church as the institutional base for opposition to the regime. This resulted in the church and churchpeople being targeted by the regime for repression resulting in their assassination, torture, exile, and harassment from October 1973 up to the end of the Pinochet regime in March 1990.[25] Such violent attacks on churchpeople helped to decrease divisions within the church over political issues and to activate a broad cross-section of churchpeople. In December 1987 over 150 Catholic priests, nuns, and lay missionaries publicly called for the resignation of General Pinochet since under his dictatorship

Chile was "experiencing a collective death, whose symptoms are generalized poverty, human rights abuse, and the regime's plan to continue indefinitely by imposing a plebiscite based on the immoral constitution of 1980."[26] In a related statement the Chilean Episcopal Conference asserted in June 1988 that fair and ethical conditions did not exist for the plebiscite.[27] By early 1988 the church had changed its strategy and undertook a massive campaign to encourage the Chilean public to register to vote in the plebiscite.[28] The October 5, 1988, plebiscite was a resounding defeat for Pinochet and opened the way for a return to civilian government on March 11, 1990.

Behind such positions are, however, some ambiguities. While there is generally a consensus within the church concerning the need for an end to military dictatorship and a return to civilian government, there is a limited consensus concerning the best new political and economic structures. Some sectors of the church support socialism, while others continue to adhere to a reformed capitalism. Most church leaders tend to sidestep such disagreements in a pragmatic effort to maintain unity in the face of authoritarian governments.

The relative unity and high degree of activism of the Chilean church was not matched by its Argentine counterpart in the aftermath of the March 1976 military coup in that country. Reports of disappearances, torture, and assassinations did not prompt the Argentine church to establish a human rights office nor to identify themselves closely with secular rights groups. Reportedly, only four of more than eighty bishops took public stands denouncing violations by the military government which held power from March 1976 to December 1983.[29] Other prelates attempted to obtain information about the disappeared on a confidential basis, while still others are alleged to have soothed the consciences of torturers.[30]

The reasons adduced for the behavior of the Catholic church in Argentina include a history of close relations with the armed forces, particularly via a system of military chaplaincies, the institutional weakness of the church in a highly secularized society, a deep-rooted fear of chaos and Marxism in the face of an urban guerrilla movement (the Montoneros), and an increasingly radicalized youth. The economic dependence of church officials on the government which still paid a part of their salaries and the formation of the Argentine clergy, which was influenced to a degree by right wing movements emanating from Europe, also contributed. Hence, while the Argentine episcopacy supported human rights in pastoral letters on a number of occasions,[31] it did not mobilize its resources and exercise strong moral leadership in their defense.

No other Latin American national church has been as criticized for its perceived lack of a prophetic stance in the face of a repressive government. The behavior of the Catholic church in Argentina appears to reflect the fact that while the Catholic church may be universal in faith and doctrine, its actual behavior is heavily influenced by local realities. An examination of the Catholic church's efforts to seek peace in Central America further confirms this.

Since the 1970s El Salvador and Nicaragua have been embroiled in war, revolution, and counterrevolution. Today both countries are devastated economically, resulting in approximately one-quarter to one-half of their populations being unemployed or refugees. In Guatemala it is estimated by international human rights observers that some 100,000 civilians have been killed since 1980 as a result of government efforts to eliminate a guerrilla force of some 3,000.[32] Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama, while not actual scenes of warfare, have experienced serious political, economic, and social destabilization. Throughout this period the Catholic church in each of these countries has attempted to defend human rights and promote peace. These efforts have met with only limited success. Nevertheless, their role has been repeatedly recognized by secular authorities, including the Central American presidents who in August 1987 formally requested the participation of the episcopacy in national reconciliation commissions. The bishops of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua assumed major roles in these efforts, their counterparts in Costa Rica and Honduras lesser ones.

September 1984 peace talks between the government of El Salvador and its political and armed opposition the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary Front) and the FMLN (Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation) were arranged in part by the Archbishop of San Salvador Arturo Rivera y Damas and some Jesuits. While this meeting was not successful since there was little inclination to compromise on either side, in August 1985 the Salvadoran episcopal conference issued a pastoral letter calling for a renewal of talks as the only means of avoiding the destruction of the country.[33] In mid-1986 President José Napoleón Duarte asked Archbishop Rivera y Damas to arrange and mediate new peace talks. While the opposition in principle accepted such talks, the initiative did not bear fruit, nor did the October 1987 talks convened under the Arias peace plan. This prompted the hierarchy in mid-1988 to attempt a slightly different strategy, inviting representatives of over one hundred social, economic, and popular organizations to participate in a national forum to promote peace. In this fashion the prelates hoped to pressure both the government and the FDR/FMLN to concede to the overwhelming desire of the public for a negotiated settlement.[34]

The bishops' initiative was sharply criticized by some Salvadoran political and economic elites who argued that the forum was an attempt to impose Marxism on the country and undercut the government and political parties. The episcopacy replied that the initiative was a simple pastoral effort to find a peaceful solution to war and did not constitute political activity.[35] It should be noted that by 1988 the government of José Napoleón Duarte was widely regarded as ineffectual and political parties represented mainly conservative elements. Labor unions, agrarian cooperatives, and other grass-roots groups supported the forum, which provided them with an opportunity to express their opinions on ending the civil war. The debate over the forum illustrates the limitations on the church's efforts to translate popular support for peace talks into serious negotiations in the face of the resistance of the contending forces. Only when the government and the guerrilla leadership concluded that they could not win militarily were productive negotiations initiated in 1990. It is hoped that they will result in a cease fire and broad-based settlement in 1991.

In Nicaragua the Catholic church as an institution and individual churchpeople played a major role in the consolidation of the movement which overthrew the Somoza dictatorship (1934–1979). Since the establishment of the Government of National Reconstruction in July 1979, the Catholic church has been a major actor in the political and ideological struggle that has ensued as the Sandinista leadership attempted to implement a socialist revolution. Counterrevolutionary elements, known as the contras, took up arms in 1980 and by mid-1981 were receiving support from the US government. Throughout the Catholic bishops called for a national dialogue to end the conflict. The situation was complicated by the fact that some priests and well-known laypersons served in the upper echelons of the Sandinista government.[36] In addition, attitudes within the church toward the Sandinistas and the contras covered the full spectrum from strong support to strong opposition with many churchpeople being uncomfortable with both options. All sides attempted to use the church to legitimate their positions, and church-state tension as well as conflict within the church was substantial.

In the fall of 1987, the Sandinista government asked its frequent critic the Cardinal of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, to chair the National Reconciliation Commission and to mediate peace talks in early 1988. The move served to diminish the image of Obando as a strong opponent of the government and reduced church-state tension.

By mid-1988, after a breakdown of peace talks, the Nicaraguan episcopacy urged the government, the contras, and the civilian opposition "to find peaceful, civic and political means for renewing peace talks where practical steps and time frames would be undertaken for an irreversible democratization of the country."[37] The bishops warned that if such a move was not undertaken Nicaraguans would suffer even more severe violations of human rights leading to desperation for "man accepts pain and temporal misery when it is accompanied by hope for the future, but not when there seems to be no way out of the situation."[38] Ultimately, the talks resulted in a settlement in 1989 and national elections on February 25, 1990, which a coalition of opposition parties won. Today high levels of societal conflict still exist in the midst of critical economic conditions. Churchpeople continue to participate in political and ideological struggles at all levels of society, representing a broad spectrum of opinions.

While Catholic leaders in El Salvador and Nicaragua agree with the public about the absolute necessity for peace, they disagree concerning what concessions the contending forces should make to achieve it. This reflects the differing ideological persuasions of churchpeople, as well as local realities. The actions of individual churchpeople whether they be bishops, priests, brothers, nuns, or laypersons further complicate matters for all tend to use religion to legitimate the political options they support. Since in highly conflictual societies, as exist in Latin America, this can lead to increased tensions within both churches and society, many church leaders in recent years have been increasing their efforts to emphasize that the church does not support specific political systems.

It has been very difficult for the church to maintain such a position, however, while at the same time criticizing those same systems and structures. Strong postures in support of peace, justice, and human rights have, as a consequence, politicized the church and made it the scene of political and ideological struggles. This has resulted in constant tension within the church, and many have questioned the church's positions in the name of the universality of the church's mission. The church's response has been to maintain that criticism of political elites across the political spectrum is part of their mission to evangelize and interpret the gospel message. The interpretation of that message at Vatican II, Medellín, and Puebla, however, presented serious challenges to political structures in Latin America. As long as the church maintains a strong denunciatory posture, its claims to political neutrality will continue to be questioned by those presiding over governments guilty of repression. At the root of the church's criticism of political structures is its belief that they are used frequently to defend unjust economic systems.

CATHOLICISM AND ECONOMICS IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

Both Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II have insisted that development is the new name for peace.[39] That is, if societal concord is to be augmented and international conflict reduced, economic policies must have as a guiding principle the reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor within nations and between rich and poor nations. Development models, it is argued, must be guided by ethical principles and morality, not just technical criteria. The prime criterion should be the promotion of the integral development of the individual, not simply economic growth. In Latin American countries where substantial minorities, and sometimes a majority of the people, exist in absolute poverty,[40] this demand has shattering implications and has perhaps generated more controversy than any of the church's other positions. Nevertheless, it has been pursued with considerable vigor.

Catholic reasoning is that while the church does not claim technical economic expertise, it does have an obligation to criticize economic systems and structures that are morally deficient because they condemn a substantial proportion of populations to inhuman conditions.[41] While admitting the necessity of economic development which promotes rising growth rates, capital accumulation, and increased exports, the Catholic church since Medellín has insisted on the necessity of integral development "which responds to the requirements of the common good [and] is not measured just by the quantitative growth of measurable values. . . . "[42]

Church leaders freely admit that this implies substantial economic change. As with political problems they do not propose specific solutions. Rather, they argue that moral economic structures flow from the incorporation of the citizenry in the process of determining the long-term goals of development policies. Unless economic decision making includes political participation, it is seriously flawed. Furthermore, "only a people called to participate in the process of their own development will accept with dignity the necessary sacrifices. Otherwise the call to sacrifice creates tension and social revolt and increased violence, repression and corruption."[43] Such participation is more likely to assure that economic models are conducive to the common good.[44]

Latin American Catholic leaders have been particularly critical of what they regard as an overdependence on technocratic elites who determine national economic policies without sufficient attention to the moral imperative of meeting basic needs. In Chile where the Pinochet government depended on a group of economists identified with strict monetarist policies, the Chilean episcopacy strongly challenged the belief that "economic decisions are based on scientific reasons, as if to say that in human sciences we do not find a variety of opinions and theories allowing for an equal multiplicity of options."[45] The programs implemented, it is argued, should not only be successful in technical terms, but must also promote the common good. If they do not then they are considered sinful. Evidence that economic structures are sinful is the continued existence of widespread poverty, which is not only directly harmful to people but encourages violent reactions within the entire society.[46]

Such positions have led Catholic leaders to take the stance that there is no absolute right to private property, but rather that each individual has a right to those resources necessary for life with dignity. As the Caribbean bishops phrased it "any society in which a few control most of the wealth and the masses are left in want is a sinful society. We believe that those who own superfluous possessions are obliged in justice to share them with those who are in want." As a consequence, Christians have an obligation to work to "change society so that wealth is more fairly divided among all and to support authentic participation initiatives by governments to this end."[47]

This position has led some church leaders to state that they are not absolutely opposed to socialism, but rather that they reject those expressions of it which involve "the denial of God and the spiritual, the insistence on the need for class warfare, and the suppression of all types of private property."[48] The bishops of the Caribbean, for example, regard the stated socialist commitment to greater enjoyment of basic needs as highly laudable. What they object to is any position that "denies God or the supernatural destiny of man, promotes violence or absorbs individual freedom into the collectivity of the state."[49] If a socialist system promotes such values as liberty, responsibility, and receptivity in such a fashion as to encourage the integral development of the individual then it is morally acceptable.[50] This stance accepts socialism while rejecting Marxism and communism because they are regarded as denying spiritual values, exploiting class differences, and emphasizing the material over the spiritual.

Catholic leaders have also been outspoken in criticizing liberal capitalism for overemphasis on the profit motive, acceptance of poverty, and exacerbation of class differences. The Catholic church in Latin America has repeatedly argued that the manner in which capitalism has evolved in the region has resulted in the subordination of human rights and dignity to the pursuit of material gain. In the face of this, the church has urged greater popular participation in decision making in order to make both socialist and capitalist systems more just.[51]

Such positions demonstrate the degree to which the Catholic church in Latin America has accepted, at least in principle, both political and economic pluralism. Hence, since the late 1960s the Catholic church in Cuba has repeatedly affirmed its belief that socialism in Cuba has made some positive contributions to the common good, particularly in the realm of expanded education and health care. As early as 1969 the Cuban episcopacy urged Catholics to participate in government-linked community efforts to promote the common good.[52] Both the prelates and the government have expressed their belief that one can be both a Christian and a revolutionary.[53] While tensions between church and state were high in the early 1960s, by the latter part of that decade the hierarchy had opted for a more pragmatic policy of rapprochement. This was facilitated by Castro's growing belief that churches were becoming increasingly receptive to socialism.

At a national meeting in early 1986, the Cuban Catholic church dedicated itself to participating more fully in the building of a socialist society while recognizing that in Cuba there were problems relating to political and religious liberties. The solution was seen not in the overthrow of the government, but in the evangelizing of Cuban society, as well as the church itself, to make all Cubans more dedicated to the common good.[54] While the Cuban Catholic church has not been as publicly outspoken in its criticism of violations of political rights in Cuba, it has used church leaders in other countries, as well as the Vatican, to work for the release of political prisoners. Throughout it has constantly reaffirmed that it can work within the socialist revolution. Not all Cuban Catholics, nor all Latin American Catholics, are as accepting of socialism. However, it should be noted that a good many of the most active bishops, priests, brothers, nuns, and laypersons have lost their faith in the capacity of liberal capitalism to substantially reduce the widespread poverty that reflects the denial of basic socioeconomic rights which, in turn, leads to the violation of political and civil rights.

CONCLUSION

While the promotion of peace, justice, and human rights has traditionally been a concern of the Catholic church in Latin America, it is true that since the 1960s it has become a hallmark of its activities. This has been the result, in large measure, of increasing concern within the church, particularly in the aftermath of the rise of fascism and World War II in Europe and state terror in Latin America, over asserting moral leadership. There was a sense among church leaders in the post–World War II period that their moral leadership was eroding and that they needed to speak more directly to issues of peace, justice, and human rights. Hence, much attention was paid to these issues at Vatican II and Medellín, as well as throughout the church. A strong commitment to human rights in the face of repressive governments, terrorist movements, and increasing societal violence has tended to increase consensus on the necessity for such work among churchpeople.

Given the complexities of Latin American societies and the diversity of individuals within the church, divisions remain on what are the most moral political and economic strategies and structures to achieve greater enjoyment of human rights. This reflects the reality of political and ideological debate and struggle in these countries. Since the Catholic church has become more directly involved in contemporary Latin American society via its current emphasis on peace, justice, and human rights, it is now a major actor in the human rights struggle. While the church has sought to maintain its position of enunciating principles, rather than recommending models, its increasing utilization of denunciation of repression, exploitation, and violations of human rights have caused it to be accused of partisanship. Furthermore, these accusations have had some weight since some churchpeople have been highly partisan. Nevertheless, throughout Latin America the Catholic church's work has caused it, as an institution, to become more trusted than in the pre-1960s period. As a result, the church has come to be more closely identified with the poor majority, although it has struggled to avoid the appearance of abandoning the rest of society. This has resulted in some ambiguities and apparent contradictions. While the Catholic church in Latin America has grown in influence and esteem, it has probably never been as beset by internal debate and tension.

Although the bishops, clergy, and other churchpeople have taken the lead in enunciating principles, much of the pressure to do so has come from the laity. Grass-roots activism within the church has grown substantially. While principles were laid out at Vatican II and Medellín, they were generally acted upon in the context of crises that affected the ordinary citizen in Brazil in the late 1960s; Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s; and Central America, Colombia, and Peru in the 1980s. In some cases, most notably Argentina, crisis did not prompt as much action as in other countries.

The activities of the Catholic church has caused it to become the target of attack, particularly by repressive governments. This has helped reduce the distance between the conservative and progressive sectors within the church. It has also stimulated the church to seek support internationally not only from within the Catholic church, but also from non-Catholic religious groups, governments, and secular organizations. In doing so, the Latin American situation has become better known abroad, particularly in Europe and North America. As a result, the churches in these areas have become more informed and active in pressuring the governments in their countries to take particular stances in their policies toward Latin America. Overall, church involvement has resulted in a considerable rethinking of European and North American positions on Latin America. A notable example of this is when the US Catholic bishops criticized the impact of international capitalism on areas such as Latin America in their 1986 pastoral letter, "Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy."

Such criticisms by church leaders have prompted accusations that the Catholic church has been infiltrated by Marxists. There is no convincing evidence of this, although some theologians and progressive churchpeople may use Marxist concepts and terminology. Rather, the church has succeeded in distancing itself from identification with capitalism as well as with political and economic elites. It has also begun the task of arguing that the political and economic models of the superpowers are not necessarily the most conducive to the common good in Latin America. As with all human institutions the pursuit of this objective is not without great difficulties as individual churchpeople are encouraged to transcend their personal and ideological biases.

In addition, not all Latin American Catholics are enthusiastic about the church's strong posture in support of peace, justice, and human rights thereby making, as the Puebla conference noted, evangelization within the church a priority. Even without fully accomplishing this the Catholic church is clearly a major political actor in contemporary Latin America. In a sense this has reinforced the traditional image of the church, although its power is not rooted in an alliance with the state, but rather in its moral authority and popular support for many of its positions. Gone is the image of the church as a monolith, although it has maintained a remarkable degree of institutional unity in spite of sharp theological, political, and ideological divisions. No schismatic or national churches have emerged and there has even been some increase of youths entering religious life. Part of the attraction is the appearance of greater relevancy of the church to modern life. This is not to ignore the fact that the Catholic church in Latin America is facing stiff competition from both religious and secular competitors. This is particularly preoccupying to church officials faced with governmental attacks. Repression has increased politicization of churchpeople at the same time as the church, as an institution, continues to struggle to be accepted as nonpartisan. In the present Latin American context the positions the Catholic church has been taking on political and economic issues have clearly undercut its neutral image. Thus, the Catholic church in Latin America is widely regarded as an institution that is activist, prochange, and theologically, politically, and ideologically heterodox. This is, indeed, a transformation from the church's traditional image in that region, but it is largely a result of its history rather than a radical transformation within the institution itself, as some current stereotypes imply. Clearly both old and new stereotypes do not fully capture the reality of the Catholic church in Latin America's past or present.

ENDNOTES

[1] This essay will focus on the Roman Catholic church as approximately 85 percent of Latin Americans identify with Catholicism. While other religious groups, particularly evangelical Christians, have made strong inroads in recent years, Catholicism is still predominant. Fundamentalists and spiritists have tended to expand in areas afflicted with high levels of conflict and socioeconomic dislocation such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and urban Brazil. Such growth has been thought to overwhelmingly reinforce political conservatism. The reality is eminently more complex with fundamentalists and spiritists often being politicized in a variety of directions as a result of local conditions as have Catholics and mainline Protestants. Furthermore, statistics concerning fundamentalist and spiritist growth are sometimes based on the claims of such groups rather than on verifiable data. Hence, the image of the Catholic church and mainline Protestant denominations being under siege by fundamentalist and spiritist growth is somewhat overdrawn. Across the board, vital congregations that are responsive to local needs are growing, while those not meeting such needs tend to decline irrespective of religious affiliation. While there has also been considerable religious renewal at the grass roots, this article will concern itself largely with the institutional church as it explores church-state relations. For statistics on the strength of various religions in Latin America, see the *Anuario Pontificio* and *Statistical Abstract for Latin America,* published annually, as well as David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[2] The Patronato or Padroado Real was a system of patronage under which the crown enjoyed privileges regarding ecclesiastical appointments, benefices, and finances in compensation for assuming certain obligations dealing with the maintenance of

the Roman Catholic church and its personnel. The monarchs were also obligated to help preserve the Catholic faith and encourage its growth. In America the rights of patronage were delegated by the crown to royal officials, primarily viceroys. Other civil officials exercised patronal authority as subordinates of the viceroy. The monarchy expected vicepatrons to promote royal prerogatives under the system of royal patronage and their efforts in this area were generally reviewed at the conclusion of their terms.

[3] Margaret E. Crahan, "Church-State Conflict in Colonial Peru: Bourbon Regalism under the Last of the Hapsburgs," *The Catholic Historical Review,* 62 (2) (April 1976): 224–44; and "Civil Ecclesiastical Relations in Hapsburg Peru," *Journal of Church and State* 20 (1) (Winter 1978): 93–111.

[4] John Leddy Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century: Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 56–68.

[5] Robert R. Kaufman, "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries," in James Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 113.

[6] David Hollenback, S.J., "Global Human Rights: An Interpretation of the Contemporary Catholic Understanding," in Alfred Hennelly, S.J. and John Langan, S.J., eds., *Human Rights in the Americas: The Struggle for Consensus* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1982), 13.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Integral development refers to the realization of the individual's full human dignity.

[9] Brazilian Episcopal Conference (hereafter BEC), "Christian Requirements of a Political Order, February 17, 1977," *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 16 (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, n.d.), 57.

[10] Argentine Episcopal Conference (hereafter AEC), "The Common Good and the Present Situation, May 5, 1976" *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 15 (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, n.d.), 17.

[11] BEC, 59.

[12] AEC, 17.

[13] BEC, 60.

[14] Ibid, 60–61.

[15] Cardenal Eduardo Pironio, "¿Qué se espera de América Latina en el Sínodo sobre los laicos?," *Páginas* 77 (May 1986): 6–7.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] For example, on June 2, 1979, the Nicaraguan episcopacy issued a pastoral letter stating that the armed insurrection against the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua was moral and licit due to longstanding gross violations of human rights. It should be noted that this support of the insurrection did not mean automatic approval of whatever government the insurrection brought to power. Hence, the Nicaraguan bishops with the advent of the Sandinista

government in Nicaragua in July, 1979 claimed the right to criticize its human rights practices and legitimacy. Conferencia Episcopal de Nicaragua (hereafter CEN), "Mensaje al Pueblo Nicaragüense, June 2, 1979."

[18] Paraguayan Episcopal Conference (hereafter PEC), "Amidst Persecutions and Consolations, June 12, 1976," *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 15, 10.

