DÆDALUS

A NEW EUROPE?
for the old

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A New Europe for the Old?

Summer 1997

Contents

For modern homogenizers, whether in the service of capital or social revolution, Eastern Europe has always been a challenging mixture of lands and peoples rudely huddled together, but resistant to amalgamation and assimilation. The demise of the Leninist project has demonstrated to what extent Eastern Europe remains a region of cultural and national diversity. Everything about the area continues to be disputed, even the name. Is it East Central Europe, as the precise scholars will have it? Could it instead be a part of some larger Mitteleuropa, which is said to include the two Germanies and Austria, but not the predominantly Eastern Orthodox countries? Is it simply Eastern Europe, an area that is occasionally drawn out to include the western rim of the Soviet Union, and perhaps the whole of European Russia? Or is *Eastern Europe* just a synonym for Soviet satellites, a category into which Yugoslavia and Albania do not fit, despite their systemic similarities with Soviet socialism?

Matters are not improved when we take up each one of the region's ancient lands. Is Poland more complete with Silesia than with its lost Eastern territories? Does Czechism define Bohemia-Moravia? How Hungarian is Trianon Hungary? What is Serbia in a territorial sense—the Rascian-Macedonian lands of Stefan Uroš II Milutin (reign, 1282–1321), or the Danubian domains of Stefan Lazarević (reign, 1402–1427)? What are the implications of Bessarabia's Moldavian heritage? Where are the bounds of the Italian area? Does Yugoslav history begin in 1918, or is 1918 its culmination?—The questions are always historical and territorial, but their importance is in the troubled relations among national groups, between Slavs and non-Slavs, Magyars and Romanians, and, no less, among the various Slavic nationalities, between Poles and Russians, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Bulgars.

Ivo Banac

In the world of today, participation is legitimated by the idea of nation—nation-states—even when a given empirical case realizes the classic nation-state form only imperfectly. Yet scholars and others have begun to suspect that the modern state form is, if not dying out, undergoing a major reconfiguration. The international weapons trade has made a mockery of the state's supposed monopoly on the means of violence. Capital's extraordinary mobility means that as it moves from areas of higher to areas of lower taxation, many states lose some of their revenue and industrial base, and this constrains their ability to attract capital or shape its flow. Capital flight can now discipline all nation-state governments. The increased flow of capital—and of populations, in its wake, producing the much commented phenomenon of transnationalism—calls into question in an unprecedented way all those arbitrary, taken-for-granted nation-state boundaries. The result is both real-world changes in those boundaries—as with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, not to mention the threatened secession of Quebec from Canada, of the Celtic Fringe from Great Britain, and so forth—and also frenzies of national relegitimation, both where the boundaries are in question and elsewhere as well. On this reading, the turmoil in former Yugoslavia merely sets in bold relief what it means to create a nation-state, with all the most violent forms of homogenizing and purification and the forcible imposition and legitimation of boundaries.

Katherine Verdery

From "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?"
Dædalus 122 (3) (Summer 1993)

When in the nineteenth century historians produced their histories, they were usually concerned with developments which were only vaguely known and surrounded by myth. One of the great tasks and achievements of nineteenth-century historical scholarship was to establish the main features of the history of European nations from the ancient world to the eighteenth century and to place the story of their development on a sound and reliable foundation. This basic work has not yet been done for large parts of the non-European or non-Western world. Historians dealing with these areas of history might still produce lengthy narratives with appeal to the general public. It should also be mentioned that the historical presentation of recent events, especially if the scholar's own country is involved, will aim at basic factual clarifications of interest to the wider public. Finally, it seems unlikely that the educated public will lose interest in reading history. General histories will continue to be written and they might even become more important because, at least in the United States, the old style textbook is losing ground as its readership demands a more sophisticated approach. There is no reason why this work should not be undertaken by experts, by historical scholars. Although such works might present a topic of history in the light of recent scholarship, they will not be the place, however, where historical discoveries are first presented to the public, or where historical theses are advanced and defended.

Felix Gilbert

From "Post Scriptum"
Dædalus 100 (2) (Spring 1971)

Most advocates and opponents of unification erred, however, in the same way: instead of contrasting national and liberal options, they should have taken heed of the close interconnection. Unity was supposed to provide the means to achieve a better world, both at the micro- and the macrolevels: liberalism, economic and political, was to be extended to the Eastern part of Germany, thereby improving the living conditions of its inhabitants. Those, both in the East and in the West, who scornfully criticized the East Germans' lust for riches—for consumption—ignored the fact that wealth and democracy often do go hand in hand. The so-called economic miracle of the 1950s ingrained democracy in West German minds, opening up minds and spirits, providing for social mobility and integration in a Western, cosmopolitan world. Some West German intellectuals, critics of the critics, like Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt or Thomas Schmid, argued that those who despised the East Germans' reach for wealth shunned the very nature of the West German democracy. Both Seebacher-Brandt and Schmid resented in particular the expression "*DM-Nationalismus*," which did no justice to the unification process.

Jürgen Habermas, who coined the phrase, did not ignore the twin character of unification: as a prepolitical process, it aimed at the reconstitution of national unity; as a democratic process, it allowed the East Germans to take part in a "politically happier and economically more successful development." The expression "*DM-Nationalismus*" misled some because it focused on a kind of libidinal lust for the deutsche mark, passing over in silence its democratic component. Nonetheless, it pointed to the twofold nature of the East German revolution: national *and* democratic.

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec

From "On German Identity"
Dædalus 123 (1) (Winter 1994)

Especially at a time of domestic unhappiness and strife there is no hope for a popular push toward greater unity, for a move from below toward a Union both deeper and wider. As in other historical cases it is from the top that the initiatives will have to come. If there ever should be a European "nation of nations" and a Federal European state above the states that have already lost many of their powers, either through formal transfer to Brussels or through devolutions to "the market" or through simple impotence, it is the elites and the governments that will have to take the decisive steps: exactly what happened in the 1950s and in the mid-1980s. But what is lacking currently is elites and leaders with a daring vision. The convergence of Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, and de Gasperi was exceptional. What obstructed progress in the 1960s was not the absence of a vision; it was the reluctance of other leaders to accept de Gaulle's vision. A less grandiose but uplifting convergence around the vision of "1992" brought together Delors, Thatcher, Kohl, and Mitterrand. Today, the French President merely survives, Kohl has his hands full with the unexpected or perverse effects of his own vision for Germany in 1989, Britain acts as a brake, and Delors by himself can do little. Precisely because of the negative trends and factors on which this essay has dwelled, it would take the convergence of exceptionally bold leaders to transcend the current malaise, timidity, divisions, and retreats. But these same trends and factors make it difficult to see where such leaders would come from and who they would be.

Stanley Hoffmann

From "Europe's Identity Crisis Revisited"
Dædalus 123 (2) (Spring 1994)

The history of postwar intellectual life in De Ruggiero's own Italy throws light on the difficulties which the liberal idea continues to face there. The single most influential intellectual in twentieth-century Italy, Benedetto Croce, was also its greatest liberal; even his formidable critics on the Right (such as Giovanni Gentile) and the Left (such as Antonio Gramsci) were shaped by Croce's liberal ideas about the relations between culture and politics. But as De Ruggiero himself wrote, intellectual liberalism of the Crocean variety had almost no political influence in modern Italy. He traced its impotence to the development during the late-nineteenth century of the immobile, clientelistic party system which Gramsci had dubbed *trasformismo*. From its very beginnings the modern Italian state managed to transform liberal reformers into clients/directors of the government apparatus without permitting them to liberalize it fully. Liberal intellectuals unwilling to engage in this influence trading faced a choice: either to join the antistate party of radical opposition, or to withdraw into an apolitical secular liberalism. Croce chose the latter course.

The enormous prestige which the Italian Communist Party (PCI) enjoyed without interruption among intellectuals after the war, and their relative indifference to the liberal tradition during the same period, can only be explained with reference to the continuing effects of *trasformismo* on Italian intellectual life. As we can see today, many of the economic and cultural forces that helped to liberalize Western Europe as a whole were also at work in Italy. Before the war much of the country lived in near Third World conditions of poverty and ignorance; these conditions, memorably recorded in Italian cinema and literature, persisted into the 1950s. Over the next several decades Italy began to change: incomes rose, as did literacy, and the basic structures of a welfare state were set into place. In the political sphere, however, very little changed. The sad truth is that, in practice, Italy has been and remains the least liberal among the formally liberal European states.

<div align="right">Mark Lilla</div>

Preface to the Issue
"A New Europe for the Old?"

F INDING A TITLE FOR THIS ISSUE OF *DÆDALUS* has not been easy.
An early possibility, which certainly had the advantage of
novelty, was to call it, quite simply, "A Farewell to Eu-
rope?" There were many reasons for asking whether the principle
of truth in advertising might not appear to be violated by such a
seemingly incendiary title. Might readers not unwittingly think
such a title to be a verdict on the European Union, on the fact that
the Maastricht accords, which once seemed destined for imple-
mentation in the time schedule originally agreed upon, had come
to be challenged in ways that those who initially framed the treaty
had scarcely anticipated? Had the events that led to the defeat of
President Chirac's electoral gamble, combined with the hostility of
the Bundesbank to Chancellor Kohl's plans, virtually guaranteed
that a single European currency—the Euro—would not see the
light of day in the next years? This issue of *Dædalus*, it must be
said at once, is not concerned principally with the European Union
or with its vicissitudes. Rather, it seeks to treat other themes,
perhaps no less consequential and certainly no less ambiguous. For
these subjects, which have to do with the European world as it has
evolved since 1989, the title of the first essay in this issue seemed

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both appropriate and apposite. "A New Europe for the Old?" carries just that element of ambiguity that seems to reflect sentiment in Europe today, both in the Europe that is only incidentally at the moment celebrating the half-centenary of the proclamation of the Marshall Plan and that other Europe that recalls 1947 as something other than an *annus mirabilis*.

Whether the Europe of the twentieth century is seen in terms invented by Eric Hobsbawm, whether he correctly perceived it as a "short century," beginning in 1914 and ending in 1989, whether its character is best rendered in ways that emphasize discontinuities and ruptures, with one Europe dying in 1914, another being created in 1918, managing to survive only to 1939, with yet another being created in 1945, reaching its end in 1989—this is one device for understanding the century. Another interpretation would make 1917 the all-important date in the century, coinciding with the fall of the Romanovs and the ascent of the Bolsheviks. For many in Europe, both in the East and in the West, the Russian Revolution played the role in the twentieth century that the French Revolution secured for itself in the eighteenth. What makes the comparison difficult is not so much that the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath remain matters of immense controversy today but that the character of the French Revolution itself, after more than two centuries, is still very much the subject of debate. When did the nineteenth century begin, at the moment of the fall of the Bastille in 1789 or with the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo and his exile to St. Helena in 1815? If the former date is chosen, then the nineteenth century becomes a very "long century"; if the latter date is preferred, and if it is agreed that the nineteenth century lasted for ninety-nine years, ending only with the catastrophe that overwhelmed Europe in 1914, then the European "civil war" of 1914–1918 becomes all important. That war, in destroying so many of Europe's monarchies and empires, in inflicting death and casualties in the tens of millions, destroyed the last vestiges of the principles of authority and order established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Those principles, though frequently challenged in the nineteenth century, had never been wholly abandoned. In Central and Eastern Europe, particularly, the "old regimes" survived, and the later nineteenth century, for all its bellicose rhetoric and imperial ag-

gressions, was a time of relative peace in Europe, at least by comparison with what had come before and with what followed. The map of Europe changed in all sorts of dramatic ways in the second half of the nineteenth century, producing a new united Italy and a new imperial Germany, but also a new Serbia and a new Romania, the latter two created by the major European powers meeting at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Bulgaria was given new borders at this congress, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while remaining part of the Turkish Empire, were to be occupied by Austria-Hungary until order was reestablished there. In the circumstances, the Great Powers, led by Great Britain's Disraeli and Germany's Bismarck, decided the major issues. While increasing attention was given to the new militarily powerful and industrially developing Germany and to Britain, with its vast and expanding empire, other of Europe's states drew less attention. Italy, for example, and not only because it was still overwhelmingly agricultural, seemed almost inconsequential by comparison. As for the new small states of the Balkans, carved out of a disintegrating Turkish European power, they appeared as pawns in the great power game of diplomacy. Yet it was a shot at Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist that led to the train of events that ushered in Armageddon in 1914 and the destruction of four empires, the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Turkish. We live in the shadow of those nineteenth- and twentieth-century events, though this is all too rarely acknowledged, especially in the United States.

Pre–World War I Europe, the Europe of the *ancien régime,* insofar as it was familiar territory to any but a relatively small company of so-called European "experts" on the American side of the Atlantic, was known principally through travel and study by those able to afford such luxuries in a pre-1914 world. While it is difficult to establish with any precision what Americans, even those who could claim an excellent university education and training, knew of Europe, it appears that their knowledge was largely confined to four societies: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. The Russia of the tsars was scarcely known, and the Austria-Hungary of the Habsburgs was largely terra incognita, as was the Ottoman Empire, both in its European and Asian parts. In theory, all this ought to have changed after the entry of the United

States in 1917 into the war. In fact, a change did occur, but its importance and extent ought not to be exaggerated. After World War I, as before, Americans concentrated their attention on the so-called Great Powers, even those that in their economic, political, and social plights seemed scarcely to merit such an old-fashioned distinction. In Paris, the American president, Woodrow Wilson, had played a key role in the establishment of several new European republics. The creation of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—not to speak of the vast alterations made in creating new borders for Austria and Hungary—ought to have stimulated interest in all these places, but this did not happen for the general population. As with Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, they figured principally for their larger or smaller immigrant populations in the United States. All this needs to be recalled if one is to understand how distant great parts of Europe were from the everyday concerns of most Americans.

Though the arrival of émigré scholars from the Soviet Union did something to establish Russian studies in the United States in these interwar years, and the later migration of scholars from Nazi Germany had even more substantial effects, all amply documented, it was really World War II that gave the impulse to a new study of Europe, principally of the Soviet Union and secondarily of those who became the allies (and the enemies) of the United States during the war. After 1947, Cold War studies, supported by both federal resources and private foundation funds, did much to establish a new vision of Europe in the United States, but again it is easy to misconstrue what in fact happened. If the "isolationism" of the 1920s and 1930s had a major impact on how Europe was perceived in the United States after World War I, if the world economic depression affected how Americans saw the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, among others—if socialism and capitalism became principal subjects of inquiry among many in and out of government—it was really the threat and triumph of Nazism and fascism that concentrated the attention of journalists, scholars, and others on Germany and Italy, but also on Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Ethiopia, all in one way or another threatened by a new European totalitarianism that was casting aside all the democratic shibboleths of Wilsonian democracy. The interest was largely military and diplomatic; it rarely extended

very far into the cultural and political realms. During the war, when information of every kind on occupied Europe had great military value, research on all these places proceeded, mostly in secret. It set the pattern for much that followed.

These habits, very substantially modified, persisted after 1945. With the Soviet Union, we know a good deal about the quality of the research that took place in universities and in other independent settings where "classified inquiry" was not pursued or permitted. We know almost nothing of the quality of the information common in the Central Intelligence Agency or in the various federal and federally supported agencies that undertook "classified" research. One can only assume that they made ample use of the unclassified research of their colleagues, joining it with whatever they learned from their own technologically sophisticated and espionage networks. Whether those in the United States who had access to such classified materials understood a society like that of Yugoslavia under Tito or Romania under Ceauşescu, not to speak of the German Democratic Republic under Honecker, better than those who had no such "privileged" information, it is impossible to say. Nor, for that matter, can we really tell whether American research on any of these subjects was as good or better than what was being conducted in London, Paris, Moscow, or Bonn by comparable private and public agencies. What can be said, incontestably, is that the Cold War had a substantial influence on research in the United States, which is not to suggest that those who wrote about the communist world were simply saying what certain individuals in Washington and elsewhere wished for them to say and chose themselves to believe. Many, as early as the 1950s and particularly after the war in Vietnam, glorying in what they perceived to be their mission to say "no" to those they characterized as "cold warriors" and "warmongers," were as ideological in their opposition to certain prevailing intellectual orthodoxies about communism as any of those who accepted them uncritically.

Since 1989, it has been possible to review with quite a new perspective what was once published both at home and abroad on the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and, no less importantly, on the Soviet Union itself. Few have chosen to engage in this Herculean task, whether out of a residual civility in not wishing to mock certain aging scholars whose research would

appear curiously dated or out of a sense of fatigue with the whole
subject of casting blame. It is by no means obvious that very much
would be gained by dwelling on the massive errors made by even
some of the more reputable scholars who claimed expertise in the
studies of communism in its various guises and permutations. In
the present circumstances, another very different mission beckons,
and it is the one that animates this issue of *Dædalus.* If, as many
believe, we are coming to the end of an era, and not only to the
end of a century and indeed of a millennium, what do we wish to
say about Europe, looking first at the "civilization" as it has
existed over the *longue durée,* but also at the historical experi-
ences of societies that we have not been in the habit of giving great
attention to? In short, what do we in the United States, in the West
more generally, know about places like Serbia, Croatia, Romania,
and Ukraine? What do we know about the "new" Russia, the
Russia of Yeltsin, or the "new" Germany, which joined together
after four tumultuous decades two societies animated by funda-
mentally different ideologies and beliefs? Are journalists the ones
who have the most to say about each of these very "foreign"
enclaves, or is it important that we recognize the role of indepen-
dent scholarship in defining what these societies were, what they
appear to be today? How much do we in fact rely on those who
know the languages and histories of these societies, and how much
do we heed the instant thoughts of those suddenly catapulted to
high public positions, requiring them to deal with these societies
militarily, politically, economically?

What, indeed, are we to think today of the principal states of the
European Union, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom?
They are purportedly more familiar to us—and they are—but do
we really understand the very substantial changes that are occur-
ring in each of these very different societies? Are they best ren-
dered by studying newspaper accounts of general election results
and public opinion polls, of the numerous interviews now habitu-
ally given by prominent politicians and others to television an-
chors and to visiting scholars, or do we need to search for different
meanings? How (and where) are these to be discovered? If his-
tory—and memory—is so important for the states of Eastern and
Central Europe, is it wholly negligible for those of the more
securely democratic states of the European Union? How accepting

are their citizens of the prospect of novelty, not simply in the matter of a currency, but in the whole concept of citizenship, of belonging to a specific national community? Finally, and scarcely less importantly, are we today not obliged to review with quite new eyes—looking at archives previously closed or unacknowledged—how individual citizens and whole communities comported themselves during the terrible years when the Nazi armies dominated the greater part of continental Europe? To look at Italy and Sweden, but also at Switzerland and Norway, during World War II is to become aware that it is not only investigative reporting that compels us to see how many myths circulated in the years after 1945 and why it is impossible to continue to believe in these in the way that was once common.

This issue of *Dædalus*, in its rather anodyne and ambiguous title, seeks to ask whether the master narratives that circulated so widely in the West in the half century after 1945 remain valid. Are we not obliged to rethink what this century has been for those who have lived in its chaotic and ever-changing ruins, and if we do so, are we not obliged also to ask about the world from which this century issued, going back to the nineteenth century and even earlier? If the future of Europe, and not only of the European Union, remains uncertain, it is not because the electorate in one state or another have registered their dissatisfaction with current policies. There are deeper fissures in Europe, East and West—and they are to a very considerable extent explored in this volume— but it would be foolhardy to suggest that knowing them, or even understanding them, provides a protection against surprise. No one in the last decade of the nineteenth century correctly prophesied the twentieth, either in the large or in the small. There is no reason to believe that our prophetic powers have improved substantially. What can be asked for, however, is a greater sympathy for the complexity of societies, and indeed for a greater tolerance for those that are small, that do not cast a long shadow in the world of today. They may, in the twenty-first as in the twentieth century, be the engines of change, both by the disorders that they produce but also by the ways in which their values, however seemingly antiquated, survive and prosper, and not only in their native lands. Today's preoccupation with the virtues of the market may have a very long life indeed; it is also possible that it will

prove to be as short-lived as the Thousand Year Reich and the Soviet Union.

This issue of *Dædalus* continues the inquiry that was initiated last quarter in our volume entitled "Human Diversity." Again, it is a pleasant duty to acknowledge with thanks the assistance we received from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in the United States and the Institute for Futures Studies in Sweden. Neither of these bodies could have predicted the results of an inquiry that began with the simple proposition that the world, for all its homogeneity, remained a very diverse place, whose differences and intricacies merited close study. We have sought to provide that in this issue.

<div align="right">S.R.G.</div>

A New Europe for the Old?

O N THE EVE OF THE MILLENNIUM, old Europe is scheduled to become new "Europe," so as to realize, at last, the true potential of an immemoriably divided continent. Appropriately, the capstone of this union, in gestation since the Coal-Steel Community of 1951, is to be a currency, the Euro—just as Charlemagne capped the first Europe with the tripartite currency of gold pound, silver shilling, and copper pence, the continental standard until 1789 (and in England for two centuries more). But is there a basic Europe to be restored? If so, what are its limits in time and in space, especially toward the East? And a delicate question in the age of multiculturalism: Does "this little cape on the continent of Asia," in Paul Valéry's phrase, embody values that justify the disproportionately mighty role it has played during the millennium now ending?

The surest way to approach these problems is through a synoptic evaluation of Europe's record over that millennium broadly conceived. Such a synopsis, however, cannot attempt to define a distinctive and enduring "essence" of Europe as a self-contained "civilization" in the metaphysical sense common to a Hegel, Toynbee, or Spengler. In our fin de siècle sophistication, we know that to write history is always to tell a story, and thus to impose an organization and a teleology on the past from the vantage point of a shifting present. Hence, the synopsis presented here offers a "master narrative" of European history oriented toward its unanticipated early twentieth-century dénouement in tragedy and toward its anticipated return to primordial unity.[1]

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Europe's beginning limit in time, its *terminus a quo,* therefore, is for present purposes defined by the moment its inhabitants began to think of themselves as a community distinct from other communities, or what we now call "civilizations" in the empirical sense of that term—a self-consciousness expressed moreover in a set of common, enduring institutions. Such a collective self-awareness, with a minimum of corresponding institutions, emerged when the Carolingian world first defined itself as "Christendom" against the worlds of pagan Barbarians and Muslim infidels. This religious definition would not be displaced by the more secular term "Europe" until the end of the seventeenth century, a conflation of identities with repercussions that linger still.[2]

The need to devise a new master narrative for this Europe in *la plus longue durée* is as necessary as it is bold, for the catastrophes of the twentieth century have rendered existing master narratives obsolete. Most of these date from the early nineteenth century and unfold in a tripartite pattern of ancient, medieval, and modern, in which the Middle Ages are a long parentheses of ignorance and superstition in the rise of "Western civilization," which becomes fully itself only in the Renaissance and Reformation. The generic name in English for such history-as-progress is "whig," and Thomas Macauley's account of liberal constitutionalism as a peculiarly British and Protestant product is its most notable expression. For less parochial liberals, however, modern liberty has been promoted by a universal "rising bourgeoisie," as in François Guizot's scenario of a "class struggle" leading from the communal revolts of the twelfth century to 1789. For the anti-bourgeois revolutionary Marx, this class struggle turns socioeconomic when the proletariat emerges to complete the dialectical march of "modes of production," proceeding from feudalism to capitalism to a putative socialism. Max Weber agreed with the proposition that Europe's development culminated in capitalism but maintained that since capitalism emerged only there (something that Marx had failed to notice), capitalism must be explained by Europe's distinctive religious culture. Leopold Ranke saw "Romano-Germanic" Europe evolving from the contest between Papacy and Empire to the modern European state-system, of which royal-bureaucratic Prussia was the most enlightened expression. And more grandly still, Hegel held that "the history of the Christian-German world is the history

of freedom," a process that was at the same time the genealogy of the Absolute's consciousness of itself. So, from one political and national perspective to another, Europe approached 1914 in a triumphalist mood.

And there was much to be triumphal about. Europe's accomplishments by then had gone far beyond those of any previous civilization. Indeed, Europe's genius had invented the modern world (America, later, would largely mass-produce it). So complete was the triumph that by 1914 Europe, after having spawned the Americas, had conquered most of the rest of the planet. To be sure, present historiography now emphasizes that Europe accomplished such epic deeds only by pillaging and enslaving all the other continents. But pillage and slavery are the common practice of civilizations; and it was largely Europe's latter-day concepts of human rights and democracy that made it possible to counterbalance her accomplishments with recognition of her crimes.

Then came the disasters of World Wars I and II, and their attendant Communist and Nazi revolutions. It would seem that Europe's superfluity of creativity had ended in the cul-de-sac of generating five Great Powers in far too small an arena. By 1945, the devastations these rival powers had wrought deprived all of them but Russia of their traditional autonomy; and by 1991 Russia too had lost her illusory superpuissant status. It is out of this impasse that the necessity of transforming old Europe into the new "Europe" emerged, for it was impossible to contemplate a third round of rivalry. It is also from this tragic *terminus ad quem* of a millennium of creativity that the need for a new master narrative arises.

The central problem, then, of the master narrative offered here is to trace how old Christendom became new Europe and then how this modern Europe led to terminal disaster. All the factual elements in this narrative will be familiar; what is new is the pattern in which they are arranged. Its novelty also lies in taking Europe's limits in space to extend from the Atlantic to the Urals, rather than cutting matters off at the Elbe and the Julian Alps as is customary, and in applying this geographic perspective roughly from the year 1000, rather than from the eighteenth-century "enlightened despotism" of Peter I and Catherine II, as is also the convention.

OLD EUROPE

The Christendom, or *Christianitas,* of the Carolingians and the year 1000 of course did not represent an absolutely new beginning; it had its origins in the *Romanitas* of antiquity, from which it derived its religion, its principal institution (the Church), and its written language (Latin), as well as what little it conserved of higher culture. But until the seventh century these attributes had been the property of a united Mediterranean oecumene, not of a rump Western Europe. In that century, however, the southern nomads of Arabia, having devised a new monotheism syncretized from Judaism and Christianity, conquered half the Mediterranean world, thus confronting the surviving Christian lands with a rival oecumene. By contrast, on the northern frontier of the crumbling Roman world, the nomadic Barbarians were converted to Christianity—the Germans first, in the fifth-sixth centuries, then around the year 1000 the Scandinavians, the Western Slavs, the Hungarians, and, on the easternmost ricochet, those Scandinavian-Slavs, the Varangians (also called Russes).

   The conversion of the northern Barbarians furnished the first substratum of historic Europe. All her modern nations made their appearance in history when Mediterranean missionaries baptized a Barbarian warrior chief—from Clovis the Frank in 497 to King Ethelbert of Kent in 598, in the first round; then, in the round of 1000, St. Olaf of Norway, St. Steven of Hungary, Mieszko of Poland, and in 988 St. Vladimir of Kiev. True, conversion from Constantinople rather than from Rome and the use of a Barbarian vernacular rather than Greek as the liturgical language would later make an enormous difference in the fates of Orthodox and Catholic Europe: the frontier is visible to this day from the Balkans to the Baltic, and indeed in current projects for expanding NATO and the European Union.[3] At the time, however, the difference was insignificant, so Henry I of France married Anne of Kiev in the mid-eleventh century, in a kind of Franco-Russian alliance against the Germanic Holy Roman Emperor.

   This matter is of more than anecdotal interest; it signifies that long before Peter the Great cut his famous "window through to Europe," in Pushkin's phrase, Russia was a part of the melding of Roman, Christian, and Barbarian elements that was the founding

act of a continuing Europe. Participation in this *Gründerzeit,*
moreover, permanently set Europe's Eastern flank off from the
rival oecumene of Islam, which, in the form now of the Turks, laid
siege to Vienna as late as 1683. Indeed, it was this underlying
kinship with the West that made Peter's task possible, even easy,
whereas the infidel Ottomans—despite their presence since the
fourteenth century in geographic, indeed Hellenic, Europe—were
never accepted into the concert of civilized nations.

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The driving force of historic Europe, however, would not be this
first, broad substratum of Christian-Barbarian protonations but
rather the smaller though more dynamic world of the Latin West,
as first organized by the Carolingians. The basic innovation of that
ephemeral imperium was to call itself "Christendom," thereby
defining itself by its religion, something that the still-classical
Roman empire of Constantine and Theodosius had never done. It
implemented this project by introducing a calendar that counted
the years from the birth of Christ; it spread Christianity, an urban
religion in antiquity, to the pagan peasantry by organizing the
countryside into parishes; and it forged an alliance with the pa-
pacy and Benedictine monasticism, thereby imposing the Catholic
orthodoxy of Rome throughout the West while at the same time
making the secular power sacred.

When the Frankish empire crumbled under the second wave of
Barbarian attacks—from the Vikings, Magyars, and seaborne
Saracens of the ninth-tenth centuries—Christendom's political unity
was ended for good. The highest secular authorities that survived
were the kingdoms descended from the Barbarian *gentes,* even
though one such nation, the Saxons, claimed to constitute the
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. In fact, however, in
the chaos of the age, minimal security could be achieved only by
the militarization of society at the local level. Thus there emerged,
in the zone between the Loire and the Rhine, a nobility of warrior
lords and dependent vassals bound by a contract of mutual fealty
and support. Unlike the ancient Romans, these nobles fought with
metal armor and on horseback—shoed horses and the stirrups to
mount them having been brought west by steppe Barbarians. And

in a rural world, this nobility lived off the labor of manorial peasants to whom they in return owed protection. By the year 1000, this feudal society, as we now call it, had gone far towards restoring internal order in westernmost Europe. Under the influence of the Church, the activity of these rude warriors was "ethicized" as knighthood and chivalry. The institution they founded had enormous staying power: the feudal hierarchy, under the suzerainty of national kings, would furnish the framework for European society and politics until the end of the eighteenth century.

Easternmost Europe, however, knew no such stability. The great corridor of horseborne Barbarians that runs from Mongolia and Central Asia across the Ukrainian steppes to the Hungarian plain became increasingly active from 1100 onward, culminating in 1240 with the arrival of the Mongols. No military force anywhere in the settled world was capable of resisting them. If the Latin West was spared, it was because the Mongols, after crushing a German-Polish host at Liegnitz in Silesia in 1241, turned homeward on learning of their Great Khan's death. In the meantime, however, most of Russia had become their tributary.[4]

Thus, like Spain for some five hundred years after 712, or Hungary for almost two hundred years after 1526, Russia for nearly three hundred years was detached from the Christian world. Or more exactly, Kievan Rus after 1240 was partitioned between its western lands in present-day Ukraine and Belarus, which were absorbed into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Muscovy, which alone experienced the "Tartar yoke." Yet, unlike Spain or Hungary, Muscovy was not occupied or colonized; and, contrary to widespread opinion, no Mongol institutions were implanted in Russia. Muscovite institutions remained essentially the prince and his comitatus of boyars, which until the late fifteenth century functioned under a contractual regime of what may fairly be called incipient feudalism.

* * *

It was in the heartland of Latin Christendom, secure after 1000 under the protection of consolidated feudalism, that historic Europe first developed a dynamism that thereafter never abated.[5] It began with an agricultural revolution, a transformation that rested

on the technology of the deep plow, on the horse collar that
allowed the nobles' mount to draw that plow, and on the three-
field system of cultivation.[6] By 1300, this revolution had made
transalpine Europe richer and more populous than the Mediterra-
nean world had ever been. It also ended serfdom. With this new
wealth, commerce grew, manufacturers appeared, and towns were
revived from the Mediterranean to the North Sea and on into the
Baltic as far as Russian Novgorod.

   With the feudal organization of power and an expanding economy,
the conditions were established for a durable European entity. It
emerged from the top down, through a revolution in that half of
the Carolingian system that had not collapsed: the monastic and
papal Church. In an almost totally rural world, feudal power
inevitably feudalized the Church, threatening to subordinate it to
the secular sword, a danger that soon provoked a reaction from
the international monasticism of Cluny. With the support of the
Saxon heirs to the Carolingian ideal, Cluniac monks captured the
papacy for radical reform; and reform, given society's self-defini-
tion as Christendom, could only mean the supremacy of the spiri-
tual sword over its secular counterpart. So the "Gregorian revolu-
tion" of 1040–1060 made an imperial papacy the effective pivot
of the Latin Christian oecumene, seeking through a set of central
institutions to implement the mission of Christianizing all aspects
of life in this world, from sexual love in the sacrament of marriage
to crusading zeal in war. This pan-European theocracy also spon-
sored a revival of higher learning; it developed an intricate legal
system and professionalized its administration. In these endeavors
it was aided by a new wave of international monastic orders,
Franciscans and Dominicans, called into being by the needs of the
new towns. Many of the achievements of this ecclesiastic revolu-
tion, moreover, as well as the trained clerics it produced, were
employed by the nascent monarchies of England and France to
give their realms an order higher than that of raw feudalism.[7]

   The twelfth and thirteenth centuries were a period of consolida-
tion and flowering of this first Europe. Traces of its institutions are
still present in the representative assemblies and the legal systems
of the major European states, as they are in the organization and
philosophical vocabulary of its universities. Its material work is
still visible in the limestone Romanesque and Gothic churches of

Europe's villages, often cleared from the forest in the wake of the year 1000; and it can be seen in the irregular street patterns and soaring cathedrals of its cities. The same work is present, though more feebly, in the brick Gothic churches of Hanseatic cities from Lübeck to Tallinn. Even in remote Muscovy, the contemporary landscape was given enduring focus by the twelfth-century stone churches of Byzantine derivation.

* * *

The original Europe of the year 1000 did not remain fixed in its exiguous Carolingian heartland, nor did it develop as a uniform bloc. It underwent a process of constant expansion and mutation, which by 1300 had doubled its size and diversified its internal composition. In 1066 a ready-made, mature feudalism, along with a closer subordination to Rome, was exported by conquest to England. Slightly later, other Norman barons detached southern Italy from the Byzantines and Sicily from the Saracens. Also during those years, the *Reconquista* of Iberia commenced its two-centuries course, aided by contingents of Frankish knights. Of course, the most spectacular, if also the most ephemeral, aspect of this expansion was the Crusades.

   At the same time, German colonization crossed the old Carolingian frontier along the line of the Elbe and Saarle rivers, the Bohemian Forest, and the Inn (roughly where the Iron Curtain descended in 1945). By 1300 this *Drang nach Osten* had passed the Oder and reached the Vistula, and it had descended the Danube to Vienna. Its farthest advance, the work of crusading knights, came along the Baltic coast from East Prussia to the present Baltic states. In part, this colonization displaced an earlier Slavic population. In greater part, however, its challenge stimulated Bohemia, the vast Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the sprawling Hungarian Kingdom to meet the threat of the West by adopting its ways.[8]

   Thus there emerged a second Europe, as it has at times been called, east of the Elbe and the Julian Alps.[9] In this semi-frontier zone, everything was poorer and less dynamic than in the Carolingian heartland and England. The three-field system appeared two centuries later; imported feudal institutions were more rudimentary; towns were rarer and smaller; and their Gothic was usually in

brick. Moreover, by the sixteenth century this second, trans-Elbean Europe had become a source of grain, minerals, and raw materials for the more developed Atlantic West. And this profitable but dependent economic relationship led the local lords to re-enserf their peasantry, a "second serfdom" that moved society in the opposite direction from the first Europe and that would last until the early nineteenth century.

From the thirteenth century onward, therefore, it is appropriate to speak of what recent German historiography has called a "West-East cultural gradient," a declivity of development separating an advanced from a backward Europe and dividing the continent between leader and follower, regions. This division, however, does not coincide with the divide between Latin Christendom and the Orthodox East. It exists within Latin Christendom itself, a circumstance that would later govern what the same German historiography, in reflecting on the twentieth-century disaster, has called their nation's "*Sonderweg*," its "special path," to modernity. Indeed, over the *longue durée* of historic Europe, the most decisive divide on this gradient can be seen to cut through Germany itself at the Elbe. And from that line the declivity, in a succession of further *Sonderwege,* extends eastward to the Urals.

Thus, in the second Europe, there are first the German military marches of Mark Brandenburg in the north and the Ostmark of the Danube, which in the seventeenth century became the foundation stones of modern Prussian and Austrian power. Beyond these marcher states, the Hungarian, Bohemian, and Polish kingdoms lived their golden ages between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries as independent nations. Yet in all three, in contrast to the evolution of the Plantagenet and Capetian realms, the nobility constantly developed its power at the monarchy's expense. So when circumstances at last brought a test of national strength, the Central European kingdoms were extinguished one after another by Ottoman Turkey, by Habsburg Vienna, and the last of them, Poland, by Hohenzollern Prussia and Romanov Russia together.

For by the time Muscovy shook off the last remnants of the "Tartar yoke," on the eve of 1500, it too had become a marcher state about to launch a grand career. It did so, however, with the greatest economic handicap in Europe, since its naturally poor soil had been adapted to the three-field system only in the second half

of the fifteenth century, or four hundred years later than the Atlantic West. Concurrently, two centuries of warfare with the steppe nomads had permitted the Grand Prince to largely free himself from dependence on the hereditary boyar nobility, replacing it with a gentry (*dvorianstvo*) holding its lands on condition of military service. The whole of this structure was now undergirded with peasant serfdom, thereby bringing Muscovy's social structure into line with the second serfdom of the second Europe. And Russian serfdom was destined to endure even farther into the nineteenth century than that of its neighbors. Still, elements of contract did not disappear entirely in this burgeoning Muscovite autocracy. Until the mid-seventeenth century, an "Assembly of All the Land," the *Zemskii sobor,* functioned as a kind of embryonic system of estates—the same period in which more elaborate representative bodies flourished in the west and center of the continent.

So by the sixteenth century it turned out that there existed in fact three Europes. There was the original Europe of the Atlantic West, now about to spearhead Christendom's second great expansion, this time across the Atlantic and around the world. There was the second Europe of trans-Elbean Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland. And there was the candidate Europe of Muscovy, still harassed by steppe nomads but, from the time of Ivan IV (The Terrible) onward, seeking to break through to the Baltic and into Poland-Lithuania.

Under Peter I, this candidate at last achieved its aims in both areas to become one of the five great powers of modern Europe. Thereby, too, trans-Elbean Europe received the configuration it would keep until World War I: three dynastic empires, organized as Old Regimes, astride the three defunct Central European national monarchies.

* * *

Throughout the process of trans-Elbean homogenization, however, the center of dynamism for the entire European system remained (as it does to this day) within the first Europe of the farther West. As of 1500, the eve of Latin Christendom's splintering, what then was the ethos of this world?

It was a world founded on superordinate authority and a hier-
archical structuring of society. It was a world in which legitimacy
came from above, from God and the timeless natural order, a
regimen that decreed the division of mankind into interdependent,
corporate strata. It was not that a sense of individuality was
lacking in this world; the feudal cult of honor and personal right
afforded a potent stimulus to individualism. Nonetheless, society
was not organized around this value as its supreme principle. Old
Europe was what later sociology would call an organic *Gemeinschaft,*
not an atomistic *Gesellschaft.* Man did not make his world; rather,
the world made him what he was, a member of an "estate"—
either of those who pray, or of those who fight, or of those who
humbly toil. Everything in this fallen world was ordered to serve
the purpose of the God who made it and to work for the redemp-
tion of those who served Him.

The institutional structures behind this ethos by and large sur-
vived until 1789. The ethos itself, however, was progressively
eroded after 1300 through a process wherein the principles of
feudal and Christian Europe undermined the institutions designed
to embody them in practice. First, the feudal organization of
power, which in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had fostered
society's development, in the crisis-racked fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries became a source of internecine strife: the Hundred Years
War, and its attendant economic "Great Depression," is the prime
instance of this crisis. The result was to throw the balance of
political power to the central monarchies, which in the process of
policing their realms gave to the estates, or orders, of the feudal
hierarchy the constitutional form of elected, representative assem-
blies. Second, the efforts of the Church to Christianize the world
ultimately had the perverse effect of making the Church worldly.
The Babylonian Captivity of the Avignonese papacy and the Great
Schism are the foremost examples of this crisis, and the result was
a succession of heresies, from the Cathars to the Hussites, directed
toward achieving salvation outside established sacerdotal and sac-
ramental structures.

And so the way was prepared for the Renaissance and Reforma-
tion of the sixteenth century. Both were intended to renew
Christendom, but both ultimately furthered its disintegration. The
Renaissance did so directly by recovering the non-Christian cul-

ture of classical antiquity; the Reformation did so indirectly by
unintentionally dividing the single Christendom it sought to regen-
erate. By the close of the seventeenth century, it was clear that the
religious unity of Christendom could not be restored, thereby
casting doubt on religious truth of whatever variety.

Into this breach moved the most momentous innovative force of
all, the seventeenth-century scientific revolution. Although not
intended by its authors as an anti-religious enterprise (indeed it
had been partially fostered by the Church's scholasticism), it none-
theless offered a source of truth that was radically new: its results
were incontrovertible as far as human experience ranged; they
owed nothing to divine revelation; and they derived everything
from natural reason and empirical verification. Here was an alter-
native culture to that of Christianity and of the classical heritage
both, and the warrant therefore for devising a rational science of
man and society by which man could make his *own* world—a
science the Enlightenment proceeded forthwith to produce.

This high cultural change coincided with the more mundane
force of the seventeenth-century military revolution, which trans-
formed traditional, residually feudal monarchy into centralized
absolutism, a system called after 1789 the "Old Regime."[10] With
a technology and a mobilization of manpower that consumed
some 80 to 90 percent of any monarch's revenue, royal govern-
ments everywhere abolished, or tried to abolish, traditional estates
in order to tax the population through their own agents. Concur-
rently, military absolutism utilized the new science and its accom-
panying philosophical rationalism to promote a more coherent
statecraft, a "policed" or orderly society, and an improved economy.
It is this military absolutism, in conjunction with the new science,
that gave a single secular culture to the unitary state-system that
by the eighteenth century extended from the Atlantic to the Urals.[11]

And so between the upper millstone of the new science and the
nether millstone of royal absolutism, the Age of Enlightenment
ground to dust the ethos of old Europe, whether in its Catholic,
Protestant, or Orthodox variant. It was therefore only a question
of time before the new rationalism would challenge divinely sanc-
tioned royal absolutism and its residual feudal underpinnings.

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Thus the way was prepared for the advent, in 1789, of what Tocqueville later called democracy. As he summed up its genesis in a bravura piece of sociological history:

> I look back for a moment at the state of France seven hundred years ago; at that time it was divided up between a few families who owned the land and ruled the inhabitants. At that time the right to give orders descended, like real property, from generation to genera-tion; the only means by which men controlled each other was force; there was only one source of power, namely, landed property.
>
> But then the political power of the clergy began to take shape and soon to extend. The ranks of the clergy were open to all, poor or rich, commoner or noble; through the church, equality began to insinuate itself into the heart of government, and a man who would have vegetated as a serf in eternal servitude could, as a priest, take his place among the nobles and often take precedence over kings.
>
> As society became more stable and civilized, men's relations with one another became more numerous and complicated. Hence the need for civil laws was vividly felt, and the lawyers soon left their obscure tribunals and dusty chambers to appear at the king's court side by side with feudal barons dressed in chain mail and ermine.
>
> While kings were ruining themselves in great enterprises and nobles wearing each other out in private wars, the commoners were growing rich by trade. The power of money began to be felt in affairs of state. Trade became a new way of gaining power and financiers became a political force, despised but flattered.
>
> Gradually enlightenment spread, and a taste for literature and the arts awoke. The mind became an element in success; knowledge became a tool of government and intellect a social force; educated men played a part in affairs of state.
>
> In proportion as new roads to power were found, the value of birth decreased. In the eleventh century, nobility was something of inestimable worth; in the thirteenth it could be bought; the first ennoblement took place in 1270, and equality was finally intro-duced into the government through the aristocracy itself.[12]

And Tocqueville's rough contemporary Karl Marx viewed the transition from the old Europe to the new in the same millennial perspective. But, shifting the focus from politics to economics, he

declared that the equality born of feudalism's destruction was a sham:

> The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of Philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—free trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.
>
> The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers.
>
> The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.[13]

And so, whether the new Europe was given a liberal or a socialist valence, after 1789 the basic unit of society was not the corporate estate, but the individual citizen; and equality among citizens would henceforth be the pivot of all politics.

Or at least this new ethos was the norm in the first Europe west of the Rhine. In the *Sonderwege* of the second and third Europe, however, semi–Old Regimes would continue to hold sway until 1917–1918.[14]

NEW EUROPE

The political nineteenth century, extending from the Restoration of 1815 to the Great War of 1914, witnessed what at the time seemed like unstoppable progress toward realizing the new ethos of democracy: one European monarchy after another was obliged to grant a constitution, and the suffrage was progressively extended downward through the social hierarchy. In 1848 Prussia and most of the other German states received parliaments with

limited powers; in 1866 Austria-Hungary followed suit; in 1871 the new German Empire adopted universal suffrage for its lower house, the *Reichstag*. By 1905 Russia had achieved a semi-constitutionalism on the Prussian model of 1848. On the Left, it seemed only a question of time before all Europe would be democratic, whether on the radical French, republican model consolidated after 1870 or the more conservative, British constitutional-monarchic model, which came close to achieving universal (manhood) suffrage in 1884. And on the Right, in the half-intact Old Regimes that until 1914 were still dominant east of the Rhine, these regimes feared that the Left would in fact win out.

The War of 1914–1918 interrupted this seeming triumphal march—though initially by appearing to accelerate it. All Europe's remaining Old Regimes perished in revolution, thereby for a brief time making democracy almost universal. Monarchies everywhere were replaced by universal-suffrage republics, combined in East Central Europe with the self-determination of submerged nations first demanded in the "Springtime of Peoples" of 1848.

Very rapidly, however, Europe east of the Rhine veered off into what would soon be called totalitarianism. Russia began the process in the course of the War itself by establishing a Marxist "dictatorship of the proletariat," which quickly developed into the Leninist party-state. Italy in 1922, under the former socialist leader Mussolini, launched a fascist state, which was the first of the postwar anti-democratic regimes to call itself "total." And in 1933 Germany became "National-Socialist," thereby creating what before 1914 would have been a contradiction in terms. Finally, all the new nation-states between Germany and Russia (except Czechoslovakia) turned into national-authoritarianisms, which have often, but inaccurately, been called fascist.

By the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, it seemed to many only a question of time before democracy was snuffed out everywhere in Europe. Indeed, numerous Western intellectuals were ready to rally to one or another of its putative successors. The majority opted for Moscow and a Popular Front against fascism. But many, such as the modernist poet Ezra Pound or the playwright and Fabian George Bernard Shaw, leaned toward Rome; not a few, such as the Duke of Windsor or Charles Lindberg, flirted with

Berlin; and some, such as the historian E. H. Carr, bet first on the Axis then on the Comintern.

How had matters come to this sorry pass so soon after a century of enlightened progress, and in the immediate wake of a victorious "war to make the world safe for democracy"? The answer, alas, must be sought in the antinomies, the paradoxes, of democracy itself, for totalitarianism is very much the product of the era of universal democracy.

* * *

The idea of modern democracy came into the world in 1789 in the name of the "nation," an ancient Roman term now used to designate the Third Estate or the "people," as opposed to the two privileged orders. And this "people" was declared to have assumed the full "sovereignty" of the erstwhile absolute monarchy. Very soon, however, as the new Republic of citizens was obliged to defend itself against its unregenerated old-regime neighbors, "nation" acquired a second meaning, the only one it has today. It now meant *La Patrie,* in the sense of a particular sovereign fatherland competing against other such *patries.* And so it turned out, with the *levée en masse* of 1793, that universal suffrage also meant universal military service. In the new century, therefore, democracy invariably entailed what was then first called "nationalism," which by its very nature was adversarial. This divisive principle was the first antinomy of democracy.

The second antinomy was socialism. By the time of the Revolution of 1830 it become clear that the "nation" of 1789, in abolishing the legal inequality of "estates," had not created a fraternal polity of equal citizens. Instead, it had laid bare a new form of inequality founded on wealth and social class, perhaps more invidious than the old form because it was camouflaged by formal political equality. The idea was therefore born that the political Republic (and, even more, the property suffrage of the July monarchy) was not enough for human emancipation, that a social Republic was necessary to make men truly equal, and thus at last fully human. To achieve this end some measure of state-imposed equalization of wealth, indeed perhaps the abolition of all private property, was required for true democracy. Moreover, since the

possessing classes, now called "the bourgeoisie," would resist such
equalization, a "class struggle"—in the term socialists borrowed
from Guizot—was inevitable. And Karl Marx, on the eve of 1848,
offered the grand dialectical theory according to which this struggle
was destined to culminate in a worldwide revolutionary triumph
of the "proletariat," as workers with only their labor to sell and
nothing to lose but their chains were now called.

Of course, there is nothing wrong per se with either socialism or
nationalism (though it is perhaps safer now to say "patriotism").
Indeed, both are inescapable facts of the modern human condi-
tion. The real question is how the two combine with democracy,
not in the sense of "popular sovereignty," but in the sense of the
rule of law, or what Montesquieu called *un état de droit*—an
aspect of the modern concept of democracy that is far older than
1789. It was the product of the secular development of Western
jurisprudence building on the feudal principle of contract, and
thus integral to the particular "rights" and "privileges" of the Old
Regime. These traditional "liberties" were abolished in 1789 by
universalizing them into a uniform liberty founded on general law.
Such a right was common to all men simply by virtue of their
humanity and humanity's highest faculty, reason—in Descartes'
formula, *la chose du monde la mieux partagée.*

It is the venerable Western concept of the rule of law that time
has shown to be necessary in order to keep popular sovereignty, in
the form of nationalism and socialism, from going off the deep end
into despotism. The twentieth-century totalitarianisms resulted
when the heady aspirations of aggrieved nationalism and thwarted
social justice broke the bounds of the rule of law to assume
revolutionary form. And this occurred under the extraordinary
pressures of World War I in the still partially old-regime polities
east of the Rhine.

The origin of the disaster is this: When universal military ser-
vice permitted Napoleon to conquer most of Europe, his old-
regime adversaries adopted universal service themselves, but with-
out the limiting corollary of universal citizenship. Prussia began
the process after its defeat at Jena in 1806, Austria after 1866, and
Russia followed suit in 1874; the French, who had abandoned the
system in 1815, reintroduced it after 1870, while the British and
Americans joined the march in 1915 and 1917. Thus World War

I became the first "democratic" war, fought by mass-conscript armies at the front. It was also the first total war, involving economic and civilian mobilization in the rear.

But democratic war can be survived only by the winners. For the losers, it brings destruction of the very polity itself. And so the three trans-Rhenan monarchies went down in open-ended revolution. At the same time, Italy—though technically a victor—was so shaken by the ordeal and so meagerly rewarded at Versailles as to feel in fact a loser.

In Central Europe, after a brief threat of social revolution, the main result of defeat was exacerbated nationalism and the desire for a war of revanche. Accordingly, parliamentary democracy with its confining legalisms—a regime moreover prescribed by the victors—was denounced as a recipe for national weakness and servitude. So Central European nationalism assumed revolutionary form and employed socialist methods of collective mobilization, a conflation Mussolini called "total."

In backward Russia, with its weakly developed urban civil society and its enormous mass of aggrieved peasants, both state and society simply disintegrated under the strain of war. Into the void stepped a small phalanx of millenarian Marxist intellectuals, the Bolsheviks. They rode the wave of popular anger to seize power in the name of the proletariat and the peasantry, in the hope of thereby igniting a general European revolution. When this strategy failed, they found themselves isolated in a country made even more backward by the destruction of war. Employing the Marxist cult of human emancipation through economic development and the violence of the class struggle, they created, by state revolution from above, the industrial and proletarian society that was supposed to have created *them*.

In the midst of the Great Depression this indeed appeared to many in the West to represent the last, best hope for humanity, a sentiment reinforced as the counter-revolution of fascism battened on that same depression. In the ideological confusion of the day many Westerners failed to note that socialism—understood in Marx's sense as the abolition of private property, profit, and the market—was the perfect formula for maximal state despotism. In fact, Soviet socialism marked the end of civil society and the rule of law even more thoroughly than the regimes of its avowedly

"total" fascist adversary, because it absorbed everything into the party-state.

Yet it turned out that both these forms of demotic mobilization are not nearly as effective modes of national and/or social cohesion as their common democratic-constitutionalist adversary. Both forms of totalitarianism, born of war, would perish in war. The totalitarianisms of the Right perished in World War II by far overreaching themselves, taking on opponents from the Urals to beyond the Atlantic. Totalitarianism of the Left, after gaining enormously in power and ideological allurement through the hot war of 1941–1945, ultimately withered away under the strains of its cold successor. The slow technological-economic grind of this second "international class struggle" revealed that the party-state's command economy, in the long run, kills social creativity and ultimately state power.

And so totalitarianism, after almost becoming New Europe's gravedigger, was itself destroyed after three quarters of a century of destruction. Still, it should not be forgotten that totalitarianism got this lethal chance because it was also an expression, albeit perverse, of the inescapable patriotic and social aspirations of that democracy on which New Europe was founded.

* * *

Europe has clearly learned the lesson of the perils of democracy unrestrained by the rule of law; this is why, for almost half a century, it has been busy building "Europe." The capstone of the Euro may be put in place as scheduled on the eve of the millennium, but this still does not mean that a new New Europe will be a done deal. A thousand years of protonational or national histories, and a whole spectrum of West-East *Sonderwege,* will not be homogenized in any foreseeable span of time. Still, there is no turning back to the past; and though the idea of Europe hardly mobilizes the masses the way nationalism and socialism once did, Europe's elites will surely persevere in their quest for unity.

Yet even if they succeed, the result cannot be old New Europe reborn; it can only be a new entity, almost a third Europe in the succession that began in the year 1000. In the first place, it cannot be restored to its world preeminence, which was for so long a part

of its self-definition, since the modern world it has invented has now absorbed its inventor into a global oecumene. It is once again a small promontory on a continent with several potentially equal powers.

But what is perhaps even more important is that unity in integration, however necessary in a shrinking world, will alter Europe's nature internally like nothing else since it emerged from the Carolingian nucleus. For that nature has been defined not just by a communality of values, whether universal Christendom, or universal reason, or universal striving for democracy and the rights of man; it has perhaps been defined even more by division and conflict as sources of creative change. One of the first visionaries of a Europe united under the reign of rational civil law, Immanuel Kant, was also one of the first thinkers, on the eve of 1789, to ponder this disturbing paradox:

> The means employed by Nature to bring about the development of all the capacities of men is their antagonism in society. . . . By "antagonism" I mean the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society. Man has an inclination to associate with others, because in society he feels himself to be more than man. . . . But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish. . . . This opposition it is which awakens all his powers, brings him to conquer his inclination to laziness and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice, to achieve a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw. Thus are taken the first true steps from barbarism to culture. . . .[15]

This "unsocial sociability" certainly had much to do with generating the capacities that made it possible for Europe to invent the modern world. Now that Kant's vision of a perpetually peaceful Europe united under a civic constitution seems about to be realized, what source of dynamism will take the place of her historic antagonisms?

The Euro and the economic strength that it will no doubt bring are surely not enough to inspire an ideal of civilization. And millennial Europe, whether in sacred or secular guise, and despite her numerous failures, has always taken herself to represent an

ideal of civilization. Whatever concrete form the new New Europe takes, therefore, we may assume that the paradoxes of the modern democratic ethos that Europe created will long provide challenges enough to insure her continued dynamism. Indeed, the task of achieving the world's first multinational version of democracy towards which she is now moving will demand creativity quite on the level with that of Old and New Europe both.

ENDNOTES

[1] For the history of the term and concept of Europe, see Dennis Hay, *The Emergence of an Idea,* rev. ed. (Chicago, Ill.: Edinburgh University Press, 1968) and Frederico Chabod, *Storia dell'idea d'Europa* (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1962).

[2] For the relation of the Europe now being built to its medieval matrix, see Jaques Le Goff, *La vieille Europe et la nôtre* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994). For the specifically Western Roman, or Latin, basis of historic Europe, see Rémi Brague, *Europe, La voie romaine,* 2d ed. (Paris: Criteroin, 1993).

[3] For the Orthodox east of Europe, see Dimitri Obolenski, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 1000–1453* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

[4] For the historical importance of Christendom's exposed eastern flank see William McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1964). Though this work treats essentially a later period, it offers insights valid from the Barbarian invasions to the time Russia finally closed the steppe corridor at the end of the eighteenth century.

[5] For the optimism of the year 1000, see Georges Duby, *L'an Mil* (Paris: Editions Gallimard/Julliard, 1980).

[6] For the material basis of Europe's "take-off" after the year 1000, see Lynn White Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[7] Dietrich Gerhard, *Old Europe, A Study of Continuity, 1000–1800* (New York and London: Academic Press, 1981), an excellent work that, however, excludes Russia from Europe, though without offering any arguments for doing so.

[8] For Europe as a constantly expanding force, see Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[9] For a Central European perspective on the diversity of Europe, see Jenó Szúcs, *Les trois Europes* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985).

[10] For the impact of the military revolution, see Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560–1660," in Michael Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966) and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revo-*

lution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[11]For the common political culture of the second and third Europes in the early-modern period, see Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).

[12]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* ed. J. P. Mayer (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969), 9–10. The translation is slightly modified here.

[13]Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Bourgeois and Proletarians," *The Communist Manifesto,* ed. Samuel H. Beer (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), 12.

[14]Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), provides a thought-provoking survey of the Old Regime's survival from 1789 to 1914.

[15]Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View," in *Kant Selections,* ed. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988), 417–418.

Tim Judah

The Serbs: The Sweet and Rotten Smell of History

E VERY THURSDAY THE MONKS of the monastery of Visoki Dečani prepare for their evening service by opening the sarcophagus of their patron. Stefan Dečanski, whose age-blackened shriveled hands peek out from under his embroidered shroud, was king of the Serbs until he was murdered by his son Dušan in 1331. Dušan went on to found a glorious though short-lived Serbian empire and, had he not died suddenly in 1355, might have gone on to seize Constantinople itself. So what? So everything. . . .

In general, pieces that set out to explain the Serbs, to place them in the context of the war that destroyed Yugoslavia, do not begin in 1331. They prefer to revolve around the familiar arguments of *ancient hatreds* or the question of guilt in a Serbian war of *aggression*. My contention is that these two poles are a false dichotomy. They are born in the minds of ivory-tower scholars and lazy editorialists who believe that if a rational argument makes sense in New England or on "Fleet Street" it will also make sense in the Balkans. This is nonsense. And here is the rub: The monks who care for the holy tomb swear that when it is opened in the summer the whole church fills with the sweet smell of roses. This seems to me the most fitting of metaphors. In the late 1980s the Serbs became intoxicated with just such an overpowering smell of history. Even as Western academics imbued with a two-dimensional view of the world discussed the end of history, the Serbs were

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induced to reembrace their history. With the death of Yugoslavia they saw themselves, as Serbs who had been subsumed as "Yugoslavs," *returning* to history. Every day they were living and making history once more, and they could be seduced into doing so because they were led to believe that precisely such a return to history was also a return to glory.

I make no claims that what happened to the Serbs was in any way unique. But theirs just happens to be a particularly interesting and almost unknown story in the English-speaking world. It is also important to explain it because it is necessary to break the stereotype of the Serbs as somehow genetically and uniquely predisposed to massive violence. After all, just as Hitler could subvert and manipulate the Germans, the late 1980s were the right time and place for Slobodan Milošević to do the same with the Serbs. By examining key elements and images in Serbian history, I want to outline the main components of Serbian historical memory and the way it has been formed, acted upon, and passed down through the generations. Only with a solid understanding of the past can we understand how the Serbs could be induced to make such catastrophic decisions about their future. After all, the Serbs could not be manipulated if there was no material with which to manipulate them.

HEAVENLY PEOPLE

> Whoever will not fight at Kosovo,
> may nothing grow that his hand sows,
> neither the white wheat in his field
> nor the vine of the grapes on his mountain.
>   —from a Serbian epic poem[1]

Visoki Dečani is one of the most exquisite of all the Serbian medieval monastery churches. But like many others, it is in Kosovo, the heartland of Serbian history where today there are few Serbs left.[2] Visoki Dečani ("High Dečani") is now a Serbian oasis in a land that is today overwhelmingly populated by hostile ethnic Albanians. One could argue forever about whether history is cyclical or not, but what is certain is that just as Jewish history in the Diaspora and the yearning for the Holy Land are intertwined, so

are Serbian history and Kosovo, in both the physical and spiritual senses.

