Inside front cover: Asian tourists in Paris. See Craig Calhoun on *Cosmopolitanism in the modern social imaginary*, pages 105–114: “Now, as then, cos-

mopolitanism lives a double life as a pop cultural evocation of openness to a larger world and a more systematic and academic claim about the moral sig-

nificance of transcending the local, even achieving the universal. Both have flourished, especially in good times and amid optimism about globalization. (*Cosmo*, as the magazine came to be called, was founded in 1886, riding the wave of a stock market boom not unlike those of the 1920s and the 1990s.)” Photograph © Richard Kalvar/Mag-

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*Daedalus* is designed by Alvin Eisenman
Daedalus was founded in 1955 and established as a quarterly in 1958. The journal’s namesake was renowned in ancient Greece as an inventor, scientist, and unriddler of riddles. Its emblem, a maze seen from above, symbolizes the aspiration of its founders to “lift each of us above his cell in the labyrinth of learning in order that he may see the entire structure as if from above, where each separate part loses its comfortable separateness.”

The American Academy of Arts & Sciences, like its journal, brings together distinguished individuals from every field of human endeavor. It was chartered in 1780 as a forum “to cultivate every art and science which may tend to advance the interest, honour, dignity, and happiness of a free, independent, and virtuous people.” Now in its third century, the Academy, with its more than four thousand elected members, continues to provide intellectual leadership to meet the critical challenges facing our world.
Jean Delumeau begins his classic study of fear in early-modern Europe with an account, drawn from the travel journals of Montaigne, of entering the great walls of the free imperial city of Augsburg, Germany, by night. Four massive gates, reinforced iron barriers and doors, sealed passageways, a drawbridge, and another bridge traversing a moat together offered a daunting prospect to outsiders while protecting the sixty thousand inhabitants of this prosperous Renaissance city from whatever might disturb their sleep. The city-dwellers had plenty to fear in 1580, the year of Montaigne’s arrival. If the Catholic and Protestant soldiers who had ravaged central Europe for decades had temporally laid down their pikes—agreeing to do so in the Peace of Augsburg (1555), brokered in the city itself—Ottoman armies still loomed to the east. To the west, in Montaigne’s native France, Christians continued their internecine religious wars without reprieve. Satan, too, lurked outside the city gates, along with demons on the open road, sorcerers and witches in the forests, and darkness itself. Each night wolves across Europe emerged from the black, together with thieves, vagabonds, and brigands—strangers and strange beings all—carrying the threat of violence, misery, and disease.

As the largest and richest city in sixteenth-century Germany, a commercial center and trading hub, Augsburg was in many ways unique—unsurprising then that Montaigne, who considered all men his compatriots and who delighted in foreign travel, should want to go there. Concurring with the popular estimation of the city as “the most beautiful in Germany,” he remarked on the surprising tolerance of its inhabitants, Lutheran and Catholic parishioners who, he claimed, intermarried often. In such respects the city was a comparative oasis, once inside. But its heavily fortified

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efforts to keep terror beyond the gates reveal a more general phenomenon, one that Delumeau describes as the “permanent dialogue with fear” of so many Europeans in this age— as well as so many before and since. His historical account reminds us of what anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists might illustrate in different ways: L’homme est un animal qui a peur. Fear has a natural presence in social life.

Whether this fear is ineradicable is something that witnesses to our own age’s war on terror could stand to ponder. No doubt, a great many contemporary fears, like those of the inhabitants of sixteenth-century Augsburg, are figments of frenzied imaginations: devils beyond the city gates. Yet to deny in an age of global terrorism that there is more to fear than fear itself would be naive. Indeed, one of the central tensions that all defenders of open societies— all cosmopolitans— must face in the early twenty-first century is how to balance legitimate concerns, and our responses to them, with commitments to international fellowship, cooperation, hospitality, and trust.

Montaigne’s entrance into Augsburg symbolizes the difficulties of achieving that balance. For Montaigne was an early cosmopolitan; he had branded the words of Terence— Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto— in the rafters above his study in the family chateau, an hour outside Bordeaux. As the word— from kosmos (universe) + politês (citizen) — implies, a cosmopolitan views the world through the prism of the city, polis, in which each of us is a member, safe within its walls. The tension between envisioning that universal city and the effort to make the world in its image is revealing. For, like Montaigne entering free imperial Augsburg, all who would dwell in the universal city must overcome the ramparts of fear. As Europeans and Americans today insist on strengthening their walls and tightening their defenses, it is worthwhile looking a little more closely at the history of the cosmopolitan venture and the concerns that it has continually raised.

“Socrates was asked,” Montaigne writes, “where he came from. He replied not ‘Athens,’ but ‘The world.’ He, whose imagination was fuller and more extensive, embraced the universe as his city, and distributed his knowledge, his company, and his affections to all mankind, unlike us who look only at what is underfoot.”3 Although Socrates may not have said anything of the sort, already by Roman times he was widely regarded as the first of the world’s citizens. Here Montaigne draws on that legacy, most likely borrowing his words from Cicero, who tells us in the Tusculum Disputations, “When Socrates was asked which country he belonged to, he replied, ‘The world’; for he regarded himself as an inhabitant and citizen of every part of it.”4 Socrates, a mundanus, one who dwells in the world, was also mundi, of the world. Epictetus shares these descriptions in Greek in the Discourses, broadening only the scope: “If what philosophers say about the kinship between god and man is true, what else is left for men than to follow the example of Socrates, and when one is asked where one is from, never to say ‘I am an Athenian,’ or ‘I am a Corinthian,’ but ‘I am a citizen


of the universe?’”5 Plutarch likewise praises Socrates in De Exilio for saying that “he was no Athenian or Greek, but a ‘Cosmian’ (as one might say ‘Rhodian’ or ‘Corinthian’) because he did not shut himself up” within the narrow limits of Greece.6

What might these descriptions mean? Unlike his Sophist contemporaries, Socrates, we know, was not born a traveling man; he only ventured beyond his native Athens on several occasions during military campaigns. To describe him as a cosmopolite then may seem odd. Indeed Montaigne judges Socrates’s famous refusal to choose exile over death at his trial as a “fastidious attitude for a man who considered the world his city.” Would it not have been better to venture forth, Montaigne wonders, judging that for his part “I shall never, I think, be so broken or so strictly attached to my own country” as to do what Socrates did.7

Socrates chose instead to find the world in his city, the teeming metropolis of Athens, rather than the city in his world. He embraced there non-Athenians as students and friends. But it was less this acknowledged openness to foreigners (limited in practice, in any case, to Greeks) than his readiness to trace the frontiers of a greater kingdom in the midst of his own that most appealed to his later, classical admirers. For Epictetus, a Stoic, the true mark of the cosmopolite was the recognition, via reason, that “the greatest and most important and comprehensive of all things is the system in which men and god are associated.” Socrates clearly understood that system, understood that his true homeland was not the corner on which his paltry body was thrown down at birth. Why then, Epictetus demanded, “should not a man who understands this call himself a citizen of the universe? Why not a son of god?”8 Plutarch, who was often critical of Stoic doctrines, nonetheless makes a similar point, immediately following his discussion of Socrates the “Cosmian,” with a fragment of poetry: “Seest thou yon boundless aether overhead / That holds the earth within its soft embraces?” “This,” Plutarch continues, “is the boundary of our native land, and here no one is either exile or foreigner or alien….Here are the same fire, water, and air … the same laws for all, decreed by one commandment and one sovereignty….Here one king and ruler, [one] God.”9 The true homeland of the Cosmian lies in the heavens, and in the universal laws of reason and god.

Regardless of how little these characterizations tell us about Socrates’s actual views, they serve nicely to draw out a number of important tensions that have accompanied cosmopolitanism from the outset. First, they beg the question of the relationship between the land of one’s birth and upbringing – that random piece of land where one’s paltry body is thrown into being, the polis writ-small – and the broader cosmo-polis, the universal city. Those who tried Socrates infamously believed that the two alle-


8 Epictetus, I.9.

9 Plutarch, On Exile, 601a – b.
giances were incompatible. And though Socrates himself denied the charge, he was forced to pay for his consistency with his life, remaining true only in death to the laws of the city of Athens and to those of his higher calling. We may be inclined to feel that a less chauvinistic regime would not demand this choice: had not Socrates in fact legitimately served both the polis and the cosmopolis by thinking globally while acting locally? Perhaps, but that possibility alone does not remove the tension itself—nor does it put to rest the suspicion that the cosmopolitan’s claims to allegiance rely rather heavily on a rejection, whether tacit or explicit, of the laws and norms of one’s native land.

This can be seen much more clearly in the teachings of a figure who is sometimes also described as the first cosmopolitan, the Cynic Diogenes. “Socrates gone mad,” as Plato called him, Diogenes saw himself, in any event, as a disciple of the Athenian sage. According to the Epicurean philosopher Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes the Cynic was “A homeless exile, to his country dead, / A wanderer who begs his daily bread,” a man who, when asked from whence he came, described himself as a citizen of the universe (kosmopolitē). Kosmos, as the scholar H. C. Baldry reminds us, here means the whole of nature, the universe—not mankind. Kosmopolitēs, in other words, is a long way from cosmopolitan in any modern sense, a fact that comes across clearly when we appreciate that for Diogenes, as for the Cynic followers of Socrates more broadly, to be a citizen of the universe was overwhelmingly a negative ideal. Far from implying, say, the universal fellowship of all human beings, Diogenes’s description of himself as a kosmopolitēs implied his rejection of the norms and standards of civilized society as understood in its locus classicus, the polis. Rather than suggest that he was at home in every city, Diogenes’s description signified that he was indifferent to them all. A nomad without a fixed home, Diogenes the cosmopolite is a child of the universe, nature, and reason—but a stranger to men.

If the extreme case of Diogenes helps to draw out a tension implicit in cosmopolitanism from the start (the potential conflict between one’s allegiance to the part and to the whole), it also hints at a second characteristic worthy of our consideration: the ironically cult-like disposition of its early adherents. While the first cosmopolitans might have claimed the universe as their true home, they were at the same time surprisingly quick to recognize only those fellow citizens who perceived the world as did they, through the lens of reason. Socrates may not have looked contemptuously upon those lacking reason—he himself claimed to know nothing—but many of his disciples clearly did, above all the Cynics, who regarded the great mass of mankind as bumpkins and fools, slaves to prejudice, chauvinism, and partial attachments. To the extent that the Cynics can be said to have had countrymen at all, they were other sophoi, wise men like he, scattered across the face of the globe.


This cosmopolitan tendency to view oneself as a creature apart is admittedly less pronounced in Stoic doctrine, particularly in its middle and later instantiations. Whereas an early Stoic like Chrysipus could stress that universal citizenship was open only to those who lived in keeping with universal laws, later Stoics tended to place greater emphasis on the unity of all humankind, governed alike by a divine principle of rationality, the logos. Yet even here the sectarian tendency is often not far below the surface, as in the passage from Epictetus cited above, after which he proceeds to argue that it is only “rational creatures,” those who “understand the administration of the universe,” who can properly be called a “citizen of the universe” and “a son of god.” “They alone are qualified by nature to associate with god, being connected to him by reason.”13 The citizen of the universe belongs to a divine elect.

Still, the thrust of Stoic doctrine was toward emphasizing the universal capacity for reason, and hence the potential fellowship of all in the broader cosmopolis that transcended any individual polis or state. Epictetus, after all, had been a slave, and admitted both slaves and women into his circle of followers. One of his admirers, the emperor Marcus Aurelius, brings out well the potential universal dynamic of Stoicism in a celebrated passage from his Meditations:

If we have intelligence in common, so we have reason (logos), which makes us rational beings, and that practical reason which orders what we must or must not do. If so, then the law is also common to us and, if so, we are citizens. If so, we share a common government. And if so, the universe is, as it were, a city. For what other common government could one say is shared by all mankind?14

But if all who exercise their reason may be citizens of the universal polis, might not a truly universal state, ruled in keeping with the logos and natural law, make citizens of all? The emperor’s words point to a third possible tension lurking in the early cosmopolitan imagination: the impulse to build a cosmopolis by extending the rational polis to the ends of the earth. Might not the truly cosmopolitan state be an empire of the world?

The prospect of a cosmopolitan empire may well seem incongruous, a contradiction in terms. But in the ancient world, the most resolute force for breaking down the walls of the self-contained polis and knitting together the varied peoples of the world was first the emperor Alexander and then the legions of Rome. Plutarch undoubtedly waxed romantic when he said of the Macedonian warlord that he “desired to render all upon earth subject to one law of reason and one form of government and to reveal all men as one people.”15 It was nonetheless a seductive thought, appealing to many Romans, who found it flattering to think of the patria as an embryonic universal state. Livy famously seeded that thought in the first book of The Rise of Rome, where he records that Romulus descended from heaven after his death in order to appear before the citizen Proculus Ilius with a providential message: “Go announce to the Romans...

13 Epictetus, I.9.


that the gods in heaven will that my Rome shall be the capital of the world.”

In this vision, the true cosmopolis lay on the Tiber, its citizens masters of the universe.

Most Stoics, notably Cicero and Seneca, refrained from fully conflating the cosmopolis and the patria, working out instead theories of concentric duties, carefully relating the part to the whole. The practical effect of such speculation, however, was to reduce considerably the tension that had dogged Socrates and Diogenes between particular and general allegiance – between the laws of one’s country and universal law. The growth of the empire had much the same effect. Derek Heater points out, “As the Roman imperium expanded so it became highly convenient to relate local laws to general principles applicable to all. Thus, in the fullness of time the Romans came to equate the lex naturae (the law of nature) with their lex gentium (the law of peoples).” In serving Rome, it seemed, one served the universal will.

That comfortable – and comforting – conflation of one’s own values with those of the world has proved a recurrent temptation for cosmopolitans from imperial Rome to revolutionary Paris to twentieth-century New York. Cosmopolitan provincialism we might call the attitude in its milder form, of the sort caricatured by Saul Steinberg in his memorable View of the World from Ninth Avenue. Such narrow condescension is admittedly just a variation on the much broader human tendency to parochialism and prejudice, as evident in Podunk as in Paris. But just as it is especially galling to encounter cosmopolitans whose only claim to the label is the drink they hold in their hand, so was it maddening at times to be in Rome without the inclination to do as Romans do. A good many on the fringes of the Empire (or the countless conquered peoples within, we can be sure) received lofty pronouncements about the brotherhood of all while wailing and gnashing their teeth.

Jews and Christians were certainly among that number, though the latter would eventually turn the tables on their erstwhile oppressors, countering the persecutory cosmopolitanism of the likes of Marcus Aurelius, who vehemently attacked the followers of Jesus, with a cosmopolitanism all their own. Once again, it may seem strange to think of cosmopolitanism – or Christianity – in this light. Yet in the genealogy of the cosmopolitan tradition that ultimately flourishes in the eighteenth century and the writings of Kant, Christianity rivals Stoicism in order of importance. The two movements were far from unrelated. Many early Christians, most notably Saint Paul, were familiar with and influenced by Stoic teachings, though it is a question of some debate how much. Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan overtones are clear in numerous scriptural passages. In the renewed self born in Christ, Paul tells us, “there is no Greek or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all, and is in all.”


17 Heater, World Citizenship, 21.


19 Colossians 3:11. All biblical citations, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the New International Version, freely available online at www.biblegateway.com.
those baptized in Christ and clothed in Christ, we are told again in the Letter to the Galatians, “there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female.” And finally, in what is arguably the most striking such passage from Paul, the apostle writes to the Christian community in the great Roman city of Ephesus in Asia Minor to explain that “you are no longer foreigners and aliens, but fellow citizens with God’s people and members of God’s household.”

The original Greek of this passage is particularly revealing. The members of this new community cease to be xenoi (ξένοι) – foreigners – and also parakoi (πάροικοι), what the ancient Greeks called metics, resident aliens who were allowed to live in the polis but denied the rights of citizens. Instead, Christians are to be sympolitai (συμπολίται – cives in the Vulgate), fellow members or citizens of the polis and, what is more, members of the inner sanctum of God’s own οἴκειοι, from aikos, or household – what Aristotle took to be the fundamental building block of all cities. Strictly speaking there can be no xenophobia in Christ’s kingdom. All will be welcome, from strangers and outcasts to tax collectors and prostitutes, as full citizens in the city of God, a realm of universal harmony, fellowship, and peace.

It is the metaphor of the city, of course, built up from the intimacy of family bonds in the household of Christ, that St. Augustine would make famous in his magnum opus, the *City of God*. Augustine takes his title, *De Civitate Dei*, from several passages in the Psalms, which employ that phrase in association with Zion/Jerusalem. In Augustine’s reckoning, however, the city of God is neither a temporal nor geographic place, but rather a community scattered throughout the world and throughout time. Comprised of the mystical fellowship of the righteous and the saints, the city of God coexists in conflict with the city of man, the city of earthly striving whose inhabitants view the cosmos through the narrow prism of their own self-love and contingent needs. It is with reason that the archetypal earthly cities – Cain’s Cain-och and Romulus’s Rome – were founded on fratricide, for they are ever places of violence. But the city of man will be leveled at the end of time, just as “eternal” Rome itself was sacked in 410 shortly before Augustine began his master work, giving way to the final triumph of the heavenly city, the true Eternal City, the New Jerusalem whose kingdom shall know no end.

Numerous commentators have pointed out that Augustine’s conception of the two cities, though playing centrally on the Jewish antithesis of Babylon and the promised land of Jerusalem, also succeeds in Christianizing the Stoic division between the universal cosmopolis and the provincial polis or state. The true citizens of the city of God are once again, as in early Stoicism, an elect with the ability, power, and grace to see the universal ends of existence. Those who dwell in the city of man, by contrast,

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21 Ephesians 2:19.

22 See Augustine, *City of God*, XI.1. The passages in the Vulgate and Septuagint are Psalms 45:5, 47:2, and 86:3, and in the New Revised Standard Version are Psalms 46:4, 48:1, and 87:3.

conceive their duties and purpose parochially, according to a narrow and restricted vision of humanity and the world.

Similarly, whereas the Stoic (and Socratic) division between the universal and the particular opened up the potential, if not always the reality, of conflict between the two, the Christian separation of the heavenly and earthly cities created an analogous prospect. True, the Christian injunction to render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s ostensibly removed this conflict altogether, ceding the political realm of earthly striving to the directors of the city of man. But from the earliest days of the church, when martyrs and millenarians were prepared to defy the authority of Rome, through to the struggles of Martin Luther – or Martin Luther King, Jr. – there have always been those who believed that to build God’s city one must challenge the city of man.

In practice, though, just as in Stoicism, an easier accommodation with local authority was more common. Indeed, as soon as they possessed the power, Christians proved that they, too, could be ruthless in persecuting all who resisted incorporation into the new kingdom. The city of God, after all, stood “against the pagans,” and pagans, it became clear, were not welcome there. When a group of bishops assembled in Toledo in 681 and called on the civil authorities to “behead all those guilty of non-Christian practices of whatsoever sort,” they were perhaps being somewhat shrill. But they were not acting far outside the norm. Clearly Christian “cosmopolitanism” could be just as ruthless as the variety proffered by Marcus Aurelius, as far too many Jews, Muslims, and “heretics” would learn in succeeding centuries, if they had not done so already.

Augustine himself would hardly have been surprised by these developments, knowing only too well that the history of the world presented a “vast mass of evils.” And because no one could know until the end of time who were the true citizens of the city of God, it was only to be expected that those of the earthly variety would mingle freely within the holy gates, using, perversely, even the church itself for their own ends. In the meantime, another metaphor presented itself to Augustine – not of the comfort and safety of the city-dweller, but of the loneliness of the wanderer, the pilgrim exiled and now looking for a final resting place, a true home. Aristotle had said that “he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a city (apopolis), is either a bad man or above humanity.” Augustine in effect declared that this was the fate of us all.

There is irony in this metaphor of the Christian as exile, banished from Eden. For it was precisely the metaphor that Christians themselves, among others, would use to characterize the “wandering Jew,” in cruel echo of Abraham’s own claim before the Hittites, “I am an alien and a stranger among you.” To be an outcast, without land or a city of one’s own, would prove, as is known all too well, a dangerous fate. But the irony is even greater still. For the “pilgrim” church, founded on the bedrock

24 Ramsay MacMullen, *Christianity & Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 16. The words are MacMullen’s own, part of a gripping chapter on Christian persecution in this period.


of Rome, saw itself as the heir to the majesty of the eternal city, and, like it, claimed *dominium mundi*, dominion of the world. The empire of the church would be catholic – *katholikos*, universal – and a revivified Rome would serve that end. From Constantine to Charlemagne to the Medieval Popes to the Habsburg Charles V, the dream (and imperfect reality) of a holy empire extending over the face of the globe made a mockery of the metaphor of the Christian wayfarer, living in exile in the world, a friendly stranger to all peoples, an enemy to none.

It was partly in reaction to that contradiction (one among others) that Christians and Classicists alike returned, *ad fontes*, to the wellsprings of their traditions, hoping to find in the unsullied wisdom of the ancients and the early church further insight into what it meant to be human in the world. The *studia humanitatis*, in this respect, when combined with a growing impatience with Christian hypocrisy and strife, would bear fruit in the sixteenth century when itinerant scholars like Erasmus, Justus Lipsius, and his friend, Michel de Montaigne, revitalized the cosmopolitan message imbedded in both the Christian and Stoic traditions. Casting scorn on the Catholic ideal of a world empire wrought by war, Erasmus begged in his *Querela Pacis* (1521), *The Complaint of Peace*, that “the promoters of bloodshed between nations . . . reflect, that this world, the whole of the planet called earth, is the common country of all who live and breathe upon it.” And he urged his Christian brethren to remember that “all men, however distinguished by political or accidental causes, are sprung from the same parents,” a proposition that he extended even to the East. “Is not the Turk a man – a brother?” he challenged.\(^\text{28}\) For genuine Christians, enjoined to love their neighbors as themselves, it was morally incumbent to treat all human beings as members of the human family – not as Catholics, Dutchmen, or scholars, or any other particular sort, but as human beings *qua* human beings. Justus Lipsius, Erasmus’s countryman and a Christian humanist of similar stature, made much the same point in crafting his influential Neo-Stoic message that blended Christian principles with those of Cicero and Seneca. Considering himself, like the man Erasmus dubbed “Saint Socrates,” a citizen of the world, Lipsius argued that ties to country were but “external and accidental.” As for the foreigners beyond our borders, he asked, “Are they not men sprung out of the same stock with thee, living under the same globe?” “The whole world is our country, wheresoever is the race of mankind.”\(^\text{29}\) Montaigne entirely agreed: “Not because Socrates said it, but because it is really my feeling, and perhaps excessively so, I consider all men my compatriots, and embrace a Pole as I do a Frenchman, setting the national bond after the universal and common one.”\(^\text{30}\)

Montaigne was prepared to take that sentiment further, arguing in effect that even cannibals are people, too, in his celebrated essay “Des Cannibales,” which pleaded for Europeans’ tolerance and


understanding as they encountered the very different cultures of the New World. There is poignancy to that plea, as in Erasmus’s and Lipsius’s calls for international peace and fellowship, coming as they did amidst the consolidation and growth of European empire across the seas, and of the bitter religious struggles at home that would rage at least until 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia. It is strangely symbolic that the word cosmopolite in French makes a first, fleeting appearance in the sixteenth century, at almost the very time Montaigne wrote. But it would not register an indelible impression until the eighteenth century, the siècle des lumières. Only then, more fully conscious of the horrors of intolerance and the costs of oppression, could small groups of enlightened Europeans and Americans begin the task of drawing out the implications of the cosmopolitan doctrines that had preceded them, slowly secularizing, politicizing, and proselytizing the Stoic and Christian belief that all human beings were God’s creatures, that all were worthy citizens in the universal city of humanity. Defending tolerance, while preaching humanity’s common patrimony of reason, they asserted the equality of all men (and gradually of all women, too), putting forth a doctrine of rights owed to every human being by virtue of being human. In unprecedented fashion, enlightened authors began to argue against empire, as Sankar Muthu has demonstrated in a rich and important book. And they praised the benefits of foreign travel and international openness, commerce, and exchange.

That is a much larger story, one that has been told well, most recently by a contributor to this volume, who reminds us that to study cosmopolitanism in the age of its greatest articulation, the Age of Enlightenment, is to confront the need to move beyond theory to the realm of cultural practice. Theorists could—and did—write nobly in the eighteenth century, and in greater volume than ever before, of the importance of cosmopolitan ideals, of the need to embrace the foreign in our midst, to recognize the common humanity of men and women beyond our borders, to be, as Diderot put it memorably, “strangers nowhere in the world.” But it was ultimately the attempt to put those ideals into practice—to realize them in person, not only in print—that constitutes the great, unfinished legacy of this cosmopolitan age. As the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah says, cosmopolitanism is less a solution than a challenge. In small enclaves like Masonic lodges and houses of global commerce in the eighteenth century, in the international republic of letters and the republican international, men and women began to take up that challenge, seeking to realize a world that transcended frontiers, that emphasized the common humanity of those within their midst, and that broke down the ramparts of fear that would keep human beings apart.


However imperfect these efforts, we should be grateful for them; such men and women were pioneers. But we should also pay heed to the reactions they provoked. For, consistent with the themes of anti-cosmopolitan thinking both before and since, they remind us once again of the defenses that men and women will put in place to guard their citadels, to surround citizens of the world or keep them beyond the gates. A “sect,” opponents cried, a dangerous “cabal,” a “conspiracy” intent on undermining altars and thrones–these were the charges that cosmopolitans and their enclaves drew in the eighteenth century and well after.35 “Rootless cosmopolitans”–freemasons and philosophers, international financiers and Jews–dissolved the natural bonds of blood, family, and soil that kept us grounded in the world. Abstract and anonymous, like the cities in which they drifted–cesspools of corruption, disaffection, and anomie–cosmopolitans were cold calculators, creatures of reason who conceived grand schemes for humanity but failed to relate to human beings. Cosmopolitans were traitors, their enemies charged, who undermined the natural order and spurned the sublime affections of patriotism and love. And they were hypocrites who, however much they might protest the fact, were bent on world conquest, craving power in place of peace. When, at the end of the century, French Revolutionaries publicly declared their cosmopolitan zeal, enfranchising world citizens like Joseph Priestly and Thomas Paine, while sending their armies out to conquer tens of thousands more, not a few observers believed they had seen the true face of cosmopolitanism in the glint of a sword.36

We are familiar with the most vehement movements that made use of these themes, the volkish and nationalist parties of the extreme right that flourished into the twentieth century and reached their nadir in fascism and Hitler. Stalin likewise inveighed against rootless and evil-minded cosmopolitans, by which he meant Jews, for their alleged treason to the fatherland; he dealt with them accordingly. But the resistance to cosmopolitanism since the eighteenth century has been much broader and more diffuse than that. It is worth recalling that Rousseau, whose position on this (as in most matters) was conflicted, nonetheless decried the corruption of cities and the “sect” of their philosophic champions, those prétendues cosmopolites “who, justifying their love of the fatherland by means of their love of the human race, boast of loving everyone in order to have the right to love no one.”37 Nor should such criticism be lightly dismissed, for it raises the important question, posed seriously by Burke among others, of just

35 On these and the following charges leveled in the eighteenth century, see Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).


how one can love humankind in any meaningful way, without first loving our own “subdivision,” our own “little platoon.”

Even Kant, the greatest of cosmopolitanism’s eighteenth-century advocates entertained doubts on this score, and such doubts have long endured.

In nineteenth-century American fiction – Emerson, Melville, and Poe, for example – the cosmopolitan is frequently depicted in decidedly negative terms as a chameleon, untrustworthy, insincere, all surface and no substance. Even more recently, Appiah, a resolute defender of cosmopolitanism, opens his book on the subject by acknowledging the negative associations the word still frequently invokes: “You imagine a Comme des Garçons-clad sophisticate with a platinum frequent-flyer card. . . . And you wince.”

The longstanding suspicion that the cosmopolitan is a creature apart – a poseur, an elitist, a well-healed fop – is very much alive, as is the concern that cosmopolitans would obliterate all manner of difference in the name of universal values. In the nineteenth century, this was a favorite theme of Marx and Engels, who railed against what they called the “private-egotistical cosmopolitanism of free trade,” while describing how the artillery of the market would knock down all Chinese walls. It is not difficult to hear overtones of that concern in the language of contemporary opponents of globalization. And something of the same fear is evident in the most determined defenders of multicultural difference, who tend to see cosmopolitanism as they see the Enlightenment: a hegemonic force masquerading as truth. In these views, the cosmopolis resembles more the cold and anonymous city of global capital portrayed in Don DeLillo’s novel of that name than a paradise on earth.

As for the oldest of anti-cosmopolitan accusations – that the citizen of the world is a threat to the fatherland – we need only open a newspaper in Europe or America to know that this fear is still with us, and busy putting up walls. Cosmopolitans might choose to protest that charge, but perhaps it is better simply to own it, taking our cue from Montaigne, who confessed that he felt all men were his compatriots – “perhaps excessively”:

I am scarcely infatuated with the sweetness of my native air. Brand-new acquaintances that are wholly of my own choice seem to me well worth those other common chance acquaintances of the neighborhood. Friendships purely of our own acquisition usually surpass those to which community of climate or of blood binds us. Nature has put us into the world free and unfettered; we imprison ourselves in certain narrow districts, like the kings of Persia, who bound themselves never to drink any other water than that of the river Chaspes, stupidly gave up their right to use any other waters, and dried up all the rest of the world as far as they were concerned.


39 Kant addresses these doubts in his Doctrine of Virtue and his lectures on ethics from 1793. See the discussion in Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire, 152 – 155.