[19] Donal Dorr, *Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Vatican Social Teaching* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1983), 157–62.

[20] FERELPAR, "Paraguay: A Statement by the Federation of Religious," *LADOC* 18 (5) (May/June 1988): 16.

[21] Archbishop Oscar Romero as quoted in Alan Riding, "The Cross and the Sword in Latin America," in Marvin E. Gettleman, et al., eds., *El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War* (New York: Grove Press, 1981), 196.

[22] John Paul II, "NC Documentary: Pope's Opening Talk to Latin American Bishops, January 28, 1979, Puebla, Mexico," NC Press Release, 10.

[23] Monseñor Carlos Camus L. (Obispo de Concepción), "La experiencia de la iglesia chilena en la defensa de los derechos humanos," in Hugo L. Frühling, ed., *Represión política y defensa de los Derechos Humanos* (Santiago: Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, 1986), 54; see also Brian H. Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenge to Modern Catholicism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[24] Jaime Esponda F. "Objetivos y criterios estratégicos aplicados por la Vicaría de la Solidaridad de Santiago en su tarea de defensa de los Derechos Humanos," in Frühling, ed., *Represión politica y defensa de los Derechos Humanos* (Santiago: Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, 1986), 108–38; and Margaret E. Crahan, "Evaluation of the Chilean Commission of Human Rights and the Vicariate of Solidarity," Report prepared for the Ford Foundation, Lima, Peru, July 1988.

[25] Americas Watch, *The Vicaría de la Solidaridad in Chile* (New York: Americas Watch, 1987); and Amnesty International, *Chile—Persecution of Human Rights Monitors and Members of the Clergy: Recent Cases* (New York: Amnesty International, 1987).

[26] "Church: Chile," *Latinamerica Press,* 21 January 1988, 2.

[27] "Church: Chile," *Latinamerica Press,* 14 July 1988, 2.

[28] Fundación Civitas, *Programa de Educación Cívica en Chile* (Santiago, Chile, 1987).

[29] The four were Enrique Angelelli of La Rioja, allegedly murdered by the military on August 4, 1976; Jaime de Nevares of Neuquin; Miguel Hesayne of Viedma; and Jorge Novak of Quilmes. The latter two both personally joined secular human rights organizations. Emilio Mignone, *Witness to the Truth: The Complicity of Church and Dictatorship in Argentina, 1976–1983,* Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1988), 19.

[30] Ibid, 11, 20, 25.

[31] AEC; and Argentine Episcopal Conference, "A Christian Reflection for the People of Argentina, May 7, 1977," *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 16, 23–29.

[32] Amnesty International, *Guatemala: The Human Rights Record* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1987).

[33] Conferencia Episcopal de El Salvador (hereafter CEES), "Reconciliación y Paz (8 de agosto de 1985), San Salvador, El Salvador," 14.

[34] In 1985 Archbishop Rivera y Damas estimated that approximately 80 percent of all Salvadorans favored peace talks. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), "Archbishop Rivera y Damas Holds News Conference," *Latin America: Daily Report,* 25 September 1985, P3–5.

[35] "A propósito de la carta de ASCAFE a Mons. Revelo," *Proceso* 9 (344) (13 July 1988): 4–7.

[36] Four priests held cabinet level posts in the Sandinista government: Miguel D'Escoto, Foreign Minister; Ernesto Cardenal, Minister of Culture; his brother Fernando, Minister of Education; and Edgard Parrales, Minister of Social Welfare. In 1986 all four were canonically censured for holding political office in the face of a 1980 Vatican prohibition.

[37] "Church: Nicaragua," *Latinamerica Press,* 14 July 1988, 2.

[38] Stephen Kinzer, "All Sides in Nicaragua Get Plea from Bishops," *New York Times,* 1 July 1988, 6.

[39] John Paul II, 16.

[40] Elizabeth W. Dore and John F. Weeks, "Economic Performance and Basic Needs: The Examples of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela," in Crahan, *Human Rights and Basic Needs,* 150–87.

[41] Chilean Episcopal Conference (hereafter CEC), "Our Life as a Nation, March 25, 1977," *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 15: 52.

[42] BEC, 66.

[43] Ibid., 62.

[44] Ibid., 66.

[45] CEC, 53.

[46] "Peru: Poverty the Most Fundamental Violence, Statement by 300 Peruvian priests, 9/8/87," *LADOC,* 18, (3) (January/February 1988): 25–26.

[47] Antilles Episcopal Conference (hereafter ANEC), "Justice and Peace in a New Caribbean, November 21, 1975," *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 16, 12.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid., 13.

[50] Ibid., 14.

[51] Salvadoran Episcopal Conference (hereafter SEC), "A Call to End Violence and Promote Justice, May 17, 1977," *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 16, 49.

[52] Cuban Episcopal Conference (hereafter CUEC), "Pastoral Letter, April 10, 1969," *LADOC 'Keyhole' Series* 7 (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, n.d.), 47–48.

[53] Margaret E. Crahan, "Salvation Through Christ or Marx: Religion in Revolutionary Cuba," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 21 (1) (February 1979): 156–84; "Cuba: Religion and Revolutionary Institutionalization," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 17 (November 1985): 319–40; "Cuba and Nicaragua: Religion and Revolution," in Thomas M. Gannon, S.J., ed., *World Catholicism in Transition* (New York: Macmillan, 1988), 265–82.

[54] Monseñor Adolfo Rodríguez, "Discurso Inaugural del ENEC pronunciado por Mons. Adolfo Rodríguez, Presidente de la Conferencia Episcopal de Cuba, en nombre de los Obispos Cubanos," in Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano (ENEC), *Documento Final* (Miami: Instituto de Estudios Cubanos, 1987), 7–19, 31.

Juan J. Linz

Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of Democracy

> *[In the last sixty years] the mutation of the Spanish Catholic Church has been extraordinary. It is as though we had been watching a play of several acts, complete with changes of scenery, of the plot, and of the personality of the characters and even the emotional tone: furious in the thirties, exalted in the forties and fifties, troubled and inquiring in the sixties, moderately euphoric throughout the seventies and discrete, with a sense both of satisfaction and disillusion in the eighties.*
>
> —Víctor Pérez Díaz
>
> *"Iglesia y Religión en la España Contemporánea"*[1]

THE RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE THIRTIES

SPANISH CATHOLICISM FACED THE CRISIS of the 1930s with a strange mixture of weakness and strength. Compared to Catholic Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and even Italy, Catholics in Spain had not been organized for political and social action. Spanish Catholicism had been living under the protection of a government that had given the church hierarchy a share in power in the Senate, had assured public recognition of the Catholic

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church, had limited competition from other churches, and, except for an occasional crisis, had guaranteed the free development of its activities. Part of that bargain had been, however, the continued existence of the traditional royal *patronato,* which had assured government influence on episcopal appointments.[2]

Efforts to create Catholic workers' organizations and trade unions had not been successful since they were bitterly contested by the anarchist movement and the Socialist unions. The weakness of lay organizations facilitated the victory of the Republican-Socialist coalition in the 1931 elections. While longtime dependence on the state under the monarchy made it difficult for the church hierarchy to accept the change of regime, the Vatican, the elite of Catholic lay organizations, and the nuncio quickly applied the doctrine of Leo XIII of indifference toward forms of government and asked for the recognition of the new regime. The electoral defeat of pro-Catholic candidates made way for the approval of an anticlerical constitution, but that victory was deceptive since lay activists and the clergy were still able to mobilize mass electoral support for the defense of the church in 1931.[3]

The Catholic reaction to the 1931 elections cannot be understood without examining the renewed intensity of anticlericalism, whose roots are complex and difficult to understand. While the connection of the church with the monarchy and the Primo de Rivera dictatorship certainly contributed to the general public's suspicion of the church, the intense anticlericalism of the bourgeois Left Republicans had other roots.

To a large extent, both the "officialization" of Catholicism and popular anticlericalism were embedded in rural community life. To people living in those areas, the fusion of the local power structure and the church seemed natural. In the context of the ongoing social conflict—the protests of the lower classes against the power structure, the legal system, and the police—that fusion appeared as illegitimate, immoral, and profane. Irrespective of their personal religiosity, many people rejected the church as an ally of the powerful and the rich, who were religious conformists or devout, which led to violent anticlericalism and a readiness to follow an antireligious intelligentsia. Those sentiments were not limited to rural society but also extended to the working class of the growing industrial centers.

On another level we find an intellectual rejection of Catholic dominance in Spanish intellectual and cultural life. Many attributed the scientific and cultural backwardness of Spain, in comparison to other Western nations, to the influence of the Counter-Reformation and the insensitivity of the church to accept many trends in modern science and culture. Socialists who had not been particularly concerned with the clerical issue, which they considered a diversion by the bourgeoisie of the working class from the real class conflict, began to back the anticlericalism of the petty bourgeois, while the anarchists, their main competitors for the support of the workers, expressed enthusiastic anticlerical and antireligious feelings.

The self-definition of the Republic as a regime one of whose priorities was the laicization-secularization of Spain and whose leaders insisted on the support of that republic in order to participate in the polity obliged Catholics to mobilize all their resources in the electoral struggle of 1933. A series of circumstances, including the extension of suffrage to women, gave an electoral victory to the Right, making the Catholic party, the CEDA, the largest in parliament; however, the ambiguity of the CEDA in relation to the monarchy-republic issue, its refusal to identify with the Republic as defined by the republicans, and the distrust of the president of the Republic prevented the entry of CEDA ministers into government until October of 1934. After initial efforts by the nuncio and some churchmen to reach an understanding with the Republic, Catholics failed to achieve their goals despite massive votes, leading to an even more everyday conflictual attitude. Violence against the church, its clergy, and its buildings increased after the Popular Front electoral victory in 1936. Hostility against the church had erupted somewhat sporadically under the Republic and, at times, was almost tolerated by the authorities, but in the October 1934 revolution against the entry of the CEDA into the government, thirty-seven priests and seminarians lost their lives.

The military uprising in July 1936, conceived as a *pronunciamiento* which soon would become a civil war, unleashed a bloody and destructive persecution in a matter of hours.[4] Some clerics reacted by going as far as to revive the classic doctrine of just rebellion, but the news of the burning of churches and convents and the massacre of priests and nuns made it clear to everyone in the church, to the clergy and most practicing Catholics, which side they were on. The tragic events that followed were interpreted by churchmen as mainly being the result of anticlerical propaganda and the actions of agitators, if not a conspiracy. They believed that most people in Spain were still Christian, even the working class. For others who were more perceptive it was the belief that the church was allied with their enemies, the privileged, and that it was class interest that kept people away from the church. To their opponents, however, most of Spain was alienated from religion and only clericalism maintained the Catholic presence. Both perspectives led to radical and intolerant responses: the first, the destruction of the enemy—the Left—and later a social interpretation of the religious mission, particularly in the last years of the Franco regime; the second, the militant anticlericalism of the thirties and in the civil war.

The Nationalists reestablished the presence of religion in education, abolished divorce, authorized jurisdiction in marital cases to ecclesiastical courts, gave public funds to pay clerical salaries, and subsidized the reconstruction of churches and convents. Religious symbols dominated the landscape. Bishops and priests occupied a prominent place in any official ceremony, and the authorities attended ex officio religious ceremonies. All those who had opposed or persecuted the church, in turn, were persecuted themselves. The intellectual life, media, and school textbooks were subject to government censorship to exclude any criticism of the church. The state had become in many areas the secular arm of the church, while the church in *a do et des* contributed to the legitimation of the regime.[5]

A complex issue in the development of religion and politics in Europe in the interwar years is the relationship of the churches and the faithful with fascist movements. Spanish fascism, despite its earlier insignificance electorally and as a mass movement, had an important role during this period due to the civil war and the hegemony of the Axis in Europe. The fascist party, the Falange, was a heterogeneous movement created from the union of different groups. Falangist nationalists saw the influence of the Vatican in internal affairs as a threat and felt a deep distrust and dislike for the CEDA, who reciprocated that dislike. Their mutual animosity would contribute later to the conflicts and squabbles of the "political families" in the Franco coalition. Some members of the hierarchy, reflecting the Vatican's hostility to Nazism, expressed their misgivings about the "statism" of the fascists and the potentially dangerous influence of foreign-pagan ideas. On the other hand, the Falange found in the church a limit to its totalitarian ambitions and attempted to save or strengthen the party's political space by claiming to be as Catholic as the "professional Catholics," thereby making its contribution to the hegemony of public religion in those years. Even so, on many issues, mainly in the field of education and cultural life, some fascists provided a brake to the ambitions of proclerical reactionary Catholics and the hierarchy supporting them.[6]

It is this background that explains a period of tensions between the Vatican and the Franco regime that would last until 1945.[7] A typical issue during this period, for example, was the refusal by the church to take an oath of allegiance to the head of state, an oath that the new primate never made but on which the church finally gave in.

Any analysis of religion and politics has to deal with the relationship between religion and nationalism. One extreme, the position of many European liberals and fascists, sees the church, especially the transnational church, as a threat to national integration. On the other end of the spectrum are those churchmen and laypeople who see an identity between the church and the nation, between being a religious person and a nationalist, excluding from the community those who question that identity. That line of thought might be reached by different paths. One sees the identification of the church with a nation as a way to defend a culture, a language, and the national self against alien cultural and ideological influences—a pattern that is characteristic of defensive nationalism in the peripheries of nations, like Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain. The other begins with a more complex religiously based claim: that the greatness of a nation, its historical success, is linked with its loyalty to the faith and the church; secularization becomes a threat not only to the church but to the nation. Spanish national-Catholicism is probably closer to the second pole.

The "triumphant" church born in the civil war was made possible by the Franco regime, but one could also say that the regime in large part was made possible, stable, and long lasting thanks to that religious legitimation. What could have been a *pronunciamiento* became for many a crusade. What could have been a military dictatorship became a complex regime with a form of organic statism that was able to survive for decades.

NATIONAL-CATHOLICISM IN POWER

The period from 1945 to 1957 was the high point of Catholic triumphalism, of the public identification of the church with the Franco regime. After delays and hesitations, the Vatican finally signed a concordat that, together with the bases agreement with the United States, ended the international isolation of the regime. It is also a time when the seeds of future tensions were planted.[8]

How did this marriage of religion and politics, church and state, emerge? Foremost was the whole process by which the Spanish church identified itself with the Nationalists in the course of the civil war. In addition, the weakening of the fascist component of the regime as a result of the defeat of the Axis led to an attempt by the Catholics to recuperate the areas in which the Falangists exercised some influence. There are, however, more specific reasons as to why Franco wanted to make efforts to co-opt political Catholicism and through it to strengthen the support of the church hierarchy and, if possible, that of the Vatican. In May 1945 and subsequent months the hostility of the Allies and many Western politicians had threatened the regime on account of the regime's ideological affinity, connection, and collaboration with defeated fascist powers. The regime needed to incorporate people who could contact foreign governments (let us not forget that Christian Democracy was on the rise in Europe) and who would be able to neutralize the monarchial pressure. Catholics who were to be co-opted, however, wanted to be assured of some of their own goals, including the evolution of the regime toward a monarchy, thereby ensuring continuity after Franco. They also had more immediate objectives, in particular, the placement of their people in key positions.

Events in 1945 and their impact on Spanish society represented a total victory for clerical-political Catholicism. Looked at more closely, using the private papers of the actors, one realizes that it was also a victory for Franco, as he was able to consolidate his power despite an emerging opposition of monarchists, a pretender, and some of his advisers, who were even contemplating, albeit with great hesitation, a future democracy. Politically, it was a complex cooptation of an elite, some of whose members would end disillusioned and in the democratic opposition to Franco. National-Catholicism would be one of the many factors that would make the emergence of a Christian Democratic party impossible in 1975–1977.

The closeness of religion and politics led to conflicts which might seem incidental from the outside: the clergy was insatiable in demanding obedience of religious laypeople in politics on the basis of their commitment to the church, and the lay religious politicians, upset by any sign of independent judgment in matters affecting them, were equally relentless in demanding support from the hierarchy, even the Vatican.

The hegemony of Catholicism, paradoxically, also was apparent in the ways that cultural matters were affected by the narrow-minded views of many members of the religious orders and the church hierarchy, which contributed to the crisis of national-Catholicism in the universities and the assertion of a more independent Catholic intelligentsia.[9] The fact that re-Catholicization from above ultimately did not assure the conversion of those defeated in the civil war made some who had been involved in the missionary effort realize that perhaps that strategy was unviable, was not in the interest of the evangelic mission of the church, and was possibly even un-Christian.

Efforts of Catholic organizations to reach the working class and the criticism of the monopolistic conception of official trade unions would generate a new dynamic in the church of great importance years later.

The triumphalism of the church was particularly oppressive when exercised by a hierarchy and clergy largely of peasant background who were trained in seminaries with little contact with the secular culture and who often lacked esthetic sensitivity. They had been formed mainly in canon law and had made their careers mostly in ecclesiastical administration. Due to their rural lower-class background, they were reverential to those who had power and money, people who had made their own social ascent possible through fellowships and influence. That background explains this anti-intellectualism that was even extended to Catholic intellectuals and a new generation of priests with prior academic training, and led to condemnations and attacks against leading thinkers and the ridiculous censorship of movies and books. At times their asceticism, rigidity, sense of power, and dignity led the clergy into conflicts with Franco and the authorities.

The cooperation with the Vatican led to new ecclesiastical appointments, among them bishops who would undertake the disengagement of the church from the state and would provide a new pastoral outlook. At the end of this period the church, together with the army, was able to defeat the constitutionalization of a single party as the center of power. The success of such an attempt would probably have made the dismantling of the regime after Franco's death more difficult.

The identification of the state with Catholicism, or as the state interpreted it, the use of Catholicism and the support of the church to legitimize the regime, became a weakness for the regime. It was clear that the Spanish hierarchy and much of the clergy were not to question the mutually convenient alliance; however, the interpretation of Catholic political-social thought was heteronomous and was not in their hands. Since alternate Catholic interpretations were religiously legitimate as long as the Vatican did not condemn them, they could be rejected but not exorcised. As alternate interpretations were inevitably present, Spanish Catholics, both churchmen and laypeople, eventually began to discover them. They would read Maritain and other Catholic thinkers and use their ideas to question the regime. After Vatican II, as increasingly wider circles introduced ideas that clearly undermined the claims of the regime, Franco's government began to find itself on the defensive in its own arena. Even those churchpeople who were sympathetic to Franco could not fully support the violent reaction of the authorities and, instead, would defend organizations and individuals who were "good Catholics" but did not share regime-supporting interpretations of their Catholicism. The more the regime attempted to suppress such threatening tendencies, the more it risked a collision with the church, which would result in the church's declaration of independence from the state. Nothing within the regime disturbed its claim of legitimacy more than the questioning of its monopoly of Catholicism and led to demands that a changing church should reaffirm earlier positions. At the same time, its claim to be a Catholic regime limited the capacity of authorities to repress Catholic dissidence, although it would ultimately do so. In the last years of the regime the government was fining priests for their sermons, jailing members of the clergy, and considering the expulsion of a bishop, thereby risking the excommunication of the government.

The situation of the Spanish Catholic church and the Franco regime in the postwar period has important implications for the analysis of religion and politics everywhere. Any regime that relies on a religious basis of legitimation—particularly of transnational religion—risks a crisis of legitimacy should the political ethic of the religion change, in other words, should emerging clerics, religious intellectuals, and ecclesiastic leaders question the interpretation that served the regime. The heteronomous character of religion with respect to the polity is always a latent challenge.

The national-Catholic project in Spain, in spite of its apparent success, encountered limits and resistance within the regime itself. It was impossible to delete the legacy of a liberal secular culture in the same way as an anticlerical and anti-Catholic culture. The writers and thinkers of half a century could not be ignored nor the important impact of European intellectual life erased. The memory of another culture, one that was different but was not intentionally opposed to a clerically dominated culture, was kept alive by Ortega y Gasset, Unamuno, Baroja, and other writers. Specific works could be censored or suppressed but they remained an essential part of the national culture. As Spain attempted to incorporate itself into the Western world, its borders became more permeable and those seeds of dissent flourished. New generations of Catholic intellectuals defended their national secular legacy against the more obscurantist tendencies in the church. The intellectual poverty and the lack of aesthetic sensibility and artistic creativity of Spanish Catholicism over decades, with honorable exceptions, generated the dissent of the intellectuals, which would later spread to the student movement.

Although the Falange and its organizations did not challenge the triumphant church of the fifties, they provided a cover for some of the critics of hegemonic clericalism. The convergence of some men coming from that sector within the regime with more liberal Catholics provoked a crisis in the late fifties. It was no accident that a new cohort of Catholic conservative intellectual members of the Opus Dei would direct their hostility against those tendencies by trying to present their own efforts abroad as a "liberal" attack against the legacy of fascism. However, since fascism as an ideological alternative was now dead, many among those people slowly moved toward a liberal or social-democratic democracy, opposing the regime. In the meantime, their students, attracted by Marxism, were moving toward more radical positions. The Opus Dei intellectuals, with the support of the state, attempted to recover their initiative, but their conservative message did not find a large audience. The Opus could not revive the by now exhausted national-Catholic project without the support of the hierarchy that was experiencing the impact of Vatican II and other changes in the universal church and had personal links with Catholics expelled from power.

THE CRISIS OF NATIONAL-CATHOLICISM

The crisis of the "reactionary" church was initiated by a new cohort of clerics and Catholic intellectuals, who were in contact with the more liberal Falangist intelligentsia and, through them, with the non-Catholic intellectual heritage. This group would directly, and more often indirectly, play a political role that was, paradoxically, a result of the post–civil war Catholic triumphalism.

The reaffirmation of the Catholic identity under persecution and the hope for a religious revival led some of that generation, after they had finished their secular studies, had lived through the war, and had established social relations outside the clerical world, to choose late vocations in the church. They reacted to the atmosphere of the seminary—its life-style and intellectual poverty, the authoritarianism of superiors, and their efforts to isolate seminarians from the world, even the Catholic world outside—with a new curiosity and openness to other religious interpretations and established new networks among themselves. Not everyone in this generation would completely reject national-Catholicism. Some stopped at their loyalty to the regime, and a few, threatened by later more radical innovators, turned back to earlier reactionary positions, but the seeds for pluralism and openness had been planted.