In the Middle Ages Kosovo and the region known as Sandžak or Raška formed the core of the Serbian lands and kingdoms. Whereas in the early medieval period the Serbs had been ruled by various warring chieftains, it was the era of the Nemanjić monarchs that was to irrevocably shape the Serbian destiny. From the late twelfth century until just after the death of Emperor Dušan, the Serbs were a major military and political force in the Balkans. Following the demise of the Nemanjas the Serbs were again divided and hence became easy prey for the steadily advancing Ottoman Turks. However, the legacy of the Nemanjas was so profound that it must be examined in some detail. It was essentially the kingdom of the Nemanjas that transformed the hitherto disparate Serbian tribes into a nation and gave them an identity that would survive hundreds of years of Ottoman domination.

In 1196 Stefan Nemanja, the father of the dynasty, abdicated in order to become a monk on Mount Athos. His most important contribution to Serbian history was to opt for the church of Constantinople over that of Rome. Living along the historical faultline of Christendom, the Serbs had been divided before that, and their chieftains had not yet definitively opted for one form of Christianity over the other. It was Nemanja's son Rastko (Saint Sava) who consolidated the religious identification of the Serbs with Orthodoxy. By securing the foundation of a Serbian autocephalous church, he unwittingly gave the Serbs, as a nation, the cultural wherewithal to withstand Ottoman rule.[3]

Medieval Serbia under the Nemanjas had two props, state and church, that were originally intertwined in one family. While the state was swept away by the Turks, the church remained. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this factor. The church canonized many of the Nemanjić monarchs, and they became immortalized in ecclesiastical frescoes and icons. This meant that for hundreds of years the churchgoing Serbian peasant saw before him images of Christ, the apostles, *and* the holy Serbian kings of the lost golden age. In other words, the resurrection was not just a spiritual affair; Serbia itself would one day be raised from the dead.

It is in the same vein that we must interpret the most famous of all Serbian semi-historical legends, that of Lazar and the Battle of Kosovo. Following the death of Dušan in 1355, his empire evaporated. By 1389 the Serbian lands were again ruled by a collection of rival noblemen, and the most powerful was Lazar Hrebeljanović. Refusing, as others had already done, to submit and become a Turkish vassal, Lazar and his allies met the Turks in battle at Kosovo Polje. Although many Serbs think they know exactly what happened there, in fact the historical record is scanty. Lazar and Sultan Murad died, and the battle appears to have been more or less a draw. However, the Turks, with their greater resources of manpower, were able over the next few years to assert their authority over the Serbs and by the end of the fifteenth century to conquer them completely.

What is important about the Battle of Kosovo, however, is not what really happened but what people *believe* to have happened. In Serbian epic poetry—which, along with the church, helped nourish national identity for so long—the Kosovo cycle became central. To the accompaniment of the one-string gusla, Serbian bards would sing of Lazar's last supper where two of his knights quarreled: One, Vuk Branković, says that the other, Miloš Obilić, will betray Lazar. The insult is hurled back. On the day of the battle, June 28th, Obilić succeeds in slipping past the sultan's guards and slays him by his own hand. In the ensuing slaughter Obilić and Lazar die, and the Serbs are indeed betrayed by Branković. So, on the eve of the Turkish conquest, we have the genesis of another vitally important part of the historical-religious mythmaking, which would not only sustain the Serbs under the Turks but in fact help mold their national psyche. Lazar, the Serbian Christ, has his own last supper and the Serbs have their own Judas. Even more significantly, according to the myths spun by Serbian monks in the years after 1389, which were then incorporated into the Kosovo cycle, Lazar had made a fateful choice. He chose to die rather than to submit.

The idea that it is better to fight honorably and die rather than live as slaves was not a Serbian invention; it had existed in epic poetry since the time of classical antiquity. But in this context its function was to provide the Serbs with an explanation for their oppression by the Turks. It also identified the whole nation with

the central guiding raison d'être of Christianity: resurrection. In other words, Lazar opted for the empire of heaven—that is, truth and justice—so that the state would one day be resurrected. An earthly kingdom was rejected in favor of nobler ideals—victimhood and sacrifice—and this choice is to be compared with the temptations of Christ. According to Žarko Korać, a professor of psychology at Belgrade University, this point is so fundamental that "it is not a metaphor; it is primordial":

> What it tells the Serbs is, "We are going to make a state again." Just as Jesus is "coming back," so is Lazar. It means that because we opted for the kingdom of heaven we cannot lose, and that is what people mean when they talk about the Serbs as a "heavenly people." In this way the Serbs identify themselves with the Jews. As victims, yes, but also with the idea of "sacred soil." The Jews said "Next year in Jerusalem," and after two thousand years they recreated their state. The message is: "We are victims, but we are going to survive."[4]

KOSOVO: EXODUS AND RETURN

Following the Turkish conquest several important dynamics were set in motion. The first, which I do not want to dwell on too heavily here, is the question of migration. As a consequence of both push and pull factors, Serbs began to migrate northwards and towards Bosnia and parts of Croatia, thus establishing areas of settlement in these regions. The single most important migration, in terms of this essay, was that of 1690. Following the penetration of the Austrians as far south as Skopje and Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox patriarch Arsenije Čarnojević encouraged the Serbs to rise up in revolt against the Turks. When the Austrians were defeated in battle, however, the patriarch led columns of refugees back with the retreating Austrians, eventually taking them over the Danube into Habsburg territory. In this way, Serbian settlement in Vojvodina was consolidated, and a new church seat was established at Sremski Karlovci free from the influence of the Phanariot Greeks of Constantinople and their Turkish masters. Of equal importance here is that this migration also provided the impetus for another—that of waves of Albanians from and across the nearby mountains, who were now encouraged by the Turks to

settle in Kosovo, sometimes forcibly so. As the political and eccle-
siastical center of Serbian life migrated northwards, the accompa-
nying demographic changes (which may yet lead to a new war in
the Balkans) took hold.

Under the Turks the Serbs lived a life that, in sociological terms,
was not dissimilar from other subject peoples in other parts of
Eastern Europe. While the towns became the preserve of Turks,
Slavic Muslims, Jews, and Greeks, the Serbs lived in relative cul-
tural and physical isolation in the countryside. The idea of "Serbdom"
remained alive, nourished as we have noted by epic poetry and the
church. With no secular leadership, of course, such inspiration had
no active result until such time as circumstances changed, giving
the Serbs the opportunity to challenge the Turks. After a brief
period (1718–1739) as a resurrected Kingdom of Serbia, subject to
the Habsburgs, Serbia returned to Ottoman domination. The re-
bellion of Karadjordje, which began in 1804 and was to lead first
to autonomy and eventually independence, was not sparked by
historical grievances. However, since every Serb had been brought
up to believe in the idea of their nation's resurrection, it is easy to
discern how this historical memory was mobilized once the rebel-
lion had begun.

First, the most prominent gusla players and singers of epic songs
quickly adapted their repertoire, thus Karadjordje and his men
came to be identified with the Nemanjas and the lost knights of
Serbia's glorious past. Portraits of Emperor Dušan appeared in
Karadjordje's *Sovjet* building, and the inspiration for symbols and
flags was drawn from history books originally circulating amongst
the wealthy and urban Serbs of the Habsburg lands.

The period after 1817 was given over to the consolidation of the
Serbian principality. Once this was accomplished, however, edu-
cated Serbs again began to draw on history in a bid to shape the
future. After all, the now-autonomous Serbia only included a
small part of the lands in which the Serbs lived. These included not
just "old Serbia" (Kosovo and Sandžak) but Macedonia, Bosnia,
Hercegovina, and parts of Croatia and Slavonia, too. Ilija Garašanin,
the towering statesman of mid-nineteenth century Serbian politics,
was the first to put history to work in his *Načertanije* or "outline
plan," which suggested a future course for Serbian foreign policy.
He maintained that the Serbs had been building an empire in the

Middle Ages but that the Turks had put a stop to this. Since the empire had begun to collapse some thirty years before the Battle of Kosovo, this was not strictly true. But for Garašanin, as for all nationalists, history was there to be used for the present, the facts notwithstanding. With the Ottoman Empire now close to collapse (or so he believed), the imperial mission had to be taken up once more. In this way, he wrote, the Serbs would be seen by the world as:

> the true heirs of our great forefathers, and they are engaged in nothing new but the restoration of their ancient homeland. Our present will not be without our tie with our past, but it will bring into being a connected, coherent, and congruous whole, and for this Serbdom, its nationality and its political existence as a state, stands under the protection of sacred historic right. Our aspiration cannot be accused of being something new, unfounded, out of revolution and rebellion, but everyone must admit that it is politically necessary, that it is founded upon the distant past, and that it has its root in the past political and national life of the Serbs, a root which is only bringing forth new branches and beginning to flourish anew.[5]

Essentially, *Načertanije* proposed to use the autonomous principality as the springboard for the fully fledged resurrection of Serbia, to make it great once more and to serve as the beacon of hope for the Serbs outside the principality—to indicate to them that they must be ready, sooner or later, to fight for their redemption. *Načertanije* was, until 1906, a secret document, but it was the guiding light of foreign policy until at least 1914, if not until the founding in 1918 of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia.

Just as *Načertanije* drew on history to shape state policy, profound changes within Serbian society itself led to a new interest in history. Until 1804 the Serbs of Ottoman Serbia had been essentially a peasant nation, although a modest merchant class had begun to develop; by contrast, an intellectual caste had begun to flourish in the neighboring Habsburg lands. The principality provided the opportunity for these separate currents to meet. Many Habsburg Serbs came to live in Serbia and played an important role in its development. Even more vital, though, was the emergence within Serbia itself of a small but literate middle class. In

terms of its aspirations, it naturally looked towards Central Europe and away from Constantinople, to which Serbia was still nominally subject until 1878.

Modest though Serbia's middle classes may have been, they were to be the engine of its history from now on. Belgrade may have been provincial by European standards, but this did not mean that its intellectuals, playwrights, and artists lacked energy. Most importantly, Vuk Karadžić, who had set a modern Serbian literary standard, was to transcribe the epic poetry of his people, ensuring that Lazar and his knights could continue to live in the minds of those Serbs who no longer clustered around the gusla player on a cold winter's night. Plays also drew on Serbia's historical moment of glory for their inspiration, as did artists who until now had painted only religious themes. In this way the Serbs of the principality—and from 1882 the kingdom declared by Milan Obrenović—were infused with a sense of national destiny in much the same way as other European nations. History, particularly the so-called Kosovo Spirit, became part of public discourse. In 1889, on the five hundredth anniversary of the battle, Čedomil Mijatović, Serbia's foreign minister, told the Royal Academy:

> An inexhaustible source of national pride was discovered on Kosovo. More important than language and stronger than the Church, this pride unites all Serbs in a single nation. . . . The glory of the Kosovo heroes shone like a radiant star in that dark night of almost five hundred years. . . . Our people continued the battle in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries when they tried to recover their freedom through countless uprisings. There was never a war for freedom—and when was there no war?—in which the spirit of the Kosovo heroes did not participate. The new history of Serbia begins with Kosovo—a history of valiant efforts, long suffering, endless wars, and unquenchable glory. . .Karadjordje breathed with the breath of Kosovo, and the Obrenovići placed Kosovo in the coat of arms of their dynasty. We bless Kosovo because the memory of the Kosovo heroes upheld us, encouraged us, taught us, and guided us.[6]

The Royal Academy is now the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which in the 1980s was to play a key role in reviving Serbian nationalism.

Two of the most famous painters of this period were Uroš Predić and Paja Jovanović. Amongst Jovanović's most famous

works, painted on a monumental scale, were *The Coronation of Tsar Dušan* and *The Migration of the Serbs,* which depicts Patriarch Arsenije leading his 1690 exodus from Kosovo. Predić's single most famous picture is *The Kosovo Girl,* an image that today (perhaps more than ever) remains imprinted on the mind of every Serb. It shows a scene from one of the best-known Kosovo epic poems, a girl holding the head of Lazar's dying standard-bearer while she gives him wine to drink from a golden jug. Strewn around them are the bodies of the dead and the warrior himself lies propped up on the corpse of a slain Turk. Curiously, the painting was only finished in 1919, which means that despite being the most famous of the genre it was also the last of its kind.

In a way, the same fate befell the church of St. George at Oplenac; although begun in 1910, it was only finished after World War I. This stark, white, vaulted construction built in Serbo-Byzantine style sits on top of a wooded hill, and its domes can be seen for miles around. It was built by King Peter Karadjordjević, who wanted a shrine for the remains of Karadjordje, the founder of the dynasty, and the rest of his clan.

Ideas for how to decorate the inside of the church changed while it was being built. At the end of the Balkan Wars, King Peter decided to inscribe its walls with the names of those who had died in them. Events overtook him, though; with the outbreak of World War I Serbia was occupied, and by the time it was over so many had died that it was thought impossible to cover the walls with all their names. Artists were instead sent out to all the medieval monasteries and churches of Serbia and Mount Athos to copy frescoes of historic kings and saints. These were faithfully reproduced in 725 mosaic compositions made up of forty million pieces. The centerpiece, hanging under the central dome, is a candelabrum made of the bronze of melted cannons. Within it is a massive inverted crown symbolizing the end of the medieval empire and the Battle of Kosovo.

Although the building of the Oplenac mausoleum was finished after Serbia had already been subsumed into the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia, its conception summarized the national-romantic and patriotic atmosphere of the years leading up to the Balkan Wars. In 1912 Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria allied to expel the Turks from the Balkans. The lightning campaign was a daz-

zling success, but in 1913 the aggrieved Bulgarians, feeling cheated over the territorial spoils, attacked their former allies. For the Serbs the crowning moment of the two wars was the return of Serbian rule to Kosovo. Such was the religious fervor of the first campaign that when the Serbian army reached Prilep in Macedonia— the home of Kraljević Marko, one of the legendary figures of the Serbian epics—the whole regiment is reported to have suffered from a collective hallucination, seeing him lead their charge. One of the soldiers who had taken part in the advance on Kosovo recalled the overwhelming sense of emotion as Serbian troops finally returned to the holy battlefield:

> The single sound of that word—Kosovo—caused an indescribable excitement. This one word pointed to the black past—five centuries. In it exists the whole of our sad past—the tragedy of Prince Lazar and the entire Serbian people. . . .

> Each of us created for himself a picture of Kosovo while we were still in the cradle. Our mothers lulled us to sleep with the songs of Kosovo, and in our schools our teachers never ceased in their stories of Lazar and Miloš [Obilić]. . . .

> My God, what awaited us! To see a liberated Kosovo. The words of the commander were like music to us and soothed our souls like the miraculous balsam.

> When we arrived on Kosovo and the battalions were placed in order, our commander spoke: "Brothers, my children, my sons!" His voice breaks. "This place on which we stand is the graveyard of our glory. We bow to the shadows of fallen ancestors and pray to God for the salvation of their souls." His voice gives out and tears flow in streams down his cheeks and grey beard and fall to the ground. He actually shakes from some kind of inner pain and excitement.

> The spirits of Lazar, Miloš, and all the Kosovo martyrs gaze on us. We feel strong and proud, for we are the generation which will realize the centuries-old dream of the whole nation: that we with the sword will regain the freedom that was lost with the sword.[7]

The single most important formative and influential piece in literature is without doubt *The Mountain Wreath,* a "modern" epic composed by the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Petar ll Petrović-Njegoš. Isolated in their mountain fastness from the rest of Serbdom,

the Montenegrins saw themselves not just as Serbs but indeed as the true fighters of the holy cause. In his 1847 epic Njegoš feted those who sought to exterminate the Montenegrins who had converted to Islam, and he identified the cause of all Serbian ills: treachery. As with original sin, the first traitor was easily identifiable—he was none other than Vuk Branković of Kosovo fame:

> Our Serbian chiefs, most miserable cowards,
> The Serbian stock did heinously betray.
> Thou, Branković, of stock despicable,
> Should one serve so his fatherland,
> Thus much is honesty esteem'd.[8]

The Serbian historian Rade Mihaljčić has written, "Once legend, or one of its motifs, has found its way into literature in its original form, then, even if it has not been perpetuated in the form of an epic poem, it becomes an integral part of the national heritage." In this way he argues that the Branković story is a "legend which has become part of the reality, the foundation of a people's historical consciousness and awareness of its ethnic individuality."[9]

Part of the justification from the middle of the nineteenth century for the forthcoming onslaught on the Ottoman Empire became "avenging Kosovo." Under Njegoš, a medal celebrating Miloš Obilić, the assassin of the sultan, became the country's highest decoration for valor. King Nikola, the last king of Montenegro, also invoked Kosovo and Miloš Obilić in his famous poem, which was to inspire his troops on the eve of the Balkan Wars:

> Over there, o'er there, beyond those hills,
> Where the heavens bend the blue sky,
> Toward Serb fields, toward martial fields,
> Over there, brothers, let's prepare to go!
>
> Over there, o'er there, beyond those hills,
> One can find, they say, Miloš's tomb. . .
> Over there! . . . My soul will receive its rest
> When Serb no longer will be a slave.[10]

While Kosovo had the power to inspire the nation collectively, what is less well known is how the fate of the entire world has been unwittingly influenced by it. Gavrilo Princip, the schoolboy

who murdered Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, knew the lengthy *Mountain Wreath* by heart, as did many of his contemporaries. Just before the assassination, Nedeljko Čabrinović, a member of Princip's conspiracy, had thrown a bomb at the Archduke but missed. Like the others, he identified with Obilić but all the more so because he too had been suspected of treachery— his father was a police informer. At his investigation he expressed outrage that Franz Ferdinand had been visiting Sarajevo on June 28, Vidovdan or St. Vitus' Day, the anniversary of the battle:

> This fact fired me with zeal to carry out the attempt. Our folklore tradition tells how Miloš Obilić was accused before Vidovdan that he was a traitor and how he answered: "On Vidovdan we shall see who is and who is not a traitor." And Obilić became the first assassin who went into the enemy camp and murdered Sultan Murad. The local socialists have called me a spy like my father.[11]

MIXING THE FATAL COCKTAIL

The Serbia that entered World War I was led by a caste of men who had not only already been fighting since 1912 but had also known only victory in these past two years. By 1915, however, Serbia was occupied by the Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Germans. For men schooled in the idea of Serbian resurrection there was only one option: the physical evacuation of the whole court, government, and army. Across Kosovo and the winter mountains of Albania they trudged on foot until they reached the sea. From there, Allied ships rescued them and took them to Corfu. In this way the Serbian Army itself was saved, resurrected, and soon took its place alongside the Allies on the Salonika Front.

Until now the Serbian leadership had been little interested in the idea of "Yugoslavia" as opposed to a Greater Serbia, but this is not the place to examine the dynamics that brought together the various components of Yugoslavia in the wake of World War I. The post-1918 kingdom was a poor and politically unstable country, but there is still no reason to suppose it could not have survived, in one form or another, had it not been the object of Mussolini's territorial desires and become embroiled in the poisonous politics of the years leading up to World War II.

Although Yugoslavia's leadership resisted signing the Axis Tri-partite Pact for as long as it could, by March 1941 it was assumed that if the country did not bow to Hitler's wishes then he would destroy it. This was certainly a correct assessment, and so they duly signed. The motives behind the coup that overthrew this same leadership almost immediately afterwards were complex. They were egged on by British agents, but one can only wonder whether such a suicidal mission would have been undertaken by members of the overwhelmingly Serbian officer corps had they not been schooled in the Kosovo tradition. Patriarch Gavrilo, who had been staunchly against the Pact, certainly saw the coup in such epic terms. In a radio broadcast he said:

> Before our nation in these days, the question of our fate again presents itself. This morning at dawn the question received its an-swer. We chose the heavenly kingdom—the kingdom of truth, jus-tice, national strength, and freedom. That eternal idea is carried in the hearts of all Serbs, preserved in the shrines of our churches, and written on our banners.[12]

On April 6, 1941 Hitler began the invasion of Yugoslavia, which fell apart with little resistance.

World War II in Yugoslavia is well covered in terms of the available literature, although much of it remains controversial. What is important for this essay is that it was to give birth to powerful new sources of historical motivation that, half a century later, were to fuse with a revived Kosovo myth.

The bare facts of the war concerning the Serbs are twofold. First, the conflict between the nationalist and royalist forces of General Draža Mihailović and Tito's Partisans was, at the outset at least, a Serbian civil war. The second point is that the quisling regime in the so-called Independent State of Croatia (which in-cluded Bosnia-Hercegovina) sought to emulate its Nazi godfather with a genocidal campaign against the Serbs. The death camp of Jasenovac thus came to have the same meaning for Serbs as Auschwitz does for the Jews.

It is important to note here that while Serbs and Muslims and Serbs and Albanians had a history of blood between them, until that point Croats and Serbs had never fought one another. In the Yugoslavia born in 1918, the Croats resented what they felt was

their junior status in a Serb-dominated state. While many were euphoric then at "independence" in 1941, this still did not mean that there was reason to suspect that a policy of mass annihilation and expulsion should now begin. In this respect the policy of the Ustashe had no roots in history, although they were of course to sow the seeds of hatred that their grandchildren would reap in 1991.

Part of the tragedy that befell the Serbs after 1945 had to do with the fact that although the Ustashe were swept away (as were Mihailović's Chetniks), Tito concluded that the only way to remake Yugoslavia was to draw a line under the past. This meant that, unlike the Germans, the Croats, who to a certain extent had fought their own civil war, did not have to undergo a German-style de-Nazification. Likewise, the Serbs could not grieve collectively as Serbs. While it is true that others, including Croats and Jews, died in Jasenovac, no mention was ever made in its official history that it had been primarily a place of death for Serbs rather than blandly put "victims of fascism." Even more importantly, little serious research into the nature of the genocide, and of the numbers in particular, was ever done.[13] In the same vein, the Bosnian Muslims who had died at the hands of the Chetniks were also written off, historically speaking. In this way ghosts were not laid to rest.

Despite its problems there is little doubt that most people who grew up in Tito's Yugoslavia not only believed in its self-proclaimed "brotherhood and unity" but were also proud of their country. Even in 1971, when a wave of nationalism swept Croatia, it would have been hard to imagine a fully independent state resulting if this "Croatian Spring" had been left to run its natural course.

Tito died in 1980, leaving the country organized as a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces. While he was alive, Tito was the undisputed boss; since his successor as president was an eight-man rotating federal presidency, it is hardly surprising that the country began to embark, albeit gradually, on a centrifugal course. Despite this, there was no reason to assume that Yugoslavia would inevitably collapse and certainly not that it should have done so in such a bloody fashion. Until 1990, after all, Yugoslavia remained a communist country. The demise of com-

munism elsewhere meant that pressure for multiparty elections in the republics could no longer be avoided. In Slovenia and Croatia, which had been locked in disputes with Serbia, nationalist parties won. In Serbia the communist, now socialist party of Slobodan Milošević retained power because Milošević had donned the mantle of nationalism.

It is at this point that the Battle of Kosovo, the exodus of 1690, Jasenovac, and the rhetoric of Slobodan Milošević all begin to come together; for the first stirrings of real nationalist dissent in Yugoslavia came not from the Serbs but from the now-majority ethnic Albanian community in Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo. The Albanians, as the only significantly large non-Slav people in the state of the South Slavs, were the odd ones out in Yugoslavia. They rebelled against their incorporation into Serbia during the Balkan Wars, Albanian guerrillas fought the Yugoslavs after 1918, and after 1941 Serbs had been persecuted and driven out of Kosovo, then part of Italian and later German-sponsored Greater Albania. After 1944 Tito's Partisans had to use military force against those who resisted the return of Yugoslav rule, and Kosovo remained Serb-run until the late 1960s. A period of relaxation followed, and the process of handing power in the province over to its Albanian majority effectively began. What many Western liberals often refuse to acknowledge when discussing Kosovo is that there has never been anything remotely resembling a civic society there nor any hint of any historic compromise—since 1912 it has been either Serbs *or* Albanians holding the whip hand.

From 1974 on Kosovo was a Yugoslav republic in all but name but nevertheless still part of Serbia. This rankled the Albanians, many of whom treated the local Serbs with contempt and hostility. Enver Hoxha's Stalinist Albania next door may have been a dreadful place, but many nonetheless saw it as an Albanian state run by Albanians for Albanians, and incidentally not for the Russians or the Chinese, either. Under Tito it was possible for the Kosovo cracks to be covered up, but after 1981 this became increasingly difficult. Serbs began emigrating in ever-greater numbers while Kosovo's mostly poverty-stricken ethnic Albanians rioted. It was at this point that voices within the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo began to suggest—cautiously at first—that something had to be done.

It was over the next few years that the malign cocktail of history and politics came to be mixed. In the gradually freer atmosphere following Tito's death it became possible for Serbian academics to discuss the Kosovo problem. Foremost among those watching over the province was the well-known Serbian novelist and dissident Dobrica Ćosić. In September 1986 the whole country was shaken by the leak of a draft memorandum prepared by a committee of academics at the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. Although Ćosić did not directly participate in the writing of the *Memorandum*, as it has come to be known, it was clear that it was very much the product of his inspiration. Most of the *Memorandum* is a rather dull analysis of Serbian problems; contrary to myth, it does not argue for a Greater Serbia. Rather, it suggests that a more centralized Yugoslavia would make more economic sense than a country splintered into six republics and two autonomous provinces. It is understandable, however, that due to what followed— sudden and uncharacteristically hysterical paragraphs about Kosovo and Croatia—such a suggestion should have automatically been read by non-Serbs as an assertion of Serbian supremacy. Departing from its plodding tone, the *Memorandum* did not say that Serbs in Kosovo were facing problems but instead asserted: "It is not just that the last of the remnants of the Serbian nation are leaving their homes at an unabated rate, but according to all evidence, faced with a physical, moral, and psychological reign of terror, they seem to be preparing for their final exodus."[14] A direct line was drawn from 1690 to the present, and the *Memorandum* declared: "The physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian people in Kosovo. . .is a worse historical defeat than any experienced in the liberation wars waged by Serbia from the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 to the uprising of 1941."[15]

Today it is difficult to imagine the fantastic shock of such language bursting into the lives of people who still lived in the relative monotony of a communist, albeit liberal, society.

Discussing the Serbs of Croatia, some 12 percent of its population, the *Memorandum* claimed: "Except for the time under the Independent State of Croatia, the Serbs in Croatia have never been as jeopardized as they are today." This was patently ludicrous especially since, for historical reasons, the Serbs were overrepresented in ethnic terms in Croatia's communist party and security

organs. Nevertheless the *Memorandum* warned that unless there was a resolution of the national status of the Serbs in Croatia "the consequences might well be disastrous, not only for Croatia, but for the whole of Yugoslavia."[16] As for Serbia itself, the *Memorandum* declared that a country that had fought more than once for its independence had been reduced to being run by committees of apparatchiks. Kosovo's autonomous status also meant that in Yugoslavia only Serbia was "not allowed to have its own state. A worse historical defeat in peacetime cannot be imagined."[17] And then the conclusion: "The Serbian people cannot stand idly by and wait for the future in such a state of uncertainty. . . . Naturally, Serbia must not be passive and wait and see what others will say, as it has done so often in the past."[18]

LAZAR'S GHOST

The effect of the *Memorandum* was fundamental; there was no looking back. Whatever its political importance, the *Memorandum* meant that Serbia's historical memory was being shaken from the torpor of the last forty years. The crucial paragraphs of the *Memorandum* touched every nerve: Kosovo, Serbian pride, the Serbs who had died in countless wars—for what?—the genocide of World War II. The *Memorandum* then was a key event that not only evoked a powerful, historically motivated nationalism that had lain dormant but reinvigorated it with a new element: that of preventing a repetition of the genocide. Of course the *Memorandum* alone was not enough to send a whole society spiraling into nationalist madness. But its most important political effect was, within time, to provide the ambitious young politician Slobodan Milošević with the ideas he needed to capture the imagination of the Serbs and eventually consolidate power throughout Serbia.

In 1987 Milošević was already the head of the communist party in Serbia, but he had only risen to that position on the coattails of his best friend Ivan Stambolić, who was then president of Serbia. In April 1987 Stambolić asked Milošević to go to Kosovo to meet with angry Serbs. It was here that Milošević betrayed Stambolić and, moving from the party line of denouncing nationalism, began his campaign to oust him and take full power. Such would be little more than the stuff of ordinary politics if we could not see so

clearly how Milošević now moved to ride the tiger of Serbia's reawakening historical memory, as evidenced by the following two speeches. The first was made by Milošević to Serbs in Kosovo on April 24, 1987:

> First, I want to tell you, comrades, that you should stay here. This is your country, these are your houses, your fields and gardens, your memories. You are not going to abandon your lands because life is hard, because you are oppressed by injustice and humiliation. It has never been a characteristic of the Serbian and Montenegrin people to retreat in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when they should fight, to become demoralized when things are difficult. You should stay here, both for your ancestors and your descendants. Otherwise you would shame your ancestors and disappoint your descendants. But I do not suggest you stay here suffering and enduring a situation with which you are not satisfied. On the contrary! It should be changed, together with all progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia. . . . Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo![19]

This was language that meant something to the Serbs. Milošević was, and is, an opportunist. He knew what he was doing. Just as after 1804 the gusla players made the essential connection between Karadjordje and the Nemanjas, television was about to do the same for Milošević. He was taking on the role of a latter-day Lazar, even if he had no intention of dying for the cause. Such speeches had *resonance*. After 1389 Patriarch Danilo recorded that on the eve of battle Lazar had addressed his men thus:

> You, oh comrades and brothers, lords and nobles, soldiers and vojvodas [dukes]—great and small. You yourselves are witnesses and observers of that great goodness God has given us in this life. . . . But if the sword, if wounds, or if the darkness of death comes to us, we accept it sweetly for Christ and for the godliness of our homeland. It is better to die in battle than to live in shame. Better it is for us to accept death from the sword in battle than to offer our shoulders to the enemy. We have lived a long time for the world; in the end we seek to accept the martyrs' struggle and to live forever in heaven. We call ourselves Christian soldiers, martyrs for godliness to be recorded in the book of life. We do not spare our bodies in fighting in order that we may accept the holy wreathes

from that one who judges an accomplishment. Sufferings beget glory and labors lead to peace.[20]

Milošević moved swiftly to take the levers of full political power in Serbia, but this was not enough. What he really wanted was to rule the whole of Yugoslavia. In what became a symbolic coronation, Milošević chose the massive celebrations that had been organized for the six hundredth anniversary of the battle, and a million people turned up to hear him speak. Perhaps in a bid to intimidate the other Yugoslav leaders, who because of protocol were forced to attend, Milošević said: "The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave and undefeated. . . . Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet. . . ."[21]

A few miles away the bones of Lazar lay in state. But Milošević did not pay homage to the man said to have died for a cause nobler than that of a kingdom on earth. In 1987, as a prelude to the six hundredth anniversary, Lazar's bones had been taken by the Church around Serbia and Bosnia, from monastery to monastery, so that Serbs could flock in pilgrimage to pray before him. After the anniversary they were laid in the monastery of Ravanica, where the sarcophagus is opened every Sunday. According to Mother Solomonija, who watches over him, "He still makes miracles and cures diseases." By the coffin is a large embroidered Serbian flag brought to Ravanica in 1989 by Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia. It is, she says, a copy of Boško Jugović's banner.

Boško Jugović was the youngest of the nine sons of the old noble Jug Bogdan; they all died at Kosovo where, like their master, they would not bow down to the Turks. Boško Jugović has a special place in the epic tales. His sister was Milica, Lazar's wife, who asked her husband to spare him from battle and keep him with her in Kruševac. She succeeded but Boško Jugović, carrying "the flag of the cross," dismissed her, saying:

Go home, sister, to the white tower;
but I would never come back to you
or give the flag of the cross out of my hands
if the Tsar had given me Krushevats,
so that my regiment would say:
"Look at that coward Boshko Jugovich,

He dared not go down to Kosovo
to spill his blood for the honorable cross
and die for the faith of the Christians."[22]

Or so says the tale. There is no historical evidence that Jug Bogdan or his sons existed. This did not bother the Krajina Serbs who with this gesture were paying homage to the mythic cause. Like Lazar, their leaders would not compromise when full-scale political and then military conflict broke out. As they saw it, they would not bow down before the Croats, who in modern times were fulfilling the role once played by the Turks.

In the years leading up to the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia, Milošević was the king of the Serbs. With his control of the media the Serbian leader was able to play on not just the theme of the resurrection of apparatchik-trampled Serbia but also that of "never again." Almost every day viewers of Serbian television were subjected to gruesome documentaries about Jasenovac and the Ustashe. This was necessary to mobilize those who might otherwise have remained immune to the temptations of wallowing in a history reborn. Naturally the effect of all this was to spark a competitive nationalism among all the other nations of Yugoslavia. At its most macabre this meant digging up the bones of those murdered fifty years before by the Ustashe or Partisans and reburying them. In more normal times this might have been understandable and acceptable, but in these circumstances the effect was only to stoke the fires. In shrill and bitter debates Serbs and Croats traded historical insults by arguing over the numbers of Serbs who died at Jasenovac—more than a million according to Serb historians, "only" thirty thousand according to the historian turned president of Croatia Franjo Tudjman.

FROM HISTORY TO WAR

The use and abuse of historical memory was what prepared the Serbs for war in 1991, but this fact alone could not begin a war. This was done by the clandestine arming of the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia and the adaptation of Tito-era local defense units to new circumstances. These military structures later changed, but initially, and with the support of the increasingly Serb-dominated

Yugoslav People's Army and paramilitaries attached to the Serbian Ministry of Interior, these were used to carve out territory in Croatia and Bosnia.

Every nation has its myths, which can be used and manipulated. In modern, open societies with free medias and a culture of democracy, it is harder to manipulate people in such a way—but perhaps not impossible. My contention here is that by drawing on roots deeply embedded, indeed dormant even, in the national psyche, Milošević was able to prepare his people for what was to amount to a war of aggression. But the latter was not possible without the former; nothing was inevitable, and Yugoslavia's politicians knew what they were doing. They were playing poker for very high stakes, and the only losers could be their people. Amongst the Serbs especially there were unique circumstances that led to a determined and cynical leader being able to harness historical memory for his own political ends and succeeding. There is no reason to assume, however, that given other circumstances and a similar determination new populist leaders in other parts of former communist Europe and the former Soviet Union should not be able to mobilize people in the same way.

As soon as the wartime front lines stabilized and the Serbs realized that they were not about to win a glorious knockout blow, they began to sober up. Reality began to set in. And this meant that for hundreds of thousands of Serbs the propaganda about what Bosnia's Muslims or Croats might do to you if they caught you alive became a self-fulfilling prophecy. When in August 1995, with the blessing and support of the United States, the Croats launched their offensive on Krajina and then moved with the Muslims on Serb-held western Bosnia, they met with little resistance. This was because Milošević had decided that he either could not or would not support the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs anymore. Given this, the decision to abandon the lines and ancient settlements was easy, because for many Milošević had, in their perception of history and politics, ceased to be Lazar and instead become the traitor Branković. And if this was the case, then flight was the naturally conditioned historical response for a people whose experience taught them that a failed revolt, as in 1690, must be followed by an exodus.

ENDNOTES

[1]Anne Pennington and Peter Levi, *Marko the Prince: Serbo-Croat Heroic Songs* (London: Duckworth, 1984), 13.

[2]Generally speaking there are estimated to be some 1.7 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and about two hundred thousand Serbs. No one really knows for certain though, and the true figures may be rather different. Although Serbs have continued to emigrate, possibly as many as three hundred thousand ethnic Albanians may also have left, mostly for Germany and in search of work.

[3]The two neighboring peoples without a strong church to bolster national identity, the Albanians and the Bosnians, were of course the two Balkan peoples to succumb in the greatest numbers to Islamicization.

[4]Author's interview with Professor Korać.

[5]Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804–1918*, vol. 1 (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 233.

[6]Thomas Emmert, *Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo 1389* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 129.

[7]Ibid., 133.

[8]Rade Mihaljčić, *The Battle of Kosovo in History and in Popular Tradition* (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavacko-graficki zavod, 1989), 117–118.

[9]Ibid., 118.

[10]Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), 274–275.

[11]Vladimir Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo* (London: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 320.

[12]Emmert, *Serbian Golgotha*, 140.

[13]By the time serious research was done on the numbers killed between 1941 and 1945 it was too late to affect debate. Nationalist historians wanted to prove their views rather than the facts. For the record, though, the two historians who did the work were Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić. The former, a Serb, published his work in London in *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (1985). The latter, a Croat, published his strikingly similar figures in Zagreb in *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu* (1989).

[14]Kosta Mihailović and Vasilije Krestić, *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences: Answers to Criticisms* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 129.

[15]Ibid., 128.

[16]Ibid., 133.

[17]Ibid., 127.

[18]Ibid., 140.

[19]Slavoljub Djukić, *Izmedju slave i anateme: Politička biografia Slobodana Miloševića* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1994) 49.

[20]Thomas Emmert, "The Battle of Kosovo: Early Reports of Victory and Defeat," in Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas A. Emmert, eds., *Kosovo: The Legacy of a Medieval Battle* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota, 1991), 24.

[21]Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 77.

[22]Pennington and Levi, *Marko the Prince,* 9. Pennington and Levi have not used accents in their text, hence the slightly different spellings of names.

Illyrianism and the Croatian Quest for Statehood

THE FULFILLMENT OF A THOUSAND-YEAR DREAM was how Franjo Tudjman, leader of Croatia's independence struggle, described his country's recognition by the international community in 1992. The phrase was scarcely off his lips that year. It strikes a discordant note in most Western ears—too grandiloquent and vaguely reminiscent of a thousand-year Reich. But it sounded sweet to most Croats, who, like many small, subjugated peoples, are much more obsessed with their own history than those nations that have generally had an easier ride. If not quite ten, their intellectual leaders had certainly spent several centuries pondering what strategy might best rescue them from their fallen state.

The Croat experience of independence was rather brief. And it was terminated much earlier than that of their Serb neighbors, whose empire reached its height in the mid-fourteenth century and whose independence was not entirely snuffed out by the Ottoman invaders until the 1450s.

The rulers of the Croat tribes in Dalmatia began adopting the title of *Dux Croatiae* (Duke of Croatia) in the 820s. The greatest among them, Tomislav, who was believed to have ruled from about 910 to 928 (the hard evidence is scanty), seems to have united the various Croat statelets in Dalmatia and Pannonia into one unit that encompassed most of contemporary Croatia and Bosnia. He had himself crowned king, and under him Croatia was sufficiently powerful to warrant an admiring reference in the Byz-

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antine emperor Porphyrogenitus's account of his empire, *De Administrando Imperio.*

Tomislav's big Croatia in the tenth century, like Tsar Dušan's great Serbia in the fourteenth century, was a temporary phenomenon. The Croats were unable to withstand the aggressive attentions of their more powerful Magyar and Venetian neighbors, and in 1102 the Croatian crown passed to the Arpad dynasty in Hungary under a pact by which the Croatian kingdom preserved its separate identity and institutions—above all, its parliaments, known as the *Sabor,* and a viceroy, known as a *ban.*

Serbs and Croats, therefore, shared a history of foreign domination. But the Serbs at least remained together in their servitude, under one Ottoman roof. They also had a national church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, founded in the thirteenth century and revived under Ottoman patronage in the 1560s. It was this institution, long after the extinction of the native aristocracy, that preserved the Serbs' strong sense of national identity and ingrained in their collective memory a recollection of a great pre-Ottoman independent kingdom.

The Croats in some ways were in a less favorable position. They did not remain united under foreign rule but were split three ways. The Ottomans ruled over Bosnia, the Dalmatian interior, and the eastern half of Slavonia; Venice ruled the Dalmatian coast (with the exception of the city-state of Dubrovnik); and the Habsburgs ruled a rump kingdom of Croatia after their election to the Croatian crown in 1527, following Hungary's virtual annihilation by the Turks at Mohacs.

Nor did the Croats have a national church that could foster memories of their former statehood. The early Croat rulers, after a brief hesitation in the 870s, took their religion from Rome rather than Byzantium. The popes thereafter frowned on any attempts to impart a national, Slav tone to the church in Croatia, suppressing the use of the native Glagolitic script and the vernacular liturgy, the use of which, with a few exceptions in certain areas, was prohibited in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

Much later the Counter Reformation in Croatia would further weaken the national element in the Church, for the Croat Protestants wished to propagate the use of the Glagolitic script and made a conscious attempt to write in a dialect that would be understand-

able in all the different Croat regions. As a result of the Counter Reformation, the Croats remained under the deracinating influence of bishops loyal first to Rome, and then to Hungary, Venice, or the Habsburgs.

What kept alive a sense of common Croat identity among these separated and subjugated peoples, therefore, was not the Catholic religion.[1] It was literature and the memory of history sustained by the intellectual elite. During the Renaissance era, Venetian-ruled Dalmatia and Dubrovnik gave birth to influential intellectuals—mostly minor aristocrats and clergymen, Jesuits especially—who kept alive the memory of Croatia and the Croatian language when they composed or translated plays and books from Italian and Latin into the vernacular. No matter that the dialects of Dalmatia and Dubrovnik were different from each other—Dubrovnik used the so-called *štokavian* while further north, in Split, they preferred *čakavian*—and that both these dialects were somewhat different from the dialect of Zagreb, capital of the Habsburg-ruled north. They still thought of it as Croatian.

When Šimun Kožičić, bishop of Modrus, had the Roman Missal printed in the vernacular in 1532, the title on the frontispiece was *Misal Hrvacki* (the Croatian Missal), and when Marko Marulić (1450–1524) of Split published the first known vernacular poem in Dalmatia in 1521, the *History of the Holy Widow Judith,* he put on the title that it had been composed *"u versih hrvacki slozena,"* "in Croatian verses." The Dubrovnik poet Dominko Zalatarić (1555–1610) explained on the frontispiece of his 1597 translation of Sophocles' tragedy *Elektra* and Tasso's *Aminta* that it had been *"iz veće tudieh jezika u Hrvacki izlozene,"* "translated from the great foreign languages into Croatian."[2]

Many of these Dalmatian writers dedicated their works to heroes from the northern, Habsburg-ruled kingdom and, in so doing, showed that they still considered themselves members of a Croatian nation that transcended contemporary political boundaries. Zalataric dedicated his plays to Juraj Zrinjski, son of Nikola Subic Zrinjski, the warrior *ban* of Croatia who had perished in 1566 defending Sziget in Hungary from the Ottoman army for the Habsburgs. The Dubrovnik poet Vladislav Menčetić dedicated his *Trublja Slovinska* (*Trumpet of the Slavs*) in 1663 to another member of this cel-

ebrated Croatian noble family, in this case Peter Zrinjski, whom the emperor Leopold I had executed in 1671.

These poets and writers complimented each other as great Croats when they addressed their baroque epistles to one another. "The Croatian peoples shout that you are the golden crown of which we are all proud," said Nikola Nalješković (1510–1586) of Dubrovnik to Ivan Vidali, of the island of Korčula, in an address from the early 1560s. Vidali replied in kind. "You are the glory and fame of the Croatian language," he declared in 1564, in an address that also extolled Dubrovnik—an oasis of Slav liberty between Venice and Turkey—as the "crown of Croatian cities."

The Dalmatian writers of the Renaissance era were pan-Slavs, using the words Croat, Slav, and Illyrian—the latter term borrowed the classical name for the Balkan peninsula—almost interchangeably. As the Ottoman juggernaut rolled over one Croat town after another (by the 1590s the Turks were only a few miles south of Zagreb), they put their faith in a great Slav brotherhood of nations that they hoped would eventually unite to liberate them from humiliating servitude to the sultan and the doge. While they were being enslaved, it was balm to the soul to dwell on the fact that way in the north, and to the east, there existed great independent Slav kingdoms. For Ivan Gundulić (1588–1638), the baroque poet of Dubrovnik, that Slav liberator was going to be Poland, and it was to Poland that he dedicated his epic poem *Osman* following the Poles' victory over the sultan at Chocim in 1621.[3]

After the decline of Catholic Poland, Orthodox Russia took its place as the object of some Croat thinkers' hopes, inspiring Juraj Križanić (1618–1683), a Jesuit from Karlovac in Habsburg Croatia, to undertake a hopeless and rather bizarre pilgrimage to the court of the Tsar Alexis in the 1680s. Križanić's Slav internationalism was so indefatigable that even after the suspicious tsar had exiled him to Siberia his enthusiasm did not flag. After all, the Poles, though they were Slavs themselves, had many foreign rulers, whereas Russia alone was pure in this respect. "The Poles have been called pigs and dogs by some of their queens," he commented indignantly. "There are no rulers of Slavic origin anywhere except here in Russia."[4]

There was no tension between a commitment to Illyria and Croatia. It was not a case of either/or but of both/and. Pavao

Ritter Vitezović (1652–1713) of Senj's influential history book *Croatia Rediviva* (*Croatia Reborn*), written in 1700, wound the two notions together. Vitezović identified as Croats all the contemporary Slav inhabitants of what the classically educated generally called Illyria. To be Croatian and Illyrian was as natural as being, for example, Prussian and German in the nineteenth century, or Scottish and British in the same period.

The pan-Slav element in Croat thought was a defense mechanism. The Dalmatian writers knew only too well that they were too puny, divided and few in number, to even contemplate confronting their Venetian or Turkish overlords. They were mournfully aware of the fact that they were a mere scrap of what they once had been, the *"reliquiae reliquiarum,"* as the Croatian *Sabor* often described the country—a fragment of a fragment of the once-great and famous kingdom of Croatia. The fantasy of belonging to a united Slav people that was as seamless as the robe of Christ (and as phony as the talk of African or Arab unity in our own time) sustained their hopes during the long centuries of foreign rule.

The Croats not only were broken up into several bits but now lived intermingled with large numbers of settlers—the result of the huge demographic changes in the Balkans caused by the Ottoman invasion. In Bosnia, the most peripheral of Tomislav's conquests in the tenth century, the old Catholic population[5] had been enormously diluted since the sixteenth century by the conversion of a large proportion of the native Slavs to Islam and by an influx of Serb Orthodox settlers to the barren and war-devastated lands of northwest Bosnia. There the demographic change was so striking that a region known until the early nineteenth century as "Turkish Croatia" had very few Catholic Croat inhabitants at all by that time.

Even in the small Habsburg-ruled Croatian kingdom, Catholics increasingly lived cheek by jowl with Serb Orthodox settlers. This was especially so in the long strip of land, bordering the Ottoman Empire, known as the Vojna Krajina (the Military Border), which was governed directly by the Habsburg military authorities and in which the authorities expressly invited Serb refugees to settle. So a notion of Croatness that was designed to appeal to as many Slavs

as possible was not merely idealism. It was a very practical response to Croatia's changed demographic reality.

Unable to alter their own destiny single-handedly, the Croats had to wait on the decisions—and armies—of the great powers. In the 1680s, the Habsburgs inflicted a series of stunning defeats on the Ottomans, ending their century-and-a-half rule over Slavonia and driving them, temporarily, from Bosnia as well. In Dalmatia the Ottomans were forced to relinquish control of the interior to Venice. When, in the course of the Napoleonic wars of the 1790s, Venice's Dalmatian empire passed also to the Habsburgs, most Croats found themselves again under one roof for the first time since the Middle Ages.

There is no doubt that most Dalmatians wanted union—or as they would have put it, reunion—with the rest of Croatia. This was demonstrated by the great reception the city of Zadar gave the Croat Habsburg general Juraj Rukavina when he entered the city on behalf of the emperor in July 1797. The Austrians, however, were careful to block the calls for Dalmatia and Croatia to be united into one administrative unit inside the empire, and they tried to foster a separate Dalmatian identity. In spite of this, popular support rose in Dalmatia throughout the century for the *narodnjaci* (nationals) who supported a reunited Croatia within the Habsburg Empire.

Now it was the turn of the richer and more developed northern Croats to pay homage to the patriarchs of the "Illyrian" movement two centuries previously. Nothing could be more symbolic of this attitude of reverence than the great curtain designed in 1895 for the new Croatian National Theater in Zagreb. On it was portrayed a procession of literary worthies, sweeping up towards the figure of Gundulic, who was enthroned against a backdrop of the skylines of Dubrovnik and Zagreb—the former the symbol of Croatia's great past, the latter the hope of the future.[6]

The expansion of the Habsburg Empire solved the greatest problem facing the Croatian nation since the 1500s, being dispersed in three states. And it brought to the forefront the question of Illyria—or, as it became known as in the less classical atmosphere of the 1860s, Jugoslavija, the land of southern Slavs. In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the dream of Slav unity had been a comforting fantasy, sustaining the drooping

spirits of a defeated nation's thinking classes. By the nineteenth century, Illyrianism was no longer just a vague ambition but a pressing political question. The southern Slavs were no longer all subject to foreign rulers and thus were equal, if only in a common state of subjection. The first quarter of the century saw the creation of small Greek and Serbian principalities; later, a Bulgarian state would join their ranks.

These little states all had big ideas. The Greeks dreamed of an empire in Asia Minor, the Bulgarians of Constantinople and Macedonia. In Serbia, as early as the middle of the century, there were important politicians who talked openly of the impending dissolution of the Turkish empire and the coming battle with Austria over the spoils. The Serbian foreign minister Ilija Garašanin was one such official; in his *Načertanije*—an outline of Serbia's foreign policy aims written in the 1840s—he spoke of their determination to reconstruct the great state that had once belonged to Tsar Dušan. "The foundations for building the Serbian empire must therefore be cleared and freed of all ruins and alluvia," he declared. "They must be revealed and then, on this hard and permanent foundation, new building must be undertaken and continued."[7]

The famous, though controversial, reformer of the Serbian alphabet, Vuk Karadžić, was another. Looking westwards, he pronounced Croatia a mere geographical expression and its inhabitants "brothers of the Roman law." They did not know that they were Serbs, he admitted, but in time would become Serbs, because they had no other name to adopt.

The Croat intellectuals of the nineteenth century were disappointed by the rise of an expansionist and rather belligerent Serbian nationalism. However much they railed against the Habsburgs or the Hungarians, they had taken it for granted that they lived in an infinitely more civilized and progressive state than their Illyrian brothers and sisters, who had spent the previous four centuries under the Ottomans, and they were surprised to find out that the newly independent Serbs now looked down on them. They did not like it when their Illyrian sympathies were interpreted as an admission that they did not really exist as a nation. Yet this was just how Vuk Karadžić did interpret it. "Clever Serbs," he said, "both Orthodox and Roman Catholic admit they are one nation," in

"Serbs All and Everywhere," written in about 1836. "Only those of the Roman Catholic Church find it difficult to call themselves Serbs, but they will probably get used to it, little by little, because if they do not want to be Serbs, they have no other choice...."[8]

The traditional yardstick of Serb identity was membership in the Serbian Orthodox Church. Karadžić took the more modern and secular yardstick of language in order to work Catholics and Muslims into his particular Serbian tapestry. Slavs who spoke a language that resembled Serbian were Serbs. Slavs who called themselves Croats were deceiving themselves: "I would say that this name belongs rightly first and only to the *čakavci*," he said, referring to the inhabitants of several Dalmatian islands where the local dialect used *ča* for the word "what," as opposed to the more widespread *što*. Even the inhabitants of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, and its hinterland were Serbs. According to Karadžić this area was more truly known as upper Slavonia, not Croatia, and the local dialect was not a national speech at all but a "transitional" speech between Slovene and Serb.

Garašanin and Karadžić were not, of course, the sole voices of nineteenth-century Serbia. In the last quarter of the century, Serbia became a virtual vassal of Austria-Hungary, the absolute opposite of what Garašanin had counseled. As for Karadžić, he was a *persona non grata* in the new Serbian state, where the powerful Church hierarchy deeply disapproved of both his reforms to the Cyrillic alphabet and his secular brand of nationalism, which seemed to place no special emphasis on the Orthodox faith. But what was increasingly typical of Garašanin and Karadžić among their contemporaries in Serbia was the assumption that Serbia was destined to absorb its smaller and weaker Slav neighbors.

The Croats did not drop their Illyrian, or Jugoslav, program, however. Again, this was not only idealism, but the result of a profound pessimism concerning their abilities to confront their enemies on their own. In the nineteenth century, these enemies were no longer the sultan or the doge but Hungarians, who from the 1790s with increasing energy and resolution pursued a policy of forcing the Hungarian language into Croatia's schools and official institutions, in spite of the fact that most Croats felt this violated the terms of their relationship with Hungary under the historic pact of 1102.

In 1848 Austria went to war and invoked the intervention of Russia in order to quash the Hungarians' revolutionary separatism. But in 1867, after the disastrous defeat at Sadowa at the hands of Prussia, Austria was too weak to resist the Hungarian demands for what was virtually a state within a state, and the subsequent division of the empire into two halves had enormous ramifications for the empire's smaller nationalities. Austria had become Austria-Hungary, and great Hungary gained a free hand over the Croats, the Serbs of Vojvodina, the Slovaks, and the Romanians of Transylvania. With that development Croat hopes of winning a greater degree of home rule disappeared, as did the hope of uniting Croatia and Dalmatia into one unit inside the empire; for while Croatia passed into the Hungarian half of the empire, Dalmatia remained inside "Austria"—the lands represented in the Vienna parliament.

In both halves of the empire, Croats again found themselves in need of allies. In Dalmatia, the Austrians favored the small Italian-speaking elite in the towns—the legacy of centuries of Venetian rule. In Croatia proper, Hungary built up the local Serb minority as a counterweight to the Croats. The prevailing opinion of Croat leaders such as Juraj Strossmayer (1815–1905), the bishop of Djakovo, was that Croats needed to keep their national movement as broadly based as possible in order to frustrate the Austrian and Hungarian policy of divide and rule.

But not everyone in Croatia was happy with Strossmayer's irenical approach to the Serbs and with the direction that Illyrianism was taking Croatia. It was clear to these more skeptical spirits that Hungary's divisive tactics in Croatia in the last decades of the century were succeeding only too well and that despite what the Illyrians said about Slav brotherhood, the local Serb Orthodox population (which then comprised about 25 percent of the population) increasingly perceived its interests as quite separate—even antagonistic—to those of their Catholic Croat neighbors.

Earlier in the nineteenth century, the Serb Orthodox of Croatia had seemed content with a Croat identity; indeed, the Habsburg "Croat" regiments in northern Italy that had gained such a fearsome reputation for savage warfare contained many—perhaps a majority of—Serb Orthodox soldiers. During the year of revolutions in 1848, the question of whether Croats were Catholic or

Orthodox was fairly irrelevant, so that when the strongly Illyrian patriot Josip Jelacic was installed as *ban* of Croatia in that year in Zagreb, it was the head of the Serbian church, Metropolitan Rajačić, and not the Catholic Archbishop, Haulik of Zagreb, who presided at the ceremony. The Metropolitan's benediction then had included an invocation to Jelacic "to protect the august House of Austria, sweet liberty, our nationality, and the common good of the Truine kingdom [of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia]."[9] Only a generation later, the assumption that there was a common nationality among Serbs and Croats and that all Serbs wished to protect the "august House of Austria" or the "Triune kingdom" would have sounded very anachronistic.

By the turn of the century, the Serb Orthodox subjects of the Habsburgs thought of themselves simply as Serbs and, like Garašanin and Karadžić, confidently anticipated the day when a reinvigorated Serbia would come and claim the land as its own. One reason for this change in attitude was that the young Serbian state was expanding and developing, and it became a much more powerful focus for the loyalty of all the Orthodox subjects of the Habsburgs than it had been a few decades earlier.

In the 1860s the last Ottoman garrison was driven out of Belgrade. In the 1870s Serbia nearly doubled in size, at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, and—symbolically important—graduated from a mere principality, theoretically loyal to the sultan, to being a full-fledged kingdom. Serbia's growing power and self-confidence changed the terrain on which Serbs and Croats now met. The Serbs had at no stage been more than half-interested in Croat intellectual talk of Illyria or Jugoslavia. Now they became less so, as the tantalizing project of restoring Dušan's great empire loomed up before their imagination.

Towards the end of his life even Strossmayer, the inspiration and financier of the whole Jugoslav movement (he poured much of his own money into founding a Jugoslav Academy of Art and Science in Zagreb in the 1860s), became thoroughly disillusioned with the business of trying to build cultural and political ties with the Serbs. No man had done more in his generation to realize the dream of the Illyrian poets and writers of an earlier age and to hold out the hand of friendship. Yet by 1885 he was so alarmed by the rise of an exclusive Serbian nationalism that he was pleased

when the Serbs were crushed in their brief war with Bulgaria. "The idea of resurrecting Dušan's kingdom is insane," he fumed. The Serbs, he declared, were now "crushing the idea of a Croatian state. We should pray now that they see that the grave they were digging for others they were preparing first of all for themselves."[10]

The beneficiary of this disillusionment with the Illyrian project was Strossmayer's archrival for the loyalty of Croatia's youth, Ante Starčević. Starčević (1825–1896) came from much the same intellectual Illyrian background as Strossmayer. Strossmayer had been a protégé of the great Illyrian *ban* Jelačić; Starčević was the son of a Serb Orthodox mother and a Catholic father, and his uncle Šime Starčević, a Catholic priest, had shown his strongly Illyrian sympathies during the brief Napoleonic occupation of Dalmatia by compiling a "French-Illyrian" dictionary. Starčević and his supports, especially the radical nationalist Eugen Kvaternik, invested many of their hopes in Napoleon III, the godfather of the Italian Risorgimento and patron saint of national unification movements everywhere.

In Starčević, Vuk Karadžić met his match, or his mirror image. Karadžić saw Serbs "all and everywhere" on the basis of speech. Starčević saw Croats everywhere as well, or at least from the Adriatic all the way to Bulgaria, not on the basis of speech but of history—the historical framework of the Croatian state of the tenth century at its greatest extent, under King Tomislav. This was the state that he was convinced the Croats had a historical right to, and his political party was naturally named the *Stranka Prava* (the Party of Rights), by which he meant the party of the Croatian state's rights.

Like the French revolutionaries, to whom he owed many of his ideas, Starčević was a secular nationalist who placed great emphasis on this concept of statehood—the Croatian state—and he insisted that all those living within the borders of this state were Croat citizens. The various religions and convictions of the people on the ground were of no more consequence to him than they were to Karadžić. Like Karadžić, he would have said, "They have no choice."

It took a good deal of creative thinking to make sense of this fantasy state, which existed only in the imaginations of his followers, known as rightists, or *pravaši*. This was especially so when it

came to Bosnia, where the Catholic proportion of the population had dwindled by the nineteenth century to only a fifth of the whole. Starčević's *pravaši* met the Serbs' challenge to Bosnia head on, insisting that Bosnian Muslims were not only Croats but the most Croat of all Croats! In fact, they were the very blossom of Croatia, because they had not been corrupted by the dead hand of Austria. Their Islam was inconsequential—in a sense, it was a badge of innocence. As for the Serb Orthodox, who by the nineteenth century formed the largest ethnic group in Bosnia, they were dubbed Orthodox Croats, in spite of the fact that they now almost all thought of themselves as Serbs, pure and simple.

Croatian politics in the latter half of the nineteenth century revolved around a contest of ideas between the followers of Strossmayer, who still advocated Illyrian solidarity and rapprochement with the Serbs, and the followers of Starčević, who matched the Serbs' exclusive expansionist nationalism with a worthy Croatian counterpart. Strossmayer became quite bitter in his old age about Starčević's success in weaning the hearts and minds of the coming generation in Croatia away from him. But in World War I it was Starčević's project that foundered and Strossmayer's that appeared to triumph.

The notion of a great independent Croatia simply could not survive the outbreak of a world conflict that brought home to the Croats just how small and dependent upon others they were for their very survival as a nation. "The only chance for Croatians lies in the total defeat of Austria-Hungary but without causing its dissolution" was the gloomy prognosis of the leader of the Croatian peasants party, Stjepan Radić.[11] Victory would leave Hungary invincible and more high-handed than ever with its minorities. Defeat was still more terrifying, for in the secret treaty of April 1915 in London, which the Croats soon found out about, the Entente powers offered Dalmatia to Italy, and Bosnia and much of Croatia to Serbia, in order to win them over and keep them on their side.