A country that will not make room for such “bad” citizens as this should be moved to a place where the waters run more freely, so that others might drink from the wellsprings of the world in peace.
Cosmopolitans, as French philosopher Denis Diderot put it in his encyclopedia of 1751, are “strangers no where in the world.”¹ By the time Diderot wrote, the term had become a commonplace. Since then, the cosmopolitan has remained largely that – a term. As a result, the history of cosmopolitan language, the history of the idea, has been carefully and cogently written. Excellent accounts now exist of writers and philosophers, largely from the early modern period, who wrote idealistically and learnedly about the cosmopolitan.² We know very little, however, about cosmopolitan practices, about actual behavior that might legitimately warrant the label, in any historical period, including our own. As long as wars have their day-to-day histories, and their antithesis remains an idea in search of an instantiation, the critics and defamers of the cosmopolitan will continue to point to its vapidity, its pie-in-the-sky, no-one-ever-went-to-war-under-the-flag-of-the-cosmopolite irrelevance.

Writing such a history of lived practices and habitudes requires sources, finding actual institutions or events

that might legitimately be interrogated to reveal behavior reasonably described as cosmopolitan. For the period of the eighteenth century, when the cosmopolitan was used widely as a compliment, one way of proceeding might be to start off by sampling the behavior of those who did not value it. In early-modern Europe, an authoritarian—specifically clerical—vision of the way traditional society should behave existed. Take the Papal territory of Avignon, for example. The Roman Catholic Inquisition gave Avignon the distinction of being the only French-speaking city policed by an inquisition. The city’s inquisitional archives, lost up until 1677 and then mercifully complete up to 1790 (when the French revolutionaries took over the city), tell a tale of bizarre phobias and cruelties, along with a carefully cultivated pursuit of absolutist political goals, all in the service of the church. Indeed the Avignon authorities established a more prosecutorial atmosphere than their rather sluggish counterparts in Spain, Venice, and Naples.³

The Avignon interrogations and letters back to Rome reveal what clerical anti-cosmopolites found most dangerous. Papal authorities fumed at Jews who refused to stay in appointed hotels (or who stayed too long) or whose windows and doors looked out on Christian holy places. The tardy could be arrested; the doors and windows boarded up. When Christian children baptized Jewish infants in their care, authorities removed the child to an orphanage to be raised Catholic. We know about one such child in Avignon because the records of the Inquisition reveal its effort to sue the father so that he would pay for the care and feeding of his legally abducted child. In Amsterdam in the same period, Jewish minors who wanted to convert to Christianity against the wishes of their parents were forbidden to do so. The mixing of religions so concerned the good fathers in Avignon, too, that they were prepared to spy on George I and his summering entourage, lest this “Anglican sect” infect the gullible. The mixing of social classes also brought down the wrath of Papal authorities, as did any hint of heresy. (The freemasons had their lodges raided and goods confiscated into the 1780s.) The archives of the Inquisition signal that any inquiry into Western cosmopolitanism before 1800 must focus not simply on the tenacity of national, ethnic, or regional identities, but also on the force of religion, on a complex set of loyalties that might make people stay among their own kind and avoid strangers or foreigners—or any sort of difference.

Other institutions were far less forbidding than the Inquisition and more capable of bearing the label cosmopolitan. Commentators have often associated early-modern European science and its academies with cosmopolitan impulses. Scientists crossed national and confessional borders and willingly participated as observers and collectors on global expeditions that brought back natural knowledge, as well as great imperial wealth—first to the Spanish, then to the Dutch and English, and finally the French.⁴ Much misery was inflicted around the globe in the process, but the catholicity of intellectual interests brought about by overseas trade and ex-


⁴ See Alix Cooper, Inventing the Indigenous: Local Knowledge and Natural History in Early Modern
exploration, and by the social mixing and correspondence of the academies, could on occasion be described as cosmopolitan.\(^5\)

Before 1700, alchemists in particular deliberately invoked a cosmopolitan stance.\(^6\) The goal of much medical alchemy, aside from pharmacological interventions, lay in the search for the elixir of life. This search for longevity required border crossing, and a constant exchange of recipes and substances across the expanse of Europe and into the colonies was commonplace in alchemical circles. The early years of The French Academy of Sciences in Paris were spent performing alchemical distillations, and their organizer, the medical doctor Samuel Du Clos, also introduced Boyle’s ideas about the mechanical philosophy almost as quickly as they were published or transmitted to him by Boyle himself. However, in 1685 a representative of the crown went into the court-sponsored academy and instructed it to stop “the great work” of alchemy and get on with business more directly useful to state power, like mapping the whole of the country.\(^7\)

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Stock exchanges, too, it was said, encouraged similar cosmopolitan mores. Poets and commentators like Addison and Steele, writing in 1711 in their famous *The Spectator*, said that the conduct of “the private business of Mankind” turned the exchange into a “Metropolis, a kind of Emporium for the whole Earth.” Factors, the merchants who made deals for other merchants, they said, “are what Ambassadors are in the Politick World.” Yet even Addison and Steele had to admit that the cosmopolitan had limits; always amid the swirl of international commerce men stood with their countrymen:

“Sometimes I am jostled among a Body of Armenians: Sometimes I am lost in a Crowd of Jews, and sometimes … in a Group of Dutchmen. I am a Dane, Swede, or French-Man at different times.” Nonetheless, the dizzying experience left the reporters describing the ultimate cosmopolitan ideal: “I… rather fancy my self… [as] a Citizen of the World.” 

Voltaire wrote the most famous description of the Royal Exchange, published in 1733:

A place more venerable than many courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew, the Mohammedan, and the Christian transact together as though they all professed the same religion, and give the name of Inflid to none but bankrupts. There the Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker’s word.

A 1780s manuscript sketch of the floor of the London exchange made by a visiting French engineer suggests that by then national identities competed with professional as well as religious ones. The sketch of the floor plan shows the familiar groupings – “place hollandaise,” “place des Indes Orientales,” “place Francaise” – but also new ones: “the place of the Quakers,” “the place of the Jews,” “the place of the silk merchants,” the drapers, druggists, and so on. Dated more or less contemporaneously with Kant’s famous meditation on the necessity for the cosmopolitan, the sketch tells us that selling draperies may have begun to give an identity as much as did one’s being a Quaker or coming from the Dutch Republic. 

The sketch also conforms to what we know about the Amsterdam exchange from an even earlier period. Guild identity weakened as merchants from all over received individual freedoms to trade and were just as likely to identify by their trade, their city, or their nation.

International commerce in bills and goods wasn’t automatically linked to the cosmopolitan, though. In Antwerp during the later part of the sixteenth century municipal records bear witness to men entering the exchange armed and with bodyguards. Traders had been murdered on the floor of the exchange by their fellow countrymen or by foreigners, if surnames are any guide. (Some of


10 This sketch is reproduced in Jacob, *The Enlightenment*, 115. The original can be found at École des ponts et chaussées, Paris.

this violence might have spilled over from decades of religious turmoil and the civil war against Spain.) Not until well into the seventeenth century did the floor of the Antwerp exchange finally take on the relative calm to be seen elsewhere. In the crash of 1720, which affected the Paris, London, and Amsterdam exchanges most deeply, literature and images appeared in Dutch that were in many instances markedly anti-Semitic. The Jews or *smousen* – in contemporary slang – were singled out as instigators of the collapse.¹²

In France most exchanges were open for an hour or two a day, their entrances guarded by archers and the lieutenant general of the police. Entry required a pass and, remarkably, in contrast to the rest of western Europe, women were forbidden entirely.¹³ Protestants could not become agents of change, a rule reaffirmed in 1766. Only in 1780 was a Protestant merchant in Marseille allowed to join the Chamber of Commerce.¹⁴

In 1631 the Consul in Lyon gave the merchants *un place de Change* with its own *corps de garde*. By 1637 a new building was in place; two years later it got a clock.¹⁵ But unlike the neutral and regulating symbols of time, or the busts of kings found elsewhere, the bourse in Lyon installed a statue of the Virgin Mary. Decades earlier Lyon had been a site of bitter contestation between Protestants and Catholics. If early modern French Protestants made their way to the building they were meant to know that the power of the Catholic Church remained intact, at least in the temple of money, or *la loge du change*, as the Lyon bourse came to be known. In 1685 Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, and French Protestants had to convert, go to jail, or find a way to leave. When a Chamber of Commerce was finally established in 1703, all its members had to be Catholic.¹⁶

A decade before Voltaire penned his famous lines about the London exchange, an anonymous observer of the Marseille exchange waxed in rapture: “Our loge is a room where strangers can barely be distinguished from our representative . . . our factors and couriers are our ambassadors . . . and maintain good relations within the rich society of men.” But when this same admirer of social mixing went on to describe all the nationalities to be seen on the floor he remarked on elbowing crowds “of Jews or usurers.”¹⁷

Commerce did not inexorably lead to cosmopolitan mores without the firm presence of a civilizing force with police

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¹² *Het groot tafereel der dwaasheid*: vertoonende de opkomst, voortgang en ondergang der actie, *bubbel* en windnegotie, in Vrankryk, Engeland, en de Nederlanden, gepleegd in den jaare MDCCXX: zynde een verzameling van alle de conditien en projecten van de opgeregte compagnien van assurantie, navigatie, commercie, &c. in Nederland, zo wel die in gebruik zijn gebracht, als die door de h. staten van eenige provintien zijn verworpen: als meede konstplaaten, comedien en gedigten . . .: gedrukt tot waarshouwinge voor de nakomelingen, in ’t noodlottige jaar, voor veel zotte en wyze (n.p., 1720).

¹³ *Manuel des agens de change et des courtiers de commerce, contenant les Édits. . . .*(Paris: Chez Mme Ve. J. Decle, 1823), 59 – 60.


¹⁵ Archives municipales, Lyon, MS Bb180, fol. 72.

¹⁶ MSS Chambre de Commerce de Lyon. Délibérations August 1702. Repertoire du premier Registre; commencé le 21 August 1702; MS fol. 2, 1703.

power. In every exchange, the records tell us that guards, whether military in France or civilian in London, kept a careful watch on the day’s proceedings. Commercial life may have thrived on fairness and politeness, law and order, but all were (and are) extremely fragile. Tensions existed beneath the surface of an imagined conviviality, and they surfaced when times got hard.

Beginning in 1772, and reaching its nadir in Marseille in 1774, a serious economic crisis gripped France. The end of a preceding Atlantic boom, the bust manifested itself at the foreign exchanges and as a credit crisis. By 1773 it was clear that little was being done anywhere to stop local bankrupts from reaching the floor of the bourse. Foreigners who were bankrupt, it was argued, had to be stopped and forced to register with the justice of the peace, which would have entailed angry denunciations on the floor of the exchange once a bankrupt could be identified. Perhaps Voltaire had been right when he said that the only infidels in such a temple would be the bankrupt.

In 1773–1774, cosmopolitanism gave way first to inhospitable suspicion and then to anger and panic. The authorities in Marseille, like so many commentators in England, saw bankruptcy in moral terms and railed against those who might in other circumstances be seen as unlucky, rather than villainous. They also wanted to impose a collective, rather than a simple individual responsibility on men whom they imagined as willfully bad credit risks.

None of these measures, at least in Marseille, proved to be sufficient, largely because of the changing face of bankruptcy. Until 1774 the problems presented by the absence of credit and capital might be blamed on bankrupt merchants. But in May of that year one of the courtiers of change, a royal official whose office was inheritable and state-guaranteed, went under. Within five months over 150 merchants (of about 600) also defaulted. These royal officials, a creation of Louis XIV, and the credit they dispensed had dominated the floor of the Marseille exchange. Unlike London, Antwerp, or Amsterdam, no shops or hawkers were allowed in the building to interfere with royally appointed authority and profit. Only notaries checked the power of the courtiers; they were expected to register deals and know something about all the parties and their creditworthiness. Since 1709 the courtiers had acted as bankers as well as the buy-


19 Archives Patrimoine-culturel de la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie Marseille-Provence, MS L v 29, where we are told that the courtiers rented 20 bureaux in “une grand salle au dessous de la maison de Ville qu’on appelle vulgairement la Loge et ou les negociants rassemble tous les jour on y fit construire vingt petits bureaux qui entourent de la salle . . . les courtiers . . . ventes et achapter secretement.”


21 Archives Patrimoine-culturel de la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie Marseille-Provence, MS L v 29, where we are told that the courtiers rented 20 bureaux in “une grand salle au dessous de la maison de Ville qu’on appelle vulgairement la Loge et ou les negociants rassemble tous les jour on y fit construire vingt petits bureaux qui entourent de la salle . . . les courtiers . . . ventes et achapter secretement.”

22 On the importance of the notaries in Paris see Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, “Information and Economic History: How the Credit Market in Old

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ers and sellers of merchandise, and, apparently with abandon, they had overextended lines of credit to merchants and collected interest and earned commissions for themselves and the crown. A bankruptcy by even one of them spelled doom.23

The crisis of 1774 highlights the strains on the civility and customs of a royally supervised exchange. At the height of the crisis a prominent merchant and former city official marched on to the floor and in full drama denounced the courtiers and demanded their suppression.24 Others argued that self-interest had become a vice: “The mobs in our stock exchange fight and destroy each other out of their individual interests and their prejudices.” “Capitalists” need a motive for entering such a dangerous market, an important commentator argued, and only higher interest rates will appeal. If these ruinous practices continue, he warned, “a much greater part of our commerce will pass into the hands of foreigners.” The anger at the courtiers became so intense that within a year the state had to suppress and reorganize the corps. The French Revolution saw the abolishment of courtiers across the country, and early in the nineteenth century Paris acquired a bourse modeled on what existed in the major cities of its northern neighbors.

When stock exchanges displayed signs of a cosmopolitan openness, how dependent was that spirit on the limitless possibility of profit and prosperity? The breakdown of civility in Marseille, and earlier in Amsterdam during the 1720 crash, points to a deep interconnection between these two impulses, the one for gain, the other for civil and cosmopolitan interaction that eased deal making and the passage to wealth. But how much was the structure of the exchange itself, rather than individual avarice, to blame for the breakdown of civility in Marseille? Perhaps as long as government-sponsored monopolists controlled a critical part of the market – the availability of money or credit – the stability of mercantile mores and customs would always remain fragile. As the situation in Marseille illustrates, the preservation of a cosmopolitan market depended heavily on a belief that no single body, sanctioned by the state, could manipulate the market and get away with it legally.

In addition, the open and cosmopolitan ambiance of the exchange masked the realities of the market. Nowhere could merchants discover who, whether fellow merchant or courtier, was in fact overextended. (Indeed mercantile elites did not want to reveal this sort of information, especially not to the tax-hungry state.) Private reputation, not the reality of the situation, mattered above all else – certainly above the health of the public’s interest. And when harsh economic realities were revealed, denunciation and moralizing displaced even a modicum of cosmopolitan peacefulness in the exchange.


23 A detailed account of these events can be found in Louis Bergasse, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, vol. 4 (Paris: Plon, 1954), 621 – 630.

24 For the printed text found at Archives Patrimoine-culturel de la Chambre de Commerce, Le Sieur Roland, *Mémoire à consulter et consultation par le sieur Simon Roland, ancien premier échevin de la ville de Marseille et l’un des membres de la chambre de commerce*.

25 See the discussion of the attempts at reform in the 1770s in Mark Potter, *Corps and Clientele*:
It is good to know that the cosmopolitan has a history as an idea; it is better understood when we examine it as lived experience. Remnants of the Inquisition, such as the Index of Forbidden Books, lasted into the 1960s. Wherever censors of whatever variety succeed, cosmopolitan mores falter, if not wither away. Some kinds of intellectual endeavors, science and medicine as examples (if left to develop their own customs) can inculcate expansive forms of border-crossing as well as habits of quality control – at least in the first instance among highly educated men. Exclusionary categories and identities die hard, though. Opening borders, as these brief historical examples seek to show, requires contestation and a careful vigilance aimed at churches or states or elites with an interest in keeping those borders closed.

Public Finance and Political Change in France, 1688–1715 (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 162.

Modern cosmopolitanism is largely an affair of philosophy and the social sciences. Whether one thinks of the ideal ethical projects of worldwide solidarity of the eighteenth-century French philosophes or Kant, or of more recently emerging discourses of new cosmopolitanism in our era of economic globalization, transnational migration, and global communications, literature seems to have little pertinence to the construction of normative cosmopolitan principles for the regulation of institutional actors on the global stage, or to the study of the proliferating associations and networks that envelop the entire globe. Cosmopolitanism is primarily about viewing oneself as part of a world, a circle of belonging that transcends the limited ties of kinship and country to embrace the whole of humanity. However, since one cannot see the universe, the world, or humanity, the cosmopolitan optic is not one of perceptual experience but of the imagination. World literature is an important aspect of cosmopolitanism because it is a type of world-making activity that enables us to imagine a world.

At first glance, cosmopolitanist discourse seems only to refer to literature in disparagement. Kant frets that his teleological account of world history, with its goal of establishing a world federation of states, will be taken for a fanciful fiction: “It is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to an idea of how world events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends; it would seem that only a novel could result from such a perspective [Absicht].”¹ However, he also points out that cosmopolitanism is a pluralism, the imagining

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of a larger community (the world) such that one’s self-importance diminishes as a result of considering other perspectives beyond immediate self-interest: “the opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world [Weltbürger].”² In this imaginative process that generates cosmopolitan feeling, we can discern three moments. First, one must sunder the identification of oneself with the world and breach and transcend the limits of this particularistic perspective. Second, one must imagine a universal community that includes all existing human beings. Third, one must place oneself within this imagined world as a mere member of it, subordinating one’s egoistic interests to that of the whole.

Literature creates the world and cosmopolitan bonds not only because it enables us to imagine a world through its powers of figuration, but also, more importantly, because it arouses in us pleasure and a desire to share this pleasure through universal communication. Literature enhances our sense of (being a part of) humanity, indeed even brings humanity into being because it leads to sociability. For humanity (Humanität), as Kant argues in the Third Critique, “means on the one hand the universal feeling of participation [das allgemeine Teilnehmungsgefühl] and on the other hand the capacity for being able to communicate one’s inmost self universally [sich immigst und allgemein mitteilen], which properties taken together constitute the sociability [Geselligkeit] that is appropriate to humankind [Menschheit], by means of which it distinguishes itself from the limitation of animals.”³

Goethe conceived of world literature as a dynamic process of literary exchange, intercourse, or traffic, exemplified by the international character of his own relations with foreign authors and intellectuals and by the revitalizing movement of mirroring (Spiegelung) brought about by the reception, translation, review, and criticism of literary works in other languages.⁴ He writes:

There is being formed [bilde] a universal world literature, in which an honorable role is reserved for us Germans. All the nations review our work; they praise, censure, accept, and reject, imitate and distort us, understand or misunderstand us, open or close their hearts to us. All this we must accept with equanimity, since this attitude, taken as a whole, is of great value [Werth] to us.⁵


For Goethe, world literature is an active space of transaction and interrelation. The content of the ideas that are exchanged matters little; what is of greatest worth is the ethos generated by the transaction. The world is only to be found and arises in these intervals or mediating processes. It is constituted by and, indeed, is nothing but exchange and transaction.

The ethical end of this intercourse is not uniformity, Goethe argues, but mutual understanding and tolerance between nations, through the revelation of universal humanity across particular differences even as such differences are valued: “The idea is not that nations shall think alike, but that they shall learn how to understand each other [sondern sie sollen nur einander gewahr werden, sich begreifen], and, if they do not care to love one another, at least that they will learn to tolerate one another.”6 World literature is an ongoing work of negotiation between a range of particulars in order to arrive at the universal. This negotiation is properly worldly because it creates the world itself as intercourse in which there is appreciation and tolerance of the particular. Goethe further brings out the mediatory character of world literature by comparing it to translation between languages and the exchange of currency:

Whatever in the poetry of any nation tends to this [that is, the universal] and contributes to it, the others should endeavor to appropriate. The particularities [die Besonderheiten] of each nation must be learned, and allowance made for them, in order by these very means to hold intercourse with it; for the special characteristics/properties [die Eigenheiten] of a nation are like its language and its currency: they facilitate intercourse, nay they first make it completely possible.7

The particularities of national literatures must be respected because without such differences, there would be no need for the intercourse that is necessary to bring out the universal kernel.

Translation, for Goethe, best exemplifies tolerance of particularities because it does not remove, but attempts to bridge differences:

A genuine universal tolerance is most surely attained, if we do not quarrel with the particular characteristics of individual men and peoples, but only hold fast to the conviction, that what is truly excellent is distinguished by its belonging to the whole of humanity. To such exchange [Vermittlung] and mutual recognition, the German people have long contributed.8

Because it furthers intercourse between peoples, translation enacts a dynamic

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8 This and the following quote are from ibid., 498; 25 – 26.
universality, which Goethe elucidates through metaphors of mercantile and evangelical activity:

And thus every translator is to be regarded as a middle-man [Vermittler] in this universal spiritual commerce [allgemein geistigen Handels], and as making it his business [Geschäft] to promote/further this exchange [Wechseltausch]: for say what we may of the insufficiency of translation, yet the work is and will always be one of the weightiest and worthiest matters [Geschäfte] in the general concerns of the world.

The Koran says: “God has given to each people a prophet in its own tongue!” Thus each translator is a prophet to his people. Luther’s translation of the Bible has produced the greatest results, though criticism gives it qualified praise, and picks faults in it, even to the present day. What indeed is the whole enormous business [Geschäft] of the Bible Society, but the evangelization to all people in their own tongue?

Like a merchant who neither owns nor produces the original object, the translator profits from the fact that his activity gives others access to something. Although he only acts as a comprador who brings the original object to another, this work of mediation is nevertheless inherently creative because, without it, the universal human values expressed in an original work would never have been shared by different peoples. Indeed, it can be said that a translation universalizes the original by exposing it to a wider gaze. Accordingly, Goethe likens the merchant-translator to a holy prophet who mediates between the divine and the mundane and spreads the word of God to his people because he conveys to the masses what is eternally human in foreign literatures.

The normative dimension of world literature as a world-making activity, however, cannot be reduced to the greater facility of global communications. “Increasing communication between nations” or “the increasing speed of intercourse [vermehrenden Schnelligkeit des Verkehrs]” are undoubtedly means of bringing about world literature. But world literature is a special form of mediation with the higher end of explicating humanity. Indeed, Goethe himself suggests that the world transcends the merely geographical. He distinguishes between two different senses of world: the world as an object of great physical extensiveness (that is, the expansion of the mundane or the diffusion of what is pleasing to the crowd [der Menge]), and the world as a normative phenomenon, a higher intellectual community that opens up a new universal horizon. He writes:

The wide world, extensive as it is, is only an expanded fatherland, and will, if looked at correctly, be able to give us no more than what our home soil can endow us with also. What pleases the crowd spreads itself over a limitless field, and, as we already see, meets approval in all countries and regions. The serious and the intellectual meet with less success, but those who are devoted to higher and more productive things will learn to know each other more quickly and more intimately. For there are everywhere in the world such men, to whom

the true progress of humanity are of interest and concern.\textsuperscript{10}

Despite its extensiveness, the physical world remains as spiritually limited and particularistic as the nation. The higher world of cultivated intellectuals, who point to the spiritual unity of humanity, will have greater power over time, but this world coexists uncomfortably with the everyday world. Its members are a vanguard so ahead of the times that they must hide from the light of day and withdraw from phenomenality. Yet this almost invisible community possesses a vital power with an enduring effectivity:

The serious-minded must therefore form a quiet, almost secret, Church \textit{[eine stille, fast gedrückte Kirche bilden]}, since it would be futile to set themselves against the current of the day; rather must they manfully strive to maintain their position till the flood has passed. Their principal consolation, and indeed encouragement, such men must find in the fact that truth is useful. If they can discover this connection, and exhibit its meaning and influence in a vital way, they will not fail to produce a powerful effect \textit{[den Einfluß lebendig vorzeigen und aufweisen können, so wird es ihnen nicht fehlen kräftig einzuwirken]}, indeed one that will extend over a range of years.\textsuperscript{11}

Goethe’s distinction between two senses of the world is significant for us today because it cautions us from obscuring the normative dimension of worldhood by conflating worldliness with globalization. The world in the higher sense is spiritual intercourse, transaction, and exchange aimed at bringing out universal humanity. It does not abolish national differences but takes place and is to be found in the intervals, mediations, passages, and crossings between national borders. The world is a form of relating or being-with. The globe, on the other hand, the totality produced by processes of globalization, is a bounded object or entity in Mercatorian space. When we say “map of the world,” we really mean “map of the globe.” It is assumed that the spatial diffusion and extensiveness achieved through global media and markets give rise to a sense of belonging to a shared world, when one might argue that such developments lead instead to greater polarization and division of nations and regions. The globe is not the world. This is a necessary premise if the cosmopolitan vocation of world literature can be meaningful today.\textsuperscript{12}

If we collapse the world into a geographical entity, we deny world literature autonomy by reducing it to a superstructure of an economic base. We assume that the literary reflects and is conditioned by political and economic forces and relations in a straightforward manner, such that a global economy gives rise to a global culture and a world literature. Following Goethe, I suggest we conceive of the world as an ongoing, dynamic process of becoming, some-

\textsuperscript{10} “Aus dem Faszikel zu Carlyles Leben Schillers,” 866; 10.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 867; 10, translation modified.

\textsuperscript{12} Recent studies that reconceptualize world literature in a global era such as David Damrosch, \textit{What is World Literature?} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), and Pascale Casanova, \textit{The World Republic of Letters}, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), have failed to grasp the normative aspects of worldhood. They have taken the world for granted and merely attached “world” as an adjective to qualify the noun “literature,” most often in order to contrast “world literature” with merely national literature.
thing continually made and remade rather than a spatial-geographical entity. Only then can world literature be understood as literature that is of the world, a fundamental force in the ongoing cartography and creation of the world instead of a body of timeless aesthetic objects.

Here, another question arises: what kind of world does world literature let us imagine? Goethe’s vision of world literature is patently hierarchical and Eurocentric. For him the normative dimension of world poetry is epitomized by classical Greece. Literatures other than that of Greek antiquity have a merely historical and particular status, whereas the archetypal beauty of humanity is embodied in Greek archetypes:

We should not think that the truth is in Chinese or Serbian literature, in Calderon or the Nibelungen. Instead, in our need/search for models, we should always return to the Greeks of antiquity in whose works beautiful man is exhibited [dargestellt]. The rest we contemplate historically and appropriate from it what is good as far as we can.  

Within this hierarchical framework, the tolerance of differences between peoples can only be repressive. But more importantly, without a critique of capitalism, Goethe is blind to the way literary processes of world formation are imbricated in power relations. Indeed, he uses commercial activity as a metaphor for understanding world literary intercourse without underscoring the self-interest and exploitation inherent to commercial mediation, even as he repeatedly notes that the translator profits as a middleman. He does, however, make clear that world literature always involves relations of power and inequality. Goethe figures literary worth as power or force (Kraft) and thinks of it as analogous to the military strength of a cohesive nation: “As the military and physical power [Kraft] of a nation develops from its internal unity and cohesion, so must its ethical-aesthetic power grow gradually from a similar unanimity [Uebereinstimmung].”

Hence, some nations – Germany, for example – will benefit more from world literary relations because they have accumulated more literary worth.

Marx’s materialist understanding of the world radically problematizes the concept of world literature. But it also enables its productive reinvention. Marx’s brief comments on world literature in the Manifesto for the Communist Party point to its inscription in concrete relations of exploitation:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. In place of the old local and national self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction [allseitiger Verkehr], universal interdependence [allseitiger Abhängigkeit] of nations. And as in material, so also in spiritual [geistigen] production. The spiritual cre-


ations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness [Beschränktheit] become more and more impossible, and from numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.\(^\text{15}\)

Like Kant and Goethe, Marx uses the word *world* to describe the transcendence of particular local and national barriers and limitations. But Marx locates this transcendence not in literary exchange but in a material objective structure that operates at the surface of every aspect of concrete existence, namely the development of productive forces by world trade and global production. For Marx, world history is the history of the world as a material or actual form of relationality, and world literature, a spiritual formation, is merely the epiphenomenon of this material world.\(^\text{16}\)

Marx called this material connectedness *society*. The material activity of production aims to satisfy human needs, and society is the complex organization of production that arises with the cooperation of individuals. Because human needs are universal, society is necessarily cosmopolitan and transcends the borders of the nation and territorial state. Marx writes:

Civil society [*Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*] embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a determinate stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organize itself as State.\(^\text{17}\)

Marx’s immanent critique of world literature inverts Goethe’s trade metaphor. Whereas Goethe mistook the real referent for a metaphor of world literary relations, Marx sees the material world, a world created in the image of the bourgeoisie, whose economic activity breaks down parochial barriers and national exclusiveness, as the concrete basis of world literary relations, which are merely the autonomized products of alienation.

However, bourgeois civil society, the world created from the erosion of national borders by the industrial development of productive forces, is still in a natural shape because, under capitalism, production is separated from the human beings who are the genuine producers. Marx thus distinguishes the world of the capitalist mode of production not only from the globe as a geographical entity but also from an alternative world that is characterized by genuine universality. The world can be changed precisely because it is an ongoing process that is created by material activity. This deficient world made in the image of the bourgeoisie contains the seeds of its own destruction. The interconnectedness capi-

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17 Ibid., 25 – 26 ; 57.
tal brings about also unites all workers into another world to be actualized:

[T]his development of productive forces [Produktivkräfte] (which itself implies the actual [vorhandne] empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it want is merely made general, and with destitution the struggle for necessities and the entire old shit would necessarily be re-produced; and furthermore, because only with the universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the “propertyless” mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones.18

Our degraded world can be transformed if productive forces and relations are re-appropriated by a world society of producers – the proletariat as world-historical subject, as subject of world history (double genitive), a subject that is produced by even as it actively produces the history of the world:

All-round dependence, this natural form of the world-historical cooperation [Zusammenwirkens] of individuals, will be transformed by the communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of those powers.19

The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity [Aktion], can only have a ‘world-historical’ existence. World-historical existence of individuals means, existence of individu-}

18 Ibid., 24; 56.

19 Ibid., 26; 55.

20 Ibid., 25; 56.

an unprecedented capacity for direct material creativity: communism as a world-historical movement does not project a world that is a mere utopian ideal; rather, it is a movement stirring in the current world and its actuality (Wirklichkeit) comes directly from the proletariat’s effectivity as a material agent. But he denies world literature the ability to remake the world because he views it as a mere ideological reflection of economic forces with almost no efficacy in relation to the world.