Spanish bishops at the time of Vatican II were basically conservatives but they were affected by it as much as other episcopacies. They were possibly even more eager than those from other countries to find out what other bishops were thinking. Perhaps their previous isolation and their desire to be with "the church," that is, with the majority consensus, contributed to their openness.[10]

The changed position first of the clergy and later of part of the hierarchy cannot be understood without reference to a profound social change that began in the late fifties and accelerated in the sixties. Because of the ways these changes were affecting the views of its members, the church was forced to recognize rather than ignore them. This was particularly true for those involved with the working class. The Catholic Action organizations of workers in Spain would experience the same evolution as those in France, generating conflict between the church and the regime when the hierarchy defended them, and within the church when it felt that it had lost its control. The lay Catholic working-class activists would later become the leaders of illegal trade unions and a new working-class movement.

In 1968 the church's response to the proposed trade union law aroused some tension. In the following years the problems would cumulate: those derived from the appointment of bishops, the Basque problem, sit-ins in the churches, the joint assembly of bishops and priests, the presence of bishops in the Franco Cortes, and so on. A declaration by the church in 1973 represented a decisive step in its thinking. As summarized by Cardinal Tarancón, it was a clear defense of the plurality of political options that could be derived from faith and commitment to justice, church participation in the transformation of the world as an integral part of the preaching of the gospel, mutual independence of the church and the political community, and the healthy cooperation of both in the common service to mankind. This was a new language.[11]

In Europe conflicts between church and state generally have been a result of policies of the state, liberal or Left anticlericalism, efforts of secularization, and "state paganism." In the late Franco regime there was no change in the position of the state initiating the conflict but a profound change in the church.

The motivation of that change was a religious *examen de conciencia*—an examination which, in view of the position of the church in the society and the ideology of national-Catholicism, had to lead to a critical analysis of the relation of the church with the society and the polity. The unrest among the clergy led the hierarchy to convene a joint consultative meeting of bishops and priests after preparatory assemblies in the dioceses.[12] The representatives were neither the radicals nor the ultraconservatives who had voluntarily isolated themselves. On September 13, 1971, this joint meeting of bishops and 169 priests representing the dioceses voted for a proposition:

> We humbly recognize and ask for pardon because we did not know [how] to be, at its [due] time; true ministers of reconciliation in the midst of our people, divided by a war among brothers.

The necessary two-thirds vote was not obtained and the resolution went back to the committee. The assembly generated a complex intrigue in the Vatican by Spanish churchmen, but the Pope publicly disauthorized maneuvers by conservative members of the *curia* and the regime. A few days later Cardinal Tarancón was elected Chairman of the Episcopal Commission. It is difficult to convey the hostility that the independent position of the church, led by Tarancón, generated among right wing radicals with the support of some clergymen, the sympathy of some bishops, and a tolerant government. After the funeral of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, who had been assasinated by ETA terrorists, the hostility culminated in threats and demonstrations under the slogan "Tarancón al paredón": Tarancón to the execution wall.

Under the leadership of Tarancón, with the support of the majority in the Episcopal Conference, the hierarchy was able to maintain its solidarity with fellow bishops who were now stepping beyond more pastoral concerns. It was a solidarity based ultimately on a commitment to the integrity and independence of the institution. But it was also this affirmation of independence which was so challenging to the regime and was the source of its disappointment and feelings of betrayal. Tarancón recalls that in a conversation with a cabinet member who argued about what was in the best interest of the church, he had to tell him: "Remember, Mr. Minister, that here the bishop is me. You should defend the interests of the state and let me state which should be the position of the church."

One of the paradoxes of the late years of the Franco regime is that the regime's opponents, many of whom had never had ties with the church or had stopped being practicing Catholics, needed and found support in the church. They wrote for publications sponsored or born in the religious realm, held their meetings in convents, and sponsored assemblies of strikers and sit-ins in churches. Funerals of victims of the struggle and repression became political events, and the church intervened on behalf of those being tried and sentenced by the government for insurrection. It was the longtime autonomy of the ecclesiastical realm and a commitment to the church that allowed the opposition to claim its political space, sometimes even the most radical.

It is important to emphasize that while the actions of individual priests were based on sincere moral convictions, the actions of their defenders, although they did not share their sentiments and were even less approving of their actions, were not moved by opportunism either, as the Francoites often said, but by a mixture of respect for the sincerity of those men and women, the insistence on the sacred status of the priests and even more of a bishop, the sanctity of ecclesiastic premises, and so on. It is ironic that a very "clerical" conception of the church was used to protect those who put traditional clericalism into question.

THE CHURCH IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY

The death of Franco (1975), the transition to a democracy (1975–1977), the new Constitution (1978), and the coming to power of the Socialists (1982) was not as traumatic to the church as the proclamation of the Republic in 1931, nor even a significant threat. Important changes in the church had taken place in the late years of the Franco regime, and for years its leadership had been preparing for the transition. The same was true for the opposition, particularly the Communist party, which wanted to avoid a confrontation with the church. The contrast with 1931 could not be greater.

A decisive factor was this time people in the church and Catholic organizations were involved in the opposition of the regime. In addition, the embittered reaction of the authorities had ended the church's identification with the government. The carefully planned private mass for Franco and the public homily of Cardinal Tarancón on the occasion of the proclamation of King Juan Carlos set the tone of the church toward the transition.

In refusing to encourage or support a Christian Democratic party, the Spanish Catholic church took a position that differentiates it from the Catholic church in other Western European countries and in Chile.[13] In 1976–1977, without the support of the church, the already fragmented Christian Democratic forces could not wage a successful organizational and electoral drive. With only 1.4 percent of the vote, their fate was sealed. These facts made it obvious that any further discussion about a "church party" would be irrelevant.

In the context of moderate democratic politics, the acceptable compromise on church-state relations in the Constitution, the absence of a communist menace, and the post-Vaticanum church, the lack of success of the Christian Democratic party gave the church the advantage of greater independence and the ability to take positions without appearing partisan, although perhaps at the cost of a more limited influence.

The drafting of a new constitution was a potential threat since it involved the separation of church and state and "mixed matters" like education, in which the stakes for the church were high. After some tensions, in which the actors were the parties and their representatives rather than the hierarchy or the public, the basic texts that were eventually chosen were acceptable to the church and were perhaps more favorable than could have been expected.[14]

Separation of church and state is one of the ideas that many associate with democracy. A number of democracies however have established churches or relations of cooperation between state and church, and others like Spain in 1931 have, invoking that principle, legislated profusely on religious matters and deprived religious organizations and their members of rights recognized to all citizens, like holding certain offices, engaging in teaching and commercial pursuits, and the right to property and compensation in case of expropriation. To say therefore that separation of church and state goes with democracy is an oversimplification, and to describe the pattern of relations in those terms without specifying it further is misleading.

The 1978 Spanish Constitution, like that of 1931, formally separates religion and the state, but the specific norms and above all the spirit with which this principle was introduced are fundamentally different. Nothing can convey that difference better than the texts themselves; for example, Article 6 of the 1978 Constitution reads:

> (1) Freedom of ideology, religion, and worship of individuals and communities is guaranteed with no more restrictions on their expression as may be necessary in order to maintain public order protected by law.
>
> (2) Nobody may be compelled to make declarations regarding his religion, beliefs, or ideologies.

> (3) There shall be no state religion. The public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish Society into account and shall maintain the consequent relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions.

The 1931 Constitution had simply stated in Article 5: "The Spanish State has no official religion," and it was in these terms that religious freedom was stated and *regulated* in Article 27:

> The freedom of conscience and the right to profess and practice freely any religion is guaranteed in the Spanish territory except for the respect due to the demands of public morals. Cemeteries shall be subject exclusively to civil jurisdiction. There cannot be in them separation of enclosures for religious reasons. All the confessions can exercise their cults privately. The public manifestations of cult shall be, in each case, authorized by the government. No one can be compelled to declare officially his religious beliefs. The religious condition will not constitute a modifying circumstance of civil and political personality, except in what is stated in this Constitution for the appointment of President of the Republic and to be President of the Council of Ministers.

The different conception of religion in 1978 is reflected in the recognition granted to the rights not only of individuals but "communities," in the mention of the religious belief of the society, in the injunction in favor of "cooperation" (in contrast to the individualistic and private rather than public character of religions in 1931), and in the inclusion in the article on religious freedom of 1931 of a public regulation and exclusion from the religious sphere of sacred areas like cemeteries.

In Catholicism, as in a number of other religions, in contrast to most Protestant churches and sects, religious orders are an essential part of the institution and their activities are central to its religious mission; therefore, any regulation affecting them touches religious freedom as defined by the church. The 1978 Constitution, in contrast to that of 1931, does not separately regulate the right to create or join religious orders, nor their property, nor their activities, and it is assumed that their rights fall under the general regulation of freedom of association and other freedoms.

Article 26 of the 1931 Constitution of the Republic had regulated the status of religious orders by stipulating that they were to be prohibited from engaging in industry, commerce, or teaching. The

Prime Minister Azaña was aware of the importance of the last prohibition when he said: "that will displease the liberals" and said that it was the obligation of republicans, of Spaniards, to prevent it at all costs, by closing his statement with: "Don't tell me that this is contrary to freedom because this is a question of public health."[15] In all Catholic countries and in many non-Catholic ones the freedom to teach and to establish, within certain limits, educational institutions has been one of the most controversial issues between churches and governments. On this point also the 1978 Constitution differs radically from that of 1931. The monopoly of *escuela pública única,* still maintained in the Socialist party program in 1976, was abandoned, and public support of educational centers was allowed under certain conditions, although this would continue to be the object of prolonged debate.

Today Spain is the model of a friendly or at least nonantagonistic separation of church and state, in a way that is similar to the Federal Republic of Germany. This has been the result of a break with the long tradition of church establishment and the legally privileged position of the church but also of a clear rejection of a laicist state that would want to push religion into the private realm and control its public manifestation and influence, for example, in education. It is normatively different from the American model of separation in the sense that it allows cooperation between the church and the state and recognizes the special position of Catholicism in Spanish society.

HOW TO CHARACTERIZE THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH IN CONTEMPORARY SPANISH SOCIETY

The Spanish Catholic church has successfully weathered the potential threats—feared for many years—of the change of an authoritarian regime it had been identified with to a democratic state. Moreover, the Catholic church claims, and to some extent its claim is valid, to have facilitated and even to have contributed to the change. The hierarchy and the mass of the faithful have accepted and supported the new regime and have not condoned attempts of involution. (This does not mean that some segments of the extreme Right have not continued to identify themselves with Catholicism.) The church as an institution and a large number of practicing Catholics have not completely rejected the past regime, but it is now merely a more or less favorable memory which becomes more faded with the passing of time. Few desire a return of national-Catholicism. While the church is obviously unhappy with constitutional provisions on church and state and laws like divorce and limited legalization of abortion, it has not made concerted efforts to question them and does not openly advocate their revision.

This development has been possible in part because of changes in the church after Vatican II but is also a result of changes in the secular and even areligious political forces. The church has not wanted to be associated with clericalism, intolerance, and rigidity, and the Left has not wanted to resurrect the specter of anticlericalism and religious persecution, both associated with the memory of the conflict in the thirties and the civil war. All parties have agreed on "never again." There have been some discordant voices in the broad consensus achieved by the Episcopal Conference, as well as shifts within that consensus, but those voices have not been able to disturb the relations of church and state, nor have they been able to polarize the clergy and the faithful.

The church is not apolitical, it never can be, but it is as nonpartisan as possible, and that is what most of the faithful and those who are nonpracticing and religiously indifferent expect from it. This nonpartisanship is both a weakness and a strength. It could be argued that caution in the transition and the internal heterogeneity and conflicts within the clergy were decisive in achieving the political neutrality of the church. But this neutral position has also resulted from a certain unwillingness of large segments of the faithful to follow the advice of the church in political matters. We now find a church that is outside main political controversies, although it is not silent on issues it considers central, when it hopes to influence the faithful rather than push itself into the political sphere. That withdrawal, which might not be permanent, has made the church less relevant to those who do not count among its faithful and has allowed them to be benevolently indifferent to it.[16]

One of the basic components of the present pattern of church and state relations in Spain is the fact that most debates are not formulated in ideological terms. Neither the church nor the state will make references to past conflicts and positions in order to strengthen their case, and, instead, will limit their debates to the constitutionality of specific norms and their compatibility with the spirit of the constitution, which reflects a consensus and is upheld by all as an ideal not to be abandoned. In using the constitution to resolve disagreements, the parties involved take their issues to the Tribunal Constitucional, which has managed to gain considerable respect and whose decisions have not been challenged. This tendency to "juridify" conflicts, however, makes them less meaningful to the average citizen and contributes to a certain depoliticization that characterizes Spanish democracy today, especially in contrast to the overheated political atmosphere of the thirties.

The need to show the relevance of religion to the modern world and to avoid the reduction of religion to the sphere of private morality has led the church to a more progressive stance on social and economic issues, the third world, and peace. These are areas which allow room for convergence with the Left but also for strong postures with little political cost.

One conclusion that might be drawn from the experience of the Spanish Catholic church in the twentieth century is that if a society changes profoundly—by evolution, rather than revolution—the church like other institutions is able to adapt and even participate in that change, especially if the change is social and cultural rather than political. That might explain why the Republic (1931–1936) did not generate change like that in the late years of the Franco regime and democracy, when political change and change within the church was a result of slow but massive changes in society. Secularization in the thirties required a militant secularizing authority undermining what it perceived as control by the church of the uneducated masses, the women, the peasantry, the lower middle class, and the elites through the confessional. The goal could only be achieved through anticlerical propaganda, by isolating the church, preventing it from educating the youth, and so on. In contrast, the secularization of Spain today is the result of social, economic, and cultural change rather than massive political upheaval.

ENDNOTES

[1] The long essay "Iglesia y Religión en la España contemporánea" by Victor Pérez Díaz in *El retorno de la sociedad civil* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1987), 411–66, is the most insightful analysis of the church in Spanish society. In many respects it could take the place of this essay. I have felt tempted to reproduce

his arguments almost verbatim since I am in substantial agreement with his excellent analysis.

[2] The best book on the Spanish church is Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

[3] On the conflict between the church and the Second Republic, see José M. Sánchez, *Reform and Reaction: The Politico Religious Background of the Spanish Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964). For the constitutional debate in 1931, see the excellent study by Víctor Manuel Arbeloa, *La semana trágica de la iglesia en España (1931)* (Barcelona: Galba, 1976). Incidentally, Arbeloa is a priest, now leader of the PSOE in Navarra and member of parliament. Miguel Larazony de la Rosa, et. al., eds., *Legislación Española: Leyes religiosas según los textos oficiales* (Madrid: J. M. Yagües, 1935).

[4] On the persecution of the church in the civil war, Antonio Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España 1936–1939* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1961). The persecution in the civil war cost the lives of 4,184 members of the secular clergy, including seminarians, 2,365 male members of religious orders, and 283 female members—a total of 6,832 religious persons. This means 13 percent of the priests and 23 percent of the members of the orders of the Spanish total, even though only part of the country was controlled by the revolutionaries. In some dioceses the proportion of regular clergy killed reached over 80 percent.

[5] Jesús Iribarren, ed., *Documentos colectivos del episcopado español 1870–1974* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1974); Ramón Comas, *Isidro Gomá, Francese Vidal i Barraquer: Dos visiones antagónicas de la Iglesia española de 1939* (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1977); Cardenal Isidro Gomá y Tomás, *Pastorales de la guerra de España* (Madrid: Rialp, 1955). For a history of the regime, see Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime, 1936–1976* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); and Javier Tusell, *La dictadura de Franco* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988).

[6] On the incorporation of Catholicism into Spanish fascism and its reservations toward "foreign movements of a similar type," see Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 203–6.

[7] Antonio Marquina Barrio, *La diplomacia vaticana y la España de Franco* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983).

[8] Javier Tusell, *Franco y los católicos: La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957* (Madrid: Alianza, 1984) is the best historical monograph on this crucial period based on published and private archival sources. Guy Hermet, *Les catholiques dans l'Espagne franquiste* 2 vols. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1980–1981) is the best and most documented monograph on the subject.

[9] Federico Sopeña, *Defensa de una generación* (Madrid: Taurus, 1978).

[10] Rock Caporale, *Vatican II: Last of the Councils* (Baltimore: Helicon, 1964).

[11] The best sources to understand the period 1971 to 1981, when Vicente Enrique Tarancón was president of the Episcopal Conference, is the book-length interview/dialogue: J. L. Martín Descalzo, *Tarancón, el cardenal del cambio* (Barce-

lona: Planeta, 1982); see also the collective work, *Al servicio de la Iglesia y del pueblo, Homenaje al Cardenal Tarancón en su 75 aniversario* (Madrid: Narcea, 1984), which includes an essay by him, "Perspectivas de la Iglesia en España" and a bibliography of his writings. A first volume of memoirs: Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, *Recuerdos de juventud* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1984) is a revealing document on the experience of the years before and up to the end of the civil war. His book *¿Examen de conciencia o "autocritica"?* (Madrid: Euroamérica, 1955) includes pastoral letters of 1955 and 1956 and is useful in understanding the development of his thought.

[12] *Asamblea Conjunta. Obispos-sacerdote: Historia de la Asamblea,* Edición preparada por el Secretario General del Clero (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Editorial Católica S. A., 1971).

[13] On the absence of a Christian Democratic party and the presence of Christian Democratic politicians see, Carlos Huneeus *La Unión de Centro Democrático y la transición a la democracia en España* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas-Siglo XXI de España, 1985). On the relation between religiosity, political attitudes, and electoral behavior in democratic Spain, see J. Linz, "Religion and Politics in Spain: From Conflict to Consensus above Cleavage," *Social Compas* 27 (2–3) (1980): 255–77; see also Richard Gunther, and J. Linz, "Religión y política," in J. Linz and José R. Montero, eds., *Crisis y cambio: Electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales, 1986), 201–56; this is based on a 1982 election survey.

[14] Richard Gunther and Roger Blough, "Religious Conflict and Consensus in Spain: A Tale of Two Constitutions," *World Affairs* 143 (Spring 1981); Jaime Pérez-Llantada y Gutiérrez, "La dialéctica 'Estado-Religión' ante el momento constitucional," in Tomás R. Fernández Rodríguez, ed., *Lecturas sobre la Constitución española* vol. 2 (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Facultad de Derecho, 1978), 129–62. On the church and state tensions on education, see Luis Gómez Llorente, *Alternativa socialista a la enseñanza,* Club Siglo XXI (Madrid: Unión Editorial, 1979); Documentos Colectivos del Episcopado Español sobre Formación Religiosa y Educación 1969–1980, Comisión Episcopal de Enseñanza y Catequesis; and Oscar Alzaga, *Por la libertad de enseñanza* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985).

[15] Manuel Azaña, *Obras completas: Una política en el poder y en la oposición* vol. 2 (Mexico: Oasis, 1966), 49–58.

[16] On the role of religion in the society in the eighties, Francisco Andrés Orizo, *España, entre la apatía y el cambio social: Una encuesta sobre el sistema europeo de valores: el caso español* (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1983), 145–96. For an excellent overview by a close collaborator of Tarancón, see José María Martín Patino, "La Iglesia en la sociedad española," in J. Linz, ed., *España, un presente para el futuro: La sociedad* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1984), 151–212. See also, Vicente E. y Tarancón and Marcelo González y Narciso Jubany, *Iglesia y política en la España de hoy,* with foreward and introduction by Olegario González de Cardedal (Salamanca, Ediciones Sígueme, 1980).

James A. Beckford

Politics and Religion in England and Wales

THE GREAT AGE OF RELIGIOUS CREATIVITY in England and Wales opened in the mid-sixteenth century and closed in the late eighteenth century. This period witnessed the origins of Anglicanism, Quakerism, Congregationalism, Presbyterianism, and Methodism in addition to numerous minor religious groups which failed to thrive. The religious "inventions" of the nineteenth century, such as the Brethren and the Salvation Army, were notably smaller in size, distribution, and social impact. But most of these major and minor innovations arose in social circumstances which made them politically controversial. The existence of established churches in England, Scotland, Ireland (until 1871), and Wales (until 1920) meant that all religious innovations were bound to create political ripples and, occasionally, serious disturbances of public order.

But the very plurality and diversity of religious groups prevented British politics from being dominated by a single, major confrontation between church and state, politics and religion, or church and church. The consolidation of the British state did not therefore cast politics into a mold which necessarily polarized or amalgamated religion and politics. Just as the British refused to subordinate labor unions to political parties, so they made subtle and flexible accommodations between political parties and religious interests when the age of mass politics began. The fact that all major religious groups drew members from a variety of social classes and cultural backgrounds also helped to prevent religion from becoming a political issue in itself.[1] The warp of social class was interwoven with the woof of religion, producing a mixed but resilient fabric.

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The overriding theme of religious history in England and Wales in the twentieth century has been compromise or accommodation within a limited range of options. All manner of pragmatic arrangements have arisen to cope with the tensions and contradictions between, for example, the "established" status of two churches with formal links to the state—the Church of England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland—and the fact that they do not actually command the allegiance of the majority of the population. Another tension exists between the de facto toleration of most forms of religious expression and the fact that there is no constitutional guarantee of the freedom of religion. Toleration and freedom are not the same thing. Yet another tension is currently growing between the deep-seated and widespread presumption that the United Kingdom is a Christian society and the fact that non-Christian minorities are the fastest growing segment of the population; for example, Muslims in the United Kingdom now greatly outnumber Methodists.

On the other hand, and in contrast to many of its European neighbors, the United Kingdom has relatively rarely experienced open social conflicts aligned with religious cleavages.[2] Certainly, the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics have cost many people their lives; discrimination against Catholics did not really subside until the Second World War; and the current fighting in Northern Ireland has at least the appearance of being a religious conflict. But the Reformation, Counter-Reformation, Commonwealth, Civil War, and Restoration of the monarchy produced much less violence than that which occurred in some other parts of Europe in the name of religion. Even the antiwitchcraft crazes which erupted periodically in Britain in the early modern period lacked the ideological intensity and sheer ferocity of the Continental Inquisition or of witch-hunting campaigns in other parts of western Europe.

By contrast with, for example, France or Spain, neither priestly rule nor anticlericalism has played a significant part in British religious history. Atheistic ideologies have also failed to make an impact beyond the boundaries of groups of marginal intellectuals and artisans.[3] Indeed, the accelerating rate of decline in participation in mainstream religion is not matched by a growth of interest in organized secularism or atheistic opinions. A polite indifference or apathy toward religious issues is much more widespread than is any form of antireligious sentiment.[4] But it is not easy to decide whether the relative lack of extremes is a direct consequence of the constitutional establishment of would-be national churches. The interweaving of religion and politics in the United Kingdom may not have given rise to any spectacular social upheavals or problems, but I shall argue below that the pragmatic compromises of the past are coming under increasing pressure from new developments in British society which primarily affect Anglicans and Muslims. These new developments may, in turn, lead to a fundamental rearrangement of the religion/politics nexus.