Faced with a threat that was, in a way, as calamitous as the Ottoman invasion, a new generation of Dalmatian intellectuals resolved to take action. Led by Ivan Meštrović, Ante Trumbić, and Frane Supilo—an internationally famous sculptor, a former mayor of Split, and a journalist, respectively—they set up the Jugoslav Committee in 1915 as an organization dedicated to ensuring that

the Great Powers did not succeed in consigning Croatia to another partition. Since Croatian independence seemed a hopeless prospect, they were determined at least to secure union for the whole of Croatia with their Slav neighbors in Serbia, on terms that approximated as much as possible the Illyrian ideal of freedom in diversity. It was fortunate for them that by the end of the war, the kind of secret diplomacy once practiced by the British and French was no longer in favor and that under Woodrow Wilson, America was forthright in championing the self-determination of nations. The Jugoslav Committee was also fortunate in that 1917 found the Serb leadership at their lowest ebb, in exile on Corfu and in despair of achieving a great Serbian state. The Jugoslav advocates were thus able to persuade the Serb leaders to line up—rather reluctantly—behind the idea of a common state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

They succeeded in a sense, for it was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that inherited Dalmatia (or most of it), not Italy. Beyond that, however, they were to be disappointed. They had never been Illyrian, or Jugoslav, at the expense of their own Croatian identity any more than the seventeenth-century Dubrovnik poets had been. Yet the Croats were incorporated with a certain amount of force into a centralized state that, though it officially adopted the name Jugoslavia in 1929, was really an extension of Serbia. The result was that Starčević's goal of a great independent Croatia did not die out, as might have been expected, but went underground, recruiting disciples from all those who were disaffected with life in the new state. Starčević's ideas had already been modified since his death in 1896. Under Josip Frank, who carried the rightists into a new era, the party became obsessively anti-Serbian. "Their adoration of Starčević, their hatred of Serbs— these are feelings and passions, not ideas," was the disapproving verdict of many moderate and practical Croat politicians, such as the peasant party leader Stjepan Radić.[12]

In the hostile atmosphere of the 1920s, the Frankist remnant became more extreme; in 1929, when Yugoslavia became a royal dictatorship, this residue evolved in exile into a new and still more authoritarian movement, led by a former deputy in the Yugoslav parliament, Ante Pavelić, and his colleagues—a collection of former Habsburg officers, university professors, and writers. Pavelić re-

christened the movement the Ustashe, from the word *ustanak,*
meaning uprising. They believed strongly in Croats *svi i svuda* (all
and everywhere) and in a state whose borders were fixed by
history, not ethnicity, which encompassed the borders of Tomislav's
kingdom of the tenth century. They also made strenuous efforts to
put into practice Starčević's theory about Muslims as the flower of
the Croatian nation.

Whether Starčević would have recognized his ideas in those
Ustashe who bore his name with such pride, however, was ques-
tionable, for while Starčević had taken most of his inspiration
from revolutionary France, Pavelić borrowed most of his ideas
about running a state from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Starčević
had rejected Strossmayer's Jugoslavism. The Ustashe went several
leagues further, denying that Croats were a Slav nation at all and
putting forward a theory that they in fact descended from the
Goths.[13] Handed the government of Croatia virtually on a plate
after Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Ustashe
takeover unleashed pogroms against Serbs on an enormous scale,
soon followed by racial laws based directly on those of the Nazis
and the erection of death camps for the "Independent State of
Croatia's unwanted Orthodox and Jewish inhabitants."

Not surprisingly, the communist-led opposition to the Ustashe,
known as Partisans and led by a Croat communist named Josip
Tito, eagerly appropriated the mantle of Strossmayer, Jugoslavia,
and Illyria for their cause. So the civil war in Yugoslavia from
1941 to 1945, besides pitting Left against Right, carried echoes in
Croatia of the political struggle of the previous century between
the *narodnjaci* and the *pravaši*—between those who stood for
Croatian statehood and those who believed Croatia's destiny lay
within a wider Slav community. When Tito promised the Croats
and the other smaller nations that there would be no return to the
centralized prewar "Versailles" Yugoslavia, he was drawing on a
common perception in Croatia that the real Yugoslavia had yet to
be tried out and that it might be the final solution to a smaller
nation's centuries-old dilemma. With this Illyrian inheritance in
mind, Tito lectured the Croatian Catholic clergy after the commu-
nist victory in 1945 (the clergy were seen as a prop to the Ustashe
regime) on the need to return to the path laid down by Bishop
Strossmayer.[14] Tito's appeal carried weight. His dedicated sup-

porter among the Catholic clergy was Svetozar Rittig, dean of the prestigious St. Mark's church in Zagreb—and Strossmayer's secretary.

The last ten years have seen the pendulum swing back again in Croatia, away from Strossmayer, Illyrian, and Yugoslavia to Starčević, statehood, and total independence. In Serbia, too, popular commitment to Yugoslavia faded after Tito's death in 1980 and gave way to a more straightforward belief in *Srbi svi i svuda*— Serbs all and everywhere. The war that broke out in 1991 between the Serb-run Yugoslav army and the hastily organized forces of the Slovenes and Croats dealt an enormous, perhaps lasting, blow to the idea that Croats might only find their freedom in a common Slav state.

Illyrianism, and its successor, Jugoslavism, was a practical response of a pessimistic nation that had been repeatedly tossed around and cut up in the wars between the great powers. It kept the spirits of the Croats up while their country was being annihilated by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century and deracinated by the Hungarians in the nineteenth. During World War I it offered salvation from the threat of partition between Italy and Serbia, and during World War II it offered a third way between Pavelić's grotesque fascist independent state and a return to the centralized, Serb-run state of the 1930s.

But the end of the Cold War removed Yugoslavia from the center of the world stage. In the 1990s, Russia was a spent force, and the Western powers divided amongst themselves over policy on the former communist states and were more or less ready to let the local actors in the Balkans decide their own fate.[15] There was no longer an external threat to Croatia, only a wearisome and increasingly violent struggle with Serbia for domination of Yugoslavia. The Illyrian movement no longer had a practical purpose; at the same time, Starčević's goal of independent statehood appeared once again possible. The moment had arrived for Mr. Tudjman's "thousand-year dream." The image, deliberately harkening back to the time of King Tomislav, was one that Starčević would have approved of.

ENDNOTES

[1]"The Catholic Church and the Croatian National Identity," *The East European Quarterly* XIII (1979): 330.

[2]Branko Franolić, *An Historical Survey of Literary Croatian* (London and Paris: Nouvelles editions latines, 1984), 16.

[3]For the literary and historical context in which Osman was written, see Zdenko Zlatar, *The Slavic Epic: Gundulić's Osman* (New York: P. Lang, 1995).

[4]Thomas Eekman and Ante Kadić Juraj Križanić, *Russophile and Ecumenic Visionary* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1976), 161.

[5]There are several recent books on Bosnia, and most contain accounts of Bosnia's complicated ethic and religious evolution. One is Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London: Papermac, 1994).

[6]For a description of the role of Dubrovnik in the Croat imagination, see "The Place of Dubrovnik in Modern Croat National Ideology," in Ivo Banac, John G. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk, eds., *Nation and Ideology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 149–175.

[7]I. Garašanin, *Nachertaniije*, printed in Bože Covié, ed., *Roots of Serbian Aggression* (Zagreb: Centar za strane jezike, 1993), 70.

[8]Ibid., 89.

[9]M. Hartley, *The Man Who Saved Austria* (London: Mills and Boon, 1912), 171.

[10]Ferdo Sisic, *Korespondencija Rački-Strossmeyer*, vol. III (Zagreb: n.p., 1930), 199.

[11]S. Gazi, "Stjepan Radić: His Life and Political Activities [1870–1928]," *Journal of Croatian Studies* XIV–XV (1973–1974): 41.

[12]Z. Kulundzic, *Radić Politički Spisi* (Zagreb: n.p., 1971), 203.

[13]Ciano ridiculed this craven attempt to curry favor with Hitler.

[14]Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 58.

[15]The Western powers did, of course, interfere in the Yugoslav conflict: France, and to a lesser extent Britain, siding with the Serbs, and Germany, and to a lesser extent the United States, with Croatia. The former strongly supported the UN arms embargo on Yugoslavia, which hindered the capacity of the Croats (and Bosnians) to resist the Serbs, whereas the Germans strongly supported recognition of Croatia. However, the outcome of the Yugoslav conflict was not a priority for any of the outside powers, and there was never much risk that it would lead to, or become caught up in, a much wider conflict.

Tom Gallagher

To Be Or Not To Be Balkan: Romania's Quest for Self-Definition

S INCE 1996 ROMANIAN DEMOCRATIC REFORMERS have been en-
gaged in frantic efforts to undo the legacy of fifty years of
rule by communists and former communists. Attempts are
being made to dismantle the economic and social structures inher-
ited from communist times. The integration of Romania with the
international system and "a return to Europe" are two of the
watchwords of Romania's ambitious but untested reformers.

The desire to draw closer to the West has resulted in improved
ties with Central European neighbors like Hungary, a historic
rival. Narrow nationalism has been dropped as Romanian leaders
acknowledge that they have much to learn from the longer experi-
ment with market economics that has gone on in Hungary. Roma-
nia wants to be seen as a provider rather than a consumer of
European security, especially with NATO scrutinizing the respec-
tive merits of a string of Eastern countries queuing for admission.

Foreigners observing Romania are still trying to get used to the
appearance of liberal, cosmopolitan leaders keen to modernize the
country after seven years of stagnation in the 1990s, when an elite
with its roots in the communist past hung on to power. But
modernization has been a rallying cry of elites trying to break free
from the structural underdevelopment endemic in the Balkans
throughout the country's history. It was as much a primary im-
pulse for the post-1848 liberals who secured national indepen-

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dence as it was a century later for the communists intent on transforming a peasant state into an industrial powerhouse.

Perhaps no country in Europe has been so assiduous in searching for foreign role models. The different social systems that have prevailed since the 1860s have often been anxious to deny Romania's Balkan heritage. Intellectuals are aware of the popularity in some Western quarters of the view that certain ingrained cultural characteristics in a region like the Balkans determine human and political behavior over a long period of time. The influence of Samuel Huntington's seminal essay "The Clash of Civilizations," in which he argues that "western ideas of individualism. . .human rights, equality, [and] democracy. . .have little resonance in. . .Orthodox cultures," causes despondency in the Balkans.[1] The wars in the former Yugoslavia prompted leaders like François Mitterand of France and John Major of Great Britain to explain the conflict in terms of "ancient ethnic hatreds" prevalent in the Balkans, an area described by Mitterand as "Tribal Europe."[2] But slowly, good news is beginning to emerge from the Balkans as the grip of postcommunist nationalism weakens.

This essay examines how Romania has struggled with a Balkan identity in a century of independence that has been full of turbulence and indeed tragedy. It dwells on its present transition from a closed political system to one engaged with the West, in a region that itself has suffered from being a zone of transition in a violent world. But it begins by examining the historical influences that have given the Balkans its unenviable reputation in the rest of the world.

ON THE FRONTIERS OF CIVILIZATION

The geographical position of the Balkans as a crossroads between Europe and western Asia made it a land of shifting frontiers where different civilizations collided. The configuration of the land made invasion relatively easy while the mountain ranges of the tapering peninsula, stretching from the Alps to the Black Sea, effectively isolated different peoples from one another and contributed to the fragmentation of political power.[3]

Balkan is the Turkish word for mountain; in the time of the ancient Greeks, it was known as the limits of the civilized world.[4]

Today it is a region whose function seems to be to remind the West just how thin the crust of civilization still is. George Kennan is only one of a number of distinguished commentators who view the peninsula as a "salient of non-European civilization" thrust into Europe by Byzantine and Ottoman penetration.[5] Images from March 1997 of Albania in the throes of revolt against a tyrannical government—emptied jails, looted armories, and thousands of gun-toting civilians—suggested that the violent state of nature warned against in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*, written during the Thirty Years' War, had returned to haunt Europe.

The Albanians, after resisting the Turks in the fifteenth century, became the fighting elite of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman rule introduced the Islamic religion and left a lasting impact on the Balkans. The inhabitants of the empire were organized on a religious basis under the millet system. The Christians, although not regarded as equal to the Muslims, were treated with remarkable tolerance for the time.[6] Sephardic Jews fleeing from Catholic Spain put down sturdy roots in Bosnia and turned Salonika into a flourishing center of trade and learning for the Jewish Diaspora. But amidst the rough cosmopolitanism of the Ottomans, members of religious communities were very conscious of themselves and how they differed from others.

In the nineteenth century, as Ottoman power decayed, nationalism was grafted onto this sense of religious exclusiveness. After the French revolution, intellectuals argued that liberation from the Turks could be achieved by going down a path of modernization based on western-style nationalism. But the complex distribution of language, religion, and nationality in the Balkans meant that nation-building involved escalating conflicts over territory.

Independence movements turned to Western powers for support and often opposed the nationalist aspirations of their neighbors as violently as they had the Turks. A new form of external dependency emerged. From the Crimean War of the early 1850s to the wars of the Yugoslav succession in the 1990s, the Balkans was the scene of Great Power rivalry. Britain, France, Germany, and Russia vied to protect trading routes, secure military objectives, or establish vassal states. The compromises reached between the powers, most notably at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, were meant to uphold an uneasy balance of power between them, but the changes

on the map often left local nationalisms unsatisfied and rebellious minorities in their wake.

Ignorance about the region as well as the pursuit of short-term goals that subverted the West's long-term interests contributed to the "Balkanization" for which the area is famous.[7] Disgruntled young Serbs, enraged by the way that Austria had annexed Bosnia in 1908, murdered Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, unleashing the first of two great European civil wars that laid waste to much of the continent. Eighty years later, Balkan discord dashed all hopes for a "new world order" after the Cold War when Sarajevo was subjected to a three-year siege of a type that would have been viewed as brutal even in medieval times.

External intervention, although initially welcomed, fueled defensive nationalism among local Balkan elites when its results proved unpalatable to them. Chastened European powers, who usually found their Balkan adventures costly in terms of blood, treasure, and reputation, cursed the region and its peoples. For Bismarck, the Balkans were "not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier," words much-quoted in the 1990s as the West dithered about what to do in Bosnia. Ambitious figures as different as Britain's David Lloyd-George (whose unwise sponsorship of a Greater Greece carved out of the Ottoman Empire led to his downfall in 1922) and Joseph Stalin (who was unable to subdue the maverick Yugoslav communist Josip Tito in 1948) saw their authority crumble in the Balkans. But as long as they worshipped at the altar of nationalism, intransigent local elites were unable to prevent the area from becoming the cockpit for bigger European quarrels.

All of the Balkan countries, except Greece, were placed in the Soviet sphere of influence after 1945. The doctrine of Marxist internationalism dismissed nationalism as a bourgeois relic whose days were numbered. However, internationalism on Soviet terms produced a nationalist backlash first in Yugoslavia, then later in Albania and Romania.[8] Wedded to self-sufficiency, Tito's pragmatic and decentralized brand of communism in Yugoslavia, not to mention the orthodox Stalinist variety of his neighbors, still retained the Soviet command economy and the interests hostile to meaningful reform associated with it.

BLOCKED EXIT TO FREEDOM

Two generations of communism in the Balkans strengthened aspects of political culture inimical to democracy. The tradition of public resources being used for private gain was reinforced by a set of rapacious leaders; goods and services were allocated on a discretionary basis. The communist Balkans remained "a society of cousins" rather than a society of citizens, a society of hidden compromises and solidarities based on kinship.[9] The communist party was built on the traditions of the peasant class, the Orthodox Church, and the nationalist state—institutions that in different ways had promoted a patriarchal authority that emphasized the primacy of the group over the individual.[10] Thus the Balkans were ill-prepared to make a clean break from communism at the end of the Cold War. The absence of independent poles of economic power or recent traditions of self-expression meant that civil society was a frail plant. Not surprisingly, well-placed elements within the ruling elite, who were guided by their own instincts for survival before any ideological considerations, managed the political transition on a limited agenda for change.

But the postcommunist elites of the 1990s were new even when they included more than a few old faces. The rules of politics had changed. Within limits, political opposition had to be permitted in order to satisfy the Atlantic democracies whose financial and diplomatic goodwill was vital in order to refloat economically moribund states. Across the Balkans, from Zagreb to Sofia, a new economic oligarchy based on former communist officials, black marketers, and organized crime built up vast wealth that quickly translated into political power. The more lucrative sectors of the state economy were sold off to entrepreneurial communists and shadowy speculators who had survived in the old days by exploiting the communist "shortage" economy. The wars in the former Yugoslavia created huge opportunities for selling arms, laundering money, and shipping drugs across the region, with organized criminal networks enjoying conspicuous success.

Millions of people who lacked useful political connections or a ruthless streak, or who were located in dying industries, faced ruin in the economic jungle that the Balkans became in the 1990s. But people now could vote, and their opinions counted more than

before. In order to obtain the acquiescence (if not the support) of a majority, the postcommunist elite often appealed to ethnic loyalties. National solidarity replaced social solidarity as a mobilizing ideology. Under Balkan communism, dormant ethnic conflicts—interstate conflicts, majority/minority disputes—had already been unfrozen to provide legitimacy for national forms of Marxist-Leninist rule. The arrival of tentative democracy and the introduction of a semblance of market economics aggravated nationalism and made elites busy with the process of wealth accumulation even less uninhibited about appealing to the core ethnic group of the majority nation at the expense of the minority.[11]

Democracy everywhere invites groups to separate and compete for resources. In the Balkans it was perhaps inevitable that the new freedoms would heighten a sense of ethnic difference even without the manipulation of unscrupulous rulers. There are genuine differences of opinions over education, linguistic rights, political autonomy, and voting systems, which, in ethnically mixed West European states that are supposedly based on a culture of compromise, have shaken politics. Amidst ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia and simmering ethnic disputes elsewhere, the image of the Balkans as a backwater on the edge of the civilized world has resurfaced.

"Balkan" today is a metaphor for arbitrary and unpredictable behavior, fanaticism, and lawlessness. The contributions to the Balkan mentality made by the Greeks, the Byzantines, and the Ottomans are often seen as being of dubious assistance in enabling the region to engage with the modern world. The cultural impoverishment of the Balkans is sometimes thought to stem from the failure of the region to experience the civilizing effects of the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Enlightenment. By contrast, Western ideas and movements that have put down roots—nationalism, industrialism, socialism—often seem to have been drained of their original worth, saddling the Balkans with even more problems than before.

It is not surprising that today more nations of southeastern Europe are ready to deny their Balkan heritage than to publicly embrace it. Croatia's president, Franjo Tudjman, delivering a state of the nation speech in Zagreb on January 22, 1997, denied the country's Balkan heritage in forthright terms:

> Reintegration of Croatia into the Balkans is totally unacceptable for
> the Croatian people. . . . Croatia belongs to Central Europe and
> Mediterranean circles. A short Balkan episode in Croatian history
> must never be repeated. . . . We should add a new article, a consti-
> tutional ban, on attempts to merge Croatia with any Yugoslav or
> Balkan state or federation.[12]

Tudjman was not the first, nor is he likely to be the last, Balkan
leader to talk in such unrealistically snobbish terms about his
neighborhood. In 1910, Romania's founder, King Carol I (who
reigned from 1881 to 1914), declared that "we belong to the
Balkans neither ethnographically nor geographically nor any other
way."[13]

ROMANIA'S BALKAN COMPLEX

Romanian attitudes towards the Balkans have always been com-
plex. The largest state in Eastern Europe after Poland, Romania
straddles a number of geographical and cultural faultlines that are
bound to generate controversy about its identity. From the fif-
teenth century until 1859 the two original Romanian principali-
ties, Moldavia and Wallachia, were subjected to Ottoman rule. An
independence movement, assisted by the French Emperor Napo-
leon III, culminated in international recognition for the new state
in 1881 under a German prince, Karl of Hohenzollern. Transylvania,
previously under Hungarian control, became part of Romania
after the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire in 1918, and this new
province added a central European dimension to Romania. The
majority Romanian population had been exposed to German hab-
its and mentalities; many of the Transylvanian towns were "Saxon"
not only in character but in population. Hungarian rule, though
geared towards assimilating the Romanians, was not arbitrary and
corrupt in the way that Ottoman control had been in the south.
Transylvania was viewed as the cradle of Romanian nationality, in
whose mountains and forests the ancestors of the Romanians had
found refuge upon the retreat of the Roman Empire in the second
century A.D. A varied and beautiful physical landscape, consisting
of tall mountains, lush alpine meadows, thick forests of beech and
pine, and undulating hills broken by river valleys, it has conjured
up strong emotions for Hungarians as well. A Hungarian state was

preserved in Transylvania when for nearly two centuries Budapest was under Ottoman rule.

But Bucharest, the capital of Romania, lies far to the southeast, in the Dobruja region—in geographical terms, the only part of the country that securely belongs to the Balkans. The Romanian historian Neagu Djuvara reckons that the location of the capital in Bucharest, the city that is "the most 'Balkan' in the whole country, is a misfortune."[14] In *The Balkan Trilogy,* Olivia Manning described Bucharest in 1939–1940 before the advent of war and the Soviet revolution changed Romania forever.[15] Her novel of English expatriates adrift in a city seething with intrigue and corruption but with a gallery of charming and sinuous local characters remains the quintessential Balkan novel.

But Bucharest is also a reminder of the cosmopolitanism of the region that preceded the rise of homogenizing nationalism and may, in a few places, yet outlive it. The human diversity to be found in Bucharest has created a rich tapestry of multicultural living. It is a melting pot par excellence that has absorbed Greeks, Hungarians, Turks, Jews, and Russians as well as Romanians from every corner of the nation.[16] Romanians who stress Romania's unique role as the only Latin race embracing Eastern Orthodoxy are diffident about their neighborhood. Neagu Djuvara has emphasized that the Romanians were the only Christian people under Ottoman rule who resisted Islamicization.[17] Another Romanian intellectual proclaimed in 1997 that "geographically speaking, to say that Romania is in the Balkans is the equivalent of claiming that Switzerland is a Mediterranean land: Romania is defined by the Carpathian mountains. . .our spinal column."[18] The largest mountain range in Europe after the Alps indeed runs through Romania, extending into Slovakia and Poland. But the invocation of a Carpathian or even a Danubian identity, as opposed to a Balkan one, has not captured the imagination. The threat posed by Hungarians advancing from the Pannonian plain and the menacing of the medieval kingdom of Moldavia by Poland does not encourage an identity encompassing Magyars or Poles. Less embattled minds see Romania as a land at the confluence of different civilizations or "as linked by history and a community of destiny with other peoples in the Balkans."[19]

NO ESCAPE FROM HISTORY

For the first fifty or so years of independence, a tenable case could be made for claiming that Romanians had transcended the problems that were making the Balkans a byword for misrule. Independence was acquired by diplomacy and the agile maneuvering of liberal politicians between the Great Powers, rather than by revolutionary violence. Until the 1920s, the country was the most stable in the Balkans. Unlike Albania and the South Slav lands there was no tradition of the populace bearing arms, and travelers' accounts even from the period before independence found peaceful roads and a tractable people.[20] Constitutional government was never interrupted by military revolts or the assassination of government leaders, as in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. In 1919, the future looked bright when oil-rich Romania doubled its size and population as a result of the Paris Peace Conference.

But it was in the interwar years that Romania came to be viewed as an archetypal Balkan problem. The Bucharest elite was not equal to the task of integrating regions with contrasting historical experiences, administrative systems, and standards of living. The absence of an autonomous and civically minded economic middle-class blighted hopes of consolidating democracy. Power remained in the hands of a bloated civil service and restless intelligentsia until the Great Depression showed how vulnerable Romania was to fluctuations in the world prices of oil and agricultural products.

Up until 1938 Romania retained the trappings of parliamentary democracy, but it was a caricature of Western forms. Elections were "arranged" in advance, and the state felt no obligation to act responsibly towards ordinary citizens. Increasingly, advocates of change favored a total and violent break with past arrangements rather than their reform.[21] Given the chasm that separated the rhetoric of the state—which insisted that Romania was a beacon of enlightenment in Eastern Europe—from the sad reality, it is not altogether surprising that a powerful fascist movement emerged, known as the Iron Guard.[22] It murdered three prime ministers in the 1930s and, along with an unscrupulous monarch, Carol II, sufficiently weakened the country so that Hitler and then Stalin had little difficulty in bending it to their totalitarian wills.

The reluctance of the West to defend free institutions in Romania after 1945 probably stemmed in no small way from the disorderly and corrupt image that Romania by now presented to the world. The traditional elite was swept away as the Soviet occupation enabled a tiny band of communists to turn Romania into a Marxist-Leninist state. Upon Stalin's death, nationalism was rehabilitated in order to make ruthless policies of social engineering more palatable. The policy of promoting national values and economic self-sufficiency was taken to extreme lengths by Nicolae Ceauşescu, Romania's ruler from 1965 to 1989. He dreamed of Romania becoming a major force on the international scene, and he even tricked Western leaders into believing that his maverick policies made him a weak link in Soviet power in Eastern Europe.

Ceauşescu's communism had distinctive Balkan features. The Byzantine tradition, with its emphasis on compliance with dogma and orthodoxy as laid down by powerful rulers, was revived.[23] Ceauşescu revealed his megalomania by destroying much of the center of Bucharest. Vast areas of a graceful city "whose character was defined by its mixture of architectural styles, from Byzantine and classical Renaissance to nineteenth century belle époque" were leveled to build a hideous complex of roads and buildings radiating towards a vast palace that was to be the seat of government and Ceauşescu's mausoleum.[24] Dynastic communism combined with virulent nationalism evoked the most paranoid aspects of the 1930s fascism. But until the 1980s, Ceauşescu enjoyed the acquiescence of perhaps most of the seven million people who had moved from the villages to the cities in the previous thirty years.[25] Their living standards were often better than before, but the impact of catastrophic policy failures on their lives ended the unwritten social contract between the state and the workers.

Ceauşescu was ousted and executed along with his wife and coruler Elena on Christmas Day 1989 after second-ranking communists mounted a coup in the wake of popular demonstrations against his rule. This act of tyrannicide, and the strong-arm measures that the dictator's former protégé Ion Iliescu used to consolidate his power in 1990, solidified the image of Romania as a violent and tragic land that encapsulated nearly all that was wrong with the Balkans: a morbid obsession with history, reviving past nationalist glories to mask a gloomy present; the relentless pursuit

of ethnic grievances as the Hungarian minority was targeted by
well-placed nationalists; and the tendency of the worst representa-
tives of the nation to rise to positions of leadership.

Romanians grew even more demoralized in the 1990s as paper
freedoms failed to bring much improvement to their lives. A 35
percent drop in living standards occurred between 1989 and 1996.[26]
The elderly, the poorly educated, and those working in derelict
factories became the chief victims of an escalating economic de-
cline. Mortality rates rose sharply as the incidence of tuberculosis
began to reach levels not seen in Europe for decades. The birth-
rate, which had been 18.9 per thousand in 1960, fell to 10.4 in
1996, suggesting that the population of Romania might diminish
by two million in the next decade, to around twenty million.[27]

GOD SMILES AGAIN ON ROMANIA

Abroad, not much attention was given to the November 1996
parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania. Ion Iliescu,
by now Eastern Europe's longest-serving head of state, seemed
destined for a third term. The opposition, composed of personal-
ity-based parties, had in previous years been unable to puncture
the widespread cynicism about the possibility of replacing a flawed
democratic order with something better. If the unexpected hap-
pened, there were fears that victorious reformers would quickly
become the prisoners of the state bureaucracy and of the intelli-
gence service. But the unexpected did happen or, as many people
felt moved to say, "God once again began to smile on Romania."
Incredibly, the National Peasant Party reemerged as the most
powerful force in the country after having been marginalized and
suppressed for over sixty years. In a country where the urban
population increased from 3.8 million in 1948 to twelve million in
the 1980s, a party standing for peasant and Christian democratic
values spearheaded an opposition revival.[28] A high electoral turn-
out of 76 percent saw a relatively clean election and a peaceful
transfer of power. Emil Constantinescu, a mild-looking geology
professor, was elected president with much working-class support,
which suggested that Romanians were outgrowing the need for a
strong personality in charge of a set of centralized institutions to
lead them. Indeed, it even looked as if Romanian political culture

might be outgrowing the Balkan stereotype dominated by images of partisanship, collectivist values, and nationalism.

Constantinescu appointed as his Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, a lawyer and former trade-union official who came from a Transylvanian village so remote that almost a week elapsed before his relatives learned of his appointment. Both men established an effective working partnership based on the need to neutralize powerful forces that had previously stood above the law. Miron Cozma, the miners' boss, who had used his men as a praetorian guard to intimidate government and opposition alike in 1990–1991, was quickly arrested for his role in the violent events of that period. A war against corruption was unleashed. Dozens of Soviet-trained diplomats were recalled, survivors from the era in which envoys without foreign language skills were sent to major embassies in the expectation that they would be less likely to defect. The top priority became the drive to be included in NATO's forthcoming eastward expansion.

The energy and boldness of men who had little or no practical experience in government was striking. Their actions are based on a conviction that this represents the only chance they will have in their lifetimes to dismantle economic and social structures inherited from communist times and plot a new course for the country. But the fate of their reform program will depend on how they measure up in dealing with a moribund centralized economy still based on heavy industry that, long after 1990, continued to soak up huge amounts of state subsidies.

Premier Ciorbea's decision to go for tough economic reforms that his predecessors shirked won him plaudits from Western governments and financial institutions. Success, however, hinges on how well he can convince Romanians who have already known twenty years of austerity that at last the country is on the right path and that further belt-tightening will be worth it.

A RETURN TO THE BALKANS?

An audacious attempt is being made to alter the image of Romania so that powerful Western states, whose favor it has craved, will start to view it as a potential partner rather than as a turbulent and immature land always ready to export its problems westwards.

President Constantinescu has wisely broken with the tradition of isolating Romania from its neighbors while seeking long-distance patrons. He seems to have concluded, in the words of one Romanian historian, that "Balkan solidarity is a prelude and not an alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration."[29] These feelings were reciprocated in Bulgaria and Serbia at the end of 1996; crowds demonstrating in the capitals against their communist-inclined regimes invoked "Bucharest" as a talisman that would hopefully speed the demise of anti-Western rulers. In January 1997 President Constantinescu sent a personal emissary to meet opposition leaders in Serbia, thus abandoning his predecessor's stance of identifying with the hard-line Milošević. Romania's contribution to the NATO forces in Bosnia was stepped up, and in March Romania agreed to contribute to the Italian-led force being sent to strife-torn Albania.

Not only was Romania projecting itself as "an island of stability" in the Balkans but it was hoping that the West would notice that it was ready to keep the peace in its disorderly neighborhood rather than wait for outsiders to do so. For a precedent it was necessary to go back to the late 1920s, when Iuliu Maniu, the Peasant Party leader, swam against the nationalist tide by advocating a confederation of Danubian states able to revive the economic links that had been severed by the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire.[30] In their turn, Central European countries, which had given Romania the cold shoulder in the early 1990s as it remained stuck in a neocommunist rut, began to make common cause with its reformers. Constantinescu received a warm endorsement from his Czech counterpart, President Havel, who perhaps recognized a kindred spirit ready to champion the values of civil society in a wasted totalitarian landscape.

There was a growing awareness in Central Europe that a stable Balkans—in which liberalism and economic reform were to be encouraged and nationalism frowned upon—would increase their chances of integration with the West, and this boosted Romania's profile in the region. Hungary has led the way in encouraging its old Danubian rival to come in from the cold. A series of confidence-building initiatives, such as the recognition of existing frontiers, growing military cooperation, and steps to protect minorities, has taken the heat out of an ancient quarrel. The presence in

the Ciorbea government of ministers from the party representing the 1.6 million Hungarians in Romania has caused remarkably little stir. Education has often been the *casus belli* between a ruling majority and a restless minority in the Balkans, and the government's early decision to restore Hungarian higher education in Transylvania was greeted equally nonchalantly by most Romanians.

On March 15, 1997 Premier Ciorbea established a hopeful precedent by sending greetings to Hungarians in Romania who were celebrating their national day. The Hungarians were commemorating the 1848 revolution led by Louis Kossuth, who had refused to recognize the existence of a Romanian nation in Transylvania. Conflicting nationalists neutralized each other's bid for freedom in a territory in revolt against imperial rule. Avram Iancu, the leader of the Romanian 1848ers in Transylvania, appealed to the Hungarians "to understand that weapons can never decide between you and us. Fate put us in a homeland so that together we can strive to improve it and enjoy the results."[31] One hundred and fifty years later, Ciorbea's bid to carry fellow Romanians with him as fences were mended with Hungary and its ethnics living in Romania was strengthened by the fact that he came from Iancu's locality in the Apuseni mountains, a cradle of Romanian nationalism.

Transylvania remains a cultural corridor straddling the Balkans and Central Europe. Like Bosnia, it has been a meeting place, interesting and challenging because of the mingling of religions, cultures, and languages. Like Bosnia, it was ill-suited to the rise of nationalism, as it found itself contested territory between Hungarian and Romanian nation-building movements and elites. Periods of Hungarian and Romanian rule up until 1989 imposed the straitjacket of conformity on a region whose identity cannot be reduced to a single national state tradition. Transylvania is now indubitably Romanian; in Hungary, Transylvanian Hungarians are increasingly viewed as different inhabitants from another state. Irredentist sentiment is fading, and the prospect that two nations who waged sterile quarrels over territory will at last bury their differences, as France and Germany did over Alsace-Lorraine, has never seemed brighter than today.

CRACKS IN THE WALL OF BALKAN AUTHORITARIANISM

But a Balkan country like Romania also needs to search for internal reconciliation if native democracy is to put down sturdy roots. The first years of postcommunism were not propitious in this regard; adversarial parties could not agree on rules for the management of political competition. In a region where there is often no alternative source of income for ruling politicians, owing to the absence of economic opportunities in the private sector or the limited nature of their skills, not a few governing leaders have been tempted to hang on to power. The tendency to view state resources as personal property, the electorate as a passive herd, and all opposition as illegitimate, if not treasonable, has lain at the root of Balkan authoritarianism regardless of the social system in place.[32]

History may well judge that, for all his faults, Ion Iliescu rejected the authoritarian temptation during his seven years as Romania's president. His opponents, though, are unlikely to see it that way. Iliescu's rule began inauspiciously in 1990 as he exploited divisions in Romanian society to strengthen his own power base. Later, he consorted with xenophobic parties upon losing his parliamentary majority in 1992, giving them places in government as well as opportunities to finance nationalist campaigns from the public purse.

But Iliescu stepped back from the practice of neutralizing democratic institutions to perpetuate his rule, which was how next-door Serbia was being run under Milošević, the emblematic Balkan strongman of the 1990s. Although once Ceauşescu's heir-apparent, Iliescu was a more rational political leader. He remained a self-effacing figure, at least in public, and his life-style was modest. His wife shunned the limelight so that comparisons with Elena Ceauşescu were inappropriate; they had no children, which ruled out the danger that an Iliescu dynasty might emerge. He even permitted a genuinely free press, something that was far from discernible in other Balkan states.

Iliescu zigzagged between authoritarian practices and acceptance of the inevitability of democracy in the first half of the 1990s. What may have led him to choose the democratic path, however reluctantly, was the realization that Romania had to engage with the West largely on the latter's terms. Renewed isola-

tion or alignment with Russia were not realistic goals. Western economic and diplomatic support was needed to refloat the economy and enable Romania to benefit from European initiatives being launched to undo the damage of communism, which he publicly admitted had been a failed ideology. He hoped that Romania could enjoy fruitful ties with the West without having to embrace fully its political rules. There was indeed a long tradition in Romania of cosmetic liberalism, in which Western institutions and practices were mimicked but drained of their reformist potential.[33] However, it was made clear to Iliescu that no "third way" was permissible if Romania wished to be a beneficiary of Western aid for the rebuilding of its shattered country.

In 1993, when Romania joined the Council of Europe and signed the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Iliescu acknowledged the limits of national state authority and gave hard-pressed citizens the chance to seek redress from state injustice through a higher transnational jurisdiction.[34] Similarly, the Romanian state recognizes that it no longer enjoys exclusive sovereignty over minority rights. As a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it signed a declaration in 1991 that specified that "issues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of a respective state."[35]

External pressure on Romania to stay on the democratic path was stepped up in 1995 when the United States took charge of faltering West European efforts to control the fighting in Bosnia and managed to produce a permanent cease-fire. One of the chief aims of the Dayton Accord, which brought a tenuous peace to Bosnia, was to limit ethnic tensions in the other Balkan states. Richard Holbrooke, the architect of Dayton, visited Bucharest in January 1996, emphasizing to his hosts the need to delegitimize conflictual nationalism in southeastern Europe. In April, Romania formally applied to join NATO, being aware that it stood a chance of being taken seriously only if it settled its differences with its neighboring states. On August 14, 1996 agreement on a bilateral

treaty of friendship with Hungary was reached after years of deadlocked negotiations.

The tangible hope that Romania could escape a geopolitical "no-man's-land" and "return to Europe" by finding shelter under the NATO umbrella, perhaps initially as an associate member, strengthened flagging democratic prospects and ensured that elections in November 1996 offered a genuine contest for power. Credit must go to the Romanian people for rejecting nationalism in these elections. Chauvinist parties won a far lower percentage of the vote than in countries like the Czech Republic that are often seen as models of tolerance in a primitive neighborhood. Nationalism thrives on a sense of deprivation and personal or group insecurity, characteristics in plentiful supply in the Romania of 1996. But Romanians rejected a paranoid form of politics that emphasized conspiracy theories, stigmatized minorities, and manipulated the past. The choice may not have been so difficult, since the rampant careerism of the chauvinist lobby and its close involvement with a string of financial scandals, most notably the fraudulent pyramid banking scheme known as Caritas, sunk their reputation.

Evidence from Bulgaria, as well as Serbia and Romania, suggests that the manipulation of nationalism by former communists is beginning to fail as a strategy to control the masses. The dismal record of regimes that had promised social protection while allowing state assets to be plundered by the new economic oligarchy became impossible to cover up. Many urban citizens threw off their customary apathy to swell the protests against corruption, economic mismanagement, and fraudulent elections, which overwhelmed the Bulgarian regime and forced Milošević in Serbia to make significant concessions to his opponents for the first time.

CONCLUSION

The Balkans has been a zone of danger and discord not only because of the failings of communist rule but because of long-term problems connected with state-building on nationalist models, structural underdevelopment, and the prevalence of conflicting ethnic aspirations. The region has also suffered from the involvement of neighboring larger powers in its affairs.

Western and Russian intervention has tended to sow the seeds of future conflicts. The pursuit of short-term goals based on ignorance or the retention of obsolete policies dating sometimes from before World War I have subverted the West's own long-term interests in southeastern Europe, which should be based on gradually integrating the region into a common European economic and security system.

The failure of Western strategies for the Balkans has allowed negative reasoning about the region and its peoples to flourish. The problems of the Balkans are often ascribed to enduring cultural characteristics that determine the behavior of elites and masses irrespective of the political system in place. The area is often seen as essentially non-European and its population incapable of aspiring to post-1945 European standards of behavior. A policy of containment in the region has been preferred over one based on effective conflict-resolution, insistence on good human rights regimes, and backing for a strategy of economic and social reconstruction. Some Western governments have even been prepared to lend support to authoritarian regimes if they show signs of being able to preserve an uneasy peace in their neighborhood.

Shortly after taking office, President Constantinescu of Romania criticized the record of the West in this regard:

> The neo-communist regimes in Eastern Europe are often very convenient for the Western World. It provided them protection against organized crime and unwanted immigration and even gave them a basis for feeling superior. . . . But by supporting them the West betrayed those fighting for democratic change. . . . Today our illusions have ended. We understand that we cannot talk for real with the West, except in terms of profit and mutual interest.[36]

There are encouraging signs that the West may be abandoning its Balkan complex and discarding its ingrained fatalism about the democratic potentialities of the region. But ultimately, the prospects of the region will only improve if Balkan leaders in government and in the opposition that have a proven commitment to pluralism lower the barriers between their states and begin a process of economic and military cooperation along lines that so transformed the future of Western Europe after 1945. States that shunned their neighbors for ethnic or ideological reasons need to

overcome suspicion and prejudice; otherwise, the region will re-
main enfeebled and easy prey for outside forces. A postnationalist
agenda of interethnic cooperation stands a fair chance of creating
conditions that will allow major internal reforms to be carried out
and encourage Western states to invest in the reconstruction of the
Balkans.

The détènte between Romania and Hungary shows the way
forward after generations of debilitating feuding over territory
coveted by both countries. If the era of postcommunism is re-
placed by one that offers more responsible government and the
integration of economically marginalized citizens and alienated
minorities into the mainstream political process, the identity of the
region will itself change. The tradition of superficially Westernized
elites denying their regional identity and even separating them-
selves from their own fellow citizens may be replaced by a willing-
ness to come to terms with the space that geography and history
has bequeathed them to occupy. Romania is the Balkan state
where the debate about national identity is currently most vibrant.
As ambitious reformers attempt to steer the country away from
seventy years of autarkic nationalism, it may also prove to be an
important test case that determines whether the Balkans can win
new respect from their more fortunate Western neighbors.

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[25]See Sylviu Brucan, *The Wasted Generation* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 124.

[26]*Adevârul* (Bucharest), 13 May 1996.

[27]Telegrama, Revista de Presei (Bucharest), 13 May 1996.

[28]Brucan, *The Wasted Generation*, 124.

[29]Tanasoca, "Definitii si asumari."

[30]Ioan Scurtu, *Iuliu Maniu* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedica, 1995), 54.

[31]Rompres (the Romanian state news agency), 21 August 1992.

[32]See Tom Gallagher, "Democratization in The Balkans: Challenges and Prospects," *Democratization* 2 (3) (Autumn 1995): 354.

[33]Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1951), 338–341.

[34]The need for reciprocal learning by the state and its citizens about the limits of state authority was underlined as a vital staging post in building democracy by Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman. See their chapter, "Romania after Ceauşescu: Post-Communist Communism," in Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 142–145.

[35]Valentin Stan, "Democratization in the Balkans: The Role of External Forces in the Transition," conference on "Democratization in the Balkans," University of Bristol, May 1997, 10.

[36]Colin Woodward, "Interview with Emil Constantinescu," *Transition* 3 (6) (4 April 1997): 43.

Roman Szporluk

Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State

U KRAINE'S PRESENT CONDITION and prospects are matters of concern to many who live outside that country's borders. It is, after all, one of the largest states of Europe, geo-graphically comparable to France, with a population only slightly smaller than that of Italy. To understand the country calls for familiarity with a host of problems that stem from the Soviet period but also derive from its much longer pre-Soviet past rela-tions with Poland and Russia. The historic relations between Ukraine and Russia in particular are too little understood, and the most common misperceptions lead to the formulation of all manner of mistaken policies. Thus, for example, one contemporary author, writing for the American quarterly *Foreign Policy,* speaks of Ukraine's future "reintegration into the greater Russian state," imagining that before 1991 Russia had been in possession of Ukraine for "nearly three and a half centuries."[1]

To consider Ukraine's normal condition to be that it is part of Russia is a major misreading of history, one that implies that its present independence is an anomaly. This essay attempts to cor-rect such misreadings by presenting a brief sketch of the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation and state in the wider context of the formation of the modern nations of Poland and Russia. Such an approach reveals an aspect of nationalism that is often over-looked—its international perspective and the nationalists' striving for recognition within the world community.

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The emergence of a nation from the condition of province or periphery, such as the case of Ukraine in relation to Russia and Poland, may be measured by the extent to which a nation-in-the-making seeks to define itself in a broader international framework extending beyond the confines of the entity from which it is "seceding." The quest for independence is not motivated by a desire to be cut off from the world at large; on the contrary, it is driven by the wish to participate directly in the affairs of the world, not through the capital of another country but by making a capital out of one's own central place. To have standing in the world, even in such matters as sports, music, or science, requires political independence.

The making of modern Ukraine accordingly needs to be viewed in an international context. The first Russian nation-builders wanted the Ukrainians to be Russian; Polish nation-builders wanted "their" Ukrainians to be Polish. The national identity of modern Ukrainians was formulated by those who, in defining Ukraine, rejected both the Russian identity and the Polish identity. But while the Ukrainians made themselves by defining themselves as distinct, and thus "seceding," from Russia and Poland, the Russians and the Poles also formed their own modern identities in a confrontation with, and in relation to, their "Other," the West.[2] Thus, those powers involved in the history of Ukraine—St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Istanbul—confronted the realization that while they commanded a position of supremacy vis-à-vis their respective "Ukraines," they remained in an unequal relationship to the West, to Europe, to "civilization"—which, indeed, viewed *them* as peripheries (or, we may say, "Ukraines").[3] In sum, then, the Ukrainian nation-building project was nothing more nor less than an undertaking to transform the peripheries of several nations, which themselves were civilizational peripheries of the West, into a sovereign entity able to communicate directly with the larger world—with what were seen in the nineteenth century, and even more in the twentieth, to be the centers of modern civilization, in politics, culture and science, and economics.

BASIC FACTS OF HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

Did Ukraine then become part of Russia three and a half centuries ago? Only a small part. Before 1648, virtually all Ukrainians lived within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, whose eastern frontier extended to the east of the Dnieper River. Only after 1667 did a part of that vast territory—today's regions of Poltava and Chernihiv, with the city of Kiev—come under rule of the tsar in Moscow. After 1667, Warsaw ruled more Ukrainian territory and more Ukrainians than did Moscow. The land to the west of the Dnieper remained within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1793–1795. The Polish nobility was the dominant group in the area until 1830, if not 1863, and the Poles retained great social and cultural influence until after the Russian revolutions of 1917.[4]

In the nineteenth century, whether Ukrainians lived under the rule of the tsar in St. Petersburg or the emperor in Vienna, the Polish influence remained very substantial. This was true even on the East Bank, where the Poles had lost their dominant position as early as the seventeenth century. It is impossible to understand today's Ukraine if one sees it simply as a province of Russia. The Ukrainian-Polish nexus was critical and remained so until 1939–1945. As Ivan Rudnytsky made very clear some years ago, "The entire course of the Ukrainian national revival in Galicia, from 1848 until World War I and beyond, was determined by the struggle, of ever-increasing intensity, against Polish dominance in the province."[5] Polish landowners remained a dominant presence in Galicia and Volhynia until 1939.

As for southern Ukraine, including the Crimea, conquered by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century from the Ottoman Turks, this region showed the continuing influence of centuries of Islamic rule. Very different was the situation in West Ukraine. The region of Transcarpathia was uninterruptedly a part of Hungary from the Middle Ages until 1919, when it was annexed to the new Czechoslovakia. It became Hungarian again from 1939 to 1944, and only after that date—for the first time ever—was it ruled from Moscow.

The Chernivtsi region—the northern part of the former Austrian province of Bukovina—was Romanian from 1918 to 1940 and became Soviet only in 1940, being formally incorporated into

the Soviet Union after 1944. As for the present regions of L'viv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, they were part of Poland from the middle of the fourteenth century, were annexed by Austria in 1772, and remained as eastern "Galicia" under the rule of Vienna until 1918. After a brief period of independence as the West Ukrainian People's Republic, in 1918–1919, the region fell under the rule of the new Poland, becoming Soviet only when that state was destroyed by the armies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. After Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Galicia came under German occupation, returning to Soviet rule in 1944. It has uninterruptedly been a part of Ukraine since then, under Soviet domination until 1991, part of an independent Ukraine today.

It is obvious that today's Ukraine cannot be viewed simply as a part of a historic Russian or modern Soviet space; Ukraine is intimately linked not only to Russia but also to the countries of Central Europe and the Black Sea region. It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that the people now known as Ukrainians began to call themselves "Ukrainian" and their homeland "Ukraine." Before that, they were variously known as Ruthenians in Austria, Rusnaks in Hungary, or Little Russians (or Cossacks) in the Russian Empire. The decision to adopt the Ukrainian name for a people living under several different jurisdictions and to consider all the lands where those people lived as one country, Ukraine, had nothing to do with that newly imagined country being a "borderland" of anyplace—a literal meaning of the term "Ukraine," common both in Polish and Russian parlance for centuries. Ukraine came to designate a geographical space extending from the land of the Don Cossacks to the northern counties of Hungary, from the mouth of the Danube to points north of Sumy and Kharkiv. Even a casual glance at the map of Europe will show that such a vast territory could not be the "borderland" or "periphery" of anything. The fact is that for the new and large country they invented—it existed only in their heads—the originators and first promoters of "Ukraine" defiantly adopted the very name that denied them the dignity of a nation.

This putting together of all the "Ukraines" was completed by 1945—or by 1954, if we count the time when Ukraine gained one of Ottoman Turkey's former "Ukraines," Crimea. It was then that Ukraine became a single entity, with a center of its own. If these

facts are too little known, one other myth about the origin of the
nation ought to be mentioned. In the view of many, Ukrainian
nationalism was first formulated in Galicia, under Austrian rule,
and then spread gradually to the East, to Russian Ukraine. While
the Austrian influence was indeed great—giving the Austrian
"Ruthenians" a unique exposure to modern government and law,
and facilitating their international recognition as belonging to the
community of Slavic people—the idea that they were not Ruthenians
but part of a larger Ukrainian nation was first formulated in the
East, in Russia, and not in Austria. It was to that Ukraine that
Austria's Ruthenians decided, after long and careful reflection,
that they wished to belong. They never believed that they consti-
tuted the core of Ukraine even though, owing to more favorable
conditions, they claimed to play a leading role in the national
movement in the twentieth century.

NATION FORMATION: SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

What is a Nation?

To understand the problems involved in Ukrainian nation-forma-
tion, it helps to draw on theoretical and historical literature on
nationalism, beginning with such basic questions as what a "na-
tion" is and how it comes into being. For these purposes, Benedict
Anderson's excellent formula is invaluable. Anderson argues that
a nation is an "imagined community"—not an imaginary commu-
nity—that is both inherently "limited and sovereign."[6] National-
ism accomplishes three things: it "nationalizes" a people by sepa-
rating them from others, by vesting in them the right of national
self-determination; it constructs a national history by attributing
national ideas to individuals who lived in the prenational age; and
it nationalizes territory, designating a certain space as the property
of the nation, the boundaries of the homeland. As for typology of
nations, Liah Greenfeld has provided a very useful set of defini-
tions in her *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity.* Greenfeld
argues that modern nations—with the exception of the English,
who formed the first modern nation—were all created through
confrontation with other nations. For example, modern national
consciousness in Russia, she says, was formed as the West im-

pressed itself upon Russian consciousness and on government poli-
cies. This happened during and after the reign of Peter the Great.
"The West was an integral indelible part of the Russian *national*
consciousness. There simply would be no sense in being a nation if
the West did not exist."[7]

Nations, so understood, are a very modern phenomenon. The
nation could be defined as a community of people living within a
specific territory—this was the prevailing definition of nation in
the West—or as a community of language and culture, which
became the way of defining nations in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. This modern understanding of nation subordinated class,
economic condition, social status, and religion to nationality. Vesting
sovereignty in the nation gave nationalism its revolutionary char-
acter, subversive towards the old authority of the monarchy, de-
rived from religion. Modern nations were unimaginable without
ideas of popular sovereignty. Creating national identities included
deciding on the status and future of what in the process of nation-
construction would come to be termed subnational identities. What
is subnational to one nation or nationalism is, needless to say,
national or protonational to others. What is a full-fledged lan-
guage to one nation's nationalist is a regional dialect to another
nation's adherent. Thus, in modern nation-states it is common for
only one language to be treated as national (or "standard"), taught
in the schools, used in the public sphere.

In the history of modern nation-formation in Europe several
ways of treating internal cultural-linguistic-ethnic differences have
been followed. In France, for example, there was a tendency to
impose one language as official and "national," and accordingly
to reduce in status, by coercion if necessary, all the others to the
rank of dialects. The leaders of Germany, recognizing how politi-
cally fragmented it was when it entered the modern era, could not
see their way to imposing such uniformity. Prudently, they toler-
ated linguistic variations, though only within a broadly defined
family of "German" speech, institutions, and traditions. In Britain,
yet another strategy was followed. According to Linda Colley, the
British nation was created above the existing national identities—
English, Scottish, and Welsh. Without denying them their nation-
hood or eliminating their institutions—England, Scotland, and

Wales did not cease to exist—new common bonds were created against a common external "Other."[8]

Periodization

This essay takes a view rather different from that advanced by Miroslav Hroch, another distinguished scholar of nation-formation. Hroch's schema of the formation of the so-called small nations has enjoyed wide international recognition.[9] He treats the formation of a modern nation as an internal process generated by social and economic change, the transition from feudalism to capitalism, in which a given ethnic group or "small nation"— whose existence is assumed as a point of departure—is seen to pass through the academic and the cultural, reaching finally to the political stage of development, as a consequence or reflection of the rise of capitalist society. In the first stage, the main actors are scholars who gather material about the nation's history and give shape to its narrative. This initial stage is followed by the "cultural stage," in which the narrative takes on significance as a means of facilitating growing awareness of a unifying culture; and this in due course is succeeded by the final, political stage, in which the idea of national identity seeks political expression.

In this essay I regard nation-building and nationalism as political *ab initio*—even when those engaged in nationalist activities denied any political intent or meaning, or insisted that their sole object was a scholarly understanding of popular culture, folklore, or local history. Such a view is grounded in an understanding of power as something political not only in the classic formulation (that is, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force); there is also economic power, as well as social and cultural power—power over the production and dissemination of symbols, values, and ideas. Beyond relations of domination or coercion we may also speak meaningfully of relations of production and distribution of material goods, or (by no means unimportantly) relations of information, of communication, and the production and dissemination of symbols, ideas, and values. Thus, "national-awakeners," questioning by virtue of their endeavors established power structures, power relationships, and the values upholding them, are quite obviously engaged in what is at least an inherently political undertaking; the impact of their work is finally to subvert the sphere of

ideological domination, in which symbols and values, not identity, are the supreme instruments of social power.[10]

One Nation's Fall is Another Nation's Rise

Hroch's approach, in the analysis presented here, does not consider that the national revival of what he terms a small nation is also an aspect of the *unmaking* of another, already existing nation. Nation-formation is thus not only an inter-national process in the sense given it by Greenfeld (that is, a process involving sovereign states); it is also an intra-state process, as an old ("large") nation disintegrates and is reconstituted into two (or more) new nations. The epithet "new" then properly applies to the nation that retains the name of the former nation conventionally classified as old, large, or historic; for aside from the continuity of its name, such a nation becomes, in important respects, a new entity, as new as any other nation thus created. Such an approach views the process of the making of Ukraine, Slovakia, or Bohemia as an aspect of the remaking of the Polish and Russian, Hungarian, and German premodern nations respectively. We see, then, that "historic" nations, whose uninterrupted continuity is usually contrasted with the discontinuities in the history of the "small" or "unhistoric" nations, also underwent profound transformations in the modern period of nation-formation.[11] On the one hand, they were transformed by their losses, out of which new nations were formed; on the other, they expanded by integrating into the nation those social groups that had been excluded from the premodern nation.

In the formation of a new nation, a social class with a distinct ethnic-linguistic character, thought to belong to an existing nation and society, becomes transformed into a full-fledged society of all classes. In this process, its ethnic marker becomes the basis of a national language and national culture. Conversely, the process of nation-unmaking often appears at first, and is so diagnosed, as a problem of economic reform or cultural integration: this was the case, for example, when what was for some a Jewish national revival (that is, modern Jewish nation-making) was perceived by others as an "internal" social/religious problem within the Polish nation-remaking process. Theodor Herzl's assertion of the emerging Jewish identity could be voiced by other national writers in countless other cases: "I do not consider the Jewish question to be

a social or religious. . .question. . .it is a national problem. We are a nation."[12]

THE MAKING OF UKRAINE

Little Russia, Great Russia, Russia

The Ukrainian case will provide a concrete example of that dialectical process in which the making, unmaking, and remaking of nations is a simultaneous and concurrent phenomenon. At the historical juncture when the Russian Empire's educated elites began to define themselves as "Russians" in the modern sense, they did so in reaction to "the West" (or "Europe"). Some other subjects of the tsar, viewed as eligible to become Russian, declined the offer of admission to the nation-in-the-making; instead they declared that if they had to define themselves in national terms— which they had not done before—they would do so as members of another nation.

One may find evidence of their reasoning in Semen Divovych's 1762 poem "A Conversation of Great Russia with Little Russia," which we may consider one of the earliest statements of the Ukrainian position. In that work, "Little Russia" patiently explained that while Little Russia and Great Russia both had the same ruler, she had her own history and character and was not subordinate to, or a part of, Great Russia. On the contrary, she was the latter's equal.[13]

Here we see why it makes little sense to speak of "Ukraine" becoming part of "Russia" in the seventeenth century; the concept of a Russian state (or nation) as something distinct from the monarch's person and possessions did not then exist. This idea first emerged, as Greenfeld reminds us, only in the time of Peter the Great and was not clearly established until the reign of Catherine II. Yet when the tsar, in addition to being the autocrat of Great Russia, became the sovereign of Little Russia—as the northeastern part of Ukraine came to be called—Little Russia did not thereby become part of Russia in the modern, national sense. This Little Russia, which was a kind of a premodern or historic Ukrainian-Cossack nation, retained its own government, laws, and institutions for at least a century after its acceptance under the scepter of

the tsar. The nation-building project of Russia called for the elimi-
nation of Little Russia's separate identity: but it was precisely in
the final decades of Little Russia's autonomous existence that its
rights began to be defended in a language revealing a modern
conception of nation.

The Russian Project

Before the Ukrainians put forward their national agenda, the na-
tion-and-state-building of Russia was already under way, in ways
that had ramifications for those who (in a premodern, prenational
sense) we may call the Ukrainian subjects of the Empire. Especially
in Catherine II's reign (1762–1796), St. Petersburg held the view
that the elimination of Little Russia's traditional institutions was
just one element of a larger state- and nation-building project and
thus required a variety of measures, the aim of which was to
achieve the complete integration of Little Russia into the Russian
state and Russian society. Greenfeld notes that, curiously,

> it is possible that as much as 50 percent of this first mass of Russian
> nationalists were Ukrainians. In itself, this fact would not be signifi-
> cant, but in Russia, which was to move steadily toward becoming
> one of the model *ethnic nations,* the prominence of ethnic non-
> Russians does indeed add a touch of irony to the story. . . . In St.
> Petersburg and Moscow, literally in the front ranks of the nascent
> Russian intelligentsia, the humble youths from Little Russia forged
> the Great Russian national consciousness.[14]

While Greenfeld's facts are indisputable, one must remember
that the nation those Ukrainians were helping to create was at that
time not a Russian ethnic nation: the imperial nation-building
project did not then define the all-Russian identity simply by
reference to its Great Russian ethnic component. It was rather the
rise of Ukraine that later contributed to the ethnicization and
"downsizing" of Russian identity, which ultimately resulted in
making "Russian" a synonym for "Great Russian."

It seemed quite reasonable to the Russian imperial government
and society to expect that Little Russia (which, after separating
itself from Poland in the middle of the seventeenth century, had
been under the tsars for more than a hundred years), as well as the
more recent acquisitions of 1793–1795, would join in with the

Great Russians in the making of a new, "European" Russia. Many natives of Little Russia (Ukrainians by our contemporary criteria) in fact did participate in the diverse activities we may put under the general umbrella of "nation-building" in Russia, especially in the eighteenth century.

While the same was true in the nineteenth century, it is important to note that Russian nation-building has meant quite different things at different times. In the eighteenth century and into the first half of the nineteenth, the concept of the Russian nation was still relatively open: Russia was not yet understood to mean the country of the Great Russians. Significantly, the construction of a Russian national identity included the construction of a national history, built around the idea of a state distinguished by a thousand-year-long history, which in unbroken procession connected Kiev with Vladimir, Suzdal', Moscow, and ultimately the St. Petersburg of the tsars. In fact, this construct was first formulated in connection with Ukraine's becoming attached to Russia after 1654; the idea was that modern Russians had possessed a state of their own without interruption from the time of Kievan Rus to the present. The corollary of this was to disinherit the Ukrainians from any claim to historic statehood and thereby deny them any future claim to independent statehood.