Indeed, if the global unity created today is one of mass cultural homogenization through sign systems and chains of images that are not of literature, then why is the study of literature still relevant in an age of global mass culture? If literature still possesses normative power, we would have to speak of the end of literature in the same way that Hegel spoke of the end of art: a sensuous form of absolute spirit that is no longer immediately connected to our daily lives because it no longer moves us in its sensuous immediacy but only appeals to the intellect and powers of reflection. It is true that more and more books of world literature are being published today. But what hold do they have on us? The problem is not going away by insisting that global literary processes and flows are distinct from and unaffected by global economic processes. This is to repeat the ideological formation of world literature Marx diagnosed in Goethe – the autonomy of the literary as a symptom of autonomization under global capital.

Economic globalization is undoubtedly an important material condition of any form of the world today. Nevertheless, world literature can be a world-making activity if we reaffirm the importance, for any cosmopolitan project, of imagining a world. Any cosmopolitan action – and this is how Marx regarded the proletarian revolution – must first open up a world and envision itself as being part of this world that is in the making. But what is the force that enables us to imagine a world in the first place? In Marx’s view, only labor in its various historical forms has the power of remaking the world because the world as it really is is the material world of production. Spiritual products are the alienated reflections of labor as living effectivity, self-activity, and the actualization of material life. Hence, ideational forms cannot be a positive force in relation to reality. They can only represent reality faithfully, that is, as science, or function as ideology to mystify or justify the existing world. As a result, Marxist aesthetic theory, as epitomized by the writings of the Frankfurt School, could only affirm the revolutionary vocation of the aesthetic in terms of its ability to negate the existing world and its ideology. As Herbert Marcuse puts it, “Art contains the rationality of negation. In its advanced positions, it is the Great Refusal – the protest against that which is.”

But what is a world, really? What constitutes its reality? I wish to suggest that a non-negative force that is intimately linked to literature constitutes the material world. Assuming that human activity alone can transform material reality begs the question of how material reality is constituted as a form of presence, that is, as a form that persists in time. This persistence allows a world to appear and enables us to receive a world. Under conditions of radical finitude, in which we cannot explain why we con-

to exist, this persistence in time is a gift that cannot be calculated by human reason. In other words, any given or present world, any world that we have received and that has been historically changed and that we self-consciously seek to transform through human activity, is riven by a force that we cannot anticipate but that enables the constitution of reality and any progressive transformation of the present world by human action. Jacques Derrida describes this force as analogous to birth but also fundamentally irreducible to it:

Birth itself, which is similar to what I am trying to describe, is perhaps unequal to this absolute “arrivance.” Families prepare for a birth; it is scheduled, forenamed, caught up in a symbolic space that dulls the arrivance. Nevertheless, in spite of these anticipations and prenominations, the uncertainty will not let itself be reduced: the child that arrives remains unpredictable; it speaks of itself as from the origin of another world, or from another origin of this world.23

Literature communicates directly with this force because of its peculiar ontological status. As something that is structurally detached from its putative origin and that permits and even solicits an infinite number of interpretations, literature is an exemplary modality of the undecidability that opens a world. It is not merely a product of the human imagination or something that is derived from, represents, or duplicates material reality. Literature is the force of a passage, an experience, through which we are given and receive any determinable reality. The issue of receptibility is fundamental here. It does not refer to the reception of a piece of literature but to the structure of opening through which one receives a world and through which another world can appear. This structure is prior to and subtends any social forms of mediation as well as any sense of public space (Öffentlichkeit) because it is nothing other than the force of giving and receiving a world. It is the “perhaps” or “otherwise” that cannot be erased because this equivocation constitutes reality. Literature can play an active role in the world’s ongoing creation because, through the receptibility it enacts, it is an inexhaustible resource for contesting the world given to us through commercial intercourse, monetary transactions, and the space-time compression of the global culture industry.

I have argued that the first step of re-envisioning the vocation of world literature is to see the world as a dynamic process with a practical-actional dimension instead of a spatio-geographical category or only in terms of global flows, even if the latter constitutes an important material condition of a world. Goethe’s distinction between the world as spatial extension and a higher spiritual realm conjured up by literary exchange, and Marx’s distinction between the world market and the world society of producers as the natural and self-conscious forms of world-historical cooperation, point to this distinction between an immediate geographical entity and an ongoing work. But world literature’s world-making power does not consist merely in the spiritual activity of depicting an ideal world as a transcendent norm from which to criticize the existing world; it is primarily a process that keeps alive the force that opens up an-

other world, a force that is immanent to the existing world.

For world literature to negotiate and resist the flows that serve global capital, several other criteria must be met. First, to track the processes of globalization that make the world, and to contest this world by offering the image and timing of another world, the literature in question must self-consciously take the world and worldhood as one of its main themes at the same time that it also exemplifies the process of world-making. Second, we must ask, “What world does a given piece of world literature let us imagine?” Experiences of globalization in the postcolonial South are largely ignored by contemporary discussions of cosmopolitanism, where the mesmerizing focus remains the North Atlantic, sometimes reconfigured to accommodate multicultural migrancy. If these experiences are taken into account, then the relation of nationalism to cosmopolitanism must be reconsidered beyond one of antagonistic opposition. Since the world, as Goethe emphasizes, exists in the relations and intercourse between nations, a world literature does not necessarily mark the decline of the national. Indeed, one can argue that since the nation is continually reproduced in contemporary globalization, the world that is coming into being is in some way mediated through the nation.

Third, the sanctioned ignorance of the experiences of peoples in the postcolonial South in the full complexity of their religions, socio-cultural norms, and geopolitical locations in cosmopolitan discourse is underwritten by a hierarchical Eurocentric view of the world that leads to developmentalism. We can arrive at a more complex conception of the world if it is not referred back to an overarching teleological end of universal progress, but is seen as the effect of dynamic contestation from different sub-national, national, and regional sites. We ought to view the world as a limitless field of conflicting forces that are brought into relation and that overlap and flow into each other without return, because each force, as part of a world, is necessarily opened up to what lies outside.

The idea of world literature should, paradoxically, be conceived more narrowly as the literature of the world—imaginings and stories of what it means to be part of a world that track and account for contemporary globalization as well as older historical narratives of worldhood. It is also a literature that seeks to be disseminated, read, and received around the world so as to change that world and the life of a given people within it. One can then speak of world literature in a more precise sense as the literature of the world (double genitive), a literature that is an active process of the world.

The world literature that I am interested in is a particular type of postcolonial literature that explores the various negotiations between commercial and financial flows and humane social development (or lack thereof) in different parts of the postcolonial South with the hope of crafting new figurations and stories of world-belonging for a given postcolonial people. This type of literature seems to me to have a special place because the devastating impact of globalization for the lower strata of these societies makes opening onto another world especially urgent in these spaces.

I end by briefly discussing one example, Nuruddin Farah’s *Gifts* (1992). Set in a Mogadiscio “of galloping inflation, famines, foreign currency restrictions, and corrupt market transactions,” *Gifts*
provides a critical cognitive mapping of 1980s famine-stricken Somalia by inserting within its narrative (fictive) international media reports of drought, famine, and government campaigns for foreign aid, and the various donations—“gifts”—from Northern states and international NGOs that have made Somalia a chronically dependent country.\(^{24}\)

The citational nature of these reports indicates that the world, too, is in (narrative) time. By citing the reports within a different frame or context, their fictic平ity is deformed, and they are received differently, thereby denaturing the world they create and allowing another world to come in its place.

The novel comments critically on the negative impact of foreign aid on Somalia. This aid often has strings attached, is a way for economically wealthy countries to dump surplus or contaminated agricultural products (Chernobyl-contaminated European milk), and can be a way of manufacturing famine through the turn to cash-crop farming for an international commodity market. Such aid makes the economy of a recipient country totally dependent on economically developed countries, and foreign food donations can even create a buffer zone between corrupt leaderships and the starving masses, thereby preventing their overthrow. But worse still, foreign aid can “sabotage the African’s ability to survive with dignity.”\(^{25}\)

It leads to a structural form of expropriation where a people cannot refuse to accept a donation, or return a donation that is unwanted.

Farah’s central theme is that a people needs to own itself before it can be responsible for its actions and its place in the world. The permanent receipt of foreign aid obstructs that self-possession. Farah links the logic of chronic dependency within the capitalist world-system to the restricted economy of the Abrahamic religions, in which one works hard in this world and trusts that an ultramundane God who gives and takes away life will reward us in another world. He associates a more salutary vision of the world with a Somalian communal form of giving that is unrestricted:

> There is a tradition, in Somalia, of passing round the hat for collections…. When you are in dire need of help, you invite your friends, relatives and in-laws to come to your place…where a mat has been spread…. Here discretion is of the utmost significance. Donors don’t mention the sums they offer, and the recipient doesn’t know who has given what. It is the whole community from which the person receives a presentation and to which he is grateful. It is not permitted that such a person thereafter applies for more, not soon at any rate. If there is one lesson to be learned from this, it is that emergencies are one-off affairs, not a yearly excuse for asking for more.\(^{26}\)

This form of giving is characterized by anonymity and incalculability. It is not a continually recurring process but a singular event that occurs in response to an unexpected emergency. It gives rise to a cooperative communal inter-dependence that is immanent to the world. Such a gift economy does not place one in permanent debt that can only then be discharged once and for all in the eternal world, because it is based on an ad hoc negotiation with the unanticipatable

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25 Ibid., 197.

26 Ibid., 196.
eruption of human finitude in the regular rhythms of social life.

*Gifts* not only makes the world created by globalization its subject, but it also tries to intervene from the standpoint of a given people in order to let another world come. More importantly, this possibility of another world is not only thematized but performatively enacted in, and as, storytelling. The macrocosmic scene of giving and receiving is played out microcosmically in the daily life of Duniya, the female protagonist who decides to break out of the relations of dependency that have always governed her life. Duniya’s decision is catalyzed by her discovery of a foundling child. The storytelling that arises in response to the child’s mysterious origins creates a community. Ultimately the child dies, but his death gives life; he leaves behind a world that survives and transforms itself through memory and storytelling:

Duniya thought that at the center of every myth is another: that of the people who created it. Everybody had turned the foundling into what they thought they wanted, or lacked. In that case, she said to herself, the Nameless One has not died. He is still living on, in Bosaaso and me.27

The novel ends appropriately with a sense of the world’s unfinished nature. “‘All stories,’ concluded Abshir, ‘celebrate, in elegiac terms, the untapped source of energy, of the humanness of women and men.’ … The world was an audience, ready to be given Duniya’s story from the beginning.”28 This untapped source of energy is not the calculative power of human reason or any of its capabilities for action, the edify-

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27 Ibid., 130.
28 Ibid., 246.
Rogers M. Smith

Paths to a more cosmopolitan human condition

To be good citizens of the World and the Nation we live in, yet to have especial fellowship with the descendants of our ancestors, is perfectly consistent with true patriotism and universal philanthropy.

– Constitution and Rules of the Welsh Society of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, 1799

The reassuring assertion of the Pennsylvania Welsh at the end of the eighteenth century that their Society was “perfectly consistent with true patriotism and universal philanthropy” may well have been an effort to fend off arguments of the sort John Quincy Adams would make in 1818— that being “American” meant casting “off the European skin, never to resume it.” Then, and perhaps even more today, many have doubted that people can simultaneously embrace their ethnic identity, citizenship in a nation-state, and some sense of world citizenship in ways that are perfectly consistent, making themselves good citizens in all three regards.

In most places today, the appeals of ethnicity or nationalism or other more particular allegiances seem far more potent than any ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship. Many of those who do endorse cosmopolitan commitments, in turn, criticize both strong particularistic attachments to “the descendants of our ancestors” and local or national patriotism. Contemporary political theorists seek to weigh the merits of claims for these and other identities, portraying them as inescapably in at least partial conflict. Likewise, many contemporary political struggles are over which allegiances will prevail in practice.

This essay is not a contribution to philosophic debates over the propriety

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1 Cited in Hywel M. Davies, Transatlantic Brethren: Rev. Samuel Jones (1735 – 1814) and His Friends: Baptists in Wales, Pennsylvania, and Beyond (Lehigh, Pa.: Lehigh University Press, 1995), 239. I am grateful to Douglas Bradburn for this reference.

of aspiring to be “good citizens of the World” or over what such cosmopolitan citizenship ought to entail institutional-ly. It is also not an effort to show that ethnic attachments, national patriotism, and world citizenship are in fact wholly consistent. I simply presume that people should share the sentiments of the Pennsylvania Welsh: it is, ceteris paribus, desirable for people to try to be good global citizens as well as good national patriots and good members of other communities, including those defined by shared ancestry.

Good global citizenship need not include support for membership in a formal global political regime or for any particular set of global institutions, though it might do so. I mean by the term what some scholars call moral cosmopolitanism: any of a range of conceptions that define appropriate conduct through reference to what is taken to be the good of all humanity – and not just individuals, families, or specific communities. My aim here is to consider how those who believe in the importance of giving weight to the good of humanity, however that good is defined, might encourage others to take more seriously the goal of being good citizens of the world. Thus my interest is in one dimension of what Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins have influentially termed “cosmopolitics,” the political processes that might foster beliefs and behaviors that elevate moral cosmopolitan concerns.

Promoting cosmopolitan sentiments and conduct is daunting not only because many reject cosmopolitan aspirations. Even among those favorably inclined, there are bound to be many conflicting notions of what good world citizenship entails. A cosmopolitics that merely advances a specific, albeit universalistic, vision of good global citizenship in preference to all others is unlikely to succeed.

I suggest a three-part strategy for fostering greater concern for the good of all humanity. It includes persuading democratic regimes to accept a permanent obligation to expand opportunities for voice to as many as possible of those whom they affect, insofar as they can practically do so. Second, it encourages everywhere an ethics of political discourse in which participants articulate the more global implications of their positions, especially in regard to problems that affect all humanity. Third, it embraces coalition building among proponents of distinct visions of the human good and of the means to cope with humanity’s common problems, fully recognizing that coalitions may need to be secured and sustained by compromises that frustrate many defensible aspirations.

My arguments build in part on those I advanced in Stories of Peoplehood. In that book I analyzed the types of persuasive narratives that current and would-be political elites use to inspire a sense of valued political community. Stories of Peoplehood presumes that a sense of political membership is not just socially but also politically constructed: though source materials can come from many spheres.
of life, elites possessing or aspiring to governing (though not necessarily office-holding) power articulate and institutionalize their conceptions of who does and does not belong to a society via their laws and public policies.

Political elites often have considerable will to power, so one might expect them to portray the potential membership of the societies they seek to influence as broadly as possible. That is, the more over whom they may wield power, the merrier. But in reality, leaders face both external and internal constraints. The coalitions they seek to build must have core constituents, and those core constituents generally have economic interests, identities, and ideological values that make them unwilling to tolerate certain other groups as fellow members of their society. Trying to alter those commitments, as opposed to complying with or catering to them, is often more trouble than it is worth. Furthermore, most political leaders recognize that some groups will oppose them no matter what they do; and so leaders wish to see those groups disempowered in – or, ideally, excluded from – their political community. Finally, like most people, elites are motivated not only by the will to power, however strong such desires may be. They, too, have principles, purposes, identities, and economic interests that make them want to exclude certain populations.6

For all these reasons, political elites usually advance particularistic stories of peoplehood. They contend that if those whom they portray as compatriots give their primary allegiances to their nation (or state, province, city, tribe, religious sect, ethnic association, social movement, etc.), good things will follow. Some leaders promise wealth; others, physical security; still others, a share of political power, within that political community and in the larger world.

Most also advance particularistic ‘ethically constitutive’ stories: accounts contending that membership in a specific political community expresses and fulfills something intrinsic to members’ identities that has ethical worth. That something can be many things, including a shared religious identity, linguistic and cultural heritage, sense of world historical mission, or desire for “fellowship with the descendants of our ancestors,” conceived of as a community especially valuable to and for ‘us.’ These ethically constitutive stories respond to a fundamental human desire for a sense of meaningful belonging, and they help to inspire allegiances that hold communities together through hard times. As a result, leaders of political communities have always included ethically constitutive themes, along with ones promising wealth and power, in their stories of peoplehood.7

All people have thus grown up with identities and values shaped by such stories. It follows, then, that they are generally attracted to leaders who articulate narratives of peoplehood in a compelling fashion, reinforcing the belief that their allegiances should go first and foremost to some particular community or set of communities, and not to all humanity.8

Those who offer more cosmopolitan vi-

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6 Ibid., 56, 102.

7 Ibid., 64–72.

8 It may seem that the power of more particular senses of attachment and allegiance can be explained simply through the fact that people know their family members and neighbors better than they do the inhabitants of distant regions. But while face-to-face interactions certainly can foster tendencies to embrace particularistic identities, recent history has provided many examples of longtime neighbors trans-
sions appear at best to be dreamy-eyed utopians; at worst, advocates of irresponsibility, apostasy, and betrayal. In any case, because the various accounts of the cosmopolitan good—and the forms of political organization and association that can best realize it—often conflict with one another, activists must form more particular alliances with like-minded cosmopolitans against rival cosmopolitans, as well as against many nationalists, tribalists, and localists, if they are to make political gains. And so, the particularizing politics of peoplehood perpetuates itself.

Yet, as powerful as these tendencies are, they remain only tendencies—probable patterns of political behavior, not iron laws. Many factors throughout history have prompted people to think and feel beyond the bounds of their particular political communities. Students of different forms of globalization believe such factors comprise a rising tide today. These factors include the spread of world-spanning communications, information, and transportation systems; the transnational networks and organizations these systems enable; the deregulation of capital markets, the proliferation of international free trade agreements, and the accompanying rise of multinational corporations and heightened flows of capital, labor, and goods; the development of regional and international security alliances; the growing awareness of environmental trends that endanger populations around the globe; and the rise in international human rights agreements and institutions. Along with other factors, these developments are prompting more and more people to think of their well-being as bound up with the decisions and actions of billions of distant persons, with whom they belong to what philosopher David Held calls “overlapping communities of fate.”

To some degree, Bruce Robbins argues, these interconnections are already shaping “habits of thought and feeling” that reach beyond traditional boundaries. But, as he also recognizes, our new senses of multiple belonging do not necessarily translate into concern for the good of all those who affect us. In fact, these connections can be interpreted as reasons to bond more closely with those whom we see as our most trustworthy fellows, against the diverse many who now have the power and, perhaps, the will to harm us.

If we believe our multiple, overlapping, and proliferating forms of connectedness and dependency are evidence of the moral propriety of acting in ways conducive to the good of all humanity, how might we convince those who believe otherwise to think more as we do? Precisely because we must seek to persuade extraordinarily diverse populations with a panorama of moral and political commitments, no single strategy is likely to suffice. Here I suggest three forms of advocacy that have promise.

The first path is aimed at all who already endorse democracy as the most just or, in some way, the best available form of government. As the great modern democratic theorist Robert Dahl has

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long conceded, one of democracy’s fundamental difficulties is its inability to generate principled standards for deciding who should be part of a self-governing demos and who can be left out.¹¹

Ian Shapiro and others have suggested a “principle of affected interests” for decision making, according to which all persons who have significant stakes in a particular issue, but no one else, would be entitled to participate in its resolution.¹² But in an increasingly interwoven world, more and more people can reasonably be said to have significant stakes in more and more issues. The principle of affected interests seems to suggest then that only a global democratic state could be legitimate. Yet it is virtually impossible to envision such a state as politically attainable; and it is at least equally difficult to see how governance on such a scale could be meaningfully democratic.

Recent democratic theorists have responded to this problem in ways that reject the literal creation of global citizenship while still suggesting paths toward wider acceptance of moral cosmopolitanism. Following Rousseau, Jane Gordon has argued that, for the sorts of reasons just sketched, democratic legitimacy does not demand the creation of a cosmopolitan democracy. But it does require that democracies accept an obligation to pursue “generality” both in policies and in memberships, in ways that are likely to promote more inclusive societies over time. They are not obligated to extend the vote to all who are significantly affected by a particular decision; but they are obligated to extend full membership, including full political rights, to all those who can claim to have had their identities and statuses significantly constituted by their recurrent interactions with a putatively democratic political community.

Gordon reads W. E. B. DuBois’s account of African American “double consciousness” as describing an identity that, while not simply “American,” was so deeply shaped by, and so substantially a part of, America that there could be no plausible American democratic “general will” that did not include concern for African Americans as integral to the good of the American people. That, in turn, demanded that African Americans be accepted as full members of the American people that defined and expressed its democratic “general will.” And because all democracies have populations that are not recognized as full members, yet are significantly shaped by, and participating in, their collective lives, all must have boundaries that are “permeable and shifting,” ever expanding to include populations with such claims, even as they are also constructed to abet coexistence with other communities, “other generalities.”¹³

Rainer Bauböck has similarly argued that because human beings appear to have a “general disposition and desire to be members of comprehensively self-governing communities,” it is both prudent and right to accept the division of humanity into a variety of particular communities in which participation in meaningful self-governance is possible. He finds the principle of affected interest too “vague and overinclusive” as


¹² Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 39.

a standard for extending democratic rights, fearing that it might make particular, relatively autonomous self-governing communities unsustainable. But, Bauböck suggests, people who have to spend major amounts of their lives in more than one political community, often in ways that have value for significant portions of both communities, have legitimate claims to be treated as ‘stakeholders’ entitled to citizenship, even if this renders them dual citizens, with political rights in more than one locale. However, such multiple memberships, and in general the drawing of boundaries between democratic political communities, should be constructed only in ways that are politically compatible with the maintenance of peacefully interacting yet distinct self-governing communities. The obligation to include can be legitimately mitigated if doing so would foster conflicts within and between societies so severe as to endanger their survival as democracies.

Common to these views of democratic legitimacy is the conviction that it is appropriate for members of modern democratic communities to have forms of what the Pennsylvania Welsh termed “true patriotism,” or deep attachments to the societies in which they can participate in extensive if not comprehensive self-governance. Yet these and many other democrats insist that citizens of particular democracies cannot legitimately disavow substantial concern with at least some inside and outside their current geographic borders who are not full fellow citizens. They are always obliged to ask whether some not granted that status have in fact been or become so extensively engaged with and by the life of the society that they should be granted citizenship within it, should they so desire.

If tensions are so severe that it appears politically impossible to extend civic memberships to all the persons and groups who have legitimate claims to full citizenship, the obligations of societies aspiring to democratic legitimacy do not cease. They must consider instead allowing not only some persons but even some communities they now govern to gain greater autonomy or full independence. They may also be obligated to extend meaningful voice in their affairs to populations and communities that are outside their current formal bounds but with whom they are deeply interconnected – via systems of confederation, joint administrative commissions, or judicial tribunals – to decide particular matters of shared concern, regularly renewed treaty agreements, or other such arrangements. Even if extending citizenship or accepting dual citizenship is not the answer, democratic legitimacy still calls for mechanisms promoting attentiveness to the concerns of at least these semioutsiders, if not all humanity.

The promotion of these sorts of policies and institutions is far from hopelessly utopian, for they do not constitute full-scale assaults on allegiances to particular democratic communities, either in principle or in practice. But if these policies and institutions became more common, they might help the members of democratic societies to think more regularly and seriously about how their collective policies, and their very collective existence, affect those whom they


do not now regard as full fellow citizens. They might foster a sense that it is right, indeed obligatory, to give weight to the interests, values, and aspirations of those populations. And insofar as citizens experience the consequences of such concern as beneficial, at least in the long run, they may become still more willing to widen their memberships, or to take more seriously the claims of outsiders they affect. That is a step toward a politics of good global citizenship.

The goal of promoting cosmopolitan concern might also be advanced through a second route, which does not depend on appeals to democratic standards of legitimacy, though it is arguably also required by them. In recent years, many normative theorists have advocated views concerning the ethics of public discourse appropriate in, at least, modern liberal democracies. Here, as on many matters, much inspiration has been drawn from John Rawls— in this case his influential discussions of the standards of “public reason.” Rawls argued for conducting political discourse largely according to standards acceptable to other “reasonable” citizens, defined as those who endorse “a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law,” whatever the differences in their broader philosophic or religious “comprehensive views.” Many writers, including me, have criticized Rawls’s standards as too restrictive, arguing that clashing “comprehensive views” ought to be part of a robust democratic politics.

Yet I want to argue for one feature of a desirable ethics of public discourse that may seem still more restrictive than Rawls’s view and that should apply in any society, not just democratic ones—so it may also seem imperialistic. It is an extension of my earlier arguments for receptivity—though not uncritical receptivity—to the political articulation of all sincerely held comprehensive views. I suggest that political participants in any society should feel obliged, and should press their allies as well as their opponents, to elaborate what their preferred policies imply, not just for the members of their political community, but for humanity as a whole.

I am not quite so unrealistic as to think that political actors will or even should do so in intricate detail and on all matters of public concern. But in an age of intensified global communications, leaders and educated publics in every country cannot pretend to be unaware that domestic energy production, manufacturing, transportation systems, and consumption practices contribute to environmental and energy problems that affect much of the world’s population. Most already participate in one or more transnational associations and organizations that seek, at least putatively, to safeguard against military conflict and to combat international crime, from the United Nations to NATO, Interpol, the African Union, and more. Many also


have regional and international trade agreements and relationships with international investors and lenders that officially link their domestic economies with many others. Therefore few leaders can deny that their policies are likely to have repercussions for millions, often billions, outside their borders. Without insisting that they must attach any specific moral value to the fates of any or all of those millions and billions, it is altogether appropriate for them to state what the broader consequences of their major policy measures may be.

What might possibly motivate political actors to accept, practice, and propagate this ethics of public discourse? That question is not as difficult as it may first seem. Within every relatively open society, those in power have rivals who wish to find grounds to challenge incumbents and win support, both from within and from outside their community’s bounds. Whenever they believe the consequences of their policies for at least parts of the larger world are, or can be made to appear, more attractive than those of their opponents, they are likely to highlight such consequences and fault their adversaries for failing to do so.

Even if the main political actors in a particular community agree on measures that injure those outside their borders in ways that they do not wish to acknowledge, those injured can be counted on to insist that they admit these consequences, in globally audible and visible ways. People who perceive themselves as victims of selfish policies are likely to try to persuade many around the world that the irresponsible conduct immediately harming their portion of humanity will ultimately harm us all. Thus Gerard Delanty has argued that today “peoplehood is increasingly being defined in and through global communication with the result that ‘we’ is counterposed not only by reference to a ‘they’ but by the abstract category of the world.”

A number of fairly reliable political, economic, and social motives may reinforce the moral ones for supporting regular public acknowledgment and justification of the global consequences of the policies and practices political leaders adopt. What is the point of urging such political discourse? After all, it is unlikely that a Rawls-like overlapping consensus on permissible and impermissible impacts will emerge. In many cases, the answers leaders would give, crafted chiefly with an eye to their domestic constituents, would only serve to highlight clashes in worldviews and values. But it is often useful to surface differences earlier rather than later, before they become acute. Also, if political actors around the world became more accustomed to spelling out the implications of the actions they favored for broader populations, they might become more conscious of adverse consequences they genuinely would prefer to avoid. Sometimes, what begins as a quest for reasons that can “sell” a policy turns into recognition that it is wiser not to put that particular product on show. Even when leaders are themselves indifferent to harmful consequences of their proposed measures, they may decide that the costs of having to defend those actions are too high to pay. Thus the spread of this sort of ethic of political discourse might help to make more customary processes of political decision making and action that give greater weight to the importance of at least appearing to be “good citizens of the World.”

It nonetheless remains a virtual certainty that notions of what constitutes the

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good of humanity will continue not only to vary but to be in sharp conflict. The final path to being “good citizens of the World” that I recommend represents the only politically sensible response to this plurality of cosmopolitan visions; yet it is still one that could be pursued more extensively and self-consciously than it now is.  

The core idea is that all political, social, and economic actors, including intellectuals, who uphold a view of the human good should devote less time and energy to persuading all the world of the rectitude of their views, and more to identifying areas of agreement around which they can build broad coalitions to support appropriate policies and institutions.

To be sure, to discover any agreements, cosmopolitans must first articulate their distinctive ideas of what contributes to humanity’s well-being and why. Many will also want to persuade others to accept their views and follow their lead. Those activities are not only perfectly legitimate; if we accept the arguments just advanced concerning the need for a cosmopolitan component in all desirable ethics of public discourse, they are required. Yet, at times, those elaborating what they take to be God’s dictates for all humanity; or the philosophically derived moral requirements of individual human and animal rights; or the lessons of economics or the natural sciences for globally beneficial environmental, energy, health, and economic measures appear more determined to impose their answers on all in as pure a form as possible than they are to canvass areas of agreement.

In July 2007, for example, the Vatican indicated that because the Catholic Church is the one true, universal church, other Christian bodies should not be called churches. On this issue at least, Catholic advocacy of a universalistic religious vision gives primacy to divisive assertions, not matters of common concern. Likewise, the current administration’s foreign policy, which actively propagates democracy and individual rights around the globe, has also been criticized, even by sympathetic conservatives, as “fantastic, disproportionate, [and] unwise” in the support it has given to “preemptive war” in Iraq. Here, a universalistic political vision is being advanced via means that feature controversial coercive measures more than international cooperative ones. Lest these examples seem politically biased, let me add that many academic philosophers are often accused of offering views on global institutions, ecology, basic human rights, and kindred matters that are rigid and demanding to the point of becoming forms of intellectual imperialism.