In order to simplify my analysis as much as possible, I shall exclude consideration of the Scottish and Northern Irish parts of the United Kingdom.[5] The religious history and structure of these regions generate too many complexities for such a brief paper. Several issues also complicate the task of analyzing the religion/politics nexus in England and Wales. First, the overwhelmingly higher profile of the Church of England in Parliament and in other parts of the public sphere means that this church is more involved in politics and will therefore receive greater attention than any other in what follows. Second, the fact that England and Wales have never had a major political party based primarily on religious allegiance or values makes it more difficult to ascertain the religious influences on political preferences and voting patterns in the United Kingdom than in countries with, for example, a Christian Democrat party.[6] Third, in a country which combines low levels of church participation with moderately high levels of customary and conventional religion,[7] it is more than commonly difficult to identify "religious people" and, by implication, religiously motivated action. This calls for a brief excursus on terminology.

There are many good reasons for thinking of religion and politics as overlapping and interrelated, rather than separate spheres of human activity.[8] The relationship between them has fluctuated across time and has shown enormous variations between cultures, but religion tends toward ideas, feelings, and actions concerned with the "felt whole" or the "ultimate significance of things," while politics tends toward ideas, feelings, and actions concerned with the distribution of material and honorific power. The two institutions are clearly interrelated, however, if not mutually necessary. I shall concentrate mainly on the recognizably religious or political *organizations* in England and Wales but, at the same time, I acknowledge that events and issues in public and private life may share both religious and political significance.

I shall analyze the political significance of developments in each of the four major components of mainstream religion in England and Wales—the Free Churches, Roman Catholicism, the Church of England, and Judaism—but incidental observations will be made about new religious movements—Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Caribbean churches.

A brief vignette of the religious situation in the United Kingdom is required before I begin the analysis.[9] Bearing in mind regional, class, and generational differences, about 76 percent of the nominally Christian adults believe in God, 57 percent in heaven, and 27 percent in hell. Only 23 percent attend church at least once a month, and membership of a church is confined to about 15 percent of adults. Mainstream churches show signs of decline in almost all respects, but a small amount of growth in members, clergy, and church buildings has taken place among African/West Indian, Orthodox, Baptist, Independent Evangelical, Pentecostal, and nontrinitarian sectarian movements in the 1980s. The number of people active in Jewish organizations, about 200,000 at present, continues to decline, but the size of most other non-Christian religious communities has been growing steadily since 1970. Roughly 250,000 Hindus, 1,000,000 Muslims, and 300,000 Sikhs are active members of their religious communities. The average rate of growth for these communities in the period from 1970 to 1987 was 31 percent.

POLITICS AND MAINSTREAM RELIGIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Free Churches

There is no clearer indication of the changes that have taken place in the relationship between religion and politics in England and Wales than the progressive decay of the close affinity which had linked the major nonestablished Protestant churches (the Free Churches) to the Liberal party in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The new century opened with an intensification of this affinity between the Free Churches (principally Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists) and the still powerful party of liberalism.

They shared a common constituency in the "respectable working class," the lower echelons of skilled craftsmen, tradesmen, shopkeepers, petty clerical workers, and functionaries in government service. The rapidly expanding numbers of people associated with these jobs in industrial towns, mining villages, and coastal settlements swelled the ranks of the Free Churches particularly in the Southwest, the counties bordering London, the Midlands, and the Northeast. There was also a large measure of agreement between these churches and the Liberal party on the desirability of planning for modest social change. Indeed, the foundations of what became the welfare state can be traced back in part to initiatives supported by this particular alliance.

But, it would be a mistake to read too much into the Liberal party-Free Church alignment.[10] Methodists, for example, have tended to be suspicious of involvement in party politics, preferring to translate political issues into the language of ethics. If their moral definition of political reality coincides with the program of a political party, Methodists are more likely to support the program. But their support remains conditional on the perceived moral integrity of the party's activists. David Martin has an even more extreme view of the matter: Methodism has lost its raison d'être because the secular world has already coopted some of its specific characteristics such as "the elevation of conscience and sincerity over rigour and of informality over formality."[11] Methodism has therefore lost even its moral leverage on politics, according to this view.

These affinities and points of agreement between the Free Churches and liberalism had crystallized over many years in the course of political struggles, on the one hand, against plans to give Church of England schools the benefit of state subsidies and, on the other, in favor of granting Home Rule to the southern section of Ireland. These two issues dominated domestic politics at the time and they can only be understood in the light of the Free Churches' numerical strength and political influence. The zenith of these churches' power occurred around 1906 when the children attending Free Church Sunday Schools outnumbered those in the Church of England's Sunday Schools by almost one million. And, although migration to towns and cities was eroding the population base for some sectors of rural Methodism, the Free Churches were continuing to attract more and more adult members and to build more and more churches at that time.

The fortunes of both liberalism and the Free Churches plummeted around the time of the First World War. This was partly because of the growing popularity of the Labour party among the swelling ranks of commercial, industrial, and clerical workers and partly a function of the Church of England's declining power and privilege. The buildup to the war, the mobilization of civilians on a mass scale, and the preparations for a welfare state all contributed to a clearer perception of the country as predominantly urban, industrial, and sharply divided along lines of social class. The horrors of the war did little to combat the sense that the old certainties and solidarities of church and chapel had been seriously undermined. The election of the first Labour government in 1924, albeit a very short-lived government, signaled the beginning of a new era in which the lingering affinities between liberalism and the Free Churches would have relatively little impact on politics or public life. Even the Protestant underpinnings of British socialism were unable to dictate many aspects of the Labour party's agenda, although some of the party's leaders and ideologues continued to acknowledge the ethical influence of, for example, Quakerism and Primitive Methodism.

The rate of decline among the Free Churches was uneven. The Congregationalists experienced the most rapid and continuous loss of members, but the rate of decline was less rapid for Methodists and Baptists. There are grounds for thinking that the weakening of the Liberal party, the strengthening of the welfare state after 1945, and the evangelical revival in the Church of England all combined to deprive the Free Churches of their distinctively radical place in both politics and religion. David Thompson's view is that "as the ecumenical movement has emphasized that which unites all Christians, the maintenance of a specifically Free Church ethos has often seemed of less importance than the maintenance of a Christian ethos."[12] Nevertheless, the Free Churches have remained important reservoirs of support for humanitarian social causes without attracting widespread public attention.

Roman Catholicism

The modern political history of the Roman Catholic church is almost a mirror image of that of the Free Churches in England and Wales insofar as the former began to exercise political influence at the moment when the latter's influence was declining. Catholics became a distinct and beleagured community following a long series of legislative acts and episodes of violence which effectively penalized continuing obedience to Rome in the mid-sixteenth century. The recusant community was virtually confined to the estates of wealthy families owning land in the Northwest and Northeast of England. Penal restraints against the practice of Catholicism were not removed until 1791, and the remaining civil penalties persisted until 1829. This experience of legal discrimination gave way to the more subtle sanctions of prejudice against the Catholic immigrants from Ireland who sought relief in the United Kingdom from starvation and destitution in the 1840s. The restoration of an official hierarchy in 1850 only reinforced the ghetto-like character of the two Catholic subcultures, the old aristocratic one and the new Irish one, and ensured that, as a result of their growing ultramontanism, Catholics in England and Wales remained largely marginal to mainstream politics outside of some industrial towns in Lancashire.

Yet, with the exception of the Irish Nationalist party, a few local councils in the Northwest, and some enclaves within larger organizations, Catholics did not form any important and separate associations of their own. There was never a Catholic "pillar," for example, in Britain to match the Catholic trade unions, universities, hospitals, insurance schemes, and political parties which have been such a prominent feature of the Netherlands, Belgium, and, to some extent, West Germany. Instead, Catholics in England and Wales tended to support, first, the Liberal party and, subsequently, the Labour party. The number of Catholic supporters of these parties has never been large enough, however, to warrant the application of the label "confessional" mobilization. The diversity of Catholics in terms of social class and culture has also been an obstacle to the crystallization of an exclusively Catholic party in England and Wales.

Catholic social teachings at the beginning of the twentieth century were critical of the emergent welfare state (despite Rerum Novarum), but the church made few official contributions to public debates on the topic. The question of Home Rule for Ireland and debates about state subsidies for parochial schools were the only significant exceptions to the pattern of Catholic estrangement from politics. But when most Irish Members of Parliament left the House of Commons following the settlement of 1921, Catholics were—and still remain—underrepresented there. The 1944 Education Act eventually reduced the perceived need for a separate Catholic political agenda. Meanwhile, debates about the Spanish civil war, rearmament, pacifism, appeasement, Hitler's treatment of Jews, and the invasion of Poland elicited very divided points of view from Catholics. The evidence indicates that, despite the high profile of such conservatives as Hilaire Belloc and the editor of *The Tablet,*[13] Catholic sympathies lay disproportionately with the Labour party, even when account is taken of their relatively low social class and immigrant status. On the other hand, the post-Vatican II willingness of Catholics in England and Wales to become active in political causes outside their own religious community has not produced a distinctively "Catholic vote," nor has it brought Catholics into any form of collective confrontation with the state (even on the sensitive issues of abortion and Northern Ireland).

The most protracted struggles took place in connection with the preparations for, and the implications of, the Education Act of 1944. When the state assumed responsibility for universal free education at the primary and secondary levels, the Catholic church responded with a massive campaign to finance, construct, and maintain its own separate (but subsidized) school system. The campaign was undoubtedly successful, but the drain on Catholic resources was debilitating, and evidence indicates that Catholic schools did not protect their students from the secularizing forces of the wider society.[14] The issue of parochial schools is, for all intents and purposes, a dead letter in England and Wales and shows no signs of erupting again as it has in France since 1981. Tensions between church and state in England and Wales have never centered on the laicization of education: only on questions about state financing of parochial schools and colleges. Moreover, the mobilization of Catholics against the 1967 Abortion Act and in favor of numerous subsequent attempts to amend it has so far failed to win majority support in Parliament.[15]

The slowing down of immigration from Catholic countries, the upward social mobility of Catholics, and the erosion of a distinctively Catholic subculture are further obstacles to the development of Catholicism into a specific focus for political loyalty in England and Wales. The conclusion of the most experienced sociological observer of the Roman Catholic church in the United Kingdom is that, "the

Catholic community on its own has relatively little in the way of political resources, that there is no single issue on which Catholics could achieve sufficient unanimity and substantial mobilisation in the 1980s, and that they have little more influence than any other interest group in pluralist Britain."[16] Nevertheless, the growing credibility of Catholic groups pursuing radically progressive politics in relation to, for example, the Third World, human rights, justice, and peace may herald a higher political profile for Catholic policies in the future.[17] But it does not signal a departure from the pattern of accommodation to the constitutional framework of British politics. In short, the Roman Catholic community has emerged from the relatively apolitical ghetto in which it sought shelter following the removal of legal disabilities in the mid-nineteenth century but without establishing a separate "pillar" of Catholic institutions. This is an example of the kind of "open Catholicism" which produced the alliance that leading Catholic laymen made in 1980 with Anglican bishops and Free Churchmen in the House of Lords to block the passage of a Conservative government bill to introduce charges for school transport.[18]

The Church of England

By comparison, and paradoxically, the established Church of England probably experiences greater tension with the state than does the Roman Catholic church in England and Wales. This is not a novel situation but is the continuation of a pattern which originated in the church-state relations imposed by Henry VIII and Elizabeth I.[19] For, apart from occasional periods of Puritan predominance in the seventeenth century, the established church and the British state have recognized that each is relatively autonomous in its own sphere of competence under the sovereign. In other words, the Church of England has never been a "state church" of the type that proliferated in the Lutheran spheres of influence; the Church of England is not a department of government. Nor has its position emulated the theocratic Calvinism of Geneva or Scotland. Instead, the church's erastianism gives it strictly limited constitutional powers but extensive capacity to symbolize and address the nation.[20] It therefore aims to represent the continuity of national identity, sometimes in conjunction with parts of the state apparatus such as Parliament, coronation and armistice ceremonies, the ancient universities, ecclesiastical courts, and historical buildings. Yet, the Church of England is not legally responsible to any government ministry and is responsible for its own finances.[21] The training of ordinands takes place in the church's own colleges, although the church also subsidizes the posts of some senior teachers of theology in universities. Its clergy, like those of some other churches, may be licensed to administer marriages and funerals, and its schools qualify for financial support from the state. Anglicanism also tends to be the "default value" of both the (theoretically) compulsory act of daily religious assembly and weekly religious instruction in schools and of the broadcasting philosophies of the state-owned BBC as well as of the commercial television networks.

In many respects, then, the Anglican church has inherited privileges, powers, and responsibilities which originated in medieval arrangements between the Roman Catholic church and the English crown. On the other hand, it has retained these benefits at the cost of accepting the sovereign as its titular head, Parliament's right to determine its basic teachings, forms of worship, and types of organization, and the prime minister's right to make the final selection of new bishops. Establishment is therefore a very mixed blessing[22] and it has probably survived by virtue of the obscurity of its constitutional basis no less than as a consequence of its apparent irrelevance to questions of real power in the United Kingdom nowadays. Indeed, the Church of England has usually managed to accommodate a very broad range of theological views, ritual styles, political preferences, and relations with its host society. As a result, the formal, constitutional position of the church may have little or no bearing on the everyday life of Anglicans or others.

The internal diversity of Anglicanism in social and doctrinal terms also means that it is hazardous to generalize about the precise implications of its established status. The fact is that the strictly legal parameters of establishment are probably not the most important determinants of the Church of England's capacity to wield political influence. The church is more likely to exercise political influence through the social channels which connect its leading members to the leaders of other powerful institutions of British society. There is an extensive, but slowly shrinking, overlap between the social circles from which Anglican bishops tend to be drawn and the social circles providing leaders of politics, business, the law, finance, the civil service, higher education, and the armed services.[23] Of course, these shared backgrounds may not actually produce identical outlooks, but the existence of so many shared interests and networks of kinship and communication at least puts Anglican bishops in a position of proximity to powerful decision makers. This gives them access to settings in which issues of national importance are discussed and decided. From a sociological point of view, it does not matter whether this amounts to a privilege or a burden, but the fact that the church's leaders are drawn so heavily from elite families, schools, and colleges does have a bearing on some of the informal implications of establishment.

Critics of establishment base one of their arguments on the fact that the Church of England has lost even the nominal adherence of large numbers of Britons. But it is doubtful whether the church could *ever* have counted the majority of lower-class inhabitants of either rural or urban parishes among its members in the early modern period. The growth of industrial cities in the nineteenth century only widened the discrepancy between the claim that the church represented the nation and the reality of declining and regionally varied rates of participation. A shortage of clergy, following the First World War, aggravated these problems of national representation which were further complicated by the church's cautious and contentious entry into ecumenical initiatives in the 1920s. But the abdication crisis of 1936 and the coronation of George VI in the following year showed that, for all its declining social base, the Church of England was still an important actor on the national stage and could still symbolize the nation in ritual performances. It refrained from uncritically endorsing the state's conduct of the Second World War, having apparently learned some painful lessons in 1914–1918, but the church nevertheless helped to orchestrate a strong sense of national unity in the face of adversity. Archbishop Temple was also active in preparations for the postwar reconstruction of the United Kingdom, including the welfare state.

Again, a postwar shortage and a maldistribution of clergy accentuated the Church of England's continuing failure to retain its nominal members. The rise to prominence of the evangelical party in the church, coupled with an emphasis in the 1960s on rationalizing its organizations and staffing arrangements, coincided with a drastic downturn in the numbers of Anglican baptisms, confirmations, marriages, and ordinations as well as with the failure of a muchheralded scheme for reunion with the Methodists. This was also the time at which it seemed that some influential members of the Anglican church were willing to relax claims to be the national church and were content to let it drift toward denominational or even sectarian status.[24]

These issues began to come to a head in the mid-1970s in the so-called Prayer Book controversy which pitted those (inside and outside the church) who wanted to preserve the seventeenth century liturgy against those who favored the introduction of new forms of liturgy employing modern language and symbolism.[25] The focus on liturgical reform actually concealed a deep cleavage within the Church of England between, on the one hand, the view that the church represented the whole nation and should therefore retain the cultural form in which the nation's ethnic and historical particularity was embodied, and, on the other, the view that the church could only exercise effective influence over the course of events by adapting its liturgy to modern cultural forms. This is not the place to discuss the controversy in detail, but the important point for present purposes is that it was one more expression of long-running disputes about the nature of the "national" church and about the appropriate form of its relationship with the increasingly diverse, dislocated, and mobile society of the United Kingdom.[26] The question of church-state relations is but one aspect of these wider disputes.

Four separate inquiries into the relations between the Church of England and the British state have been conducted in this century, but the most significant changes did not occur until the 1970s in response to the report, *Church and State* (1970), produced by the Archbishop's Commission chaired by Owen Chadwick. The report proposed that the church should no longer require parliamentary approval for matters concerning worship and doctrine and that new bishops should be elected by an electoral college of the church instead of being appointed by the prime minister. The General Synod and Parliament finally approved the Worship and Doctrine Measure in 1974, but there was strong opposition to the request that Parliament should authorize Synod to seek a replacement for the Prayer Book of 1662. This sparked off an energetic campaign to preserve the old liturgy and to resist the reduction of parliamentary control over matters of doctrine and worship. In effect, the relaxation of parliamentary control opened up the possibility that the church's historical and cultural significance for the nation as a whole might be jeopardized for the sake of a much narrower vision of the church as a purely voluntary, if not confessing, association. The fact that some politicians who had no personal commitment to the Anglican church eagerly combated the new arrangements only served to show that the underlying issues were as much sociological as theological.

The proposal for a new method of selecting bishops was less controversial but, again, it touched on some crucial aspects of the church-state relationship. This is why the Chadwick commission's proposal had to be modified. Given that the General Synod had expressed no strong desire to disestablish the Church of England, it remained necessary to preserve the crown's involvement in the appointment process. But, since the monarch can only act constitutionally on the advice of his or her ministers, it was agreed in 1976 among representatives of the major political parties and of the church that the prime minister would make a final choice from a list of three candidates submitted by a new body of the General Synod, the Crown Appointments Committee. This was a compromise which ensured that, in the future, all new bishops would have Synod's approval and that their appointment would still have ratification by the crown. The church's relative autonomy has thereby increased without seriously disrupting the pattern of church-state relations, but opponents of the new system have objected that it erodes the sense in which the Church of England can possibly represent the whole nation. Ironically, it was this new procedure which led to the appointment of the most controversial bishop of recent times, Dr. David Jenkins, to the see of Durham in 1984. His searing criticisms of the Conservative government's social and economic policies are no less controversial than his misgivings about some basic Anglican doctrines.

The tension between Parliament and the Church of England's General Synod rose again in 1982 when procedural irregularities occurred in the discussion of the Pastoral Reorganisation (Amendment) Measure in the Ecclesiastical Committee of both Houses of Parliament. The politicians accused the Synod's officers of cavalier attitudes toward Parliament and of underhand political maneuvers to ensure passage of the measure. A further dispute erupted in 1984 when some MPs objected to the way in which Synod had allegedly tried to abolish the ancient practice of obliging Cathedral chapters to formally "elect" a duly appointed bishop. Critics saw this as a further stage in the process of "creeping" disestablishment and in the abrogation of the church's national responsibilities. Another underlying complaint was that the relatively unrepresentative General Synod was increasingly displaying arrogance toward the much more representative and nationally elected body of MPs.[27]

In addition to the friction and tension apparent in the machinery of formal relations between the General Synod and Parliament, church-state relations are further complicated by political and ideological disputes. The complaint of many conservatives, for example, is that in the Church of England and some other churches, "the present identification of Christianity with western bourgeois liberalism seems an unnecessary consecration of a highly relative and unstable set of values. . . . To regard [liberalism] as the distillation of Christian wisdom, as the contemporary repository of a timeless faith, is, to say the least, a short term view."[28]

Special targets for conservative criticism include the Bishop of Liverpool's *Bias to the Poor,* Christian Socialism, ecumenism, skepticism toward capitalism and the "enterprise culture," and allegations about unfairness in the administration of British justice. The allegedly leftward-leaning leaders of the Church of England attract special criticism because their liberalism supposedly compromises their responsibility to preserve the national religious heritage without distinction of class or ideology. A truly national church, according to this view, must abandon the search for political theology and must, instead, confine itself to preaching the message of salvation. The church has no role, then, in formulating public policy—only in shaping the conscience of individuals. In Suzanne Berger's formulation of this view, "the decline of traditional religion, then, threatens liberal democracy by producing religious politics" and by adding yet more power to the centralized state. This is because "those individuals whose break with traditional religion is motivated by unsatisfied yearnings to realize transcendent aims on earth and to achieve a unity between religious beliefs and everyday life are the most likely recruits for totalitarian politics."[29] In other words, the Church of England's declining capacity to act as a consensual intermediary between whole communities and the British state supposedly creates a vacuum which might be filled by the advocates of a religiously inspired politics. But there is no evidence that this is actually happening among Christians in England and Wales. The situation among Muslims, as I shall suggest below, is different. It may develop along the lines indicated by Berger.

In the course of defending the idea of a national church against what they see as a conspiracy to tie its future to left-liberal ideology, conservative critics have been particularly hard hitting in their attacks on the Church of England's apparent advocacy of certain public policies in the area of nuclear warfare, inner-city problems, racism, and capitalism.[30] The links between church, nation, and culture seem to be the main anchor of the conservative argument. The link with the state is only a necessary condition for preserving these more important connections.

The principal opposing view, in its strongest Christian form, is that,

> In looking for an open church which has integrity, I find establishment tripping us into the pit of phoney openness. In looking for prophetic simplicity and political involvement, I find establishment plunging us into a middle region neither seriously prophetic nor political and imposing a model of Christian service which is inappropriate in a pluralist society. In looking for the union of our separate churches in one body, I find establishment checking our advance and tempting us to aim for a less ambitious goal.[31]

The political-moral counterpart to this view is that "as the crisis of our society deepens, the moral basis that must underpin all political judgments is becoming clearer and clearer, and the Church must be liberated from its subservience to the State."[32] The rhetoric of crisis, prophecy, and liberation is loud and clear, but there are few signs of practical attempts to mobilize Anglicans specifically for political purposes.