Even if politically expedient, such a reading of history gravely tested credulity. For several centuries prior to the union with Ukraine, official Muscovy had a very dim sense, if indeed any at all, of being the direct heir of Kiev.[15] It was the newcomers from the South who informed the Muscovites that their state was a direct continuation of the Kievan state. The idea that they and the Muscovites were really "Russians" performed a significant integrating function in the eighteenth century and afterwards. The Russians further embellished their "national" history by according later to the grand principality of Moscow the claim of sole, legitimate, and direct successor of Kiev—first by invoking dynastic and religious arguments, and then, in the age of ethnic nationalism, by claiming an ethnic identity between the modern Russian nation (and its empire) and the state of Kievan Rus, denying any legitimacy as Kiev's heirs to other polities that functioned in the post-Kiev space. (This served to make the Lithuanian and Polish presence in those territories illegitimate.) As ethnic nationalism inten-

sified throughout nineteenth-century Europe, this operation was carried one step farther: the Great Russians were declared to be the real Russians, while the Ukrainians and Belorussians were viewed either as a junior branch of the Russian family or as Russians corrupted by foreign influences.

In the early phase of nation-formation the relation of "Little Russians" or of "Great Russians" to "Russians in general" had not yet been resolved. Many "Little Russians," and some "Great Russians" too, thought that what mattered most was that the Russian *narodnost* was a member of the Slavic family and that the cultural stock of Little Russia, its songs, legends, even historical experiences, could be integrated into a common "pan-Russian" identity—the precise content of which had not yet been defined. If the imperial government promoted the "Official Nationality" idea of the Russian nation, some Russians found in Ukraine's history material with which to promote a more libertarian, anti-tsarist conception of an all-Rus Russian nation (thus the well-known interest of some of the Decembrists in Ukrainian history).

That the imperial version of the Russian nation was defined ideologically—in confrontation with the West—had important domestic implications for the status of Little Russian history and society. The state was promoting a vision of the Russian nation from above, centered on the understanding of Russia as an autocracy; the educated public, the emerging civil society, was not allowed to advance a competing vision. Thus, the Russian nation was forming in an international setting in which comparisons with the West were always made; but the implicit adoption of Western ways went hand-in-hand with the explicit rejection of some elements of the West.

The Idea of Ukraine

If natives of Little Russia were so prominent in the Russian nation-building project, why did some of them refuse to join what had been crafted, choosing instead to declare themselves Ukrainian? Since the Russian project signified a Europeanization of Russia, was Ukrainianism a reactionary movement, a refusal to accept "Europe"? Or was it the result of a conclusion that the road to Europe being built in St. Petersburg was not the right road for Ukraine?

This essay argues for the latter interpretation. Sensing that both Russia and Poland were themselves peripheral in relation to the West, the early Ukrainian nation-builders believed it better to establish access to "Europe" directly, rather than by way of St. Petersburg—that is to say, without acquiescing in enduring as the periphery of a periphery.

The emergence of modern Ukrainian national consciousness can be dated with relative precision; its beginnings are found in the late eighteenth century. Certain features were common to those who may be characterized as the earliest Ukrainian nationalists: they belonged to what then were upper-strata social groups; they were literate—indeed, well educated; they knew the world beyond the land and people in which they had been born. They already possessed, to a certain degree, a secular outlook, even when they were taken to be religious believers; this outlook extended to understanding the state in terms other than the ones propounded by those who still advocated the divine right of kings. They knew that at least some other nations decided for themselves how they would be governed.

Those few individuals who had a broader view of their own land and of a larger world could see that societies and states were redefining themselves. No longer was it the case that the monarch defined his subjects; increasingly, it was the other way around. But how then was one to know who the "people" were? What were the criteria for defining that collectivity of people entitled to define the government under which they would live, and to whom such a government would be responsible?

The first definition of Ukraine was historical. The Little Russia of the age of Catherine was aware, and took pride in the fact, that it was a child (some said a stepchild) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; its defenders asserted their rights against the empire by invoking Little Russia's past ties with the Commonwealth. Such was the view of Hryhorii Poletyka, who "articulated a view of Ukraine ruled as a gentry democracy in the manner of the Polish Commonwealth."[16] In the nineteenth century the populist historian of Ukraine, Aleksander Lazarevsky, criticized the efforts of Ivan Mazepa, a leader of Ukraine's abortive early eighteenth-century quest for independence, for perverting the supposedly open Ukrainian social order: "There is no doubt," Lazarevsky

wrote, "that if there had not been the restraining power of the Russian government, then Mazepa would have made out of Little Russia a little Poland, with all its splendor for the *pany* and all its hardships for the *muzhiki.*"[17]

However much he disapproved of the social system of old Poland and the ideas of its imitators, Lazarevsky thus acknowledged Ukraine's political ties to the non-Russian world. The construction of a Ukrainian national history that "seceded" from the imperial version of "Russian" history included the declaration of a link, a continuity in political tradition, between Little Russia, itself a direct product of the Cossack association with the Commonwealth, on the one hand and Kievan Rus on the other.

Later, after the historic nation of Little Russia was dissolved for both internal and external reasons, Ukrainians appealed to ethnography for guidance as to who constituted "us" and who was "other." The ethnic argument defined Ukraine territorially as the land where Ukrainian dialects were spoken by the peasantry.

Whether framed in ethnographic, linguistic, or historical terms, declarations of a distinct Ukrainian cultural identity had political significance from the first moment. Their effect was to modify the official definition of the nation in a way that was contrary to the aims and intentions of the empire. If the official ideology held that Russia was an autocracy, then collecting and popularizing folk songs that extolled "freedom" served to question that system.

The Ukraine being constructed was acquiring its existence through the activities of "name givers," classifiers, and conceptualizers; their words created the material entities of national identity. These individuals, members of the Russian-speaking intelligentsia, of Ukrainian, Russian, or mixed Ukrainian-Russian descent, assumed the roles of spokesmen for and leaders of a nation that was overwhelmingly peasant. In many ways these intellectuals were simultaneously Ukrainian and Russian, reflecting the sociological and political realities of Ukraine. The mass constituency of any Ukrainian movement, were it ever to emerge, consisted primarily of serfs and thus remained beyond the pale of social and cultural life in the empire.

The defense of Little Russia was expressed in works of literature, in theater, and in historical, philological, and other researches. At this initial stage in the late eighteenth century, language itself

was not regarded as the defining marker of the nation; culture, and especially the politico-historical identity of the nation, was understood as the *sine qua non* of nationhood.

The adoption of the vernacular took place in the part of Ukraine that was the most "Westernized" culturally—the farthest eastern region, in Poltava and Kharkiv. Marc Raeff has written insightfully on this subject, noting the crucial role of educational institutions. Raeff distinguishes between the contribution of those in Kiev and in Kharkiv. The older intellectual center, Kiev, had been of central importance during the transition from Muscovite to imperial political culture. Kharkiv, which functioned as Ukraine's cultural center in the early decades of the nineteenth century, on the other hand fostered not only the Russification of the elites but also the reception of idealism and Romanticism, which, according to Raeff, were "the necessary preconditions of modern nationalism."[18]

The new nationalism was not only different in kind from the preceding emphasis on regional and historical identity; it was also subversive of the state and the imperial establishment. The traditional elite of Ukraine, having become largely Russified, was accordingly only marginally involved in this new expression; instead, the first and most energetic propagators of this new sense of national identity were intellectuals, academics who systematically developed its scholarly and philosophical justification. As Raeff notes, "The old regionalism was dead. A new nationalism, based on historical anthropology, philology and folk culture (or what was thought to be folk culture) was emerging under the influence of Romanticism, idealistic philosophy, and the government's complete refusal to grant civil society an active role."[19]

Benedict Anderson's argument on the rise of the science of philology helps us to understand the circumstances under which the Ukrainian idea was formulated. Of the revolution in language and the study of languages, which he places in the later eighteenth century, Anderson notes:

> Advances in Semitics undermined the idea that Hebrew was either uniquely ancient or of divine provenance. . . . "Language became less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves." Out of these discoveries came philology. . . . From this point on the old sacred languages—Latin,

Greek, and Hebrew—were forced to mingle on equal ontological footing with a motley plebeian crowd of vernacular rivals, in a movement which complemented their earlier demotion in the market-place by print-capitalism. If all languages now shared a common (intra-) mundane status, then all were in principle equally worthy of study and admiration. But by who? Logically, since now none belonged to God, by their new owners: each language's native speakers—and readers.[20]

The construction of modern Ukraine also required a different philosophical framework—one no longer theological or monarchical. If one takes into account the dominance of the clergy in the Greek-Catholic (western) parts of Ukraine (which lasted well into the nineteenth century) on the one hand and the formation of a Polish vernacular literature as early as the sixteenth century on the other, it becomes possible to understand both the protracted process of a specifically Ukrainian nation-formation in Galicia and other areas of Austria and the enormous attractiveness of the Polish national project to "Ruthenians"—not evident before 1772, but especially pronounced under Austrian rule. A theological Weltanschauung confronted a modern secular outlook. Closely related was the question of power in this society; the clergy, as the masters of a sacred language for divine mediation, did not want to share power with or abdicate power to secular elites. In the 1830s and 1840s, the clergy fought against the vernacular proposed by the young intelligentsia; in 1848 clerics managed to deny admission into the Ukrainian community to members of the landed aristocracy. The Greek-Catholic clergy continued to fight language-power struggles into the final decades of the nineteenth century, not giving up for good until the twentieth.

Ultimately, it was the process leading to the delineation of the territory of modern Ukraine that took the longest to be completed; in a sense, this was completed only after 1917. In the nineteenth century it involved the use of both ethnography and history but also, crucially, had a material, practical aspect: the colonization of the previously Tatar and Turkish South by Ukrainian peasants from the Russian East Ukraine (or Little Russia) and the former Polish, right-bank Ukraine, conquered by the empire in the late eighteenth century.

Geopolitics Rearranges the Stage

We shall never know how the Ukrainian-Russian relationship might have evolved had the Russian Empire remained in its pre-1770 borders. Two major events on the international scene transformed the setting in which the subsequent history of Russian and Ukrainian nation-making took place. First, the partitions of Poland moved the borders of the Russian Empire far to the west—making it possible for Little Russia, a western periphery of the Russian Empire before the partitions, to come into direct contact with former Poland's eastern periphery (or "Ukraine") on the western bank of the Dnieper. In the long run, this resulted in the formation of a new entity—the Ukraine we know today—around a new center, the city of Kiev, which before the partitions of Poland had been a border town. Second, Russian imperial conquests in the region of the Black Sea made possible a Ukrainian colonization from the Ukrainian peripheries of Russia, and from Poland's former Ukrainian peripheries (annexed by Russia in 1793–1795), to what is now southern Ukraine, which had been peripheral lands of the Ottoman Empire.

With the Russian annexation of what had been Poland's border territories in 1793–1795, an "undoing of 1667" (that is, of the partition of Ukraine between Warsaw and Moscow) took place. For Ukrainians, the Polish partitions rearranged the stage in the midst of their transition from an administrative regional or provincial problem within the empire to an "inter-nationality" and finally an *international* problem. Most obviously, the east and west banks of the Dnieper were now united within one state. Not only were there many more Ukrainians in post-1795 Russia, but for the first time, the Polish question began to play a crucial role in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship.

But the Russian public did not understand that the partitions of Poland had transformed the conditions under which the relations between Great Russia and Little Russia, between the "Ukraine" and the empire, would develop. The critical importance of Poland for the politics and culture of Russia was perceived by few Russians in the nineteenth century. And yet the inclusion of new millions of Roman Catholics and Uniates, and of several million more Jews, put on the agenda of Russian politics a number of

pressing questions. Were these new subjects full-fledged citizens of Russia? Were they *rossiyane* even if they were not *russkiye*?[21]

The Russian-Polish Struggle for the "Borderlands"

Andreas Kappeler, in his study *Russia as a Multinational Empire,* rightly argues the importance of the Polish national movement in undermining the Russian Empire in two ways: through the efforts of Poles themselves and by Polish influence on the Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians. "The Poles played this leading role once again in the crisis of the Soviet Empire at the end of the twentieth century."[22]

After 1795, the Russian Empire ruled its former Polish acquisitions in a de facto, and after 1815 a de jure, alliance with the Polish nobility of west-bank Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. This Russo-Polish relationship did not become something formal and lasting, in the manner of the Austro-Hungarian "compromise" after 1866. But it did define the parameters in which the Ukrainians lived for more than a generation: Polish social and cultural dominance, and Russian political, state, and military power.

After 1830, the situation changed dramatically. The Polish insurrection of 1830–1831 destroyed this Polish-Russian cohabitation (which was being subverted anyway by imperial violations of the 1815 accord). Each for their own reasons, the Russians and the Ukrainians formed something similar to a common front against the Poles. The Russians were resolved to prove these lands were not Polish, and in this effort they were assisted by the Ukrainians. (It took some time before the Russians realized the Ukrainians were also trying to prove the lands in question were not Russian, either.) Thus, the making of a modern Ukraine was taking place not in "Austria" and "Russia," as most textbooks say, but in a social world—the social space—where an overwhelming majority of would-be Ukrainians lived under Polish nobles. The modernizers of the Polish nation promised those serfs that they would become free and Polish at the same time.

This new concept of the Polish nation first emerged in the intellectual revolution and political reforms—a peaceful revolution from above—of the final decade of the eighteenth century. The Polish nation survived the destruction of the Polish state by Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Poland further survived as a

society; the social landscape of the late *Rzeczpospolita* was domi-
nated by the Poles. But the old noble-dominated society was gradually
dissolved by industrialization and urbanization and by new ideas
of social and political organization. In a real sense the "successor
nations" of the Commonwealth—modern Poles, Jews, Lithuanians,
Belorussians, and Ukrainians—emerged out of the transformation
of its old classes, estates, and religious groups under the impact of
modernization.

Ukraine under Russia and Poland: The Nineteenth Century

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Russian public
did not know Ukraine in any other form except that of Little
Russia. As Paul Bushkovitch has noted, the Russians thought of
the right bank of the Dnieper as Polish; they knew that the nobility
there was Polish. And when the Russians thought about the south—
the Steppe region—it was Odessa, the sea, and economic develop-
ment that came to mind, not the Ukrainians:

> To the Russian writer and reader the Ukraine was Malorossija, the
> old Hetmanate and the Slobodskaja (later Char'kovskaja)
> gubernija. . . . This exclusive concentration on the left bank was in
> itself the product of several forces. The assumption that the left
> bank was the entire Ukraine was so powerful that none of the
> authors of the time explained this identification, but the basic rea-
> son was undoubtedly the existence of a gentry society in that
> area. . . . As most Russian writers of that age came from the gentry,
> when they turned to the Ukraine, they saw only their counterparts
> in the so-called Little Russian gentry. Further, these gentry had
> many personal and family ties with Russian gentry, and many had
> been and still were prominent in all-Russian politics.[23]

At first glance it might seem that the life of the Ukrainian
national poet Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861) supports Hroch's
thesis that national awakeners in the so-called small nations are
drawn from the lower social strata. Born a serf, Shevchenko tech-
nically remained a serf until his freedom was purchased by his
friends when he was a man in his twenties, a graduate of the St.
Petersburg Academy of Fine Arts. But as Omeljan Pritsak has
recently reminded us, Shevchenko did not become a builder of
modern Ukrainian consciousness because he was born in the vil-
lage, because he lived his childhood surrounded by folk culture, or

because he spoke the Ukrainian vernacular as his first language. It was only *after* he had acquired a modern political and cultural awareness—long after he had left his native village and became aware of a larger world, first in Vilnius and then in St. Petersburg—that Shevchenko began to see the political significance of his native culture and "nationalized" it by making its language a medium of artistic expression. Pritsak argues that it was the encounter with Yevhen Hrebinka (1812–1848), "a landowner from Poltava" (among other things), that opened Shevchenko's eyes to the fact that literary circles had great interest in Ukrainian folk song and that modern original literature was in fact being already produced in the language of those folk songs.[24]

The great Russian critic Vissarion Belinsky (1811–1848) understood instantly what the Ukrainian literati were really up to and knew that creating a Ukrainian-language literature might—indeed would—lead to the idea that a Ukrainian society, a nation, to *match* that literature, should be created next. As George G. Grabowicz has noted, "Belinsky's consistently negative reaction to Shevchenko was occasioned precisely by his principled opposition to literary 'separatism' and the political separatism that it necessarily implied."[25] For their part, however, the Russians did not understand that Shevchenko represented a qualitatively new stage in the formation of Ukraine and the decline of Little Russia. The Ukrainians were operating in the bipolar Russian-Polish world, but the Russians continued to regard them as their own province. (Interestingly enough, some Poles were gradually accepting the emergence of a Ukrainian nation and of other nations in formerly Polish lands.)

Indeed, the Russian state responded to this national and religious diversification of the empire and the coming of the era of nationalism in Europe by formulating its own definition of Russia: the doctrine of Official Nationality, according to which Orthodoxy, autocracy, and *narodnost'* were the principles on which Russia stood. The nation was the property of the monarch; serfdom was held to be a national institution. Peter the Great was extolled to almost divine levels and was routinely described as the creator of Russia. One tsarist official, Count E. Kankrin (who incidentally was born in Germany with the surname of Krebs), even suggested that "Russia should be called Petrovia, and we

Petrovians: or the empire should be named *Romanovia*, and we *Romanovites*." A Russian journalist who read this proposal commented: "An unusual idea, but an essentially correct one!"[26] It is of course significant that Kankrin's ideas were being aired at precisely the time that an emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia was defining the Ukrainian people as a nation devoted to liberty.

Before long, the Russians began to understand the connection between the Polish and the Ukrainian questions. They did so in a manner characteristic of a police mentality. Drawing a number of conclusions from the 1863 Polish uprising, which was finally suppressed by the summer of 1864, the government in St. Petersburg modified the terms of the emancipation of 1861 in regions that had been the scene of the Polish uprising; further, it announced a number of anti-Catholic measures. St. Petersburg also concluded that the Ukrainian movement was a product of the Polish plot to dismember the Russian nation.

In 1863 the so-called *Valuyev ukaz*, named after the minister of the interior, introduced the first restrictions on the use of the Ukrainian language. The government, which enjoyed the support of a large segment of the public in this respect, concluded that the Ukrainian phenomenon was dangerous—even though the Ukrainians limited their activities to literary and scholarly pursuits, in marked contrast to the Poles. What the Ukrainians were doing, some Russians came to realize, subverted the very unity of the Russian nation, which in the view of educated Russians consisted of three major ethnographic or folkloristic subdivisions—the Great Russians, the Little Russians, and the White or Belo-Russians—yet was one nation, united in its common higher culture and in politics.

The Russian government did not believe that the Ukrainian movement was an expression of any authentic and legitimate aspirations of the population of Little Russia and chose to treat it as a product of foreign (in this case, Polish) "intrigue." This set the tone for how Russia would view Ukrainian nationalism for decades to come: in the future, "Ukrainianism" would be viewed as a product of German, Austrian, or Vatican plots, besides being seen as, in one way or another, an originally Polish invention.

In 1876 the imperial government went even farther in its identification of Ukrainian language and culture with political separat-

ism when, in a secret edict signed by the tsar at Ems, it forbade the publication of Ukrainian writings and the performance of Ukrainian plays and songs. According to Grabowicz, in taking this step the Russian government helped, albeit ironically, to raise Ukrainian literature out of its provincial mode, giving it newfound political import by casting it as something subversive, separatist, or protonationalist: "It goes without saying, of course, that these qualities must already have existed—more or less openly, as in Shevchenko, or *in potentia*."[27]

The model of the Russian nation and society promoted by the tsarist state encountered challenges from two directions. One might say figuratively that there emerged, in approximately the same historical period, two alternative ways, or models, for seceding from the empire. One path of secession amounted to the rejection of, and eventually a challenge to, the fundamental principle on which the empire was built—autocracy. This became the basis of a deep cleavage in Russian identity, as revealed in the title of Alexander V. Riasanovsky's book *A Parting of Ways,* which examines the relations between the government and Russia's educated elite in the first half of the nineteenth century.[28] The other mode of "secession" was represented by the Ukrainian idea.

Ukraine and the Turkish/Tatar Connection

While the partition of Poland affected the Ukrainians in a way the Russian public failed to notice until long after the event, something similar happened to the Ukrainian perception of, and responses to, the Russian imperial annexation of formerly Turkish and Tatar holdings in the Black Sea region.

From the eighteenth century onward, colonization was carried out in the south and southeast. The newly colonized lands had not in past centuries been inhabited by Ukrainians or other Slavs. Thus, in the Ukrainian case, the nationalization of space was more than a matter of attaching national labels to an already inhabited territory upon which some other nation or nationalist movement had put another designation. Uniquely among the peoples of Europe in the nineteenth century, the Ukrainians were in fact creating what in the age of nationalism would become a major part of their future national space, their *national homeland.* These were new lands of Russia—indeed, the Russians called them "New Rus-

sia"—but they were being settled mainly by Ukrainians and in due course would be claimed for Ukraine. The process of settling the south—and expanding the Ukrainian space—was not understood in the national thought as an aspect of Ukrainian nation-building when it was taking place. (Neither the Russian state nor the public attached any special importance to this fact.) The opera *Zaporozhets' za Dunayem* ("The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube") was not written and produced until much later, in the 1860s; and it was only in the late 1870s that Mykhailo Drahomanov clearly set out the reasons why New Russia was included within his definition of Ukraine.

In Russian national consciousness, the conquest of the Black Sea coast and of Crimea is perceived in terms of imperial wars, imperial military grandeur, and the building of Odessa and Sevastopol. By contrast, seen from the perspective of the Ukrainian national epic, the story begins several centuries earlier; moreover, it is a people's history, a story of people's wars and people's settlement. Seeing the matter in this way can help shed light on the psychological background of the current Russo-Ukrainian dispute about the Black Sea fleet. For the Russians, it is a matter of military prestige and national grandeur; from the Ukrainian perspective, it is yet another expression of that brave plebeian insistence upon freedom so typified in Repin's painting "Zaporozhians Writing a Letter to the Sultan of Turkey."

Vienna and the Slavic Question

Only now may we turn to a theme that typically enters accounts of modern Ukraine, though much earlier. We have seen that the formation of modern Ukraine took place as a process of self-definition against both Russia and Poland. Yet there took place a further "culturalization" or "ethnicization" of the nation, beyond that effort of nation-formation that had first been undertaken by a historical elite.

The entry of Vienna directly into Ukrainian history was of enormous long-term significance, although not in a way normally presented by Ukrainian historians. If *esse percipi* is needed to become a nation, Vienna opened a new dimension in the "internationalization" of the Ukrainian phenomenon. The transfer from Polish to Austrian rule also made possible the transition to a

different level of life: serfs became legal subjects with standing in public law, human beings de jure.

What Geoffrey Hawthorn has observed about the impact of the absolutism of the European powers in Africa in the nineteenth century can equally be said about Vienna's impact on "Galicia":

> Absolutist states were, in their absolutism, states. They controlled their territories and their population within them. And if they did not emerge from an already existing political community, they almost always served to create one. Those who came later to contest them. . .could take that community for granted, or at least could take it that there was a community to be fought for.[29]

Austrian reforms made the rise of a political community possible, but they did not make Ukrainians out of peasants and Greek Catholics. Their first "higher" identity was "Ruthenian," and their first political consciousness was imperial—we may call it, in Tomáš Masaryk's term, "Viennism." The party capable of taking advantage of what the Austrians had set in motion was the Poles; they knew how to benefit from the creation of a single Galicia, i.e., a new entity that consisted of mainly a Ruthenian eastern part, forming the province of "Ruthenia" before 1772, and an overwhelmingly Polish western part. Things would have been quite different had "Ruthenia" been retained as a distinct entity under Vienna. After the Poles had transformed their own identity in the 1790s, it became clear that the Vienna reforms had merely cleared the ground for the subsequent triumphal march of "Polonism." In fact, there was more Polonization in "Ruthenia" after 1795 than there had been in the four centuries between 1370 and 1772.

However slowly, a new social reality was emerging. The ancient, sharply defined barriers and structures were being gradually undermined by "culture"—growing literacy, dissemination of knowledge about the larger world, scientific and secular thought. The meaning of being Polish, as indicated above, was becoming transformed. The new Polish identity was open to these "Ruthenes," to "Greek Catholics," to all who were leaving the peasant stratum—or to those sons of the clergy who did not wish to pursue their father's station in society and hoped to be doctors, engineers, or teachers instead. In the early nineteenth century, the Ruthenes lacked a secular ideology; they did not use their own living lan-

guage in print, education, or civic affairs. All these spheres were serviced by Polish language and Polish ideas; those individuals who had reached a certain intellectual level and social station had nowhere else to go but to Polonism.

The masses remained Greek Catholic and "imperial" so long as serfdom defined the way of life of the overwhelming majority. In the 1830s—after the Polish Insurrection of 1830–1831, and three generations after 1772—some young "Ruthenians" turned seriously to what was going on in Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kiev. They opened up to Ukrainian culture from the East and discovered in it a force capable of immunizing them to Polonism and at the same time bringing them to a world stage. Thus "Ukraine" entered, as a third party, the great historic contest between Russia and Poland. An observer from the side, the Czech journalist and activist Karel Havlíček (1821–1856), dubbed the polemic (and struggle) between the Russians and the Poles "a fable of two wolves." "If there is a lamb in the picture," he went on, "it is the Ukrainian."[30]

The emergence of a distinct Ukrainian nationality was thus penetrating the consciousness of the world beyond Russian-Polish spheres. The "internationalization" of the Ukrainian phenomenon, begun with the partitions of Poland, was further advanced by the new intellectual climate in Europe associated with the birth of nationality. As the idea of a Slavonic family of nations took hold, and as institutional structures reflecting this emerged—beginning with the establishment of chairs of Slavic studies in Prague and in Vienna—the Ukrainians "arrived" in their own right as a distinct nation, despite lacking political status.

Ukraine—One Nation or Two?

Ukrainian differentiation from Russia and Poland respectively did not necessarily guarantee the unity of those Ukrainians who refused to be Russian with those Ukrainians who refused to be Polish. The Russian Ukrainians needed to defend their identity against the Russians; the Galician Ukrainians—even those in the west bank region, who had lived under Russia from 1793 to 1795—had been traditionally preoccupied with maintaining themselves against the Poles. Some time had to pass before the "Russian" Ukrainians began to think of "Polish" and "Austrian" Ukrai-

nians as a part of one nation, and before the latter took note of the "Russian" Ukrainians as their conationals.

It was the Galicians who first turned their eyes toward "Ukraine." But in dealing with Galicia we need to discern phases in its history. First, there was the partial but critical emancipation from the virtually total social and cultural dependence on the *szlachta*. This was accomplished by Viennese intervention after about 1772. The resulting "Ruthenianism," as soon became evident, was largely helpless in resisting Polonization. Mass Polonization occurred in the second phase, when Polonism came to mean not only the old noble power but also a revolutionary program of emancipation and cultural freedom. Only in the third phase did a turn toward the people and its language come, accelerated by the discovery of, and a receptiveness to, Ukrainian life in the Russian Empire. This third period began only in the 1830s.

But this march was neither simple nor straightforward. There were periods of *moskvofil'stvo*—an orientation toward Russia— before Galicia finally decided it wanted to be a part of Ukraine. Why then did the Galicians, having decided they would not be Polish and having likewise rejected the Russian option, not want to be a Galician nation? What made them choose instead to be a small part of Ukraine?

Two tentative answers come to mind. First, Ukraine had cultural resources that enabled the culturally impoverished and socially underprivileged Ruthenes of Galicia to compete with Polish culture, society, and politics. Second, by joining Ukraine the Galicians were becoming members of a nation larger than Poland; not by accident did they call it *Velyka Ukraina*, "Greater Ukraine." Without an affiliation with Ukraine, the Galician community was roughly the size of the Slovak or Lithuanian nationalities. Perhaps it was the sense that Ukraine offered them the best hope of survival versus Poland that made it possible for Catholic Galicians to unite with the Orthodox East—against Catholic Poles.

This may be a place to remind oneself of the fact that the period after 1795—indeed, well into the nineteenth century—was, despite Russian political rule, one of Polish cultural hegemony in all the lands of the old republic. This period even saw an expansion of "Polonism" into Kiev and as far to the east as Kharkiv. (There were Poles involved in the founding of Kharkiv University; more-

over, Kharkiv functioned as a link to the West via Warsaw, by-passing the Moscow–St. Petersburg channel, with important ramifications for Ukrainian development.) It was therefore understandable that the necessity of defining oneself as distinct from Poles was so strongly felt in Galicia. So strong was Ukrainian anti-Polonism that when Vienna ceased to be the Ruthenes' protector and made a deal with the Poles (after 1867), some Ruthenes sought their salvation from the Poles even in tsarist Russia.

Little surprise, then, that the question of intra-Ukrainian unity was seen by Ukrainian patriots as a key issue for decades. As late as 1906, Mykhailo Hrushevsky published an article titled "Ukraine and Galicia," in which the historian warned his compatriots that if they did not take care, they might well end up as the Serbs and Croats had—two nations based on one ethnic foundation. Hrushevsky argued that a common ethnicity could not by itself guarantee that one nation would rise on it; the transformation of an ethnic group into a nation required work and the wish to be one. Ethnicity was only a point of departure, a foundation. The development of a common Ukrainian literary language required a deliberate policy, a sustained effort, and Hrushevsky appealed to Ukrainians on both sides of the border to step up their efforts.[31]

We can speak confidently of the completion of the Ukrainian nation-building process only when individuals and organizations emerged who thought in terms of a common "pan-Ukrainian" national interest—above western Ukraine's preoccupation with Poland and eastern Ukraine's preoccupation with Russia.

The Ukrainians consciously and energetically worked to create a common language; the Austrian west modeled itself on eastern authors. Even so, the relation between language and nationality is commonly misunderstood. The Ukrainians of Russia and Austria did not become one nation because they spoke the same language; they came to speak the same language because they had first decided to be one nation. They were helped in reaching this conclusion by Hrushevsky's greatest accomplishment—his synthesis of Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky both established the standard and pointed the way toward achieving it; he constructed a conception of Ukrainian history that offered a path toward a common Ukrainian political strategy, toward envisioning the future of the whole nation, not merely its parts. By constructing a historical

argument for the unity of the Ukrainian nation, his work espe-
cially stressed the crucial importance of links between Kiev and
L'viv at critical junctures of history. Hrushevsky, as John A.
Armstrong has argued recently, provided the vindication of the
"Ukrainian myth"—and did so in the language of nineteenth-
century science.[32]

Just as emphatically (and just as importantly), Hrushevsky ar-
gued against the idea of a "thousand-year-old Russian state" and
denied that any single "Russian" nation had existed for a millen-
nium. To a contemporary political observer, the so-called Belovezha
accords of 1991, in which the leaders of the three East Slavic
republics and nations dissolved the Soviet Union, appear to be the
implementation in real, political terms of the Hrushevsky schema;
the establishment of the independent states of Ukraine, Russia,
and Belarus can quite easily be deduced from Hrushevsky's inter-
pretation of the past, as he summarized it in a famous paper of
1904 on the "rational structure" of East Slav history.[33]

Hrushevsky's contemporary Ivan Franko explained at roughly
the same time the practical tasks for the present that emerged from
the historical constructions of his friend. In "An Open Letter to
Young Ukrainians of Galicia," written in 1905, Franko distilled
what nationality or nationalism was about:

> Before the Ukrainian intelligentsia an enormous practical task [*diyova
> zadacha*] is opening up now, under freer forms of life in Russia: to
> create out of the vast ethnic mass of *Ukrainian people* a Ukrainian
> nation, a comprehensive cultural organism, capable of an indepen-
> dent cultural and political life, resistant to assimilationist efforts of
> other nations, whatever their origin, and, at the same time, a nation
> open to receiving, on the widest possible scale, and at the fastest
> rate, those universal human cultural achievements without which
> no nation and no state, however powerful, can survive.[34]

CONCLUSIONS

In evaluating the prospects of Ukraine as a nation it may be useful
to turn to the ideas of the Russian philosopher and theologian
Georgii Fedotov, who as early as the 1920s and 1930s, while
living in exile, reflected on the future of Ukrainian-Russian rela-
tions after the fall of communism. Fedotov thought the central

question involved in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship was the existence of a third party—Poland, "with which it is tied with centuries-long historical links. Objectively, Ukraine will have to make a choice between Poland and Russia, and it depends in part on us that this choice is not made against our old common fatherland."[35]

Equally important to Fedotov for the preservation of the unity of Russia was what he perceived to be the role of Russian culture in giving all of the Empire's peoples "access to world civilization." As he put it: "This was so in the St. Petersburg period of the Empire, and it should remain so [in the post-Soviet future]. If the peoples of Russia will study not in Moscow, not in St. Petersburg, but in Paris and in Berlin, then they will not remain with us."[36]

We do not know what Fedotov would have said about the situation today when Ukraine includes also regions that in his time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania and were largely Catholic rather than Orthodox. Ukraine does not have to make a "choice" between Russia and Poland; Poland has given up any claims to Ukraine and recognizes Ukraine's independence. Warsaw has thus transformed itself, in the Ukrainian perspective, from a historic enemy into an important ally. And it is not only in Paris, London, and Frankfurt, but also in New York, Boston, Toronto, and Tokyo that non-Russians *and* Russians themselves are "studying" after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But Fedotov's general point merits serious attention today. Just as the unity of Russia as he saw it depended on Russia's capacity to be a window to the world for its peoples, so the survival of Ukraine as an independent state (one may reason) will depend to a large extent on how it succeeds in bringing the world to its people—and its people to the world. Success or failure in managing the major "internal" problems of Ukraine today will be affected by the relations it establishes between itself and the world community. The idea of Ukraine as a nation, as argued in this essay, was that its people should have direct access to the centers of civilization rather than being condemned to an inferior status, that they should be communicating with the world at large on their own rather than through intermediaries.

During his visit to Kiev in May of 1995, President Clinton delivered a speech at Shevchenko University clearly intended to

assure ordinary Ukrainians that the United States fully embraced their independence—a message his audience enthusiastically applauded. The crowd at the university roared when Clinton concluded his speech with the Ukrainian phrase *Slava Ukraini*—"Glory to Ukraine."

"He spoke Ukrainian!" came the shout from Oksana Shulga, a sixty-five-year-old retired Aeroflot worker who stood on a stone wall and craned her head over the throng in order to see the American president. Later, spying a clutch of American reporters gathered on the sidewalk to observe the proceedings, she took them under tutelage: "We want to be part of the world, not part of Russia," she explained. Then, approvingly, she added of the president: "And he understands that."[37]

ENDNOTES

[1]Eugene B. Rumer, "Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?" *Foreign Policy* (96) (Fall 1994): 129–144. For comprehensive recent surveys of Ukrainian history see Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) and Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1996). For current debates, see Mark von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" and George G. Grabowicz, "Ukrainian Studies: Framing the Contexts," *Slavic Review* 54 (3) (1995): 658–673, and 674–690, and the comments by Andreas Kappeler, Iaroslav Isaievych, Serhii M. Plokhy, and Yuri Slezkine. Ibid., 691–719.

[2]Contrary to common belief, in the early modern period the Poles—despite sharing a religion with the West—viewed themselves as forming a distinct political and cultural entity that was superior to the West. They thus sought to define themselves in relation to the West, although they did so in terms very different from those in which the Russians saw themselves as in opposition to "Europe." See Andrzej Walicki, *Poland Between East and West: The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland*, the August Zaleski Lectures, Harvard University, 18–22 April 1994 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, 1994).

[3]Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[4]Daniel Beauvois, *The Noble, the Serf and the Revizor: The Polish Nobility Between Tsarist Imperialism and the Ukrainian Masses (1831–1863)* (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991), translation by Barbara Reising of *Le Noble, le Serf et le Revizor: La noblesse polonaise entre le tsarisme et les masses ukrainiennes (1831–1863)* (Paris: Archives Contemporaines, 1984), and *La Bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863–1914: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques* (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1993).

[5]Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Franciszek Duchinski and his Impact on Ukrainian Political Thought," in *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Ukrainian Research Institute, 1987), 194. For references to recent works on Polish-Ukrainian relations see Roman Szporluk, "After Empire: What?" *Dædalus* 123 (3) (Summer 1994): 21–39. See also Ilya Prizel, "The Influence of Ethnicity on Foreign Policy: The Case of Ukraine," in Roman Szporluk, ed., *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 103–128. An earlier volume, by Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), contains useful essays.

[6]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 6.

[7]Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 254. For a comprehensive treatment of the place of "Europe" in Russian thought and politics, see Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

[8]Since in the British case the "Other," the defining "negatio," was Catholicism, and in politics, the Catholic France, the Irish did not qualify for admission. See Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), 5–6. Colley cites, with approval, Peter Sahlins's argument that national identity, "like ethnic or communal identity, is contingent and relational: it is defined by the social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the collective self and its implicit negation, the other." See Ibid., 5–6, quoting from Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989), 271.

[9]Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations,* trans. Ben Fowkes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). See Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), 182–200, for an analysis of Hroch's interpretation of the emergence of nations.

[10]According to Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, Ill. and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 65–66, "a[n] incipient nationality is formed when the perception of the boundaries of community are [*sic*] transformed. . .when a group succeeds in imposing a historical narrative of descent and/or dissent on both heterogeneous and related cultural practices. I will. . .coin the word *discent* to suggest the porosity of these two signifiers. . . . The narrative of *discent* is used to define and mobilize a community, often by privileging a particular cultural practice. . .as the constitutive principle of community—such as language, religion, or common historical experience." At the same time, Duara points out that "[h]istorically, what is unique and new about nationalism is not an epistemological category, such as a type of identity or a mode of consciousness," but "the global *institutional* revolution which. . .produced its own extremely powerful representations of the nation-state." Duara's overall treatment of nationalism is close to that of Greenfeld's (and my own) position: "What is novel about modern nationalism is

the world system of nation-states." Ibid., 8–9. Although he is not exclusively or primarily concerned with nation-formation, Pierre Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Power,* ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), sheds light on the intellectual effort it involves.

[11]For a reminder about this, see for example Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita wielu narodow* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1985), 38ff. The literature on this question, needless to say, is very large.

[12]I discuss the decomposition of the historic Polish nation in relation to the emergence of the Ukrainian nation and, indirectly, of the other successor nations of the Commonwealth in "Polish-Ukrainian Relations in 1918: Notes for Discussion," in Paul Latawski, ed., *The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914–23* (London: Macmillan, 1992), 41–54. My quotation from Herzl is taken from Andrzej Chojnowski, "Problem narodowosciowy na ziemiach polskich. . . ," in Andrzej Garlicki, ed., *Z dziejow Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1986), 180.

[13]Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988; distributed by Harvard University Press), 63. An excerpt from the Divovych poem is included in Ralph Lindheim and George S. N. Luckyj, eds., *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 69–70.

[14]Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity,* 238–239; emphasis in original. In a source note to this discussion, Greenfeld comments: "The number of Ukrainians among the non-noble intellectuals is extraordinary; it is beyond doubt that they played a very prominent role in the activities of the eighteenth-century intelligentsia. . . ." Ibid., 531, n. 90.

[15]Edward L. Keenan argues that Muscovite Russia did not have an awareness of being a continuation of Kiev; "These people were not even thinking of Kiev." Keenan, "On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors," in S. Frederick Starr, ed., *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 19–40, esp. 23. As Keenan sees it, modern scholars, and the general public, have been misled by certain myths regarding early "Russian" history without realizing that they were the product of a much later era, i.e., the time of Russian nation-building. Those misconceptions concern the links between Muscovy and Kiev ("the Kiev myth"), the nature of the Mongol period ("the Tatar-yoke myth"), and the popular myth of an alleged Byzantine or Greek influence, "one of the great mystifications of all of European cultural history. . . ." Keenan, "On Certain Mythical Beliefs," 27, 37. Also see Keenan, "Muscovite Perceptions of Other East Slavs before 1654: An Agenda for Historians," in Peter J. Potichnyj et al., eds., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 20–38.

[16]"Poletyka, Hryhorii," entry in Danylo Husar Struk, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine,* vol. IV (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 94.

[17]David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta,

1985), 9, quoting A. M. Lazarevsky, *Zamechaniia na istoricheskie monografii D. P. Millera o malorusskom dvorianstve i o statutovykh sudakh* (Kharkiv: n.p., 1898), 15.

[18]Marc Raeff, "Ukraine and Imperial Russia: Intellectual and Political Encounters from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century," in Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, and Gleb N. Zekulin, eds., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 82.

[19]Ibid., 80. This case illustrates Bourdieu's thesis that "political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a subversion of the vision of the world." Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 127–128.

[20]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 70–71. The quote is from Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 136.

[21]For a review of competing models of the Russian nation in the context of tsarist Russia's and the Soviet Union's politics, see my "The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR: The Russian Question and Imperial Overextension," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 65–93.

[22]Andreas Kappeler, *Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992), 179.

[23]Paul Bushkovitch, "The Ukraine in Russian Culture, 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals," *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* 39 (3) (1991): 343–344. See also D. B. Saunders, "Contemporary Critics of Gogol's *Vechera* and the Debate about Russian *narodnost'* (1831–1832)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* V (1) (March 1981): 66–82.

[24]Omeljan Pritsak, "Prorok," *Kyivs'ka starovyna* (2) (1994): 11–12.

[25]George G. Grabowicz, "Ukrainian-Russian Literary Relations in the Nineteenth Century: A Formulation of the Problem," in Potichnyj et al., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, 227.

[26]F. Bulgarin, *Vospominaniia* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1846–1849), I, 200–201; cited in Alexander Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967), 138. Riasanovsky also mentions another author, who slightly later proposed to rename the country "Nikolayevia."

[27]Grabowicz, "Ukrainian-Russian Literary Relations in the Nineteenth Century: A Formulation of the Problem," 226–227.

[28]See Alexander V. Riasanovsky, *A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801–1855* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).

[29]Geoffrey Hawthorn, "Sub-Saharan Africa," in David Held, ed., *Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 344.

[30]Karel Havlíček, *Politické spisy*, ed. Z. Tobolka (Prague: n.p., 1900–1903), I, 70; quoted in Barbara K. Reinfeld, *Karel Havlíček (1821–1856): A National Liberation Leader of the Czech Renascence* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1982), 25. In his "Slovan a Cech," Havlíček argued that Slavs are not a

nation, as shown by the Polish-Russian relationship: "So intense is the hatred between these two peoples that they exclude each other from a Slav brotherhood! The Poles claim the Russians are Mongolians, while the Russians call the Poles Sarmatians. The main bone of contention which has divided every generation of Poles and Russians is the possession of Ukraine. Both the Poles and the Russians claim this land on the basis of related nationality. The Russians point to the fact that they share the same religion with the Ruthenes; the Poles retort with the formation of the Uniate church. At present the Russians hope to acquire the Ukraine by Russifying the people as the Poles have been able to Polonize the Lithuanians, by alienating the upper classes from the rest of their own people." Havlíček, *Politické spisy*, I, 63, cited by Reinfeld, *Karel Havlíček*, 24–25.

[31]Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Ukraina i Halychyna," *Literaturno-Naykovyi visnyk* XXXVI (1906): 489–496; cited in Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 79–80 n.

[32]John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," in Potichnyj et al., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, 125–139. Anthony Smith has noted that ". . .ethnic communities often develop political myths, myths that are constitutive of the political community (or mythomoteurs. . .). . . .The main distinction of relevance here is between "dynastic" and "communal" mythomoteurs, between political myths attached to sacral kingship or those based on the ideal of the sacred community or people." Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities, History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 50. As we see it, the Ukrainian "mythomoteur" upheld the idea of a culturally defined people that carried forward ethical and social values and did not depend on the state for its existence. Thus, it was by definition incompatible with the official definition of "nationality" that made autocracy the constitutive element of an imperial Russian identity that also included "Little Russians."

[33]Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Zvychaina skhema 'russkoi' istoriyi i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istoriyi skhidnoho slovianstva" (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1904); reprinted and translated in A. Gregorovich, ed., *The Traditional Scheme of "Russian" History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1966).

[34]Ivan Franko, "Odvertyi lyst do halyts'koi ukraiins'koi molodezhi," *Zibrannia tvoriv u piatdesiaty tomakh* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1976), vol. 45, 404, cited in Oksana Zabuzhko, *Filosofia ukrains'koi idei ta evropeiskyi kontekst: Frankivskyi period* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1992), 61. (The title of Zabuzhko's book reveals its message: "The Philosophy of the Ukrainian Idea and its European Context: The Period of Franko.")

[35]Fedotov, "Budet li sushchestvovat' Rossiya?," in *O Rossiyi i russkoy filosofskoy kul'ture, Filosofy russkogo posleoktiabr'skogo zarubezh'ya* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 455.

[36]Ibid., 461.

[37]Ann Devroy and James Rupert, "Clinton Commends Ukrainians for Sticking with Tough Reforms," *Washington Post*, 13 May 1995, A20. In 1997, demonstrators in Minsk, at a solidarity rally with Serb and Bulgarian democrats, displayed the slogan "we want to live in Europe, not in Russia!" Oleg Moroz, "Kremlevskie politiki pugaiut," *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 5 February 1997, 9. The future of Belarus as a state, one may surmise, will depend not on how many people speak Belorussian (rather than Russian) but on the nationalists' ability to convince people that the republic's independence from Moscow means its openness to "the world."

Anatoly M. Khazanov

Ethnic Nationalism in the Russian Federation

WHY NATIONALISM?

W HEN THE COMMUNIST REGIMES COLLAPSED, nationalism im-
mediately came to the fore as one of the most conspicu-
ous ideological and political factors in the development
of former Second World countries. Suppressed by communism and
by the postwar international political climate in general, national-
ism is now emerging like steam from a pressure cooker. One
obvious example is the former Yugoslavia; though the Soviet and
the Czechoslovak breakups differ from the Yugoslav case in their
manifestations and consequences, their underlying reasons are the
same. In fact, an outburst of nationalism has affected virtually all
former communist countries, including the successor states of the
former Soviet Union.

This outburst of nationalism calls for an explanation, and the
rapidly growing number of publications on the issue reflects at-
tempts at meeting this demand. The easiest, though by no means
sufficient, approach to explaining why nationalism became so
conspicuous in the former communist countries would be to avoid
a bird's-eye view of facts and events and put it in a global political
context. In this case one may follow the question with a
counterquestion: And why not? After all, we are now witnessing
the rise of nationalism in many other parts of the world, including
Western Europe. If this is the case, we can ask why the former

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communist countries should be different, especially if one takes into account that in post-totalitarian societies competing ideologies are still playing a much greater role than in the Western liberal democracies.

After all, the difference between Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Istvan Csurka, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, and Miroslav Sládek, on the one hand, and Jean-Marie LePen, Jörg Haidar, and even Pat Buchanan, on the other, has more to do with tactics and rhetoric than principles. It is true that the latter still remain in opposition to their governments, although they are by no means marginal any longer, while people like Milošević and Tudjman are in power. But who would dare to predict that in the future xenophobic nationalism in the West will remain under control, as it seems to be at the moment? If observers talk about the "lepenization" of French political life, why should the "Zhirinovsky factor" be so surprising?

Still, there are some specific factors that contribute to the rising importance of nationalism and ethnicity in the former communist countries. To attribute ethnic conflicts there to the alleged "ancient hatreds" is wrong, but it would be equally wrong to deny that ethnic tension was a fundamental part of their modern history. The explosion of nationalism in the postcommunist countries is a product of at least three developments that took place successively in the precommunist, communist, and postcommunist periods of their history. Since the nineteenth century, the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian empires were prone to all kinds of nascent nationalisms, due to the great ethnic diversity of the regions incorporated in them; to the fact that ethnic, cultural-religious, and linguistic borders within these empires did not coincide with administrative and political ones; and to the processes of uneven and differential modernization and ethnic competition that they brought to the fore.

The right of nations to self-determination proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson (and ironically, for tactical reasons, also by Lenin), the Treaty of Versailles, and the consequent treaties in the aftermath of World War I were aimed at creating democratic nation-states on the ruins of empires, delimiting their borders along ethnolinguistic lines, and, at the same time, protecting ethnic minorities. That was the principle; the realities, however, were quite different.

Nevertheless, a serious step had been taken toward ethnic homogenization in the new political map of Europe (although not in the Soviet Union). Before World War I ethnic minorities comprised approximately half of most European states; by 1919 this figure was reduced to one-fourth. At what price this had been achieved and at what consequence is another matter. In the period between the two world wars, the authoritarian character of most of East and Central European states, irredentist claims and movements, border disputes, and some other factors resulted in the predominance of illiberal and exclusive ethnic nationalisms in the region.

In the communist period, nationalism was never quite defeated either in the Soviet Union or in the East Central European countries, in spite of all assurances to the contrary. Although it was labeled with obligatory adjectives such as "bourgeois" or "petty bourgeois" and its continuing existence was denied, as a rule only spontaneous and uncontrolled outbreaks of nationalism were suppressed. The rest was simply played down, relegated to the ranks of taboo topics. In Jacques Rupnik's words, nationalism was simply put into the refrigerator.[1] In this respect one may say that the dissolutions of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were but the continuation of the processes initiated by the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy. However, as János Kovács has aptly remarked, the communist refrigerator was unplugged from time to time, or its door was opened repeatedly.[2] The communist rulers periodically allowed the ghosts of nationalism to rise from their graves.[3]

The communist practice was far removed from official internationalist ideology. The communist regimes appealed to nationalist feelings whenever they considered it expedient to do so. They favored some nationalities at the expense of others by limiting access to the ranks of the elite and by creating unequal opportunities for social advancement. In one form or another, discrimination against ethnic minorities existed in virtually all communist countries.

In fact, even official communist ideology was not above resorting to nationalism as an additional means of legitimation. Nevertheless, the communist regimes were never able to legitimize themselves as the embodiment of a nation-state or, as in the cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, of a supranational state. All attempts to work out an unwritten contract between a communist

party-state and a nation failed, because any such contract implied an allegiance to and an acceptance of the communist state's goals and practices. National sovereignty implies popular sovereignty, and inasmuch as popular sovereignty was denied to citizens, their loyalty to a nation did not often coincide with loyalty to a party-state.

The fact that communism in East Central Europe was imposed and backed by an alien power added to its perception as an antinational force, and here a sense of victimhood was an essential component in the structuring of nationalist sentiment. Likewise, Soviet pseudofederalism did not succeed because a genuine federalism in a multinational state implied consensus across nationalities' borders, which would require at minimum an efficient and impartial federal authority and a considerable degree of social and political trust.[4] To the contrary, many nationalities in the Soviet Union considered the central leadership in Moscow as the manifestation of the political dominance of the Russians in the country. Loyalty to one's nationality was stronger than loyalty to the Soviet state. In all, nationalism in the communist countries remained a Trojan horse, hiding a number of possible outcomes. When communism collapsed, the unsolved problems immediately surfaced.

Moreover, nationalism is not merely a by-product of the modernization process. It also provides a partial remedy for alienation resulting from this very modernization. Among other factors, the strength of nationalism in the modern world should be attributed to the fact that it serves (and sometimes serves best) the needs of group identification and provides a sense of encompassing community. Communism and many varieties of nationalism have some common characteristics. Their ideologies are collectivistic; they are based on "we"/"they" dichotomization and claim to promote a common good and common interests against particular interests. However, while the communist ideology based on the class struggle principle worked to divide the nation, nationalism seems, by contrast, to be a uniting force.

Communism failed to solve the problem of alienation; indeed, it only aggravated this problem. One may agree with Katherine Verdery that socialist homogenization left a relatively undifferentiated social field that nationalists can claim to represent on behalf of the nation as a whole.[5] Communist society was collectivistic but

at the same time extremely atomized, and atomized societies are always predisposed to collective identities. The multiplicity of individual identities was sharply limited in the communist countries. The virtual absence of civil society and the suppression of all voluntary organizations and institutions independent of the state made the appeal of individualistic liberal ideas rather weak and abstract. To the contrary, nationalism often became the focus and the rallying call of reemerging political activism and mass mobilization especially.

In many countries, this initial political activity took place under the banner of national liberation and self-determination, but the very fact that it acquired an anticommunist character seemed to promise democratization along with national emancipation. In the beginning, democrats and nationalists were sometimes the same people; at any rate, they were allies against a common enemy.

WHY ETHNIC NATIONALISM?

Still, the question remains, why did exclusive ethnic nationalism, and not inclusive civic nationalism, become so salient in the postcommunist countries? One of the conclusions that can be drawn from the experience of the former communist countries is that most if not all varieties of nationalism are directly or indirectly connected with ethnicity. This phenomenon remains the subject of animated scholarly debate, because it escapes a rigid anthropological or other sort of definition but constantly demonstrates its importance in everyday life, as well as in politics on an individual state's level and in the international arena. In fact, ethnic and civic nationalisms have much more in common than is sometimes assumed. All nations have, or had, a cultural-linguistic core (or, as a rare exception, cores) rooted in a dominant ethnic group, which was instrumental in creating a national identity. Even the American nation, despite all its peculiarities, had a dominant Anglo-Saxon core.[6]

The two main varieties of nationalism differ mainly in their degrees of inclusiveness. While in principle civic nationalism leaves the door open for all citizens of a given state, ethnic nationalism is more selective. But an entrance ticket is never issued unconditionally. Even French nationalism—which is often referred to as a

classic example of civic nationalism—actually is based on a firm rejection of linguistic and cultural pluralism and on an acceptance of uniform cultural norms, social values, and a constructed historical past. Those who were welcome to join the French nation were allowed to do so on the condition of their assimilation for the sake of homogeneity. This worked rather well with immigrants from European countries, but not with postwar immigrants from Africa and the Middle East. At the moment, their place as ethnic and religious minorities in the civic French nation is ambiguous. In their case, ethnicity, citizenship, and nationhood do not coincide, and it is far from clear that this situation is only transitional.[7]

Nationalism, when it is more than a sentiment, is always a language of politics. In Serbia, Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, and some other former communist countries, the concept of ethnonation was constitutionally legalized. An ethnic nation, not a citizenry, was proclaimed to be the embodiment of state sovereignty. Actually, this development is by no means new in East Central Europe, nor in the former Soviet Union. It has prevailed there since the nineteenth century.

This is not surprising, considering the specificity of nation-building in those regions. Remarkably, the similar and essentially primordialist conceptions of a nation conceived as a people—*das Volk,* in Herder's terms—was shared by such different people as Karl Kautsky, Karl Renner, Tomás Masaryk, and Joseph Stalin. The same understanding of a nation as a nationality was preserved, maintained, and even further articulated in the communist period, although the Austro-Marxist principle of extraterritorial national-cultural autonomy was rejected in the Soviet Union in favor of an ethnoterritorial one. In some communist countries, membership in nationalities was made very ascriptive; in others, such as in Bulgaria with regard to the Turkish-speaking and Muslim groups, or in Romania with regard to Hungarians in Transylvania, assimilation was encouraged or even forced. However, in both cases these policies only hindered the development of civic nationhood.

With regard to the application of an ethnic criterion, the Soviet Union's nationalities policy was the most consistent.[8] The Soviet Union was devised as a pseudofederation of ethnoterritorial republics, though the latter were denied real sovereignty and were

put under supranational party-state power. In addition, most of
the Soviet nationalities were allowed various degrees of territorial
autonomy.[9] While many of the autonomous formations were his-
torically and/or culturally-linguistically conditioned, they were
arbitrarily mapped. The Soviets made state-controlled ethnic iden-
tity even more important by connecting nationality with specific
territories and by linking the political and cultural-linguistic posi-
tions of the former with a degree of autonomy. The hierarchy of
autonomous status (union republics, autonomous republics, au-
tonomous regions, and autonomous districts) put various nation-
alities in the Soviet Union in unequal positions. Together with
ascriptive ethnic identification—which in some important aspects
was used as a social measuring stick—this *divide et impera* policy
prevented even the possibility of the emergence of a civic multiethnic
nation in the form of the so-called single Soviet people, despite all
assurances to the contrary made by Soviet rulers and social scien-
tists.

This policy also prevented the formation of multiethnic territo-
rial nations within the union republics, not to speak of the autono-
mous formations of the lower levels. In all of them loyalty to one's
nationality prevailed over loyalty to a given ethnoterritorial unit.
Only in the case of titular nationalities did these loyalties go more
or less together. However, the goal of titular nationalities was to
preserve as much as possible the ethnic character and territorial
integrity of their formations in order to secure their advantageous
positions there vis-à-vis other nationalities. Together with other
characteristics of the Soviet nationalities policy, these circumstances
left little room for the possible emergence of multiethnic territorial
nations in the non-Russian republics on the basis of the language
and culture of their titular nationalities. In these cases a cultural-
linguistic core remained confined within ethnic borders; an en-
trance ticket to join a nation was neither issued nor requested.
Thus, the Soviet nationalities policy did not help to break down
barriers between ethnicity, nationality, and nation. The outbreak
of ethnic nationalism during the *perestroika* period and afterwards
was its logical consequence.

Still, to comprehend its explosion in the former communist
countries in general one should take into account several other
specific factors. The first of these is connected to power legitima-

tion and the perception of national emancipation as an ethnic emancipation. The political salience of ethnic issues in conditions of rapid ideological differentiation makes attractive their appropriation for the purposes of mass mobilization and manipulation. In a multiethnic environment, especially if it is a hierarchical one, ethnic solidarity may become instrumental in a social respect if liberal democracy and civil society are absent. With political change it may become a foundation for new identities.

Because nations in the communist realm were considered to be ethnonations, the dominance of the Soviet Union in East European countries, and of the Russians in the Soviet Union, was often perceived in not only political but also ethnic terms. The dominance of some nationalities in the communist countries and in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union was perceived by ethnic minorities there in a similar way. Many Hungarians in Romania, Albanians in Kosovo, Muslims in Bulgaria, Abkhaz in Georgia, or Armenians in Azerbaidzhan thought that they were discriminated against not just by the communists, or by the Romanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Georgian, or Azerbaidzhanian communists, but by corresponding nationalities in general. The tension between Czechs and Slovaks, and much more so between different nationalities in Yugoslavia, also had noticeable ethnic aspects.

In the postcommunist countries, ethnicity gains not only salience but credibility. It becomes a force that pretends to be above, and capable of crossing, party lines. It is no wonder that so many communists and postcommunists hurried to use it as a trump card in their struggle for political survival. Moreover, sometimes ethnic nationalism proved capable of bridging the gap between the old elites and the emerging new ones. A Romanian Illiescu, a Ukrainian Kravtchuk, or a Slovak Meciar—their conversion to nationalism made them acceptable to the public, for the time being at any rate.

Actually, the transformation of communists into ethnonationalists is more than a tactical device. Some of them were always susceptible to ethnic nationalism. Despite their ostentatious allegiance to the "internationalist" ideology, they strove to protect the interests of their own nationalities, considering them a crucial base of support. Not surprisingly, in the Soviet Union the struggle against national communism began almost immediately after the Bolshe-

vik revolution.[10] In the postwar period, it was extended to other
communist countries. Already during the *perestroika* period, many
political elites in non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union turned
to ethnic nationalism, resisting Moscow's dictate.

The second factor that contributed to the growth of ethnic
nationalism in the postcommunist countries is connected to ethnic
competition intensified by the still-hypertrophied role of the state
in the economy and in public life. In this situation, ethnic aspira-
tions are directly linked to statism. The collapse of communism
was accompanied by the emergence of new states and the restruc-
turing of old ones. This entails the redistribution of power and
spoils among different nationalities. Even a liberal democratic
state is never completely neutral with regard to ethnicity and
nationality, although it may pretend to be blind in this respect. In
many former communist countries this situation is aggravated
further by the delay in and shortcomings of economic reforms. As
a result, positions in the government and administration remain
very lucrative and highly competitive because they provide good
opportunities for acquiring wealth. This leaves too much room for
arbitrary and manipulative preferential policies. In the postcommunist
countries, affirmative action often tends to support not ethnic
minorities but dominating majorities. In the non-Russian republics
of the former Soviet Union, in the successor states of Yugoslavia,
or in Slovakia, ethnic nationalism provides new avenues of social
mobility. This is in connection with the reorientation of cultures
and with the elevation in status of some languages and the lower-
ing in status of others. The new language laws were aimed at
curbing ethnic competition in favor of dominating nationalities at
least as much as promoting their languages.