These tendencies may be psychologically explicable. Those who believe firmly that they have grasped the universal human good may be especially likely to see concessions to other views as at best indulgence for errors, at worst as unforgivable abandonment of what true morality and human well-being require. It is also likely that anyone who subscribes to an account of the cosmopolitan good must regard some dimensions of it as not legitimately subject to compromise.

19 I am grateful to Martin Heisler for illuminating discussions of the ideas in this section.


But surely not all dimensions; and if we really wish both to be good global citizens and to promote good global citizenship, we ought to strive as much as possible to identify what forms of good we can agree upon and pursue, rather than focusing on those forms that, in practice, only lend themselves to frequent and unyielding condemnations of misguided or malevolent others. There are important differences, but there are also important overlaps, in the accounts of the human good that we find in most variants of the world’s major religions and in the neo-Kantian and utilitarian ethics that predominate in Western philosophic traditions. There are equally profound differences but also some relatively widespread agreements on the character of the common problems that humanity faces in the twenty-first century, with its challenges of environmental degradation, energy shortages, gross economic inequalities combined with intensifying economic interdependencies, population imbalances and immigration pressures, epidemic diseases, natural disasters, and international security concerns.

Agreements on answers to these common problems are admittedly much harder to come by, and to turn agreements into constructive actions is hardest of all. But that is why it makes sense for those who see themselves as cosmopolitans of some sort to seek out all those who are at all like-minded, and to strive actively to forge practical alliances with them on as many matters as proves politically possible. Doing so represents a practice of global citizenship that is more likely to produce constructive results, however limited, than any other course available to us. And if we wish to be “good citizens of the World,” the quest for such results is something that we ought to take seriously, if it is not indeed morally mandatory.

Though I will not attempt to detail them here – indeed, I have not tried to research them all – many such practical alliances are visible in the world today. And the increased practices of thinking and feeling beyond the nation suggest that many more may well be possible. It therefore does not seem particularly impractical to urge proponents of cosmopolitan citizenship to become first and foremost proponents of coalition-building citizenship, constantly on the alert to identify and seize opportunities for concrete, constructive collaborative political action.

This does mean that they should focus less on what is distinctive, or even what seems most important and most right about their views, and focus more on the features of their views that can be pursued with like-minded others in ways that have reasonable prospects for success. It also means rhetorically emphasizing the aspects of their outlooks that are not threatening to others, that instead foster confidence about the prospects for dealing with tensions peaceably and productively, even as activists acknowledge more quietly the inevitable tensions that must ultimately be confronted.

I perceive just such a rhetorical effort at reassurance and cooperation expressed in the statement by the Welsh Society of Pennsylvania with which this essay began. That Society in fact was relatively inclusive, open to persons of different ethnicities who wished to associate with and assist their Welsh neighbors; and it was receptive to the variety of denominations represented among the Welsh, although it was predominantly Baptist. Its constitution did not embody all the advice I have given here: raising controversial subjects that might
disrupt sociability was forbidden under penalty of fine, and in practice it sought more to aid Welsh immigrants to America than either the Welsh at home or immigrants of different origins.  

But it is not inappropriate for a group designed to aid immigrants and to promote good social relations to veer away from difficult issues that a larger political society cannot afford to ignore; and again, it is not my goal to argue against all special concern for fellow members of particular communities. The Welsh Society did help to foster a significant measure of moral cosmopolitanism by raising awareness of and interest in immigrants more generally, and by prompting communications with, and some measure of support for, Welsh communities both in Britain and America, as well as kindred religious communities.

The Pennsylvania Welsh also went on to contribute significantly to the building of the new American nation. In so doing, some in their ranks helped establish traditions of resistance to international and domestic slavery and to chauvinistic militarism that have, from cosmopolitan vantage points, been especially valuable and enduring contributions. At a minimum, then, their historic example suggests that if we do seek through democratic means to promote associations and communities that embrace the goal of being “good citizens of the world,” along with other forms of human fellowship, we may not soon achieve a genuine moral cosmopolis—but we will not have reason to regret that aspiration, or the ways in which we have sought to pursue it.

Cosmopolitan, the English equivalent of the older French word *cosmopolite*, derives from the ancient Greek term *kosmopolites* (*kosmos* plus *polites*) to signify “citizen of the world.” The original Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope (c. 390 – 323 B.C.), notorious for his “in your face” discourse and readiness to do everything in public, probably coined this expression and first applied it to himself.1 “Citizen of the world” suited Diogenes’s stance of flouting local conventions in order to demonstrate their lack of grounding in what he took to be the pre-cultural norms of human nature.

In light of the hundreds of individual Greek city-states, highly jealous of their autonomy but also Panhellenic in many of their customs and collective sense of superiority to the “barbarians,” citizenship of the world must have originally seemed a profoundly paradoxical, even nonsensical concept.

Diogenes was a younger contemporary of Plato (alleged to have called Diogenes “Socrates gone mad”) and much the same age as Aristotle.2 With its dropout lifestyle, Diogenes’s Cynicism never became a school with a formal curriculum. Its leading adherents left a prominent mark on Hellenistic literature through their sardonic criticism of conventional values, but Cynicism more or less died

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2 DL, 6.54.
The concept of the cosmopolitan in Greek & Roman thought

out as an independent movement and was absorbed into Stoicism until it underwent a revival in the Roman Imperial period.

Before Stoicism, the great contributions to political thought of Plato and Aristotle presupposed the small and nationalistic city-state as the normative context of community life. With no vestige of cosmopolitan sympathy, each assumed that the populace of an ideal community would hardly reach six figures, and that it would engage in defensive and offensive wars from time to time. Babylon, for example, notwithstanding its encircling walls, was for Aristotle too large to count as a true city-state.3

Stoic ethical and political thought, however, in the five centuries of its educational impact on the Mediterranean world, readily embraced cosmopolitanism in its various guises. Crates of Thebes, a leading Cynic follower of Diogenes, powerfully influenced Zeno (334 – 262), the Cypriot immigrant to Athens who established the Stoic school of philosophy there.4 Such different figures as the Roman jurist and philosopher Cicero (106 – 43); the apostle Paul (fl. 50 – 60); Philo (c. 30 B.C. – A.D. 45), the Alexandrian exegete of the Torah; and the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius (reigned 161 – 180) also express cosmopolitan sentiments. Philo, although not an official adherent of Stoicism (his allegorical interpretations of the Five Books of Moses are permeated with Stoic ideas nonetheless), is in fact the earliest surviving author to use the exact expression kosmopolites.5

Ancient ideas of the Stoic cosmopolitan live on today, especially in such notions and contexts as moral universalism in the Kantian tradition, natural law theory, and the indifference of race, gender, and status to the worth of individuals.6 Yet none of these ideas is as important to modern cosmopolitan or quasi-cosmopolitan contexts as international political institutions, free trade, and supranational efforts to implement world peace, combat rogue regimes, and relieve suffering across national borders. Moreover, the ancient cosmopolitan wasn’t typified as a highly sophisticated person or someone with multicultural sympathies, whose tastes, manners, and values are precisely what make him or her at home anywhere, as the modern cosmopolitan is cast. The principal continuity between the ancient and modern cosmopolitan turns on taking citizen, in the expression “citizen of the world,” in an extended or metaphorical sense. In the absence of a global state or government (which no Greek or Roman envisioned), literal world citizenship is an impossibility. What is possible, however, and what Stoic cosmopolitans advocated our doing, is for us to treat persons, no matter who or where, as quasi-siblings, whose claims on our care and fair treatment are grounded simply in the fact that we are all human beings.

3 Aristotle, Politics, 2.6, 65a14, 3.3, 76a28.

4 On Zeno, see Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew Mason, The Philosophy of Zeno (Larnaca: The Municipality of Larnaca, 2002). For detailed treatment of early Stoicism, see Keimpe Algra et al., The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and for an introductory account that extends into the later Stoic tradition, see A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986).


Citizenship of the world presupposes the existence of cities in the ordinary sense of the word: settled communities with precise territorial boundaries, cultural traditions, laws, political institutions, and social identities. In Homer’s epic poetry, our principal written source for earliest Greece, full-fledged cities are not part of the main narrative, which looks back to less formally structured communities governed by hereditary chieftains. There are fortified palatial settlements, centralized farmsteads, such as the home of Odysseus on Ithaca, and the great citadel of Troy, but nothing that we can call a polis in the sense of a Greek city-state. Such communities and their colonies only start to emerge in the eighth century B.C., some five hundred years after the Bronze Age societies that Homer principally envisions. His Achaeans and their Trojan foes are fiercely partisan, but foreign though the latter are, Homer himself does not take sides. He scarcely differentiates the two sets of people in the Iliad or Odyssey, where ethnicity and nationality are not identifiers of human worth. Instead he characterizes human beings quite uniformly as mortals, bread-eaters, speech-users, and with numerous other attributes. His evenhandedness and uniformity, rife with normative connotations, imply that human identity is inseparable from an ethical orientation.

Is Homer’s outlook cosmopolitan? Yes and no. His uniform perspectives are more than Panhellenic because they extend to Egyptians and Ethiopians, as well as Trojans. But nationalism is too weak a component of his poems for it to be transcended by strict cosmopolitanism. What is most striking is the complete absence from his vocabulary of the word barbaros (barbarian) in reference to non-Greeks. Homer knows the word only as part of an epithet meaning “foreign-speaking.” As a prejudiced ethnic slur connoting brutish, stupid, slavish, and coward, barbaros came into vogue in the context of the unexpectedly successful Greek, and especially Athenian, victories against the invading Persians. Depreciation of non-Greeks had already begun after Homer, but it gained momentum, especially at Athens as that dominant community established its hegemony over other Greek city-states (ostensibly as an alliance against Persia), during the first half of the fifth century. Still, Herodotus, the Ionian historian of the Persian Wars, was wonderfully aware of cultural relativism. Other contemporary writers commented on the natural (as distinct from the cultural) identity of human beings, the absence of a natural basis for slavery, and the existence of natural norms that transcend the practices of particular communities. The atomist philosopher Democritus is credited with saying “To a wise man every land is accessible; for the entire world (kosmos) is a good soul’s native land.”

Prejudice and chauvinism did, however, prevail at this time, no doubt deriv-

11 Fragment 247 Diels-Kranz.
ing much of their support from the belli-
cose patriotism individual Greek states
adopted both in relation to one another
and to the continuing threats of Persian
invasion. For the medical writer Hippoc-
rates, differences in basic human nature
do not make peoples of Asia – modern
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran – “soft” and “lazy”
by comparison with Europeans, but, in-
stead, the equable climate and despotic
regimes of their native lands.12

Was Socrates an early cosmopolitan?
His incalculable influence on all of mor-
al philosophy and his position as the
Stoics’ chief role model make this ques-
tion an important one. Offered the op-
portunity to escape while awaiting exe-
cution, Socrates, according to Plato’s
Crito, declined to do so, on the ground
that he would be doing wrong to the
laws of Athens, which he personified as
his cultural parents. Even though Socra-
tes appears to have left Athens only
when on military service and showed no
significant interest in foreign affairs, his
ethical convictions are completely uni-

eral in their scope, including such
propositions as the involuntaryness of
wrong-doing and the absolute sover-
eignty of justice.13

Two of Socrates’s followers merit
mention as well. Aristippus, reputed
founder of the Cyrenaic school of rad-
ical hedonism, is reported to have told
Socrates that his own ideal was a life of
freedom (avoiding the two extremes of
office holding and slavery), which he
pursued by “not confining [himself] to
one nationality but by being a stranger
everywhere.”14 A Cynic or Stoic would
substitute “citizen” for “stranger,” so
Aristippus was at most a half-hearted

cosmopolitan. Antisthenes, another of
Socrates’s leading companions, proba-
bly had a major influence on Diogenes.15
Self-sufficiency, mental strength, free-
dom grounded in deliberate poverty,
“making reason one’s city wall,” as he is
memorably quoted as saying, and ap-


12 See Hippocrates’s remarkable little work
Airs, Waters, and Places.

13 A case for attributing some cosmopolitan
tendencies to Socrates is made by Eric Brown,
“Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism,” in Mary L. Gill
and Pierre Pellegrin, eds., A Companion to Anci-

14 Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, 2.1.13.

15 On Antisthenes, see Susan Prince, “Socrates,
Antisthenes, and the Cynics,” in Sara Ahbel-
Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar, eds., A Compan-
ion to Socrates (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

16 DL, 6.63.

17 DL, 6.71.

18 Ibid.
had defaced the local coinage.\textsuperscript{19} (This story reads suspiciously like an attempt to provide a literal scenario for Diogenes’s metaphorical defacements of custom or law. Other anecdotes include his being captured by pirates and sold as a slave.) In due course he found his way to Athens, where he lived as a “resident alien” without citizen rights, seemingly supporting himself entirely by begging and the handouts he received as a famously entertaining curmudgeon and street philosopher.

Diogenes sought to present himself as a living icon of counter-culturalism. He was especially renowned for his way-out exhibitionism – masturbating in public, eating raw meat, living in a tub – his cult of poverty, rugged simplicity, refusal to respect anyone on the basis of rank or position, and his brilliantly caustic discourse, the last of which harked back to Socrates and Antisthenes. Neither of these predecessors, though, anticipated Diogenes’s unremitting exhibitionism and affronts to conventional decency and manners.

Where is the originator of cosmopolitanism in any of this? He approved being described in the following verses from Greek tragedy: “Stateless, homeless, without a native land / A beggar, a vagabond, living by the day.”\textsuperscript{20} Here his world citizenship, rather than an endorsement of internationalism or worldwide community, looks like a combination of refugee and hippy, with the “I don’t give a damn where I live and I regard all laws as constraints on my freedom” flavor of the modern cynic.

Reading Diogenes’s expression “citizen of the world” negatively is certainly correct up to a point; he took himself to be living a life unconstrained by any local or official citizenship. However, Diogenes wasn’t purely iconoclastic in his rejection of the conventional norms of civic life, nor did he have only a negative manifesto to promote. Diogenes Laertius, after quoting the verses printed above in his biography of Diogenes, says of the Cynic, “He claimed that he could oppose confidence to fortune, nature to law or custom, and reason to emotion” – with nature and reason being the crucial words in this statement. By opposing nature to \textit{nomos} Diogenes took up sides in a debate that had been rumbling on for the previous one hundred years. Earlier defendants of nature tended to view it as libertarianism, and, in doing so, saw themselves as hedonists or supporters of untrammeled political power. Diogenes was a libertarian of a kind, but the nature he opposed to \textit{nomos} was not an anything-goes egoism, but, rather, reason, which he took to be the essence of human nature. His forceful attacks on \textit{nomos}, ribald though they typically were in formulation, had the serious purpose of challenging his audience to hold their cultural practices accountable strictly to the light of reason. By forcefully contrasting nature with \textit{nomos}, Diogenes drew attention, as Antisthenes had already done, to the idea that in reason human beings have their greatest authority for action and their greatest bulwark against the vicissitudes of fortune. For Diogenes, the true Cynic was a Hercules of the mind, whose conquests would be the monsters of irrational passion and cultural prejudice and whose weapon would be reason on the path to self-mastery.

We are probably warranted in crediting Diogenes with the idea that human

\textsuperscript{19} DL, 6.20, probably with a view to putting bad money out of circulation. Diogenes’s father is said to have been in charge of the local mint.

\textsuperscript{20} DL, 6.38.
nature in its rational capacities transcends all civic and ethnic boundaries. Diogenes’s cosmopolitanism was normative rather than descriptive, though. His worldwide city should be regarded as the community of the wise, an ideal of enlightened persons united not by local or relational ties but by the common values they share—a group that understands what human nature needs in order to perfect itself. This is the cosmopolitanism that Diogenes, through his follower Crates, passed down to Zeno and the Stoic tradition.

In the early Hellenistic world, Greek language and culture spread into Western Asia and Egypt in the aftermath of the conquests of Alexander the Great (d. 323), providing a fertile context for implicit cosmopolitan sentiments to take root. Stoicism provided the theoretical stimulus and explicit support for these sentiments.

Zeno stamped Cynic credentials on his earliest and most famous book, Republic, probably in deliberate confrontation with Plato’s most celebrated work of the same name. The philosopher and biographer Plutarch, writing some four hundred years later, described its main point thus:

Our household arrangements should not be based on cities or local populations,

Zeno radically proposed that the ideal community would dispense with such fundamental Hellenic institutions as temples, courts of law, gymnasia, currency, conventional family life, and dress codes. Plutarch’s “one way of life” captures some of Zeno’s ideas, but fails to register the completely utopian character of the Stoic founder’s vision, namely a community comprised solely of the wise and virtuous.

Zeno gave impetus to two closely related and enormously influential ideas: moral universalism and natural law. According to Stoic cosmology, the world is under the direction of a supreme nature named Zeus, who is perfectly rational and providential and present to all human beings (or at least those who listen to the voice of reason) in Zeus’s law-like prescriptions and prohibitions.

Zeno himself may not have theorized the concept of a world city, but Stoicism was soon associated with the notion that the universe as such is a kind of city or, as Cicero two centuries later expressed it, “the common home of gods and human beings, or a city that belongs to both.” Rather than reject the conventional concept of a city or local community, Stoics characteristically spoke of “two communities.” The Roman Stoic Seneca (d. A.D. 65) said:

21 Did Diogenes present himself as a universal benefactor and philanthropist? I see him as more quirky and hard-edged than these descriptions imply, appropriate though they are to the Stoicized Cynic of Epictetus. But for a different view see John Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” in Branham and Goulet-Cazé, The Cynics.

22 On Crates, who is said to have been Zeno’s first teacher (DL, 7.1–2), see A. A. Long, “The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics,” in Branham and Goulet-Cazé, The Cynics.

23 On the Fortune of Alexander, 329A–B.

24 DL, 7.87–89.

There are two communities— the one, which is great and truly common embracing gods and human beings, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of our birth.  

Marcus Aurelius penned the most eloquent statements of our cosmic citizenship. Through a chain argument, he links what is common, reason, law, citizenship, humanity as a whole, and the world:

If mind is common to us all, then so is the reason which makes us rational beings; and if that be so, then so is the reason which prescribes what we should do or not do. If that be so, there is a common law also; if that be so, we are fellow-citizens; and if that be so, the world is a kind of state. For in what other common constitution can we claim that the whole human race participates?

For both Marcus Aurelius and the ex-slave and Stoic teacher Epictetus (c. A.D. 55–135), persons who detach themselves from human society are as “severed limbs.” Epictetus presents an idealized Cynic as his cosmopolitan paradigm. This figure, whom he also calls God’s messenger, makes the earth and the sky his home. Witnessing to the truths that make for a good life, Epictetus’s Cynic cosmopolitan practices philanthropy on a global scale.

This cosmopolitanism does not imply that Stoics thought that human beings lack, or should learn to lack, all preferences for their immediate family members or weaken their ties to local communities. Stoics listed among appropriate acts (which reason recommends our undertaking) honoring parents, brothers, and native land and spending time with friends. They derived human sociability from our natural love of offspring and (outside the utopian contexts of their earliest philosophers) proposed that their wise paragon would want to engage in government, marry, and have children.

Yet, while softening Diogenes’s mordant unconventionalism, Stoicism was the one ancient philosophy that adumbrated ideas of natural human rights and international ideals of justice. In On Duties (De officiis), Cicero, writing as a supporter of Stoicism, argues that international law (ius gentium), the law governing relations between states, ought to be the civil law (ius civile). At the same time he complains (in sentiments that have lost no force in the ensuing two thousand years) that we still lack a firm image of the authentic justice that international law should reflect. Cicero’s On Duties was more influential on early modern thought than any other work of classical antiquity.

Hierocles, a Stoic philosopher of the second century A.D., proposed a fascinating model and recommendation for the way human beings should regard their personal and social identities. Each of us, he said, should picture our-

26 On Leisure, 4.1.

27 Meditations, 4.4.

28 Meditations, 4.29; Epictetus 2.5.26.

29 DL, 7.108.

30 Cicero, On Ends, 3.67–68.

31 Cicero, On Duties, 3.69.


33 The translated text is included in A. A. Long and David N. Sedley, The Hellenistic
selves as the center of a series of concentric circles. The nearest circle contains one’s immediate family – parents, siblings, spouse, and children – and the next contains uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and cousins. The circle beyond this is comprised of more distant relatives, and then, as one goes farther, the circle of neighbors, then fellow tribesmen, then fellow citizens, then people from nearby towns, then fellow-countrymen, and, finally, in the outermost and largest circle, the entire human race. Hierocles recommended two strategies for reducing the distance between oneself and the series of circles. First, we should draw the circles closer to ourselves, treating the third circle as if it were second and so on, making the occupants of each circle that degree closer to us. Second, we should call cousins brothers, uncles and aunts fathers and mothers, and so forth. Without rejecting the nuclear family, as early Stoic utopianism had proposed, Hierocles offered this way of reducing the conventional gaps separating close family members from other citizens, and citizens from foreigners.

Stoic thought clearly shaped cosmopolitan sentiments in the general culture of later antiquity, too. Take, for example, the Apostle Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians (3:26). After telling the baptized that they have been clad in Christ, the Epistle reads: “There is no such thing as Jew and Greek, slave and free, male and female; you are all one in Christ Jesus.” Paul, in the context of the irrelevance of Jewish ritual and identity to the Christian faith, focuses on unity and anticipates Marcus Aurelius’s conception of universal and shared citizenship.

His negation of race, status, and gender differences is a rhetorically charged application of the Stoics’ claim that all human beings are the same in virtue of their basic natural attributes.

A second example harks back to Philo of Alexandria, the extraordinary exegete of the Torah who wrote a few decades before Paul. Philo, mentioned above as the earliest extant author to use the exact Greek word kosmopolites, did so because he had an expert knowledge of Stoicism that he drew on constantly, not for its own sake but as an interpretive guide to the more obscure passages of Biblical narrative. In most instances, Philo applies the term to virtuous and wise persons in contexts that are obviously Cynic and Stoic in inspiration: “The good man [alluding to Moses] is a citizen of the world, and therefore not on the roll of any of the world’s cities since he has the whole world as his portion” and “The law-abiding man is directly a world citizen because he regulates his actions by reference to the will of nature by which the entire world is administered.”34 Of particular interest is Philo’s assessment of Adam as the aboriginal and unique citizen of the world. The world was quite literally Adam’s home and city because in Eden he lived without a manufactured dwelling and passed his life there in complete fearlessness and peace, in command over all other created beings.35 With shades of primitivism and pre-civilized innocence, Philo’s Adam reads like an ideal Cynic, fully integrated with himself and his natural surroundings.

Cynics and Stoics were classical antiquity’s principal theorists of cosmopolitanism.

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34 First reference from Life of Moses, 157; second reference from On the Creation, 3.

35 Ibid., 142.
What merits future research is the extent to which the Roman Empire, with its extensions of citizenship to its multitudinous provincials, gave people a sense of identity that went beyond their local allegiances. Would “citizen of the world” have come so readily into Philo’s mind three centuries earlier? I doubt it, largely because a cosmopolitan ideal is not attested in other philosophical schools before the Roman Empire.

Epicurus founded his school at Athens a few years before Zeno acquired his following of Stoics. Avoiding political involvements and cultivating a simple life, Epicurus showed some affinity to the Cynic practice of Diogenes and Crates, but he recommended that his adherents live in ashram-like communities of friends under the protection of conventional cities, rather than as citizens of the world. In the second century of our era, yet another Diogenes (of Oenoanda in central Anatolia) characterized the Epicurean millennium in strongly cosmopolitan terms, saying “Then everything will be full of justice and mutual friendship, and there will be no need of city-walls or laws.” In this future ideal of felicitous farming and philosophy (as the text explains), the state has withered away. As with Philo, Diogenes of Oenoanda is capable of looking at normative human identity and culture on a global scale.

Thinking along such lines must have been encouraged by the internationalism of the Roman Empire, but such an outlook was hardly widespread. No classical author is more sophisticated than the satirist Lucian (b. c. A.D. 120), but, though he liked to draw on Cynic authors, he shows no sympathy for cosmopolitanism. In a little work entitled *Encomium of one’s native land*, Lucian, drawing on Odysseus’s epic nostalgia for Ithaca, voices what was—and probably still is—the majority attitude of people today: the land where one is born is dearer than anywhere else.

A complex and paradoxical thinker, Rousseau has rightly been called “the great wrecker of theories and categories.”¹ This description is particularly fitting when it comes to cosmopolitanism, an ideal and a constellation of values that he repeatedly denounced. On this issue, as on so many others, Rousseau was both a philosophe and an anti-philosophe; his was a critique of the Enlightenment from within.² Rousseau attacked cosmopolitanism not because he did not espouse the humanitarian principles it was supposed to promote, but because he thought it was a sham.

Setting himself up as the moral conscience of his age, Rousseau reminded his readers that manners and morals are not the same thing. Curiosity or ‘openness’ toward others, the willingness to do business with them, and even the eagerness to socialize with them should not be confused with accepting them as one’s social and political equals. As Rousseau pointed out, cosmopolitanism could, and did, easily coexist with, and lend support to, unjust political and social regimes. In rejecting cosmopolitanism, Rousseau held up a mirror to the elites of his time. He denounced what he thought were their superficial and self-congratulatory attitudes. He revealed how unnatural, vain, and even corrupting their ‘civilized’ values were. With all their celebrated hospitality toward strangers and inquisitiveness about foreigners, cosmopolitan philosophes were neglecting a simple moral imperative: “The essential thing is to be good to the people with whom one lives.”³


³ Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Rousseau are from his Œuvres complètes, ed. Bernard Gagnébin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959 – 1995). (Henceforth, OC.) Translations are my own. This quotation is from Emile, OC, vol. IV, 249.
Rousseau was not shy about his disdain for cosmopolitanism. In his political treatise, *The Social Contract*, he identified the cosmopolitan as a person who “pretended to love the whole world in order to have the right to love no one.”

At the beginning of his pedagogical treatise, *Emile*, he placed a similarly cutting remark. Rousseau advised his readers to “beware of those cosmopolitans who go to great lengths in their books to discover duties they do not deign to fulfill around them. A philosopher loves the Tartars so as to be spared having to love his neighbors.”

Later in the same book, Rousseau again denounced cosmopolitan values as amounting only to hypocrisy and pretense: “The man of the world lives entirely in his mask…. What he really is, is nothing; what he appears to be is everything for him.”

But these are only Rousseau’s most obvious broadsides against cosmopolitanism. Elsewhere in his writings, he condemned the institutions and practices most commonly credited with spreading it: he denounced international commerce, regretted the progress of the sciences, detested cities, abhorred the salons, and violently objected to the “vile and deceitful uniformity” being propagated by cultural interaction. To Rousseau, the polite manners of “civilized people” were nothing but a hypocritical “veil” suffocating the inner voice of conscience; they were the “garlands of flowers” decorating the chains of despotism.

One might even be tempted to say that all of Rousseau’s literary productions, from his autobiographical writings to his novels and political treatises, can be read as one long and elaborate diatribe against the rise of cosmopolitanism in early modern Europe.

In *Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Europe*, Margaret Jacob celebrates the “border crossing” encouraged by eighteenth-century cosmopolitans. Jacob argues that their tolerant attitude toward others promoted the transgression of boundaries separating people by nationality, race, class, religion, and gender. The cosmopolitans’ openness toward people different from themselves, she reasons, eventually helped to spread the notion that all men are equal and in possession of the same human rights.

Given this compelling thesis, there is something strange and even disturbing about the fact that the most radically democratic thinker of his time, a man who even helped invent the term “rights of man,” so vehemently disagreed. Indeed, much of Rousseau’s philosophy is precisely about erecting barriers, keeping people apart, and even encouraging a certain amount of insularity. While cosmopolitans encouraged the “mingling, jostling, clubbing [and] fraternizing” that fostered communication and exchange between strangers, Rousseau preferred small and exclusive societies deliberately designed to keep out foreigners.

Thus, in his pedagogical treatise *Emile*, Rousseau advised parents to erect psychological walls around their children to shield them from the outside world,


5 *Emile*, 249.

6 Ibid., 515.


9 Ibid., 6.
to “set up an enclosure around your child’s soul.” Emile’s education up to the age of twelve is expressly designed to avoid his exposure to, and thus eventual dependence on, other people. He is raised far from the city and kept away from the social relationships that Rousseau believed were inherently corrupting. Care is taken not to awaken his curiosity about other people or faraway places; he is not taught urbane manners. Rather, he is educated so as to preserve his natural goodness, to be self-sufficient and comfortable in nature, and to value the simple and solitary pleasures of the countryside.

Similarly, in his novel Julie, or the New Heloise, Rousseau constructed an ideal community especially designed to protect its inhabitants from the outside world. Clarens is a community that is as insular and secluded as it is small. It is isolated geographically and largely self-sufficient economically. Thus, it cultivates its members’ psychological and material autonomy, which Rousseau suggests is the only way to true happiness. In a preface to the novel, Rousseau explained that one of his purposes in writing it was to teach men to “love solitude.” He wanted them to leave the crowded cities and move to places where they could “hold some distance one from another.” He hoped to teach them that “the sweetest sentiments of the heart,” cultivated in carefully circumscribed and ordered communities like Clarens, were far more agreeable than all the “affected” socializing going on in the cosmopolitan cities.

Rousseau’s political writings also show his preference for small, isolated, and self-sufficient states whose economies center on agriculture, not trade. He repeatedly upheld ancient Rome and Sparta as models, warning his fellow Genevans to abandon their emerging commercial ethos and return to their traditional values. Rousseau’s recommendations to both Poland and Corsica also called for strict regulation of their commerce. He advised them to encourage agriculture and a rustic life instead. If the Poles wished to create “a free, wise, and peaceful nation . . . self-sufficient and happy,” they should “preserve and revive among [their] people simple customs and wholesome tastes.”