I have used the labels "conservative" and "liberal" to designate opposing attitudes toward the idea of establishment, and there is considerable congruence between these attitudes and broader theological outlooks. But it would be a mistake to identify the two sets of beliefs too closely with each other because theological conservatives and liberals hold the full range of opinions about the relative merits of establishment and disestablishment. In addition, there is an extensive middle ground which is occupied by many Anglicans who would probably accept for themselves the Archbishop of York's self-designation as a "conservative liberal,"[33] who, while recognizing the problems of establishment, finds it on balance preferable to any alternative. It is important to emphasize, therefore, that support for the link between the Church of England and the state-nation comes from very diverse, and partially incompatible, sources. This diversity may be one reason why church-state issues become contentious from time to time without ever achieving high priority on any political agenda. It seems unlikely that any single interest group will acquire sufficient homogeneity to launch an effective campaign for or against establishment in the foreseeable future.

Another consideration is that, in the British political system, the process of disestablishment would require a majority vote in Parliament and would probably have to be sponsored by one or more of the main political parties. Even if the Church of England decided to instigate the process, the matter would immediately become the preserve of party politics and would have an uncertain future. Indeed, the oscillation of power between the Conservative and Labour parties since the Second World War has tended to prevent Anglican or other interests from becoming tied to only one political party, in defiance of the old adage that the Church of England was the Tory party at prayer. Furthermore, the consolidation of the centrist Liberal Democratic party in the late 1980s did not produce a new alignment of religion and politics, although some commentators hinted at an implicit affinity between the new party and the Free Churches.

Judaism

Jews in Britain were, like Roman Catholics and Nonconformists, disqualified from political activity between the late eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries. The large numbers of Jewish immigrants who went to Britain from Eastern Europe in the period from 1881 to 1914 tended to side with political parties which promoted their immediate interests. An initial sympathy for the Liberal party eventually faded away as that party showed increasing support for Arab causes in the Middle East. The 1930s saw a steady transfer of loyalty to the Labour party, at least among working-class Jews, but, again, the growing sympathy of the British Left in the 1940s for Palestinian Arabs alienated many Jews. Despite the vagaries of international politics and allegations of anti-Semitism at local levels of the Conservative party, Jews progressively shifted their electoral loyalties toward this party in the 1960s and 1970s. But this was as much a function of their growing prosperity and upward social mobility as of their loss of ideological disposition toward socialism. Alderman has demonstrated that British Jews experienced disproportionately high rates of upward social mobility and of geographical mobility into prosperous suburbs in the postwar period.[34] Consequently, their affinities with conservative political opinion also increased. But this increase has actually been greater than the assimilative hypothesis would have predicted.

The voting patterns of British Jews reflect the changing fortunes of a largely immigrant ethnic minority representing less than 1 percent of the United Kingdom's population. In this respect, Jews are not politically distinctive. They *are* unusual, however, insofar as a disproportionately large number of Jews have held seats in Parliament since the 1960s. Yet, despite the fact that Jewish MPs currently constitute about 5 percent of the House of Commons, there is no clear evidence of a Jewish lobby at work except perhaps in respect to Middle Eastern affairs. In any case, with a ratio of roughly two Jewish Labour MPs to every one Jewish Conservative MP, it would be difficult for any such lobby to be effective in the strictly adversarial framework of British party politics. Moreover, there are nowadays very few domestic issues which concern Jews either exclusively or even predominantly.[35] Their opinions seem to be divided even on questions which formerly would have affected them directly. Many British Jews support, for example, legislation restricting the kind of immigration into the United Kingdom which had previously benefited them or their ancestors. In short, considerations of social class are at least as important as ethnic or religious factors in explaining the distinctive pattern of political conduct among British Jews.

CONCLUSIONS

Although relations between religion and politics have remained fairly placid in England and Wales throughout the twentieth century, there are signs that the pattern is beginning to disintegrate under pressure from political and economic forces. Eleven years of radical Tory government have polarized opinions on many topics and have forced a realignment of some time-honored arrangements. The previously taken-for-granted ease of relationships between government and the

Church of England or the BBC, for example, has been severely tested on several occasions. Similarly, leading clergy in several churches have protested against the government's alleged attacks on the welfare state. Members of the government have, in turn, been critical of the Archbishop of Canterbury's refusal to celebrate the end of hostilities in the Falklands/Malvinas as any kind of national triumph. Mrs. Thatcher consistently argued that religious organizations should concern themselves with the spiritual well-being of individuals—not with social, political, or economic matters.[36] Finally, some Christians have channeled their dissatisfactions with the alleged lack of a religious voice in British political life into a new pressure group, the Movement for Christian Democracy. The movement's founders aim to support all MPs and candidates for election who, regardless of political party, endorse its principles for social justice, respect for life, reconciliation, active compassion, wise stewardship, and the political empowerment of Christians.

Some interpret these tensions and frictions as indications of a widening rift between church and state. But others see in them only a reconfirmation of the need for a national church with a prophetic and critical function as a counterweight to the growing power of the centralized state apparatus. Both interpretations recognize that public religion has become more controversial in recent years and that a new kind of dissenting conscience is emerging in numerous places.[37] It is too early, at the time of writing, to know whether Mrs. Thatcher's resignation of the premiership in November 1990 will significantly change the situation. The self-presentation of her successor, John Major, is less confrontational, and he has no reputation for forthright views about religion or morality. The combination of a not notably religious prime minister and a new Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George Carey, is unlikely to herald any early intensification of church-state problems.

On the other hand, several other developments in British society point to the growing salience of religion as a controversial component of public life. The religious input has been considerable in disputes about, for example, abortion, nuclear weapons, human rights, inner-city deprivation, racial and ethnic problems, and, most recently, the law relating to blasphemy in the wake of demands for legal action against Salman Rushdie for allegedly defaming the Prophet Mohammed in his novel *The Satanic Verses.* The outcry against Rushdie fueled demands for an unprecedented degree of autonomy for British Muslims. In particular, the Islamic party of Great Britain was launched in 1990 at a time when various influential leaders of Islam were advocating the establishment of *shari'a* courts in the United Kingdom, the immunity of Muslims from some secular laws and regulations which were incompatible with the practice of Islam, and the granting of state subsidies to Muslim schools to match those currently available for Christian and Jewish schools.

These initiatives seem to be examples of what Suzanne Berger termed "religious politics," although it must be added that they have arisen less as a result of "the decline of traditional religion" and more as a consequence of the interweaving between religion and politics which is integral to Islam. This is also true of some of the ways in which groupings of Hindus and Sikhs in England and Wales have taken up political issues at both the local and the national level. Their concerns echo political controversies in India as well as issues peculiar to the United Kingdom. Berger's claim that religious politics are a threat to liberal democracy is nevertheless valid in its application to politico-religious extremism.

Of course, the Muslim population is far from unanimous in its attitudes toward these initiatives. Some Muslim newspapers and organizations such as the British Muslim Forum urge a moderate strategy, whereas the British Muslim Action Front, the UK Action Committee of Islamic Affairs, and the Muslim Institute represent a hard-line approach. The latter organization intends to create a parliamentary body for Muslims in the United Kingdom akin to the British Board of Jewish Deputies. Muslims are nevertheless numerous enough and sufficiently strong in cities such as Bradford and Leicester to force a reconsideration of the balance of political power. The Labour party runs the risk of losing the electoral support that it has come to expect from working-class Muslims since the 1970s. It is also conceivable that financial and organizational support from Muslim agencies in Iran and other Islamic countries will eventually strengthen the basis for Muslim separatism to such an extent that constitutional problems will arise in the United Kingdom.

Recurrent controversies about allegations of exploitation in new religious movements as well as discrimination against them,[38] censorship, and the ordination of women in the Church of England have also helped to keep religion in the public eye at a time when participation in formal religious activities continues to decline to levels lower than those of all Western European countries except Scandinavia.

The picture that emerges from the past decade is partly one of continuing decline in the capacity of Christian organizations in England and Wales to mobilize faithful members on a regular basis and partly one of increasingly frequent recourse to religion as a means of protesting against trends in government policies and popular culture. The breakdown of a religious consensus, or, at least, of a polite and limited pluralism seems to be opening the way for a more instrumental and aggressive use of religion as a vehicle for political and cultural agitation. This development is clearly not unconnected with the current redistribution of electoral loyalties in the United Kingdom and with the apparently low levels of confidence in the integrity of the political process. But this development is mainly confined to small, overlapping networks of activists; it is far from representing a revitalization of public religion. The great majority of adults in England and Wales have very tenuous connections with organized religion, but a small minority is energetically pursuing a variety of political goals through the medium of religion. Moreover, it is a minority of activist clergy and lay leaders who are leading the pursuit. The gap between politicized leaders and more conservative followers is apparently widening. This is a further sign that religion is gradually losing its anchorage in geographical communities or kinship networks and is increasingly taking the form of special interest groups and lobbies.[39]

ENDNOTES

[1] David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 32.

[2] For evidence of the declining influence of religious affiliation on voting behavior, see W. L. Miller and G. Raab, "The Religious Alignment at English Elections between 1918 and 1970," *Political Studies* 25 (2) (1977): 227–51. For contrasting evidence about Jewish voting patterns, see G. Alderman, "The Jewish Vote in Great Britain since 1945," *Studies in Public Policy* 72 (1980): 38.

[3] See C. Campbell, *Toward a Sociology of Irreligion* (London: Macmillan, 1971); and S. Budd, *Varieties of Unbelief* (London: Heinemann, 1977).

[4] See A. D. Gilbert, *The Making of Post-Christian Britain* (London: Longman, 1980).

[5] But see Bisset, "Kirk and Society in Modern Scotland," in P. Badham, ed., *Religion, State and Society in Modern Britain* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1989); and B. McSweeney, "The Religious Dimension of the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland," in P. Badham, ed., *Religion, State and Society in Modern Britain* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1989).

[6] See J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, "Religion and Voting: A Critical Review and a New Analysis," *Political Studies* 18 (2) (1970): 205–9. But according to J. H. Whyte, *Catholics in Western Democracies* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1981), 13, the Irish Nationalist party came close to functioning as a Catholic party in its heyday between 1885 and 1918.

[7] See M. Hornsby-Smith, R. M. Lee, and P. A. Reilly, "Common Religion and Customary Religion: A Critique and a Proposal," *Review of Religious Research* 26 (3) (1985): 244–52.

[8] See C. J. Bourg, "Politics and Religion," *Sociological Analysis* 41 (4) (1981): 297–316; and R. Pannikar, "Religion or Politics: the Western Dilemma," in P. H. Merkl and N. Smart, eds., *Religion and Politics in the Modern World* (New York: New York University Press).

[9] Useful sources of statistical information include R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and H. Horsley, *Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church Growth in the British Isles since 1700* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); P. Brierley, ed., *UK Christian Handbook 1989/90 Edition* (London: MARC Europe, 1988); and D. Gerard, "Religious Attitudes and Values," in M. Abrams et al., eds., *Values and Social Change in Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1985).

[10] B. S. Turner and M. Hill, "Methodism and the Pietist Definition of Politics: Historical Development and Contemporary Evidence," *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain* 8 (1975): 158–80.

[11] David Martin, "Church Denomination and Society," *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain* 5 (1972): 188.

[12] David Thompson, "The Free Churches in Modern Britain," in P. Badham, ed., *Religion, State and Society in Modern Britain* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1989).

[13] A. Hastings, "Some Reflections on the English Catholicism of the late 1930s," in A. Hastings, ed., *Bishops and Writers: Aspects of the Evolution of Modern English Catholicism* (Wheathampstead: Anthony Clarke, 1977).

[14] See J. Brothers, *Church and School: A Study of the Impact of Education on Religion* (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1964).

[15] See G. Moyser, "Voting on 'Moral' Issues in the House of Commons," *Papers in Religion and Politics* (University of Manchester, 1979).

[16] M. Hornsby-Smith, *Roman Catholics in England* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1977), 160.

[17] Delegates to the National Pastoral Congress in 1980 showed radical attitudes toward issues of peace and justice but traditionally conservative attitudes toward issues of family and personal morality. See M. Hornsby-Smith and E. Cordingley,

Catholic Elites: A Study of Delegates to the National Pastoral Congress, Occasional Paper no. 3 (Guildford: University of Surrey, 1983).

[18] A. Hastings, *A History of English Christianity, 1920–1985* (London: Collins, 1986), 594–95. Moreover, a Gallup Poll in 1980 found that 76 percent of practicing Roman Catholics in the United Kingdom very strongly favored the idea that the Queen should remain Supreme Governor of the Church of England.

[19] See P. Cornwell, *The Church and the Nation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); and P. Cornwell, "The Church of England and the State: Changing Constitutional Links in Historical Perspective," in G. Moyser, ed., *Church and Politics Today: The Role of the Church of England in Contemporary Politics* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1985).

[20] Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* of 1594 captured the essence of the church's relationship with the nation as follows: "There is not any man of the Church of England but the same is also a member of the commonwealth, nor any man a member of the commonwealth, which is not also of the Church of England." Book 8, chap. 1.2, quoted in Cornwell, "The Church of England," 42.

[21] But Anglican clergymen who were despatched to work in the colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries received payment from the state and were subject to the authority of colonial officials. Indeed, the growth of a worldwide Anglican communion of autonomous national churches has created special problems for church-state relations in the United Kingdom, but it would overburden this paper to consider these problems here. See Cornwell, "The Church of England," 48–51.

[22] See J. Habgood, *Church and Nation in a Secular Age* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1983).

[23] See D. H. J. Morgan, "The Social and Educational Background of Anglican Bishops," *British Journal of Sociology* 20 (3) (1969): 295–310; K. Thompson, "The Church of England Bishops as an Elite," in P. Stanworth and A. Giddens, eds., *Elites and Power in British Society* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1974); and K. Medhurst and G. Moyser, "From Princes to Pastors: The Changing Position of the Anglican Episcopate in English Society," *West European Politics* 5 (1982): 172–91.

[24] But see S. Sykes, *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (Oxford: Mowbray, 1978); D. Martin, "The Church of England: From Established Church to Secular Lobby," in D. Anderson, ed., *The Kindness that Kills: The Churches' Simplistic Responses to Complex Social Issues* (London: SPCK, 1984); and A. Aldridge, "Slaves to No Sect: The Anglican Clergy and Liturgical Change," *The Sociological Review* 34 (2) (1986): 357–80.

[25] See D. Martin and P. Mullen, eds., *No Alternative: The Prayer Book Controversy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981). An earlier controversy had occurred in 1927–1928 when Parliament refused to approve the church's proposal to revise the 1662 Prayer Book. Opposition to the proposal arose mainly from suspicions that the changes would dilute the Church of England's Protestant heritage.

[26] See D. Martin, "Revised Dogma and New Cult," *Dædalus* 111 (1) (Winter 1982): 53–71; and D. Martin, "The State, *Res Publica* and the Church of England," *Acts*

of the 17th International Conference for the Sociology of Religion (Lille: CISR, 1983).

[27] G. Moyser, "Patterns of Representation in the Elections to the General Synod in 1975," *Papers in Religion and Politics* 7 (University of Manchester, 1979) showed that the General Synod's members were drawn disproportionately from the upper middle class and that their political opinions tended to be considerably more liberal than those of other members of the church or, indeed, of their own social class.

[28] E. K. Norman, *Christianity and the World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 8.

[29] S. Berger, "Religious Transformation and the Future of Politics," in C. S. Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 111–12.

[30] D. Anderson, ed., *The Kindness that Kills* (London: SPCK, 1984); and D. Reeves, ed., *The Church and the State* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984).

[31] P. Cornwell, *The Church and the Nation,* 102–3.

[32] A. Benn, "A Case for the Disestablishment of the Church of England," in D. Reeves, ed., *The Church and the State,* 73.

[33] J. Habgood, *Confessions of a Conservative Liberal* (London: SPCK, 1988).

[34] G. Alderman.

[35] Things were, of course, very different in the late 1940s when the British mandate for Palestine was expiring. Jewish support in Britain for Zionism was crucial to the success of the movement for a sovereign state of Israel.

[36] Addressing the Church of Scotland's General Assembly in May 1988, for example, Mrs. Thatcher affirmed the belief that "Christianity is about spiritual redemption, not social reform." Her view had the backing of the majority of respondents to a Gallup Poll of Anglicans in 1985—58 percent of lay Anglicans were opposed to the church's active involvement in politics. But, by contrast, 86 percent of Anglican clergy claimed that their church should be actively involved in politics. *Sunday Telegraph,* 7 April 1985.

[37] W. Schwarz, *The New Dissenters: The Nonconformist Conscience in the Age of Thatcher* (London: Bedford Square Press, 1989).

[38] See J. A. Beckford, *Cult Controversies. The Societal Response to New Religious Movements* (London: Tavistock, 1985).

[39] See J. A. Beckford, *Religion and Advanced Industrial Society* (London: Unwin-Hyman, 1989), 166–72.

Lamin Sanneh

Religion and Politics: Third World Perspectives on a Comparative Religious Theme

THE MODERN NATIONAL STATE, WITH ITS relatively recent introduction to Africa, can be said in part to be the legacy of Machiavelli and Bodin. In *The Prince* (published in 1515) Machiavelli establishes an absolute executive sovereignty as the supreme form of the state whose purpose is unity and order. Bodin, in his *République* (published in 1577), creates a state with uncontested power over citizens and subjects and is itself free of the constraints of the laws it enacts. The roots of the modern Western secular state and the science of instrumental politics may be traced to these two authors and their historical contemporaries.[1]

Western political influence has not been confined to Western society but, as in Africa, has penetrated other societies. As Lord Hailey remarked in his monumental study of African conditions under colonial rule, "It is the singular fate of Africa that so many of its countries should be subject to the political control of one or other of the European Powers."[2] The existing state boundaries of Africa, for example, were created by Western colonial powers and inherited by the independent governments. These boundaries still provide the context of state jurisdiction in modern Africa.

Thus, we in Africa have become offshoots of the Western political heritage, even though our roots lie in a different soil. Because of the relatively recent nature of our assimilation and because we did not have the informed debate that should accompany the rise of national

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states, we feel constrained to take a fresh look at our inherited political institutions and ideas. It is a process of reappraisal in which Muslims, too, have eagerly joined.

I will discuss the religious aspect of the presence of the Western political heritage in Africa in three parts: the first, using some African examples, will examine the nature of the relationship between religion and politics, in particular, what religious interest there might be in political affairs and whether such interest is compatible with religious autonomy; the second will expound the Islamic formulation of the issue in terms of the rightful integration as well as proper separation of religion and politics; and, finally, the third will offer some reflections on the religious case for the inadequacy of the national state to serve as an absolute moral arbiter of human relations. The conclusion will be that the current ferment in religious circles in Africa, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, provides a useful context for reexamining standard Western suppositions on the principle of separation of church and state; we should therefore turn our critical eye back on the West and reassess what its successful expansion abroad has brought to other societies.[3]

A thread that will run throughout this discussion is that both national loyalty and religious loyalty appeal to and have their source in a commitment that is in the final analysis spiritual, so that an exclusive political definition of that commitment throws a gauntlet to any religious commitment. In response, religious people have sometimes employed "holy nationalism"[4] to strengthen their cause, creating a debate on the issue.[5] Such a debate has opened the state to moral scrutiny and therefore to a qualification of its absolute claims. In view of such complex issues, we may argue that religion, in its critical realism about human nature, has a role in political renewal and social advancement. This argument can be extended by taking due cognizance of developments in Muslim thought which shows a divergence from Western political practice.

ON ORIGIN AND TENSION

Any analysis of the impact of the secular state in Africa will result in two conclusions. One is the fact that national, linguistic, or ethnic identity does not coincide with the boundaries of the state. Similarly, the state as presently constituted is unable to cope with the resulting complex political, economic, and military order. This has encouraged the creation of coalitions, alliances, and pacts between and across nations, including membership in international organizations. The other is the role religion plays in contemporary life: there are often religious questions that go beyond national state jurisdiction, and given the persistence of religion as a force for change and identity, the modern national state often encounters religion in areas where it seeks popular endorsement.

The crux of the case being presented in this paper may be stated as follows: those who have followed Machiavelli and Bodin in arming the sovereignty of the state in full panoply have also dissolved the separation of church and state by awarding authority to the state in religious matters. At the same time, the state, by being so absolutized, challenges religion in its own sphere. By proceeding on one front it must, in fact, proceed on another, much in the manner of the traditional square dance: moving three or four steps to the right anticipates as many to the left. In one pattern of political "absolutization" we elicit a contrasting pattern of religious "relativization." In Africa such gyrations have characterized much of the scene. In addition, it is clear that the absolutized state incurs a double jeopardy: it cripples the instrumental function of authority and infects religious motivation with tactical rewards. Thus, the versatile state has stumbled on its own inflexible contradiction.

The conditions for the absolutization of political norms have their source in the theory of sovereignty. "Sovereignty," says Sir Ernest Barker, "is unlimited and illimitable."[6] As the definition of sovereignty expanded over time, it came to be applied to human relations in the notion of the liberator-state that may intervene to protect social groups from interfering with the principle of the free agency of their members. Marsiglio of Padua, a medieval writer who straddled the world of the middle ages and early modern Europe and as such was a precursor of Bodin, "asserted the primacy of law-making over all other expressions of state power; he insisted on the indivisibility of ultimate legislative authority."[7] Although it is clear that Marsiglio did not develop his ideas into a coherent theory of sovereignty, his emphasis on the formal right of the ruler to make laws provides support for the Machiavellian executive sovereign.

Two important elements may be said to persist in medieval writings about political authority, at least in writings about the medieval world in the advanced stages of its development.[8] One is the role assigned to reason and natural law, and the other is the concept of political obligation, especially how, if at all, dissent fits in with such an obligation. The ruler is assumed to be beholden to norms of reason and justice, but, in fact, the circularity of thought involved makes those norms attributes of the sovereign. What you give with the right hand you take with the left.

Given the benefit of hindsight, we may say the national state in its long and forceful expansion in Africa and elsewhere appears to have reached the limits of its development and that, henceforth, we are confronted with the task of defining its limits in terms of the new international order, human rights, social pluralism, and religious freedom—old questions, perhaps, but cast in a new light by unprecedented modern developments. It is, I think, to this phenomenon that much of the current religious ferment in the Third World is directed, with religion able to demonstrate, in however tentative or precarious a fashion, the limited nature of political sovereignty.

The secular, rational state thus conceived is not just the victim but a protagonist in the religious controversy concerning its will and purpose. By absolutizing itself the state claims not only the power to organize life and command the obedience of men and women but to be itself what H. Richard Niebuhr calls "the value-center," consecrating its operative dealings with the henotheist faith of national loyalty.[9] It is a short step from there to the next when the state becomes, in the words of ancient sacred monarchies, "the shadow of God on earth," followed by a third step when the state makes obligation a matter exclusively of its control.