This leads to the third factor that contributes to the growth of
ethnic nationalism in the former communist countries. Conven-
tional wisdom says that modernity brings about stability. Corre-
spondingly, incomplete and insufficient modernization may easily
be accompanied by instability. Modernization is always uneven
and differentiated and, thus, may lead to a certain economic in-
equality among different nationalities of a state as well as to
increased competition between them for the benefits of modernity.
Modernization that took place in an economy of scarcity in the
communist countries, in addition to hardships from the transition

to the market economy, made and still makes the populace particularly susceptible to a specific kind of economic nationalism. This "sausage nationalism" is fueled not only by ethnic competition in the job market but also, sometimes even more so, by competition for the distribution of goods, foodstuffs, benefits, and subsidies. A common complaint in the Soviet Union and other communist countries was, "Our nationality is exploited by them." During the transition period, ethnic competition acquired some additional characteristics. It also became a competition for profits and property redistribution. The claim, "Our nationality would be better off without them" goes hand in hand with the claim, "Our resources belong to us, and to us alone." An ethnicization of privatization is a rather widespread demand that may be heard from Romania to Central Asia.

The winning electoral formula for Vladimir Meciar was not the separation of Slovakia but the conviction that a separate economic policy for Slovakia was needed. The Czech-Slovak divorce was met with only muted resentment in the Czech lands because the Czechs were convinced that economically they would do better without the Slovaks.[11] The same applies to Slovenians and Croats in the former Yugoslavia, or to the Balts and Ukrainians in the former Soviet Union.

Last but not least, as Verdery has pointed out, communism has left a broad societal receptivity to black and white dichotomies.[12] It also produced a specific organization of the self that was characterized by an internalized opposition to external "aliens" seen as "them." Under the conditions of social and economic instability of the postcommunist transition, when most social identities are lost or inflated, people turn to ethnicity as an identity of the last resort.[13] The shift from the oppositional identities of communism to that of ethnic nationalism is not so difficult. The enemies have changed, but the mentality remains essentially the same.

RUSSIANS IN A QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY

Ernest Renan, in his famous essay on the nation, remarked that to be a nation its members have to forget many things. What Russian citizens should remember and what they should forget remains a matter of ongoing debate. Actually, there is not one debate but

many: between ethnic Russians and non-Russians, between communists and anticommunists, between populists and Westernizers, between liberals and antiliberals, and even among the nationalists themselves. In Russia, the future always begins with rewriting the past, and the current situation is no exception. At the moment, different concepts of Russia's past are competing with attempts to define Russian national identity and the country's future. Inasmuch as history is open to different interpretations, it continues to be ideologized and remains a battlefield where different political forces and social groups are contending for victory or revenge. Historical facts, myths, and symbols in this contest are reinterpreted and invented to control collective memory and to justify contemporary politics.

Even Germans are still engaged in *Vergangenheitsbewältigung,* the process of mastering the past. To use William Faulkner's saying, in Russia the past is not even past. In this respect the Russian liberals, with their sober and rather negative estimation of the Russian and Soviet past, are at a disadvantage. They can appeal only to the future. Russia's past seems gloomy to them; at best, they can see there only the lost promise of missed opportunities. By contrast, their opponents refer to Russia's mythicized and glorified past in order to construct their vision of Russian identity.

This ambiguity reveals itself even at the state level. The state has two official names: the Russian Federation and Russia. Six years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, it still lacks some basic elements of state symbolism. There is no law so far on the state emblem, and the new national anthem is performed without lyrics. Actually, the new Russian anthem is the "Patriotic Song" composed by Mikhail Glinka in the first half of the nineteenth century to praise the Russian tsar and the Orthodox Russian people—no wonder all attempts to write the lyrics have failed. Russia did adopt the prerevolutionary "tricolor" as its flag, though even this is contested by the communists and some nationalists. However, the situation with the state emblem is even more confused. Two previous emblems, the Soviet and the prerevolutionary ones, were extremely ideologized. The old Russian two-headed eagle, which is used now in a modified form as a de facto emblem, was borrowed from Byzantium in the fifteenth century. It implied the idea of Russia as the Third Rome. As the Russian state expanded, the

eagle holding the scepter and the orb with three crowns became surrounded by coats of arms of newly conquered provinces and cities and of the main princely houses. It was adorned with Orthodox Christian symbols: the inscription "God is with us," the cross, and the images of the archangels Gabriel and Michael. Even with modifications this emblem, given its implied imperial symbolism, is hardly ethnically neutral and leaves many doubts in the minds of non-Russian citizens of the state and even many ethnic Russians. However, the current situation makes it difficult to invent a new emblem that could satisfy everybody. The ambiguity of the basic elements of state symbolism reflects a lack of public consensus and is a symptom of the uncertainty felt by both society and the authorities in regard to the character of the Russian state and the Russian nation.

The Russian state has never in its history been a nation-state, and at the moment it can hardly be characterized as such. It remains a multiethnic state in which the process of civic nation-building meets with many problems and difficulties. In Russia, empire-building preceded and prevented nation-building, not only of the civic type, but to some extent even of an ethnic type. Before the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian nation, or rather the Russian people (*narod*), was officially conceived of mainly in religious (the profession of Orthodox Christianity) and linguistic terms. This concept lacked clear territorial boundaries. All conquered territories of the Empire were considered to be inalienable parts of Russia, "single and indivisible."

Actually, the situation did not significantly change in the Soviet period. The Russians were defined as an ontological category in ascriptive and exclusive ethnic terms. However, in practice their territorial dimension extended to the whole Soviet Union, which Russians tended to consider as their national state. The identification of the Soviet Union with Russia was rather easy because of the political domination of ethnic Russians in the country. The borders of the Russian Federation within the Soviet Union were fairly arbitrary, and many of its administrative, cultural, and other institutions were dissolved into those of the Union. In all, the Russians remained a nationality more than a nation.

In a way, the events connected with the end of communist rule in Russia were quite different from the analogous developments in

other Soviet republics and in East European countries. In many of
them the political change was also conceived of as a national
liberation. In Russia, the initial change was almost exclusively
political. The national issues remained uncertain and unsolved.
Moreover, the liberal democrats and the Russian nationalists were
ideological and political rivals.

A binary typology would be a great simplification of the situa-
tion that existed in Russia in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s.
Still, under conditions of rapid political and ideological differen-
tiation the debate on Russian national identity was often under-
stood as a contest between two visions of the country's future. On
one side of the debate were liberals, modernizers, Westernizers,
and adherents of the concept of a civic, inclusive, secular, and
multiethnic Russian nation. On the other side were the national-
ists: conservatives, traditionalists, populists, and adherents of au-
thoritarian rule. They envisaged the Russian nation as ethnic,
Orthodox, collectivistic, and exclusive. One may sum up these
differences of opinions in the following way: while the liberals
wanted Russia to become a Western-type nation-state, the nation-
alists desired a Russian national state in which non-Russians would
at best be recognized only as ethnic minorities.

In Russia, the struggle against the communist party-state was
led not by the nationalists but by democratic-minded people. Inas-
much as the Soviet Union was considered by them to be a totali-
tarian empire, they were not interested in its preservation at any
cost. Moreover, they viewed the pro-independence movements in
the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union as their allies. In this
respect, they opposed not only the Communist Party but also
Gorbachev's leadership. In contrast, many Russian nationalists
began to ally with the most conservative groups in the communist
establishment. In terms of growing anticommunist sentiment in
Russia, this turned out to be detrimental to their popularity.

The logic of political struggle resulted in a desire on the part of
the democrats to create their own power base in the Russian
Federation to oppose the all-Union center. In fact, the demand for
Russia's sovereignty was borrowed by the democrats from the
nationalists.[14] However, the former put an accent not on the ethnic
(*russkii*) but on the civic (*rossiiskii*) understanding of the Russian

nation,[15] which was conceived of in accordance with the Western nation-state model.

It seemed that Russia might escape the trap of other former communist countries. Moreover, in 1992–1993, Yeltsin's leadership was certainly considering the Russian nationalists as its adversaries. However, it soon became obvious that Russia was no exception and that it, too, was prone to ethnic nationalism. Several factors contributed to its growth in the country.

By the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Marxism in the country had been compromised because it had failed to deliver both of its main promises: economic prosperity and social emancipation. Likewise, disappointment with the results of economic reforms has compromised not only their proponents, the liberal democrats, who are blamed for the difficulties and shortcomings of the transitional period, but also to some extent the ideology of liberalism. Thus, a nationalism advocating a third way, a specifically Russian—i.e., not Western, not democratic, and not individualist—path based on alleged primordial Russian traditions and values, had a good opportunity to fill the ideological void. The disappointment with liberal values gives rise to national-populism with an authoritarian accretion that propagates the myth of the organic Russian *sobornost'*, an alleged ethnic unity in which the interest of the Russian people as a whole should prevail over the interests of individuals.

In many countries, the end of communist rule embodied the idea of national liberation and renaissance. In Russia, it was connected with the loss of superpower status and a diminished role of the country in international affairs. This was perceived by many as a national humiliation, especially since the hoped-for economic rewards did not accompany the disintegration of the empire. To understand the negative effect of these events on the collective consciousness of Russians, one should remember the feelings of Austrian Germans, or even Hungarians, after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. The psychological trauma may be even greater for Russians since official propaganda had long been convincing them, to some extent quite successfully, that they had an almost messianic mission to protect, to assist, and to lead their "younger brothers" in the Soviet Union and their allies in Eastern Europe. Suddenly these brothers and allies turned their backs on Russians,

who found themselves in isolation and discovered that the "elder brother" and protector actually was considered an oppressor. Anti-Western feelings, which for a short time became less salient, re-emerged, this time accompanied by a general xenophobia. A rhetoric of victimhood, an image of an external enemy, and a feeling of ingratitude and Russophobia acquired credibility in public opinion.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russians for the first time in their history were confronted with the territorial definition of their nation. The situation was aggravated further by the fate of about 25 million Russians who have to live now against their will in other states. Unexpectedly, they were relegated to the status of ethnic minorities—something for which they were neither psychologically nor culturally prepared. In addition, many of them are experiencing overt or covert discrimination. Hundreds of thousands already have been forced to return to Russia; many more are considering this option.[16] Under the circumstances, a nationalist backlash in Russia was practically inevitable.[17]

Although the ethnic Russians constitute a vast majority in the Russian Federation (about 80 percent of the whole population), it has inherited and must retain from the Soviet Union a system of institutionalized and territorialized ethnic differences. Many non-Russian nationalities have their own republics—the autonomous formations based on ethnoterritorial principles, or other autonomous units. They consider them their homelands. Inasmuch as these formations occupy about 53 percent of the whole territory of the Russian Federation, interethnic relations in the country are crucial to its future. In the Russian Federation, the growth of ethnic nationalism of the non-Russian nationalities became conspicuous already in the 1960s and the 1970s, when they rapidly began to catch up with the Russians living in their autonomous formations. This resulted in a growing competition for high-status positions. In the post-Soviet period, ethnic nationalism among non-Russian nationalities in a few cases stimulated a desire to secede or, much more often, to achieve a preferential status in their republics. In one way or another this status is asserted in the constitutions of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Buryatia, Tuva, Komi, and Sakha-Yakutia. Actually, 9 million ethnic Russians who live in the non-Russian republics of the Federation to a

significant extent have already lost their dominant status.[18] With
the exception of Karelia, Komi, Khakassia, and Udmurtia, politi-
cal power there is controlled by the elites of the indigenous nation-
alities, even if the latter are in the minority, as in Sakha-Yakutia or
Adygea.[19]

The non-Russian political and intellectual elites in these repub-
lics prefer to strengthen ethnic and territorial republican identities
and citizenships at the expense of the all-Russian ones. In 1994, 59
percent of Tatars but only 19 percent of Russians in Tatarstan,
71.9 percent of Yakuts and only 34.2 percent of Russians in
Sakha-Yakutia, and 64.4 percent of Tuvinians but no more than
13.3 percent of Russians in Tuva considered themselves citizens of
the Russian Federation in general.[20] Thus, its very character be-
came an acute problem. An exaggerated fear that the Russian
Federation might follow the fate of the Soviet Union alarmed
Russian public opinion, and the Chechen crisis only confirmed this
fear. Statism was always an important ideological factor in Russia;
its current merger with nationalism seems almost natural. Under
the circumstances, the claim that the Russian Federation is above
all the Russian national state has a certain appeal for Russian
audiences. Since 1992, Moscow's authorities have been conduct-
ing a campaign of harassment against members of the nationalities
of the Caucasus. The abuse includes restriction of movement,
arbitrary detention and house searches, extortion, and physical
assault. These practices clearly violate human rights and Russian
legislation; however, they are welcomed by a significant number of
Muscovites. Opinion polls in 1993 indicated that 53 percent of
respondents believed that ethnic Russians should have more rights
in the country than members of other nationalities; 56 percent of
respondents were of the opinion that non-Russians enjoyed exces-
sive influence in Russia.[21]

It would be wrong to describe Russian nationalism as a single
movement. Political and ideological differences among the Russian
nationalists are quite conspicuous. Neofascist groups include Vladimir
Zhirinovsky and his followers, who have declared their main goal
to be the restoration and expansion of the Russian empire and are
ready to grant the non-Russians cultural autonomy but deny them
political autonomy. With regard to federalism, similar views are
expressed by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who calls for the restoration

of a "genuine Russian unitary state." A more circumspect kind of
nationalism, similar to that of the French, is represented by Gen-
eral Lebed, who appeals to the moderate electorate. Lebed claims
that "the time of empires is over" and insists that "the ideology of
Russian pragmatic nationalism does not mean an infringement of
the rights of other people." To him, "Russians are those who
speak Russian and think like Russians, who consider themselves
part of our country, who embrace our standards of behavior,
thinking and culture." He rightly points out that the proposal to
turn the national republics of the Federation into *guberniias* (ad-
ministrative regions) is irresponsible and provocative talk; how-
ever, he hopes that sooner or later the national Russian state will
assimilate the non-Russian minorities.[22]

It is true that the extreme nationalist groups and parties in
Russia enjoy only very limited public support so far.[23] However,
some of their demands, such as the restoration of the Russian
empire, the protection of ethnic Russians from "unfair competi-
tion" by non-Russians, a concept of Russia as a national state in
which ethnic Russians should occupy privileged positions, or even
the opposition to the West, now find an increasingly receptive
audience. Just like the populism that, at present, has become more
a technique of political mobilization and manipulation than an
ideology, nationalism in Russia is becoming a force that crosses
party lines. This was especially evident after the December 1993
parliamentary elections in which the democratic parties were de-
feated.

Nowadays the Russian Communist Party has hastily realigned
itself with nationalist ideology.[24] In fact, the process started long
ago. During the Soviet period there were groups within the party
and the ruling elite that played with Russian nationalism and
attempted to use it for their own purposes. At present, both
nationalists and Communists advocate the idea of the Russian
nation as a stable and organic community. Both of them long for
an empire and profess an ideology of revenge. Both court the
Orthodox Church. Over the past few years the pro-communist
newspapers *Pravda* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* have regularly offered
their pages to different Orthodox leaders, including high-ranking
Church hierarchs who exposed democracy as the continuation of
a worldwide anti-Russian conspiracy. Both nationalists and Com-

munists resort to anti-Semitism and a militant rejection of the
Western tradition in the history of Russia. After their defeat in the
1996 presidential elections, the Communists rejected a social-
democratic alternative and are assiduously pursuing their transfor-
mation into a nationalist authoritarian party.

Yeltsin and his leadership have also borrowed some ideas and
slogans from the Russian nationalists.[25] Apparently, it is hoped
that the propagated state nationalism and patriotism will compen-
sate for a lack of civic national unity. Pompous words like "na-
tional interests," "national grandeur," a "special role,"
"*derzhavnost*" (a strong and mighty statehood), and so on, which
the "party of power" has already included in its own political
lexicon, are supposed to be ethnically neutral. However, when
accompanied by symbols of the Russian past glory and verbiage
about "Slavonic unity," they indicate that alleged Russian inter-
ests are being substituted for the interests of all citizens of the
Federation. As such, they cannot serve as a means of multiethnic
integration.

Thus the Russian government's policy for Yugoslavia, with its
overt support of the "Orthodox Serbian brothers," does not take
into account the sympathies of the Muslim population of the
Russian Federation. Likewise, the growing support for the Ortho-
dox Church, which has nearly acquired the status of State Church,
again clearly violates the proclaimed secular character of the state
and invites the resentment of those who profess other beliefs.

The break with the Soviet past is accompanied by a growing
desire to associate with the Russian imperial past.[26] The very
controversial reconstruction of a replica of the Cathedral of Christ
the Savior in Moscow, built by the tsars to commemorate Russia's
victory over Napoleon and razed in 1930 by Stalin, leads to many
questions in Russia. It will cost 250 million dollars, and its 102-
meter high cupola will be gilded with 400 kilograms of gold.
Despite official statements to the contrary, the construction is
being financed to a large extent by the state, at a time when it lacks
the money to regularly issue payroll checks.

Yeltsin's recent suggestion to develop a new national ideology
reveals not only a deeply rooted authoritarian mentality but also a
specific vision of the post-Soviet Russian state. In an already
sufficiently pluralist society, such an ideology could be promoted

and spread only by the state and would inevitably be a statist one with strong nationalist and anti-liberal sentiments. One may wonder to what extent this ideology would differ from the ideas that are actively propagated by the Russian nationalists. The respected academician Dmitry Likhachev, who is considered by many to be a main proponent of a liberal and tolerant variety of Russian nationalism, has remarked in this respect that a national idea as a panacea for all troubles is not only folly; it is a very dangerous practice because it would inevitably result in intolerance for other races, other peoples, and other religions. He acidly added that Hitler's idea was also a national one.[27]

Inasmuch as Yeltsin's leadership continues to stress the civic and polyethnic character of the Russian Federation, its current policy is inconsistent and contradictory. Moreover, in trying to use a nationalist card, it is playing on the ideological battlefield of its adversaries, where the latter have a stronger position. However, even some Russian "democrats" have turned out to be prone to nationalist ideas, supporting Russia's policy trend towards neo-imperialism.[28] (In the Russian political parlance they are called *gosudarstvenniki*, "the statists.") Among other things, this is demonstrated by their position during the Chechen war and by their desire to dissociate a nationality from a territory, which in Russia's condition would meet with strong resistance by non-Russian nationalities.[29]

It is clear that if Russia continues to slide toward antagonistic nationalism, the authoritarian tendency in her political development will become stronger. Russia's future as a liberal democratic country precludes her transformation into a Russian national state. On the other hand, it is also clear that a formation of the civic polyethnic nation in Russia will take a long time at best. At the moment, Russia lacks a common national consensus and identification.[30] In the near future, democratic Russia can exist only as an asymmetrical federation based on two principles, national-territorial and administrative-territorial, and as a polyethnic political nation in which a common citizenship is accompanied by a multiplicity of ethno-cultural identities.

In this situation, the best hope would be to develop what Jürgen Habermas characterized as the constitutional patriotism of the modern democratic state. This is a far cry from the current realities

of the country. Its constitution is considered only a transitional one and is under criticism from influential political forces; its political order remains unstable, and the government often resorts to extra-legal measures. Still, if one speaks about windows of opportunities for Russia, *tertium non datur.*

ENDNOTES

[1]Jacques Rupnik, *Social Research* 63 (1) (1996): 52.

[2]János Mátyás Kovács, "Uncertain Ghosts, Populists and Westernizers: Old-New Cleavages in Eastern European Thought," paper presented at the conference on "Recasting Social and Political Identities in Eastern Europe," University of Colorado at Boulder, 25–26 October 1996.

[3]I am indebted to János Kovács for permission to quote from his unpublished paper.

[4]Nicholas Stargardt, "Origins of the Constructivist Theory of the Nation," in Sukumar Perival, ed., *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), 100–101.

[5]Katherine Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania," *Slavic Review* 52 (2) (1993): 193.

[6]Walker Conner, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 21, 200–201.

[7]Dominique Schnapper, *La France de l'integration: Sociologie de la nation en 1990* (Paris: Gallimard, 1991).

[8]For a detailed description, see Anatoly M. Khazanov, *After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States* (Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 4 ff.

[9]In the Soviet Union, an ethnic hierarchy was articulated not only in political (i.e., various degrees of autonomy) and cultural-linguistic terms but also in evolutionary ones. Thus, the term "nationality" acquired a double meaning. The variety of peoples in the country was subdivided into ethno-nations (*natsii*), nationalities (*natsional'nosti*, underdeveloped nations), and ethnic groups of even lower levels (*narodnosti*). At the same time, the term "nationality" in another meaning designated a hereditary ethnic identification that was noted in all identifying documents. This alone made the crossing of ethnic borders very difficult, if not completely impossible.

[10]B. F. Sultanbekov, *Tainy national'noi politiki TsK RKP: Stenograficheskii otchet sekretnogo IV soveshchaniia TsK RKP, 1923 g* (Moscow: Insan, 1992).

[11]Sharon Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia," *East European Politics and Societies* 8 (1) (1994): 153–187.

[12]Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania," 192 ff.

[13]Igor S. Kon, "Identity Crisis and Postcommunist Psychology," *Symbolic Interaction* 16 (4) (1993): 407.

[14]V. D. Solovei, "Russkii natsionalizm i vlast' v epokhu Gorbacheva," in Paul Goble and Gennady Bordiugov, eds., *Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v Rossii i SNG, 1* (Moscow: ITs AIRO-XX, 1994), 65.

[15]The Russian language contains two different words that can be used to describe the Russian nation: *russkii*, which is an ethnic description, and *rossiiskii*, which is mainly a political-territorial and potentially also a civic description.

[16]I. A. Subbotina, "Russkie: migratsionnye protsessy nakune i posle raspada Sovetskogo Soiuza," in Gennady Bordiugov, Paul Goble, and Valery Tishkov, eds., *Sreda i kul'tura v usloviiakh obshchestvennykh transformatsii* (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995), 130.

[17]Mark R. Beissinger, "The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11 (2) (1995): 166 ff.

[18]V. K. Mal'kova, "Russkoe naselenie v rossiiskikh respublikakh," *Issledovaniia po prikladnoi i neotlozhnoi etnologii (95)* (Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii, 1996), 4.

[19]V. A. Tishkov, *Rossiia kak mnogonatsional'naia obshchnost' i perspektivy mezhetnicheskogo soglasiia* (Moscow: ATs RI, 1994), 8.

[20]Mal'kova, "Russkoe naselenie v rossiiskikh respublikakh," 19.

[21]L. D. Gudkov, "Russkoe national'noe soznanie: potentsial i tipy konsolidatsii," in T. I. Zaslavskaia and L. A. Arutiunian, eds., *Kuda idet Rossiia? Al'ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiia, I* (Moscow: Interpraks, 1994), 183–184.

[22]Alexander Lebed, "What is to be Done?" *New Times* (June 1996): 13.

[23]L. M. Drobizheva et al., *Demokratizatsiia i obrazy natsionalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 90-kh godov* (Moscow: Mysl', 1996), 63–64.

[24]Joan Urban and Valerii Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads: Leninism, Fascism, or Social Democracy?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

[25]L. M. Drobizheva, "Etnisism i problemy natsional'noi politiki," in T. I. Zaslavskaia and L. A. Arutiunian, eds., *Kuda idet Rossiia? Al'ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiia, I* (Moscow: Interpraks, 1994), 189.

[26]V. V. Gushchin, "Dolzhna li Rossia byt' imperskoi?," in Paul Goble and Gennady Bordiugov, eds., *Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v Rossii i SNG, 1* (Moscow: ITs AIRO-XX, 1994), 144.

[27]*Novaia gazeta*, 9 December 1996.

[28]M. P. Kholmskaia, "Rossiiskaia mnogopartiinost': sovremennyi etap razvitiia (ianvar'-oktiabr' 1994 goda)," in Gorshkov et al., eds., *Obnovleniie Rossii: trudnyi poisk reshenii, 3* (Moscow: RNISiNP, 1995), 161–162.

[29]In private conversations with the author, some leaders of the parties of democratic orientation explained that they had to pay lip service to Russian nationalism because of the changed public mood. This explanation is significant in itself.

[30]Drobizheva et al., *Demokratizatsiia i obrazy natsionalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 90-kh godov*, 310.

Barbara Ischinger

Im Osten viel Neues: Plenty of News from the Eastern *Länder*

B Y TWISTING THE WELL-KNOWN TITLE of Erich Maria Remarque's 1929 novel *Im Westen nichts Neues* (*All Quiet on the Western Front*), we dare to point at some refreshing and encouraging trends in the academic and social environment of higher education in the new *Länder* (states) of Germany.

It is remarkable, as well as indicative of new Eastern impulses, that one of the first critical articles on the German academic scene published in an internationally renowned journal was written by Hans Joachim Meyer, minister for science and art in Saxony. In March 1994, the journal *Nature* featured his essay entitled "Shake-up for German Universities." The subtitle of the essay made its message quite clear: "The right to a university education in any subject is enshrined in German law. But the system has become hopelessly cumbersome and is ripe for radical reform."[1]

Not unlike Philipp Melanchton's famous inaugural speech at Wittenberg (an East German university) in 1518 entitled "*De corrigendis adolescentiae studiis*" ("On Reforming the Studies of Youth"),[2] Meyer's appeal is directed toward reclaiming high standards in education and introducing necessary reforms. Since German unification, the five East German *Länder* (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia) have undergone the painful task of restructuring their higher education system. A sensitive "de-indoctrination" process was necessary, in particular in the teaching of the humanities,

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social sciences, law, and economics at institutions in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The qualifications and personal suitability of individual academic faculty members were examined, and ideologically warped disciplines were "rebuilt from scratch."[3] Furthermore, two different academic systems were integrated into a federal system that had existed in West Germany for forty years. Following the evaluation by the Science Council (*Wissenschaftsrat*), a semi-autonomous body of scholars and administrators whose recommendations determine the all-important federal subsidy of 50 percent of all capital expenditures to institutions of higher education, five institutions were closed by the end of 1990, other institutions were integrated into larger universities—for example, many of the former teacher-training colleges—and, last but not least, by 1995 the institutions of higher education in East Germany had lost more than one-third of the staff they had in 1991.[4]

Confronted with such dramatic changes, it does not come as a surprise that the Saxon parliament, at the initiative of Hans Joachim Meyer, was the first to adopt a new university act in 1993, embodying all the reform proposals at least as far as the federal law permitted. At the core of the university reform debate were the length and structure of degree courses. Meyer is correct when he says that East Germany's role has become that of a "catalyst"[5] in the structural crisis that had already developed in West Germany before the breathtaking events of 1989–1990. Our "new" Eastern compatriots are proving that, through strong academic leadership, change can happen but that the necessary modernization process requires new types of education.

* * *

Hans Joachim Meyer, born in Rostock in 1936, studied law and political science at Potsdam-Babelsberg from 1955 to 1958 and then was deleted from the university register for political reasons. He studied English/American philology and history at Humboldt University in Berlin, where he obtained a doctorate in 1971. In 1982 he was appointed university lecturer in applied linguistics and later became associate professor. He has been minister for

science and art in Saxony since 1990 and president of the Central Committee of German Catholics since April 1997.

Meyer sees German unification as an opportunity for the whole country to undergo a process of renewal. Under his authority, Saxony's Higher Education Act was passed, which included reforms in restructuring degree courses and strengthening university teaching. In his own words, "The new law restored academic autonomy on a democratic basis and, at the same time, established a new model of governance intended to ensure effective academic leadership."[6] In pursuing this vision, Meyer has enjoyed the support of committed rectors of institutions of higher education in Saxony. However, this does not preclude the occasional heated debate, especially with regard to budget cuts.

The University of Leipzig was founded in 1409; an etching from the sixteenth century depicts Leipzig as "Lipsia litterarum studiis et mercatura celebre mismiae oppidum." The leaders of Leipzig know that maintaining their long-standing reputation as a leading city in both higher education and commerce is a constant challenge. In 1989 the university reclaimed its traditional name "Alma mater Lipsiensis" (University of Leipzig) and discarded the name "Karl Marx," which had been introduced in 1953.

This return to old traditions did not prevent the new avant-garde from encouraging broad innovations. Cornelius Weiss was one of the founding members of the "democratization group" at the University of Leipzig. Dr. Weiss was born in Berlin in 1933 and spent his childhood in the Soviet Union, where his father, a nuclear physicist, had been sent by the communist authorities. During his early years, the family lived behind a barbed wire fence, but later Weiss was permitted to attend school in Moscow and study chemistry in Minsk and Rostow. After returning with his family to what had become the GDR, he completed his doctorate in chemistry at the University of Leipzig, where he later pursued his academic career. In 1990 he was elected rector of his alma mater and was reelected in 1994. Since 1995 Weiss has been vice president of the German Rectors' Conference, thus prominently representing the new members of the German higher education family.

In an effort to balance the demand for both globalization and regionalization, Rector Weiss has played an important role in

shaping the University of Leipzig's profile. First, he has created an international orientation, with a window toward Eastern Europe (reflected particularly in the history department and the fields of social and cultural studies as well as Jewish studies, i.e., the Simon Dubnow Institute), but also a window toward the West (as evidenced by its study center focusing on France). Second, he has made certain that the university's curricula include those fields that are predominant in the daily life of the city and the region. Leipzig has once again become a banking center as well as a center for insurance, realty, the media, and publishing.

But, of course, this list is not complete; students in Leipzig can also receive training in American and Japanese studies. The university, which has one of the best-staffed and best-equipped institutes for media and communication sciences in Germany, is increasingly attracting students from West Germany (16 percent of its student population) and from all over the world (9 percent).

The universities in Saxony are competing for the "new tradition" profile. Among them, the smallest university is the Technical University of Mining and Technology in Freiberg. Freiberg is located in the center of Saxony, near the Erzgebirge mountains. The town was founded in 1186 when rich silver deposits were discovered. In the Middle Ages, Freiberg became a wealthy town, and many splendid buildings from this period still exist today, the most famous being the cathedral with its twelfth-century Romanesque "Golden Portal."

Centuries prior to the founding of the Freiberg University of Mining and Technology through a royal decree by Prince Regent Xaver in 1765, the sciences of mining engineering and metallurgy were taught privately in Saxony's silver mining areas. Freiberg University is thus one of the world's oldest technical universities, and the first one specializing in mining and metallurgy. Former students include the famous German scientist and "second discoverer of America" Alexander von Humboldt, one of James Watt's sons, as well as the founding father of the natural sciences in Russia, Mikhail Lomonossow.

Freiberg University uses the competence it has acquired over the centuries for the new tasks it now faces. One of the focal points in both teaching and research is environmental technology; industry

funds more than 40 percent of the university's research budget, a
fact remarkable by German standards.

Rector emeritus Dietrich Stoyan, who retired this spring, is
proud of the university's long tradition in hosting international
students. Between 1850 and 1930, the average proportion of inter-
national students in Freiberg was about 50 percent; today, interna-
tional students from approximately fifty countries make up about
13 percent of the student body, which far surpasses the average
foreign contingent of 4 percent in German higher education. Rec-
tor Stoyan, who came into office in 1991, has spent his profes-
sional career in the field of applied sciences at Freiberg University.
When the Berlin Wall fell, he quickly developed strong ties to the
United States via the "Atlantik-Brücke" in Bonn and the American
Council on Germany in New York; at the age of sixty he began to
learn English and reopened the Freiberg University of Mining and
Technology to the Western world.

Due to the nonpolitical focus of academic fields in Freiberg, few
changes in personnel were necessary following unification. In pri-
vate, one can still hear from the predominantly "Eastern" staff
that at times it was easier to ask Americans for advice and guid-
ance than the "imported West Germans." As one of the smallest
universities in Germany, with about 2,300 students, Freiberg will
have to fight hard in order to survive, especially with a big techni-
cal university, Dresden, only about one hour away. University
administrators in Freiberg are determined to win this battle and
have developed new curricula in the fields of recycling and envi-
ronmental protection.

Some of the larger universities in West Germany could certainly
learn from the smaller universities in Saxony about how to de-
velop new profiles—but then, their main target is not to attract
more students but rather to downsize to overcome mushroomed
enrollment and overcrowded facilities. Since students in Germany
do not pay tuition, they are not a relevant source of income for
their academic institutions.

* * *

At present the new *Länder*—with a population of 15.5 million—
have a total of seventeen universities, fourteen colleges of art and

music, and twenty-six *Fachhochschulen* (colleges of professional studies). The latter institution was only recently introduced in East Germany, yet it has enjoyed great acceptance.

Cooperation between higher education institutions and industry in the new federal states is developing. One good example of this new venture is the Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena in Thuringia. With the cooperation between Zeiss and Ernst Abbe at the university, Jena epitomized the productive combination of science, technology, and industry in the last third of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The region's potential for industry and research was able to outlast forty years of a socialist planned economy and is a bearer of hope for the whole state. With the appointment of the former minister president of Baden-Württemberg Lothar Späth as managing director of Jenoptik GmbH, the educational and research institutions in Jena now have a promoter who, in cooperation with the Thuringian Ministry of Science, is committed to making Jena attractive to investors as a center of technology and innovation. These incentives will open up new prospects for people in the region.

The university's structural reform, including establishing new faculties and institutes, formed the basis of the scheme for renewing the content and personnel of entire disciplines and courses of study. In the humanities and cultural and social sciences, this reorganization was tantamount to founding the university anew. The natural sciences, mathematics, and medicine have always enjoyed a good reputation. Evidence of this scientific caliber can be seen in the fact that seven Max Planck Society working groups, two special research sections of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation), and working contacts with a Fraunhofer Institute have been established.

In Thuringia, the Hochschule für Architektur-und Bauwesen Weimar (College for Architecture and Civil Engineering in Weimar), which was rebuilt based on a significant tradition, is also worth mentioning. In our brief account on "new tradition institutions" of higher education in Thuringia, we should also include the fact that the University of Erfurt, refounded in 1994, has a founding rector in Peter Glotz, one of the leading SPD intellectuals.

Traveling farther north, we encounter Rostock, in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the "land of a thousand lakes." Rector Dr.

Gerhard Maess, appointed in 1990, is less enthusiastic than those mentioned above about many of the required reforms and plans for university restructuring. Fritz Stern of Columbia University most accurately described the moral and psychological conse- quences of German unity in a 1993 article entitled "Freedom and its Discontents": "The GDR is dead, and some East Germans already have their nostalgic moments. Disappointed in the present, prompted by a selective memory, they ask, 'Was everything wrong in the last forty years?'"[7]

In his speeches and publications, Rector Maess has repeatedly voiced criticism about the enforcement of West German principles in the Eastern sphere of higher education. He correctly states that the length of studies in the former GDR was better structured, and he pleads for maintaining this system. He also points to the excel- lent ratio of teaching faculty to students that existed and in part still exists.[8] His complaint about the new style of never-ending faculty discussion meetings and his conclusion that democracy is certainly very complicated and time-consuming are also well un- derstood.[9]

The University of Rostock has admitted about 9,400 students and has developed a focus on agriculture and engineering, a reflec- tion of the regional economic premises. New disciplines—on a still-modest level—include ecology, "biomaterials," computer sci- ence, and related fields in the new technologies. The University of Rostock builds on its tradition as the oldest university in northern Europe, founded in 1419, and reaches out as a seaport town with traditional shipbuilding, maintaining its shipping routes and naval commerce to Scandinavia as well as to Eastern Europe.

The department of economics and social sciences offers eight curricula, including economic engineering. Seven years after the transition from a state-controlled economy to a market economy, the restructuring of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania's economy is well underway. The Rostock region will also directly benefit from a new chemical and petrochemical company, Olefinverbund GmbH, located in the Halle-Leipzig region of Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony. It is a combination of three formerly state-run chemical and plastics manufacturing companies, which Dow, the former Treuhand, and its successor consolidated into a single, unified company. If all goes according to plan, by the year 2000 the new

Dow Chemicals plant will be equipped with a computer system for a 280-mile pipeline to the Baltic Sea. It will also gain a new highway, new rail connections, and a terminal at the Baltic port of Rostock.

Unemployment rates in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania are among the highest in the Federal Republic today, with unemployment registered at 20 percent in Rostock in March 1997; educational institutions in the region will have to provide the know-how for the new generation that is expected to take over soon.

* * *

Not only has the chemical industry in the eastern part of Germany benefited from American investment, but institutions of higher education have as well. Hundreds of US scholars in fields where "rebuilding" was needed (such as the social sciences, law, business, and American studies, in general) were funded by the German-American Fulbright Program and sent to universities all over the new *Länder*. While the Fulbright Program could place only nine US grantees with universities in the East in the academic year 1991–1992, it arranged for sixty-eight positions for lecturers, high school teachers, teaching assistants, and graduate students for the academic year 1997–1998. Following unification, American lecturers and teachers were needed in English-language training, American literature, and both American and West European history. During the past two years, universities in the East have also started to request lecturers in fields such as philosophy, sociology, economics, law, and Jewish studies. This contribution will help the institutions in the East make the transition to international practices.

One of the most remarkable contributions made by a single scholar is that of Dr. Hans N. Weiler, professor of comparative politics and rector of Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder). Dr. Weiler left Germany in 1965 for Stanford University, having completed his doctorate in political science at the University of Freiburg/Breisgau and a three-year appointment at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut. He was on leave from 1974–1977 while serving as director of the International Institute for Educational Planning (UNESCO) in Paris. In 1979 he returned to Stanford

University as professor of education and political science. In 1992, Dr. Weiler was appointed rector of the Europa-Universität Viadrina at Frankfurt/Oder, an institution within walking distance of the Polish border. This university is one of three universities created by the state of Brandenburg following German unification.

The state of Brandenburg surrounds Berlin on all sides and stretches all the way to the Polish border in the east. The Brandenburg concept of reconstructing a system of higher education was based on an interesting division of labor: One university, Potsdam (south of Berlin), was to focus on the training of teachers; a second, Cottbus, was designed to be a technical university with a special emphasis on environmental studies; and the third, Frankfurt/Oder, was to concentrate on the study of law, economics, and culture and was given "a special mandate for building an academic bridge between Western and Eastern Europe, in general, and between Germany and Poland, in particular."[10]

The history of Viadrina University in Frankfurt an der Oder dates back to the years between 1506 and 1811. Heinrich von Kleist and the von Humboldt brothers studied there. In 1811, after founding the new university in Berlin, the state of Prussia decided that it was unnecessary to have two universities so close together (it is only 70 miles between Berlin and Frankfurt) and moved the Viadrina University southeastward to the Silesian capital of Breslau.

In 1991, less than a year after unification and the creation of the new governmental entities in the *Länder,* a planning commission comprised of international scholars (under the guidance of Rector Weiler) went to work to create the new Viadrina University. A year later, two schools, one for law and the other for economics, opened their doors to the first four hundred students. In the fall of 1993, a third school for cultural studies followed. In April 1997, 983 students were enrolled at the law school, 343 of whom were foreigners (337 were Polish students).

Political leaders were committed to hastening the rebuilding of Viadrina to fulfill the state government's promise of bringing a university to a region that had been severely hit by post-unification economic restructuring. A semiconductor complex, the pride and joy of the GDR's technological establishment, employing eight thousand in the past, was no longer competitive in the free market.

Now that visas are no longer required for travel between Germany and Poland, Frankfurt an der Oder is acquiring an even greater importance as a trading hub with the countries of Eastern Europe. Since 1991, a German-Polish intergovernmental commission has been working to promote good-neighborly contacts. The new Viadrina fits well into this changing environment. Brandenburg, which has the longest border with Poland of the three easternmost *Länder,* had from early on assumed responsibility as a mediator between Poland and the "new" Germany. Weiler is correct in pointing out that "there was a good deal of political encouragement to seek out new ideas and take advantage of a new institutional departure for introducing innovative elements into the German system of higher education, which had not exactly become notorious for its innovations."[11]

The twin elements of the new university's concept are internationality and interdisciplinarity. The international character of the Viadrina was based on the specific definition of its "Europeanness," which included a substantial cross-national orientation in teaching, an emphasis on the notion of "culture" (an emphasis on cultural diversity as a genuine element of the European tradition), and a conception of Europe that includes Poland as well as other Eastern European countries. The central role of language both as a medium of cross-national communication and as a constituent element in cultural identity is also fostered.

Some of the institutional characteristics postulated by the planning commission reflected these two components. The state of Brandenburg committed itself to educate a truly international student body where one-third of the places at Viadrina University would be reserved for students from Poland. In addition, the university outlined its special efforts to recruit international scholars and to include a significant amount of international and comparative material in curricula and graduation requirements.

In April 1997 a total of 2,243 students were enrolled at Viadrina University, 856 of whom were from Poland, 85 from other countries, and 320 from West Germany. The three schools (Law, Economics, and Cultural Studies) were directed to develop a set of interrelationships in teaching and research that represent the ways in which legal, economic, and cultural elements of societies affect each other.

The School of Cultural Studies at Viadrina is a rather radical departure from the tradition of the "philosophical faculty" at German universities, where the social sciences and the humanities were neatly compartmentalized, each in its own limited special domain. In order to avoid jeopardizing employment prospects for their graduates, the institution adopted a compromise between interdisciplinarity and the command of one discipline. It is only in the second half of the program, in the final two years, that the true interdisciplinarity of cultural studies is adopted.

Last year, the first graduates of the School of Economics, including a number of Polish students, all found employment, even before completing their final exams. In 1997, ten out of eleven candidates for the final law exams were successful in passing all the tests; they are the first generation of law graduates at Viadrina, and there are therefore no records yet regarding their employment.[12]

* * *

From medieval until early modern times, it was theology that tied the sciences together, although Kant, Schiller, Fichte, and Humboldt believed it should have been philosophy. However, philosophy, like sociology and pedagogy, could not endure as a guiding discipline. According to Kurt Reumann, this was not due solely to the triumph of the natural and technical sciences.[13] In the former GDR and in the new *Länder* today still, the status of the humanities—especially philosophy—is rather problematic. In the former GDR, it was considered a taboo to refer to *Geisteswissenschaften* (humanities), which alluded to bourgeois ideals. Instead, the humanities were grouped together with economics, sociology, etc., into the so-called *Gesellschaftswissenschaften* (social sciences). According to the Marxist-Leninist dogma of science, these disciplines had to focus on those issues that, in the definition of the ruling party, were beneficial to society. This instrumentalization of academic fields led to specializations and deformations—especially in the more politicized fields. Insurmountable obstacles were introduced by prohibiting travel and, in many cases, publishing.

Under the forty years of GDR rule, not one new university was founded, although a number of special institutions of higher edu-

cation—especially in technical fields—were created. The humanities continued to be taught only at those universities that had traditionally included them before 1949: Berlin, Greifswald, Halle, Jena, Leipzig, and Rostock. After 1968 research projects were supposed to be led outside of the universities in the Akademie der Wissenschaft (Academy of Science); luckily, however, the directive restricting teaching to universities and research to the academy was never achieved in practice.[14] Despite this official regulation, there were several traditional fields, such as Latin American studies at the University of Rostock, where internationally competitive research was conducted. In the field of history, research and teaching were mainly restricted to the history of the GDR, socialism, and the workers' movement. Areas such as the history of ancient, medieval, and early modern times as well as history related to Western Europe and large sectors of non-European regions were neglected.

The restructuring of the humanities at Eastern universities after unification is still in its first phase and continues to be problematic. For example, only 35 percent of the professors who taught under the GDR still hold their positions today, though more than 20 percent of the positions are not yet filled. Philosophy departments in Leipzig, Halle, Jena, Greifswald, Rostock, and at the Humboldt University in Berlin are still going through reorganization; several of these departments are in the process of dealing with their past (see, for instance, the impressive number of publications in the early 1990s on Ernst Bloch and his removal from Leipzig University.)[15] Frank Richter's book *Philosophie in der Krise* (*Philosophy in a Crisis*), published in 1991 by the Dietz Verlag in Berlin, is a critical account of the GDR philosopher Herbert Hörz. It is worth mentioning that during the final decades under the GDR regime, linguists, most notably professor emeritus Gottfried Graustein from Leipzig University, were not prevented from contributing to international grammar, including the English language.

In her welcoming speech at the opening of the new American studies department library at Leipzig University in the spring of 1997, Dr. Anne Koenen commented on the nature of dissertations accepted at Leipzig University in the fields of *Anglistik* and *Amerikanistik* since 1950. The titles of these dissertations cover a

very broad spectrum, including the Elizabethan "Kanzone," the portrayal of social developments in modern Africa in British writing, the new American drama, and so on. Today, an increase in the number of dissertations is expected, though not necessarily on such a variety of topics. Students in Leipzig and Halle are easily attracted to new fields like African-American women's studies, the technologies of gender, and popular culture. All of the professors in American studies are from Western Europe and the United States, and they import identical "trendy" teaching material.

While on the whole this account of the current situation of the humanities may not be as exciting as that of other disciplines, there are nevertheless numerous promising stories to tell. As we mentioned earlier, the University of Frankfurt/Oder is a good example of a university introducing new concepts regarding the teaching of the humanities. At Leipzig University, two departments, *Anglistik* and *Amerikanistik,* have introduced a threefold pattern of teaching. In addition to the pillars of language and literature, a third pillar, *Kulturwissenschaften* (cultural studies), was added. This third pillar emerged from the traditional GDR area studies, but with a new, if not to say "international" or "American," context. Students use a cultural studies reader edited by Simon During and published by Routledge to allow themselves to become as familiar as their fellow American and British students with texts by scholars such as Cornel West, Richard Dyer, and James Clifford, among others. Universities in West Germany will have to follow this example and adjust their teaching methods as well as open their departments to areas that are not only literature and language oriented.

* * *

The process of modernization and the transition to the information age calls for changes in teaching and learning that will produce individuals with the strong personal and interpersonal skills necessary to compete in a new global environment. As we embark on a path leading toward turn-of-the-century educational reforms, we will look for models and success stories in other European countries and around the world.

For Germany, it is well worth looking eastward to evaluate some of the well-structured curricula with a duration of study shorter than the West German average and to look at interdisciplinary studies, increasing cooperation between departments of regional institutions of higher education (in Saxony, both Halle and Jena are good examples), and cooperation with the private sector. Change could occur partly because of strong academic leadership; in addition, the Max Planck Institutes, the Fraunhofer Institutes, political and private foundations, and industry have all contributed their support.

The costs involved in these substantial changes should not be neglected; higher education reform in East Germany, covered within the framework of a program costing DM 2.4 billion, has both improved the academic range and the distribution of institutions. The total number of students in the new states in 1995 was 298,000. Today, in West Germany, politicians as well as educators are asking questions related to higher education and the investment in future generations. While there were fewer than four hundred thousand students in West Germany in 1962, total enrollment today is approaching nearly two million in unified Germany.

The institutions of higher education in the East have been facing a problem that went from being a curse to a blessing: the lack of students led to competition and the need for a specific profile. As we well know, each crisis bears in itself an opportunity for change and innovation; many of these "new tradition" institutions have met the new demands and today attract more international students (in proportion to the German student population) than their partner institutions in the West. The new challenges resulting from the revolutionary events of 1989 and unification are productive catalysts today for change in a western society that stagnated for too long.

Rebuilding cannot only apply to the East; it has its socioeconomic as well as cultural and education-related repercussions in the West as well. As Robert von Rimscha has noted, the story from Germany today is about big changes under way, and there is already plenty of good news from the Eastern *Länder*.[16]

ENDNOTES

[1]Hans Joachim Meyer, "Shake-up for German Universities," *Nature* 368 (March 1994): 11–12.

[2]Richard Nürnberger, ed., *Melanchtons Werke*, III. Band., Humanistische Schriften (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1961), 29–42.

[3]Rainer Künzel, "University in Transition—Part I: Investment, Structure, and Perspective; Development, Problems, and Reform Issues of the German System of Higher Education," extended version of a paper presented at the German-American Conference on "University Transition" at the University of California, Berkeley, 16–20 March 1997, 5.

[4]*Grund und Strukturdaten 1996/97, Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie*, published by the Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie, December 1996, 236.

[5]See Meyer, "Shake-up for German Universities," 11.

[6]Ibid., 12.

[7]Fritz Stern, "Freedom and its Discontents," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (4) (September/October 1993): 108–124.

[8]See Gerhard Maess, "Der Erneuerungsprozeß an der Universität Rostock," *Nova Acta Leopoldina* NF 71 (290) (1994): 87–93.

[9]See Gerhard Maess, "Die Universität Rostock auf dem Weg in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Aufbruch und Reform von oben*, ed. Renate Mayntz (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1994), 142.

[10]Hans N. Weiler, "Conceptions of Knowledge and Institutional Realities: Reflections on the Creation of a New University in Eastern Germany," unpublished essay prepared for the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society, 21–24 March 1994, San Diego, Calif., 2.

[11]Ibid., 5.

[12]Dieter Buhl, "Chaoskompetenz im fernen Osten," *Die Zeit* (16) (11 April 1997): 34.

[13]Kurt Reumann, "Gesund oder verrottet? Trotz Not und Narretei: Humboldts Idee lebt," *Forschung & Lehre* 12 (1995): 655.

[14]See Wissenschaftsrat, *Empfehlungen zur künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den neuen Ländern und im Ostteil von Berlin* Teil IV (1992): 18.

[15]Peer Pasternack, *DDR-Wissenschaftsgeschichte & Umbau von Hochschule und Wissenschaft in Ostdeutschland* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1994), 154–155.

[16]Robert von Rimscha, "The Story from Germany is about Big Changes under Way," *International Herald Tribune*, 25 April 1997, 8.

Jan U. Clauss

Addendum to "*Im Osten viel Neues:* Plenty of News from the Eastern *Länder*"

I N APRIL 1997, JAN CLAUSS INTERVIEWED two West German and one East German student on the situation "in the East" at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena (Thuringia). Those interviewed were: Daniel Herz, a twenty-three-year-old third-year medical student from Zweibrücken (Rhineland-Palatinate); Maike Dury, a twenty-three-year-old fourth-year law student from Saarbrücken (Saarland); and Martin Berger, a twenty-two-year-old third-year medical student from Greiz (Thuringia), near Hof. The text of these interviews follows.

* * *

Q: Daniel, why did you choose a university in the East?

DANIEL: It was not my choice. I was assigned to Jena University by the ZVS (*Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen, Dortmund*)—the German Central Office for placing *Numerus clausus* (students in restricted majors)—in 1994. My girlfriend Maike, then studying at Saarland University, joined me in 1995.

Q: And it was quite a shock for you to be "displaced in the far East"?

DANIEL: At first, yes. My schoolmates kidded me and said that I was being displaced into *Dunkeldeutschland* ("Dark Germany")— a stereotype that is still very much at hand. But I decided not to worry; I thought that Thuringia could be a challenge for me, right

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after my *Abitur* (high school certificate). Besides, the Jena medical faculty is known for its quick and effective training of students.

Q: And then you packed your car in order to begin this new part of your life?

DANIEL: I went ahead, full of expectations, to learn about Jena. After all, this town has historically enjoyed a good reputation in German cultural history: Goethe and Schiller were active here. And in economic terms, Jena had been one of the German leaders in engineering.

My friend Maike, for the time being, was luckily assigned by the *ZVS* to a university right outside her front door (Saarbrücken). But we both decided to study together in Jena one day. So, Maike placed an advertisement expressing her desire to exchange her university position at Saarbrücken with a law student at Jena University (*Studienplatztausch-Angebot*). This was successful in 1995.

MAIKE: Jena is well known as a university with a completely re-structured law faculty and excellent junior professors, mostly from the West. East German universities generally claim—and they promote this image very well—to provide close contacts between professors and students. Teaching and studying in small seminar groups is available. The professor knows you personally and takes care of your study problems. This small ratio of lecturers to stu-dents has successfully become a trademark here, and it is becom-ing more and more known, even in the West.

DANIEL: The other day I read in an article by Kurt Reumann in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (April 29, 1997) that the Annual Conference of German University Presidents *(HochschulRektoren-Konferenz)* had an extensive discussion on whether the classical Humboldt principle of combining research and teaching *(Einheit von Forschung und Lehre)* was still valid for German mass univer-sities. In Jena we do not understand this controversy. The union of science and training (*Einheit von Forschung und Lehre*) is very much present at the newly restructured higher education institu-tions in the five new *Länder* of Germany, and particularly at the relatively small university in Jena.

Q: How could you decide realistically about these "educational principles" before you had even started? You are both very young, and Daniel had no university experience at all.

DANIEL: As a future medical student who had taken many mathematics, pathology, biology, and physics courses, I tried to be very open from the beginning. Having had the chance to witness fundamental changes in my country, I was curious to learn how these things happen in an "enlarged Germany," apart from specific study issues.

MAIKE: If I just wanted to learn and study at my desk and in the seminar, I could have continued to take my law courses in Saarbrücken. But for me it was an adventure, too, being a pioneer in a completely new academic environment. Daniel and I will profit more from our university studies in Jena than in the West. Gradually people are learning that East Germany is an excellent place for university beginners. West Germans are still a minority among the students in the East, but we are slowly increasing our numbers. The rough and crude reforms that took place at all of the Eastern educational and science institutions at the beginning of the 1990s—starting with the so-called *Abwicklung* (the screening and evaluation of East German science and educational institutions, which resulted in the closing of hundreds of institutions and the firing of tens of thousands of people)—will surely, in the end, not only provide better study conditions, as they have already, but also better training outputs compared with "normal" universities in the West.

MARTIN: "Fundamental changes"—Daniel just mentioned them— create some difficulties for East Germans. Not everything "imported" after unification is seen as unequivocally good by us *Ossis*—those who were born and raised in East Germany.

DANIEL: Some of my (Western) friends were "lucky" to have been assigned a study place close to my native region, Rhineland-Palatinate. If you take all of the Cologne universities together, with more than ninety thousand students, you have nearly as many students there as we have inhabitants in Jena! Could you ever imagine—namely in medical studies—that practical conditions for future doctors at the Cologne University would be better than in Jena? My former

schoolmates complain a lot. Some of them have visited me in Jena. Having now seen this pleasant town and its modern medical facility, they would like to move here (which would require that I move to Cologne in order for a change of study places to work). But I will stay here, and I am happy to do so.

MAIKE: The same is true if you compare law studies in Cologne with those in Jena.

Q: These selection criteria, Martin, certainly are not the same ones you used when deciding to study in Jena?

MARTIN: One of our dictums is the individual drive of young people to acquire a professional degree quickly and then to be on one's own. This is perhaps different from the main motivation of *Wessis*—people from West Germany—to study here in the East (these *Wessis* then are called *Wossis*). Apart from that, our financial situation does not permit me to study in the old (Western) *Länder,* where student life is much more expensive.

Q: So, Daniel and Maike, you mainly appreciate both the academic setting and the idyllic atmosphere in Jena?

DANIEL: Perhaps it will take some time for *Wessis* to realize that the polity of East Germany has been completely turned upside down with unification after 1989 and that this "mental revolution" has an impact on all administrative structures—in the university and the society as such. You will not find any structure to be static or deadlocked. The university is new—its buildings have new colors—its staff looks to the future, the curricula are modern and student-oriented, and student participation in courses and in the laboratories is provided for and encouraged on a personal level. This radical change *(Umbruchsituation)* resembles much of what my parents told us about the situation after World War II: a new beginning without the old-fashioned stuff of decades and centuries, without tools, structures, and procedures that they had been accustomed to for ages.

MAIKE: Our new faculties allow students to actively participate in any restructuring that affects them and their studies. This is valid both for the content of the new curricula as well as for the social life at the institution. Without "political" engagement and a pio-

neer mentality, one cannot move forward. This is marvelous. It is fun to collaborate with highly motivated young lecturers and professors who had no chance during the old regime or—as is more frequently the case—with highly qualified West German scientists who for years unsuccessfully applied to teach at Western universities, where no additional teaching staff had been recruited since 1977, in spite of a doubling of the student population.

MARTIN: To elbow one's way into active (political) participation may be more an issue for the *Wessis*. We, the *Ossis*, still have to learn it. Our mentality is to be careful, reluctant, and less active in terms of these innovations in everyday life. *Eigeninitiative* (to think for oneself) is a concept that we still have to learn, and we cannot pick it up from our parents, a generation that for forty years was not encouraged to practice it.

Q: There must be more that attracts *Wessis* to study in the East.

DANIEL: The study conditions Maike mentioned are one reason. Beyond that—speaking for Jena—the equipment, namely in the sciences, is so modern that many Western faculties can only dream of having it. The mass subventions and subsidies from the central government in Bonn since the opening of the Wall have not just disappeared, as many newspapers dramatically describe. The bulk of this money, I am very sure, is used to pay for the restructuring. Take, for example, our new computers—every student has access!—and the laboratory equipment at my institution. These investments in the universities in the East give them a substantial and comparative advantage over the mass universities in the West. The building boom in the East may have created skyscrapers without tenants, but it also contributed to the "intellectual benefit" of all research institutes and educational institutions. It is these investments in the East that will enable Germany to remain competitive in Europe.

MAIKE: Have you noticed the escalators between Zeiss Optics Ltd. and the science faculties of the university—in the main building of Jena? The former minister president of Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth, now chairman of Zeiss Optics, was attacked in the early 1990s by people in Jena: He authorized the considerable job cuts at the Zeiss Optics factories. But in the same course of reorganiza-

tion he created a physical and psychological symbiosis between Zeiss and the "new university." Now, Zeiss is doing better, and the university has a considerable amount of third-party funds that are needed nowadays in order to fund good research. Jena's economy grows, and new jobs are created.

MARTIN: These impressions, however, are only a part of the reality. As a genuine *Ossi* I would like to add that the wounds that were inflicted on this part of the country in the course of reunification were large; they are far from negligible. Indeed, the five new *Länder* have advanced positively, in economic terms. If you start from zero and reach a 0.001 increase, this is mathematically speaking a huge gain—some billion percent. But the economic damage and the human tragedies that befell the Thuringia population after 1989 are not forgotten, nor are they resolved.

Besides, it would be wrong to state that, as an example, medical studies at the universities in the East are now the envy of the world. Daniel's impressions, which originated in the West and are dominated by scenarios of overcrowded medical faculties in Cologne, Münster, and the Saarland, may be true. But what Daniel is comparing with his situation in Jena is "over-objectized"; he focuses on the multiple-choice tests and the governed medical curriculum that have existed at all West German universities for decades. In West Germany the use of numerical, multiple-choice teaching methods in medical schools was and is "normal" and widely accepted. This system was designed for mass universities that have several thousands of students—ten times more medical-student candidates than study places available. Since the East German regime never gave its students a choice in selecting their majors or professions, our universities were never overcrowded. In medicine, we have never known these multiple-choice test procedures. Medical faculties in East Germany—to take only the most well known, the Charité in Berlin (Humboldt University) and Jena—were characterized by their excellent teaching and very "human atmosphere." German reunification imposed the Western type of numerically oriented medical teaching procedures on our excellent faculties. They became less "human" unwillingly. This is one of the sacrifices of unification!

DANIEL: This type of "reform" should not have been introduced in the new *Länder*. The Charité and Jena faculties surely would do better with the old teaching principles of the former GDR. What I wanted to stress, however, is that unification brought extensive and expensive technical equipment with it, which now enables East German faculties to be more advanced than their colleagues in the West.

MARTIN: In some areas of life, complete structures and procedures were "erased." In other areas today you find an interesting mix of old (proven) and new (introduced) organizations and procedures.

DANIEL: Here, two completely contrary systems start to mix.

Q: Would you say the same thing for the "political faculties," Maike?

MAIKE: The situation in these faculties was substantially different after 1989. In economics, sociology, and political science, nearly all of the professors were dismissed. In the law faculties practically 100 percent of the professors were fired. All of the Eastern "political faculties" had to start again—and they started with "Western imports." But still today there are not enough junior scientists from the East who can take over. The situation, however, will be different in ten years.

Q: You very much defend this new system, which has been attacked by several Western (German and foreign) newspapers and other media. Have you become too much a partisan of the East just because you are content here?

MAIKE: Perhaps a bit, yes. But you have to consider the situation before 1989. The Western ideals of democracy and the social market economy had been thrust upon the country and its inhabitants without warning. The Berlin Wall had fallen, but the "wiring diagrams of the brains" of the East Germans were not abolished overnight. To understand the situation in the Eastern regions, one first of all has to try to have insight into the "pre-1989 mind" and its way of thinking and acting. The mentality of most East Germans is still formed from their history, though young people have a less difficult time; an eighteen-year-old student was ten when Germany became united. We, the *Wessis,* have to be

patient in understanding this mental break, which affected virtu-
ally everyone (not to mention the new unemployment and the loss
of privileges for many people). In order to build up a "common
Germany," we first of all have to drop our (Western) prejudices;
we have to exercise tolerance with people whose pasts were differ-
ent from ours and at times much more difficult. After all, we are
both Germans in Germany!