To Rousseau, trade with foreigners was not a civilizing or democratizing force; rather, it was a poisonous source of inequality and corruption. Commerce with others engendered the love of luxury and its related train of vices. It caused people to neglect their real duties and become selfish and vain.

Rousseau also deplored what he saw as the cultural conformity being promoted by commerce and travel. While eighteenth-century cosmopolitans displayed an eagerness to borrow ideas and habits from other lands or civilizations, Rousseau warned people against such practices. “Today,” he wrote regretfully, “there are no longer Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, or even Englishmen; there are only Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, and the same customs.”

To counter what he saw as a nefarious trend, Rousseau advised states to cultivate what was unique about themselves. When forming a state, the first rule to follow was “national character.”

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10 Emile, 246.
13 Ibid., 960.
Corsicans, he explained, “Every people has or ought to have a national character and if it lacks one, we would have to begin by giving it one.” Likewise, to the Poles he spoke admiringly of “the genius, the character, the tastes and the mores of a people, that cause it to be itself and not another.” Such statements are partly why Rousseau is often regarded as a founder of modern nationalism.

One efficient way to cultivate national character was through patriotism. In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau declared that every legitimate state should protect and encourage national institutions designed to attach its citizens to their country. It should offer civic education to its inhabitants and encourage traditional customs, ceremonies, festivals, and spectacles. Thus, Rousseau advised the Poles that they should encourage “that ardent love of country based upon habits of mind impossible to uproot.” And he suggested that each Corsican should be made to swear the following oath: “I unite my body, my goods with all my will and all my power to the Corsican nation. I swear to live and die for it.”

Rousseau even seems to have accepted the fact that patriotism normally goes along with a contempt for foreigners. He noted that the ancients knew this; for them, the words ‘stranger’ and ‘enemy’ were synonymous. At the beginning of Emile, Rousseau acknowledges that “every patriot is hard on strangers; they are only men, they are nothing in his eyes. This inconvenience is inevitable, but not serious.” Rousseau was not alone among eighteenth-century thinkers in perceiving a fundamental incompatibility between love of country and love of humanity. Voltaire explicitly distinguished between being a patriot and a “citizen of the world”; the cosmopolitan Voltaire, however, favored the latter. Throughout history, patriotism had only consisted in “bringing back to the communal mob what one stole from other nations…. To love one’s country thus means to kill and plunder other men.” Elsewhere, Voltaire wrote that “to wish for the greatness of one’s country is to wish evil to one’s neighbors.” But Rousseau thought otherwise. Throughout his writings, he attacked cosmopolitanism, extolled patriotism, and proudly trumpeted his own title: “citizen of Geneva.”

Thinking about Geneva seems to have been particularly conducive to stimulating Rousseau’s mistrust of strangers and foreigners. In his “Dedication” to the Second Discourse, he denounced the values Genevans were acquiring while traveling abroad. He urged them to turn inward and cultivate their patriotism instead. In Julie, or the New Heloise, a main character explains that “the Genevan gets his virtues from himself; his vices come from elsewhere.” Again, in his Letter to d’Alembert, Rousseau wrote, “Never has a foreigner entered Geneva, but Voltaire explicitly distinguished between being a patriot and a “citizen of the world”; the cosmopolitan Voltaire, however, favored the latter. Throughout history, patriotism had only consisted in “bringing back to the communal mob what one stole from other nations…. To love one’s country thus means to kill and plunder other men.” Elsewhere, Voltaire wrote that “to wish for the greatness of one’s country is to wish evil to one’s neighbors.” But Rousseau thought otherwise. Throughout his writings, he attacked cosmopolitanism, extolled patriotism, and proudly trumpeted his own title: “citizen of Geneva.”

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15 Considerations on the Government of Poland, 960.
16 Ibid.
17 Project for a Corsican Constitution, 943.
18 Geneva Manuscript, 288.
19 Emile, 248.
21 Julie, or the New Heloise, 662.
Rousseau himself was a solitary man by inclination, and felt awkward in society. Late in life he confessed, “I have never been truly suited for civil society, where everything is annoyance, obligation, and duty...my independent natural temperament always made me incapable of the subjection necessary to anyone who wants to live among men.” Nevertheless, his autobiography recounts some fleeting moments of happiness experienced as a young man in what Rousseau described as an intimate “little circle,” centered on Madame de Warens: “All our vows, our cares, our hearts were in common,” he recalled. “Nothing of them passed outside of the little circle.” Here again, then, one sees Rousseau’s preference for the closed, intimate, and secluded communities that he felt were the only spaces within which sincere communication between human beings could occur.

Later, of course, he identified himself as a “citizen of Geneva,” and tried to be a true patriot by advising his fellow Genevans on how to protect their traditions and constitution. In this attempt he largely failed; few Genevans understood the Second Discourse, and The Social Contract was condemned in Geneva as it was elsewhere in Europe: few of his fellow Genevans rose up in his defense. Thus, he gave up his Genevan citizenship and ended up spending much of his life alone, as a social and political outcast. Late in life, he developed acute feelings of paranoia.

No wonder, then, that Rousseau’s later writings, particularly the autobiographical ones, promote an ethic of withdrawal and inwardness. In The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, he speaks of his intense desire for solitude, and his conviction that “the source of true happiness is within us.” Indeed, by writing highly personal texts, such as Confessions, Rousseau: Judge of Jean-Jacques, and The Reveries, Rousseau valorized introspection and man’s private inner world. In a different way, Rousseau’s late botanical writings helped to spread the idea that the best life is spent not in the company of other human beings, but in solitary communion with nature. From start to finish, then, Rousseau seems to have lived the life, and espoused the values, of an anti-cosmopolitan.

But Rousseau wouldn’t be Rousseau if he didn’t also contradict himself. Thus he sometimes spoke well of cosmopolitanism. In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, he praised the “great Cosmopolitan Souls” who resisted particularist or nationalist sentiments and “embraced all of mankind in their benevolence.” In the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, he similarly celebrated those philosophers, such as Bacon, Descartes, and Newton, who distinguished themselves

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26 The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, 1003.

by being “tutors of mankind.”

In his own writings, Rousseau claimed to adopt “a language that suits all Nations,” and to promote the “felicity of mankind.” By these contradictory statements, what he seems to be saying is not that all cosmopolitanism is bad, but that true cosmopolitanism is rare.

Moreover, although Rousseau is sometimes called a founder of modern nationalism, it would certainly be wrong to equate Rousseau’s endorsement of “national character” and patriotism with the virulent nationalism born later, in the nineteenth century. First, it is important to realize that patriotism, in Rousseau’s thought, is always closely linked with political liberty. Rousseau believed that only free men could be moved to love their fellow citizens, “for it is only they who have a common existence and are truly linked together by the law.” To Rousseau, patriotism did not come from the love of a specific geographic area, but rather from that of a particular set of laws; democratic principles and patriotism were inextricably linked. Only “a true republican” who is also a “member of the sovereign” could experience “the love of the fatherland, that is, its laws and its liberty.”

Thus, there is not necessarily a contradiction between Rousseau’s stance on ‘national character’ and patriotism, and the underlying humanitarian principles of cosmopolitanism.

Second, Rousseau denounced all systems of rule based on domination, exploitation, or even dependence, and he made his horror of war and violence abundantly clear. Even more to the point: in the Second Discourse, Rousseau regretted the moment in history when “the division of mankind into different societies” had occurred. The unity of humanity had been lost irrevocably and, with the division of the species, had come

National Wars, Battles, murders and reprisals that make nature tremble and shock reason, and all those horrible prejudices that rank among the virtues the honor of shedding human blood. The most decent people learned to consider it among their duties to kill their fellow men. Finally, men were seen massacring one another by the thousands without knowing why.

It was after making this statement that Rousseau referred to the few “great Cosmopolitan Souls” who managed to rise above national divisions.

Finally, Rousseau himself exhibited a kind of cosmopolitanism when he, far ahead of his time, identified and denounced what he saw as Eurocentrism in European travel accounts. In a revealing footnote to the Second Discourse, he regretted that Europeans did not have accurate information about other cultures. Travel accounts were infected by “ridiculous” “national prejudices.” Once again, Rousseau’s point was that, under present circumstances, true cosmopolitanism was rare. Instead, what you had were many civilized hypocrites who pretended to love the world while, in fact, loving only themselves.

The truth is that despite Rousseau’s professed preference for close-knit families, private “circles,” and small city-

28 Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, 20, my emphasis.

29 Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 133.

30 Considerations on the Government of Poland, 966.

31 Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 178.

32 Ibid., 213.
states like Geneva, he was deeply attached to universalist and humanitarian principles. As I already noted, in the First Discourse, his critique of Enlightenment values was intended to promote the “felicity of mankind.” In the Second Discourse, his denunciation of society had a similarly humanitarian goal: “It is of man that I am to speak,” he wrote, “I shall defend with confidence the cause of humanity.”

Rousseau was especially eager to convince people that even though present society was corrupt, and political states unjust, man was born “naturally good.” Human nature was therefore not to blame for man’s sorry predicament. Moreover, Rousseau was keen to show that human nature was everywhere the same. All men, regardless of class, race, nationality, or religion, had a common ancestor (the “noble savage”); and all men were endowed by their maker with the same basic human qualities. They were “perfectible,” that is, capable of self-improvement and endowed with a free will. Notably, all men, regardless of origin, shared an instinct of compassion—which Rousseau held to be the source of all “sentiments of humanity.” Over the course of history, a combination of factors had led human beings to suppress their natural capacity for compassion, which had stunted their “sentiments of humanity.”

The problems of the world were therefore not the result of a flawed human nature; rather, in the Second Discourse, Rousseau explained how men had been corrupted through a fundamentally vicious socialization process. A series of historical accidents and unfortunate choices had turned the noble savage into modern man: a civilized hypocrite, who, under a veil of cosmopolitan politeness, was actually selfish, competitive, and vain. Clearly, then, society’s problems could not be solved simply by accelerating the pace of social interaction, as the cosmopolitan ideal seemed to suggest. There was something profoundly wrong with the way modern men related to each other. Deeper changes were needed than “mingling, jostling, [and] clubbing” with strangers.

Anyone who reads Rousseau attentively will soon see that his preference for small, enclosed communities sheltered from the outside world was not about withdrawal for withdrawal’s sake. Always a moralist, Rousseau thought deeply about how to socialize men properly—in other words, how to reactivate man’s instinct of compassion and to cultivate those “sentiments of humanity” that are latent in each individual.

In this sense, Emile can even be read as a book about the formation of a true cosmopolitan. Rousseau began by dismissing the notion that Emile should be raised as a patriotic citizen. He declared that “there is no longer a fatherland,” and thus the word “citizen” should be “erased from modern languages.” Hence the young boy is not taught national character or patriotism. He is raised to be a “man” rather than a “citizen.” Kept away from cities and society while he is young and impressionable, he is prevented from acquiring corrupt tastes such as the desire to please or to dominate others. Instead, he is given an education in conformity with nature, designed precisely to foster his sentiments of humanity. He is then taught to “generalize” and “extend” his compassion to “the whole of mankind.” All of this prepares him for adulthood, when

33 Ibid., 37, 55.
34 Emile, 250.
he will be well equipped to enter into healthy social relations with others. As a finishing touch to Emile’s education, he is advised to take long trips abroad, which will allow him to get to know other peoples. A free spirit, unencumbered by national prejudice, the adult Emile spends almost two years choosing where to live, only to conclude that “I shall loosen all the bonds which attach me to [wealth] … Rich or poor, I shall be free. I shall not be free in this or that country, in this or that region. I shall be free everywhere on earth.” Elsewhere, Emile remarks: “What does it matter where I am? Wherever there are men I am among my brothers.”

As all of his writings make clear, Rousseau believed in peace, justice, and mutual understanding. He wished to promote sincere bonds of affection between human beings, and to encourage their naturally latent “sentiments of humanity.” The real question for him was how to accomplish this. How was one to draw modern individuals, who are prone to selfishness and vanity, out of themselves and into a fruitful and moral engagement with others? Rousseau believed that it could only be done on a small, local scale. Only carefully circumscribed and controlled communities like Clarens, Madame de Warens’s “little circle,” or tiny city-states like Geneva, could socialize individuals effectively. Human beings needed to turn inward, to consult their consciences, to listen to their natural sentiments, and thus find their true and shared humanity, before they could love others as they loved themselves.

For Rousseau, it was primarily the family, and the family with a loving woman at its center, that could socialize the individual, teaching him sincere feelings of affection for others. Genuine socialization could certainly not happen in a cosmopolitan city. Being suddenly thrown together with masses of strangers does not moralize the individual; rather, it encourages false display and thereby even estranges man from himself. This can be seen in the character Saint-Preux in Julie, or the New Heloise. Visiting Paris, Saint-Preux soon remarks, “It is the first inconvenience of great cities that men become different from what they really are, and that society gives them, so as to speak, a different being than their own.”

To Julie, he explains, “I enter with a secret horror into this vast desert of the world. This chaos offers only a horrible solitude where a dismal silence reigns.” He remembers an ancient writer who once said, “I am never less alone than when I am alone”; after experiencing Paris, Saint-Preux adds, “I am alone only when in a crowd.”

Something very different happens to Saint-Preux in Clarens, where honesty and transparency reign. Within their protected “little world,” members of the household can reveal their feelings to each other openly and thus remain true to themselves. Crucially, Rousseau suggests that the sincere ties of affection that are nurtured in a place like Clarens can be extended outward to the world beyond. In one particularly suggestive passage, Saint-Preux describes the emotions he had felt one day, right before a holiday celebration was about to begin: he had been moved by the “agreeable and touching portrait of communal happiness, which seemed at that moment to cover the face of the earth.”

Experiencing compassion and affection within a do-

36 Ibid., 856–857.

37 Julie, or the New Heloise, 273.

38 Ibid., 231.

39 Ibid., 17, 604, my emphasis.
domestic community allows the individual to expand and extend these sentiments to encompass the rest of the world.

In his political writings, Rousseau suggests that there is a similar dynamic at work in international relations. Human beings do not automatically identify and sympathize with people who are different from themselves, who live far away, and about whom they know little. In the *Discourse on Political Economy*, he explains, “It seems that the sentiment of humanity evaporates and weakens as it extends itself across the globe.” To activate man’s latent sentiments of humanity, it is necessary to “limit and compress” his natural feelings of compassion, focusing them first on his fellow citizens, before they can be extended further.40 As Rousseau writes elsewhere, “We conceive of the general society on the basis of our particular societies; the establishment of small republics makes us think about the large one, and we only really begin to become men after having been citizens.”41 Once again, then, Rousseau’s praise of patriotism and national character is not incompatible with true cosmopolitanism; rather, he suggests that the right kind of patriotism, nurtured in a small republic like Geneva, would be conducive to it.

Even in his lonely seclusion during his final years, as Rousseau became more and more reclusive and introspective, he never abandoned his essentially universalist and humanitarian outlook. In his autobiography, *Confessions*, he reached across all barriers constructed by society in order to speak directly to his readers. He bared his soul and, in so doing, invited his readers to recognize their own humanity in his. Once again, Rousseau suggested that it was only by withdrawing from society – in other words, by removing oneself from all the social sources of falsehood and hypocrisy – that one could discover one’s true self; and only then could one identify humanely with others. And, once more, his intensely personal writing helped to develop sympathetic understanding in his readers, enabling them to empathize across class, sex, and national lines.

Rousseau’s last major work, *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, begun in 1776 and still unfinished at the time of his death, reflects his final descent into what most scholars now recognize was paranoia. In its opening passage, he describes his complete estrangement from society: “Here I am, then, alone in the world, with no brother, neighbor, or friend, nor any company left to me but my own.” “Everything external is henceforth foreign to me,” he continues, “I am on earth as though on a foreign planet…. Alone, for the rest of my life…I find consolation, hope, and peace only in myself.” However, in a final jab at the Enlightenment’s version of cosmopolitanism, Rousseau suggests that even as a hermit, he is a greater lover of mankind than any fashionable socialite could ever be. Withdrawn from society, he can get in touch with his true nature and thus the sources of his humanity. “I love myself too much to hate anyone at all. That would be to compress my existence, and I would instead like to extend it across the whole universe.”42 In this paradoxical way, by removing himself from society, and by being a stranger everywhere in the world, Rousseau proffered lessons to all of mankind and even offered himself as the ‘truest’ cosmopolitan of them all.

41 *Geneva Manuscript*, 287.
42 *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, 995, 999, 106.
‘Cosmopolitanism’ is not – or not yet – the name of a determinate political philosophy. Although many contemporary theorists have put forward views that they describe as cosmopolitan, there is little agreement among them about the central elements of a cosmopolitan position. Almost nobody advocates the development of the kind of global state that would give the idea of ‘world citizenship’ literal application. Instead, disparate views have been advanced under the heading of cosmopolitanism, and these views share little more than an organizing conviction that any adequate political outlook for our time must in some way comprehend the world as a whole.

To some people cosmopolitanism is primarily a view about sovereignty. To others it is primarily a view about culture and identity. To many philosophers, however, it is primarily a view about justice, and in recent years there has been an increasing flow of books and articles devoted to the subject of ‘global justice.’

In part, the focus on justice reflects the continuing influence of John Rawls, who insisted that “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.” In so doing, Rawls elevated the concept of justice above other important political ideas such as liberty, law, equality, power, rights, obligation, security, democracy, and the state, and gave it a privileged place on the agenda of contemporary political philosophy. It is testimony to Rawls’s influence that justice – especially ‘distributive,’ or economic, justice – has remained a central preoccupation of political philosophers ever since.

Yet there is disagreement about the bearing of Rawls’s own work on cosmopolitanism considered as a view about justice.

In the cosmopolitan literature, Rawls figures both as hero and as villain. As hero – for saying that a just society cannot permit the distribution of income...
and wealth to be influenced by morally arbitrary factors such as people’s native abilities or the social circumstances into which they are born. Cosmopolitans see this as paving the way for a recognition that national boundaries are equally arbitrary from the standpoint of justice. As a matter of justice, the accident of where one is born should have no effect on one’s economic prospects.

As villain – because Rawls himself refused to draw this conclusion. In *A Theory of Justice*, he argued that the “primary subject of justice” is the “basic structure” of an individual society. The basic structure comprises a society’s major social, political, and economic institutions. Rawls’s principles of distributive justice are universal in the sense that they apply to the basic structure of each society taken one at a time, but not in the sense that they apply to the global distribution of income and wealth as a whole. So, according to Rawls’s ‘difference principle,’ the laws and institutions of the United States should be designed in such a way as to maximize the position of the worst-off Americans, and the laws and institutions of Bangladesh should be designed in such a way as to maximize the position of the worst-off Bangladeshis. But justice does not require that the worst-off Bangladeshis should be as well-off as the worst-off Americans. Indeed, it does not require that the best-off Bangladeshis should be as well-off as the worst-off Americans. According to Rawls, the principles of distributive justice impose no constraints at all on the distribution of income and wealth between the United States and Bangladesh or among citizens of the two countries.

*A Theory of Justice* was published at a time when globalization was not yet a word in our everyday lexicon and few people described themselves as cosmopolitans. Virtually all political philosophers at the time assumed that the individual society was the default unit of analysis. So if he had written nothing further on the subject, Rawls’s failure to question this assumption might have been taken to reveal nothing more damning than a lack of prescience or a failure of imagination. Yet when, late in his career, Rawls explicitly addressed issues of global justice in light of the extensive literature that had by then emerged on the subject, he refused the invitation of sympathetic cosmopolitan critics to apply his theory of distributive justice globally. Instead, he argued that relations among societies are governed by the “law of peoples.”2 The law of peoples sets out principles of justice to govern international relations, but they are not principles of distributive justice. In other words, they do not concern themselves with the distribution of income and wealth per se, but instead presuppose the existence of separate societies within which distributive principles do apply. In taking this position, Rawls cemented his ambiguous status – part hero, part villain – within the cosmopolitan literature.

I believe that this mixed assessment gets things backwards. On the one hand, Rawls is not the hero that cosmopolitans take him to be, because he never did say that morally arbitrary factors should not be allowed to influence the distribution of income and wealth. Any distribution, including distributions that conform to Rawls’s own difference principle, will inevitably be influenced by such factors. What Rawls said was that a just distribution must not be improperly influenced by morally arbitrary factors. But to decide what counts as an improper influence we

need a substantive theory that we have compelling independent reasons to accept. Rawls took himself to have provided such a theory for the special but crucial case of the basic structure of an individual society. Cosmopolitans would have to do something comparable for the global case. The mere observation that national boundaries are morally arbitrary—hardly controversial if what it means is just that nobody deserves to be born in one country rather than another—does not take us very far.

On the other hand, Rawls’s emphasis on the basic structure as the primary subject of justice does not qualify him as the villain of the piece either, for its real effect is to clarify the form that a compelling argument for cosmopolitanism would have to take. If anything, it is this feature of Rawls’s view, rather than his claim about the moral arbitrariness of natural talents and social class, that paves the way for the development of a credible cosmopolitan position.

There is one well-known argument for cosmopolitanism that does take its inspiration from Rawls’s claims about the primacy of the basic structure. Rawls is correct, according to this argument, to stress the importance of regulating the basic structure by norms of justice, but what he fails to recognize is that there is now a global basic structure—a worldwide network of economic and political institutions. It is to this structure, rather than to the institutions of a single society, that the principles of justice properly apply.

Samuel Freeman, a prominent defender of Rawls, has responded forcefully to this line of argument. He emphasizes that, for Rawls, distributive justice is not concerned with the allocation of goods in the abstract. Nor, contrary to what some philosophers appear to believe, are we to decide on the principles of distributive justice by comparing the intrinsic attractiveness of different allocative patterns. Instead, distributive justice is a response to social and political cooperation and the possibilities and problems that cooperation brings with it. As such, it is an essentially social and political value, and it governs the basic social institutions that make possible the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of goods. The institutions in question include the legal systems of property and contract, and they are political products, the results of political decisions and political action. The principles of distributive justice provide standards for designing and assessing such institutions. The role of these principles is to specify fair terms of cooperation for people who are conceived of as engaged in a complex cooperative project governed by a strong notion of reciprocity.

Since, in Rawls’s view, a world government is neither feasible nor desirable, and since the basic institutions to which distributive justice applies must be constructed politically, there is no global basic structure and no reasonable expectation that one will emerge in the future. There are, to be sure, global institutions and arrangements of various kinds, but they do not add up to a global basic structure that is remotely analogous to the domestic case. Instead, these institutions are largely the product of international agreements among independent states, and they presuppose the existing legal and institutional structures of those states. In the absence of a global state with a world government, there is nothing that would count as a global basic structure in Rawls’s sense.

3 In Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), part III.
This response is effective against the simple cosmopolitan strategy of generalizing Rawls’s claims about the basic structure to the case of the so-called ‘global basic structure.’ Yet even if this simple generalizing strategy fails, Rawls’s focus on the basic structure holds a more encouraging lesson for cosmopolitans.

To see why, it will help to review some of the motivation for that focus. One place to start is with utilitarianism – the theory that Rawls treats as the primary rival to his own – and in particular with utilitarian revisionism. Utilitarians hold that the correct normative standard to apply both to individual actions and to institutional policies and arrangements is the standard of maximizing average or aggregate utility or welfare. Utilitarianism is famous – or notorious – for its willingness to deviate from traditional or ‘commonsense’ moral principles whenever a deviation will promote maximum utility overall. The simplest form of utilitarianism holds, for example, that killing innocent people is normally wrong because it normally fails to maximize the general welfare. But if, in extraordinary circumstances, killing some innocent person would maximize the general welfare, perhaps because it would prevent the deaths of more innocents overall, then it is the right thing to do.

Utilitarian revisionism is motivated by two mutually reinforcing convictions. The first is that there is a strong connection between morality, properly understood, and well-being. If adherence to a given set of values and norms does not serve to enhance human well-being, then it is irrational and inhumane to insist on those norms, however firmly entrenched in tradition and common sense they may be. The dead hand of tradition should not blind us to the fact that the only possible point of morality is to make our lives better, nor should it lead us to acquiesce in values and norms that fail to contribute to that aim.

The second conviction is that it is essential to think about moral questions in a systematic and holistic way, focusing not merely on individual actions in isolation but also on the way in which our actions are structured by social institutions and are related to wider patterns of human conduct. The fates of people in the modern world are tied together in complex ways through their shared participation in vast social, political, and economic structures. In these circumstances, we cannot continue to rely uncritically on the heterogeneous assortment of commonsense values and principles that people are used to applying in their daily lives. Instead, individual actions must be assessed, and the norms governing them must be rationalized, from a broader perspective. In formulating social policy, we must consider how and when the competing interests of different people should be balanced and aggregated, and we must decide what principles should guide the design of the massive social and political institutions that structure individuals’ lives.

Among philosophers, utilitarianism has long been criticized for its many counterintuitive implications and its willingness to reject or revise values and principles in which most people have great confidence. Yet economists and social policymakers have continued to be attracted by its broad institutional perspective, its simple maximizing structure, and its foundational reliance on an inclusive notion of well-being. Despite its revisionism, utilitarianism has seemed to them to provide a rational, humane, and systematic basis on which to address the large-scale questions of institutional policy and design.
that are so important in the modern world. Rawls himself regarded it as extremely significant that the great classical utilitarians were also leading economists and social reformers with a primary interest in institutions. Indeed, an institutional emphasis of some kind seems to be required if we are to develop norms and principles capable of regulating the structural and aggregative phenomena to which the utilitarian is rightly sensitive. If the influence of utilitarianism is to be challenged, an alternative must be found that shares some of its virtues.

Now, Rawls cannot accept utilitarian revisionism, which he sees as a threat to the basic values of freedom and equality that are the foundation of a democratic society. And he believes that utilitarianism’s reliance on well-being as a fundamental notion is deeply misguided. Yet he shares the institutional focus and systematic aims of utilitarianism. In the Preface to A Theory of Justice he says that his aim is to give a systematic account of justice that will be superior to the utilitarian account. This account is meant to apply specifically to the basic institutional structure of society. The claim that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice gives social institutions priority over individual actions, from the standpoint of justice, and it reveals important affinities with the utilitarian view. In so doing, it confirms Rawls’s intention to offer a serious alternative to utilitarianism at the level of institutional design for a democratic society.

Although Rawls’s position is in general much less revisionist than utilitarianism, there is one respect in which it is actually more revisionist, for Rawls believes that social institutions require special normative principles that do not apply directly to individual agents. This represents a departure from the dominant historical tradition within moral and political philosophy. Not even utilitarianism, with its avowedly institutional emphasis, maintains that the norms governing institutions differ fundamentally from those governing individual conduct. On the contrary, a striking feature of the utilitarian view is its insistence that, ultimately, there is but a single fundamental principle that regulates both individuals and institutions.

Rawls’s claim about the primacy of the basic structure, expressed in his characteristically colorless prose and initially presented as part of an informal introductory exposition of the main outline of his theory, did not become a major focus of attention during the outpouring of critical discussion that greeted the publication of A Theory of Justice. Although it attracted the interest of a few commentators, it was generally overshadowed by other more striking and more obviously consequential features of his theory. Nor did Rawls do much at first to highlight the significance of his emphasis on the basic structure. In fact, he tends in Theory to understate the novelty of this emphasis, insisting, for example, that his view of justice is entirely compatible with Aristotle’s.

However, critics have maintained, rightly in my view, that Rawls’s focus on the basic structure marks a sharp departure from traditional philosophies of justice. Indeed, as Samuel Fleischacker has argued, although the term distributive justice is an ancient one, the actual idea of distributive justice that Rawls employs, and which receives its fullest and best developed account in his work, appears to be a relatively modern one.

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But whereas his critics believe that this is a serious failing of his view, it seems to me to be one of its most important features.

Rawls’s insistence on the primacy of the basic structure amounts to an attempt to redirect liberal theory away from a focus on individual acts, agents, and transactions, and toward a focus on the fairness of basic social institutions. More precisely, his aim is to reorient liberal theory in two ways: first, by making justice its primary virtue, and then by interpreting justice to apply in the first instance to social institutions rather than to individual actions. A concern with the justice of fundamental social arrangements, Rawls insists, must take priority over, and is a precondition for, any legitimate concern with the justice of individual actions and transactions. This focus on the basic structure represents, among other things, an attempt to incorporate into liberal theory what Rawls sees as the legitimate insights not only of utilitarianism but also of the socialist tradition. In their different ways, each of these traditions has emphasized the extraordinary and transformative significance of modern social and economic institutions. Rawls’s focus on the basic structure represents an attempt to incorporate these insights securely within liberal, democratic thought.

Now we live in a time when, in the United States of America, there has been a massive retreat from the kinds of social welfare policies that Rawls’s theory recommends, and the idea that our economic institutions must satisfy a test of fundamental fairness has fallen into disfavor. This means that the reorientation of liberal thought that Rawls sought to achieve in theory has, for the time being at least, been stymied in practice. But its theoretical importance remains undiminished.

Rawls provides a number of explicit reasons for his focus on the basic structure. First, he says in A Theory of Justice that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects in shaping people’s life prospects are so profound. Individuals born into different social positions have different expectations in life, some of them more favorable than others. These inequalities of expectation are obviously not grounded in considerations of merit or desert, and because they affect people at birth they are especially “deep” and “pervasive.” We cannot simply eliminate them all, for “any modern society … must rely on some inequalities to be well designed and effectively organized.” But their depth and pervasiveness make it essential that such inequalities should be regulated by principles of justice.