Not merely content to restrain and arbitrate but also to prescribe faith of a moral kind and conformity of an absolute nature, the omnipotent state in Africa has opened for itself a wide channel of power. Ideological advocates of the state who had used their theories to combat religious dangers have now inherited in the omnipotent state far worse hazards, only now magistrates have substituted for mullahs and commissars for cardinals. With that change the state has attained a radical arbitrary posture for which a suitable motto might be, "if the state loses the confidence of the people, it shall dissolve the people and elect another." The idea of political stability is interchanged with the continuity of the state.

My basic contention here is not born of a facile romanticism for a stateless society and a Rousseauistic innocence, but rather of the conviction that the omnipotent state in Africa has been its own undoing, that it is riddled with fundamental contradictions. Such a state promotes a political metaphysic in place of religion. Dietrich Bonhoeffer used to complain that the modern world in which the church tries to minister has outgrown the metaphysical religious outlook of the Bible—"God as the working hypothesis" has been superseded in a "world come of age."[10] In fact, however, the religious metaphysic has been replaced with the political metaphysic with political messianism as the creed in which people place their trust. Thus, the otherwise natural convoy of religion and politics has been reduced to capture by the state, with citizenship its hostage.

In many countries in Africa, the capture of religion by the state was signaled by formal agreements. The Missionary Concordat of 1940 and the Statute of 1941, for example, created privileges for the Roman Catholic church in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. In 1955, after the Ethiopian Orthodox church was established, the emperor and the patriarch had thrones side by side in the Cathedral in Addis Ababa. Following dramatic political changes in these states in 1976 and 1977, their governments swiftly moved to abolish preferment and enact freedom of religion. Elsewhere in Africa it was a period of stormy relations as churches maneuvered for autonomy: in Ghana, there was the fateful confrontation of the churches with the regime of General Acheampong; in Uganda, the clash between the churches and General Idi Amin leading to the murder of Archbishop Janani Luwum in 1977; and in Liberia, the coup d'état in 1980 of the late President Doe, which installed a military government that chose to make an example of the pastor-politicians who had ruled Liberia from the very beginning of the republic.[11] Similar tensions have existed in Zaire, Nigeria, the Sudan, and in Zambia and Kenya. For example, in the tense atmosphere following the abortive coup attempt of August 1982, the churches in Kenya decided to respond to government attempts to introduce political indoctrination in schools. In September 1983 the churches published a document entitled, "Love, Peace, and Unity: A Christian View of Politics in Kenya," which stated that the churches should be true to their prophetic calling rather than merely do the state's bidding.

From all these complex situations we may draw the following observations. The call for political mobilization in Africa has made wide use of religious symbols, whether or not such symbols have received official sanction. This has led to a hybrid politico-religious culture, making familiar such phrases as "national redemption," "economic salvation," "political justification," "national regeneration," "seeking first the political kingdom," "sanctity of the state," "the supreme law of the state," and so forth. In a move calculated to muzzle the civil service, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana declared in 1962 that a civil servant "who sells information concerning his work is worse than a traitor and incurs an eternal curse upon his head."[12] The "eternal curse" was a code for political stigmatization, a fate carrying a serious threat. Such sentiments exploited religion for political ends. The state assumed metaphysical connotations with the single-party state becoming a monotheist secular absolute. Such a state was ideologically intolerant of pluralism, which excited all the bitter passion and iconoclastic fury monotheist crusaders reserve for polytheists, and brought the connection of religion and politics to the level of state monopoly. As a result, political life itself was transformed, with African leaders promoting themselves as anointed messianic champions. One of the most successful contemporary figures of political messianism is General Mobutu of Zaire, who refers to himself as "the Father and God of the nation."[13] An American journalist in Africa recently observed of Mobutu that the Zairean leader aims at being omnipotent and omnipresent. His face is everywhere:

> His photograph hangs in every office in his realm. His ministers wear gold pins with tiny photographs of Him on the lapels of their tailored pin-striped suits. He names streets, football stadiums, hospitals, and universities after himself.... He insists on being called "doctor" or "conqueror" or "teacher" or "the big elephant" or "the number-one peasant" or "the wise old man" or "the natural miracle" or "the most popular leader in the world." His every pronouncement is reported on the front page.... He bans all political parties except the one he controls. He rigs elections. He emasculates the courts. He cows the press. He stifles academia. He goes to church.[14]

The rhetoric of state power, however, is nearly in inverse proportion to the influence it exerts. In much of Africa political rhetoric has aroused feelings and expectations far in excess of realizable goals. People have responded with withdrawal, which leaders have alleged to be apathy resulting from colonial alienation. As messianic slogans have turned incandescent in the darkness, the bedazzled populations have also turned skeptical. Farmers, peasants, and workers in the mines and on the roads, rivers, and railways have bucked the system by holding back or falling to the highest bidder. Productivity has collapsed and with it state revenues. Parastatals have entered the scene and have combined economic incentives with political rewards to reverse the process, though the adopted measures have failed abysmally, with people seeing them as versions of state excess.

The assault of the state on its citizens has left people with a return to traditional values, however defined, as a last recourse. However, even there the state has pursued the people, arrogating the right to define those values and to appropriate them for itself. Hence Mobutu's call for "African authenticity," including the dropping of European names and the adopting of African ones. Socialist doctrine in other parts of the continent has been assortedly upholstered in colorful communitarian values and stiffened with oriental lessons,[15] mostly lean-to ideas jacked up by party activists. A spiritual reaction has followed in which church leaders, backed by the rank and file, have taken up the cudgels. In response, the state has pretended that political obligation is a matter of its exclusive control, a state of mind requiring surrender and submission. It is as a state of mind that the churches oppose the state bureaucracy.

As African and other political leaders have been quick to realize, religion and politics are intimately connected: they affect each other, draw on each other's insight, and make an identical appeal to trust and loyalty. Yet we appear to have inherited in Africa a Manichaean ideal, with the state as the embodiment of truth and goodness—a dichotomy that breeds political intolerance. It allows political leaders when it suits their interests to give religion an enclave, voluntary status, a secondary value vis-à-vis the primary truth-center of political action, although from the religious point of view "enclavement" may promote a liminal sense of superiority.[16] A notion has grown that politics impinge on religion in a superior way: that the state as the superior and ultimate representation of human reality will survive the demise of religion and, meanwhile, must actively work toward that end. The state has seized on its instrumental capability to press its right to limitless power. Consequently, in several well-known instances, religious people have responded with a counterchallenge, viewing the claims of political metaphysics as vestiges of genuine religious metaphysics. It is this religious case that receives eloquent treatment in the Islamic tradition.

THE ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FERMENT

Representative Muslim scholars treat the issue of religion and politics without the sanguine notion that the public and private domain require separate and exclusive understanding. The Muslim counter-argument, now the topic in media and print reports,[17] is symptomatic of the widespread disenchantment with the national state as a moral absolute. Early Muslim nationalists, however, had to run the gauntlet of orthodox suspicions that they were encouraging the usurping tendencies of the modern state. Thus it was that in the constitutional debates preceding the establishment of the state of Pakistan, Muhammad 'Alī Jinnah, a founding father of Pakistan and a leading voice in the Constituent Assembly, in 1947 declared support for a secular, nonreligious basis for the new nation, "You may belong to any religion or creed or caste—that has nothing to do with the business of the state . . . you will find," he added provocatively, "that in the course of time Hindus [will] cease to be Hindus and Muslims cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in a political sense as citizens of the State."[18] In a prophetic outburst against religious cavilling, Jinnah insisted that "Pakistan is not going to be a Theocratic State ruled by priests with a divine mission."[19]

Yet religious sentiment which legitimated the entire project of a separate state for Indian Muslims would only be inflamed by Jinnah's assertions. Speaking to the same issue on a different occasion, Sādiq al-Mahdī, a veteran of Sudanese politics and more than once its prime minister, implicitly answered Jinnah's contention: "The concepts of secularism, humanism, nationalism, materialism, and rationalism which are all based on partial truths, became deities in their own right; one-eyed superbeings. They are responsible for the present Euro-American spiritual crisis. The partial truths in all these powerful ideas can be satisfied by Islam."[20] As this and other statements clearly suggest, the great ferment in the Muslim world today is proof of the riveting appeal of religion and politics for ordinary people. As Kenneth Cragg writes in his classic work, "The renewed and effective politicization of Islam is the most important single fact of the new century."[21] This politicization is at the level of the rank-and-file faithful and includes an overscrupulous populist reaction to the perceived religious menace of Europe and North America, regions that are also now home to significant Muslim communities.

Classical Islamic sources deny any strict distinction between religion and politics. The caliph (*khalīfah*), the earthly sovereign, as the Prophet's successor, is one charged with the "power to bind and to loosen," and is, furthermore, commanded to restrain people from bloodshed and to ensure their welfare in this world and in the future life.[22] Following the demise of the caliphate, the reformulation of Muslim political thought shifted the weight of opinion to the maintenance of the *sharīʻah,* the religious code, as the prerequisite of a viable community life. In the modern world of national states this reformulation has been practiced at a grass-roots level where it has introduced an ideology of populist legitimacy. This would suggest a shift in favor of the civil community, with the state representing, rather than replacing, popular appeal. Unlike the caliphate, the *sharīʻah* is every believer's responsibility and comes within the terms of duties mandated not by the state but by the religious code. As a famous African Muslim reformer put it, "Most people are ignorant of the sharīʻah, and it is obligatory [therefore] that there should be, in every mosque and quarter in the town, a *faqīh* teaching the people their religion."[23]

In one sense Islam broke with the Aristotelian idea of "the good of the state [being] manifestly a greater and more perfect good" by making the "highest good" a religious one: a person's last end is happiness in God, and that is as much a pursuit as it is "the gift of God." Knowledge of existing things helps in practical pursuits of many kinds, but perfection in the ethical life defines the higher happiness (*saʻādah*).[24] The state itself is held to these norms. In another sense, however, Islam has extended the Aristotelian idea by positing the *ummah,* the religious community, as the indispensable foundation of human civilization. Aristotle's assertion, following Plato, that the human being is a "political being" (*zoon politikon*) is now expanded in the Muslim view that the human being is created for religious solidarity. Either way, whether it concerns the greater good of the state or the true end of human life, the religious foundation for the human enterprise is secured. In that sense Islam sidesteps the rigid separation of religion and politics.

Nevertheless, mainstream thought still supports at least a notional separation of religion and politics for eminent religious reasons. The classical Muslim scholar Sufyān Thaurī put it in epigrammatic form as follows: "The best of the rulers is he who keeps company with men of [religious] learning, and the worst of the learned men is he who keeps the society of the king."[25] We might gloss that aphorism thus: actions of political expedience must be qualified by moral norms, but moral norms must not be qualified by political expedience. Muslim scholars have argued, for example, that coercion is unworthy of religious integrity, basing themselves on a verse from the Qur'ān to the effect that "there is no compulsion in religion" (*lā ikrāha fi-l-dīn*).[26] Thus, a prescriptive religious state conflicts with that scriptural injunction and, at another level, with the high ethical purpose of human felicity. In such a state many people, undoubtedly, would choose to join or remain in the religious fold for very sound religious reasons, but others would do so for reasons that would be very bad from a religious point of view: from fear of reprisal, hope of gain, or the force of blackmail—motives fatal to the spiritual pursuit. Similarly, it would make it impossible to treat minorities and other nonconformists, religious or other, with anything but expedient cynicism. Repression would then become both the instrument and end of human conduct.

The question of equal treatment for non-Muslims in an Islamic state has had a long and detailed examination, although attempts to assure critics that classical Islamic resources offer full guarantees have not been entirely persuasive.[27] Privileges conferred on minority groups in a prescriptive religious state soon carry the stigma of exclusion, with statutory safeguards becoming nothing better than inquisitional staging posts—society's handy valve for disgorging unassimilated elements in times of crisis. This situation, therefore, forces us back to the great question of the dangers of interchanging religion and politics.

A Muslim writer who devoted considerable attention to this matter was Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1405/6). Writing in 1377, Ibn Khaldūn tried to summarize the views of his predecessors. He cautioned against the uncritical mixing of religion and worldly affairs lest we

> Patch our wordly affairs by tearing our religion to pieces.
> Thus, neither our religion lasts nor (the worldly affairs)
> we have been patching.[28]

For Ibn Khaldūn, religion is entangled at numerous levels with society, from having an established position at the center to being an uncoopted force. Religion may either be a social ornament or a ruling ideology.

THE STATE: SOURCE OR INSTRUMENT? CHRISTIAN RUMINATIONS

The august counsels of Muslims demand an analogous response from Christians and others concerning the state. The Islamic attitude indicates that the accepted principle of separation of church and state should come under close scrutiny.

In Western Christian thought, the interconnection of religion and politics goes back to the origins of the modern state. Sir Thomas More (d. 1535), in his work *Utopia*, responded to the challenges of the "new economics" by speaking to the moral issues raised by the changes. To do this, he turned to the Sermon on the Mount and suggested that the interests of the worldly kingdom are not disconnected from those of the heavenly kingdom, an insight he deepened by closely reading St. Augustine's *City of God.* More felt that God's claims on us should oblige us to establish a City of Man such that God would be pleased to dwell within it.

In his monumental work, *Of the Laws of the Ecclesiastical Polity,* Richard Hooker (d. 1600) made the first ambitious attempt to make the civil compact parallel to the religious community. In Hooker's scheme the state may safely be entrusted with the ecclesiastical polity, and he adduced reasons to that end. Hooker was a religious radical but a theological moderate. He accepted the rational law, or the light of reason/nature, as no less authoritative than divine injunction, but he rejected the antinomian strains of Puritan thought with its relentless anti-Catholic tendencies. Hooker would have nothing to do with the Barthianism of the Puritans, the theology which set a God of inscrutable will "over against" the "accursed nature of Man," as that dialectic creates a simultaneous extremism of the "right" and of the "left": ask of any institution whether it is of God, in which case you will fall down and worship it, or whether it is of man, then you attack and destroy it. Unlike the majority of Puritans, Hooker was not searching for the true church, and could never have prayed with John Donne, "Show me deare Christ, thy spouse."[29] His view of church and state is conditioned by his premise of Christianity, as Edward Gibbon would call it, as a "religion of the provinces",[30] that is to say, as a religion that assimilates into the characteristics of national cultures.[31] Such pluralism was important to Hooker's thesis that the church belongs equally to this world and the next, which enabled him to secure natural law alongside Scripture as a necessary juridical source. Furthermore, Hooker, unlike the extreme Puritans, acknowledged those who might otherwise be excluded from the "sound" part of the church as heretics, idolaters, and other wicked persons. Hooker believed that churches were "rather like diverse families than like divers [sic] servants of one family," so that no "one certain form" of polity need be common to them all.[32]

All ages have their shibboleths, powerful generalizations that exert their influence beneath the surface of thought. Our age is no exception. The principle of the separation of powers, formulated in vastly different historical contexts, has been rigidified into the implacable doctrine of instrumental science. In that extreme form the doctrine denies the connection between the moral and the expedient and between means and ends. Yet many scholars in the West are critical of such assumptions, and their views are echoed in practice throughout Africa, especially among Muslims.

In this regard, the words of the American philosopher William Ernest Hocking are apt. In his work, *The Coming World Civilization,* he points to the great shibboleth of our age. "We rely," he argues, "on the political community to do its part in the making of men, but first of all to furnish the conditions under which men can make themselves."[33] But he goes on to say that "the state, purely as secular, comes to be regarded as capable of civilizing the human being, and in doing so of remaking him, training his will, moralizing him."[34] Yet the political community is seriously handicapped in enabling human beings to mature fully as moral agents. We need another realm for that:

> Human nature has indeed another mirror, and therewith another source of self-training. It is often the religious community—let us call it

> in all its forms "the church"—which has promised to give the human individual the most complete view of his destiny and of himself. It projects that destiny beyond the range of human history. . . . It provides standards of self-judgment not alone in terms of behavior, as does the law, but also in terms of motive and principle—of the inner man which the state cannot reach.[35]

Hocking contends we are unwilling to see the state as a partial mirror of truth, being inclined instead to concur when the state

> regards itself as the more reliable interpreter of human nature—dealing as it does solely with verifiable experience—and as a sufficient interpreter. . . . Outside the Marxist orbit, the prevalent disposition of the secular state in recent years has been less to combat the church than to carry on a slow empirical demonstration of the state's full equivalence in picturing the attainable good life, and its superior pertinence to actual issues. As this demonstration gains force the expectation grows that it will be the church, not the state, that will wither away.[36]

William Esuman-Gwira Sekyi (1892–1956) of Ghana, also known as Kobina Sekyi, expressed the continuity between religion and political affairs. Writing in 1925, Sekyi quoted an Akan proverb as follows, *Oman si ho na posuban sim,* "The Company fence stands only so long as the state exists." He comments: "Now, our ancestors were above all things a religious people, with whom religion was no mere matter of form or weekly ceremony. Religion with our ancestors was interwoven with the whole fabric of their daily life; and therefore when the company system was established among them it was not without its religious concomitants."[37] Sekyi affirmed that religious loyalty was fundamental for state effectiveness without implying religion has only analogous value. Another wise saying of the Akan was, *Aban wo twuw n'dazi; wo nnsua no,* "Governments, too often heavily weighted with power, are to be pulled along the ground but not to be carried."[38] This suggests a need for a radical reappraisal of the church-state theme that goes beyond instrumental codes for public and personal conduct.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In new environments, transplanted phenomena tend to stand out and are prone to exaggeration, bringing to focus something of their essential character. The secular state in its expansion abroad has assumed this exaggeration and thus has revealed basic limitations in its nature. In the context of religion in Africa, in particular Islam, we find gaps in the operation of the national state, raising questions about its effectiveness. The proximity of religion and politics in practical situations modifies any rigid separation of the two, and, conversely, the instrumental nature of politics implies at least a notional distinction between them. Ideally, there are as sound religious grounds as there are pragmatic ones for not confusing religion and politics, though in practice it is risky to attempt splitting the two. Cross-cultural debates and reflections in Africa and among Muslims may help shed light on the relation of religion and politics and can deepen our general understanding of the phenomenon.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to Professor William Foltz of Yale for his helpful comments on a draft of this paper.

ENDNOTES

[1] For a summary of the views of Machiavelli and Bodin in the context of the modern national state see Sir Ernest Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 13ff.

[2] Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: Revised 1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 145.

[3] See Max Stackhouse, "Politics and Religion," *Encyclopaedia of Religion,* vol. 11, Mircea Eliade, ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 408–23.

[4] The phrase occurs in Conor Cruise O'Brien, *God Land: Reflections on Religion and Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

[5] Among others, says Ninian Smart, the Christian or Buddhist "will have a certain ultimate skepticism about patriotism." The reason is the nation state "has nothing truly transcendent," except, of course, a universal imperial urge. See Peter H. Merkl and Ninian Smart, eds., *Religion and Politics in the Modern World,* New York: New York University Press, 1985), 27.

[6] Barker, 60.

[7] Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas,* 2 vols. (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1974), vol. 1, 30.

[8] See Charles H. McIlwain, "Mediaeval Institutions in the Modern World," in Karl H. Dannenfeldt, ed., *The Renaissance: Medieval or Modern?* Series on *Problems in European Civilization* (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1959), 29–34.

[9] See H. Richard Niebuhr, *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).

[10] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison* (London: SCM, reprinted 1971), 381, 286, 326.

[11] See David M. Gitari, "The Church's Witness to the Living God: Seeking Just Political, Social, and Economic Structures in Contemporary Africa," *Transformation: An International Dialogue on Evangelical Social Ethics* 5 (2) (April/June 1988).

[12] Cited in Trevor Jones, *Ghana's First Republic: The Pursuit of the Political Kingdom* (London: Methuen, 1976), 52.

[13] Cited in *The New York Times,* 14 April 1990.

[14] See Blaine Harden, *Africa: Dispatches from a Fragile Continent* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); see also Thomas Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

[15] In imitation of China, the Malagassy President, Didier Ratsiraka, adopted what he called a "Red Book" (*Boky Mena*) program of state-directed policies in August 1975, marked by populist radical rhetoric. Its lynchpin was the notion of *fokonolona,* the traditional village community *soi-disant,* but now conceived in agrarian revolutionary terms as a "territorial collectivity." The rural economy, supplying 80 percent of the country's export earnings, was shattered as a consequence, with the disaster being blamed on "compradore bourgeoisie." Ratsiraka resorted to the tactics of the secret police to combat disaffection; the Catholic church, however, stood its ground. See Mervyn Brown, *Madagascar Rediscovered: From Early Times to Independence* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1979); see also "The Church and Christians in Madagascar Today," *Pro Mundi Vita Dossiers,* Africa Dossier 6 (July-August 1978).

[16] "United or opposed to each other," writes Peter Merkl, "virulent nationalism and religious myths have been major political factors in modern history." See Merkl and Smart, eds., 1.

[17] The late Ayātullāh Khumaynī of Iran, for instance, was quoted as saying that Muslims have been robbed of their heritage through the connivance of the West. Western agents, he charged, "have completely separated from politics. They have cut off its head and gave the rest to us." Cited in A. Rippin and Knappert, eds., *Textual Sources on Islam* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 191–92.

[18] Cited in E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Islam and the Modern National State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 212.

[19] Ibid.; see also Kenneth Cragg, *Counsels in Contemporary Islam* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965), 21ff.

[20] G. H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (London: Pan Books, 1979), 126–27; see also Cragg, *Counsels,* 115ff; and Rosenthal, *Islam,* 138, 206.

[21] Kenneth Cragg, *The Call of the Minaret,* rev. ed., (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985), 8; see also Cragg, *Counsel.*

[22] See E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 21–61.

[23] Isma'il A. B. Balogun, tr. and ed., *The Life and Works of 'Uthmān dan Fodio,* (Lagos: Islamic Publications Bureau, 1975), 74.

[24] Rosenthal, *Political Thought,* 13ff.

[25] Cited in Nizām al-Mulk, *The Book of Government for Kings* (*Siyāsāt nāma*) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), 63. This work was written in the late eleventh century.

[26] Qur'ān, ii:256.

[27] In the debates on the creation of an Islamic Constitution for Pakistan, a Congressman, B. K. Datta, observed in this connection that in such a state "minorities [have] an inferior status. The nation would remain communally divided into two houses, the minorities tasting neither democracy, nor freedom, nor equality, nor social justice, but being merely tolerated." See Rosenthal, *Islam,* 210.