MARTIN: Because of the political oppression during the years of the
old regime, the feeling of solidarity *(Solidaritätsgefühl, Gemein-
schaftsempfinden)* among the citizens of the GDR was very dis-
cernible. This feeling was much stronger than any motivation to
present oneself as distinct and unique *(Statusprofilierung)*. Now,
after the transformation of the system *(Wende)*, we have to ac-
quire these characteristics. This is part of the new "wiring diagram
of the brain."

MAIKE: Remember that East and West Germany, for our genera-
tion, were two completely different worlds before 1989: two worlds
of thinking and two worlds of acting. Few of us had the opportu-
nity to get to know the "other" Germans—those on the other side
of the Wall—and their way of thinking. For us, East Germany was
stranger and more distant than France, Italy, or Spain. East Ger-
many was a complete terra incognita for us.

DANIEL: Now it is up to us to discover it again. We will understand
this process of growing together only by looking around, for
example, in Jena, with our own eyes: ugly block flats, huge soul-
less suburbs, communist monuments, rotted industry plants—these
are not only relics of a polity sentenced to death in 1989 but a part
of the human beings living here. Bonn may give billions and
billions for the restructuring, but the mental reconstruction has to
be accomplished by us, the younger generation. And this "revolu-
tion" takes time. We are proud to be in a position both to partici-
pate in this revolution and also to realize and benefit from its
future outcome.

MAIKE: And these effects are very positive. If every *Wessi* would
stay just one week in the East, he would return home "brain-
washed," in a good sense.

MARTIN: A good idea!

Vivien A. Schmidt

Discourse and (Dis)Integration in Europe: The Cases of France, Germany, and Great Britain

UROPEAN INTEGRATION IS AT A CROSSROADS. As the race to European Monetary Union (EMU) accelerates, with politicians staking their political reputations and their country's economic prospects on making the first wave of membership, popular support has been diminishing. As unemployment continues to rise and social benefits fall, European integration no longer appears to be what was promised: a union of countries that would bring greater prosperity for all. Those most affected by the austerity measures are growing restive, evidenced in the increasing number of strikes to protest cuts in jobs and benefits, and alienated, reflected in the generalized malaise and in the rise of the extreme Right.

Much of the economic pressure, of course, cannot be blamed on European integration alone: globalization, most evident in the burgeoning international financial markets and global business competition, is an even more potent force for change, as is the demography that means that fewer and fewer workers must support more and more retirees on social security. The political disaffection, moreover, also has much to do with the fallout from the end of communism—traditional Left/Right party divisions and ideas having been thrown into disarray—and with the increase in

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political corruption, the prosecution of which has landed many politicians in jail and parties in disgrace. Nevertheless, European integration is the most visible impetus for change and therefore the most tangible target for the dissatisfied.

Most European pundits see the current problems linked to integration as temporary, resulting from the necessary economic adjustments in the preparation for monetary union, to be resolved when prosperity returns on more solid fiscal ground. But there are the Cassandras who raise the specter of doom if monetary integration fails to materialize on time or at all or, worse, is launched and then abandoned as impracticable. In the worst-case scenario, European disintegration would follow the turmoil in the markets, the pullout from common macroeconomic policies, the rise of protectionism, and the breakdown of free trade across borders.

In this focus on the economic, both the optimists and the pessimists overlook other equally fundamental elements that may act to reinforce European integration or to promote disintegration. For European integration is not only economic; it is institutional and ideational as well. Within each member-state, continued support for European integration depends not only on the successful adjustment of the economy but also on the successful adaptation of national institutions to the newly emerging European governance system and the successful construction of a national political discourse that serves to justify both economic adjustment and institutional adaptation.

There is no doubt that the developing European economic system, with its drive toward monetary union and a single market, has demanded structural adjustment from member-states, which have had to impose strict monetary policies and tight budgets in the macroeconomic sphere, deregulation and privatization in the microeconomic sphere, and a reduced welfare state in the socioeconomic sphere. Equally importantly, however, the emerging European governance system, with its quasi-federal institutional structures, quasi-pluralist policy-making processes, and cooperative decision-making culture, has required institutional adaptation by member-states that are more often unitary in structure, statist or corporatist in policy-making process, and conflictual or consensual in decision-making culture. And the ever-more ambitious European project, with its vision of a political Europe that is

larger, stronger, and more cohesive and of an economic Europe that is more neoliberal, has impelled member-states to construct national discourses that project country-specific visions of how the nation fits into Europe and the world, which at the same time serve to justify the Europe-related economic and institutional changes.

Although all European member-states are subject to these self-same European pressures, differences in economic profile, institutional organization, and ideational pattern have ensured that they have not felt their weight equally or responded in the same ways. While some countries have had an easier time than others adjusting their economies to the structural demands of Europe, some have found adapting their institutions to European governance requirements less disruptive than others, and some have managed to construct national discourses to justify Europe-related economic and institutional change more readily than others.

Of the three major European powers, France has changed the most in response to the pressures of Europeanization: Having undergone major economic and institutional transformation, it is now in the throes of a political crisis, in large measure because it has been unable to construct a coherent discourse capable of justifying those changes. By comparison, Great Britain and Germany have had to change relatively little: Great Britain anticipated many of the economic and institutional changes required by Europeanization and successfully resisted others, and Germany has until recently been able to avoid change due to its economic strength and its institutional organization. And both have suffered little so far politically from the changes they have instituted, having managed to maintain coherent justificatory discourses, albeit very different ones. Today, however, Great Britain faces major institutional choices with regard to further integration while Germany confronts major economic strains, and whether their discourses will be able to carry them through politically remains open to question.

THE ADJUSTMENT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES

Since the 1980s, economic change has accelerated for all member-states in both microeconomic and macroeconomic spheres. The push for a single market has spurred liberalization of the financial

markets, deregulation of the rules governing business, privatization of nationalized industries, and harmonization of standards. The impending monetary union has engendered tight monetary policies, austerity budgets, low inflation, and caps on public debt and government deficits. With these microeconomic and macroeconomic adjustments, moreover, have come changes in business and its relationship with government and labor. Big business has grown bigger in size, more dispersed in operations, and more European (if not international) in scope. It is consequently in less need of not only the compromises with labor of the past but also the traditionally close ties with national governments—even if it cannot be considered entirely "stateless," since its main political linkages, cultural traits, and economic base remain nationally focused.[1]

But although these changes have on the whole produced healthier economies and more competitive businesses, they have also led to a concomitant loss of capacity in the socioeconomic sphere. Most European countries have faced declining social services and rising unemployment, and as a result have experienced increasingly frequent strikes and/or a generalized malaise. The discipline of European monetary integration together with the pressures of global financial markets have ensured that the welfare state has taken a backseat to the competitive state, as governments appear more concerned about the value of their money and the views of the markets than the well-being of their citizens.

Among the three largest European countries, France has undergone the most fundamental change in response to European economic imperatives. Having been more vulnerable to global market forces and more buffeted by the challenges of international competition than either Germany or Great Britain, Europeanization through monetary integration and the single market became, in the view of the French government, the only effective shield against globalization and the only way to stabilize the economy and promote economic growth. But this required France not only to relinquish its economic autonomy but also to abandon its traditional *dirigiste,* or interventionist, approaches to macroeconomic and microeconomic policy-making. Beginning in the early 1980s, France transformed an economy characterized by a state-sanctioned cycle of inflation and devaluation and a state-dominated industry into one focused on taming inflation, maintaining a strong currency, and reducing

state ownership and control of business through deregulation and privatization.[2]

The problem for France today, however, is that the successful transformation in macro- and microeconomic spheres has precipitated a crisis in the socioeconomic sphere. While the economy has been turned around and the business-government relationship transformed, unemployment has grown (hitting a postwar high of 12.8 percent in February 1997), wages have stagnated, and social benefits have decreased. The public-sector strikes of late 1995, which paralyzed the country for nearly a month and which attracted tremendous popular support, are only the most dramatic expression of the generalized malaise that also manifests itself in the rise of the extreme Right.

Germany, by contrast, which has always been more internationally oriented and globally competitive, has so far had to change comparatively little in response to European integration, either in the macroeconomic or microeconomic realms. For Germany, Europeanization has represented more of a reinforcement of the country's traditional macroeconomic hedge against global forces than a new protection against them, as has been the case for France. In fact, as the lead European economy with the lead currency and the leadership role in monetary policy through the *Bundesbank*, it has tended to impose its own macroeconomic patterns and prejudices on the rest of Europe.[3] Moreover, while Germany has been a Europeanizing force in the macroeconomic sphere, it has managed to delay Europeanization in the microeconomic sphere, having negotiated deregulation and privatization very slowly with the "social partners," business and labor, and with the *Länder* (the federal states), so as to ensure as little disruption as possible to the traditional relationship.[4]

Only in the past couple of years or so has the German formula for economic success come into question. The costs of unification and the pressures of global competition weigh heavily as Germany suffers from too-expensive products, too-high labor costs, and an unemployment rate that is at its highest since Hitler, while in-country investment (foreign and domestic) declines, productivity slows, and innovation drops. Moreover, the traditionally consensual, tripartite business-labor-government relationship is becoming more conflictual as businesses, worried about declining com-

petitiveness and eroding profits, push for greater labor flexibility and workers push back, seeing their jobs leave the country and their benefits legislated or bargained away. Although the actual diminution in German socioeconomic capacity so far is comparatively minor, it is being taken very seriously, as was evident from the controversy over the reduction of sick pay from 100 to 80 percent, which was sanctioned by government law, protested by striking employees, and ultimately not adopted by large-scale employers in wage negotiations.

Great Britain has also experienced comparatively little change in response to Europeanization. In the macroeconomic sphere, Britain has retained its traditionally liberal and international approach to macroeconomic policy-making and limited its commitment to European monetary integration, having found it anything but a shield against global forces (as the 1992 exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism [ERM] of the European Monetary System attests). In the microeconomic sphere, Britain has limited its exposure to EU-generated change not only through its negotiated opt-out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty but also because deregulation and privatization came before the European pressures; the Thatcher government was ideologically committed to dismantling state control of an economy that was in any event less state-dominated than either that of Germany or France.[5]

But British industry has been left to sink or swim on its own, as the government exposed it to greater international competition and the vagaries of the market without France's level of government support and takeover protection or Germany's business cooperation and labor concertation, and it has sunk more often than not. It is only recently, since its exit from the ERM, that the British economy has begun to thrive again, aided by the performance of foreign-owned firms and those British firms that managed to survive, as well as by its greater labor flexibility, which has made it highly attractive to foreign direct investment. In the socioeconomic realm, in fact, Britain has many fewer problems than France: the welfare system has been progressively cut since the 1980s, although never as much as was threatened, and unemployment is comparatively low (albeit at the expense of job security).

In pursuit of European integration, in short, all three countries have sacrificed much socioeconomic capacity along with

macroeconomic and microeconomic policy autonomy. The economic adjustment has been felt more acutely by France, however, than Germany or Great Britain. This is also the case with regard to these countries' institutional adaptation to Europe.

THE ADAPTATION OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Although for the moment the prospect of monetary union has grabbed all the headlines, European integration does not rise or fall simply on the ability of member-states' economies to meet the Maastricht criteria. An integrated Europe is likely to continue regardless of whether a single currency is achieved for some core group in 1999, in 2001, or never—and not only because the single market is largely complete. There is no easy way institutionally to go back to a nonintegrated Europe, although going forward could prove more difficult for a variety of reasons, and not only if monetary integration were to fail.

Along with the Europeanization of national economic policies and profiles has come the Europeanization of national institutional structures and policy-making processes. All member-states are now enmeshed not only in a European politico-economic system that ties national currencies to a single European currency, turns national markets into European markets, and encourages national firms to become European firms but also in a European politico-administrative system that turns national political officials into European decisionmakers, national administrations into implementers of European decisions, and nationally organized interests into European lobbies. National public and private actors who in the past remained part of single or at most dual-level national governance systems and of largely fixed national governance networks increasingly operate in a multi-level European governance system as part of highly fluid European governance networks.[6]

At the same time that national actors have enhanced their supranational powers as a result of European integration, however, they have subordinated their national powers to Europe. The European Union's institutions have increasingly taken precedence over national institutions, diminishing national executives' authority and reducing their control over subnational authorities; usurp-

ing parliamentary powers of initiative; and subordinating judicial authority to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). European policy-making processes, moreover, increasingly impinge on national ones, allowing access and influence to different actors and different interests, arriving at policy decisions differently, and enforcing decisions or expecting their enforcement in different ways.

Within this context, some countries have felt the strain of institutional adaptation more than others, mainly because of questions of institutional fit. European institutional structures are more federal, that is, more balanced in the powers of the executive, legislature, and judiciary and of the different levels of authority, than they are unitary, where the executive predominates over the legislature and the judiciary as well as over subnational authorities. And European policy-making processes tend to be more pluralist than statist or corporatist, that is, open to the influence of interests in policy formulation rather than either being completely closed or open only to certain privileged interests; more regulatory in policy implementation by applying the rules without exception than either administrative, by being open to interest accommodation, or corporative, by applying the rules in conjunction with certain privileged interests; and more cooperative in culture, with a more technically driven, bottom-up decision-making process, than either conflictual, where decisions are more political and generally made at the top, or consensual, in which decisions are less clearly political and rarely made at the top.[7]

As such, the EU's quasi-federal structures have tended to have a greater impact on unitary states such as France and Great Britain, altering the institutional balance of power between the executive, legislature, and judiciary by promoting national court independence and subnational autonomy while diminishing legislative power, than they have on federal states. In Germany, the executive has never been especially dominant, given constitutionally guaranteed court independence, subnational autonomy, and legislative power. Moreover, the EU's quasi-pluralist policy-making process has tended to impose greater adjustment burdens on statist polities such as France and Great Britain—by undermining government autonomy in policy formulation, reducing administrative flexibility in implementation, and expecting greater cooperation in EU policy-making—than on corporatist polities. Germany has never had the

same kind of governmental autonomy; its corporative implementation has been deemed compatible with the regulatory; and its consensual culture better matches the EU's cooperative one.

For France, institutional adaptation to European integration has been particularly hard. The country's unitary structure—in which the central government has always been strong, subnational authorities have always been weak, and the executive has always had overarching authority over the legislature and the judiciary—has been undermined by the EU's quasi-federal structure. The "state"—which has over time acquired almost mystical qualities in the minds of the French, embedded as it is in the culture and history, in the institutions, and in the seemingly autonomous action of decisionmakers[8]—has lost some of its mystique. No longer the sovereign power able to decide alone and for itself on matters of national interest, it now shares decision-making authority with fifteen member-states in the EU Council of Ministers at the same time that it often finds its own national constituencies, primarily business and subnational authorities, partners in lobbying the Commission.

At the national level, the French executive is no longer the single all-powerful authority. The judiciary, despite being subordinated to the ECJ, has gained increasing power and legitimacy beginning in the 1980s.[9] This was driven not only by external forces, in particular the courts' empowerment as an enforcement arm of the EU, but also by internal dynamics. These include the magistrates' increasing activism in the pursuit of malfeasance in high political and business circles alike—a matter of distress for the executive— and the Constitutional Council's growing influence in settling disputes between executive and legislature, or between majority and opposition. Parliament, by contrast, which has never had much independent power of initiative or oversight, has even less power: Despite reforms attendant upon the Maastricht Treaty, it has become little more than a rubber stamp for directives developed in the EU Commission and agreed to by the French executive in the Council of Ministers.[10] Subnational authorities, by comparison, have grown in power and independence, the beneficiaries not only of EU access and resources but also of internal decentralizing reforms.[11]

The country's statist policy-making process has also been undermined. Governments that traditionally would formulate "heroic" policies absent interest input then accommodate the most affected interests in the implementation process, or else risk confrontation, can now no longer formulate policy autonomously, given the primacy of the EU in ever-enlarging domains, and can also no longer accommodate those interests by making exceptions to the rules. This loss of administrative flexibility, resulting from the increasing incursions of the regulatory model, whether nationally or EU-inspired, has meant the end of the traditionally close, often informal business-government relations of the past where ministries and industries were generally free to work things out amongst themselves, ignoring the rules as often as not. For business, this loss of accommodation in policy implementation is offset by greater access to policy formulation at the supranational level. But because of France's generally closed policy-formulation process, where "lobbying" is regarded as illegitimate and influence is exercised in a more personalistic manner, as well as because of its more conflictual decision-making culture, which tends to be political and top-down, French private actors tend to be less effective in the EU's more technical, bottom-up lobbying process while public actors are often less adept in the EU's more cooperative and open everyday decision-making process.[12]

The threats to national sovereignty, governmental autonomy, and administrative flexibility have been acceptable to the French only to the extent that the country could predominate in the EU, engaging in the kind of heroism at the supranational level that was no longer possible at the national, given the economic adjustments as much as the institutional adaptation. But although this predominance has largely been realized where grand strategy is concerned, it has not with regard to everyday policy-making.

For Great Britain, institutional adaptation has not been quite as difficult as for France. Its unitary structure has been less affected by EU institutional structures given a central government that has been equally strong, but in a more limited sphere, and an executive that has also always been the overarching authority, but without as much power to impose on legislature or judiciary, although with much more power with regard to subnational authorities. And yet concerns about institutional encroachments have been

even greater in Britain than in France. Although Britain has never had the same mystical attachment to a "state" as such, the word never having been part of the politico-philosophical vocabulary,[13] national sovereignty remains at the forefront of national government concerns with integration—it is seen as something to be jealously guarded in negotiations at the EU level.

At the national level, although the executive has also lost power and authority, it has lost comparatively less than in France. This is mainly because the executive has always been less able to impose upon the British Parliament, which has traditionally exercised a more powerful role in terms of oversight and representation of public concerns, and on the British judiciary, which has traditionally had significant independence. The EU-related increase in the national judiciary's independence, therefore, has occasioned less distress on the part of the British executive than the French (especially since it has not been accompanied by the same kind of judicial activism), although the ECJ's judicial activism has provoked more distress, since it encroaches on long-established prerogatives. Moreover, the erosion of the greater powers of Parliament have been cause for concern not only for members of Parliament but also for the executive, which given the lesser party discipline and the more vocal, not to say fractious, nature of Britain's Parliament, has been forced to focus more on national self-interest in EU negotiations (or at least to proclaim so publicly) in order to forestall criticism and to ensure back-bench loyalty. Subnational authorities, finally, which have been denied independence and even their very existence in the Thatcher years (e.g., the dissolution of the Greater London Council), stand to gain much as a result of EU integration in light of the principle of subsidiarity that creates an impetus for reinstating local autonomy and instituting regional authorities.

Great Britain's statist policy-making process has also been undermined, but differently from that of France. Here, too, governments that traditionally formulated "heroic" policies have lost autonomy in ever-enlarging domains as well as administrative flexibility. For the British, however—who have always been less confrontational than the French, have had greater respect for the rule of law, and have been more consensual in their approach to implementation by generally accommodating interests (with the

exception of the Thatcher years)—administrative flexibility has generally meant avoiding promulgating laws. This entailed leaving ministries and industries free to work things out amongst themselves without the constraints of formal rules. For Britain, therefore, deregulation, whether nationally or EU-inspired, has been experienced as reregulation, with the creation of legal procedures, where informal agreements generally held, and the establishment of independent regulatory bodies, where civil servants made administrative decisions or business associations constituted selfregulatory bodies. For British business, this loss of national accommodation has been offset by greater supranational access, much as for the French. But because the British policy-formulation process is less closed to interest input than the French, given the wellorganized lobbying of Parliament, British business has been better equipped to engage in the EU lobbying process. While British private actors are therefore often more effective than the French at exerting influence at the EU level, British public actors are sometimes less so, especially at the level of grand strategy. The British, who have a conflictual decision-making culture that is as political and top-down as the French, also have a bargaining style that makes greater resort to brinkmanship and an agenda that is more focused on protecting their own prerogatives. They often push the envelope much farther than other, less ambivalent member-states and also feel fewer compunctions, in the face of defeat after a long and arduous bargaining process, about picking up their marbles and leaving.

The threats to national sovereignty, governmental autonomy, and administrative flexibility have thus been even more keenly felt by the British than the French and more successfully resisted—as the opt-outs to the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and to the European Monetary Union attest. Where the French response to such threats has been to seek a greater "heroism" at the EU level in exchange for its loss at the national level, the British response has been to resist "heroically" what it sees as European incursions on its sovereignty, autonomy, and flexibility. But while Britain's self-styled role as a reluctant partner has undermined its ability to have significant influence over grand strategy, such a role has made it very effective in gaining opt-outs at the national level and in pushing a more neoliberal agenda at the EU level.

For Germany, institutional adaptation has been much easier than for France or Great Britain. Its federal structure—in which the central government has always been weaker, subnational authorities stronger, and institutional power more balanced between executive, legislature, and judiciary—greatly resembles the EU's quasi-federal structure. The German executive has never had the autonomy of French or British executives or the possibility for "heroic" policy-making, while the "state" as such has never been more than "semi-sovereign," given the constitutionally guaranteed powers of the *Länder,* the constitutionally established independence of the *Bundesbank,* the legally separate collective-bargaining powers of the social partners, the separate jurisdictional powers of the courts, and so on. (The closest thing that the Germans have to a symbol of national sovereignty is their currency, which explains why giving up the deutsche mark in favor of the Euro is acceptable only if the replacement currency will have the same symbolic value that it does in Germany, as a guarantee of stability, as well as the same strength.) Loss of national sovereignty, as a result, has never been the issue for Germany that it has been for Britain, although the protection of the semi-sovereign powers of its institutional structures has been a major concern in all negotiations at the EU level, much more so than for France or Great Britain.

At the national level, the balance of powers between executive, legislature, and judiciary, as well as between national and subnational authorities, has been largely maintained. Although Parliament has seen its powers of initiation erode, its legislative powers remain much greater than in either France or Great Britain, as does its ability to exercise control over the executive. The executive, in fact, has little power to impose. The complicated structure of decision-making demands, depending upon the issue, legislative compromises between the conservative-dominated *Bundestag* and Social Democrat–controlled *Bundesrat,* regionally negotiated collective-bargaining agreements between the national peak associations of business and labor, and coordinated agreements between the federal government and the *Länder* on fiscal and implementation policies. Moreover, not only has the traditionally independent judiciary seen its independence enhanced, much as in Britain, but the highest court of the land—even more distressed than the Brit-

ish to give up its long-established prerogatives—has also refused to accept ultimate subordination to the ECJ. Finally, German subnational authorities (the *Länder*), unlike their closest equivalents in France (regions and *départements*), let alone in Britain (where self-governing regions do not exist), have always had significant power and autonomy through their direct representation in the upper chamber of Parliament (the *Bundesrat*) and in their role as implementers of federal laws. Although they had lost some power before Maastricht due to the increasing importance of EU-level policy-making, they have since regained it through their official representation on relevant EU committees.

Germany's corporatist policy-making process has similarly experienced little disruption, especially by contrast with France or Great Britain. This has been in part the product of conscious government efforts to ensure that the Maastricht Treaty allowed the *Länder* to participate officially in policy formulation and that both the *Länder* and the social partners continued to have their traditional role in policy implementation. But it also stems from the better institutional "fit" between the EU and Germany. Both have equally complicated, relatively open policy-making processes that promote a culture of compromise in policy formulation and not simply in implementation (as in France and Great Britain), whether it takes the form of consensus-seeking, as in Germany, where decisions are less clearly political and rarely made at the top, or of cooperation, as in the EU, where the decisions are more technical and bottom-up. In policy implementation, the traditional corporative flexibility remains largely unchanged, mainly because subnational authorities and social partners participate as they traditionally have. Moreover, because Germany has not only always respected the law as much as the British but has also codified it much more so, the increasing legal formalization coming from the EU does not cause the kind of consternation that it does in Great Britain—and need not, since it has not brought with it quite the proliferation of independent regulatory agencies that it has for Britain and France (although this may be imminent as deregulation accelerates).

In policy formulation, by contrast, some disruption has occurred; direct access for the organized interests ordinarily involved, i.e., business and labor, is diminished by having moved up to the

EU level, where business but not labor has great access. For business at least, national-level organized interest involvement in policy formulation, together with the consensual decision-making culture, has proven excellent training for EU lobbying efforts. German public actors, moreover, probably do as well as private actors when it comes to everyday negotiating, aided by their familiarity with a complex process focused on arriving at consensus. Although consensus, even in Germany, is often achieved only through conflict, the bargaining process has less of a quality of brinkmanship than the British. German public actors, as much as private, of necessity have learned not only how to bargain very hard for what they want but also when to give up and acquiesce—unlike the British, who leave rancorous feelings in the EU when time and again they choose to opt out rather than compromise.

Germany thus has no reason to feel the threats to sovereignty, autonomy, or flexibility as strongly as France or Great Britain, its institutional structures and policy-making process having been less subject to the kinds of changes that the EU has imposed on other member-states. By the same token, however, Germany's lack of autonomy and heroism, due in large measure to its federal institutions and corporatist processes along with its consensual culture, has made it very difficult for it to exercise leadership when it comes to grand strategy in the EU—where France excels—or forcefully to resist policy initiatives of which it disapproves—where Great Britain is the past master.

In short, all three countries have experienced economic adjustment and institutional adaptation in pursuit of European integration, although France much more so than either Germany or Great Britain. What is more, France has found it harder to gain public acceptance of such change, mainly because it lacks a coherent, justificatory discourse, unlike Great Britain, which has managed to construct a more or less coherent discourse since the advent of Thatcher, and Germany, which is only now beginning to show cracks in its postwar discourse.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL DISCOURSE

The importance of developing a national discourse capable of justifying the economic and institutional changes related to Euro-

pean integration cannot be underestimated. Without such a discourse, countries will risk what Wolfgang Streeck has termed the "democracy illusion," in which political opportunism and populist demagoguery will prosper as voters and politicians alike are torn between "refusing to recognize the externalities that increasingly govern national polities, and blaming everything on them—at one time calling for national solutions where these are no longer possible, and at another demanding 'European solutions' while in the name of national sovereignty and diversity refusing integrated Europe the means to deliver them."[14] For Streeck, this is inevitable in "democracy under fragmented sovereignty." But this underestimates the power of rational political discourse and also the possibility of producing a coherent vision of what integration within a larger Europe is and should be, a vision that is capable of convincing the public that the pursuit of the national welfare is reconcilable with the construction of a unified supranational economy and that this is worthwhile even if it means short-term national sacrifices.

Any such discourse, however, will of necessity be quite different from one European member-state to the next, given the fact that member-states have continued to manage their affairs quite differently. The main challenge for each country in the construction of a national discourse is how to project a convincing economic and political vision of the country, within an integrating Europe and a globalizing world, that also serves to justify the economic adjustments and institutional adaptations related to Europeanization.

Without such a vision and a discourse that serves to put Europeanization coherently in a national context, discussions of European (and global) imperatives tend to be heard more as rhetorical exhortations, with no greater rationale than as excuses for government policy and with little lasting message other than that outside incursions are causing change within. At best, in times of prosperity and complacency, the public will accept the rhetoric and the rationale with little question and will respond to the message as a challenge. At worst, in times of recession and malaise, the public will reject the rhetoric and the rationale, finding itself left only with the message, which most likely will instill fear and increase public vulnerability to political opportunism and demagoguery.

Ideally, such a discourse, although likely to be led by the government, should not be the construction of the governmental elite alone but rather should be part of a broader discussion in society, with opinion leaders from outside government as much as from inside taking part, including academics, the media, corporate executives, opposition parties, labor leaders, and so forth. Any monopolistic control or monolithic approach is problematic, since critical stances are often helpful in clarifying the issues and even modifying positions.[15] Moreover, the lack of criticism does not necessarily signal acceptance or agreement; it merely hides disagreement and makes it more difficult for government to gain a sense of the fault lines. And the more general the discussion, the more likely that what starts out as government rhetoric alone can become a more widely held, national conviction.

France: In Search of a Discourse

French governments have been markedly unsuccessful in constructing a coherent, national discourse capable of projecting a convincing vision of how France fits within an integrating Europe and a globalizing world. Ever since the Socialists converted to liberal economic policies in the early 1980s,[16] abandoning their socialist discourse, and the Right failed to sustain their neoliberal discourse of the mid-1980s in the face of electoral defeat,[17] French governmental elites have been in search of a new discourse that would serve to explain the country's economic and institutional transformation in terms of some larger vision of France in Europe and the world. In its absence, they have managed little more than a pro-European and antiglobal rhetoric that presents all of the changes related to European integration as necessary to protect the country against the pressures of globalization. European integration, in other words, acted as much as a political shield as an economic one, masking the lack of any real national discourse. But although their pro-European and antiglobal rhetoric worked for much of the 1980s, by the early to mid-1990s its ability to protect the political class diminished with the decreasing ability of European economic integration to shield France in the face of economic recession and the increasing incursions on social policy.

Criticism of the overall project of European integration and, in particular, of the EMU, however, has remained largely taboo. "*La*

pensée unique" (literally, single-minded thought), as the injunction against criticizing the EMU is often termed by dissenters, has stymied any thoroughgoing, open discussion of the problems involved. Prior to the 1997 election campaign, the only moment of open dissension occurred during the public debate on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, after which the discussion was closed again. Parliament, where one might have assumed the debate would continue, has been largely silent on the matter and in any case exercises little voice or power.

The taboo itself stems in large measure from the fact that perseverance with monetary integration has become not only a point of honor for most mainstream politicians of the Left and the Right—the sacrifices of the past several years include suffering high unemployment and too-high interest rates—but also a source of national pride, given France's economic leadership role in the EU that has accompanied its perseverance.[18] But it means that public debate is choked off, leaving little or no middle ground between accepting all aspects of the EMU without question or opposing it, which generally encompasses not just an exit from the EMU but also from the EU. The result is that before the election campaign even those national politicians on the Right who initially opposed the EMU were largely silent, with the exception just ahead of the call for elections of former Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua (his fellow Maastricht opponent, National Assembly President Philippe Séguin, by contrast, remained quiet, hoping to succeed Alain Juppé as Prime Minister). Moreover, those few politicians who recommended exit tended to be marginal or marginalized, as in the case of Jean-Pierre Chevènement on the Left and, of course, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front on the extreme Right, the most vocal proponent of exit. And the public, left with little more from mainstream politicians than exhortations to continued sacrifice and incantations on the future benefits of the EMU, are therefore more vulnerable to demagoguery from the extreme Right.

Silence on the EMU, however, does not entail silence on the ensuing loss of socioeconomic capacity. Here, politicians of the nongovernmental Right (in particular, Philippe Séguin) as much as the Left have been increasingly vocal, concerned in particular about the threats to "social solidarity" that come from government belt-tightening in the race toward the EMU. This came to a

head during the 1997 election campaign, when the taboo against criticism of the EMU was lifted. Although the Socialist-led coalition on the Left never went so far as to question the value of monetary union, it did criticize the restrictiveness of the budget criteria and the absence of an "economic government" that would push the European Central Bank to switch its focus from deficit reduction to economic growth.

The problem for French governmental elites of the Left and the Right is that they have yet to find a discourse that would serve to reconcile their expressed commitment to "social solidarity" with the effects of economic liberalization. And as French citizens see taxes and unemployment continue to rise while their social benefits and services are cut, they are losing patience—not only with the policies that seem not to have succeeded in bringing prosperity and jobs to France but also with the processes that continually leave them out of the decision-making loop. The late 1995 strikes are a testimony to this loss of patience.[19] But whether the French government can live up to President Chirac's pledge in response to the strikes—to engage in more dialogue and concertation—remains to be seen, given that it has rarely achieved much dialogue or concertation in the social arena with French citizens and has more often sought to impose or to pacify (in the face of protest) than to listen. Moreover, even if the government were truly eager to listen, the intermediary bodies necessary for social concertation are either weak or missing, by contrast with Germany, and Parliament has never acted as an effective voice for citizen concerns, by contrast with Great Britain. What is more, the other main avenues for expression of citizen concerns—the press and the courts—are viewed with growing suspicion by governmental elites, as corruption scandals are increasingly uncovered by the press and legally pursued by the courts.

France's institutional problems, then, are as much a cause of strain for the country as the economic ones. They are compounded by the fact that the EU offers little additional recourse in terms of citizen access in policy formulation (compared to business), and it actually reduces citizen accommodation in policy implementation. The rise of the regulatory model, which admits of no exceptions to the rule, means that French citizens, already cut out of the policy formulation process by a French government that tends to make

decisions without much societal consultation (and that has now lost autonomy in making those decisions), may also find themselves without their traditional recourse at the implementation stage, given the French government's loss of administrative flexibility. This loss of flexibility in policy implementation may only contribute to more protests as citizens turn to confrontation in the absence of accommodation—unless or until French governmental elites find new ways of organizing French citizens (and themselves) for dialogue and concertation to bring citizens into the policy formulation process, at least in the socioeconomic sphere.

The success of any such dialogue and concertation, however, depends upon the ability of French governmental elites to fashion a new coherent political discourse to justify the conversion to a more liberal and open macroeconomy, to a more market-oriented microeconomy, and to a more restricted socioeconomy. Without such a justificatory discourse, the loss of socioeconomic capacity in the face of European integration is instead likely to raise politically opportunistic or demagogic questions about the vision of France in an integrated Europe, leaving French citizens feeling increasingly under siege and the country's commitment to European integration at risk of blowing up in the faces of the governmental elite. Great Britain and Germany run less of this risk, albeit for very different reasons given their very different political discourses.

Britain: A Discourse in Need of Renewal

British governments, starting with Thatcher, have been most successful in constructing a coherent discourse that projects a convincing vision of Britain both in and out of an integrating Europe and in a globalizing world. Both their proglobal stance, which has roots in the country's more open economic history, and their anti-European rhetoric, which has enabled them to gain opt-outs from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and from the EMU, fit in well with their neoliberal discourse that propounds the rollback of the state in all spheres—socioeconomic as much as macroeconomic and microeconomic. In fact, the discourse serves just as much to justify Britain's loss of socioeconomic capacity, having preached ever since Thatcher about the need to dismantle the welfare state, as it does the resistance to the loss of autonomy in the macroeconomic

sphere due to monetary integration or in the microeconomic sphere due to any perceived EU reregulation. Today, however, as Britain faces major choices about its commitment to European integration in the wake of national elections, the discourse is in need of renewal, whatever the decision as to commitment.

The success of the discourse up until now has had much to do with the fact that, unlike in France, British citizens have benefited from more dialogue—although not necessarily any more concertation—on all aspects of European integration. By contrast with France, where criticism of the EMU and even the EU has been largely taboo, in Britain such criticism has become almost a *sine qua non* of British political life, whether in Parliament or in the newspapers. Defending the EU, in fact, has been a much riskier proposition—as the Labor Party found in the recent election campaign, having had to qualify time and again its statements about how much and where Britain would opt back in (in particular with regard to the Social Chapter).

Such public debate on the EU has meant that while Great Britain is almost as statist as France in its policy formulation process, citizens' concerns have at least been given more voice. This has been ensured primarily by a Parliament that, although almost as weak as the French when it comes to influencing policy, has always played a major role as a forum for the vigorous debate of ideas. In addition, government itself has been consistently protesting the EU's encroachments on Britain's parliamentary democracy, by promoting national interest almost exclusively in the collective decision-making in the Council of Ministers[20] as well as by opposing EU regulations that reduce the space left open to administrative discretion. All of this public discussion has given British citizens at least the appearance that their interests are being represented, even as their access to decision-making diminishes. Such discussion, combined with the success of economic and institutional reforms that largely anticipated European integration, has ensured that the neoliberal discourse that had appeared so radical when first introduced by Thatcher has now gained such widespread acceptance countrywide that even the Labor Party in opposition all but adopted it, even if it has not been quite as anti-European in its rhetoric or as doctrinaire in its neoliberalism.

The problem for Great Britain over the last couple of years of Tory government was that the anti-European rhetoric risked becoming reality, as the delicate balancing act that Tory governments had managed, by making public declarations of opposition to further integration while taking action that kept the country more in than out of the EU, had become increasingly difficult to maintain. The central issue for any British government, whether Tory or Labor, is that the approach of monetary union makes it more difficult for British governments to opt out while staying in, that is, to continue to reap the benefits of the EMS without giving up monetary sovereignty to the EMU. Macroeconomic autonomy remains at the heart of British sovereignty concerns and is likely to make or break British membership in the EU, even if microeconomic issues have gotten their share of attention lately, whether the case of BSE (mad cow disease), in which anti-European rhetoric was at its peak, or the ECJ decision that Britain must comply with the forty-eight-hour workweek rule, which also drew vociferous protests.

The danger for Britain is that as the anti-European rhetoric has escalated, the rational discourse that has consistently put European integration squarely within the neoliberal vision of Britain's future, as part of a larger, neoliberal Europe and world, may have been forgotten—not so much by the elite and in particular the business elite, which is well aware of the necessity of continued integration for the country's global competitiveness, as by the population, making it more open to demagogic manipulation. The Major government found it increasingly convenient to point out the dangers of Europeanization without mentioning its other merits, whether in playing to the Euroskeptics in Parliament in order to retain their allegiance or to the Eurocrats in Brussels to broker the best deal. In consequence, ultimate government compliance with European imperatives has increasingly looked to the public like it has no other rationale than capitulation to outside forces. The message that remains in the minds of the population, in other words, is increasingly negative with regard to Europeanization. And this, together with the continued exaggerations of "Fleet Street"—with its specious headlines heralding the EU banning of curved bananas and square gin bottles—ensures that a growing

portion of the British public is questioning whether being in the EU is any good at all.

Any new government, therefore, would have to be certain to renew the national political discourse, recreating a vision of how Britain in Europe and the world is or ought to be that will help it make the case for entry, or not, into the EMU. The Tory government was increasingly held hostage by the Euroskeptics, making such a renewal in the discourse unlikely, and the characteristic ambivalence with regard to the EU was certain only to continue had they been reelected, with possibly disastrous results as the time for a decision about the EMU drew near. Moreover, its neoliberalism had been wearing thin; people began to wonder if the public sector doing less and the private sector doing more meant accepting that the trains run late and the hospitals have no beds when they need them. For a newly elected Labor government, which renewed its own party's discourse in recent years by rejecting nationalization and "socialism" in favor of neoliberalism with a more human face, and which has maintained a more pro-European outlook than the Tories, the renewal of the national discourse is more likely. But it will not be very easy, given Labor's need to satisfy potentially conflicting constituencies. While "New Labor's" new conservative supporters are likely to accept monetary union but not the Social Chapter in its entirety, its old labor supporters are certain to welcome the Social Chapter but possibly not monetary union if it is seen to entail greater British sacrifices in terms of budgetary austerity and socioeconomic cutbacks, much as it has on the continent. New Labor, in other words, having renewed its own discourse in order to gain election but having left the details of its European policies quite vague, will now have to renew the national discourse as it decides whether to make Britain fully part of an integrated Europe or not. If the choice is in favor of Europe, the renewed discourse will depend for success upon its ability to reconcile the further loss of national sovereignty, especially in the macroeconomic sphere, with the greater benefits of full participation in all aspects of the EU, including greater British influence over grand strategy at the European level.

Germany: A Discourse in Need of Recasting

German governments have also been successful in sustaining a coherent national discourse that projects a convincing vision of Germany securely ensconced within an integrating Europe and a globalizing world. But that vision has remained within the confines of a postwar, liberal social-democratic discourse that in the 1990s has increasingly been fraying at the edges as a result of the economic problems related to unification and the growing pressures from globalization. As long as the German economy flourished and Germany managed to dominate European macroeconomic policy and delay adjusting national microeconomic policy, German governments found it relatively easy to reconcile their pro-European and proglobal stance with a social-democratic discourse infused with liberal market notions that served to justify the "social market" economy. But now that they are facing the loss of capacity in the socioeconomic realm, increasing deregulation in the microeconomic arena, and difficulties in meeting the strict Maastricht criteria they themselves insisted on, they are finding it much harder to maintain a social-democratic discourse that appears increasingly at odds with the neoliberal policies promoted by Europeanization and globalization. This, however, is a recent phenomenon, and it is too soon to tell whether governmental elites will be able to recast the discourse to fit the changing realities or, like France, will have to go in search of a new one.

The success of the discourse up until recently in Germany has to do with the fact that German citizens, unlike the French, have benefited not only from more dialogue, as have the British, but also more concertation on all aspects of European integration. German citizens tend to have fewer limits to access, not only because of the federal system that guarantees the *Länder* a role in supranational decision-making, but also because of the social concertation process that ensures greater access to supranational decision-making by citizens organized in unions that negotiate as equals with management and government (although other groups may still feel left out, e.g., consumers, women, immigrants, and the unemployed).

Despite all this, however, criticism of the EU or the EMU has been no more prevalent in Germany than in France, although there

has been less of a taboo since most have felt that the country has had significant control over a process that so far has had minimal economic or institutional impact. Before June 1997 and the fallout from the French elections and Finance Minister Theo Waigel's attempt to use the revaluation of the gold reserves to help Germany meet the Maastricht criteria, only one major politician—albeit the leader of the opposition and the most likely future challenger to Kohl, Gerhard Schröder—had the temerity to question the EMU.

A taboo is in effect, however, with regard to unification when it comes to assigning blame for the necessary belt-tightening and economic adjustments. Despite tacit acknowledgment of its impact on German economic, political, and social life, the most any major politician is willing to say publicly is that mistakes were made in the unification process, especially with regard to the exchange value of the mark. There appears to be little or no middle ground between accepting unification without question or opposing it—with the latter unimaginable to any except the most unreconstructed former communist or the most right-wing extremist. Controversy has arisen over who should pay the costs, for example, with the federal government having been forced to shoulder a larger burden in response to protest by some *Länder* over fiscal solidarity issues (i.e., revenue sharing between richer and poorer states), and concerns have been raised about the high levels of unemployment and the high social costs in the East; but no one takes that next step and blames the current economic crisis on unification. Instead, all discussion of the problems confronting Germany today focus on globalization. But this is not to say that the traditionally proglobal stance has turned antiglobal, only that globalization is now used in Germany the way Europeanization has been used in France, as an incitement to change and an excuse for it.

By using globalization as the reason for change, Germany does manage to avoid some of the worst problems of France, with its pro-European rhetoric, and of Great Britain, with its anti-European rhetoric, since both rhetorics risk jeopardizing their countries' commitment to further integration. The danger for Germany is that globalization alone may not be enough to convince the public of the need for neoliberal belt-tightening and that it could

be seen more as an external menace to be resisted rather than only one of a set of forces—internal forces related to unification and changing demographics as well as external forces related also to Europeanization—that demand reform of the social security and jobs system if the country is to remain competitive.

Gaining acceptance of such reforms is no easy task, however, since it requires a recasting of the national discourse. The postwar liberal social-democratic discourse as it now stands cannot serve to justify changes that emphasize the liberal to the detriment of the social in the social market economy. And in Germany, where the discourse cannot be instituted from the top down, as it sometimes appears to be in France, any change requires agreement from all the major parties to the consensus. Among mainstream politicians, this has already occurred, with a striking level of congruity in analysis across the political spectrum. Members of the opposition as much as of the majority coalition all say much the same thing about the need for pension and tax reform, although they may differ somewhat on the details of reform. This kind of consensus has been a harder sell for the social partners, however.

German business has for the most part gone a lot farther than most mainstream politicians in embracing the need for reform, and it has been engaged in much more neoliberal posturing than any politicians other than those of the small Free Democrat Party (FDP). Employers are more willing to push for changes that seem to break with the traditional arrangements, whether in the case of labor-management relations, where many supported the law reducing sick pay only to back off after strong union reaction, or in business relations, where some have launched hostile takeover bids (e.g., Krupp for Thyssen in March 1997) only to capitulate to political pressures for a merger instead. Some employers have even quit the employers' associations, unhappy with the persistence of sectorwide wage bargaining that ends in too-generous packages (in their view).

In response to business, German workers have engaged in job action and strikes while agreeing to a certain number of concessions, with the focus being jobs in place of higher wages. Although the bargaining is now much more conflictual, it continues to lead to compromises that leave both sides more or less satisfied. The sick-pay controversy was a case in point: The unions and social-

democratic politicians claimed a symbolic victory, given that no employers ultimately used the law in the collective bargaining process. But once Daimler-Benz backed off in the face of strikes, employers and liberal-democratic politicians saw successful adjustment in that most firms have recalculated the formula for sick pay such that workers now receive more like 80 percent of what they did previously by getting 100 percent of base pay, without overtime.

This suggests that the greater neoliberal pressure brought to bear by employers has so far represented a productive way of breaking the impasse, making it possible for them to push the competitive state forward just as in the past labor's socialist threats had helped advance the welfare state. Many, in fact, see neoliberalism as a useful tool not so much to break the corporatist set of relations but rather to move Germany forward into a new, more neoliberal but still corporatist set of relations—a wake-up call, so to speak, that if change does not occur from within, it will be imposed from without and then will not be nearly as consensually managed. The only danger is that with the increasingly confrontational stance of both labor and management, the disagreements that have so far been successfully resolved through compromise will the next time precipitate a break in the consensus, with a sustained period of labor unrest to follow. But even if this does not occur, the high level of unemployment remains a matter of concern, since the consensus between employers and labor that keeps wages and benefits more or less steady for those with jobs leaves a large number of people outside, with little hope of getting back in. This is where the malaise is greatest and the risk of growth of right-wing extremism a reality.

The questions for Germany, then, are twofold. First, will the consensus continue? For most German politicians, this is not a serious question; they insist that, whatever the problems and the current malaise, the German social partnership and the consensual style of policy-making will continue, because everything—institutions, laws, culture, and politics—conspires to make this so.[21] Second, if the consensus does continue, will it enable the country to make the necessary economic adjustments quickly enough, or will maintaining the social partnership mean simply managing decline consensually? Most top politicians agree that this is a

danger but are nevertheless confident that the country will be able to respond in good time, stemming the decline in investment and innovation while increasing productivity and wage flexibility. For this, however, the country needs not only to make up its delays in economic adjustment and institutional adaptation but also to re-cast its discourse to justify the more liberal turn in the economy and institutions, emphasizing the liberal while downgrading the social in its liberal social-democratic discourse. And none of this will be easy.

CONCLUSION

Of the three largest European member-states, then, France has experienced the greatest economic adjustment, moving from a largely state-directed economy to a more market-oriented one and embracing European integration as protection against the forces of globalization. Germany and Great Britain, by comparison, have experienced little Europe-spurred economic adjustment: Germany has been able to embrace both globalization and Europeanization without the same needs for protection, given an economy that has led Europe and the world until very recently, and Great Britain has preferred globalization over Europeanization for protection, there-fore limiting its exposure to European macro- and microeconomic imperatives, although it has nevertheless changed a great deal more than Germany as a result of nationally driven, liberalizing reforms.

Similarly, of the three countries, France has undergone the most significant institutional adaptation, weakened in its unitary struc-ture by the loss of executive authority and legislative power and the gain in judicial and subnational independence; undermined in its statist policy-making process by diminished government au-tonomy in formulation and flexibility in implementation; and dis-advantaged in EU decision-making by its more conflictual culture. Again, Germany and Great Britain have by comparison undergone minimal Europe-instigated institutional adaptation. Germany's federal structure has always had a weak executive, strong legisla-ture, and independent subnational authorities and judiciary; its corporatist policy-making process never had as much governmen-tal autonomy and retained most of its flexibility; and its consen-

sual decision-making culture better matches the European. Great Britain's unitary structure has always been weaker than the French due to a more limited executive authority, stronger legislature, and more independent judiciary; its statist policy-making process has had less governmental autonomy and therefore lost less, though it has lost as much flexibility; and its conflictual decision-making culture nevertheless achieves greater consensus than the French.

Finally, France has had the most ideational difficulty, given its inability since the mid-1980s to develop a coherent discourse that goes beyond its pro-European, antiglobal rhetoric to project a credible vision of a modern France in Europe and the world. Here, too, Germany and Great Britain have had fewer problems constructing a discourse—Germany, because its postwar liberal social-democratic discourse, which has remained both pro-European and proglobal, has survived almost intact until the current strains from unification and globalization, and Great Britain, because its Thatcherite neoliberal discourse, which has been proglobal in stance and anti-European in rhetoric, has managed until now to project a credible vision of Great Britain in and out of Europe while fully in the world.

For France, the successful reform of its economy and institutions, absent a credible discourse capable of reconciling its commitment to social solidarity with its neoliberal reforms, has already precipitated a crisis in the polity. Although Germany and Great Britain have been more successful at maintaining coherent discourses in the face of European integration, both face problems in the coming years in light of the continued pressures on economies and institutions. Great Britain, confronted in particular with decisions on deepening its commitment to Europe, is finding it increasingly difficult to balance successfully its proglobal stance with its anti-European rhetoric. Germany, no longer able to put off neoliberal economic adjustment given the pressures from unification and globalization or to accommodate institutional adaptation within the confines of its postwar consensual system, is also experiencing problems with its traditional discourse in the face of neoliberal economic reform and the downsizing of the welfare state.

Economic adjustment and institutional adaptation, then, are not enough to ensure the progress of European integration. Ideational

reconstruction is equally necessary. For Germany, this means recasting its liberal social-democratic discourse to reflect a more liberal emphasis; for Britain, this entails renewing its neoliberal discourse to reflect its new commitments; and for France, this requires finding a new discourse to reconcile its conflicting commitments.

ENDNOTES

[1]See Vivien A. Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," *Dædalus* 124 (2) (Spring 1995): 75–106.

[2]See Vivien Schmidt, *From State to Market? The Transformation of French Business and Government* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[3]See Kathleen R. McNamara, "Consensus and Constraint: The Politics of Monetary Cooperation in Europe," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1995, chap. 6.

[4]Josef Esser, "Germany: The Old Policy Style," in Jack Hayward, ed., *Industrial Enterprise and European Integration: From National to International Champions in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[5]Wynn Grant, "Great Britain: The Spectator State," in Hayward, ed., *Industrial Enterprise and European Integration.*

[6]On multi-level governance, see Gary Marks, Liesbeth Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, "European Integration since the 1980s: State-Centric versus Multi-Level Governance," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34 (3) (1996); on governance networks, see Beate Kohler-Koch, "Catching up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in the European Union," *Journal of European Public Policy* 3 (3) (September 1996).

[7]See Vivien Schmidt, "European Integration and Democracy: The Differences among Member States," *Journal of European Public Policy* 4 (1) (March 1997).

[8]See Georges Burdeau, *L'Etat* (Paris: Seuil, 1970); Kenneth J. F. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); and the discussion in Schmidt, *From State to Market?*, 20–21, 337.

[9]See Alec Stone, *The Birth of Judicial Politics: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[10]See Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32 (1) (March 1994).

[11]See Vivien A. Schmidt, *Democratizing France: The Political and Administrative History of Decentralization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[12]Vivien A. Schmidt, "Loosening the Ties that Bind: The Impact of European Integration on French Government and its Relationship to Business," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34 (2) (June 1996).

[13]See Dyson, *State Tradition.*

[14]Wolfgang Streeck, "Public Power beyond the Nation-State: The Case of the European Community," in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 311–313.

[15]See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Democratic Governance* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 82–83.

[16]For the progressive change in socialist plans and rhetoric from the 1970s to the early 1980s, see Schmidt, *From State to Market?*, 96–106.

[17]See Emmanuel Godin, "Le Néo-Libéralisme à la Française: Une Exception?" *Modern and Contemporary France* NS4 (1) (1996).

[18]See Vivien A. Schmidt, "Economic Policy, Political Discourse, and Democracy in France," *French Politics and Society* 15 (2) (Spring 1997).

[19]Ibid. For an excellent set of discussions of the strikes, see "The 1995 Strikes— Something New or Déjà Vu?" *French Politics and Society* 14 (1) (Winter 1996).

[20]Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, "Executive Power in the European Union: The Functions and Limits of the Council of Ministers," *Journal of European Public Policy* 2 (1995).

[21]The general view in interviews with the author of over a dozen top German politicians in January-February 1997.

Dominique Schnapper

The European Debate on Citizenship

UROPE INVENTED THE IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP, and Europe is the
birthplace of the nation-state. Yet today, for some reasons
that are common to all Western democracies and others
that are specific to Europe, national political citizenship or "clas-
sical" citizenship is "devalued," to use the expression of an Ameri-
can author.[1] This fuels a debate that is as political as it is philo-
sophical in nature.

In fact, European nation-states are weakened as much by the
construction of the European Community (EC) at the supranational
level as they are by the reemergence of identities within each
nation, a phenomenon that is reinforced by increasingly powerful
regional institutions in all European countries. In 1949 Germany
was already organized into regional states (*Länder*) with a weak
central power. By 1982, even the nation with the most centralized
political tradition—France—had adopted decentralization mea-
sures and increased the power of local communities. In the United
Kingdom, Scottish and Welsh identities reassert themselves, and
claims for autonomy, if not outright independence, are being voiced
with renewed strength. One must also consider the *de facto* breakup
of Belgium, the division of Czechoslovakia into two sovereign
states, and the separatist movements in northern Italy.

Besides these political reasons, modern democratic societies fol-
low the same direction in their internal evolution. The increasing
value placed on the economic and social dimension of public life as
well as the greater emphasis on self-interest and the pleasure of the

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individual, stemming from a productivist and hedonistic logic, tend to weaken political relationships and the sense of civic spirit. The justification for the modern state seems to lie more in its efficiency in providing for the material well-being of the people through production and transfers of the welfare state than in ensuring the freedom of its citizens and their equal participation in political life. The mercantilist logic prevails at the expense of the civic logic. Individuals give greater importance to the material benefits of the social organization than to their rights and responsibilities as citizens.

This general evolution is reinforced by factors that are specifically European. On the one hand, the welfare state plays a more important role in Europe than in any other region of the world. On the other hand, the fall of the Berlin Wall, built at the center of the European continent, had a far more direct impact on public life. Until 1989 Europeans had kept their common political objectives to a bare minimum: they were not willing to experience a communist regime under the control of a Soviet army that was present at two stages of the Tour de France, to refer to an old expression of General de Gaulle's. Since 1989 the feeling of an exterior threat has vanished, but one knows that being confronted with a common danger has always been a powerful means of integration. Finally, in the context of depoliticized societies, the social and political effects of an economic crisis—or mutation— that has persisted for the past twenty years should not be underestimated, since it has affected European countries more than other industrialized nations. This crisis fuels unemployment and creates divisions and competition among social groups; it leads to an increasingly large number of people being excluded from public life because they no longer seem to have any social utility; it furthers the development of extreme political parties; and it contributes to the weakening of the social and political bond.[2]

As a last weakening factor, many view the permanent settlement of foreign-born populations or those of foreign origin—especially when they appear, rightly or wrongly, more interested in preserving their original characteristics than in becoming integrated into the nation's life—as a threat to the cultural homogeneity, which is considered a condition of political unity in the classical nation-state. More than twenty million foreigners settled in Europe be-

tween 1950 and 1970. With the notable exception of France, which has long been a destination for immigrants, this is a new experience for European countries that until then had "exported" rather than "imported" people throughout the world. In Europe, the idea of immigration is not part of the national reality or national myth, as is the case in the United States or Australia. Although migrations have always taken place, massive immigration seems to call into question a long tradition of settlement and cultural unity of the national society.[3] Muslim culture, in particular, is often considered incompatible with common values. Modern societies have open borders; as a result, noncitizen foreigners who are culturally different (or perceived as such) inevitably become more numerous in the national territory, to the point where many wonder if their presence does not call into question the practice of democracy in the European nation-state—a practice that is based on the proclaimed coincidence between the cultural homogeneity of the populations and the universal character of citizenship.

NATIONAL POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

Today, the very word "citizen" is so often used for all purposes that it has become trite. Moreover, it has different connotations in different national traditions. For these reasons, it is useful to define here what is meant by national citizenship (often called "classical" citizenship), to which we refer so frequently, in order to better affirm its devaluation. Citizenship is not an essence but a historical construction.

   The classical democratic nation-state, which was born in England and whose principles were proclaimed by both the American and French Revolutions, based its legitimacy on the idea of the citizen; it is defined by a number of rights and responsibilities that are guaranteed and sanctioned by law. All citizens enjoy the same rights and must fulfill the same obligations and abide by the same laws, without regard to race as it is socially perceived, gender, affiliation to a specific historical or "ethnic" group, religion, or social or economic characteristics. Whatever church they belong to, whatever region or nation they came from, however rich or poor—they are all citizens equally. The democratic goal is univer-

sal, not only because it concerns all those gathered in the same nation—societies defined by anthropologists as "plural" are opposed to the idea of a modern democratic society—but also because the use of politics to transcend particularisms of any kind, which is the principle of citizenship, can theoretically be adopted by any society. Universality is the ultimate aim of the ideology, postulated by individuals, of liberty and equality; these are the founding values of the modern democratic idea.

The political dimension is clearly paramount: citizenship defines a set of mutual rights and obligations within the nation-state's society. "Citizens rightfully demand that the state respect their rights, because the state rightfully demands from citizens that they fulfill certain obligations."[4] Inasmuch as citizenship is defined in political terms, it is necessarily unique, for loyalty cannot be split. Obligations towards the homeland must prevail over the relationships and affinities that citizens inevitably develop with other nations or historical communities. Examples of double nationality, though unavoidable in real life, should only represent marginal cases.

Citizenship is closely linked to human rights. Yet the very idea of human rights covers two fundamentally different concepts. The first, "liberty rights," guarantees the rights of citizens against the power of the state by ensuring their freedom to think, speak, meet, work, or trade—rights that are summarized in Article 9 of the French Constitution of 1791: "The law shall protect public and individual liberty against the oppression of those who govern." The second concept, "claim rights," defines the rights of individuals to receive services from the state: the right to a job, material well-being, education, time off, etc. In contrast to the former, these rights imply state intervention to benefit the individual.[5]

In the "classical" view, claim rights—the meaning and value of which are not disputed—are considered as conditions for the exercise of liberty rights or citizenship. It is clear that citizenship itself has evolved over the past two centuries as the emphasis was increasingly placed on claim rights. This was established progressively: as a result of measures taken after the revolutions of 1848, through labor protection laws at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the construction of the welfare state after World War II, and, finally, by the laws of the EC. But in the classical

conception, social and economic rights are not on the same order as political rights, which define the essence of the citizenship idea.

THE DEBATE

If citizenship defined as classical is indeed devalued, what should citizenship be today? This is more than a theoretical question, for it leads to two concrete political problems that have been the subject of impassioned debate at the national level as well as in European institutions. How can laws of nationality be made to evolve? What policy should be adopted for the numerous noncitizens who have settled permanently? Should the laws on nationality be changed to be more open to legally settled foreign residents? Or, without granting them citizenship, should they be given political rights at the local or national level? Through the debate on nationality laws, which have actually been changed over the past decade in most European countries (i.e., Great Britain, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France), and discussions on the political rights of foreigners, what is also being questioned in an implicit and explicit manner is the meaning of citizenship and nation, their evolution, and the social philosophy behind this evolution.

The debate is organized around three answers to these questions. The first answer consists of acknowledging the decline of political citizenship and replacing it with the "new citizenship," essentially economic and social in nature. The second involves establishing a postnational, hence European, political citizenship founded on human rights principles. The third answer is to rethink the national political citizenship, which, in light of modern developments, represents an unsurpassable principle of the organization and legitimacy of the democratic political order. As is often the case in the social sciences, proponents of these three positions combine situation analysis with justification or militancy. The debate is simultaneously scientific and political.[6]

The "New Citizenship"

Theorists of the "new citizenship" strongly criticize the notion of citizenship in its classical definition on the basis of both fact and value. They note that it is devalued yet at the same time consider

this a welcome evolution. In their view, its devaluation is both positive and desirable; classical citizenship should be replaced by a new conception of citizenship, of an economic and social nature, that will become the basis of a new democratic practice, defined as "participatory." After stating the facts, they go on to enunciate a political norm. These analyses are made from two different viewpoints, but they both lead to a redefined notion of citizenship: some theorists start with a reflection on the creation of a new legal code by EC institutions;[7] others focus instead on the new opportunity created by the permanent presence of foreign-born populations who would like to be "citizens in a different way." Both groups concur in suggesting a new conception of citizenship that would be in the making at the European level. For them, citizenship can no longer only be defined by a set of liberty rights, the political definition; it must incorporate claim rights, or more specifically, economic and social rights—claim rights that have become the actual political rights.