A second reason Rawls mentions has to do with the way the basic structure shapes people’s desires and their characters. Citing “economists as different as Marshall and Marx,” he says that a social system inevitably shapes people’s desires and aspirations, and helps to determine the kinds of persons they are and want to be. The choice among different systems therefore implicates different views of the human good and different moral assumptions. Yet these issues are not always confronted openly. Rawls’s emphasis on the basic structure is meant to counteract our tendency “to acquiesce without thinking in the moral and political conception implicit in the status quo, or [to] leave things to be set-


6 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 259.
tled by how contending social and economic forces happen to work themselves out.”7

Taken together, these two considerations highlight the formative role of social institutions in shaping people’s desires, characters, and differing expectations in life. In view of the massively consequential social role of the basic structure, bringing it under the control of a regulative conception of justice is a matter of the first importance. Any failure to do so will mean that matters of great moral urgency are left to be settled by default or by the play of “contending social and economic forces.”8

In “The Basic Structure as Subject,” first published in 1977, Rawls provides an additional reason.9 He argues that agreements among individuals should be treated as morally authoritative only if they are made freely and under fair conditions, and that only the basic structure can secure the background conditions necessary to ensure that agreements are free and fair. Even if such conditions happen to obtain at a given moment, the cumulative effect of many separate and seemingly fair individual transactions may be to alter the distribution of resources and opportunities in ways that erode background justice. With the best of intentions, individuals cannot sustain background justice over time, for the task is too complex and requires too much information. There are no feasible rules of individual conduct full compliance with which would suffice to prevent the erosion of background justice. Instead, it is the role of the basic structure to secure and preserve just background conditions. As Rawls puts the point,

When our social world is pervaded by duplicity and deceit we are tempted to think that law and government are necessary only because of the propensity of individuals to act unfairly. But, to the contrary, the tendency is rather for background justice to be eroded even when individuals act fairly: the overall result of separate and independent transactions is away from and not toward background justice. We might say: in this case the invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction and favors an oligopolistic configuration of accumulations that succeeds in maintaining unjustified inequalities and restrictions on fair opportunity. Therefore, we require special institutions to preserve background justice, and a special conception of justice to define how these institutions are to be set up.10

This reason differs from the two previously mentioned. In appealing to the profound effects of the basic structure and its role in shaping individuals’ wants and aspirations, Rawls had emphasized some of the potentially problematic ways in which the basic structure can affect individuals’ lives and the attendant need to bring it under normative control. But in calling attention to its role in achieving background justice, he makes a complementary point. There are profound moral problems that only the basic structure can solve. In view of the tendency of individual transactions to erode background justice, and the unavailability of feasible rules of personal conduct to counteract this tendency, in-

7 Ibid., 260.
8 Ibid.
9 John Rawls, “The Basic Structure as Subject,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April 1977). A revised and expanded version was published the following year, and is included as Lecture VII of Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
10 Ibid., 267.
dividuals by themselves cannot achieve a just society. Only a properly designed basic structure can secure the background conditions that are a precondition of such a society.

In this same essay, Rawls retracts his earlier claim that his focus on the basic structure is in accord with traditional thinking about justice. Conceding that this claim was misleading, he instead highlights the distinctiveness of his approach by contrasting it with utilitarianism on the one hand and libertarianism on the other. Neither of these two otherwise opposed positions sees a need for special principles to regulate the basic structure. Utilitarians recognize the moral importance of social institutions, but they believe that the same principles that regulate institutions can also be applied to individual conduct, even if this means departing from the traditional norms of personal morality. This is in keeping with the revisionism noted earlier.

Libertarians, meanwhile, see no difference between a political society and any other form of association, and regard basic social and political institutions as having no special moral status or importance at all. Instead, the same principles that govern the justice of individual transactions can be used to assess the justice of social arrangements. By contrast, Rawls insists that the institutional framework of a complex, modern society constitutes a distinctive kind of moral subject, with a social role and a set of capacities that differ from those of individual agents. As such, it requires regulation by a distinctive set of principles.

One striking implication of Rawls’s position is that, as the social world develops, new social and political forms may emerge, and some of these forms may come to play such a distinctive and consequential role in human life – creating new problems, compounding old ones, and being indispensable to the solution of new and old alike – that they constitute, in effect, new types of moral subject, requiring regulation by *sui generis* normative principles. If this is correct, then morality depends on politics in the sense that, in order to know what normative principles should be applied to institutions, we need to attend to the actual institutions that have emerged in our world, to the problems they have created and the problems they can solve, and to the social roles that they play. In short: new social forms may require new moral norms.

Of course, this slogan is too simple, for these new moral norms may in turn require the modification of the new social forms or even their replacement by still newer forms. But the direction of influence runs two ways: moral norms may require changes in existing institutions and practices, but changes in existing institutions and practices may also create new forms of agency and give rise to a need for new moral norms. We should understand complaints about the novelty of Rawls’s emphasis on the basic structure in this light. Critics may well be right to say that the very idea that there are special principles of ‘social justice’ that do not apply directly to individual agents is a distinctively modern one, which finds no echo in the thought of the ancients or their successors up to the modern age. But as a modern idea it presumably emerged in response to a modern predicament and, as far as I can see, it is none the worse for that.

The bearing of these considerations on the case for cosmopolitanism should be clear. Even if there is no ‘global basic structure’ to which principles of distributive justice should be applied, there is another way of generalizing Rawls’s ar-
argument, and one that is potentially more encouraging to cosmopolitan ideas. This alternative strategy involves arguing that the processes of globalization have given rise to new human practices and institutional arrangements, which, whether or not they add up to a global basic structure, nevertheless require regulation by distinctive principles of justice.

Rawls’s arguments for the primacy of the basic structure suggest that, for this alternative generalization strategy to succeed, three things would have to be established. The first is that at least some of the new global practices and arrangements have come to exert a profound and morally consequential role in human affairs. The second is that it would be either unfeasible or undesirable simply to undo the relevant practices and arrangements. And the third is that there are urgent moral problems – akin to the problem of background justice – that could not be solved either by individual agents or by the basic structures of individual societies even if both complied fully with the respective norms that apply to them, but which could be solved if the relevant global practices and organizations were regulated by sui generis principles of justice. Call the first of these conditions the consequential role condition, the second the irreversibility condition, and the third the moral indispensability condition.

It is not as easy as it may seem to tell whether these three conditions have been satisfied. One implication of Rawls’s argument in The Law of Peoples, for example, is that the shocking facts of global poverty and inequality do not by themselves establish that the moral indispensability condition has been met. The relevant question, from a Rawlsian perspective, concerns the extent to which these appalling problems would persist even if all of the world’s states were domestically just and complied fully with the law of peoples. The answer to this question is not obvious.

Nevertheless, the global economic, legal, and regulatory terrain is complex, rapidly changing, and difficult to survey. It is hard to take the measure of these developments, and easy to mistake transient features of current arrangements for permanent ones. But it seems clear that accelerating global integration is giving rise to new social forms and practices, to new patterns of interaction and interdependence, and to new modes of governance involving a heterogeneous assortment of rule-making bodies charged with fixing the terms of global economic activity. It would be rash to assume that the principles of justice with which we are already familiar, whether they apply to individuals or to the institutions of an individual society or to relations among “peoples” in Rawls’s sense, will suffice to regulate all of these new social forms.

Nor should we assume that none of the new norms that may be required will be norms of distributive justice in particular. There is a tendency to frame discussions of global distributive justice as debates about how much people in affluent countries owe to those in poorer countries. This invites attention to questions about the moral significance of membership in a political society, the relative strength of our duties to conationals and to others, and the limits of required self-sacrifice. Important as these questions are, however, there is a more direct way in which economic globalization can raise issues of distributive justice – namely, by facilitating modes of interaction that have significant distributive effects that cut across national borders and elude political control by the institutions of individual societies. Consider, for example, the claim
that increased access by Western capital to labor markets in developing countries has depressed the wages of Western workers while improving the prospects of poor workers in the Third World. If true, this claim seems to implicate issues of distributive justice that may be difficult to address solely at the level of the individual society.

Furthermore, the absence of a global basic structure does not mean that problems of background justice cannot arise on the global level. After all, it is not the existence of the basic structure that gives rise to the need for background justice. Cosmopolitans may argue that, if injustice is to be avoided, it is as important to impose background constraints on the processes of economic globalization as it is to impose them on a domestic market economy. One effect of globalization, in other words, may be to shift the locus of the problem of background justice by making it difficult for any single society to ensure just background conditions for transactions involving its citizens. Under these conditions, cosmopolitans may argue, using Rawls’s words in a different context, that we “require special institutions to preserve background justice, and a special conception of justice to define how these institutions are to be set up.”

One lesson of Rawls’s theory for philosophers is that we should be wary of trying to address problems of distributive justice by debating rival allocative formulae in a political and institutional vacuum. This is a lesson that some anticosmopolitan theorists have at times perhaps neglected. But another lesson is that it is not the job of philosophers to announce a priori limits on the social and political forms that may emerge in our world, or to foreclose the possibility that at least some of those forms will require new regulative norms. This is a lesson that some anticosmopolitan theorists have at times perhaps neglected.

It is worth remembering that Rawls devised his own theory of distributive justice, with its novel insistence on the primacy of the basic structure and on maximizing the position of the worst-off social group, only after the institutions of the welfare-state had already become familiar and well-established. If cosmopolitanism is the view that, similarly, the continued emergence and development of new global practices, bodies, and organizations may require the development of new and previously unanticipated kinds of regulative moral norms, then there is nothing in Rawls’s theory to rule that out. Indeed, there is no better illustration of the view that changes in our social world may require changes in our repertoire of moral principles than Rawls’s own arguments for the basic structure as the primary subject of justice.
In 1892, a World’s Fair, called the Columbian Exposition, was scheduled to take place in Chicago. Clearly, it was gearing up to be a celebration of unfettered greed and egoism. Industry and innovation were to be its central foci, as America planned to welcome the world with displays of technological prowess and material enrichment. Gross inequalities of opportunity in the nation were to be masked by the glowing exterior of the buildings that came to be called the ‘White City.’

Advocates for the poor, upset by the plan, got together to think about how the celebration might incorporate ideas of equal opportunity and sacrifice. A group of Christian socialists finally went to President Benjamin Harrison with an idea: at the Exposition the president would introduce a new public ritual of patriotism, a pledge of allegiance to the flag, which would place the accent squarely on the nation’s core moral values, include all Americans as equals, and rededicate the nation to something more than individual greed. The words that were concocted to express these sentiments were: “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands: one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”

As so often happens with patriotic sentiment, however, the Pledge soon proved a formula of both inclusion and exclusion. Francis Bellamy, the Pledge’s au-

1 All of this is well portrayed in Erik Larsen’s novel The Devil in the White City, a work of popular sem fiction that has, at the same time, a serious historical thesis.

2 The history of the Pledge is exhaustively documented in Richard J. Ellis, To the Flag: The Unlikely History of the Pledge of Allegiance (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). The words “under God” were added to the Pledge in 1954, during the cold war. I discuss the Pledge and the legal conflicts surrounding it in Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: Basic Books, 2008), chap. 5, 8.
thor, was himself both a socialist and a xenophobe, who feared that our national values were being undermined by the flood of new immigrants from southern Europe. By the 1940s, required by law as a daily recitation in schools in many states, the Pledge became a litmus test for the ‘good’ American; and those who flunked the test faced both exclusion and violence. Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refused to recite the Pledge for religious reasons, seeing it as a form of idolatry, soon found their children expelled from school for noncompliance. Then, in a Catch-22, the parents were fined or jailed for “contributing to the delinquency of a minor” because their children were not in school.

Patriotism is Janus-faced. It faces outward, calling the self, at times, to duties for others, to the need to sacrifice for a common good, to renewed effort to fulfill the promises of equality and dignity inherent in national ideals. And yet, just as clearly, it also faces inward, inviting those who consider themselves ‘good’ or ‘true’ Americans to distinguish themselves from outsiders and subversives. Perhaps more dangerous yet, it serves to define the nation against its foreign rivals, whipping up warlike sentiments against them. (It was for precisely this reason that Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought that a good nation needed a patriotic ‘civil religion’ in place of the dogmas of Christianity, which he found too meek and pacifistic.3)

For such reasons, people committed to the twin goals of a world in which all human beings have a decent set of life opportunities, and a world in which wars of aggression do not mar people’s life chances, typically turn a skeptical eye on appeals to patriotic sentiment. They see such sentiments as binding the mind to something smaller than humanity; and, in a way, they are not wrong.

Patriotism is a species of love that, by definition, is bounded rather than global, particularistic rather than universal. Although it calls the mind to many aspects of humanity that lead the mind beyond its domestic confines – for example, human need or the struggle for justice and equality – patriotism is also irreducibly attached to particular memories, geographical features, and plans for the future.

If, then, our political doctrine included the thought that duties to all humanity should always take precedence over other duties, or the thought that particular obligations are correctly understood to be derivative from universal obligations (as a way of fulfilling, locally, those general obligations), it would be inconsistent with giving a large role to patriotism.

In my earlier writing on cosmopolitanism, I tentatively endorsed those two claims.4 In the meantime, however, my ideas have changed in two ways.

First, having come to endorse a form of Rawlsian political liberalism, I now think it crucial that the political principles of a decent society not include comprehensive ethical or metaphysical doctrines that could not be endorsed by reasonable citizens holding a wide range

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of comprehensive doctrines. Clearly, a strong form of cosmopolitanism that denied legitimacy to nonderivative particular obligations could not be the object of an overlapping consensus in a political-liberal state. Many of the reasonable comprehensive religious and secular doctrines that citizens hold do insist on the importance of particularistic forms of love and attachment, pursued for their own sake and not just as derivative from universal duties to humanity. (Indeed, duties to God, in most religions, are particularistic in this way.) So even if I had continued to endorse cosmopolitanism as a correct comprehensive ethical position, I would not have made it the foundation of political principles for either a nation or a world order.

I do not, however, even endorse cosmopolitanism as a correct comprehensive doctrine. Further thought about Stoic cosmopolitanism, and particularly the strict form of it developed by Marcus Aurelius, persuaded me that the denial of particular attachments leaves life empty of meaning for most of us, with the human psychology and the developmental history we have. The dark side of Stoic thought is the conviction that life contains merely a sequence of meaningless episodes, once particular attachments have been uprooted; and the solution to problems of particular attachments ought not to be this total uprooting, so destructive of the human personality.

It should be, instead, an uneven dialectical oscillation within ourselves, as we accept the constraints of some strong duties to humanity, and then ask ourselves how far we are entitled to devote ourselves to the particular people and places whom we love.

This, then, is my current comprehensive ethical position, and it makes plenty of room for patriotism, especially in a form that accepts the constraints of global justice.

As it happens, this position allows me to incorporate — both in my political doctrine and in my comprehensive ethical doctrine — an insight firmly grasped by thinkers of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: that national sentiment is also a way of making the mind bigger, calling it away from its immersion in greed and egoism toward a set of values connected to a decent common life and the need for sacrifices connected to that common life.

Italian revolutionary and nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, seeing the many ways in which the rise of capitalism threatened any common project involving personal sacrifice, believed that national sentiment was a valuable “fulcrum,” on which one could ultimately leverage universal sentiment toward the goal of a just world. He doubted that the immediate appeal to love all humanity could motivate people deeply sunk in greed, but he thought that the idea of the nation might acquire a strong motivational force even when people were rushing to enrich themselves.

Mazzini’s argument for patriotic sentiment goes something like this.

1. It is good, ultimately, for all human beings to care strongly about the good of all humanity.

2. Human beings are, by nature, somewhat narrow and particularistic in their concerns, and are not able to form a strong attachment to all humanity directly.

3. Human beings are, however, able to form a strong attachment to the nation, seen as the embodiment of both memory of past struggles and commitments to a common future.
4. The nation, because of its connection with common memory, episodes of suffering, and common hopes, is the largest unit to which such strong attachments can be directly formed.

5. Such national sentiments, if rightly targeted on things of genuine importance, such as human liberty and human need, will give people practice in caring about something larger than themselves, jolting them out of the egoism that is all too prevalent and preparing them for enlarged concern for the liberty and well-being of all humanity.

6. Human beings ought to cultivate patriotic sentiment, as a basis for global concern.

Mazzini offers an attractive route out of egoism to global concern through a rightly focused nationalism. These days, however, one might doubt premise 4. In the nineteenth century, nations looked very large. As Germany and Italy were unifying, pulling nations together out of disparate regional entities and the loyalties they had traditionally inspired, it seemed natural to think that calling the mind to the nation was already a way of calling it to something very vast. The success of that call seemed, to many people, to show that global concern was only a step away. John Stuart Mill even said that the world was simply a “larger country,” and that the strength of patriotic feeling showed that his “religion of humanity” was possible.

Today, we are much more skeptical about the nation. We think of it as smaller, not larger, as confining the mind rather than enlarging it. Many people believe that nations should not exist in a future decent world order, and many more doubt that the nation is the largest unit to which human beings are capable of feeling a strong and vivid loyalty. Any contemporary argument for sentiments that give the nation a special place must begin, then, by explaining why it ought to have any place at all.

My own argument for patriotism is rather different from Mazzini’s, but reaches a similar conclusion: national sentiment can play a valuable role in creating a decent world culture. I contend that:

1. The nation-state, including a strong form of national sovereignty, is an important good for all human beings, if the state takes a certain (liberal, democratic) form. Any decent world culture should promote the continued sovereignty and autonomy of (liberal and democratic) nation-states and protect the rights of citizenship associated with them.

2. Nation-states of the sort described cannot remain stable without moral sentiments attached to their institutions and their political culture.

3. The sentiments required cannot be supplied merely by allegiances to smaller units, such as families; cities; regions; and ethnic, racial, or gender groups: they must have the nation (under some description) as their object.

4. So, there is a good reason for nations of the sort described to engender sentiments of love and support in their citizens.

5. National states of the sort described need the moral sentiments even more if they are going to undertake projects that require considerable sacrifice of self-interest, such as substantial

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internal redistribution or copious foreign aid, the overcoming of discrimination against traditionally marginalized groups, or the protection of allies against unjust domination.

6. Such projects are good projects for nations to undertake. Therefore, we have even stronger reasons for the cultivation of nation-directed moral sentiments.

How would one defend premise 1? The classic defense is Grotian: a legitimate national state provides people with a role in creating the institutions and laws that govern them. It is thus a key expression of human autonomy. One may have a lot of autonomy elsewhere in one’s life, but if one has no voice in the choice of policies affecting one’s society’s ‘basic structure,’ i.e., the set of institutions that governs one’s life chances pervasively and from the start of a human life, one is cut off from an extremely important good.

Of course, other institutions might do this job equally well, or even better: the world state; the large NGO; the United Nations; the multinational corporation; the ethnic group; the state, the city, the family. All of these can be decisively rejected, however, on grounds of access and accountability. The contenders that have not been eliminated are a federation of nations, such as the EU, and smaller self-governing units within a federal nation, such as the states of the United States and of India. Such political entities do offer some reasonable degree of access and accountability. Both, however, ultimately fall short of the nation-state in accountability and protection of basic rights, at least at the present time. We should keep reexamining these cases as new information becomes available. But currently, and for the foreseeable future, nations are critical for the promotion of people’s well-being and life opportunities.

As for my premise 2, Rawls defends this in A Theory of Justice, especially since his state is very ambitious in the sacrifices it asks of its members in the name of justice. Habermas offers a similar moralized account of supportive sentiment, in his defense of a “constitutional patriotism.”

It is plausible, however, that the moral sentiments on which Rawls relies are a bit too transparently rationalistic to do the job he assigns to them. He fails to consider (although he does not deny) that an essential motivational role, in connection with the love of just institutions, may be played by more indirect appeals to the emotions, using symbols, memories, poetry, narrative. People are sometimes moved by the love of just institutions presented just as such, but the human mind is quirky and particularistic, more easily able to conceive a strong attachment if these high principles are connected to a particular set of memories, symbols, narrative, and poetry.

My claim is that the emotions of citizens in a Rawlsian well-ordered society

6 This definition of ‘basic structure’ is that used by Rawls in Political Liberalism.


8 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 479–504. Although Rawls came to doubt the specifics of this section by the time he wrote Political Liberalism, he continued to assert that the just society needed to operate with a “reasonable political psychology.”

are, or should be, like this: that is, fixed on the moral meanings of the political conception (thus attaining stability for the right reasons, and not merely a tradition-governed type of stability), but held to those meanings by rituals and narratives of a kind that must be more particular, more uneven, more aesthetic, more tragic, and more silly than anything explicitly envisaged in Rawls’s text.

These rituals and narratives might possibly be confined to what Rawls calls the “background culture” – but on the other hand, inasmuch as they are essential vehicles of public reason, there is no reason to confine them to that role. Candidates for election, legislators, and even judges might use such symbols and poetic references, and songs and stories, if they do so in a way that reinforces and deepens the moral meaning of the political conception. We just need to be sure that citizens develop a type of ‘purified’ patriotism that is reliably linked to the deeper principles of the political conception, that does not exalt the United States (for example) above other nations, and that focuses on suffering humanity wherever it occurs.¹⁰

In order to talk about the sentiments of a ‘purified’ patriotism, we need to have a normative conception of a decent society, since it is the institutions and entitlements of such a society that such sentiments would support. Let me, for the sake of argument, stipulate that the (national) society has committed itself to my capabilities approach, which guarantees to all citizens a threshold level of ten central opportunities, or capabilities, and that also assigns to the richer nations some definite, and rather exigent, duties of foreign aid in the pursuit of global justice. Since my conception requires a high degree of sacrifice, it will need to call patriotism to its aid. If the patriotism in question is to be of the right sort, much thought must be given to questions concerning which sentiments should be fostered and which avoided.

Before I discuss these sentiments, I must add two preliminary notes. First, since the society I take as my starting point is a classically liberal one, with ample protections for freedoms of speech and association,¹¹ the public cultivation of sentiment will not be a form of coercive enforcement; later on I shall insist on a key role for a vigorous critical culture as part of what will make the whole enterprise work. So what I am talking about is public persuasion, about the many ways in which public leaders and educators cultivate sentiments through rhetoric and example.

Second, any nation is a narrative, a story in which memory of the past and aspiration for the future are salient. But any national narrative is an interpretation. Some past events are made salient and others are not. Some aspects of founding documents are brought forward and others are left behind. The moral form of patriotism that I am trying to articulate here will need to attend carefully to issues of interpretation, selecting from the many versions of a nation’s history the one that makes best constructive sense against the background of the core moral commitments of the decent society. If the nation is a new one, the interpreter has somewhat more freedom of selection; nonetheless, this freedom is not total, since the creator of patriotism for a new nation still needs to link the nation to the past of its


¹¹ See Nussbaum, Frontiers, chap. 1, 3.
people, their memories of struggle, and their religious and ethnic traditions.

Which moral sentiments will help and which will hinder the creator of a purified patriotism for the decent society envisaged in the capability approach? There is a limit to how useful any general answer to this question can be, in advance of knowing what historical materials we have to work with, and what problems the patriot is facing. Patriotism, like and as a species of love, is particularistic. Nonetheless, we can say something about what is generally helpful or harmful—just as we can in the case of familial or romantic love.

Johann Gottfried Herder, in the eighteenth century, wrote well about the moral sentiments a wise leader would need to create.12 Revealingly, he called these “dispositions of peace.” These dispositions, he said, would include a horror of war; a “reduced respect for heroic glory”; a loathing of a “false statecraft” that connects national glory to warlike expansionist projects; a “purified patriotism” that would breed contempt for aggression against other nations and, equally, for internal hatreds and group animosities; “feelings of justice towards other nations,” including sentiments of pain when another nation is disparaged or treated badly; humane feelings about international trade relations, so that people would feel upset when weaker nations “get sacrificed…for a profit that they do not even receive”; and, finally, a love of useful activity on behalf of human well-being, together with a dislike of attempts to promote well-being through war.

On one point, however, a modern patriotism must to some extent diverge from Herder: we must not base patriotic sentiment on any ethnolinguistic homogeneity, or on any religious sentiments that are divisive. It must appeal to sentiments that bind together the citizens of modern democracies that are diverse in religion and ethnicity, all of whom must be treated as fully equal citizens.

Moreover, we need to say much more than Herder does concerning the specific moral sentiments that a true statecraft and a purified patriotism should call to its aid. Central to the stability of any society that asks people to make sacrifices will be the sentiment of compassion, together with an ability to imagine vividly the predicaments of others. People will not be moved to address poverty constructively, or to give copious foreign aid, without a carefully constructed and moralized compassion that addresses the predicaments of the poor, seeing them as both serious and not caused simply by laziness or bad behavior. This compassion must learn a lesson from ancient Greek tragedy in the following sense: it must combine compassion for the plight of the suffering person with respect for that person’s agency, treating the person not as a passive victim of fortune, but as a human being striving, often heroically, against great obstacles.

Because compassion is not intrinsically reliable—for example, people usually feel compassion more strongly toward the near and dear than toward the distant—it must therefore be carefully constructed in connection with the nation’s moral norms.

Two other useful sentiments—with in proper limits—are anger and hope. Anger may be misdirected, but no struggle against injustice can do without it. Leaders will need to try to construct an

anger that is targeted at injustices, not at people; that is firmly linked to nonviolent political struggle; and that offers, in the distance, possibilities of mercy and reconciliation. Hope is an essential comrade of a reasonable anger, since people will only stick with nonviolence, and hope for reconciliation, if they do not despair.

What, by contrast, does a wise statecraft need to watch out for and try hard not to construct? In *Hiding from Humanity* I argue that two of the most dangerous moral sentiments for a decent society are disgust and shame. Both arise in early childhood in a primitive form, and both take as their first object the insufficiencies of the human body, its necessary mortality, weakness, and dependency. These features of human life are difficult for ambitious and intelligent beings to endure, and are the source of much instability in the moral life. In disgust, people initially reject the effluvia and decay of the animal body. Usually, however, things don’t stop there, as people find a group of humans onto whom they can project the discomfort they feel about their own bodies, calling them smelly, slimy, disgusting, and so forth. Much racial hatred, and most misogyny, has such elements, as does the hatred of homosexuals. A politician who appeals to disgust in the public realm is a dangerous person, one who is seeking to exploit for divisive purposes the discomfort that people feel at having a body that will die and decay.

Shame is more complex, since shame can sometimes call us to high ideals that we have let slide through laziness or obtuseness. But there is a type of shame, or ‘primitive shame,’ that focuses on the alleged shamefulness of the very fact of needing others, that seeks a rock-hard type of invulnerability and calls that manliness. A ‘real man,’ so we are told, is able to be totally self-sufficient. Any kind of weakness or need is a sign of compromised masculinity. Studies of disturbed adolescents in the United States show how this sort of shame, in connection with diseased norms of manliness, leads to aggression against the weak and against women.

In my recent study of religious violence in India, I found that shame was a key element in the violence of militant Hindus against Muslims, in the 2002 Gujarat pogrom and elsewhere. Hindu males tell themselves a story of centuries of humiliation – first at the hands of the Muslims, then at the hands of the British. Out of this collective sense that their virility has been compromised emerges a narrative of the shame-free nation of the future, one that will be so successfully aggressive, so efficient in cleansing the land of the ones who are blamed for the humiliation, that Hindu pride will reign supreme and inviolate. This story is a large part of what fuels violence against Muslims, as well as sexual violence against Muslim women.

So the good sort of patriotism will have to attend carefully to shame and to images of masculinity, seeking to cultivate an acceptance of bodily vulnerability as a part of daily life and to prevent the formation of diseased stereotypes of the real man. These ideas converge, clearly, with Herder’s ideas about the need to discourage people from seeing glory in aggressive military exploits.


As my story of the Pledge of Allegiance shows, even a purified patriotism has its dangers. Although we turn to patriotism to render good institutions stable (for the right reasons), the good in patriotism may itself be unstable in times of anxiety. Law and institutional structure are therefore essential props to the good in patriotism. Five factors contribute to our getting the good out of patriotism without the bad.

The first is constitutional rights and an independent judiciary. Constitutional rights are bulwarks for minorities against the panic and excess of majorities. Because minorities are always at risk from patriotism, which can often stir majority sentiment against them, a purified patriotism needs to be advanced in conjunction with a firm and comprehensive tradition of constitutional rights protecting all citizens, and an independent judiciary, detached from public bias and panic, as these rights’ interpreter.

A second factor is a separation of powers that makes going to war more difficult. Herder thinks of a horror of war as the very core of a purified patriotism. But a people’s horror of war will not stop leaders from making war in the absence of political structure. War-making powers should reside in the legislature, and executive authority to initiate and continue wars should be severely contained.

Next, protections for the rights of immigrants are necessary. Patriotism always risks veering into xenophobia, and xenophobia often takes new immigrant groups as its targets. In addition to protections for minorities who already enjoy citizens’ rights, a purified patriotism needs to be advanced in conjunction with firm protections for the rights of legal immigrants who are not (or not yet) citizens, and decent arrangements for illegal immigrants.

Fourth, getting the good out of a purified patriotism requires education about foreign cultures and domestic minorities. Panic and xenophobia are always more difficult to sustain when people are acquainted with complex historical facts regarding the groups they encounter. For example, if schools in Europe and the United States were doing their job teaching people about the varieties of Islam, the current atmosphere of panic would be far more difficult to sustain.

Finally, purified patriotism requires a vigorous critical culture. Kant emphasized perhaps the most important factor: protection of the freedom of speech and dissent, and of the voices of intellectuals who play leading roles in shaping a critical public culture. Schools need to foster this critical culture from the earliest years, by teaching children that the ability to think critically is one of the most essential abilities of the democratic citizen, and that learning by rote and thinking by habit are the marks of the bad citizen.

Indeed, although the United States is far from having as vigorous a critical culture as it ought to have, my story of the Pledge of Allegiance owes its relatively happy denouement to the critical culture it does have. After the Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of the laws mandating the daily pledge recitation and flag salute\(^\text{15}\) -- notice that even the independent judiciary was led astray by patriotic fervor -- there was a tremendous outburst of protest from the public, led by journalists and intellectuals, but joined by people of goodwill all over the nation. The Court reacted to the public critique of its arguments by hearing, only a short time later, a similar...

case, taking that occasion to change its mind. In *Board of Education v. Barnette*, Justice Jackson observed that nationalism often seeks to “coerce uniformity of sentiment,” and insisted that we must be vigilant against all such attempts.16

History contains countless examples showing how bold projects requiring sacrifice derive support from moral emotions directed at the nation and its history. Let us look at two different cases: the attempt to end the injustice of slavery and racial discrimination in the United States, and the attempt to forge a new Indian nation dedicated to combating economic inequality. In each case I shall focus on political rhetoric—not because I do not believe that sculpture, music, public parks, and many other things are also important, but simply because political rhetoric is the easiest to describe in an essay. In the case of Gandhi, however, some description of his self-dramatization and his use of theater will prove essential.