[28] A verse attributed to Abū al-'Atāhiyah and cited by Ibn Khaldūn, *Al-Muqaddimah,* i, 427.

[29] Cited in C. S. Lewis, *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century,* in the *Oxford History of English Literature* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 454. For an abridged edition of Richard Hooker's work, see *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,* A. S. McGrade and Brian Vickers, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975).

[30] See Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 3 vols. (New York: Modern Library, N.D.), see especially chapters 14 and 15 of vol. 1.

[31] Mojola Agbebi, a leader in the African Church movement in Lagos, Nigeria, made some acute observations on how the successful assimilation of Christianity into English life and culture justifies a corresponding process in Nigeria. The authors of the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, he notes, supported the view that "every country should use such ceremonies as they shall think best to setting forth of God's honor and glory," and consequently deny that they "prescribe anything but to their own people only." See his inaugural sermon preached in 1902, and reproduced in J. Ayo Langley, ed., *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa: 1856–1970* (London: Rex Collings, 1979), 72–77.

[32] Lewis, *English Literature,* 455.

[33] William Ernest Hocking, *The Coming World Civilization* (New York: Harper, 1956).

[34] Ibid., 2.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., 3.

[37] Kabina Sekyi, *The Parting of the Ways*, rep. in J. Ayodele Langley, *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856–1970* (London: R. Collins, 1979), 251–52.

[38] Cited in F. L. Bartels, *The Roots of Ghana Methodism* (Accra: Methodist Book Depot; London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 241–42.

Gananath Obeyesekere

Buddhism and Conscience: An Exploratory Essay

THE BUDDHIST APPROPRIATION OF THE WESTERN CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

ONE OF THE FASCINATING PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY of modern Theravada Buddhism is the manner in which the Western scholarly definition of that religion has been appropriated, albeit with a variety of modifications, by the Buddhists of Sri Lanka. This form of Buddhism is nowadays the official view held by the government and voiced by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. I think that it is widely dispersed: it is the version that one hears among Buddhist scholars, including many monks; among the educated bourgeoisie; and perhaps among the generality of people in villages, whose opinions are molded by the schools and the mass media. In this paper I trace the intellectual genealogy that led to this development and then try to understand the consequence of this appropriation of the new Buddhism by ordinary people for the structuring of their "conscience." This is a vast topic; I will only attempt a preliminary sketch.

Since the modern scholarly investigation of Buddhism is a nineteenth-century phenomenon, let me begin my account with the final conquest of Sri Lanka by the British in 1815 and their rapid

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consolidation of imperial power. The traditional spokesmen for Buddhism, the monks, had not only to contend with the demoralization that set in with the disestablishment of Buddhism, but also had to deal with Protestant proselytization. The details of this confrontation and the Buddhist response are found in Malalgoda.[1] According to Malalgoda, the initial response of the Buddhist monks to Christian missionization was not unfriendly. Buddhist monks even gave Christian missionaries permission to preach in their temples and were surprised when this gesture was not reciprocated. The religion itself had no clear notion of heresy, and it had always accommodated alien deities into its fold. Thus, as far as Buddhists were concerned, the Christian god was like the Hindu gods they had appropriated. Many Buddhists had little sympathy for God the Father but had considerable feeling for Christ. Gogerly, the foremost Anglican Bishop, noted around 1850:

> Until Christianity assumed a decidedly opposing position, even the priests [monks] looked upon that religion with respect, and upon its founder with reverence. I have seen it stated in a controversial tract, written by a Buddhist priest of Matura not fifteen years since, that probably Christ in a former state of existence was a God residing in one of the six heavens (a position which they represented Gotama as having occupied immediately previous to his birth as Buddha); that animated by benevolence he desired and obtained a birth as a man, and taught truth so far as he was acquainted with it. That his benevolence, his general virtue, and the purity of his doctrine rendered him worthy of reverence and honor. If, therefore, the supremacy of Buddha and the absolute perfection of his system were conceded, they say nothing inconsistent in respecting both systems—Buddhism as the perfection of wisdom and virtue; Christianity as an approximation to it, though mingled with errors.[2]

Gogerly was right: it was the decidedly antagonistic posture of the missions that alienated Buddhists, and their spokesmen, the monks. What was striking and totally alien to the Buddhist tradition was the fact that simply being a Buddhist was for the missions something morally and spiritually wrong—a position that no Buddhist monk adopted toward Christianity.

To frame the issue somewhat differently, the missionary conscience not only required the conversion of nonbelievers, but they could justify, even sanctify, their iconoclastic and denigrating view of Buddhist belief and practice on the grounds of conscience.

The mobilization of Buddhists against the missions was begun by monks from all the fraternities. This began on several fronts. First, Buddhists started their own printing presses and tracts as a response to the missionary ones, generally from an organization begun in 1862 known as "The Society for the Propagation of Buddhism." This was one of the very first attempts by the Buddhists to take over organizational styles from Christianity—in this case, an imitation of the "Society for the Propagation of the Gospel." A second thrust was public debates between Buddhists and Christians, the most famous held in Panadura, a village south of Colombo in which, by Buddhist accounts, they trounced the Christian representatives.

These confrontations brought to the fore a powerful orator, Mohoṭṭivattē Gunānanda, who gave up the sedate style of Buddhist sermonizing and adopted instead the active, polemical, vituperative style of the missions. It was after 1862 with the establishment of the presses and especially in the debates between 1865 and 1873 that the Buddhists for the first time used the European views of Buddhism and atheistic critiques of Christianity in their attacks on the missions. Reginald Copleston, Bishop of Colombo, noted in 1879, that the secretary of "an obscure society" was corresponding with monks, "hailing them as brothers in the march of intellect" and praising them for their spirited antimissionary and anti-Christian challenges. "This nonsense had a good deal of effect, I think, on the common people, while the more educated, having really become free thinkers, welcome the extravagant encomiums passed on the true, original Buddhism by European writers. . . ."[3]

The "obscure society" that Bishop Copleston referred to was the Theosophical Society, whose secretary was Colonel Henry Steele Olcott. Olcott wanted to consolidate these early contacts with Buddhists and on May 17, 1880, he, with Madame Blavatsky and several other Theosophists, arrived in Sri Lanka for this purpose. Soon after his arrival he founded a local branch of the Theosophical Society but soon became aware of the larger role that Sri Lankan Buddhists expected of him. Olcott enthusiastically accepted this role as a Western champion of Buddhism against the Christian missions. Thus, wherever he went, he was given an enthusiastic welcome, which Olcott noted occasionally with some irony. "The Asiatics have certainly perfected the art of feeding the vanity of public men and their public men seem to like it."[4] Despite protestations to the contrary, Olcott did too.

As a Westerner and an anti-imperialist American who had fought in the war of independence, Olcott possessed enormous charisma which was reinforced by his discovery of his capacity to heal the paralyzed and the lame. He attributed these skills entirely to "animal magnetism" and "mesmerism" which for him was a latent capacity in every individual, but the thousands who crowded at his door no doubt thought otherwise.

One week after his arrival Olcott, along with Blavatsky, knelt before a Buddha statue and repeated the five precepts administered by a Buddhist monk. Thus, he was formally declared a Buddhist. Yet he makes an important qualifier in his diary:

> Speaking for her [Blavatsky] as well as for myself, I can say that if Buddhism contained a single dogma that we were compelled to accept, we would not have taken the *pansil* [precepts] nor remained Buddhists ten minutes. Our Buddhism was that of the Master-Adept Gautama Buddha, which was identically the Wisdom Religion of the Aryan Upanishads, and the soul of all ancient world-faiths. Our Buddhism was, in a word, a philosophy, not a creed.[5]

But Olcott was soon to find out that Buddhist monks were hardly interested in Theosophy, though the Theosophical (and consequently "scientific") interpretations of spiritual powers that *arahants* and other religious virtuosos possessed were accepted by them. This accounts for the virtual demise, shortly thereafter, of the Theosophical Society that he founded in Sri Lanka, whereas the *Buddhist* Theosophical Society (known as B.T.S.), which he also founded, profoundly influenced the shaping of modern Buddhism.

Olcott's presumption was that the Buddhist laity of Sri Lanka were ignorant of their own great religion. Also that they were addicted to a mass of non-Buddhist rituals and anti-Buddhist institutions like caste, to the extent that even monastic recruitment was often caste based. Tactfully, he avoided the whole issue of caste by ignoring it, but he was overtly critical of popular "superstition." His charisma was such that he could raise the consciousness of monks and laymen to their responsibilities in fighting the missions, resuscitating Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and attempting to promote interchange and ecumenical unity among the different forms of Buddhism in Asia. Though his work on ecumenical Buddhism had little immediate impact, it must be remembered that the now ubiquitous Buddhist flag was invented by him and ceremonially hoisted in Tokyo in 1885.

Olcott's influence on Sri Lankan Buddhism was both immediate and long lasting. He felt it a duty to provide Sri Lankan children with a good knowledge of their religion through Buddhist schools. To do this he started an educational fund and, with the help of Buddhist monks and laity, founded vernacular schools in village areas and English schools in the cities. By 1898 there were 103 B.T.S. schools in Sri Lanka, many of them modelled on mission schools and equal to the best of them, providing a modern English education to Buddhist children. These children were trained for administrative, professional, and mercantile positions under the colonial regime.[6] It is primarily through these schools that modern Buddhism (that is, the Western conception of Buddhism) diffused into the society and became the basic religious ideology of the educated Buddhist bourgeoisie.

A key event in the foundation of modern Buddhism is the publication of Olcott's *The Buddhist Catechism* in 1881. "Finding out the shocking ignorance of the Sinhalese about Buddhism," Olcott wrote in his diary, "I began after vainly getting some monk to do it, the compilation of a Buddhist Catechism on the lines of the similar elementary handbooks so effectively used among Christian sects. . . ."[7] To do this Olcott read ten thousand pages of Buddhist books from English and French sources, and on May 5, 1881, he finished his first draft which he showed to the scholar monk Sumangala and the orator Mohoṭṭivattē Gunānanda. The role of the monks was to effectively and uncompromisingly throw out overt or hidden elements of Theosophy so that the final version could receive their official imprimatur as being "Buddhist." The fact that no monk could be coopted into actually drafting the catechism surprised Olcott, but what he did not realize was that the distillation of the "essence" of Buddhist doctrine in the form of a catechism was to them a totally novel idea. Furthermore, many textual sources, sometimes texts attributed to the Buddha himself, imply that laymen were not qualified to understand the abstract and difficult doctrine.

But Olcott believed that the philosophical essence of Buddhism had to be taught in schools. He was unaware that the main vehicle for communicating the nature of this high religion to the doctrinally unmusical masses was the story and the parable. It is to the credit of the monks that they endorsed the *Catechism,* perhaps anticipating that with the development of an educated lay population, a more doctrinally informed view of Buddhism was both necessary and inevitable.

The *Catechism* contains much that is found in modern Buddhism, though it also excludes much. In so far as Olcott used French and English translations of texts and expositions of Buddhist doctrine, it was inevitable that the *Catechism* should be oriented to a Western intellectualist view of Buddhism. Olcott noted that the missions "taught that Buddhism was a dark superstition"[8] and that the few government schools that existed did not teach the religion at all. Consequently, he made a not unusual outsider's inference that "our Buddhist children had but small chance of coming to know anything at all of the real merits of their ancestral faith."[9] Olcott was ignorant of the fact that Sinhala children were traditionally educated into Buddhism in a variety of ways. Like many contemporary intellectuals he seemed to accept implicitly the missionary critique of Buddhism. Olcott speaks of *devales*, or shrines for the Hindu derived gods (*deva*s) adjacent to Buddhist temples, as an "excrescence on pure Buddhism, left by the Tamil sovereign of former days. . . ."[10] This condemnation of popular religion is carried over into the *Catechism*:

> *Q*: What was the Buddha's estimate of ceremonialism?
> *A*: From the beginning, he condemned the observance of ceremonies and other external practices, which only tend to increase our spiritual blindness and our clinging to mere lifeless forms.[11]

Again:

> *Q*: Are charms, incantations, the observance of lucky hours and devil dancing a part of Buddhism?
> A: They are positively repugnant to its fundamental principles. They are surviving relics of fetishism and pantheism and other foreign religions. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* the Buddha has categorically described these and other superstitions as Pagan, mean, and spurious.[12]
>
> *Q*: What striking contrasts are there between Buddhism and what may be properly called "religions"?

> *A*: Among others, these: It teaches the highest goodness without a creating God; a continuity of line without adhering to the superstitions and selfish doctrine of an eternal, metaphysical soul-substance that goes out of the body; a happiness without an objective heaven; a method of salvation without a vicarious Saviour; redemption by oneself as the Redeemer, and without rites, prayers, penances, priest or intercessory saints; and a *summum bonum*, that is, Nirvāṇa, attainable in this life and in this world by leading a pure, unselfish life of wisdom and of compassion to all beings.[13]

Olcott was a son of a Protestant minister and it shouldn't surprise us that he introduced a Protestant and "purified" form of Buddhism. He also used the words of the missionary lexicon—idolater, pagan, and so forth, a vocabulary further developed later by his disciple Dharmapāla to castigate the Christians themselves. He did not concern himself overly with public morality, but he must surely have noted the existence of polyandry and also occasional polygyny:

> *Q*: What does Buddhism teach about marriage?
>
> *A*: Absolute chastity being a condition of full spiritual development, is most highly commended; but a marriage to one wife and fidelity to her is recognized as a kind of chastity. Polygamy was censured by the Buddha as involving ignorance and promoting lust.[14]

The British had already forbidden polygamy, and Sri Lankans were just beginning to accept laws and morality pertaining to monogamy and divorce. But it is not likely that they would have forgotten that the Buddha's father (and perhaps Siddartha Gautama himself) practiced polygyny.

The systematic modernist aspect of the *Catechism* is a justification that the doctrine is not only perfectly compatible with "science" but also in some ways is vindicated by modern science. Early in the *Catechism* he asks:

> *Q*: Is that [karma theory] consistent or inconsistent with common sense and the teachings of modern science?
>
> *A*: Perfectly consistent: there can be no doubt about it.[15]

He then developed this theme in a whole section entitled *Buddhism and Science*.[16] Here he justifies Buddhism as a "scientific religion" and notes its support of education and science. Perhaps the most interesting part is where he justifies popular Buddhist ideas pertaining to "Buddha rays" and the power of *arahants* (renouncers). The former are "auras," their existence had been proven by scientific experiments of Baron Von Reichenbach; "Dr. Baraduc, of Paris, has, quite recently, photographed this light." These auras are therefore not miracles, but products of nature. If the Buddhas and *arahants* emanate these, this is due to their "superior development." The power of the Buddhist *arahant* to project his image outside himself is also similar and based on hypnosis. These and other accomplishments are not "miracles" but powers cultivated by the Buddhist meditator. This type of discourse is of course justified by Theosophy and it has gone into the Buddhism of educated people today. It produced in our time a line of empirical investigations into the verification of rebirth through hypnosis and into philosophical attempts to legitimize Buddhist thought as a kind of "empiricism" of the British variety. The whole thrust of Olcott's message exemplifies the turn to modern Western writing to justify Buddhism. This thrust produces some startling absurdities:

> *Q*: Where can be found a learned discussion of the word Nirvāṇa and a list of other names by which the old Pāli writers attempt to define it?
> *A*: In the famous *Dictionary of the Pāli Language*, by the late Mr. R. Childers is a complete list.[17]
>
> *Q*: In the whole text of the three Pitakas how many words are there?
> *A*: Dr. Rhys Davids estimates them at 1,752,800.[18]

The Buddhist Catechism was, in Olcott's own lifetime, translated into twenty-two languages and went into forty editions. The Sinhala translation was employed in Buddhist schools; it is used to this day. The modern Buddhist curriculum in practically all schools has been influenced, if not by the *Catechism*, at least by the larger tradition of Buddhist modernism that it initiated. Yet Olcott himself perhaps might not have had as powerful an effect on Sinhala-Buddhist thought but for the fact that he had a Sinhala disciple to continue his work and popularize it. This was the great Buddhist reformer, Anagārika Dharmapāla (1864–1933).

Dharmapāla was born into a wealthy Buddhist home as Don David Hevavitarana and educated at Christian mission schools (there being hardly any Buddhist schools at this time.) As a child, Dharmapāla heard some of the famous Buddhist debates. In his early teens he passed the temple of Mohoṭṭivattē Gunānanda on his way to school, and it was from Gunānanda that he learned of the Theosophists, even before their arrival in Sri Lanka.

He met them in 1880 when he was only sixteen, and, when they returned to Sri Lanka in 1884, he persuaded Olcott to initiate him into the Theosophical Society. Despite parental objections he went with Olcott and Madame Blavatsky to the Theosophist headquarters in Adyar, Madras. He wanted to study occultism, but Blavatsky persuaded him instead to study Buddhism and Pāli, the classical language of the scriptures. Returning the same year to Sri Lanka, he became manager of the B.T.S. and worked for it until 1890. Meanwhile he had changed his surname and his Western-style personal names and called himself Anagārika Dharmapāla. Dharmapāla means "defender of the Buddhist doctrine," and Anagārika means "homeless," the classical epithet for a monk. Dharmapāla used it, however, to denote an interstitial role to stand between monk and layman as traditionally conceived. He used it to mean a man without a home or family ties who nevertheless lived in the world, not in the isolation of a monastery. This permitted him to orient Buddhism into a kind of "this-worldly asceticism" appropriate to the generality of laymen. I have discussed Dharmapāla's social and ethical reform and his anticolonialist and antimissionary discourse in detail elsewhere.[19] For present purposes I shall limit my discussion to his continuation of the Buddhist takeover of Western ideas of Buddhism initially started by Olcott.

From 1889 to 1906 Dharmapāla travelled widely; first to Japan with Olcott; then to India, Burma, Thailand, Europe, and the United States where he represented Buddhism in the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. He became the founder of international Buddhism, both in the sense of making Buddhists in different Asian countries aware of each other and in starting propaganda for Buddhism in the West. From 1906 to 1915 (when he was exiled to Calcutta for his anti-British activities) Dharmapāla lived mainly in Sri Lanka and his Sinhala Buddhist nationalism intensified. In 1906 he started his own newspaper, *Simhala Bauddhayā* (The Sinhala Buddhist) and carried out polemics against the B.T.S., which he now wished to purge of Theosophy in name as well as in substance. Yet Amunugama has shown how deeply rooted and pervasive were the Theosophical influences in his thought. But more than Theosophy it was the Western intellectualist representation of Buddhism that Dharmapāla, following Olcott, popularized in his passionate polemic in both Sinhala and English. Unlike Olcott, Dharmapāla strongly influenced a stratum of Sinhala intelligentsia. It is as a consequence of this influence that the highly intellectualized view of Buddhism reached into large sectors of the society. I shall restrict myself by briefly describing the continuity of Olcott's heritage in Dharmapāla's writing.

A large part of Dharmapāla's corpus is entirely devoted to the popularization of doctrinal Buddhism. In fact, he calls himself an "interpreter of Buddhism to the present day world." If Olcott's catechism is designed for Buddhist children, Dharmapāla's distillation of Buddhism is for adults. Dharmapāla, like Olcott, castigated popular religious cults and the belief in gods and demons. "The gods are helpless to help the helpless" he said.

> The message of the Buddha that I have tried to bring to you is free from theology, priestcraft, rituals, ceremonies, dogmas, heavens, hells and other theological shibboleths. The Buddha taught to the civilized Aryan of India 25 centuries ago a scientific religion containing the highest individualistic altruistic ethics, a philosophy of life built on psychological mysticism and a cosmogony which is in harmony with geology, astronomy, radioactivity [sic] and relativity. . . .[20]

Dharmapāla's discussion of Buddhism coexists with a violent anti-Christian, antimissionary, and anticolonial polemic. He turned the missionary dialectics on its head: thus it is the Christians (and Hindus and Muslims) who are "superstitious," "idolatrous," "pagan" and given to crude doctrines that are contradicted by modern science. He wrote in both English and Sinhala and traveled and lectured extensively all over Sri Lanka, thereby reaching a wide audience. His English writings appeared in the *Journal of the Mahābodhi Society* and influenced leaders in other Buddhist nations. In his Sinhala writing he unhesitatingly condemned village monks for their apathy and failure to teach ordinary people the complexities of Buddhist doctrine. It is interesting to note that he barely dealt with the *jātakas*, or life stories of the Buddha. In the collection of his English writings, recently edited by A. Guruge, the *jātakas* are discussed in one page and mainly as a storehouse for ethnological and historical information—which is exactly the Western indological conception of the *jātaka* tales.

BUDDHISM AS A RELIGION OF THE HEART

In the preceding account I traced the intellectual genealogy that helped effect the transfer into Sri Lanka of the Western conception of Buddhism. Institutionally, this transfer was effected through the Buddhist schools; later, with the expansion of the bourgeoisie by the middle of this century, this form of Buddhism constituted the dominant religious ideology in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan appropriation of the Western conception of Buddhism was perhaps inevitable. Traditionally, Buddhism recognized a clear distinction between the highly literate monkhood and the ordinary laity involved in the world. I noted earlier that there are several places in the textual tradition that explicitly recognize that laymen cannot grasp the abstruse and abstract nature of the doctrine, and further, that the whole path of salvation through the discipline and technology of meditation was, for practical purposes, an exclusive preserve of the monks. With the development of an educated bourgeoisie the monk order as the sole repository of the religion no longer held. Thus, it became possible for laymen to know more about Buddhism and its history than monks did. Their interpretation of Buddhism was, however, based on the work of Western scholars. There was nothing alienating about this since, in the context of the loss of self-worth that colonialism brought in its wake, the Western discovery of Buddhism as a "rational religion" appealed to the plurality of Sinhala, enhancing their dignity and helping them to recognize their nation as the historic center of Theravada Buddhism. The charter for this sense of worth in the religion and the nation was provided by Anagārika Dharmapāla rather than by Olcott.

In this modern conception Buddhism is an atheistic and antimagical religion of reason, as it were. "Atheistic religion" is almost a contradiction in terms; yet there are many Buddhists who will say that Buddhism is not a religion at all but a philosophy. It is not that this version of Buddhism is not true; it is, like all half-truths, also half false. It eliminates ideas of faith, devotion, miracle, story telling, and parables that constitute a good part of the ongoing practical religious life. These elements are not simply excrescences that were superadded to a pristine Buddhism. They existed to some extent in the original doctrinal corpus and were then supplemented historically from other sources such as Hinduism and pre-Buddhist folk beliefs. In the doctrinal tradition itself, one notes the following elements of popular religiosity.