The Multiple Citizenship of European Citizens. I will borrow the arguments for this position, essentially, from Elizabeth Meehan. In her view, the distinction between citizens and noncitizens is from now on socially less significant and less meaningful for the fate of individuals than the distinction separating citizens and, on the one hand, legally settled foreigners who enjoy the right to stay and work and benefit from social protection—those Tomas Hammar calls denizens[8]—and, on the other hand, foreigners in a precarious or even illegal situation. What has become important in the life of the community is economic and social participation. True membership in the community is no longer defined by political participation but by economic activity.

The purely political nature of citizenship has been linked to the time when nationalism and nation-states were established. In the nineteenth century the national states' new citizens were freed from the bonds inherited from a feudal society that had become obsolete; likewise, the construction of Europe today is liberating economic actors from the restrictions imposed by national borders and from legislations dating back to the era of nations and nationalism.[9] National citizenship no longer provides legal status and rights by itself; European institutions today are building a new citizenship. The link between nation-state and citizenship, despite

its historical nature, is not necessary, and citizenship can be exercised at a different level.

To think that economic and social rights are simply the condition necessary to exercise political citizenship is to continue thinking in terms of the classical citizenship. In fact, these rights represent the basis of the "new citizenship," in that their impact also affects the political status of the individuals. European institutions develop primarily social law: they define the status of the "salaried employee" and the rights attached to it; they guarantee the right to work, the social rights of immigrants, and gender equality. Thus they give European citizens and foreigners legally settled in the European space a strictly political status, as rights, practices, and loyalties are expressed from now on at the European level politically. EC law is about to create a specific citizenship founded on a conception of solidarity and social justice that is common to all Europeans. The national state undoubtedly remains the only authority that can confer the status of European citizen through nationality law. But European citizens can take their case to the European Court of Justice, eventually arguing against their own national state—which has sometimes actually been sentenced by the Court to defend the rights of European citizens against their own national state. There is now a European as well as a national citizenship.

According to Meehan, this new citizenship is the very product of EC history. By its own logic, the constitution of economic unity led to political unity: lower customs duties led to a common market, and necessarily to a common currency, a common economic policy, hence to a common political power, and so on. Transnational economic interest groups are being formed that are acting in the same direction. The Maastricht Treaty represents yet another step since it gives local political rights to all Europeans, establishes the principle of a uniform voting system, and provides the right to petition. From now on, Europe and the regions—and no longer the national state—deal with problems of poverty, unemployment, education, urban and rural renewal, and gender equality. A regions committee of the European Parliament will now be able to grant regions "a legitimate right to self-determination." Multiple identities are arising, as well as a number of various rights and obligations that are expressed through an increasing

number of institutions. This is the beginning of a new configura-
tion in which national, regional, and European political authori-
ties combine with transnational interest groups in a complex man-
ner. The new citizenship emerging through these measures, institu-
tions, and actions is no longer national or even cosmopolitan, but
multiple.

The Residency-Citizenship of Foreigners. Experts studying for-
eign-born populations are more radical in their criticisms of the
classical citizenship. Their main argument is that citizenship de-
fined as classical represents a principle of exclusion of noncitizens,
and of inequality between citizens and noncitizens, that has be-
come unbearable given the values of modern democracies. This is
indeed demonstrated by the fact that European countries did not
dare expel guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) despite terms in their
contract that allowed them to do so: it was actually felt that from
then on they were part of the society they lived in.[10] All the
consequences of this evolution need to be considered. Giving the
right to reside and guaranteeing civil, economic, and social rights
without granting the right to vote and to participate in political
life, in the narrow sense of the word, means creating second-class
citizens who, unlike others, cannot defend their rights and inter-
ests through political action. Principles of equality and liberty
must apply to all, foreigners included. How can we justify their
exclusion from full citizenship and the resulting discrimination
they experience?

Expanding citizenship, and hence the right to vote, to foreigners
would simply mean extending the history of suffrage law. After
adopting a restrictive definition of citizen at the end of the eigh-
teenth century—limited to men, property owners, and heads of
households—citizenship was granted in time to those with no
property, servants, and beggars (who were excluded at first for
being nonautonomous and nonresponsible), then to women, young
people, and even, according to B. S. Turner, to nature and the
environment.[11] Granting citizenship to foreigners would be com-
pleting the last stage in the potentially universal vocation of mod-
ern citizenship.

The political consequence of these analyses is that nationality
should be separated from the exercise of citizenship; the nation-
state era was characterized by the confusion of the two. *De facto*

participation in a society is by itself sufficient to confer citizenship, and individuals become integrated from the moment they arrive. How can we demand more from them than what is needed to make living in a given society possible? It is unworthy of a true democracy to set conditions for obtaining citizenship for those who aspire to it. An individual born or who arrived at a young age in a given society must automatically be entitled to become a citizen, as should those who have resided in the country for more than five years, even illegally, because they have in fact participated in the society. Any condition set for the acquisition of nationality, in particular if it relates to cultural assimilation or the desire to participate in a historical-political community, is unjustified.

Therefore, residency alone should give one the right to citizenship, to the exclusion of any other requirement for conformity or volition. As Joseph Carens wrote, "I want to propose as a principle that people have a moral right to be citizens of any society of which they are members."[12]

Applicants for naturalization should be obliged only to provide proof of their residency for five years on national soil.[13] In all cases, the banning of double or multiple nationality should be lifted. Acquiring nationality should be one of the means of integration, not the consecration of this process.

> Foreigners have progressively won, not without struggling, almost complete juridical equality in the civil and social arena. As a result, civic rights appeared as the ultimate sign of discrimination separating the French from immigrants. Globally equal on all other counts, they remain unequal on one particular point: citizenship, around which nationality still raises a barrier whose existence has become problematic, since it represents an obstacle to the equality and freedom of those present in its territory. . . . That is why it is now appropriate to substitute residency for nationality as the foundation of citizenship.[14]

The most extreme expression of this idea is articulated by those who believe that the very term "citizen," with its purely political connotation, no longer carries any meaning and that the real social actor is the "taxpayer" or "user." Since they pay taxes, foreigners are entitled to nationality.

Thus new proposals might emerge such as a resident right based on the actual act of living and working in a society, which would progressively be substituted for the notion of citizenship, as a body of rights and obligations dependent on a territory or a state. . .or the suggestion that the definition of "the new citizenship" progressively replaces the vague concept of citizen with the more precise notion of taxpayer, and even better, of user. . . . Is not the presence of a large population of immigrants and second-generation children leading to an emerging new conception of citizenship, pertaining to the existence of minority ethnic communities settled in a pluralist society in the making? A citizenship that is unrelated to territory, granted to residents and not only to nationals or based on the notion of acquired rights. A resident right that would be substituted for the aged conception of citizenship and that would desacralize the idea of "nationality." Accordingly, some suggest replacing the vague concept of "citizen" with the more precise notion of responsible users able to assert their rights."[15]

The law would thus help establish the decline of political citizenship.

Meehan shows that a new conception of citizenship is being elaborated, which is no longer based on the juridical and political relationship between individuals and the state in the traditional sense of the word but instead founded on a set of social values and practices established and guaranteed by EC institutions, and particularly on case law from the European Court of Justice. As for residency-citizenship theorists, they conclude even more strongly in favor of a functional idea of citizenship. Despite their differences, which should not be underestimated, these two positions are based on a conception of society that tends to exclude the idea of historical and political community in favor of an organization of production and wealth redistribution based on common values. Partners are no longer related by a contract of a political nature but by their common participation in the social and economic life. From this viewpoint, the welfare state merges with political society and defines itself outside of any political dimension. The classical distinction made since antiquity between *ethnos* (concrete society) and *demos* (political society conscious of itself) tends to fade.

Postnational Political Citizenship

By contrast, theorists of the postnational citizenship function within the context of a political conception: citizenship must retain all its political meaning and translate the values that are common to European democracies as expressed through their commitment to human rights. Yet they acknowledge that the sovereignty of national law is weakened not only by the development of European law but also by multiple legal allegiances due to the mobility of populations. They also take into account the fact that some foreign-born populations now wish to be "citizens in a different way," that is, to remain faithful to a culture or nationality of origin while participating in the society where they live. The political construction of Europe and the presence of stable and permanent foreign residents forces us to sever the historical link between nationality (understood as a community of culture inherited from the era of nations) and citizenship (seen as a strictly political practice).

Theorists of the postnational citizenship are concerned that this dissociation might threaten social cohesion and democratic practices and that social integration might become purely "functional" (in this regard, they disagree with theorists of the new citizenship). So they propose that this dissociation be accompanied by what Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux calls a real "citizenship contract." Citizenship rights would be granted to foreign nationals on the condition that they commit themselves to "adopting democratic values" and supporting national laws respectful of human rights. They would be otherwise free to remain attached to a particular culture, provided that the social practices of this culture are not incompatible with supranational principles of human rights.[16] More precisely, these practices should include "the respect of the person's fundamental rights (namely, nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, or religion; children's rights; and so on), a reformulated secularism, and a generalized contribution to taxes and social security."[17]

Costa-Lascoux's observations, based on her study of the participation of foreign-born populations in the life of European societies, converge with those conducted on a more philosophical level by Jürgen Habermas, wherein he develops the concept of "consti-

tutional patriotism." Against the "conventional form of national identity," which links nationality with citizenship, he argues in favor of the creation of a "constitutional patriotism," which would no longer refer "to the concrete totality of the nation but instead to abstract processes and principles."[18] Consequently, the realm of patriotism should be separated from the realm of citizenship, thus dissociating the "nation," which would remain the "realm of affectivity," from the "state," which would only become the "realm of the law." National identity, and its underlying ethnic and cultural dimensions, could therefore be separated from a civic and political participation based on reason and human rights. Thus conceived as a pure civic practice, detached from its national allegiance, constitutional patriotism would be likely to rebuild German identity on an essentially critical examination, repossessing the past as it was. Patriotic feelings would no longer be linked to Germany as a particular cultural and historical nation but rather to the very principle of the state of law.

Jean-Marc Ferry pursued this inspiration and generalized it by developing the idea of postnational identity, which would also refer exclusively to "the principles of universality, autonomy, and responsibility underlying the conceptions of democracy and the state of law."[19] From now on citizenship would be founded on "a reflexive moral identity whose principle is actually written into the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, with the right (for men) and the obligation (for citizens) to revolt against tyranny."[20] Individuals would support the principles of the state of law and republican order, with the exclusion of any reference to a territory or particular concrete historical and cultural community. Any European state would likely be able to inspire such patriotism. Thus the construction of Europe could become the forum for democratic political practices, separate from national feelings and passions.

Habermas's thinking is linked to his desire to found a historical conscience that could integrate democratic values with the national tradition, to counteract the revisionism of some German historians. He wants to create a form of democratic political organization that would be protected from national and nationalistic passions. This effort fits into the great debate among German historians over the specificity of German history and "the singu-

larity of the extermination of the Jews by the Nazi regime."[21] Yet
it is important to note that this thought is also the continuation of
an old reflection about the abusive and disquieting forms that
nationalism has often taken throughout history. Many authors
before him have tried to conceive of a form of political organiza-
tion that would make it possible to separate nationalist and cul-
tural expressions from the political organization. The Austrian-
Marxist attempt by Otto Bauer remains the most famous example:
born as a Jew in a supranational Austro-Hungarian empire torn by
its "nationalities," to quote the term used at the time, he dreamed
of a new form of political organization in which entities would
cooperate while maintaining their cultural identity and their right
to self-administration. He imagined the creation of the "United
States of Greater Austria," a confederal state "in which each
nation would manage its national affairs independently while unit-
ing into a single state for the protection of their common inter-
ests."[22] Each individual, no matter where he settled, would be free
by simple declaration to join a community of culture
(*Kulturgemeinschaft*) or "nation." Common economic and politi-
cal problems would be handled by a supra-"national" govern-
ment. Thus nationality, chosen voluntarily, would be independent
of a particular territory or state.

One is entitled to wonder, however, if it is possible to separate
national membership from a purely political allegiance. To use the
words of Habermas, democratic society implies a "communica-
tional," intersubjective "space." In simpler terms, spaces need to
exist, both in the abstract and concrete sense of the word, where
citizens, politicians, and experts can talk to each other, understand
and persuade each other, without resorting to violence in dealing
with the problems of community life and arbitrating conflicts
between individuals and groups. That implies that even if all
members do not speak in the same tongue, they at least share a
common language, culture, and values. Otherwise, how can this
space for dialogue and negotiations, which defines democratic
practice, be established?

Would a purely civic society, founded on abstract principles,
have the strength to control passions born from allegiances to
ethnic and religious groups? Up to what point can intellectual
commitment, clearly as reasonable as it is desirable, to abstract

principles—respect for human rights and the state of law, constitutional patriotism—replace, at least in the foreseeable future, the affective and political mobilization aroused by the internalization of the national political and cultural tradition? While pretending to support a universal ideology and political project, the leaders of communist states made sure to use and organize rivalries and even national and ethnic hatreds for their benefit. The abstract or concrete aspect of the nation, let alone the concrete aspect of belonging to an ethnic group, will stir people more than the purely abstract notions of class consciousness, state of law, or human rights. As Benedict Anderson humorously pointed out, "Who will willingly die for the COMECON or the EEC?"

Rethinking National Citizenship

The thinkers characterized as "republican" in France start from the idea that citizenship is an unsurpassable principle in the democratic political organization and that it is important to analyze its evolution and maintain it as the foundation of political legitimacy.[23] The meaning of citizenship and the political forms it takes may be different in the various European countries. However, the political construction of Europe above and beyond national citizenship or the evolution in forms of social life should not call into question the fundamental fact that the principle of citizenship is the basis of a political society, which should not be confounded with concrete society—that it gives a political expression to the idea of wanting to live together.

The definitions that were given of citizen and citizenship do not overlap; actually, they were often the product of conflicts and compromises between various conceptions, and their definition has evolved with time. The same proclaimed principles have been applied differently according to each country's historical traditions, and within the same country, according to the evolution of social movements and the balance of power that existed between them. The "citizen" of the 1789 revolution—man and property owner—is not the one of the 1848 revolutions that granted citizenship to workers. In both cases, the exclusion of women was self-evident. Today the application of the citizenship principle takes particular concrete forms in each liberal democracy: political institutions are different in each case. Proponents of a revised na-

tional citizenship strive to define what the essence of citizenship is, common to all democratic nations, in the 1990s and what it can be.

They keep the fundamental idea of the political definition of national citizenship. But following recent historical experience, they make it more explicit or complete it on two points: the universal vocation of a citizenship potentially open to noncitizens; and the civil, economic, and social rights granted to legally settled noncitizens.

In response to the idea of citizenship as a principle of exclusion of noncitizens, articulated by proponents of the new citizenship, they favor the idea of the exclusion/inclusion dialectic. Like any political organization that by definition includes some and excludes others, the democratic nation-state is founded on a principle of inclusion of citizens and exclusion of noncitizens.[24] It includes the former by ensuring their equal participation in political life; it excludes the latter from practices directly linked to citizenship. But openness is what characterizes modern citizenship. National inclusion, because of its political nature, is potentially open, which obviously does not prevent it from being affected by different variables such as space, time, and interest of each nation as perceived by leaders and public opinions. Defined in legal and political terms, its vocation is to be open to all foreigners who are likely to participate in the "community of citizens."[25]

This is what nationality rights represent. All national democratic states make sure that foreigners can be granted the right to enter the political community, provided that a certain number of conditions defined by law are respected. These conditions vary from state to state: American nationality law is based simply on *jus soli*; French law applies *jus soli* under certain conditions and remains the most open law in Europe; and, in contrast, Germany and Switzerland refuse to take *jus soli* into account. Concretely, rights are granted to foreign nationals who attended school (i.e., have become socially integrated) in the country and to those who have married a national. The possibility of becoming a naturalized citizen is offered to those who have lived a certain number of years in the national territory and who master the essential instruments of the common culture. The translation of these requirements into law varies, but in all cases they show that the political community is potentially open to all those who can and want to participate in it.

This does not mean that the nation amounts to a purely civic project built upon the abstraction of citizenship. Participation in a national society is concretely founded on all kinds of elements that can be called ethnic: usage of a common language (aside from exceptional cases); a common culture and particular historical memory shared by all nationals; participation in the same institutions, including the school system, workplace, and every other practice defined as strictly political. The immediate familiarity that exists between nationals, whatever other differences keep them apart, is the product of this specific socialization and the common life within a concrete national society. Individuals are naturally attached to all that constitutes their familiar environment, within which they have built their individual identity in relation to a collective identity. Each of us finds one's nation within oneself as one of the dimensions of one's own identity. In Europe, the nation is indissociably a community of culture, a place of collective memory and historical identity, and at the same time a civic project. Nevertheless, the singularity of the democratic nation compared to other forms of political organization lies in the fact that in the final analysis, the civic idea and the principle of citizenship—open in principle—must take precedence over ethnic or religious particularisms, over family or clan solidarities.

If the right to nationality remains open, theorists of the revised national citizenship criticize and reject the idea of granting the right to vote to foreigners: this would be denying the distinction between nationals and foreigners, between political society and concrete civil society, and questioning the very idea of a "community of citizens" that creates political legitimacy. Obviously, this does not preclude finding ways to consult foreigners on town policy and on all local or national measures that may concern them particularly; this is what is normally done in most European countries. Certain countries (Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland) have granted foreigners the right to vote in local elections. But none, to this day, has granted them the right to vote in national elections.

If only citizens of a democratic nation are recognized to have full political rights, all foreign-born legal residents who are noncitizens enjoy the same civil, economic, and social rights as nation-

als. This is the second characteristic of citizenship in modern democracies.

Foreigners enjoy all individual liberties, such as the freedom to come and go, to marry, to be presumed innocent when arrested by police and to be brought to justice, to take a lawyer to act in their defense, and so on. To these civil rights, add economic and social rights. Since the end of World War II, the status of foreigners in Europe has been based on the idea of their juridical assimilation with nationals in terms of salaries, labor law, and social protection. Foreign legal residents enjoy all rights directly or indirectly linked to employment. They must abide by labor laws and pay social security contributions and taxes. In return, they benefit from legislation that protects them against work injuries and sets the hours and conditions of their work. This legislation provides them with the same paid vacations, sick leave, unemployment compensation, childbearing allowances, and retirement benefits that nationals enjoy. Thus foreigners participate throughout Europe in what has been called "workplace democracy." Their rights have progressively been expanded, and they can participate in the directing boards of associations or create associations themselves. All legislation on foreigners' social rights was established by European law in the 1960s. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Justice would condemn any state whose practices did not conform to the principle of equality of civil, economic, and social rights for all—encompassing nationals and foreign legal residents.

This legislation affirming the equality of civil, economic, and social rights is indeed based on the fundamental and universal idea that there are rights of men as human beings, which underlie and go beyond the citizen rights resulting from their participation in a particular political organization. Foreigners cannot be denied these rights; why would a foreigner be less of a human being than a national? Respecting the rights of foreigners as human beings reasserts the values around which modern democracies were built, even if they always risk betraying the values they claim to be founded upon. Citizen rights cannot be confounded with human rights, but without human rights, there could truly be no citizen rights. Moreover, without citizen rights, human rights do not have

much real meaning, as was tragically demonstrated by the experience of the Jews during the war.

The classical definition of citizenship in the nation-state has now been revised and completed by the conception of economic and social rights, established by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But in the minds of thinkers referred to as "republican," it must still be founded on the distinction between the citizen and the concrete individual. Its definition must be deduced from the Hegelian distinction, referred to by Marx in *The Jewish Question*, between the member of a civil society (*Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), or the economic actor, and the citizen, who participates in the universal state through elections. Allegiance to a political community must by nature remain distinct from participation in the concrete society. Nationality law must remain open beyond ethnic, religious, or cultural differences but should be checked by requirements of a civic nature. Multinational citizenship should only concern marginal groups, for the loyalty to a political organization cannot be split; a double or triple allegiance would always inevitably lead to a loyalty conflict.

For proponents of this interpretation, economic and social rights are not of the same nature as political rights. Social protection, in the broad sense of the term, is a consequence, postponed in time, of the very principle of political citizenship: based on the idea of equal dignity of all citizens, society must ensure for each of its members the dignity of their practical conditions of existence, so that they can really exercise their rights as citizens. Claim rights are first and foremost the conditions for exercising liberty rights or political rights.

In this conception, citizenship must today remain both a principle of legitimacy and a source of social bonds, because it is the only one to conform to the characteristics and requirements of modern democratic society. It is not only in immigration countries that citizenship has become "an ideological substitute to traditional community solidarities"[26] and that it transcends diversities, providing a common ground for all. All democratic societies are multicultural, even those that consider themselves most deeply rooted. Citizenship integrates populations otherwise divided by their different ethnic, religious, and cultural origins. The presence in Europe of foreign-born populations, despite their numbers,

must not call into question this principle of legitimacy. The possibility of citizenship must therefore be open to newcomers, but not too much; otherwise it would cease to create a concrete link between members of the society. Political citizenship must remain the foundation of the social bond, even when forms of ethnicity resulting from a long history, or conversely from a recent settlement, continue to exist. In modern democracy, living together means being citizens together. However, the juridical and abstract nature of this bond always tends to be insufficient to unite human beings. Not everyone can become a citizen without the condition of a minimal commitment to common values and practices. A democratic nation cannot be of a purely civic nature.

Proponents of the classical or political citizenship tend to point out that, for the time being, there is actually no European citizenship existing independently from national citizenship: what confers European citizenship is being a French or German citizen. Even if the EC grants throughout its entire territory the same economic and social rights to citizens of the nations it includes as to legally settled foreigners, political citizenship of individuals cannot be assumed from the fact that they enjoy these civil and social rights. Political rights that are granted to foreigners after a given length of stay in certain countries only concern political life at the local level. Besides, European elections currently carry a political significance that is primarily national in nature.

These analyses do not necessarily lead to hostility towards the construction of Europe. But some who wish to see the construction of Europe get underway fear that the civic principle will be lost in it and that the ensuing depolitization will weaken the political will of Europeans. For them, the creation of a truly European citizenship would imply that a European public realm first be established in which individuals would consider themselves full-fledged citizens. Citizens of Europe would need to consider the representatives they elect at the European level as their legitimate leaders, whose decisions they accept. A political arena common to all European citizens would be needed, organized around European stakes, debates, and institutions. Even those who view this as a desirable objective acknowledge that it is far from becoming reality, and they question the possibility of realizing it in the foreseeable future.

This position is severely criticized, particularly in European institutions. Its supporters are accused of not taking into account the actual evolution of democratic societies, and of justifying a utopia that has become inefficient and consequently dangerous. By refusing to acknowledge by law the actual evolution of increasingly open societies, this too-narrow and too-classical conception of citizenship—essentially linked to the French experience—would not be sufficient for integrating foreign-born populations. Should we not plan better and therefore control the concrete evolutions of societies, as well as the actual construction of the European entity currently underway? How could classical citizenship have a concrete effect if the very notion of citizenship no longer means anything to individuals? Is not insisting on the difficulties of building Europe betraying the reality of these evolutions and at the same time making them even more difficult?

QUESTIONS

There is obviously no conclusion to this debate. My personal opinion appeared clearly in the preceding lines, and I would like to reiterate just two points.

It is true that the principle of citizenship does not necessarily translate at the nation-state level and that the confusion of citizenship and nationality—in the double meaning of cultural community and juridical bond—was linked to the era of nationalisms and to the social philosophy of the nation-states it generated. The link between nation and citizenship is not logical but historical.

However, the historical fact that citizenship practices have until now always been exercised at the national level cannot be discounted as unimportant or without significance. Human societies are never *tabulae rasae*. Citizens of European countries vote in order to elect national representatives. All political institutions—voting system, organization of political parties and pressure groups, parliamentary practices, forms in which local democracy is exercised; in short, everything that makes the principle of citizenship concretely real—have always been and remain for the time being national institutions. Elections are still called to decide on national political stakes, even those organized to choose representatives to the European Parliament. Decisions and constraints imposed by

national institutions are still what European citizens view as legitimate (consider, for example, the passionate reactions to "Brussels"). European citizenship cannot be built by denying the past. Admittedly, citizenship can be exercised at the level of the EC as well as of nation-states or regions. The nation is no more natural or artificial than the region or Europe; they are all historical constructions. If one favors the creation of a new political entity at the European level, one must build it. However, it is important to remember that decades and even centuries were needed to build a legitimate national public domain. The tradition must be made to evolve—by definition, tradition gets reinterpreted by each generation—but neither its existence nor its importance should be denied.

This is, I am afraid, the risk behind the ideas of the proponents of the postnational citizenship. The question is whether the latter—most often, philosophers or legal experts—like the French Revolutionaries of the early years, tend to underestimate not only the ethnic realities of any concrete society but above all the necessity to integrate these ethnic realities in the concrete political organization, even the one calling on the principle of citizenship. No society can exist as a purely civic entity. Is it not somewhat utopian to think that, in the near future, a political will can exist that would be dictated only by convictions founded on abstract reason, as proposed by theorists of the postnational citizenship, however respectable and even desirable their suggestions might be? Can we conceive of a form of politics that would not spring from the specific values, traditions, and institutions that define a political nation? Every organized, democratic society indissolubly carries ethnic elements—cultural, historical, and nationalist—as well as a civic principle. The political organization cannot fail to respond to what Elias calls "the affective desire of human society." Yet, as he himself remarked, "the emotional tonality of the identity of 'we' weakens considerably as soon as forms of postnational integration come into play."[27]

My personal criticisms towards the proponents of "the new citizenship" raise other questions. Human societies, even democratic ones, even modern or "postmodern" ones, cannot afford to reject the strictly political dimension. They cannot be reduced to material interests only. If it were so, there would not be any

legitimate institution to control the inevitable racial or religious ethnic passions of human beings, to enforce arbitrations between the interests of individuals and groups that are divergent or opposite by nature, and to channel all energies against an external threat. Whatever the level at which it exists, a place is needed where the political space can materialize—the space for choices, arbitrations, obligations, and the desire to exist—for institutions to ensure the exercise of the principle of citizenship. A place is needed where individuals can believe that the leaders they elected represent them adequately. Institutions are needed whose decisions, and the obligations that necessarily go with them, are considered legitimate and are therefore accepted by citizens.

The construction of Europe will not occur simply as the result of economic cooperation and an extension of social welfare. The historical and political community does not result from actual participation in civil society, as theorists of the postnational citizenship well understood. To define political society as the simple effect of the economy is to retain a rough idea of Marxism. Law is not derived from fact; the political does not boil down to the economic.

Translated by Mireille M. Dedios

ENDNOTES

[1]Peter H. Schuck in William R. Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989), 51ff.

[2]The title given by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. to his essay on the United States, *The Disuniting of America* (Knoxville, Tenn.: Whittle Direct Books, 1991), finds an echo in a series of European publications. In France, references to the "social fracture" abound; in Great Britain, numerous books refer to the "divided Britain."

[3]A large immigration country such as the United States has not been shielded from nativist reactions. Massive immigration always appears as constituting a threat to national unity.

[4]Raymond Aron, "Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?" *Social Research* XLI (4) (1974): 640.

[5]For this analysis, see Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *Philosophie politique 3: Des droits de l'homme à l'idée républicaine* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1985).

[6]What is described here is not a complete analysis of all the various texts written on the subject, but an ideal-typical interpretation of the three positions based on a few significant works.

[7]Elizabeth Meehan, "Citizenship and the European Community," *Political Quarterly* (April-June 1993): 172–186.

[8]Tomas Hammar, "State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship," in Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, 83.

[9]Dahrendorf, cited by Meehan, "Citizenship and the European Community," 179.

[10]William B. Brubaker, "Introduction," in Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, 19.

[11]B. S. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992).

[12]Joseph Carens, "Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States," in Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, 32.

[13]Since 1985, the right to participate in local political life in the Netherlands is based on the notion of a "country of residency" and not a "country of birth." Jan Rath, in Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison and Catherine Withol de Wenden, *Les étrangers dans la cité: Expériences européennes* (Paris: La Découverte, 1993), 138.

[14]Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, "Immigration, politique et citoyenneté: sur quelques arguments," in ibid., 102.

[15]Catherine de Wenden, *Citoyenneté, nationalité et immigration* (Paris: Arcantère, 1987), 71–73.

[16]Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, "L'étranger dans la nation," *Raison Présente* 106 (1992): 79–93.

[17]Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, "Vers une Europe des citoyens," in Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux and Patrick Weil, *Logiques d'Etats et immigrations* (Paris: Kimé, 1992), 292.

[18]Jürgen Habermas, *Ecrits politiques* (Paris: Cerf, 1990), 238.

[19]Jean-Marc Ferry, *Les puissances de l'expérience* (Paris: Cerf, 1991), 194.

[20]Ibid., 195.

[21]To use the subtitle for the collection of essays, *Devant l'histoire* (1988).

[22]Quoted by Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1982), 101. According to Georges Haupt, Otto Bauer later revised this theory of cultural autonomy. Georges Haupt, Michael Löwi, and Claudie Weill, *Les Marxistes et la question nationale* (Paris: Maspéro, 1974), 52.

[23]It is not a coincidence that this thinking process was developed mainly in France. This is where the "citizen" has been most fervently theorized about on the political scene, even if the British were the ones to implement it in reality.

[24]The fact that most analysts now define this idea only as a process of exclusion is symptomatic of the crisis that the idea of classical citizenship is going through.

[25]To use the title of my book that develops these arguments, Dominique Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).

[26]Quoted by Schuck in Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America,* 62.

[27]Norbert Elias, *La société des individus* (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 261, 263.

Dario Biocca

Has the Nation Died? The Debate over Italy's Identity (and Future)

I L CORRIERE DELLA SERA, one of Italy's most respected and widely circulated newspapers, recently reported that novelist and playwright Ignazio Silone, during the years when he was a leader of the Italian Communist Party and an exile in Switzerland, corresponded secretly with a high-ranking Italian police official. In his letters Silone informed the Ovra about the political initiatives of fellow anti-Fascist exiles and harshly condemned the "criminal behavior" of the Communist Party.[1] It was apparent, according to *Il Corriere della Sera,* that between 1928 and 1930— that is, before Silone's expulsion from the Communist Party—the man who was to become the author of *Fontamara, Bread and Wine,* and *The God that Failed* suffered from a devastating moral and intellectual crisis in which he temporarily lost his psychological and political identity. In the following years remorse—or perhaps fear—prevented Silone from confessing and explaining his "betrayal" to even his closest associates. Traces of a deep-felt anguish, however, surfaced in virtually all of his novels.[2]

Critics and readers were baffled by these revelations. The handwritten documents left no room for doubts or skepticism. Silone had gone a long way to devise ingenious schemes to communicate with Fascist authorities without raising the suspicion of Communist Party members. He regarded his correspondent as a *galantuomo,* a man of honor, and spoke to him frankly and at length. Eventually, however, he repented and asked that all contacts with the

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police be broken. Contrary to all procedures and established strat-
egies, the Ovra agreed to Silone's request and made no attempt to
reestablish the liaison—or to blackmail him. The readers of *Il
Corriere della Sera*—and all those familiar with Silone's writings—
were left with disturbing questions: Was Silone a cynical manipu-
lator or had the Italian authorities forced him to cooperate? Did
Silone act for a "cause" or did he fall victim to his own ambition?
What kind of officials operated within Fascist intelligence? And
how should one read Silone's novels, plays, and memoirs in light
of these new biographical elements?

In the course of the debate that followed in the press, few
readers noticed that the archival evidence did not come from a
recently acquired personal or police file. In fact, *Il Corriere della
Sera* had made no new discovery. On the contrary, the same
archival documents had been examined for years by historians,
university students, and biographers; they had chosen to ignore
them. The letters and memoranda appeared "unbelievable"—they
had certainly been fabricated.[3] There was no evidence to suggest
that Silone's file had been tampered with. Certain of the docu-
ments shed light on intricate episodes that had long remained
unexplained. Among them was a terrorist attack carried out in
Milan in April 1928, in which eighteen people were killed. No
political organization had ever claimed responsibility for this ex-
plosion, but Silone's younger brother, Romolo Tranquilli, was
fingered by the authorities as the mysterious terrorist who had
ignited the explosive device. Moreover, the Italian Minister of the
Interior—and, perhaps, the Duce himself—became aware of Silone's
attempt to distance himself from other Communist leaders. Thus,
there was enough evidence to reconsider certain long-held assump-
tions and reticent explanations—including those offered by Silone.

While two of Silone's letters to the police were released by state
archivists and appeared in the press, the debate about their con-
tents did not go very far. The letters established the authenticity of
the claim initially made by *Il Corriere della Sera*; yet they also
introduced notions hardly conducive to plausible conclusions, jus-
tifications, or even accusations. While claiming that the Com-
munist Party had assumed an "idiotic and criminal stand," Silone
told his correspondent that "except for its leaders" the PCI still
appealed to thousands of workers and peasants "in good faith."

For this reason, Silone explained, he would postpone the public abjuration of his political credo. Silone revealed also that in the course of the profound "moral depression" he had just undergone, he "always remained faithful to the workers of his homeland," to his *Patria*. He wrote the word *Patria* in capital letters and underlined it; he then repeated the concept to make sure that his reader would fully grasp its relevance. Readers of *Il Corriere della Sera* were given additional reasons to be perplexed; this hardly sounded like Silone's language. Rather than reflecting on the agony of his dilemma—Silone's brother, the only surviving member of his family, was jailed and critically ill—the confession appeared as the capitulation to a value, the *Patria*, utterly alien to convictions that Silone had so often forcibly expressed in so many of his literary and political works. But the mystery was not as great as it seemed. In the interwar years, the *Patria*, though a notion blurred in ambiguity and politically charged, was a value very significant to all Italians, including and especially those who lived outside the country. In claiming loyalty to his native Italy, Silone may have sought to redefine his identity rather than lose it.

A CONDITION OR A CRISIS?

Upon the outbreak of World War II, Mussolini dispatched his secret Ovra agents to gauge the attitudes of the Italian people. The Duce intended to take the reports into account to determine if and when Italy should join the war. As Mussolini's advisers expected, the Ovra discovered widespread ambivalence; most Italians were simply unprepared for total war. The Duce then asked the Ovra to extend its investigation to Italian communities abroad. A few weeks later police informers reported that they had detected a different attitude in Zurich, Basel, and Geneva, where a number of influential political exiles had chosen to live. Indeed, for these individuals the issue was far more complex and ambiguous, involving deeply held convictions shaped over many years of isolation, revolving around political, civic, and religious beliefs. In the end, when asked whether they wished for the military success of the *Patria* or the defeat of the Fascist alliance, police informers reported that most exiles chose the *Patria*—much as their hesitant pacifist predecessors had done on the eve of World War I. To

many Italians, the "betrayal" of the *Patria* had been a choice too painful to make.

In recent years scholars have quietly but decisively reexamined the transition that Italy underwent between the outbreak of World War II and the 1948 approval of the Republican Constitution. The significance of particular episodes, traditionally regarded as crucial in the political and military developments of the period, have been carefully reassessed, often leading to new and controversial conclusions. Close attention has been paid to the Resistance movement and the political compromises struck by the democratic parties in the afterwar years. The reasons why a new examination of the Italian Civil War and its aftermath have been initiated are related to the concern to do away with the prejudice and ideological misconceptions that have been common. Opinion polls conducted in the wake of the recent government corruption trials, as well as the emergence of the separatist Northern League, have indicated a rapidly declining trust in public institutions. More importantly, perhaps, commentators have underscored the unsettling and disturbing "waning" of the nation's identity, accompanied by troubling episodes of xenophobia.[4] The traditional recourse to the principles of unity, solidarity, and tolerance, embodied in the Resistance and solemnly enshrined in the postwar constitution, no longer appear as viable tools to reverse the process of disintegration. Indeed, Italians wish for a quick conclusion of the parliamentary attempts to amend the constitution so that the country may move on towards European political integration.[5] The past is to be left behind.

Most scholars involved in the debate on the *Patria* share the belief that the roots of the problem are deep and intricate. Any study focused exclusively on the World War II crisis and its aftermath would fail to provide all the necessary answers. At the time of the Italian Risorgimento, historians have noted, hardly any political party or prominent statesman believed that the country should be unified at all. Some argued for the creation of a federation of states and municipalities over which the Pope would preside. Another, more realistic strategy envisioned a northern Italian nation under Piedmontese rule. Yet another party called for a unified Italy but under a utopian republican constitution. Even after unification, a process that unfolded in unexpected circum-

stances, Catholic authorities disputed the legitimacy of the law granting special privileges to the clergy and foreign status to the Vatican. The Pontiff called on the faithful to ignore or boycott any attempts on the part of Italian authorities to achieve cultural, political, and administrative unity. Italy had come into existence— as the Church acknowledged—but Italians remained divided.

A crucial turning point in the making of the Italian national identity, when local and religious resistance subsided, came with the outbreak of World War I. To those who believed that Italy had not reached the economic and political cohesion required for such a colossal effort, the country proved that its citizens shared more than just a common language and cultural heritage; Italy embarked on the war with a newly created spirit of unity. By the close of the conflict, the country was thoroughly transformed. Yet the magnitude and intensity of the effort produced effects that extended well beyond the peace treaty. Among the most disturbing legacies of the conflict was the unparalleled distortion of individual and collective memory. Many who between 1915 and 1918 painfully recorded the striking and disheartening features of trench warfare in their diaries became staunch supporters of veteran organizations (and fascism). Many who had shared patriotic enthusiasm in the early days of the conflict were transmuted by war into silent and detached observers of postwar chaos. Italians did indeed fight for the *Patria,* but perhaps they fought not for one *Patria* but for the many *Patrie* they believed in.[6]

The perception that World War I finally forged a firm national identity may have been in part an illusion. As fascism began systematically to incorporate the symbols of the Risorgimento and "the last war of independence" into its political rituals, encountering little or no resistance, the process of depriving the country of its earlier political traditions grew more intense. The regime imposed a new, artificial identity upon the nation. Again, the process met with no visible opposition. The Romanization of Italy occasionally took the form of an awkward performance where the Duce alternately played the role of *condottiero, pater familias,* infantry man, or airplane pilot. In fact, historians still debate whether the theatricality of fascism succeeded in rallying deep support for the regime, or if the act left most Italians unaffected and indifferent. As the farce eventually turned into tragedy, how-

ever, all Italians, regardless of their previous political stand, faced an empty stage. Long-neglected questions had finally to be answered.

"The Republic," most standard history textbooks adopted in Italian public schools claim, "was born out of the Resistance." Two generations of Italian pupils have learned that during World War II a coalition of democratic parties resolutely opposed fascism and eventually forced the state authorities to rebel against Mussolini. The coalition then led a galvanizing struggle against the German occupation. These textbooks argue that "the spirit of the Resistance" informed the first democratic Parliament, which, after long debate and with commendable resolve, approved the constitution. A growing number of scholars now recognize that this tale is so simple as to be misleading. The lack of popular support for fascism and the widespread opposition to war; the presence of a hidden army of political opponents and the mass uprisings to drive Nazi forces away from Italy; even the rebuilding of a parliamentary system in the wake of military success—all these must not be regarded as historical facts. They were an attempt to provide Italy with the national identity it had lost—or, as some historians believe, Italians never enjoyed. If the present Parliament is to succeed in drafting a new constitution, scholars say the record should be accurately laid out in the open, allowing all Italians to reflect upon their common (and divisive) heritage.

Nearly twenty years ago, upon the conclusion of his first monumental volumes on the life of Benito Mussolini, the noted historian Renzo De Felice argued that support of fascism was prevalent in virtually all segments of Italian society, including the industrial working classes of the North. Although scholars were initially skeptical and disconcerted by the political implications of De Felice's thesis, in time they came, whatever their ideological or political proclivities, to accept his view; it was supported by overwhelming evidence. Still, critics pointed out that the intensity (and sincerity) of the mass participation in Fascist organizations required additional in-depth analysis. In the wake of De Felice's studies, other scholars began to investigate the process by which fascism assimilated the symbols and myths of major Italian historical traditions, using these to invent the idea of the "imperial utopia." The one question crucial to all historians—whether or

not they shared the vision of a Fascist regime based on very solid
social and cultural agreement—remained the subject of bitter con-
troversy: When did Italians recover their democratic vocation and
withdraw their support of fascism? What did that change of atti-
tude imply?

Federico Chabod, the distinguished historian and pupil of
Benedetto Croce, presented an argument that found broad and
receptive audiences in the immediate post–World War II years.
Fascism, he indicated, lost the support of the Italian people with
the 1938 approval of anti-Semitic legislation.[7] Almost inadver-
tently, by virtue of its own totalitarian aspirations, the regime
embarked on a collision course with the more tolerant attitudes of
a great segment of the Italian people. The Catholic Church, in
particular, voiced its opposition to these racist measures and made
its view publicly known, breaking its long-established pattern of
supporting fascism. Chabod's view appealed even to those who
shared the vision of Italian fascism as an "imperfect totalitarian-
ism," where the regime coexisted with institutions and traditions
more deeply entrenched in Italian society. Recent research, how-
ever, has proved Chabod's assumptions to be unconvincing. In the
view of his contemporary critics, he took into account only the
attitudes of select Italian elites, neglecting to consider elements
essential to the drawing of a broader and more accurate picture. If
the Catholic Church expressed its dissent, other segments of Ital-
ian civil society did not. Jewish academicians, for example, were
forced out of universities and research institutes—their posts being
reassigned to less qualified non-Jewish competitors—but hardly
any opposition was voiced by the rectors, deans, and colleagues in
the major Italian universities. Opposition to anti-Semitism was not
as widespread as Chabod had suggested.[8]

Another common view, frequently expressed in the immediate
postwar years, is that most Italians at the outbreak of war failed to
develop any nationalistic enthusiasm. Allegedly, they resented the
anti-bourgeois rhetoric of the regime, feared the arrogance of their
German ally, and even questioned the soundness of Mussolini's
decisions in foreign policy matters. But an overwhelming body of
newly discovered evidence suggests that each of these assumptions
is false. In 1940, support for Mussolini, whether deeply felt or
inspired by the Duce's reputed talent to succeed in even the most

adverse circumstances, did not diminish. On the contrary, the number of army volunteers equaled or exceeded that for the Great War of 1915. "But there was a great misunderstanding," as Piero Melograni, the historian, has explained: "Italians were supportive of the war because they believed the war had already ended with the fall of France. They supported the war because they did not want to fight it. . . . As they discovered the truth, the picture changed dramatically."[9]

After two decades of intense and carefully orchestrated ideological manipulation, Italians in the early years of World War II could make no distinction between fascism and the *Patria*. As late as June 1941, a police informer reported from Switzerland that:

> No, not even Silone, Schiavetti or Lussu would wish for a humiliating defeat of their country. They would never take up arms against people of their own blood and religion. They keep wondering if and when fascism will fall, and they discuss a federated Europe to be created after the war, but it is little more than wishful thinking [*pie illusioni*]. The truth is that they sit here and wait.[10]

Italians began to separate fascism from the *Patria* only when catastrophic news from the war fronts in the Balkans, Africa, and the Soviet Union made their military defeat imminent, indeed inevitable. But they changed their attitudes very slowly and reluctantly, as police informers continued to report to the Duce at his Salò headquarters. It was only after the systematic Allied aerial bombings of Italian cities had produced their desired psychological effects that the dialogue between clandestine democratic parties and the Italian people resumed and intensified. It was still in its very early stages, scholars say, when the war ended. Thus, despite the *post-facto* political rhetoric and the simplistic tales in conventional textbooks, fascism did not collapse because of widespread popular opposition. Fascism fell because the Allied military forces defeated Mussolini and his Fascist Italian armies. This fundamental fact, historians argue, should receive more attention by legislators, politicians, community leaders, and educators.

THE POLITICS OF HISTORY

Claudio Pavone entitled his exhaustive 1991 historical study of the Italian anti-Fascist movement *An Essay on the Morality of the Resistance.*[11] In the wake of the "revisionist tide" initiated by De Felice, a number of studies have underscored the peripheral role of the Resistance in the military struggle against foreign occupation. Some scholars have gone so far as to emphasize the ambiguity of the Resistance political agenda and have questioned the integrity of some of its leaders. Pavone, wishing to keep his distance from them, argued that despite the adverse conditions in which the Italian democratic parties operated, they succeeded in establishing the foundations of a legitimate modern democracy. Along the same lines, Pietro Scoppola has identified the new Republican Constitution of 1948 with the most significant achievements of the Resistance. In his view, a successful compromise was struck by Italy's political leaders, confronted by a widespread fear of a political backlash but also by Communist insurgence and the emergence of a Cold War scenario.[12]

The restoration of the Resistance (and the constitution) as the valid cornerstones of the Italian democracy has led many to believe that the issues of national identity have been largely resolved. There were, however, dissenters and skeptics, men like Ernesto Galli della Loggia, political historian and journalist, who reformulated the controversy in more penetrating terms. In *La morte della Patria (The Death of the Patria)*[13] della Loggia argued that the debate over the unity and identity of the Italian Republic neglected those elements brought to light by recent historiographical research. In his view, the evidence suggests that in 1945 the *Patria* did indeed appear to be dead; politically motivated historians manipulated chronologies and interpretations so as to deny the disjointed and contradictory course of Italian postwar politics. In a series of follow-up articles, della Loggia went so far as to link the more recent fear of Albanian immigration—minuscule both in scope and numbers—to the Italians' weak sense of identity as a nation. Italy, in his view, has been incapable of addressing even the most simple issues of national solidarity or of economic assistance to others.

According to della Loggia, more attention needs to be drawn to the events of September 1943, when the notion of *Patria* became, to use a lapidary metaphor adopted by the press, "petrified." The decomposition of the state had devastating consequences because in Italy, unlike certain other European societies, the nation had been the product of a unified state and therefore could not be separated from it. The closing events of World War II revealed a curious combination of indifference, incompetence, and short-sighted Machiavellianism; in truth, they revealed also an abyssal vacuum. Fearing German revenge, Prime Minister Badoglio fled from Rome in such haste that he left behind the documents he had signed to proclaim Italy's neutrality. After he reached the southern port city of Brindisi, Badoglio asked his Anglo-American counterparts for a copy of the document, explaining he had not had time to read the clauses of the armistice. Indeed, there were urgent reasons to examine the text carefully. The agreement called for a cease-fire but ordered Italian military forces to react against any hostile acts "from wherever they came." The ambiguity of the statement left Italian officers, who faced possible German reprisals, both stupefied and paralyzed.[14]

Beyond this extraordinary scene of military and political incompetence, with authorities systematically neglecting their fundamental duties, Galli della Loggia has noted that recent historical investigations have brought into light other episodes that indicate malfeasance unrelated to the war or even the legacy of fascism. For example, armed forces and relief organizations in other defeated countries, including Nazi Germany, acted effectively to help their civilian populations meet their basic needs. In the Italian case, the administrative structures, down to their regional and local levels, collapsed entirely and literally vanished, leaving no trace of their personnel, offices, or emergency supplies. As a result, according to della Loggia, the Italians' tragedy, in its final act, saw a deepening of the gap between the citizens and their institutions—perhaps reinforcing that "amoral familism," which anthropologists would soon discover in the villages and small towns of southern Italy.[15] But there was even more.

During the war, as Alvaro recorded, some Italians did betray the *Patria*:

Italians constantly listened to Radio London, which claimed we
were all good friends, and that all troubles were the fault of
fascism. . . . And the Italians believed in Radio London; more than
ever they began to hope for their own defeat. And yet they had their
sons in uniform fighting in Africa, in the Balkans, in Russia. . . . It
was a real tragedy. Italians looked at their sons as if they were
fighting for a foreign army; and when they came home and marched
at a military parade with the band and the flag. . .their parents
hoped they would be soon and quickly defeated; and then they
witnessed to the bombardment of their own city and believed the
enemy was right. That was enough to draw one of the most tragic
pictures of the moral folly that any people could inherit from dicta-
torship.[16]

Galli della Loggia has insisted that the ineffectiveness of the
military and the civilian leaders during the war as well as the
ambivalence of civilians towards Fascist military and political in-
stitutions cannot by themselves explain the high incidence of popular
diffidence and mistrust. In his view, they reflected a long-estab-
lished feeling of uncertainty about the nation's identity and stand.
Had Italians perceived themselves as a "true nation" much like the
other states involved in the conflict, not only would military events
have unfolded differently but in September of 1943, when the state
disappeared from the scene as an active political protagonist, the
Resistance movement would have relied upon the support of ad-
ministrative, political, and local bodies expressive of the internal
cohesion of Italian civil society. Unlike Holland or Poland, such
support was not made available to Italian Resistance fighters in
their struggle against the German occupation. The distance be-
tween the people and their social, cultural, and political institu-
tions had become unbridgeable. Truly, the nation, then, was dead.[17]

In the debate that broke out in the Italian press following the
publication of these articles, which engaged historians, political
scientists, and journalists, della Loggia extended his argument to
include the immediate postwar years. The democratic parties that
appointed the first parliamentary representatives, he argued, aban-
doned history, obliterating memory from their collective political
conscience. In the interest of a fair deal being struck to embrace all
Italian citizens, Italy's political leaders ought to have recognized
that nearly all the symbols of Italian national traditions had faded.

Even non-Fascist institutions that had survived the fall of Mussolini—
the monarchy and the Church, for example—became the target of
bitter criticism. King Victor Emmanuel, having abandoned his
people in their moment of danger, thereby condemned his dynasty
to perennial contempt. Vatican authorities appeared to have been
all too willing to compromise with the Fascist regime. Thus, Ital-
ians were compelled to face their new condition without tradi-
tional supports. Government leaders refused to acknowledge that
the Resistance had not been driven by the pathos that only a
unified nation could have ignited; rather, they insisted on creating
a "historic legend," thereby legitimizing their newly acquired po-
litical authority.[18]

TRYING AGAIN

In spite of starting off on the wrong foot, the Italian "miracle" of
the post–World War II years commanded attention and even as-
tonishment. The country rebuilt its economy with unparalleled
vigor; internal migration fueled the growth of modern, dynamic
cities; literary and cinematographic masterpieces offered the image
of a people engaged in intense introspection and renewal. At the
institutional level as well, much seemed to heal and change quickly.
Authoritative commentators pointed out that the new constitu-
tion, despite having being approved in the wake of civil war,
provided a fertile soil for democracy. Indeed, political parties
established deep roots in society, the press provided the public
with plentiful political information, and most barriers to educa-
tion were removed, thereby allowing for increased social mobility.
As a result, polls soon showed that democratic institutions were
highly supported throughout Italy and that rates of approval for
party leaders were higher than in most Western democracies,
including the United States.[19]

   Some remained skeptical, however. Proponents of amoral familism
argued that the absence of community-oriented attitudes induced
patriarchal families of southern Italy to develop hostility towards
outside agencies, including the representatives of the central gov-
ernment and welfare programs. Along similar lines, the notion of
civic culture underscored the empirical observation that most Ital-
ians displayed attitudes and behaviors—such as an unwillingness

to cooperate with others, localism, and a lack of confidence in the social environment—that were hardly compatible with modern democracy.[20] Robert Putnam, among others, later emphasized regional variations and showed that in the districts where a solid tradition of "civic community" encouraged horizontal cooperation, like the Romagna and other areas of northern Italy, the economy flourished and effective administration could be maintained. But elsewhere, continued political alienation deepened the gap between the people and their governing bodies.[21]

In less than two decades the newly established order began to weaken. Evidence showed that government instability had prevented the implementation of structural long-term projects and that the economic "miracle" had left vast areas of the country unaffected. As a result, disillusionment gave rise to an increase in Communist Party membership, and large segments of Italian civil society realized that the new parliamentary system needed additional and more profound measures of rejuvenation. Surprisingly, voters continued to turn out to the polls in very high percentages. Some believed this trend to be an encouraging show of confidence. Others warned that the trend signaled crisis and even rejection. Franco Pavoncello, for instance, has theorized that in the post–World War II years Italian voters consistently supported those political leaders who reassured them about continuity and stability; thus, the Italian constitution derived its legitimacy not from the Resistance but from the provision of a parliamentary system in which party coalitions could effectively counter each other's reforms, even to the point of inducing legislative paralysis. This widespread fear of any destabilizing political initiatives taken by an elite seen as removed or even hostile was the product of a mistrust generated by fascism, World War II, and military catastrophe. However, Pavoncello concluded, Italians' diffidence was also indicative of an inner strength and cohesion perhaps unparalleled in other Western European societies.[22]

Whatever the causes of the emerging gap between the people and their institutions, many Italians perceived that international and domestic concerns were slowing down and distorting the democratic process. According to Luciano Cafagna, one of Italy's most attentive scholars of the newly born "northern question," beginning in the 1950s the parliamentary system was increasingly

paralyzed by the understanding, dictated by Cold War politics, that no viable alternative to the rule of the Christian democrats existed. The opposition, led by the Communist Party, could not be allowed to gain access to key government posts. This factor, known to political scientists as the "K" factor, resulted in the Italian system being weakened both by its immobility and by individual leaders who maintained ministerial positions for virtually unlimited terms. Beginning in the 1960s the system was further corrupted—in more ways than one—by its inability to cope with emergency situations requiring firm stands and clear implementation policies. The student-worker protest of 1968, the energy shortage of the early 1970s, and terrorism eventually induced the Christian democrats to share part of their responsibilities with other parliamentary forces.[23] This failed to resolve the "K" factor, however, and instead caused an awkward compromise among incompatible political forces, which helped Italy overcome some formidable obstacles but ultimately induced the agonizing death of the *Prima Repubblica.*

In the wake of dramatic international changes and the waning of the "K" factor, the 1990s eventually brought about a new crisis in Italian society and political culture. The change began with a striking break in voting patterns and the emergence of the separatist Lega Nord. Supporters of regional autonomy claimed that the people of vast areas of Italy, which they called Padania, no longer recognized the central government as the legitimate source of all political authority. Rather, they regarded the vast bureaucratic and administrative apparatus set up in Rome as a potent factor of economic stagnation. Their arguments reversed the traditional view of the southern question. If, during the early stages of Italian industrialization, the northern regions had taken advantage of their privileged position to deprive the Mezzogiorno of its economic resources, now it was the south—by means of the central government—that was living off the wealth of the north. So heavy was the burden of this parasitic dependence that, in spite of its outstanding industrial output, the Padania now ran the danger of being excluded from the European Monetary Union and of being dragged away from the core of the European economic system. Thus, for an estimated 30 percent of northerners, worried solely

about economic issues, the Italian *Patria* should then be traded for Padania and the new Europe.

The bitter reproaches and complaints of the Lega Nord failed to persuade the Italian political elite but found attentive audiences among northern voters. Almost simultaneously, a struggle broke out between key sectors of the state. Italian magistrates, in particular, launched a campaign against corruption that involved prominent deputies, senators, entrepreneurs, fiscal authorities, party leaders, and local administrators. Virtually the entire ruling elite of Italian politics and industry fell under charges of embezzlement, corruption, theft, or illegal disposal of public funds. Some leaders left the country to escape imprisonment; others committed suicide; others faced publicly televised trials and received humiliating jail sentences. As part of a mounting reprisal, some judges were then indicted on charges of complicity and for violating legal procedures. To the vast majority of the Italian people, who had initially welcomed the cleanup operation with confidence, the struggle was transmuted into a civil war fought amongst the highest authorities of the public sector—and became yet another blow to their national pride and identity. Not surprisingly, as the crisis deepened, many cities, including Milan, chose separatist mayors and elected new radical supporters of Padania to the Parliament; polls also showed a steady increase in Italians' support of European integration.

In a climate of uncertainty and political upheaval, the 1996 general elections gave the majority of votes to a leftist coalition headed by economist Romano Prodi, the representative of a new generation of politicians. After approval of severe economic measures dictated by European partners—which found little opposition in the Italian Parliament—the political agenda in the fall of 1996 focused on a second pressing issue: constitutional reform. All party leaders agreed that the text of the 1948 constitution needed to be amended and that a special commission should present its proposed draft for plenary debate. The long-neglected issues related to the Italian national identity had become crucial to legislators as well as government authorities. The historiographical debate that was previously confined to journals and newspaper editorials finally began to involve political parties as well as the broader public. Clearly, the objective of the commission rested not

merely in the reformulation of electoral laws, nor in the establishment of a new Italian federation of regions. As in all Western constitutions, the essential questions concerned legitimacy and responsibility. With the withdrawal of the old political elite from the public scene, the "K" factor no longer prevented parties from making innovative choices. The Lega Nord also swayed public opinion towards taking a firm stand on national unity. As the European Union eventually laid down its timetable and conditions, Italians set out collectively to reflect on their values and beliefs. As in 1948, the text of the new constitution will derive its legitimacy from the ability to bridge the distance between the people and their institutions; it will provide stability and progress. The Italian experience suggests that this may also rekindle another unexpected miracle.

ENDNOTES

[1]See Giovanni Belardelli, "Silone: con l'Ovra per amore del fratello," *Il Corriere della Sera,* 6 March 1996.

[2]See, in particular, the 1934 short story entitled *La Volpe.* Ignazio Silone, *Viaggio a Parigi (Novelle),* ed. Vittoriano Esposito, Centro Studi Siloniani, Pescina dei Marsi.

[3]See Dino Messina's interview with Leo Valiani in *Il Corriere della Sera,* 9 March 1996.

[4]See Gian Enrico Rusconi, *Se cessiamo di essere una nazione* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993).

[5]See Patrick McCarthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 140–166.

[6]See Anna Pasquale, *La Prima Guerra Mondiale e le memorie dei combattenti,* unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Perugia, 1996.

[7]Federico Chabod, *L'Italia contemporanea (1918–1948)* (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1961).

[8]Angelo Ventura, ed., *L'Università dalle leggi razziali alla Resistenza* (Padua: Cleup, 1996).

[9]Piero Melograni, *Dieci perché sulla repubblica* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1995), 15–16.

[10]Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome, series Casellario Politico Centrale, folder 5195, "Secondino Tranquilli," 2.

[11]Claudio Pavone, *Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità della Resistenza* (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991).

[12]Pietro Scoppola, *25 aprile. Liberazione* (Turin: Einaudi, 1995).

[13]Ernesto Galli della Loggia, *La morte della Patria. La crisi dell'idea di nazione tra Resistenza, antifascismo e Repubblica* (Bari and Rome: Laterza, 1996).

[14]Elena Aga Rossi, *Una nazione allo sbando* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993).

[15]Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

[16]Corrado Alvaro, *L'Italia rinunzia?* (Palermo: Sellerio, 1986), 34–35. Quoted in della Loggia, *La Morte della Patria*, 8–9.

[17]See *Liberal* (2) (1997).

[18]See Giorgio Rebuffa, *La Costituzione impossibile, Cultura e sistema parlamentare in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995), 57–62.

[19]See Warren A. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952–78* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).

[20]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1965). See also Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1980).

[21]See Robert Putnam, Franco Pavoncello et al., "Explaining the Success of Political Institutions: The Case of Italian Regional Government," *APSR* (March 1983): 55–74.

[22]See Franco Pavoncello, *The Roots of Discontent: The Nature and Dynamics of Political Disaffection in Italy* (Rome: Graf, 1990).

[23]Luciano Cafagna, *La grande slavina. L'Italia verso la crisi della democrazia* (Venice: Marsilio, 1993), 115–135.

Postwar Europe: The Capriciousness of Universal Values

*The Jew is unable (and unwilling) to shake off his
uniqueness, but he can live only in a world based on
universal values. In this he is unique, but at a deeper
level his problem is really a parable on the human
condition in general.*

> —*J. L. Talmon*
> *Preface to* The Unique and the Universal
> *(London, 1965)*

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SETTLER, the pile is a symbol of permanence. It is the place where a line from heaven to earth intersects with the horizontal plane. It is close both to God and to the dead and buried. It is where all journeys start. It is the unshakable point of return.

The nomad brings his pile to wherever he encamps. His narratives of life and death are based on myths and rituals, constantly varied in the present tense.

Cain, the settler, kills Abel, the nomad, and is turned into a fugitive. The tale of his home and lineage loses its foundation. There is no stable point of departure, no immovable point of return, and no given sequence of collective memories.