Abraham Lincoln’s speeches insistently focus on the history of the United States, offering a constructive account of its core values that underwrites his request for continued sacrifice. The Gettysburg Address, for example, begins with memory, with the mention of “fourscore and seven years,” reminding people that the nation, so imperiled at present, had a beginning. It was “a new nation,” with a distinctive set of ideals focusing on liberty and equality. Lincoln observes that the present war tests whether any nation of this sort “can long endure.” Praising the sacrifice of those who died (in a battle that was one of the war’s bloodiest), he then says that the living cannot hallow the ground: only the bravery of the fallen can do so. Living people are thus led toward an attitude of reverential emulation of the sacrifice of the fallen. Lincoln then asks that dedication of them: we are all to be dedicated to the task of preserving the American democracy, and to giving it “a new birth of freedom.” He ends on the note of urgency he has sounded throughout: the struggle is really over whether democracy itself can exist.

Lincoln’s speech contains appeals to a constitutional patriotism that would have pleased Rawls and Habermas. But it does much more: in its vivid invocation of the founding, its heartfelt mourning for the fallen soldiers, its appeal to renewed commitment, it puts historical and contemporary flesh on these moral bones.

Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address is another interesting Herderian document, because it carefully positions the Union as the side that wanted and desperately tried to avoid war. The survival of the nation is the starting point: the South would rather “make war” rather than see it survive, while the North was willing to “accept war” rather than see it perish. The two sides are asymmetrical in their relationship to the nation: the secessionist struggle of the South is a war of aggression against the body of the nation, and the Union’s response is a just response to aggression. Thus the speech does what Herder wanted, nurturing a horror of war and a reluctance to make war.

The situation of the slaves now enters the picture, and the fact that the South is motivated by greed is emphasized. On one side, then, we have people motivated by self-interest, who “wring their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces” and even ask God to help them do it. On the other are those who would

include the slaves as human beings and citizens who count, “one-eighth of the whole population.” The nation is now allied with respect and inclusion, the secessionist movement with egoism and false religion.

Finally, however, the speech appeals, famously, to mercy and forgiveness—“With malice toward none, with charity for all”—since the nation is wounded and its wounds must be “bound up.” Mercy does not compromise “firmness in the right,” but it gives us a way of going on together into an uncertain future.

This speech contains admirable principles, but its use of image and narrative, and its rhythmic cadences of language, are what make the moral principles come alive, in ways that could be internalized by children, forging their deepest images of what their nation is. Said together in schools by black and white children together, it reminds them of the history of pain and struggle, but also of Americans’ capacity for respect, love, and sheer endurance. It constructs an interpretive patriotism, using general ideals to criticize historical wrongs.

The speech ends on a strongly universalistic note: “To do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.” This comes easily, because when a nation is conceived around ideas of inclusion and human dignity, it can easily lead to a struggle for these ideas everywhere.

The Emancipation Proclamation was signed in 1863. One hundred years later, its promise was not fulfilled. Martin Luther King’s great “I Have a Dream” speech, delivered in Washington, D.C., on August 28, 1963, is another of the most formative documents of American education: all young Americans have heard it thousands of times, in King’s extraordinary voice. Nobody could doubt that it is a masterpiece of rhetoric, and that its achievements go well beyond the abstract sentiments that it conveys. Its soaring images of freedom and revelation, and its musical cadences, all give the bare ideas of freedom, dignity, inclusion, and nonviolence wings, so to speak. What I want to study more closely here is the way in which King appeals to the history and traditions of the nation, and to sentiments connected to an idea of America that is, once again, interpretive, using general ideals to criticize an unjust reality.

The speech begins with an allusion to the Gettysburg Address—“Five score years ago”—positioning itself as its next chapter. Just as Lincoln looked back to the founding as a moment of commitment to ideals that he sees as gravely threatened, so King looks back to Lincoln’s freeing of the slaves as a moment of commitment whose promise is still unrealized. He uses a mundane, and very American, image for that failure. The Constitution and the Declaration of Independence were a “promissory note,” but the nation has “defaulted,” giving the Negro people a “bad check” that has come back marked “insufficient funds.” King constructs an image of America: the virtue of fiscal rectitude on which Americans pride themselves is inconsistent with their past and current behavior toward the country’s Negro citizens. And it is the virtues that must and will win the battle with selfishness: “[W]e refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation.”

Throughout the speech, King sounds a note of urgency: the “sweltering summer of the Negro’s legitimate discontent” means that there will be no peace in America until justice is done. But he
also cultivates in his followers a purified patriotism: they must, in Gandhi-an fashion, attain moral superiority by forgoing violent deeds. Like Gandhi, he makes nonviolence seem “majestic,” and violence sordid. (“Again and again, we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.”) And he also, like Lincoln, appeals to trust between the races, reminding his followers that many white people are present and have joined the struggle for justice: “We cannot walk alone.” By cultivating hope and trust, along with legitimate anger, he defuses the urge to violence. This is Herderian purified patriotism, based on a strong denigration of violence and a refusal to bow down before false idols of aggressive masculinity.

The visionary and well-known “I have a dream” section of the speech is central to its construction of an image of a morally decent nation, in which all may join together on terms of equality. But then, immediately following upon this vision of a new America, King returns to national memory and national tradition, by quoting in full the famous song “America,” or “My Country ‘Tis of Thee.” Significantly, he now says, “And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true.” In other words, the song, which people usually sing complacently, as the account of a reality, is itself prophecy, and its words of freedom must be made true by committed action for justice.

The next section of the speech can best be described in the language of jazz, as a series of riffs on the song, as freedom is asked to ring from a series of sites in the South. In a way reminiscent of the Second Inaugural, King expresses malice toward none and charity toward all. The note of sly humor, as he gets in his dig at Mississippi (“let freedom ring from every hill and every molehill of Mississippi”) is a reminder that bad behavior has not been forgotten; it has, however, been transcended in a surge of joy whose object is the purified patriotic nation.

Like Lincoln’s speech, King’s ends on a global note: the victory of integration in America will “speed up that day when all of God’s children” will enjoy freedom. Thus purified patriotism melds naturally into a striving for global justice and an inclusive human love.

Let us now turn to India’s founding. When a new nation is founded, there are no canonical documents or traditions, no memories of long past struggles, that will command the agreement and sentiments of all. Indeed, to this day, a struggle continues over the proper image of the nation and its history, as partisans of the Hindu Right endeavor to characterize that history as one of indigenous Hindu peace and alien domination, first by Muslims and then by Christians. Gandhi and Nehru, setting out to forge the image of a pluralistic India, united by commitment to a truly shared history of struggle for self-rule and to the na-
tion’s people, had an uphill battle, since colonial humiliation bred in many a strong desire to perform deeds of manly aggression. Their struggle involved, then, a conception of true manliness and truly strong patriotism that was controverted by a more warlike form of patriotism.

This struggle is neatly exemplified by the ongoing dispute over which of two songs should be India’s national anthem. The actual national anthem, “Jana Gana Mana,” was written (words and music) by poet, novelist, and theorist of global justice Rabindranath Tagore, a determined critic of most existing forms of nationalism. Its addressee is an immortal spirit of righteousness, equivalent to the moral law, and the anthem describes all Indians as seeking the victory of that moral principle. Like King, Tagore enumerates all the regions from which Indians come together: people from all regions seek the blessings of justice.

The Tagore anthem puts beautiful sensuous poetry and music underneath inclusive and egalitarian moral sentiment. Its notion of victory is a moral, not a warlike, notion. Very different is the anthem preferred by the Hindu Right, known as “Bande Mataram,” (“Hail Motherland”), taken from a novel by the nineteenth-century Bengali novelist, and early nationalist, Bankimchandra Chatterjee. This anthem depicts the citizen as bowing down to the motherland, which is then identified with a series of Hindu deities. (Thus the not-too-subtle suggestion is that India is a Hindu nation, in which Muslims will always be outsiders.) This uncritical devotion (“Mother, I kiss thy feet”) is closely linked to warlike aggression against the enemies of Hindu India: “Who hath said thou are weak in thy lands / When the swords flash out in twice seventy million hands / And seventy millions voices roar / Thy dreadful name from shore to shore?”

This controversy about the national anthem is a debate between the form of patriotism Herder loathed and a form that would have been very congenial to him. There is a parallel debate about the Indian flag. The existing flag has at its center the wheel of law, a symbol associated with the Buddhist emperor Ashoka, who fostered religious toleration. It is, then, a symbol of religious inclusiveness, nonviolence, and the supremacy of law. The flag preferred by the Hindu Right is the saffron banner of the eighteenth-century Maharashtrian hero Shivaji, who conducted a briefly successful rebellion against Muslim rule. It is an aggressive and exclusionary symbol, a symbol that says that Hindus will strike back against centuries of humiliation and seize power for themselves, subordinating others.

The world has known no more canny creator of purified patriotism than Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi wrote copious-

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17 See Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism, lectures delivered in 1917. “Jana Gana Mana” was not written as the national anthem; it was written much earlier, as Tagore’s form of indirect protest against the visit of George V to India. What he was basically doing is to state that India’s diverse citizens owe their ultimately loyalty not to the colonial ruler, but to the moral law. I discuss the anthem’s history in the introduction to The Clash.

18 Chatterjee is one of the targets of Tagore’s mordant critique of warlike nationalism, in

19 I cite the well-known translation by nationalist philosopher Sri Aurobindo.
ly, but his success in forging a purified patriotism for the new nation, a vast majority of whose inhabitants could not read and write, owes little to his writings. What Gandhi brilliantly did was to make his own body a living symbol of a (purified conception of the) nation. This self-fashioning expressed his idea that the essential site of national struggle is inside each person, a struggle to conquer greed and anxious desires for domination of others.

Gandhi did not fashion himself in a vacuum: he relied heavily on traditional Hindu images of asceticism, and he therefore had to be very careful lest his image of the nation seem Hindu in an exclusionary way. He took care to put Muslims in central positions in his freedom movement, and to turn to them at what we might call key ritual moments. His famous fast unto death in 1947, for example, was broken when he turned to Maulana Azad, a Muslim cleric and Congress Party leader, asking him for some orange juice and some bread. He thus broke with traditional Hindu ideas of purity, which were exclusionary along lines of both caste and religion. Wielding the enormous power of traditional asceticism, he diverted it to an utterly new cause.

At the same time, Gandhi constructed his body as a symbol of unity across lines of wealth and caste. If one examines the change in his physical appearance between the early days in South Africa and the height of his influence in India, one sees a deliberately cultivated solidarity with the lowest and poorest, into which the force of his moral authority also led the elites around him. To see an elite Kashmiri Brahmin such as Jawaharlal Nehru spinning his own thread, or marrying his daughter Indira in a homespun sari, is to see the magnitude of the transformation Gandhi was able to accomplish. His half-naked persona, draped only in a loincloth and propped up by a walking stick, etched itself indelibly into the mind of the nation, and the world.

Gandhi constructed purified patriotism above all through his theater of civil resistance. Both supremely moral and strategic, Gandhi knew that when the eyes of the world were on India, dignified nonviolent behavior both seemed and was strong and self-governing, and that British thuggishness seemed and was puny and ugly by contrast. In the process, he made both his followers and countless others see manliness in a new way: the body that stood with dignity, taking blows, looked strong and proud. The body that kept dishing out the blows looked utterly at sea, hopelessly weak, not able to touch what it was trying to control.

Gandhian patriotism asked a lot of people. It asked the rich to live in solidarity with the poor and to make huge sacrifices of personal comfort. It asked all men to adopt a new type of nonviolent manliness that entailed a great deal of sacrifice, since revenge is pleasant. Only the use of symbols, Gandhi repeatedly said, could succeed in making people willing to take on these difficult tasks. Fortunately, he was a brilliant forger of symbols, symbols that moved because they were old and yet included because they were utterly new. He was also a brilliant wielder of humor, who found ways to include through a kind of loving childlike play. Thus, a common reaction to meeting him was to be surprised that he was not forbiddingly austere or saintly, but puckish and delightful.

Because Gandhi was so charismatic, his crusade on behalf of purified patriotism temporarily disabled the struggle of the Hindu Right on behalf of exclu-
sionary patriotism. Gandhi’s assassin, Nathuram Godse, justified the assassination for posterity in the name of a (correct) love of country. Godse remains a hero for the Hindu Right, not least for the Gujarati Hindus who, in December 2007, reelected by a large margin as chief minister Narendra Modi, a leader whose complicity in the killings of innocent Muslims during riots in 2002 has now been proven beyond doubt.20

Gandhi’s version of patriotism, however, is the one that won out at the founding, enshrined in India’s constitution and in the founding principles laid down in Jawaharlal Nehru’s famous “tryst with destiny” speech on the night of India’s independence, yet another example of the public construction of a purified patriotism of inclusiveness and equality. Imagining Indian citizens not as aggressive warriors, but as mothers laboring to bring forth a new and just nation (“Before the birth of freedom, we have endured all the pains of labor, and our hearts are heavy with the memory of this sorrow”), Nehru drew a map that linked proper patriotism to a universal commitment to justice and the eradication of poverty and misery: “[A]s long as there are tears and suffering, so long our work will not be over.”

For the popular idea of an aggressive warlike India, Nehru then substitutes the idea of an India at work, characterized by incessant labor and striving toward the goal of eradicating human suffering – not only in India, but everywhere: “And so we have to labour and to work, and to work hard, to give reality to our dreams. Those dreams are for India, but they are also for the world, for all the nations and peoples are too closely knit together today for any one of them to imagine that it can live apart.”

Unfortunately, where patriotism is concerned, both India and the United States have recently taken a turn from the purified toward the malign. In today’s India, patriotism shows her Janus-faced nature. The Hindu Right, building on sentiments of ethnic purity, has created a climate of violence and fear for minorities, especially Muslims. Although the Gandhi-Nehru vision in some ways prevailed in the 2004 elections, it is hanging on by its teeth, and still faces strong opposition from the malign patriotism of “Bande Mataram,” egged on substantially by nonresident Indians in the United States, who made a large financial and emotional contribution to Narendra Modi’s recent victory.

Meanwhile, a new technological middle class focuses on the patriotism of national enrichment, repudiating the Nehruvian ideas of striving and of solidarity with the poor. The Congress Party has tied itself into knots trying not to alienate these voters, and this has meant that only Sonia Gandhi continues to speak out resolutely in favor of sacrifice and against a patriotism that divides. On this account she is repeatedly attacked for her allegedly ‘Italian’ ideas. (Her Italian birth is a trope used to undermine her claim to represent the nation.) Every day, in the weeks leading up to the Gujarat state elections, I received e-mail denouncing her, from a group that calls itself “Indian media bias.” Titles such as “Is Sonia Losing Her Marbles?” and

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20 On the evidence that led to a denial to Modi of a visa to enter the United States, see Nussbaum, The Clash Within, chap. 1; since that time, interviews by the investigative magazine Tehelka, conducted with hidden camera, have given even more overwhelming evidence of his guilt; see the special issue of Tehelka, “The Truth: Gujarat 2002, In the Words of the Men Who Did It,” Tehelka 4 (43) (November 3, 2007).
“It is not Muslims, It is Islam, stupid!” show a malign exclusionary patriotism making its way, through mockery of ideals of peace and demonization of the different.

As for the United States, a politics of fear has convinced many Americans that they need to curb civil liberties in the name of a never-ending ‘war on terror,’ while politicians increasingly help themselves to a language that demonizes Islam and Muslims (‘Islamofascism,’ ‘war against Islamic terrorism’). At the same time, political actors from Antonin Scalia to Mike Huckabee rally around an exclusionary vision of America, with Scalia holding, with Mitt Romney, that we should prefer the monotheistic religions and disfavor other religions and nonreligion, and Huckabee going so far as to assert that the United States is a Christian nation. Acute fear has typically led Americans to characterize the nation in narrow and exclusionary terms. As with Congress Party members in India, Democrats in the United States are not standing up for the Hindus, Buddhists, agnostics, and atheists whom the rhetoric of the Right invites us to consider second-class citizens. Nobody dares to alienate the powerful evangelical movement by pointing to the way in which current Republican rhetoric violates an idea of equal standing and fair play that lies deep in the history of the nation. The demonization of illegal immigrants is yet another ugly part of this politics of anxiety.

Obviously, then, patriotism in and of itself is not a good thing; often indeed it is a very bad thing. It might, then, seem perverse of me, at such a time, even to mention the idea of patriotism. What I have argued, however, is that a nation that pursues goals that require sacrifice of self-interest needs to be able to appeal to patriotism, in ways that draw on symbol and rhetoric, emotional memory and history – as Lincoln, King, Gandhi, and Nehru all successfully did. This is all the more true when a nation pursues not only internal justice but the goal of global justice as well. If people interested in economic equality, justice for minorities, and global justice eschew symbol and rhetoric, fearing all appeals to emotion and imagination as inherently dangerous and irrational, the Right will monopolize these forces, to the detriment of democracy.
In recent years, the language of human rights has become ubiquitous around the world, shaping such nascent transnational institutions as the International Criminal Court, and justifying international interventions to halt genocide.¹ Yet there is wide-ranging disagreement among philosophers and jurists about the nature and scope of supposedly universal human rights. Some argue that human rights constitute the “core of a universal thin morality” (Michael Walzer), while others claim that they form “reasonable conditions of a world-political consensus” (Martha Nussbaum). Still others narrow the concept of human rights “to a minimum standard of well-ordered political institutions for all peoples”² (John Rawls), and caution that there needs to be a sharp distinction between this minimum standard and the much longer list of rights that the United Nations enumerated in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948.

Such disagreements inevitably raise doubts about what, precisely, should count as a human right. Walzer, for one, suggests that a comparison of the moral codes of various societies may produce a set of standards, a “thin” list of human rights, “to which all societies can be held – negative injunctions, most likely, …

¹ I first developed the themes discussed in this essay in my Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, in December 2006. See Seyla Benhabib, “Another Universalism: On the Unity and Diversity of Human Rights,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (2) (November 2007): 7 – 32. A longer version of this essay will appear as the Lindley Lecture of the University of Kansas at Lawrence.

rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny.”\textsuperscript{3} But this way of proceeding would yield a relatively short list. “Among others,” notes Charles Beitz, “rights requiring democratic political forms, religious toleration, legal equality for women, and free choice of partner would certainly be excluded.”\textsuperscript{4} For many of the world’s moral systems, such as ancient Judaism, medieval Christianity, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, Walzer’s “negative injunctions against oppression and tyranny” would be consistent with great degrees of inequality among genders, classes, castes, and religious groups.

Certainly, the most provocative proponent of limiting human rights to “a minimum standard of well-ordered political institutions for all peoples” has been John Rawls. Rawls lists the right to life (i.e., to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (i.e., to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to personal property; and to “formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice” (i.e., that similar cases be treated similarly)\textsuperscript{5} as the basic human rights.

The rights to liberty of conscience and association are pared down in *The Law of Peoples* such as to accommodate “decent, hierarchical societies,” which grant some liberty of conscience to other faiths but not equal liberty of conscience to minority religions that are not state sanctioned. Article 18 of the UDHR, by contrast, which guarantees “the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” (including the right to change one’s religion and “to manifest one’s religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance”), is much more egalitarian, and uncompromising vis-à-vis existing state religions, than is Rawls’s right to “nonegalitarian liberty of conscience.”

Most significantly, unlike Article 21 of the UDHR, which guarantees everyone “the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives,” and which stipulates that “the will of the peoples shall be the basis of the authority of government,”\textsuperscript{6} the Rawlsian scheme has no basic human right to self-government.

Given that the UDHR is the closest document in our world to international public law, how can we explain this attempt on the part of many philosophers to restrict the content of human rights to a fraction of what is internationally agreed to – at least on paper?

I am not precluding the possibility that these documents themselves may be philosophically confused, produced as a consequence of political compromis-
es – as was the UDHR, which was the subject of continuous negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet it is at least necessary to consider seriously the “discrepancies between the best philosophical account of human rights and the international law of human rights.”

The UDHR and the succeeding era of international rights declarations reflect the moral learning experiences not only of Western humanity but of humanity at large. The World Wars were fought not only in the European continent but also in the colonies, in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The national liberation and anticolonization struggles of the post–World War II period inspired the principles of self-determination enshrined in these rights documents.

The UDHR’s preamble states that the “peoples” of the United Nations Charter affirm their faith in “the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women.” All persons, “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,” are entitled to dignified treatment regardless of “the political, jurisdictional, or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs.”

The UDHR was followed by the 1951 Convention on Refugees, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the same year, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which entered into force in 1981. Most significantly, in 1948,


10 Ibid., art. 2.


the UN General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention, which made genocide and acts related to it a crime whether in times of war or peace between nations.\textsuperscript{15}

These public law documents have introduced a crucial transformation in international law. While it may be too utopian to name them steps toward a world constitution, they are certainly more than mere treaties among states. They are global public law documents, which, along with many other developments in the domain of \textit{lex mercatoria} (law of commercial transactions), are altering the international domain. They are becoming constituent elements of a global civil society. In this global civil society, individuals are rights-bearing not only in virtue of their citizenship within states but, in the first place, in virtue of their humanity. Although states remain the most powerful actors, the range of their lawful activity is increasingly limited. We need to rethink the law of peoples against the background of this emergent and fragile global civil society, which is always being threatened by war, violence, and military intervention. These transformations in law have consequences for how we understand cosmopolitanism.

\textit{Along with globalization and empire, cosmopolitanism} has become one of the buzzwords of our time. \textit{Moral cosmopolitanism} espouses a universalistic morality that views each individual as being worthy of equal moral concern and respect. Our obligations to kin, family, and country, it is argued, do not supersede our obligations to distant strangers. From a moral point of view, particularistic attachments, deriving from our rootedness in certain linguistic, cultural, religious, and other communities, have no privileged claims upon us.

\textit{Cultural cosmopolitans} emphasize that all cultures learn and borrow from one another constantly. We should be open to the dizzying multiplicity, variety, and incongruity of the world’s cultures. The Herderian view of cultures as coherent and centered wholes, each with a unique perspective on the world, is wrong empirically and normatively, argues the cultural cosmopolitan. Rather, we should acknowledge and embrace a decentered, multiply situated, and hybrid conception of culture as well as identity.

\textit{Legal cosmopolitanism} is distinct from both positions, while sharing with moral cosmopolitanism the view that each and every person deserves equal moral respect and concern. For legal cosmopolitanism, such a moral attitude needs to be translated into actual doctrine and practice protecting the lives of individuals in the world community. Beyond this, legal cosmopolitanism is agnostic as to whether, as a matter of morality as opposed to law, the needs of distant strangers must \textit{always} take precedence over our more particularistic attachments. For legal cosmopolitans, it is likewise not necessary to endorse one or another view of culture and the self.

\textsuperscript{15} Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the U.N. General Assembly, December 9, 1948: \texttt{http://www.hrweb.org/geal/genocide.html}. There were also developments throughout the postwar period that extended the various Geneva Conventions protecting combatants, prisoners of war, and civilian noncombatants from mistreatment during conditions of armed conflict alone to civil wars as well, including the actions of sovereign states against particular groups upon their territory. It is significant then that since World War II, crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes have all been extended to apply not only to atrocities that take place in international conflict situations, but also to events within the borders of a sovereign country.
The most important objections to legal cosmopolitanism are twofold: What sense does it really make to defend such a position, when to be a rights-bearing person means first and foremost to be a member of a sovereign polity in which one’s “right to have rights” (Hannah Arendt) is protected? Furthermore, how is legal cosmopolitanism to be reconciled with the diversity of the world’s governments and regimes, which consider the individual as a being embedded in definite moral, religious, ethical, and linguistic contexts? Doesn’t legal cosmopolitanism amount to a justification of moral interventionism – even moral imperialism? Certainly, much of the recent reticence in contemporary discourse about the justification of human rights can be traced back to their instrumentalization for political ends by some, and to the fear on the part of others that the robust language of human rights can usher in moral imperialism.

In a recent article Joshua Cohen helpfully distinguished among two kinds of “minimalism” about human rights. The first is “substantive,” the second “justificatory.” Substantive minimalism concerns the content of human rights, and is, “more broadly, about norms of global justice.” Justificatory minimalism, by contrast, is about how to present “a conception of human rights, as an essential element of…global justice for an ethically pluralistic world – as a basic feature of…global public reason.”

This is an important distinction. The attractiveness of justificatory minimalism flows out of a concern with finding an “overlapping consensus” in the international domain that would not be based on comprehensive worldviews and doctrines, which often are exclusionary or sectarian in outlook. Instead, such a global overlapping consensus would need to be “freestanding” in Rawlsian language. In a world where the concept of human rights has been much used and abused to justify all sorts of political actions and interventions, such caution is certainly welcome. A “freestanding” global overlapping consensus is intended to enhance the prospects of world peace by assuring that the terms of agreement be acceptable to all peoples.

Yet this laudable concern with liberal toleration and peaceful coexistence may also lead to liberal indifference and, even more, to an unjustified toleration for the world’s repressive regimes. Are we caught then between the Scylla of moral imperialism and the Charybdis of moral indifference?

The strategy for dealing with both sets of problems is a better understanding of how cosmopolitan legal norms function. For this purpose, I want to introduce the concept of democratic iterations. By democratic iterations I mean complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange – through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned – throughout legal and political institutions as well as in the associations of civil society.

A democratic iteration is never merely an act of repetition. Every iteration in-

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17 Ibid.

volves making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different context. The antecedent thereby is reposited and resignified via subsequent usages and references. Meaning is enhanced and transformed; conversely, when the creative appropriation of that authoritative original ceases to have meaning for us, then the original loses its authority upon us as well.  

Through such iterative acts a democratic people who consider themselves bound by certain guiding norms and principles reappropriate and reinterpret these, thus showing themselves to be not only the subjects but also the authors of the laws. Natural rights doctrine assumes that the principles that underlie democratic politics are impervious to transformative acts of will, while legal positivism identifies democratic legitimacy with the correctly posited norms of a sovereign legislature. By contrast, democratic iterations signal a space of interpretation and intervention between context-transcendent norms and the will of democratic majorities. On the one hand, the rights claims that frame democratic politics must be viewed as transcending the specific enactments of democratic majorities in specific poli-

ties; on the other hand, such democratic majorities re-iterate these principles and incorporate them into the democratic will-formation process of the people through contestation, revision, and rejection.  

This is obviously an idealized account of political legitimacy. Naturally, if the conversations that contribute to democratic iterations were not carried out by the most inclusive and equal! participation of all those whose interests are affected, or if these deliberations did not permit the questioning of the conversational agenda, then the ‘iterative’ process would be unfair, exclusionary, and illegitimate.

Democratic iterations take place in overlapping communities of conversation between members of what can be called the ‘demotic community’ (i.e., all those who are formal citizens and residents of a jurisdictional system) and other more fluid and unstructured communities, which can include international and transnational human rights organizations such as Amnesty International; various UN representative and monitoring bodies; global activist groups such as Médecins Sans Frontières; and the like.  

Ultimately, democratic iterations are not concerned with the question, ‘Which norms are valid for human beings at all times and in all places?’ but rather with questions such as, ‘In view of our moral, political, and constitutional commitments as a people, and our international obligations to human rights treaties and documents, what decisions can we reach that would be deemed both just and legitimate?’ As such, democratic iterations aim at democratic justice.  

They mediate between a collectivity’s

19 I offer democratic iterations as a model to think about the interaction between constitutional provisions and democratic politics. It may be possible to extend democratic iterations as a model for the pouvoir constituant, the founding act as well. In this essay, I am assuming that democratic iterations are about ordinary as opposed to constitutive politics, though I am claiming that ordinary politics can embody forms of popular constitutionalism and can lead to constitutional transformation through accretion. See Rawls’s final reflections in his “Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 92 (3) (March 1995): here 172ff. Thanks to my student Angelica Bernal for her observations on this problem.

constitutional and institutional responsibilities, and the context-transcending universal claims of human rights and justice to which such a collectivity is equally committed.

Without the right to self-government, however, exercised through proper legal and political channels, we cannot justify the range of variation in the content of basic human rights. To be sure, the juridical, constitutional, and common law traditions of each human society, as well as the history of their sedimented interpretations and internal debates, will shape the legal articulation of human rights. For example, while equality before the law is a fundamental principle for all societies observing the rule of law, in many societies, such as Canada, Israel, and India, this is considered quite compatible with special immunities and entitlements that accrue to individuals in virtue of their belonging to different cultural, linguistic, and religious groups.\(^{21}\) There is, in other words, a legitimate range of variation even in the interpretation and implementation of such a basic right as that of equality before the law.

But the legitimacy of this range is crucially dependent upon the principle of self-government. Freedom of expression and association, therefore, are not merely citizens’ political rights, the content of which can vary from polity to polity; they are crucial conditions for the recognition of individuals as beings who live in a political order whose legitimacy they have been convinced of with good reasons. Only when this condition has been fulfilled, can we also say that there is legitimate ‘unity and diversity’ in human rights among well-ordered polities.

At the same time, only under a system of self-government can the contextualization and interpretation of human rights be said to result from public and free processes of democratic opinion- and will-formation. Such contextualization, in addition to being subject to various legal traditions in different countries, attains democratic legitimacy insofar as it is carried out through the interaction of legal and political institutions with free public spaces in civil society. When such rights principles are appropriated by people as their own, these principles lose their parochialism as well as the suspicion of Western paternalism often associated with them.