1. Though the Buddhist dialogues had an ironic Socratic quality, its founder was quite different from his Greek contemporary. Buddhist discourses clearly indicate that the Buddha himself was treated like other Indian *rishis* as a supernormal, if not supernatural, human being possessed of both wisdom and magical power. The myths of his birth gave special emphasis to these qualities, so that it is said that he was conceived outside of sexual intercourse and bodily impurity, that he was born from the right side of his mother without injury to her, and as soon as he was born he took seven steps over which lotus flowers bloomed. At his death his relics were enshrined in *stupa*s and venerated. When he was alive he was sometimes referred to as "a god among gods." He possessed supernormal powers that enabled him to converse with the *deva*s (gods) in heaven and tame demons that afflicted people on earth. While it is indeed true that the Buddha castigated the "beastly arts" (such as magic, auguries, astrology, medicine) there is plenty of evidence that he took a good part of the reality of the spirit world for granted, as he did of the realms of hells and heavens and other places of ethical punishment and reward.

2. Most important for present purposes is that the Buddha himself was worshipped soon after his death. At first we know that the Buddha was represented iconographically in the Bodhi tree or in his footprint; but soon he was represented iconically in images. Prayers and rituals of worship for the Buddha were also instituted and they are today an indispensable component of Buddhism as a religion of the heart. It is true that Buddhist prayers were not supplicatory or propitiatory; they praised the Buddha and commemorated him. This is inevitable in a religion that says that the Buddha has achieved Nirvāṇa and has no intercessory role in the affairs of the world.

But from this evidence it is wrong to infer that Buddhism was not a religion but a philosophy since not even Marx is propitiated in quite this manner. And it would be quite impossible to do this for Hegel. Thus, an important question for the history of religion: how was the

Buddha internalized in the mind and heart of the devotee; and if he did not resemble the powerful male god of the world's monotheisms, what kind of deity was he? In Buddhism as a religion rather than as a philosophy, the Buddha is the center of worship. The problem is to understand the nature of the faith he represents.

3. Not only is the Buddha the center of Buddhist faith, but he is, par excellence, the hero of its mythology. Every Buddhist temple has frescoes that depict the life and past births of this hero and sermons almost always deal with them. The best known are the *jātaka*s, over five hundred tales pertaining to the previous lives of the Buddha and the Buddha legend—his birth, life, death, and above all the enactment of the *pāramitā*s, exemplary deeds that the Buddha performed in past existences to ensure his final birth as the Buddha. These stories were the lifeblood of everyday Buddhism, yet they are almost never part of the scholarly discussion in the modern literature of Buddhism. The *jātaka*s are part of the canon; their almost total neglect in Buddhist studies is because they have been relegated as unimportant folk tales that have little to do with the profoundly philosophical corpus. These tales are full of gods, demons, and miracles, but, owing to their dismissal by scholars, even the indigenous intelligentsia have failed to "demythologize" them in order to recognize their profoundly symbolic, ethical, and parabolic significance. Let me illustrate this with a brief examination of a Buddhist story from an ancient Pāli (and Sinhala) compendium of stories illustrating the ethics of the *Dhammapada.*

> A householder, on the death of his father, had a hard time continuing his father's occupation and caring for his widowed mother. She urged him to marry so he would at least have help with the household chores. At first he refused but finally agreed. Unfortunately the wife proved to be barren; so the mother nagged him to get another wife. Again he refused. The barren wife felt that the husband would eventually yield to his mother's request and also felt a second wife of his mother's choice might undermine her position in the household. She therefore decided to pick a second wife for her husband herself and keep the woman as her subordinate. This she did but lest the second wife bear a child and thereby pose a threat, she pretended friendship and asked to be told when the second wife conceived.
>
> The woman did so and the barren wife secretly introduced dangerous medicines into the food she prepared for her cowife and this caused

> a miscarriage. She conceived again, and again the barren wife caused the fetus to be aborted. The cowife was now warned by the neighbors and took precautions not to tell her rival about her third pregnancy. But the barren wife found out and administered a poison during the labor. The child lodged horizontally in the womb as a result and both mother and child died during the labor. Before she died the cowife swore vengeance, to be born as an ogress and devour her enemy's children in a future birth.
>
> So in the next birth the cowife was born as a cat and the barren wife as a hen. When the hen laid her eggs, three times in succession the cat ate them up. The hen then vowed revenge and was born as a tigress while the cat was born as a deer. Three times the tigress ate the deer's offspring and so in turn the deer vowed revenge. Then the tigress was reborn as a daughter in a noble family in Savatthi. She married and bore a son. The deer was reborn as a demoness who, taking the guise of a friend, came and devoured the child. A second child was eaten in the same way. On the third pregnancy the woman fearing a repetition went to her parent's home to deliver the child. Meanwhile, the demoness was performing her duties in the demon world. The noblewoman had her child. However, as she was returning home, she happened to pass by the monastery where the Buddha resided and stopped to take a bath in the nearby pond. Just then the demoness who had completed her labors in the demon world saw the woman and child and pursued them. The woman picked up the child, rushed into the temple, fell at the feet of the Buddha and begged protection for her child that was about to be devoured by the demoness. The demoness, unable to enter the temple, was lurking outside. The Buddha invited her in. He preached a sermon to the ogress that expressed the ethics of the *Dhammapada.* "Hatred that burns on the fuel of justifications must be quenched with the water of compassion, not fed with the firewood of reasons and causes." He then asked the woman to give her child to the demoness to hold. The woman was terrified but the Buddha calmed her fears. The demoness hugged and caressed the child and began to weep. The Buddha then instructed the noblewoman to "take this demoness to your home and without fear keep her there. Give her the first serving of whatever you cook and look after her well."[21]

The story is a parable that explicitly embodies an ethical principle in the *Dhammapada* text: "Hatred is never appeased by hatred. Hatred is appeased by nonhatred. This is the eternal law."

This text is then a commentary on the deceptions and dissimulations that govern everyday life. The Buddha himself states that "hatred is fueled by justifications." The story upsets our conventional understandings of good and evil, and the distribution of rewards and punishments. By the time we reach the end of the story we have lost track of who committed the original act of violence. The opposition between good and evil, so important in Western thought, is blurred in this text. In fact, the good woman in the last episode is the evil cowife of the first. The point, however, is not to work out the who's who of the story but to recognize that hatred builds up its own momentum and the spiral can only be broken by a bold act of trust. This act of trust is initiated by the Buddha himself when he asks the terrified mother to give her child to the ogress to hold. When the ogress holds the child in her arms she weeps, releasing her own frustrated maternal love and complex guilt feelings. The new reconciliation based on trust is put into practical effect when the erstwhile enemies now have to live together under the same roof. The conclusion of the text (not summarized above) humorously shows how the demoness in spite of her new awareness, must suffer for her past karma. Ultimately, the demoness becomes a benevolent deity and the guardian of the village.[22]

4. The incorporation of gods and demons into the specific Buddhist scheme of things was already effected in the main body of the doctrinal tradition, that is, the *sutta*s, or discourses of the Buddha. This was done through the karma theory, as the story of the demoness illustrates. The Buddha himself on numerous occasions discusses how a person is reborn as a god, demon, or ghost (*preta*) owing to the working out of his karma. The theory of karma and rebirth then is a kind of mechanism that continually churns out gods and demons! Their karma-bound nature means that they are part of an ethically bound cosmic order, or *samsara.*

The preceding argument indicates that the relation between doctrinal tradition and the popular religious beliefs and practices of Sinhala villagers was not all that discontinuous. In general, missionaries, Western scholars of Buddhism and educated Sri Lankans seem to agree on one thing, namely, that the ordinary peasant propitiation of Hindu gods and demons in communal rituals was non-Buddhist or "animistic." Quite the contrary: in popular ritual and belief these beings are fully incorporated into the karma theory and their myths of origin, as in the *jātaka* tales, exemplify the operation of karma.

Peasant ritual dramas, on one level, are kinds of morality plays, with demons representing Buddhist notions of hate, illusion, desire, and attachment. The whole dramatic interplay between gods, demons, and the Buddha enacted in these rituals are a concretization of the abstract ethical values of the doctrinal religion. Gods like Skanda and Viṣṇu worshipped in these rituals are Hindu in a historic sense only: once they are incorporated into popular Buddhism they are transformed into Buddhist deities with their own myths of origin, and then are further converted into bodhisattvas through the operation of the karma theory. What modern Buddhism has done is to downgrade these rituals, if not to totally reject the reality of the existence of gods and demons. The rich ritual dramas of the peasant tradition have become moribund in most parts of the nation today.

MODERN BUDDHISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF CONSCIENCE

Let me now discuss a fundamental characteristic of Buddhism, be it in the doctrines or the popular tradition. Its founder, the Buddha, is no longer alive, he does not "exist" in any sense of the term; he has no say over man's life or history, unlike the Christian or even the Hindu deities Viṣṇu or Śiva. The world was not created by him in the first place, and its operation is for the most part due to karma. How is the Buddhist conscience constituted on the basis of a nonliving god?

The Christian case is virtually nonproblematic in this regard. God is the Father, and, as Freud clearly recognized, it is possible for the child who introjects the paternal values to further introject the value system represented by God the Father also. There is no inherent problem in socialization of the conscience.

In Buddhism the fact that the deity is no longer alive poses several problems in the socialization of the conscience. First, the emphasis must be on the past: the time when the Buddha was alive in the world. Thus, the many lives of the Buddha were recounted in stories often selectively chosen from an enormous repertoire. The stories dealt essentially with Buddhist ethics: primarily with the themes of nonviolence and nonretaliation for injury and compassion. The most popular stories dealt with the self-sacrifice of the Buddha in various past existences. In many of these stories the compassionate Buddha is born as an animal—a monkey, an elephant. The point of the tale is not only ethical; insofar as the animal is the Buddha himself it permits the listener to identify with a being outside the human community. This fits with Buddhist cosmological conceptions that life and the world—*samṣāra*—embrace every creature, and all are ethically or karmically involved. The tales break the barrier between self and other, such that empathetic communication is rendered possible. Nowadays it is hard to persuade a Buddhist child, educated in a modern school, that the Buddha was once literally born as a leader of a troupe of monkeys and that he sacrificed his life to save his herd. Yet it would not be hard to persuade him that this is a *parable* illustrating Buddhist notions of self-sacrifice and the profound Buddhist truth regarding the basic affinity between man and the rest of the sentient world. Traditional Buddhists would have accepted both the literal and the symbolic meaning of the tale; modern Buddhists could only be easily persuaded to accept the latter.

The role of ogresses and demons are similar: these terrifying beings are ultimately humans who have been reborn in that state through greed and hate, both forms of attachment (*tanha*), and they can also revert to human form and humane ethical living. The demon is both outside us and one of us, and also resides in us.

In these texts there is not only a critique of the futility of vengeance and retaliation, but there is no conception of intrinsic evil. In fact, many of these texts, like the story of the demoness related earlier, blur the distinction between good and evil. Demons and ogresses are eventually brought to the ethical viewpoint of Buddhism. Parallel with this is that the hero of the myths—the Buddha—never advocates any form of violence. It is impossible for the Buddha to say "vengeance is mine." This is left to the gods of the pantheon borrowed from Hinduism and popular religion.

As a consequence, the Buddha is totally idealized, a fully benevolent being. Though he is no longer alive, the myths recreate his presence, and insofar as these myths are related in childhood, they inculcate the Buddha's "presence" in the consciousness of the child. If the Christian god is isomorphic, on one level with the father, the Buddha is different. To use a Freudian term he represents the good parental imago, a composite of both the idealized father and mother. This isomorphism appears in Buddhist language games where one wishes a loving parent, irrespective of gender, to achieve future Buddhahood. However, language cannot always express the emotional attitude to the Buddha since, in everyday language use, he is a male and so perceived. Yet on another level, below consciousness, the Buddha has strong feminine and maternal characteristics. This is facilitated by the fact that in iconography the Buddhist robe had little explicit gender relevance; in fact, it is closer to the female attire. Further, the Buddha (and monks) are without passion, their heads shaved (symbolically castrated). The attitude to the Buddha is wholly nonerotic. He is, as the texts say, the embodiment of *karuṇā* (kindness empathy) and compassion (*maitri*). Erotic feelings as well as negative attitudes toward parents and significant others are projected on to gods, demons, and other supernatural beings in the pantheon. This aspect of the Buddhist belief was noted by Bishop Gogerly:

> In morals the Buddhists look on their own religion and that of the Christians as identical, so that without formal hypocrisy they fancy they can find themselves justified in making profession of both. The doctrine of Christ shedding his blood for the redemption of men is not in opposition to their previous habits of thought, for they are taught by their own books that if all the blood lost by Buddha himself in his different transmigrations for the benefit of sentient beings were collected, it would be more than the waters of the ocean.[23]

The Buddhist conscience, insofar as it contains a set of internalized norms, is not a punishing one, so that there is little in the literature that deals with a tormented religious conscience. It is impossible to have a Buddhist writer turn out anything like Hopkins's "terrible sonnets"; there is no Saint John of the Cross; no Saint Theresa with her "wild laments." I am not suggesting that people in Buddhist societies do not suffer the torment of the conscience, but it is rarely expressed in a Buddhist idiom. Contrast this with the Freudian notion of the conscience based as it is on Judeo-Christian conceptions of the deity. According to Freud the superego is essentially negative and "manifests itself essentially as a sense of guilt." Freud says that "it may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of the ego that it strives to be moral, and of the superego that it can be supermoral and then becomes as cruel as only the id can be." One wonders whether this isn't a reification of the mind of a hyperconscientious person socialized in Western culture! While the superego can be excessively harsh in some individuals who turn their aggression inward, even "ordinary normal morality has a harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality. It is from this indeed, that the conception arises of a higher being who deals punishment inexorable."[24]

In contrast with the "negativity" of the Freudian conscience is the "positivity" of the Buddhist one where the fundamental movement is compassion arising out of an empathy with a condition of "suffering." Thus, a Christian may give to a beggar out of guilt, a Buddhist out of "compassion." Such notions pertaining to the positivity of the conscience—compassion, kindness, and empathy *(karuṇā)* come from the internalization of the Buddha figure which in turn is made possible by the manner in which, through a long period of time, the religion has been converted into a religion of the heart. Its reconversion into a religion of the head meant, I believe, a slow but inevitable dismantling of the Buddhist conscience. I do not think one can fully grasp the terrible violence in contemporary Buddhist Sri Lanka without an understanding of the processes that led to this dismantling of the Buddhist conscience.[25]

The ethnic conflict between the Sinhala Buddhists and Tamil Hindus is a product of complex historical and socioeconomic forces that cannot be easily summarized or disaggregated into causes. It is, however, possible to describe the intellectual climate that made it possible for Sinhalas to see the total otherness of their Tamil neighbors and, one might add, for the Tamils to perceive the Sinhalas in similar fashion (owing to parallel historical conditions that I cannot discuss here). Thus, ordinary people might not participate in violence against the alien ethnic group; they can, and often do, *condone* that violence. Part of the perception of the other as alien and the inability to see the common humanity underlying the surface of cultural differences and physical signs between self and other that the great Buddhist doctrinal tradition enjoined can be seen as the heritage of Anagārika Dharmapāla.

We noted that Dharmapāla selectively stressed the intellectualist strand in nineteenth-century Western Indology by rejecting peasant religiosity and by reaffirming a Buddhist identity, treating Christians and non-Sinhalas as alien outsiders. He resurrected the myth of Duṭugämuṇu, a famous king of the second century B.C., who rescued the nation and Buddhism from the yoke of the Tamil rulers who had conquered the country. This myth has in our own times become the rallying cry for modern day nationalists, but it was Dharmapāla who first employed it in this sense: "Enter into the realms of our king Dutugemunu in spirit and try to identify yourself with the thoughts of that great king who rescued Buddhism and our nationalism from oblivion."[26]

Through his familiarity with Bengali intellectuals, Dharmapāla also used the term Aryan, not in its traditional meaning of "noble" but in its racist sense. It is Dharmapāla who identified non-Sinhala civilian populations for verbal attack: the Muslims, Borah merchants, and especially Tamils, whom he referred to as *hädi demalu* (filthy Tamils). The Tamil issue was just beginning to be a serious social and political problem owing to the introduction by the British of South Indian Tamil labor into the plantations and the creation in the central highlands of a new Tamil community hemmed in by Sinhala populations.

Dharmapāla himself never encouraged violence against minority ethnic groups, but he framed the ethnic issue in terms of a modern Buddhist nationalism and paved the way for the emergence of a specific modern Sinhala Buddhist national consciousness laying bare for many—especially for those who live in modern overcrowded cities—the dark underside of Buddhism without the mitigating humanism of the Buddhist conscience. Without that conscience and humanism, Buddhism must become a religion that has betrayed the heritage of its founder.

ENDNOTES

[1] Kitsiri Malalgoda, *Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

[2] Quoted in Malalgoda, 210.

[3] Ibid., 230.

[4] S. Karunaratne, *Olcott's Contribution to the Buddhist Renaissance* (abridged version of Olcott's diary, *Old Diary Leaves*), (Colombo: Ministry of Cultural Affairs, n.d.), 58.

[5] Ibid., 10.

[6] Malalgoda, 250.

[7] Karunaratne, 31.

[8] Ibid., 31.

[9] Ibid., 36.

[10] Ibid., 42.

[11] Henry Steele Olcott, *The Buddhist Catechism* (Colombo: Ministry of Cultural Affairs, n.d.), 4.

[12] Ibid., 41.

[13] Ibid., 41–42.

[14] Ibid., 47.

[15] Ibid., 29.

[16] Ibid., 76–87.

[17] Ibid., 27.

[18] Ibid., 36.

[19] See Gananath Obeyesekere, "Sinhalese-Buddhist identity in Ceylon," in George De Vos and Lola Ross, eds., *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change* (Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1975), 229–258; Gananath Obeyesekere, "Personal Identity and Cultural Crisis: the Case of Anagarika Dharmapala of Sri Lanka," in Frank Reynold and Donald Capps, eds., *The Biographical Process* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1976) 221–52; Heinz Bechert, *Buddhismus Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus,* vol. 1 (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner, 1966), vols. 2 and 3 (Weisbaden: 1967 and 1973); and Sarath Amunugama, "Anagarika Dharmapala and the Transformation of Sinhala Buddhist organization in a Colombo Setting" *Social Sciences Information* 24 (4) (1985): 697–730.

[20] Anagarika Dharmapala, *Return to Righteousness,* ed. Ananda Guruge (Colombo: Government Press, 1965), 27.

[21] For a detailed discussion of this text see Ranjini Obeyesekere and Gananath Obeyesekere, "The Tale of the Demoness Kālī: a Thirteenth Century Text on 'Evil,' " in *History of Religions* 29 (May 1990): 318–34.

[22] See the full text in *Jewels of the Doctrine: Stories from the Saddharmaratnāvaliya* translated by R. Obeyesekere, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 98–110.

[23] Quoted in Malalgoda, 210.

[24] Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id,* (1923), Standard edition, 49–54.

[25] In recent Sri Lankan history there have developed several popular movements as a reaction to the kind of intellectualized Buddhism discussed here as well as the Protestant redefinition of Buddhist mores. For an account of these movements, see R. F. Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, *Buddhism Transformed* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 11, 384–410.

[26] Anagārika Dharmapāla, *Return to Righteousness,* ed. A. Guruge (Colombo: Government Press, 1965), 510.

The processes of modernization are, therefore, unique in comparison with other historical movements of change, because they have been grounded on the assumption that it is possible to create a new sociopolitical order, an order based on premises of universalism and equality. The spread of these attitudes has led to far-reaching changes in societal structures and organization, especially in the economic and political spheres. Modernization has taken place throughout the world through a series of social, political, and cultural movements that, unlike movements of change and rebellion in many other historical situations, have tended to combine orientations of protest and those of center-formation and institution-building. It has fostered the establishment of a universal civilization in which different societies have served one another as mutual reference points. A society judges both itself and others in relation to these premises of universalism and equality.

The continuous spread of these assumptions throughout the world in a variety of guises—liberal, national, or socialist movements and ideologies—has greatly undermined the bases of legitimation found in historical or "traditional" civilizations. This does not mean, of course, that modern or modernizing societies are traditionless—that within them there is no attachment to customs and ways of the past or to various symbols of collective identity in which primordial elements combine with strong orientations to the past. It means, rather, that modernization has greatly weakened one specific aspect of traditionality—namely, the legitimation of social, political, and cultural orders in terms of some combination of "pastness," "sacredness," and their symbolic and structural derivatives. At the same time, however, modernization has given rise to the continuous reconstruction of other aspects of tradition, often as a response to problems created by the breakdown of traditional legitimation of sociopolitical and cultural orders.

S. N. Eisenstadt
From "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity
and Reconstruction of Tradition"
Dædalus, Winter 1973

Ever since English utilitarians or evangelicals and Indian reformers set out to modernize India, the problem of misunderstood tradition and miscarrying modernization has been with us. It may, therefore, not be out of place to take a point of view that may enable us to understand the meaning and function of tradition, not in order to oppose it once more to modernity but rather in order to arrive eventually at an integrated view.

To begin with we may view tradition as the way society formulates and deals with the basic problems of human existence. In other words, it is the way in which society comes to terms with the insoluble problem of life and death, including such life and death matters as food and water in a world of scarcity. In this respect, of course, it is not different from modernity. Since the fundamental problem is truly insoluble it has to be attacked, formulated, and dealt with each time anew under a different aspect. Tradition is, therefore, and has to be bound up with the ever-shifting present. Hence the irritating flexibility and fluidity of tradition.

J. C. Heesterman
From "India and the Inner Conflict of Tradition"
Dædalus, Winter 1973

If Weber was right, then competitive capitalism finds its natural seed bed among people of cautious puritanical disposition who are savers rather than spenders, who prefer investment to conspicuous consumption, and who have confidence that they are the elect of God. But the practical (as distinct from scriptural) ethic of Theravada Buddhism is very much the converse of this. Each man is for himself alone, and there are no elect; an endless prospect of future lives of suffering is the common prospect of all. The standard pattern is to lead a wild gay life while you are young and become a sainted patriarch (*upásaka*) when you are old. Youth is a time of gambling and reckless speculation; maturity is a period of piety accompanied by the performance of works of merit. One approved form of merit earning is to expend accumulated resources on spectacular public works, including temples, bridges, and irrigation channels. Building a factory for the benefit of your personal descendants quite definitely does *not* fall into the category of works of merit.

Edmund Leach
"Buddhism in the Post-Colonial Political
Order in Burma and Ceylon"
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