The concept of nationhood is, thus, based on the fear of the wandering tribes as the destroyers of communal history.

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I.

In the early fifties, Arthur Montgomery, a noted Swedish professor of economics who was in no sense a Marxist, visited Zurich to give a lecture on the Swedish model of economics to a select group of his Swiss colleagues. The essence of his argument was a version of what, a decade later, would be known in the Western world as "the end of ideology." He held that in terms of economic policy, the distance between the ruling Social Democrats and the opposition on the Right was almost nonexistent. One could find neither orthodox liberals nor outright socialists. Since a general agreement had been established on collective social provisions as an inevitable aspect of modernity, the only task left to professionals of economic theory was to give politicians the right advice in balancing the budget.

Montgomery's position generated concern and anger. A prominent Swiss journalist drew comparisons with Bolsheviks and National Socialists; what was emerging now in Sweden was, in his mind, the third attempt within this century to eliminate the cornerstone of freedom, namely, private property. The incident set the tone for a discussion that would accompany the development of the Swedish model over the coming decades. But the twists of history now lend a certain irony to the Swedish-Swiss origins of this controversy.

At the end of the nineties, it is possible to study the postwar period from a distance. One can rediscover the local flavors of how nations adapted to the end of national socialism and the beginning of the Cold War. Sweden and Switzerland remained strictly neutral. Both were accused of being unwilling to define the triumph over fascism and the emerging battle with communism as elements of a struggle for the future of the human race. Their response was to define their own national projects as unique attempts to achieve universal values. Their separateness was a means of upholding the morals of the common good. But in supposedly embracing the liberal universe, they chose different roads.

By remaining the focal point of financial transactions, Switzerland guarded the free market of the world, as it appeared to have done against all odds during the war. Claiming special entitlement

to another universal value—national sovereignty—Switzerland re-
fused to enter the emerging structure of global bodies like the
United Nations. Its separateness, it seemed, gave it a special role as
the central venue for international deliberations.

In a policy paper prepared by the US State Department's West-
ern European experts in December 1944, Swiss neutrality was
defined as an asset to the Allies. It was felt that economic warfare
considerations should be placed in the perspective of a wider set of
relations:

> Switzerland differs from other neutrals in that her neutrality is not
> unilateral. It is a neutrality which has been guaranteed for many
> years by the major powers. As a result of this neutrality Switzerland
> performs certain indispensable services for all the belligerents and
> claims in return the right to trade with such of them as will help
> maintain its essential economy and internal stability. As far as the
> United States is concerned Switzerland serves as the protecting power
> for our prisoners of war in Germany and Japan. It is the agreed
> policy of the British and US Governments to avoid Switzerland
> forcing a break with Germany. . . .
>
>   Lastly, it must be remembered that no people in Europe are more
> profoundly attached to democratic principles than the Swiss. Con-
> tinued moderate prosperity will ensure the maintenance of the present
> economic and political system which is so close to our own.[1]

The US war and navy departments had been pressing for a
tougher line, supported, for other reasons, by Henry Morgenthau's
treasury department. In the postwar negotiations between the
Allies and the Swiss government on the handling of German assets
and looted gold, there was constant friction, especially among the
Americans, between those advocating a moral position and those
essentially viewing the matter in terms of long-term interstate
relationships, a perspective increasingly influenced by the nascent
Cold War. The latter position won the day when a preliminary
Allied-Swiss accord was reached in May 1946, causing the most
flamboyant moralist on the American scene, Senator Harley Kilgore,
to write a letter of protest to President Truman. In the view of the
senator, the agreement violated "both in spirit and in form, the
Allies' pledges to root out Nazism and the German War poten-
tial."[2] And he found the terms of Switzerland's gold repayment
flabbergasting: "Justice, decency, and plain horse sense require

that the Allies hold Switzerland responsible for all of the $300 million of looted gold which they accepted from the Nazis and reject their proposition of settling for 20 cents on the dollar."[3]

The recently issued Eizenstat report notes that Kilgore's was a lone voice of protest in the US Senate. A political settlement was soon reached. Swiss politicians continued at home, however, to comment on the position of the Allies in a context in which the issue had been defined as a case of David versus Goliath. A strong body of opinion held the struggle to be a vain attempt to uphold the sanctity of private property against infringements by the Great Powers. In November 1946, the chief Swiss negotiator, Walter Stucki, accused the Allies of having violated the principles embodied in their own Atlantic Charter. The fact that Switzerland, in March 1945, had bowed to American pressure and agreed to freeze all German assets, prohibit the dealing in foreign currencies, and restrict the purchase of gold from Germany was, he stated, the result of pressure worse than anything Göring had ever attempted, a violation of principles in a world "lacking material and moral foundations," where Switzerland found itself in "dangerous political isolation."[4]

The irony of a singularly narrow-minded definition of Swiss national interest proclaiming itself to be the embodiment of universal norms did not become apparent until five decades later, when the World Jewish Congress confronted the Swiss authorities on the matter of wartime Jewish property. The atmosphere heated up as soon as one particularly abhorrent feature was made public: the arrogance of banks asking survivors of the Holocaust to provide death certificates for the relatives they had lost as a condition for getting access to their inheritance. The handling of this "heirless property" erupted into an emotional issue that leading circles in Switzerland seemed unable to deal with. The deeper layers of Switzerland's official double standards then slowly came to light.

The Eizenstat report has laid bare the most important ingredients. When the principles for settling such matters were defined after the war, the Swiss had initially agreed to make the proceeds of heirless assets available to refugee organizations. This promise, however, was never formally included in the Accord, and the Swiss never fulfilled it. Another category, property belonging to survivors of the Holocaust, was classified by the Swiss in a particularly

insolent way: since German assets had been blocked due to Allied pressure, Jews who had once held German citizenship, including those who had survived Nazi death camps, were classified as "Germans in Germany." Such persons thus found their assets blocked as part of the project involving Swiss recompense for its dealings with the Third Reich.

On top of all this, in 1949 Switzerland reached a secret accord with communist Poland, allowing the Polish state to acquire the assets in Switzerland of deceased Polish citizens (most of them Jews) defined as being without heirs. These assets were then—as part of the agreement—used by the Poles to settle Swiss claims against Poland. Political reality outside communist countries has probably never been further removed from the classic definition of property rights.

At that point in history, however, there were other issues that tended to overshadow the moral settling of wartime accounts. The US State Department in August 1950 specified US policy objectives towards Switzerland in clear-cut terms:

> The Swiss Confederation is an important factor in European economic recovery and a positive force in the maintenance of free democratic institutions in Europe. While traditional neutrality precludes their political or military alignment with the West, the Swiss can nevertheless be relied upon to defend their territory resolutely against any aggressor. As such, Switzerland constitutes a deterrent to the expansion of Soviet influence in Western Europe and a strategic asset, even though a passive one, within the frame of United States objectives.[5]

The Swedes may have been regarded as being slightly less reliable in the epochal battle against communism. On the other hand, Swedish officials had been easier to prod into admitting an element of guilt in their commerce with the Third Reich. Dean Acheson reflected on the matter in his memoirs: "If the Swedes were stubborn, the Swiss were the cube of stubbornness."[6]

After the war, Sweden chose compassion as its own special quality, based on a recently established redefinition of the national project. A form of social change had been instituted in the thirties that could now be proclaimed to be the incarnation of modernity; the communal bodies that had been born in reaction to industrial

capitalism had been allowed to share in the management of state affairs. The result was a change not only in the formal division of power but in the moral quality of society. The new social forces, the labor movement and the farmers' association, infused their value systems into the state. It was a trade-off: these values henceforth had the backing of state authority and were even allowed to penetrate the educational system. In return, the labor movement and the farmers had to give up a large part of their class ideology. They were transformed into guardians of the national interest by becoming proponents of a universalistic world view.

The moral basis was enhanced by the Allied victory over fascism. On the one hand, fascist perversion of nationalist ideology finally rendered obsolete the concept of glorious war as a basis for national sentiment. The ideology of participatory democracy as the true legitimation of modern nation-states became firmly embedded in most West European countries. To a varying degree, these countries experienced in their politics an "awareness of common ways and institutions," and for the first time in modern European history this frame of reference was almost exclusively shrouded in a progressive ideology.

The definition of Swedish separateness as the incarnation of universality was fraught with paradox. European political refugees who sought shelter in Sweden in the thirties have testified to how remote the country seemed from the conflicts and trouble spots found on the continent. But at that time Sweden offered hope for the future: harmony as opposed to chaos, common political action as opposed to paralyzing conflicts. When Social Democrats like Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt returned to their native countries after the war, they took with them a blueprint for the European society of the future: the welfare state, the all-inclusive definition of citizenship. Sweden was thought to point the way out of a cumbersome historical tradition.

The Swedish view of Europe at that time was characterized by an opposite view: the continent belonged to Sweden's past; it was a historical burden. The "Old World" seemed only too apt a name for Europe. A closer relationship held little temptation for a nation striving to become the incarnation of modern values. The statement by Tage Erlander, prime minister for two decades, that Europe was composed mainly of Catholics and political reaction-

aries was typical of the views held by leading Social Democrats at the end of the fifties (the Pope being the incarnation of evil in a country for centuries embedded in Lutheranism). It was commonly held that Sweden was so far ahead, both socially and economically, that there was no point in it getting involved in European cooperation. In time, Western Europe was sure to follow in the footsteps of Sweden and Scandinavia. The continental countries would eventually become "Swedenized."

The debate on Europe, in other words, was conducted as though Sweden were free to choose not only her trading partners but also her geographical and cultural home. Sweden could afford to base her position vis-à-vis Europe on moral considerations. Compassion was directed principally at Third World countries. In the beginning of the sixties, it was defined by a prominent young intellectual and author, Lars Gustafsson, as the transcendence of nationalism: "This awakening of international conscience, I believe, represents a way out [of], and perpetual consolation for, what we experienced for so long as isolation. If Swedish patriotism exists nowadays, it consists of our desire to make ourselves heard in the context of this new solidarity."[7]

The idea of being the most emancipated country in the world was integral to the Swedish model. It was traditional nationalism turned upside down. The psychological impact was exactly the same as in the old-fashioned version: Swedish elites could be very proud of their eminence. They became used to feeling morally superior due to the fact that they were no longer fettered by tradition. And leaving nationalism behind was the core of their achievement.

In hindsight, this use of antinationalism as a national paradigm must be one of the strangest social paradoxes in political history. Politicians and diplomats were convinced that they had a privileged insight into the future of humanity. They projected the Swedish attitude onto the world stage as a special sort of idealism. Sometimes, as when supporting the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa—including giving strong material support to the ANC while it was branded as a communist-front organization—this kind of self-confidence achieved something worthwhile. But there were other areas where the Swedish analytical model simply failed to fit. There idealism turned into arrogance and negligence. The official

attitude towards the Baltic countries—regarding them as nonexist-
ent—is a prime case in point. (Sweden was the first Western
country to accept Soviet annexation in 1940.) Reluctance to press
the Soviet Union into admitting having arrested Raoul Wallenberg
is another. Generally speaking, close to home, idealism tended to
cede to *realpolitik*.

It is common knowledge now that the idealist consensus has
eroded. The economic aspects of this crisis are only too well
known. The Social Democrats, who have returned to power after
a short break, switched their position on the European community
within a matter of months, applied for EU membership, and legiti-
mized the change with a referendum in which the "yes" ticket
drew strength from the carefully orchestrated fear of Sweden being
left behind.

But the moral rhetoric of this particularly Swedish brand of
progressivism remains unchanged at the official level in times of
crisis. When Sweden's ambassador to Washington was summarily
called before a Senate committee to answer questions about the
Eizenstat report on Nazi gold, he referred to events that boosted
Sweden's postwar image of compassion: Raoul Wallenberg's res-
cue of Hungarian Jews and Prince Folke Bernadotte's efforts to
save inmates of the concentration camps toward the end of the
war. These, he implied, had been in line with the deeper intentions
of Swedish foreign policy. Sweden had adapted her neutrality to
Germany's seemingly overwhelming might at the beginning of the
war. From today's perspective, this might perhaps appear to be
compromising, but the end result was beneficial to humanity.
Sweden managed to stay out of the war and thus was able to act
as the savior of tens of thousands of refugees, most of them Jews.

II.

History may, as James Joyce said, be a nightmare from which we
are trying to wake up. Or it may be a nightmare from which we
almost managed to escape by forgetting it. In the nineties, Euro-
pean history folded in the middle. Today, the dream of a continent
cleansed of racism suddenly seems to be one of this century's
greatest illusions. More than fifty years after the end of the war,
Hitler's shadow is suddenly back with us.

Friedrich Meinecke reinterpreted German history as the victory of *Nationalstaat* over that of *Weltbürgertum.* In his universe, every state was a law unto itself. Striving to embody the ideals of universalism, as Sweden and Switzerland claimed to be doing after the war, could seem to be the exact opposite of the German tradition of historicism. But the nationally defined ideology of progressivism was still based on an assumption of uniqueness. Historians, claiming to demystify the course of events, could use an established concept of nationhood as their screen in choosing and evaluating facts. They could stress apparently progressive elements and disregard the rest.

In Switzerland, the two most prominent postwar authors, Friedrich Dürrenmatt and Max Frisch, continually used their talents to describe a counteruniverse, an alternative to the hypocrisy masquerading as objectivity. Frisch's comedy *Biography,* dating from the sixties, is a satire on the concept of history as a project: a man is given the option of returning to the crucial points of his life and altering the decisions he made at the time. The constant revisions, which seem on the surface to be the result of rational decisions, turn into absurdities that make him realize that whatever preplanned course he takes is the wrong one.

His play *Biedermann and the Pyromaniacs* is a tragicomedy on doing business with the devil. A man lets three pyromaniacs enter his house; he accepts them as residents, petrol cans, fuse, and all. When they need matches, he duly obliges.

Frisch's most famous play, *Andorra,* based on an idea that had already appeared in his breakthrough literary work, *Tagebuch mit Marion,* is a tragic and terrifying depiction of the mechanisms involved in social inclusion and exclusion, where the ritual of omitting someone involves a kind of bonding for those remaining. Out of sheer pettiness, a man begins describing his stepson as a Jew; the boy, facing prejudice, comes to accept this given identity as an unalterable fact. When the country is invaded by a racially defined neighboring state, his fate is sealed.

Andorra can also be seen against the background of a political battle that went on for decades in Switzerland until it was finally settled two years ago. Paul Grüninger, a police chief in the border areas fronting Austria and Germany, was dismissed in 1940, accused of using false information to let Jewish refugees into the

country. He was rumored to have made money from the operation and died semi-destitute at the end of the 1960s.

Grüninger was later exonerated, thanks to the testimonies of many of those he saved. A Swiss journalist made a meticulous study of what had occurred; he forced the authorities to produce the minutes of the trial and the reports of the secret police. A cautious estimate is that Grüninger saved three thousand Jews from the Holocaust. There is no evidence that he did so for gain. His breach of the service regulations involved stamping a date of entry in the refugees' passports that preceded the date on which Switzerland closed its borders altogether.

Public opinion forced a reluctant Swiss government to reopen the case, and the court referred in its verdict to an ancient Swiss practice—the right to act in self-defense. Posthumously, Grüninger was fully exonerated. Years after his death, he has become the hero of wartime Switzerland. But the documentation surrounding his fate has released the stink of what *realpolitik* was about at that time—a power game laced with accommodation and discreet anti-Semitism.

The cupboard doors have scarcely been opened in Sweden. The collusion of the war years culminated in a postwar dictum: let it be. Contrary to what has been the case in Switzerland, the number of major literary works dealing with the morality of Sweden during the war is very limited. Only one of them has attained the international prominence reached by their Swiss counterparts: *The Aesthetics of Resistance,* a novel by Peter Weiss, who settled in Sweden in 1939 as a Jewish refugee.

Switzerland has landed in an international hurricane of opinion as a result of its gold dealings. In terms of culpability, Switzerland was at center stage, with Sweden as a supporting player. The problem, however, is that present-day analysis of the moral quality of Swedish wartime behavior has to be based on guesswork. Far too little is known about the details.

The main reason why Sweden has so far only experienced a few mild breezes, including what is stated in the Eizenstat report, is more a result of postwar tactics than of wartime realities. Swedish politicians and officials were smarter than their brethren in Switzerland. They appeared more willing after the war to atone for at least some of their dubious transactions. As a result, the outside

pressure on Sweden to really investigate what happened has so far been negligible.

Swiss historians and journalists have shown considerably more energy on this account than their Swedish colleagues. Virtually everything that has fed the frenzy about the gold transactions is described in a book from 1985, *Raubgold aus Deutschland* (*Gold Booty from Germany*), written by a journalist named Werner Rings. It created scarcely a ripple when it first appeared but has now been reissued, validated by all the international attention. And it has been followed by several other investigative works that break new ground, the foremost of which is *Bankgeschäfte mit dem Feind* (*Banking Business with the Enemy*), the journalist Gian Trepp's analysis of the strange machinations of the Bern-based Bank for International Settlement (BIS), where Hitler's bankers, all of them party members, worked in harmony with the bank's US president, Thomas H. McKittrick, and British, Swedish, Swiss, and Japanese top-level officials, among others. Considering the structure of the bank, it is not surprising that it was closely involved in gold dealings. Its chief executive, the German Paul Hechler, unashamedly signed letters on the bank's stationery with "Heil Hitler."

Rings and Trepp both look at Sweden's role. They share a basic understanding of what it was all about—invisible, multinational networks of people in power for whom trading with the Third Reich was, at least for a while, business as usual.

In Sweden, the investigative talent of an official at the National Archive, Göran Blomberg, has turned up the fact that a number of Swedish companies went through a voluntary process of "Aryanization" in 1940 and 1941. A secret agency established by the government for the task of reading letters and tapping phone calls was, it seems, extremely diligent. Letters in the thousands were opened and transcribed before being delivered, and the transcripts remain in the National Archives. Among the documents are numerous declarations by Swedish owners and executives assuring their German counterparts—including government authorities—that they could be trusted as solid business partners as there was not a single Jew on their staff.

A private letter from the director of the Swedish-German Chamber of Commerce, Eitel Becker, gives some idea of the situation in

February 1941, when a German victory seemed only a matter of time:

> It is interesting to note the atmosphere in Sweden, particularly as
> my work domain lies in a country that is still in possession of its full
> freedom but geographically is already part of the Grand German
> financial region. You could say that Sweden's greatest source of
> concern is its proximity to Russia, which is why the majority view
> a strong Germany as being in their best interest. There are of course
> a number of blemishes, in particular the rather difficult press in
> western Sweden. If you want to work successfully on behalf of the
> German economy, you must draw a sharp distinction between the
> press, the politicians, and financial circles in Sweden. . . . Swedish
> state policy is the embodiment of a conscious policy of neutrality.[8]

"The rather difficult press in western Sweden" was one man and
one newspaper: Torgny Segerstedt of the *Göteborgs Handels &
Sjöfartstidning,* a venerable Swedish equivalent of the *Financial
Times.* It was subjected to outright censorship on numerous occa-
sions, including once for trying to publish reports about the use of
torture in occupied Norway. In 1940, it was the target of an open
letter calling for a boycott by advertisers, initiated by prominent
businessmen and published by the main local competitor, a news-
paper whose editor was a member of the official censorship board.

In an editorial entitled "The Verdict of History"—published in
the mid-1920s—Segerstedt actually described the elements involved
in defining history as a progression of events. When the present
moves into the past, the events that have occurred are stratified.
History is written in terms of winners and losers.

> What will finally decide the verdict of future generations, insofar as
> one is forthcoming? The assessment of those who were contempo-
> raries of the age in question. They are the only witnesses able to
> view things from within. Those who make the greatest clamor will
> be the ones heard most. When one considers how easily opinions are
> formed and legends created, how little the version of events that
> emerges usually has to do with what actually occurred, one is not
> inclined to place much trust in the testimony of the time, of what
> the future will call the present. . . .
>
> Alternatively, one might simply abandon the idea of trying to
> right wrongs. One can do the good and proper thing for its own
> sake alone, and seek an inner freedom, thereby achieving a certain

independence with regard to what happens in the world. Sometimes right will triumph, sometimes it will be conquered. When belief in retribution and a settling of accounts beyond the grave wavers, and faith in the historian's verdict dims, the door opens to the endless reaches of inner freedom. Whoever passes through need never again suffer disappointment and mortification.[9]

This was the key to Segerstedt's self-view. Right sometimes wins and sometimes loses, but it is not your estimate of the likely outcome that decides the position you take. Segerstedt was not driven by a desire to be on the victors' side when history reached its verdict, nor by any dream of personal glory. He was quite unashamedly a genuine idealist: "Ideas alone can keep people on the human plane."

It was precisely this that made him the odd man out among Swedes in positions of power in the early stages of the war. The main problem, he saw, was not open pro-Nazism—that banner had only a limited appeal. Nor was it fear of Germany—that was both sensible and legitimate in a country so close to the Third Reich. But opportunism was another matter. As the historian Gunnar Richardson has noted in a recently published book, *Beundran och fruktan—Sverige inför Tyskland 1940–42 (Admiration and Fear: How Sweden Viewed Germany 1940–42)*, a line of thinking advocating readjustment, *anpassning*, ran from the political Right deep into social democracy. The outcome of the war seemed obvious: Germany would stamp its mark on the Europe of the future, and Sweden must adjust its role accordingly. Allan Vougt, editor in chief of a major Social Democratic newspaper, *Arbetet*, during the war and Sweden's defense minister immediately after it, expressed the essence of this position thus: "After all the shattering events that have occurred since 1938, a German victory must be a source of concern to the small nations, which surely many Germans realize as well. On the other hand, we have no right to doubt the honesty of the Germans' ambition to create a better Europe."[10]

This was written in July 1940. The deportation of Europe's Jews and Gypsies was in full swing. Like Switzerland, Sweden had closed its borders. Paulsson and Rothmund, the officials in charge of these two countries' alien commissions, had jointly arrived at the Columbus egg solution to the refugee issue—they asked Ger-

many to stamp a *J* in the passports of all Jews. For Segerstedt, this was the key point. Germany could conceivably win the war. But in that case, the moral battle would simply enter a new phase. In military terms, Sweden was neutral, but this was absolutely not the case when it came to fighting the Nazi paradigm.

What did Swedes do with Segerstedt's approach when the war ended? It was confined to the archives. After all, the fight had been won through *realpolitik*—Hitler and national socialism had been crushed. And the fact that Torgny Segerstedt died in March 1945, when the era he helped shape was ending, instantly left its mark on how his actions were viewed. A prominent conservative newspaperman, Gunnar Unger, who during the war was employed by the state board of information, came close to accusing Segerstedt of treason in an obituary: "He fought perhaps less for the sake of democracy, freedom, and humanity than for himself, the superior being, and he has zealously undermined our reputation abroad through his constant insinuations about the policy of neutrality that has been pursued in accordance with the wishes of the majority. He dared not advocate war yet had no plausible alternative to offer. This stance is both politically and morally irresponsible."[11]

Twenty years later, the end of the war seemed far more than a couple of decades away. Future problems? Surely they had nothing to do with the legacy of Hitler. A famous telegram of protest from Göring, framed and exhibited at the newspaper offices of the *Göteborgs Handels & Sjöfartstidning*, had become no more than a historical footnote. Torgny Segerstedt's final article dealt with "the eternal Closing of Ranks, collective thinking."[12] It proved prophetic in relation to the positions he had taken, which were largely omitted from public discussion.

The turmoil now created by the Nazi gold controversy appears at the intersection between morality and *realpolitik*. Access to wartime archives brings things into fresh focus.

In Sweden, the investigation has only just begun. A story is emerging that appears to scatter once and for all the claim of Swedish separateness. A pamphlet published in 1989 by journalist Maria-Pia Böethius, which attacked the prevailing view among Swedish historians and which was immediately called overzealous, turns out to be an understated version of the true facts. A former ambassador, Sven-Göran Hedin, and a radio journalist specializ-

ing in history, Göran Elgemyr, have together uncovered docu-
ments shedding new light on positions taken by the Swedish gov-
ernment during the war.

<div align="center">III.</div>

A year after the end of World War II, both Switzerland and
Sweden were under considerable pressure from the Tripartite Com-
mission, a body led by the United States with Britain and France as
deputies. The winning side was demanding the return of all the
looted gold acquired from Berlin. The Swiss had originally rejected
this demand. Since all gold transactions with the Third Reich had
taken place in accordance with normal business practices, they
could see no grounds whatsoever for complying with the repay-
ment demand.

The first round of negotiations in March 1946 had collapsed.
The chief Swiss negotiator, Walter Stucki, had left Washington in
protest. Now round two was under way. The Swiss were con-
fronted with evidence proving that they had taken possession of
large amounts of gold stolen from Belgium by Nazi Germany.
Their new tactic was to offer a "goodwill payment" without
conceding that they had been aware that the gold was war loot.
Originally, the Commission's claim was for $200 million, about
$1.9 billion in current prices. On the basis of available documents,
Commission experts had worked out that Switzerland had taken
delivery of stolen gold worth up to $289 million. The Swiss of-
fered $58 million in compensation without admitting that they
had any guilt in the matter.

A third of the stolen gold had been passed on to other states that
were neutral and nonaligned during the war—Sweden, Portugal,
Spain, and Turkey—and it was clear to everyone how the transac-
tions had been carried out. Germany had no means of paying for
the import of war material and strategically vital raw materials
with negotiable currency. Via the National Bank in the Swiss
capital of Bern, they were able to continually exchange gold for
Swiss francs or transfer the gold directly to the country whose debt
they were in. It was an adroit procedure. All the countries involved
had gold reserves in the Swiss National Bank's underground vaults.
When a major transaction was to take place between the Third

Reich and other countries, bank officials simply saw to it that the right number of gold bars was transferred from one deposit box to another once the deal had been completed.

It was an official at the Swiss National Bank who had come up with the idea of a multinational gold depository. In the autumn of 1942 he had visited Spain and Portugal to discuss mutual problems. On returning home, he wrote a three-page report in which he noted that in the future Portugal did not intend to accept gold as a means of payment from Berlin, "partly for political reasons, partly as a precautionary legal measure." But, he wrote, there was a solution: "Such objections would no longer apply if the gold were to pass through our hands. We should give this our consideration."[13]

In the spring of 1946, these notes were still a secret, withheld from everyone but the innermost circle of power in Switzerland. The whole world, however, could see that Switzerland had acted as a turnaround point for the Nazi gold. And the governor of the Swedish Central Bank, who had been a constant guest in Bern and Basel during the war, was well aware that Switzerland's role as an intermediary had been an essential precondition for Sweden's war trading. As the end of the war approached, in August 1944, the Swiss National Bank described the situation in sober terms: "These circumstances are not publicly known. Consequently, Sweden is not named in the press as a buyer of 'stolen gold.' Generally speaking, Switzerland is serving as a curtain for Sweden. Our country is giving them an alibi."[14]

But in the minutes of a Swiss National Bank executive meeting in May 1946, Swedish Central Bank governor Ivar Rooth put things in another light. According to Rooth, Emil Puhl, deputy governor of the German Reichsbank, had assured "a Swedish trade delegation" on February 18, 1943 that no stolen gold had been transferred to the Swedish Central Bank. All the gold received as payment in Sweden throughout the war had been "old gold," and no gold had been received after January 15, 1944. Thus, at a sensitive stage in the negotiations, a central Swedish figure in the affair corroborated the Swiss denials. A week later, Sweden's negotiations with the Allies were due to begin in Stockholm.

Rooth was obviously speaking against his own better judgment. But the record ends with a passage that in hindsight takes on new significance:

> In conclusion, Herr Rooth also declared that he had been totally convinced that Puhl had spoken nothing but the truth and that he had not signed over his soul to the National Socialist party. He had reached this conclusion as a result of the conversations between Puhl and Hechler [Director General of the Bank for International Settlement] that he had heard on occasion in Basel, conversations that without a shadow of doubt would have cost both gentlemen their lives had they come to the attention of the regime.[15]

Who was Puhl? There is a relevant document dated twenty days prior to the above record that states Rooth's position in relation to one of the prime movers of the stolen gold:

<div align="center">

AFFIDAVIT
Baden-Baden, Germany
May 3, 1946

</div>

EMIL PUHL, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. My name is EMIL PUHL. I was born on August 28, 1889 in Berlin, Germany. I was appointed a member of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank in 1935 and Vice President of the Reichsbank in 1939, and served in these positions continuously until the surrender of Germany.
2. In the summer of 1942, WALTER FUNK, the President of the Reichsbank and the Reich Minister of Economics, had a conversation with me and later with Mr. Friedrich Wilhelm, who was a member of the board of directors of the Reichsbank. FUNK told me that he had arranged with Reichsführer HIMMLER to have the Reichsbank receive on safe deposit gold and jewels for the SS. FUNK directed that I should work out the arrangements with POHL, who, as head of the Economic Section of the SS, was in charge of the administration of the economic aspects of the concentration camp program.
3. I asked FUNK what the source was of the gold, jewels, banknotes, and other articles to be turned over by the SS. FUNK replied that it was confiscated property from the eastern occupied territories but that I should ask no further questions. I protested against the Reichsbank handling this material. FUNK stated that we were to go

ahead with the arrangements for handling the material, and that we were to keep the matter absolutely secret.

4. I arranged subsequently with one of the responsible officials in charge of the cash and vault departments for receiving the material, and reported the matter to the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank at its next meeting. Pohl of the Economic Section of the SS, on the same day telephoned me and asked if I had been advised of the matter. I said I would not discuss it by telephone. He came to see me and reported that the SS has some jewelry on hand for delivery to the Reichsbank for safe keeping. I arranged with him for delivery and from then on deliveries were made from time to time, from August 1942 and for the following years.

5. The material deposited by the SS included jewelry, watches, eyeglass frames, dental gold, and other gold items in great abundance taken from Jews, concentration camp victims, and other persons by the SS. This was brought to our knowledge by SS personnel who attempted to convert this material into cash and who obtained in this connection the assistance of the Reichsbank personnel with FUNK's approval and knowledge. In addition to jewels and gold and other such items the SS also turned over banknotes, currency, and securities to the Reichsbank to be handled in the usual legal procedure established for such items. As far as the jewelry and gold was concerned, FUNK told me that HIMMLER and von KROSIGK, the Reich Minister of Finance, had reached an agreement that the gold and similar material was on deposit for the account of the Reich and that the proceeds resulting from the sale thereof would be credited to the Reich Treasury.

6. From time to time, in the course of my duties, I visited the vaults of the Reichsbank and observed what was in storage. FUNK, in the course of his duties, also visited the vaults from time to time.

7. The Golddiskontobank, at the direction of FUNK, also established a revolving fund which finally reached 10 to 12 million reichsmarks for the use of the economic section of the SS to finance production of materials by concentration camp labor in factories operated by the SS.

I am conversant with the English language and declare that the statements made herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Emil Puhl
Witness: Susan Schaeffer[16]

This testimony is taken from the records of the Nuremberg war trials. It was central to the evidence that brought the minister of economics Walter Funk a life sentence. And it was through this testimony that the world first heard confirmation from one of those responsible that the looting was so thorough that it even included the gold teeth of the Holocaust's victims, that it had been conducted as a carefully planned business project, and that Holocaust gold, too, had been part of Germany's trading with neutral countries. Eventually, testimony from SS officers and Puhl's own underlings resulted in Puhl himself being put on trial. In the last of the war crime proceedings, known as the Wilhelmstrasse trial, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment as the person chiefly responsible for managing the valuables from the Holocaust outside the SS structure.

In February 1943, Ivar Rooth had asked the Swedish government for advice on the matter of stolen property, following a statement just issued by the Allies. His own record states that he was told explicitly not to delve too deeply into the problem:

> At the beginning of February, I notified the trade minister of the following. In the view of the declaration from the British and other Allied governments that claims may be forthcoming on property deriving from the occupied countries, the Central Bank faced the risk that gold it had bought or might buy in the future from the Reichsbank could be placed in this category. As it seemed likely that the Reichsbank, having sold gold to the Central Bank for a total of SEK 70 million under a previous agreement, would apply to sell further quantities, the risk faced by the Central Bank was likely to grow.
>
> I therefore asked whether the issue of possible further gold transactions should be raised by myself in a letter to Puhl or in talks between Richert [Sweden's ambassador to Berlin] or Hägglöf [Foreign Office official] and Puhl. The reason being that I wanted to bring the British declaration to Puhl's attention and to request—in order to avoid any unpleasantness or losses for the Central Bank— that the Reichsbank should in confidence declare its readiness to supply only such gold as did not fall into the category described in the British declaration.
>
> In answer to my question, the minister of trade stated on February 12 that the government was of the unanimous opinion that there were insufficient grounds for raising the matter in any of the

ways I had proposed. There was, however, nothing to prevent me from raising it in passing during a personal conversation with Puhl.

On February 15 I received a letter dated February 10 from Reichsbank director Wilhelm, who is head of the bank's foreign affairs department. He wanted us to agree to raise the upper limit for our gold purchases from 70 to 105 million crowns. As a result of this, I raised the matter once again by the minister of trade and the finance minister. . . . On his own and the Government's behalf, however, he stood by the statements previously made to me in respect of this issue.

I pointed out that a matter of this nature was not something I alone could take responsibility for and said I would bring it before a meeting of the [Central Bank] executive board. The trade minister then authorized me to record in the minutes of the meeting that the government wished the Central Bank to agree to the Reichsbank request for further gold transactions but that the Central Bank should *not* make this conditional on a declaration from the Reichsbank regarding the nature of the affair. He did, however, repeat what he had previously told me—that there was nothing to stop me raising the question with Puhl in private.

I presented the matter at a meeting of the executive board on February 18. A view voiced by one of those present was that "the government has dismissed the risks rather too hastily."[17]

A week later, the question was, at the request of the Central Bank, put to Puhl in private by the financier Jacob Wallenberg. He promptly received a denial.

It was Emil Puhl who, in his capacity as the day-to-day manager of the Reichsbank's affairs, had approved the gold transactions of 1943–1944 when the Wallenberg empire, Sweden's largest business group, secretly accepted the equivalent of $1 million (worth about $9 million today) as reimbursement for stocks acquired from the German company Bosch in 1940. The Wallenberg group had agreed to act as a front in the United States to prevent confiscation of Bosch's American subsidiary. The records show that Jacob Wallenberg wanted to avoid having possibly contaminated gold paid directly to his company. He suggested to the Germans that they should secretly trade the gold into Swiss securities; they followed his advice. The transaction was completed in May 1944, with the Swiss National Bank acting as the buyer of gold shipped from Berlin as part of the deal.

In June 1944 Emil Puhl was received as a guest in Stockholm, with receptions and dinners given by both the government and top financiers, including the Wallenberg family. And his name appeared as an unofficial referee as late as August 1944, when Jacob Wallenberg tried to get the Swedish Central Bank's permission for yet another gold transaction. His request was denied.

Just three weeks after Puhl supplied his sworn testimony, Ivar Rooth, unaware of what his old friend had admitted, contended that the German banker had certainly not signed over his soul to Nazism. Henceforth, the chief German mover behind Sweden's war trading vanishes into the dark depths of history. The archives of the national newspapers contain not a single line about Puhl's testimony against the minister of economics Walter Funk and not the slightest word about the trial against his own person—events that were fundamental in showing that the Holocaust was not only about mass murder but also about money.

The war trials were conducted in the full glare of international publicity. The absence of Swedish interest in Puhl's case can only be explained as a process of mental repression. In 1941, he had been made a Knight Commander First Class of the Royal Order of The Pole Star, a prestigious Swedish decoration, and his circle of Swedish contacts was impressive. But those who did business with his assistance, or indeed who included him among their friends, have not subsequently commented on his testimony or on the verdict against him. And Swedish historians, in describing Sweden's situation in World War II, have never introduced him as the mastermind behind the stolen, bloodstained gold.

The Swiss have not been able to repress him so easily. The Swiss government's first line of defense before the Allies was that in the spring of 1945 it had agreed to comply with US demands that it cease dealing in gold. In other words, Switzerland tried to state that by its actions, it had shown that it was finally on the right side. While it was busy presenting this line of argument, Senator Harley M. Kilgore was disclosing to his committee in Washington the contents of four letters sent by Emil Puhl from Switzerland to Walter Funk in March and April of 1945. They reveal in detail how Puhl, only a month before the end of the war, persuaded the Swiss to accept three tons of gold. When, in their negotiations with the Allies, the Swiss denied having had any knowledge of the

origin of the German gold during the war, they were confronted with statements made by Puhl to his American interrogators: he had told them that Swiss National Bank officials knew they were receiving looted gold.

In closing his final letter to Walter Funk, dated April 6, 1945, Puhl looks back on yet another successful round of negotiations with the Swiss, despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles, and reveals the reason why it succeeded. "Personal contacts on this occasion, as always, were marked by the utmost friendliness, something that is of decisive importance whenever one negotiates. In other words, they should be cultivated at all costs."[18]

IV.

Are the Swiss and Swedish examples of countries secluding themselves from the deeper implications of the war singular aberrations, temporary deviations from a general standard of conduct, a result of their not being involved in the moral struggle?

Not so. Norwegian Jews who survived the Holocaust returned to find others living in their flats and houses. Their bank accounts had been cleaned out, their life insurance policies cancelled, and their personal possessions scattered. The special office created by the Norwegians in 1942 to handle the assets of Norwegian Jews, the Liquidation Board for Confiscated Jewish Property, did not cease to exist after the Liberation. It was renamed the Reparations Office, and some of the administrators were used as experts in defining the terms of retribution. The only officials sentenced for treason were those who had been members of the Quisling party. Thus, returning Jews trying to reclaim their assets could be facing officials who, three years earlier, had handled the authorized theft of their property. And part of the remaining assets of the Liquidation Board was used to pay the salaries of the administrators. The preliminary findings of the Norwegian investigation of the affair indicate that a total of 32 percent of the confiscated funds were used for the Board's operations. One Jewish family from Oslo, whose assets had been fixed at NOK 2 million in 1942, was informed in 1947 that only NOK 19,000 would be returned. The fact that the Jews had been the object of genocide, where the confiscation of their property was the first step in robbing them of

both their identity and their life, was never taken into consideration in the postwar settlement. Slightly more than one-third of the Norwegian Jews were killed within three months of their assets being seized.

The affairs of Norwegian seamen were attended to by a specially created authority, whereas the fate of the Jews scarcely entered the public eye. They were portrayed as just a handful of individuals who were victims of the war like everyone else, in a country where ten thousand lives had been lost. The uniqueness of their fate vanished from the historical account. Their status in relation to the resistance fighters was immediately apparent. At the end of the war, the Red Cross's white buses brought Norwegians home from the concentration camps. But the Liberation only applied to political prisoners. Surviving Norwegian Jews had to stay behind and eventually find their way home on their own. After the Liberation, Norwegian refugees in Sweden were given state grants for their journey home. The exceptions were those who were termed stateless Jews, often refugees from Germany who had come to Norway before the occupation and had managed to flee a second time. Among the persecuted, they were at the bottom of the pile. When Norwegian Prime Minister Nygaardsvold was asked why they were left to fend for themselves, he gave an ambiguous reply: "We do not want to refuse them entry to our country but it has not been our wish to use money to bring these people home."

In 1947, two members of the resistance movement were cleared of a charge of killing and robbing a Jewish couple who had tried to flee to Sweden. The evidence against them was strong, but the postwar climate swayed the court.

The Norwegian Constitution, dating from 1814, still applies in all respects except one. Section 2 originally stated that "Jews are excluded from access to the realm." This regulation remained in place until 1851, when the author Henrik Wergeland managed to have it removed as the result of a tenacious campaign. It was reintroduced by Vidkun Quisling. By referencing Norway's most important symbol of nationhood, the constitution that is celebrated every May 17, he was able to present the extermination of the Jews as a Norwegian-minded project, implemented by the Norwegians themselves, with the Germans at a distance.

In the last two years, a historian, Bjarte Bruland, and a journalist, Björn Westlie, have exposed a wound that has been festering ever since the war's end: who was involved in the handling of assets that the Quisling regime confiscated from Norwegian Jews? Such property, it turns out, was much sought after and was sold at auctions and at special property markets, where the customers were average Norwegians with full knowledge of where the items had originated. And those who had good contacts within the government agency managing the property were privy to special deals. The Adelsten Company, a clothing business that is now the second biggest in Norway, set up a nationwide chain of stores after the war and began its expansion by buying its main competitor at a fraction of the real value—a shop whose Jewish proprietor, as well as his wife and two small children, had been shipped off to the Holocaust. The son of the buyer was locally in charge of confiscated Jewish property. The only surviving member of the Jewish family, a son who now lives in London, has received a minuscule amount in compensation. When he wanted to restart the family business in 1945, the local bank refused to loan him money, stating that, after all, his standing as a creditor was not as good as his father's.

The orderly lists of stolen Jewish property, meticulously classified and evaluated, were easily accessible in Oslo's National Archive. Until they were found by Westlie, no one had bothered to look through them. And after his disclosures were published, marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Liberation, it took eight months before the matter turned into a national scandal and the government was forced to set up a commission of inquiry. The World Jewish Congress had asked Westlie to write a report in English, based on the material he had published in his newspaper report. The facts were already known in Norway, but when they were refloated by an official Jewish body, entering the Norwegian media via international news agencies, the affair suddenly became a matter of national and international concern. The Commission report, published on June 23, immediately caused a major political controversy concerning the terms of compensation.

The Commission members appointed by the state defined the task as a mathematical one. What was the market value of confiscated Jewish property during the war? How much of this sum

remained at the time of the Liberation? How much of this did Jews get back? The Commission members arrived at the sum of $13 million (in current prices) as a measure of the difference between the actual loss suffered and what those involved got back. But the majority on the Commission, not including the chairman, failed to take a position on the question of whether and in what way present-day Norwegian Jews should be compensated. Thus, in practice, they reiterated the basic approach that governed official action directly after the war: "all citizens have the legal duty to bear the burdens themselves that the war has imposed on them."

In a minority report, the two members appointed by the Mosaic Congregation, Bruland and psychologist Berit Reisel, made the point that the confiscations did not only affect individuals; the authorities had smashed a cultural sphere. Ultimately, providing compensation for what happened during the war would be a form of recognition—the majority of the population would finally acknowledge that a minority in its midst was almost eliminated. Due to the heat of the discussions, the Norwegian government appears to be agreeing with the minority position rather than accepting the narrow definition applied by the Commission's majority.

As Canadian Law Professor Irvin Cotler has stated in relation to the Norwegian situation, restitution "must compensate for the lives lost as well as the assets plundered; for the destruction of a community as well as the plundering of its individual members; for the unjust enrichment over time by the successor Norwegian governments and Norwegian citizens as well as for the lack of prompt compensation at the time of the 'takings'; for the fact that Norwegian Jews were the only group singled out for genocide...on account of their race."[19]

The controversy in Norway is an instructive case. The documents now coming to light as a result of the furor created by the Nazi gold affair in various parts of Europe clearly indicate that the Norwegians' behavior in relation to Jewish property is only one example of a general abuse in several occupied countries that was not confronted after the Liberation. It adds new dimensions to the problem of guilt. To the wartime collaborators another group has to be added—the profiteers, some of whom might even have been members of resistance organizations.

The money distributed after the war—restitution from the neu-tral countries and booty found in Germany—was handled by governments, with only a fraction going to agencies and organiza-tions dealing with refugees. Individual recompensation was largely ignored. And no real effort was made to investigate the myriad transactions in Germany and in the occupied countries where Jewish property had been "Aryanized." In 1962, in what amounted to an admission of guilt in the matter, the US Congress approved a token payment of $500,000 to the Jewish restitution successor organization.

In the general climate of a reconstitution of universal human rights, symbolized by the Allied victory, the "Non-Repatriable Victims of Nazism" were left without anyone to act on their behalf. Universalism was essentially defined as a reconstitution of sovereign nation-states in a liberated Europe. And when the Cold War agenda became the overriding issue for the US government, all states except Germany were allowed to define their war history with little regard for primary issues such as the Holocaust. The Swiss and Swedish handling of the matter is colored by their special problems as neutrals, but in terms of claiming a uniqueness with regard to universal issues, they were certainly not alone.

In the three Western zones of occupied Germany, the Allied armies were confronted by the task of handling seven million "displaced persons"—forced laborers, concentration camp victims, and prisoners of war. In Austria and Italy, the number of such individuals was smaller, but the problem was similar. Citizens of Western countries, most of them war prisoners, could easily be reintegrated. A large number of those with origins in Eastern Europe were unwilling to return to their native countries for fear of political reprisals. Jews were initially a small minority among the displaced, but their numbers rose dramatically when Poland entered a period of open anti-Semitism that included pogroms. The number of displaced Jews in Germany rose to 156,000 in 1946.

While the Americans eventually instituted a special status for this category in the US-administered sector of occupied Germany, allowing them to settle in separate camps, the British refused to implement such measures. Jews were forced into a mixed commu-nity of displaced persons. Some of their new comrades in these

camps had actively supported the Nazi Reich. Britain's policy reflected its status as a Palestine mandatory power. The British government feared the pressure of Jewish emigration to the Middle East and wanted to avoid adverse Arab reaction. A few thousand Jews remained in the last of the German camps until 1957. A German newspaper, commenting on the situation in this camp in 1953, called it "the waiting room of the unfortunate."

Another largely neglected chapter in postwar history is the forced deportation of twelve million persons of German origin from countries in Eastern Europe. The fact that ethnic cleansing on this scale could take place without causing long-term problems is remarkable. However, the fact that these displaced persons were on the whole successfully integrated into the Federal Republic has diverted attention from the constitutional implications of the process. By allowing a change of nationality under these circumstances, the Allies legitimized a continued definition of citizenship based on ethnicity. This now sets Germany apart from other Western nations. Classifying second-generation immigrants of non-German origin as temporary residents as distinct from those of German origin is an integral part of the ethnically based definition of being German.

David S. Wyman's and Charles H. Rosenzveig's *The World Reacts to the Holocaust,* a broad-based comparative history of national reactions to the issue, describes two prevalent postwar European strategies for escaping the moral issues. In Germany, attempts have been made to play down the uniqueness of the slaughter of the Jews by stressing similarities with other crimes against humanity. One such perspective put forward in the mid-1980s by historian Ernst Nolte caused a major controversy, the so-called *Historikerstreit.* Nolte was accused of a false universalization of the issue. The matter still cannot be considered settled. The strong feelings aroused by Daniel Goldhagen's accusations of widespread German complicity in the Holocaust indicate that the way people view the part played by Germans during the war is still a highly sensitive national issue.

The focus on German guilt, however, has generated a tendency to assume that countries occupied by Hitler were without guilt. In Wyman's and Rosenzveig's view, occupied countries have attempted

to universalize the victims, making no real distinction between the different forms of victimization.

Singling out Switzerland as the main culprit has drawn attention away from the fact that the moral conundrums posed by the Holocaust affected occupied countries as well. Homes, businesses, and valuables owned by Jews changed hands during the war. A number of governments discouraged survivors from confronting the new owners. The question of how to deal with the property of the millions of Jews who perished was given very little attention. In Eastern Europe, communism gave state authorities the chance to treat the Nazi confiscation of Jewish assets as an integral part of the renunciation of private property.

The controversy that has erupted in Norway illustrates a wider problem. Postwar nationhood in most occupied countries was built on myths of general resistance. Norway has only now been forced to confront the fact that its definition of wartime resistance largely excluded the Jews and that this exclusion continued in subtle ways even after the war. In France, where the complicity of the Vichy government had much wider ramifications, this conflict between a heroic mythology and the actual facts is even more apparent. It took the efforts of an American, Robert Paxton, to force French historians to start dealing with the issues.

Some 115,000 Jews living in the Netherlands were killed in the Holocaust, making the scale of the tragedy there the largest in any nation in Western Europe. There were subtle and not-so-subtle elements of anti-Semitism in the postwar reaction to this tragedy. In 1949, a former resistance fighter, the editor of an underground newspaper, set the Dutch Jews apart from the heroic, homespun *Nederlanderschap*. According to him, they "did not offer resistance against the pogroms." And, he claimed, "this lack of resistance came as no surprise. The Jews, who do not exert themselves when there is no chance of success, were not expected to fight. . . . The Jews may not be heroes, but they are certainly cunning. . . . Only when the Nazis reached out their claws for their capital and goods did the Jews awaken. And then they did very well indeed: with great craftiness, they were able to snatch away uncounted millions from the enemy."[20]

The story of Friedrich Weinreb gives an ironic twist to this perspective. Weinreb was a Dutch Jew who survived the Holo-

caust and was convicted in 1948 of embezzling money entrusted to him during the war by other Jews. In the sixties, the New Left catapulted him into prominence by describing him as a wartime fighter working against the establishment, continuously fooling the enemy, saving not only himself but also many other Jews. In 1942, he forged a German army document that listed Jews who were supposedly allowed to emigrate and used it to fool the officials in charge of deportation. Hundreds of people applied to be registered. Eventually Weinreb was arrested. Because the authorities believed that army officers had been behind the scheme as part of an operation to privately gain access to Jewish property, Weinreb was allowed to continue with his project, but this time he was used as bait. He was arrested once more when the Germans discovered that the false document had truly been Weinreb's invention. An official then decided to use Weinreb's talents for his own benefit. Weinreb was turned loose once again, this time with the task of helping to secure Jewish property. A number of Jews were actually saved as a result of his activities. The German authorities gave them a stay of deportation, hoping that they would inadvertently give a clue to the whereabouts of their hidden valuables. In February 1944, Weinreb went into hiding and stayed out of sight until the end of the war.

When his case was raised in the sixties, it sparked a countrywide debate on what courage and commitment had meant during the war. Conventions about heroism and cowardice were reexamined. According to Debórah Dwork and Robert-Jan van Pelt, dealing with the Dutch experience in *The World Reacts to the Holocaust,* the Netherlands—through a combination of circumstances, including the scale of the tragedy—has had to reconsider the mythology of resistance and nationhood to an extent that far surpasses that of other occupied countries. One result of this is now very evident: Dutch historians have been at the forefront of research into the material aspects of the Holocaust and the complicity of sections of the business community in aiding German industry during the war. Two Dutch researchers were the first to question the role of the Swedish Wallenberg group in relation to the Germans.

In other occupied countries, sensitive issues—such as complicity and collaboration, the failure of non-Jews to attempt to save their

Jewish compatriots, and the fact that the outside world offered very little in the way of rescue efforts—were largely avoided until the seventies and eighties. The crucial change came when these matters emerged as national issues in the United States, eventually influencing the European perception of them. The Nazi gold controversy is a prime example of this transatlantic interaction.

Without a state, Mazzini told his fellow Italians, "you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission as brothers into the fellowship of the people. You are the Bastards of Humanity. Soldiers without a banner, Israelites among the nations, you will find neither faith nor protection; none will act as sureties for you."[21]

This perspective remains true in an international system based on nation-states. To my mind, the deeper dimension of the Nazi gold controversy is that it reminds us of the fact that the Holocaust was only the climax of a policy whereby a state set out to exclude a casually classified group of citizens, positioning them as enemies of the "real," ethnically defined citizens, then making large segments of the population state accomplices by allowing them to profit from the elimination of the so-called enemy. Confiscation of Jewish property was an integral part of the Third Reich from the beginning. Before the Holocaust, the results of this policy were largely accepted as an unavoidable fact by Germany's neighboring states. Jews did not find faith or protection anywhere.

Besides all its other dimensions, the Holocaust was, on the grandest scale in history, a form of robbery combined with murder, with a network of victims, murderers, fences, and profiteers extending across a whole continent. Nazi gold has become a metaphor for stolen valuables of every kind—stocks and shares, bonds, rights of property, art, antiques, and jewelry. It is this murky swamp that is now seeing the light of day.

V.

European integration is in reality a question of war and peace in the twenty-first century. My deceased friend François Mitterand shared this view. He stated before the European Parliament in Strasbourg on January 17, 1995 that nationalism is war. I know that people do not like to hear this. . . . However it is no use burying one's head in

the sand. If there is no momentum towards continued integration, this will lead not only to a standstill but also to retrogression. But we have no desire to return to the nation-state of old. It cannot solve the great problems of the twenty-first century. Nationalism has brought great suffering to our continent.[22]

Helmut Kohl's speech in the Belgian city of Louvain last year is colored by the peculiar German predicament faced by Kohl's generation: how to shape a national faith without nationalism. It illustrates one aspect of the European project—how to avoid destructive competition between major states. There is a basic truth in Kohl's position. In Europe, the development of nation-states has been closely interlinked with the history of war. But it lacks emphasis on another aspect of European cooperation, namely, how to guard minority rights in a system of nation-states based on ideas of common history and cultural homogeneity.

Long ago, a historian wrote an open letter to a nameless minister whose office had yet to be established, in a government that had yet to be formed, in a state that had just arisen out of nothing. Like all the other people in this new state, the historian had been granted limited citizenship. He and his compatriots had lived without a constitution or a government for four years. At the time, he lived a stone's throw from the border, in a provincial city whose inhabitants had been forced to change both their nationality and their official language four times in seven decades. The young men of the city had twice in twenty-five years been ordered to fight against the nation that they were now part of once again. This city, the historian declared, would soon become the center of a continent.

The letter writer was Eugen Kogon, the point in history was the autumn of 1949, the state was the German Federal Republic, the city was Strasbourg, once again returned to France, and the letter was entitled "From the Future Capital of Europe."

Kogon had survived six years in the Buchenwald concentration camp. When he was liberated, he ended up in the American zone. His role as a prominent opponent of Hitler was enough to land him one of the most sought-after privileges of the time—permission from the occupying powers to publish printed reading matter for a German public.

In 1946, together with a close friend and political ally, newspaperman Walter Dirks, Kogon launched a quarterly magazine focusing on culture and politics, entitled *Frankfurter Hefte*. The shortage of paper decided the form it took: the thick volumes were packed with closely printed essays illustrated by drawings the size of postage stamps. But *Frankfurter Hefte* proved to be a roaring success. In less than a year, its circulation had reached sixty thousand. With its remorseless analysis of the Hitler years and its forward-looking commentaries on current events, the magazine filled an ideological vacuum.

In 1946, as part of the same political project, Kogon published the first historical study anywhere of the political structure behind the Holocaust: *Der SS Staat* (*The Theory and Practice of Hell*). One central feature of Kogon's analysis was the conclusion that the Third Reich was from the very start a European project, with racial demarcation as an instrument of the government. In 1938, Hitler had stated the matter clearly. He was "exporting only one idea, and that is not the idea of national socialism. It is the idea of anti-Semitism."[23]

Closely connected to this perspective were Kogon's reflections on popular support for political action. Hitler had built up his position as a future dictator from within a system of parliamentary democracy. It was on the basis of the support he commanded from an ethnically defined majority that he claimed absolute power as Germany's führer, the core of his project being the elimination of a minority group of citizens. For Kogon, the concept of popular sovereignty appeared dangerously equivocal. The idea of the people's right to decide is the very basis of democracy. But it has no built-in checks on abuses of power, whether directed at a nation's own minorities or at other nations.

At the time of publishing his open letter pointing to Strasbourg as the future capital of Europe, Kogon, as a German observer, had just witnessed the first session of the Council of Europe. It was a remarkable occasion, where leading European politicians gathered to discuss the future integration of their respective states. Kogon was one of many people there who were hoping that the meeting would lay the foundation for a European parliament with genuine power in important, if limited, spheres. One of the first tasks of

such a parliament would be to define human rights on a level higher than that of the national government.

In May 1946, Kogon took part in a congress in The Hague as a member of the European Movement, which involved six organizations who were working from different perspectives toward a united Europe. Among the prime movers at this meeting was Winston Churchill. The congress had a great impact on public opinion, and the debate on Europe took off in several countries. A few months later, the French government presented a proposal for a supranational community with the power to raise matters embracing an entire continent, which was supported by Britain and the Benelux countries. This led to the creation of the Council of Europe.

For Kogon, this was a moment of triumph. The occasion coincided with the founding of the Federal Republic. And the constitution of the new Germany included a clause for which Kogon and Dirks had fought for as long as they had published their journal— voluntary restrictions on national supremacy. The new Germany had written into its constitution that ensuring "peaceful and lasting order in Europe and between the peoples of the world" took priority over clear-cut national interests. The next task was to ensure implementation of the clause by binding Germany to the Council of Europe.

The dream of Strasbourg as the capital of Europe was highly symbolic. Should the province be called Alsace-Lorraine or Elsass-Lothringen? This was one of the questions that had led to three wars in less than seventy years. The battle for supremacy between the French and German languages had culminated in Hitler's total regimentation.

When Kogon wrote his open letter, the legendary cabaret "Barabli" had just had its first performance in Strasbourg. Its creator, Germain Muller, incapable like so many others in the province of defining himself as entirely French or German, satirized the problem by calling his first revue "Let's Stop Talking About It." The name "Barabli" was taken from a joke about how the Allies used to distinguish between real Germans and forcibly recruited soldiers from Alsace in the same prison camp. They held out an umbrella and asked the prisoners what it was called. The Germans always

replied *Ein Regenschirm* while the prisoners from Alsace replied in their own language, *E barabli.*

Kogon overestimated the experimental inclinations of Europe's established politicians. Two years later, the dream of a Council of Europe leading to a European Parliament was in question. Stagnation had set in at the Council's sessions, and the countries were at a loss as to what to do about it. Narrow national interests blocked their decisions.

Instead of focusing on restrictions on national sovereignty in regards to the implementation of human rights, the move towards Europe took the economic and security policy road. West Germany was linked to France, Italy, and the Benelux countries in the coal and steel community. Brussels, not Strasbourg, emerged into the limelight as the projected capital of a future Europe. It made little difference that Strasbourg eventually became the seat for the European Parliament. Real power was wielded by the bureaucrats and lobbyists in the corridors of Brussels.

The balance of terror gave the impression of having created firm rules for the European power game. But the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia illustrate almost too clearly the abuse of the concept of popular sovereignty that Kogon described as an ever-present dilemma. Milošević's, Tudjman's, and Karadzic's interpretations of the ethnic majority's right to use violence are echoes from the Third Reich. "Ethnic cleansing" means state-supported plunder. And the problems involved in settling such matters once they have occurred is only too evident. The right of individuals to regain stolen property was not in practice part of the Dayton agreement. The EU has shown itself incapable of mastering the situation. The present structure offers no guarantee that the exigency of unlimited ethnically based national authority will not resurface.

Strasbourg's eclipse saw the disappearance of a crucial idea cherished by the European Movement of the late 1940s—the creation of checks hindering the power politics of individual nations, in the form of a new, supranational system of law guarding minority rights. By manipulating public opinion, governments can still potentially present violations as an expression of popular will. Politicians such as Le Pen and Jörg Haider are setting the stage for ethnic confrontation as an element in European politics. And in a continent in which nations range in size from tiny Andorra to

Germany's 80 million, the struggle for dominance is always there, just beneath the surface.

The Nazi gold controversy is, hopefully, the beginning of a meltdown of the national mythologies relating to the Holocaust. Facts kept out of sight until recently are now widely available. The confrontation that brought the issue to life came from the outside, with the World Jewish Congress as the *agent provocateur* and the US Senate as the sounding board. It could be seen as the result of a seemingly paradoxical American mind-set: an enduring belief in universal values, shaped by strong tendencies towards particularism. The Jewish community, as one American minority among many, has been allowed to define its version of history to an extent that has never been reflected in Europe. The Holocaust has acquired an overwhelming national significance; in terms of the prominence given to the issue, only Israel surpasses the United States. But the American perspective is presented in strictly universal terms. The Eizenstat report is not a conventional official statement, dealing with the national agenda. It is an attempt to objectivize the matter, judging the question of property theft in a comparative perspective and from a moral point of view.

The Holocaust experience—truly unique, yet universal in its significance—has to be integrated into the various national projects that comprise Europe. Emancipatory provocation across borders is necessary to build an element of real universality into the European project. Lord Acton once tried to define the issue in relation to a specific mind-set: "Our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, Germans and Dutch alike."[24] A reflection written by Swiss author Adolf Muschg in relation to the gold controversy captures the heart of the matter: "It was a long time ago: now we are paying for the sleepless nights that we did not have because of Auschwitz; now we are overtaken by all the concerns that never affected us when it came to building up Europe, drowsing in the sleep of the self-righteous, a state of mind where tears turned dry."[25]

ENDNOTES

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