To illustrate this with another example: In subscribing to a norm such as equality for women under the terms of the CEDAW agreement, a sovereign polity does not derogate its right to interpret this norm in accordance with its own constitutional and legal traditions. The United States rejected the Equal Rights Amendment. In the United States, gender equality is, in most cases, protected by Title IX clauses. Countries such as France and Germany, by contrast, have accepted more extensive \textit{parité} clauses, which have obliged political parties to seek to populate at least half of the nominated positions within the party structure with women candidates. This variation in the range of interpretation of a cosmopolitan norm such as equality before the law for women falls within the democratic prerogative of sovereign polities, and is part of their process of democratic iterations.

When states subscribe to various international human rights conventions, a dynamic process is set into motion in civil society and the public sphere. These provisions give rise to a public language

of rights articulation and claims-making for all sorts of civil society actors, who range from compliance-monitoring NGOs to women’s groups, church groups, advocacy associations, and the like. This new language of public claims-articulation circulates in the unofficial public sphere, and can, and often does, impact further institutional reform and legislation.

Democratic iterations can thus explain how legal cosmopolitanism can be reconciled with the right to self-government of individual polities. In fact, my argument is stronger than this: only in a democratic polity can the varying range in the articulation of rights principles as concrete legal norms be viewed as legitimate. Democratic self-government provides the essential context within which cosmopolitan norms, which articulate moral principles, assume flesh and blood as justiciable claims that the consociates of a polity guarantee to one another. Thus, the diversity of human rights articulation in law is not incompatible with the universalism of human rights declarations. Self-governing peoples engage in creative iterations of abstract cosmopolitan principles.

Yet if this is so, have I not offered an understanding of legal cosmopolitanism that would harshly judge many of the world’s existing regimes: in Rawlsian terms, not only outlaw states but “decent, hierarchical” peoples as well? Doesn’t this argument, which links – all too tightly, some will claim – legal cosmopolitanism with democratic governance, lead to such a demanding concept of legitimacy in the international arena that it can pave the way for political imperialism? This is not an objection that I take lightly at all, but, in my opinion, it is one that is based upon the misidentification of the addressees of cosmopolitan discourse.

When the constituent addressees of global public reason are identified as worldviews rather than as individuals and as peoples with complex histories who ascribe to such moral theories and worldviews, what results is a methodological holism. Clashes of interpretation and even breaks in tradition within such outlooks are minimized; and an overly coherent picture of a particular moral, religious, or even scientific worldview is presented. A Rawlsian would argue that, without such a simplification, the representation of these positions would be overly complex; but with this kind of oversimplification, the Rawlsian position ends up abstracting from the lived history of traditions and worldviews to such a radical extent that it underestimates points of overlap between worldviews and the liberal tradition, and among these worldviews themselves. Rawls has also made it amply clear that in proceeding in such fashion he wishes to avoid normative cosmopolitanism by insisting that peoples, construed along such idealized devices of representation, and not individuals, are the agents of justice in a global context.

To understand how wrongheaded this form of argumentation is, take a country like Turkey. Ninety-nine percent of its population is Muslim. If we wished to represent this country in terms of the religious beliefs of its citizens, we would be completely mistaken. Much like the rest of the world, since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman Turkey has encountered modernity, and struggled with the compatibility of Islam and modernity, in a process that has left nei-

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Other the Turkish understanding of modernity nor that of Islam unchanged. Many arguments about human rights, equality, and democratic representation have been part of the political vocabulary of reform and transformation since the early nineteenth century. How can a Rawlsian methodology even account for such complex transformations of worldviews?

In case it is argued that Turkey is a special case because of its close and sustained encounter with the West for many centuries, take a country like Malaysia: at the present an authoritarian form of Islamic orthodoxy rules in this country. But Malaysian history exhibits Buddhist, Confucian, and liberal secular thinking. These traditions often constitute resources for dissidents to draw upon in opposing the regime. How is this complex history to be represented in a ‘law of peoples’? I fear that it is not represented at all. The assumption that, in reasoning about global human rights, the relevant subjects to be considered are comprehensive worldviews simply reduces peoples and their histories to a holistic counterfactual, which then results in the flattening out of the complex history of discourses and contestations within and among peoples.

Far from exhibiting liberal tolerance, this approach in my mind displays liberal ignorance. It leads us to assume that individuals from other cultures and traditions have not entertained throughout their histories similar kinds of debates and concerns about human rights, justice, and equality as we have in ours. It ignores that there have been complex cultural conversations throughout human history, and that secular Enlightenment liberal ideas have themselves been part of the cultural discourse of many peoples and traditions of the world since the inception of Western modernity. By not giving this complex conversation its due, the minimalist approach preaches liberal tolerance but results in liberal indifference.

Basic human rights, although they are based on the moral principle of the communicative freedom of the person, are also legal rights, i.e., rights that require embodiment and instantiation in a specific legal framework. As Ronald Dworkin has observed, human rights straddle that line between morality and justice; they enable us to judge the legitimacy of law. The core content of human rights would form part of any conception of the right to have rights as well: these would include minimally the rights to life; liberty (including to freedom from slavery, servitude, forced occupation, as well as sexual violence and sexual slavery); some form of personal property; equal freedom of thought (including religion), expression, association, and representation. Furthermore, liberty requires provisions for the “equal value of liberty” (Rawls) through the guarantee not only of socioeconomic goods – including adequate provisions of basic nourishment, shelter, and education – but also through the right of self-government.

There is still one crucial objection that I need to face: In appealing to civil society and the public sphere as the privileged arenas for norm-articulation and democratic iteration, isn’t one ignoring the frequent cases of such grave human rights abuses that intervention via the use of military force may be essential to maintain any allegiance to legal cosmopolitanism? After all, Article 51 of the

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UN Charter permits war of self-defense in cases of occurrence of armed attack against a member-state or a member of such an organization as NATO, while the Genocide Convention obliges states to undertake military action to prevent genocide, slavery, and ethnic cleansing—provided the UN Security Council authorizes such actions.

As most students of international affairs admit, however, we are now poised on a slippery slope, when judges seem to be creating law, while statesmen are clamoring for the need to make new laws in this arena.24 The grounds for humanitarian intervention are expanding into “the obligation to protect” (Kofi Annan). Who the responsible parties for such an obligation to protect would be is unclear. If it is the United Nations who is responsible, then in fact we will need to revise the current practice of considering military intervention on behalf of the United Nations legitimate only when authorized by the permanent members of the Security Council. The obligation to protect and the veto power of the five permanent members of the Council are pulling the United Nations in opposite directions with no clear resolution in sight.

These are uncharted waters in the international arena. On the whole, I am opposed to the creeping interventionism behind the formulation of the obligation to protect, placing my hope for as long as possible, and for as long as necessary, upon the forces of civil society and civilian communities instead to spread cosmopolitan norms and move all societies closer together to compliance with the UDHR. My commitment to global civil society actors in this arena should not be mistaken for neoliberal antistatism. Within the boundaries of existing polities, the state is the principal public actor that has the responsibility to see to it that human rights norms are both legislated and actualized. However, in the international arena, there is a range of cross-border and transnational actors and groups that are the principal agents of spreading legal cosmopolitanism.

Yet, when, why, and under what conditions military intervention to stop massive human rights violations is justifiable remains a question in political ethics. However, particularly when states are considered the unique agents of intervention, and when intervention means the use of military force, only the prevention of genocide, slavery, and ethnic cleansing can justify such acts. Regime change is not justified. As members of a global community, there are myriad other ways in which we can work across borders to spread democracy, civil society, and a free public sphere. The range of activities of global citizens goes much beyond military intervention and the use of force.

There is need for a new Law of Humanitarian Interventions that is clearer about the conditions under which intervention by the United Nations in the affairs of a country is justified. As recent interventions (as well as failure to intervene in Rwanda and Darfur) prove, the Genocide Convention and the UN Charter alone are not adequate for this task in guiding the world community. But these

will remain hard choices that will always entail the exercise of political judgment. As Allen Buchanan asked several years ago, “Is illegal international legal reform …possible through unauthorized interventions?” Such questions impose upon citizens, leaders, and politicians the burden of history. Philosophy can neither guide us all the way in such deliberations, nor can it guarantee that our good intentions will not be destroyed by contingent events and turn into their opposite. Nor should it do so.

Nevertheless, as Kant observed, there is a distinction between the “political moralist,” who misuses moral principles to justify political decisions, and a “moral politician,” who tries to remain true to moral principles in shaping political events. The discourse of human rights has often been exploited and misused by political moralists; its proper place is to guide the moral politician, be they citizens or leaders. All that we can offer as philosophers is a clarification of what we can regard as legitimate and just in the domain of human rights themselves.


One day in the early 1980s, I was riding in the backseat of an old Land Rover through the desert southwest of Khartoum. There was no road, but the landscape, mostly flat, was marked by the occasional saint’s tomb distinctive to Sudanese Islam. My companions and I hadn’t seen another vehicle for a couple of hours when one appeared as a tiny dot on the horizon. It was headed our way, and as is typical both cars slowed down to see who else might be passing through the seemingly empty desert. My curiosity was mild—I had been in the Sudan only a month or two and didn’t think I’d know anyone—until I realized that in fact I did know the face looking back at me through the window of the other Land Rover. It was my friend Vaughan, an Oxford classmate from years earlier. We both shouted and our cars stopped.

The reunion was a pleasure. It seemed very old-school, and we laughed about how many Oxford classmates of different generations had run into each other in the Sudan over the last 150 years. More than a few, I’m sure, each taking pleasure in his or her cosmopolitanism (and more than a few in colonialism, too).

Vaughan and I caught up on families and careers and work on multiple continents. Being citizens of the world was going well for both of us. Vaughan was an attorney by the time of our reconnection, working for Chevron, which was developing oil fields near Bentiu in the Southern Sudan. A university professor supported by the Kellogg Foundation, I had come to Sudan on the heels of traveling through China and was teaching at the University of Khartoum while my wife Pam worked for the U.S. State Department’s Office of Refugee Affairs.


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She would go on to a career in the United Nations. Vaughan’s wife Mary became a photographer and founded a support group for expatriates.

Our little group exemplified much of the cosmopolitanism that was sweeping up a wide variety of young professionals and activists in a global network of relief work, diplomacy, corporate investments, journalism, and advocacy. “Small world!” at least one of us exclaimed tritely. Indeed it is for those equipped to navigate as we were. I’m sure it didn’t seem small in the same way for the Eritrean refugees seeking shelter in Sudan from fighting to the east or, in some cases, being resettled in Europe or America.

Eritreans who settled in the United States also found old friends, sometimes former comrades in arms and often distant relatives: they, too, inhabited a global world. In fact the Eritreans successful in navigating the maze of international organizations and national governments to reach Europe or the United States were generally the more cosmopolitan among the migrants. They knew of far-flung events and appreciated cultural difference; they were more educated than their fellow nationals; they had more experience with cities and complex organizations. But they were less prone than the Western aid workers they met to think of globalisation as a matter of nations fading into a borderless world. The refugees made connections across long distances, but they recognized these as particular, specific connections and didn’t confuse them for unambiguous tokens of a universalistic type: global connections.

Common approaches to the idea of cosmopolitanism encourage people like Vaughan and me to confuse the privileged specificity of our mobility for universality. It is easy for the privileged to imagine that their experience of global mobility and connection is available to all, if only everyone would “be” cosmopolitan. We need continually to remind ourselves of the extent to which felt cosmopolitanism depends on privilege. As Anthony Appiah suggests, “Celebrations of the ‘cosmopolitan’ can suggest an unpleasant posture of superiority towards the putative provincial.” In other words, the genuinely attractive ethical orientation toward a common human community of fate can be undermined by an unattractive self-congratulation and lack of self-critical awareness of privilege.

Cosmopolitanism is in fashion. The trend started in the 1990s, after the end of the cold war and amid intensifying globalization. Cosmopolitan is now a compliment for the suave in a way it hadn’t been since the 1920s or at least the 1960s, when in cold war spirit spies epitomized the cosmopolitan. The Cosmopolitan is a popular drink, a vodka-based cocktail, flavored with orange and cranberry, made famous as the favorite drink of the girls on TV’s Sex and the City. Those self-styled girls didn’t show much interest in the political philosophy

1 Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism (New York: Norton, 2006), xiii.

2 One of the several bartenders with claims to have invented the Cosmopolitan, Toby Ceccini of the Odeon in New York’s Tribeca, entitled his autobiography Cosmopolitan: A Bartender’s Story (New York: Broadway, 2004) — and the pun is intentional. Tribeca is the New York neighborhood most identified with the 1990s boom, but the boom was, in general, identified with the Silicon Valley — apt then that the blogging consensus gives San Francisco the strongest claim on inventing the drink of the decade. But only in New York did the relevant bartender write his autobiography. It was that sort of decade.
of globalization or Kantian ethics; they were cultural descendants of Helen Gurley Brown, who reinvented *Cosmopolitan* magazine in the 1960s.

Now, as then, cosmopolitanism lives a double life as a pop cultural evocation of openness to a larger world and a more systematic and academic claim about the moral significance of transcending the local, even achieving the universal. Both have flourished, especially in good times and amid optimism about globalization. (*Cosmo*, as the magazine came to be called, was founded in 1886, riding the wave of a stock market boom not unlike those of the 1920s and the 1990s.)

Cosmopolitanism, though, is not merely a matter of cocktails or market ebbs and flows. It’s what we praise in those who read novelists from every continent, or in the audiences and performers of world music; it’s the aspiration of advocates for global justice and the claim of managers of multinational businesses. Campaigners on behalf of migrants urge cosmopolitan legal reforms out of both concern for immigrants and belief that openness to people from other cultures enriches their countries. Cosmopolitan is the first category in the advertisements posted by would-be husbands seeking brides (and vice versa) in the *Sunday Times of India*.³

These different usages reinforce the fashion for the concept but muddy its meaning. Cosmopolitan can be claimed for a political project: building participatory institutions adequate to contemporary global integration, especially outside the nation-state framework. Sometimes it is claimed for an ethical orientation of individuals – each should think and act with strong concern for all humanity – at yet other times it is claimed for a stylistic capacity to incorporate diverse influences or for a psychological capacity to feel at ease amid difference and appreciate diversity. Used sometimes for all projects that reach beyond the local (with some slippage depending on whether the local means the village or the nation-state), it is used other times for strongly holistic visions of global totality, like the notion of a community of risk imposed by potential for nuclear or environmental disaster. Cosmopolitan can also describe cities or whole countries. New York or London, contemporary Delhi or historical Alexandria gain their vitality and character not from the similarities of their residents but from the concrete ways in which they have learned to interact across lines of ethnic, religious, national, linguistic, and other identities.

Britain was a center of the 1990s boom in talk of cosmopolitanism. This was a period of renewal in the cultural and financial life of British cities, with yuppies, art galleries, and startling improvement in restaurants, and reference to “cosmopolitan Britain” became standard speech – as in “cosmopolitan Britain has emerged as one of the word’s most diverse and innovative food and drink markets.”⁴ These references evoked sophisticated, metropolitan culture.

³ While cosmopolitan is the first category listed, the ads go on for many pages, organized also (for the less explicitly cosmopolitan) by caste, community, language, religion, profession, and previous marital status. International educational credentials are noted throughout, but only in the cosmopolitan section are alliances invited specifically in terms like “Cultured, Cosmopolitan, Westernized” or “Smart, Westernized, Cosmopolitan working for MNC.”

⁴ U.K. Ministry for Trade and Investment, online at http://www.investoverseas.org/United_Kingdom/UK_Sectors/Food_and_Drink.htm. Examples can readily be multiplied from almost any market imaginable: “With a more cosmopolitan Britain driven by ‘lifestyle’ and ‘design’ home and garden television pro-
ture versus the non-cosmopolitan hinterlands, multicultural Britain versus monocultural English, Scottish, or Welsh national identity. More so, British cosmopolitanism evoked a positive orientation toward European integration and engagement with the rest of the world. LSE (the London School of Economics and Political Science for those without this cosmopolitan knowledge) was academic headquarters for this, with a range of intellectual exchanges and conferences, new master’s programs focusing on fields like human rights and NGO management, a clutch of international celebrity professors, and, not coincidentally, fee-paying students from all over the world. LSE became, in a sense, the first really European university.

Britain was especially well-placed to embrace this cosmopolitanism because English was increasingly the world language, because it had joined the European Union without losing its special relationship with the United States, because it was a major financial center, and because its former empire gave it unusually strong connections around the world. Britain remains a center of cosmopolitan discourse. Consider British Airways’s rebranding as “a global, caring company, more modern, more open, more cosmopolitan, but proud to be based in Britain”:

What is vital to this new identity is its international feel. This is indicative of BA’s desire to be a global player. Also, according to BA, it shows Britain’s own multicultural mix. However, the emphasis is on presenting the positive aspects of different cultures and how British Airways truly supports its operations, including its many joint ventures, in different countries. All this leads to a positive image for the 60 percent of BA customers who are not British.5

But the message is not just for foreigners. As British Airways’s branding consultants point out, “The United Kingdom is not keen on being seen as the country of outmoded traditions and old castles. The new surface shows a youthful, cosmopolitan Britain, confidently looking to the future.”6 Indeed, this example of commercial cosmopolitanism comes on the heels of the late-1990s rebranding of Britain itself as “Cool Britannia.” New Labour was in power, but hints of the mod ’60s and the once mighty empire were not accidental. Britain was by no means unique; nation-branding flourished around the world with nearly every nation claiming to be cosmopolitan but with distinctive arts and culture and delightful local scenery.7

In both popular culture and political science, cosmopolitanism often figures

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5 Bob Ayling (Chief Executive Officer, British Airways), in British Airways News, June 10, 1997; see also http://www.euran.com/BC/art&BritishAirways.htm (accessed April 7, 2007).


Cosmopolitanism in the modern social imaginary

as an attitude, a style, a personal commitment; this is not necessarily political or even ethical. Contrast the significance of the phrases “citizen of the world” and “man of the world.” The latter is as likely to be about expanded tolerance for ethical lapses – or simply about more fashionable clothes. Cosmopolitanism does signal a direct connection between the individual and the world as a whole. But if this is sometimes given ethical emphasis, equally often cosmopolitanism imagines a world that is simply an object of consumption, there for individuals’ pleasure. “The goal of cosmopolitanism is self-expression and self-realization,” writes Kimberly Yuracko. “Cosmopolitanism presents individuals with a wide range of options; they choose the one that will bring them the most pleasure and gratification.”

More commonly, being cosmopolitan is glossed as being a “citizen of the world.” Contemporary usage gives this almost unambiguously positive valence – who wouldn’t want to be a citizen of the world? – but the idea can be terrifying if what world citizenship means is exclusion from citizenship and rights in particular states: past demonizations of “rootless cosmopolitans” shouldn’t be forgotten. Complicating matters further, positive and negative estimations of cosmopolitanism often coexist. For example, there is no upper class in the world more dedicated to cosmopolitan shopping than that of Russia. But it is not just ignorant rural Russian masses with minimal access to the new megamalls that participate in xenophobic nationalism. State elites and well-connected millionaires press anti-cosmopolitan policies. Even oligarchs who drive Bentleys and have homes in the south of France are complicit, though they may also become objects of nationalist attack.

Consumerism versus ethics, or the co-existence of stylistic cosmopolitanism with political nationalism, isn’t the issue. It is the tendency to substitute ethics or style for deeper senses of politics. Cosmopolitan typically suggests an attitude or virtue that can be assumed without change in basic political or economic structures, which are external to the individual. Much of the appeal comes from the notion that cosmopolitanism (a version of ethical goodness) can be achieved without such deeper change – a key problem in an otherwise attractive concept.

Cosmopolitanism should not be simply a free-floating cultural taste, personal attitude, or ethical choice; it must be a matter of institutions. What seems like free individual choice is often made possible by capital– social and cultural, as well as economic. Take Singapore’s president, who spoke of that island’s “cosmopolitans” and “heartlanders.” After the speech, a local blogger posted mock advice on how to be a cosmopolitan: “Many Heartlanders think that to become a Cosmo, you need a lot of money. Nothing could be further from the truth. Being a Cosmo is essentially a state of mind, and has nothing to do with that overdraft that keeps you awake at

8 In this, as in other ways, cosmopolitanism echoes rather than transcends nationalism, emphasizing direct connection rather than institutional mediation; see Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). There are exceptions, including efforts to understand cosmopolitanism from within various scales of relationships across lines of difference rather than categorical similarity on a global scale. See Sheldon Pollock, “Cosmopolitan and Vernacular in History,” *Public Culture* 12 (3) (2000): 591 – 625.

night.” He continues with advice on wine and watches, cars and condos. But, as he says, “Travel is the true measure of a Cosmo. ‘Been there, done that’ is their motto.” Sadly, his readership is “those of us who haven’t been, primarily because we haven’t a bean.”

The class consciousness of frequent travelers involves not only privilege, but the illusion that our experience of diversity and mobility reveals the world as a whole. I have met my friend driving through the Sudanese desert. I have friends around the world. I have traveled on every continent. I feel at home in cities (and hotels and airports) I have never before visited. I drive a foreign car and happily eat food from widely varying cuisines. I care about distant victims of disasters and injustices. The world seems small. Yet none of this makes the world a whole or reveals it to anyone in that wholeness.

The dominant strands of cosmopolitan theorizing draw heavily on the experience of frequent travelers like Vaughan and me, moving freely across borders and, sometimes, creating expatriate communities where businesspeople, academics, and aid workers of several nationalities mix in once-imperial cities. The theories do at times make reference to less privileged border-crossers: Bolivian musicians who play on street corners around Europe, Filipina housekeepers who serve locals and expatriates alike in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, Sikhs who drive taxis in Toronto and New York, Mexicans who migrate to Spain and the United States. These migrants are certainly sources of multicultural diversity and global connections. They may be cosmopolitans in the sense of having loyalties that cross borders, but they do not exemplify the abstract universalism of much cosmopolitan theory. Migrant experience seldom reflects the privilege of, say, Anthony Appiah’s account of how ties he made in his father’s royal compound and later private schools remain active through friends and relatives who have moved to several countries. For that reason, it seldom supports a synoptic view of the world as a whole as distinct from multiple particular connections. Cosmopolitan theories need to be supplemented by emphasis on the material conditions and social institutions that make this sort of cosmopolitan inhabitation of the world possible – and much more likely for some than others.

Webs of specific connections position us in the world, from friendship and kinship through national states or religions to markets and global institutions. These make possible meetings like mine in the desert, even though it is more typical to equate cosmopolitanism with either a personal style or with universalistic ethical commitments. Navigating beyond one’s state is largely the product of particular networks of ties, material resources like credit cards, and the support provided to individuals by states, such as the issuing of passports. It is not by a relationship to any encompassing institution that defines belonging to the world as a whole. Though there are growing institutions and private agreements for global governance – for policing, regulation of the Internet, arbitration of contract disputes – most of these do not offer “citizens” opportuni-


ties either to participate politically or to make claims in the ways that different states do.

When cosmopolitans are described as “citizens of the world” this is clearly not directly analogous to citizenship of a state – and in fact may be a more inferior or less protected type of citizenship. Not all states offer very much chance for participation or response to claims, but most do offer some. They offer a structure in which individuals are recognized to belong and gain certain entitlements. Citizens may fight to extend their rights and improve their states. Many individuals are denied full rights, and not all are recognized and empowered as citizens – precisely the exception that proves the value of the rule: to be stateless is not a happy circumstance.

If cosmopolitans are citizens of the world, we have not only to ask what kind of polity this world is (if it is any) but what makes this cosmos whole. Divine creation would be a possible answer; the world is whole by virtue of its single maker. Likewise, we could derive unity from the notion of the tao existing before the differentiation of the world as we know it. Or we could follow “deep ecology” in focusing on nature itself as creator not creation, as sacred and beyond the human.

None of these is what most self-declared cosmopolitans mean when they use the term. Most mean something like the abstract equivalence, or at least equal value, of human beings considered as individual tokens of a global type: humanity. This understanding underwrites most philosophical accounts of ethical universalism and is the basis – explicit or implicit – for much cosmopolitanism. But categorical equivalence among all human beings describes only an abstract whole, not the more complicated and heterogeneous world in which human beings differ for cultural and other reasons, claim identities, and forge solidarities and enmities. There is nothing wrong with employing a logic of universal equivalence, such as that of Kantian ethics or human rights ideals, in order to grasp the inequalities and other injustices of the world. But this is one-sided and needs to be complemented by a cosmopolitanism oriented to the connections that link people to each other in several scales of solidarity and social and cultural organization.

From the perspective of abstract equivalence, essential similarities are the main ground for cosmopolitanism, and differences tend to appear as potential problems: members of one religion tolerate adherents to others – hardly a source of cosmopolitan unity; nations are often understood as only self-interested sectional loyalties; and strong cultural loyalties often appear as prejudices. Embracing global fashions and opportunities is good; however, it would be a mistake to imagine that embracing local or national cultures and solidarities instead was somehow a personal failing. For thick or strong cultural loyalties not only join people to each other and enable both individual and collective life but also, along with creativity, offer variety to the world. The development of nations (and the social institutions that organize national societies, including, but not limited to, governmental ones) is also a cosmopolitan achievement. Nations knit together smaller

12 For important and forceful recent statements of cosmopolitanism as universalism, see Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
regions and provinces, however imperfectly. And though religions divide human beings, religions also offer some of the largest-scale and most influential forms of transnational, cosmopolitan solidarity.

It, too, would be a mistake to understand the wholeness of the world as already complete, based on the abstract equivalence of human beings rather than as an always incomplete but richly open building of more and hopefully better social connections. Connections allow us to ground cosmopolitanism, instead of in the categorical equivalence of human beings, in our relationships to each other. Another answer lies in history and the lateral connections human beings create with each other – that is, the connections among people and places (and animals and plants and flowing waters) are not those of divine creation or of fate but, rather, products of human action in history. In this view, humans are joined not just by abstract equivalence but by the interpersonal relationships and the social institutions – from language to states to religions – that we have created. The capacity for such creation is basic to humanity.13

We are connected, but incompletely. We have responsibilities because of our connections, because we are affected by and affect others, not only because of abstract similarities. At the level of both individuals and culture more broadly, we are transformed by the historical processes of interaction; these give us capacities for mutual understanding. These capacities are always in some degree specific to the cultural and historical circumstances in which they are forged; they are not simply universal. We should not confuse the experience of roaming the world and appreciating its constitutive differences with grasping it as a whole. This seems a more robust way to ground cosmopolitan thinking than the universalism of abstract categorical equivalence.

Today, markets may be the most widespread of all historically made connections. Markets do not precisely coalesce into a single global totality – the market – except in ideology. They, too, link imperfectly and incompletely, just more extensively and intensively than ever before. Even if certain aspects of markets approach complete abstract categorical equivalence – the reduction of qualitative differences among goods to mere monetary prices – markets are historical connections. And insofar as we are concerned with how human beings around the world might be joined in a cosmopolitan whole, we need to break with the ideology of an abstract market and see global markets – even those in arcane derivatives and those managed in part by computerized trading programs – as relationships among actors: people, places, institutions (including states).

We cosmopolitans, meeting in our various ostensibly empty deserts, may sometimes link our sense of immediate inhabitation of the world – our oyster! – with a misleading notion of its universal accessibility. Moving among different places, cosmopolitans feel that they inhabit the world as a whole. But what, if anything, makes the world whole? In asking this question, we confront the limits of universalism and are forced to take seriously the people whose lives are

13 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). Arendt’s account of the creative capacity at the heart of being human is inspired largely by ancient Greek thought. Christians and Jews may also draw similar ideas from the biblical book of Genesis, where creative potential is part of what humans derive from being created in the image of God.
constituted and constrained by their ties to particular settings. Vaughan and Mary and Pam and I were but weakly connected to the Sudan. The Sudan was the backdrop to our story; it provided the terrain of difference that marked us as cosmopolitan. But we didn’t have to be there, and the Sudan wasn’t really about us.

Certainly, thinking in terms of the abstract equivalence of human beings is helpful – in theories of justice and human rights, for example. But cosmopolitanism shouldn’t be equated with such universalism. Cosmopolitanism becomes richer and stronger if approached in terms of connections rather than (or in addition to) equivalence. And cosmopolitans who think in terms of connections – and their incompleteness and partiality – are less likely to turn a blind eye to the material inequalities that shape the ways in which different people can belong to specific groups while still inhabiting the world as a whole.

The Catholic Church has confronted this issue in relating the universality of Christian faith to the need for working and living through particular groups. It developed the notions of modalities (locality-based groups like parishes) and sodalities (task-based groups like missionary organizations) to mediate the universal faith. This way of thinking about Christian ministry offers a reminder of more general importance: the organizations, networks, and pathways by which we transcend locality are still particular, specific – to people, dimensions of human life, ways of bringing some human beings closer rather than others. Accordingly we need to pay more attention to specific connections – political and economic, as well as cultural – among people that offer both solidarity and encourage division.

Within a year of my meeting in the desert, the briefly latent civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan would again become a devastating open conflict. The Chevron oil fields would become part of the stakes of the struggle, and Chevron would be replaced by other multinationals, with China eventually becoming the main customer for Sudanese oil. And the oil trade wasn’t the only multinational enterprise shaping events in Sudan. Global Islam was already important, and in the next twenty years Sudan would undergo a revolution, a radicalization of Islamic politics, and then a split between military and religious leaders. Osama bin-Laden would find Khartoum a hospitable base for a while, leading the United States to fire missiles to destroy a factory possibly linked to international terrorism. Not least, even as war died down in the South, the Western Sudanese province of Darfur would become nearly synonymous with the failure of global good intentions faced with nasty government and deeply complex local politics.

In this same intervening period, as the Soviet Union collapsed and capitalist globalization intensified, international civil society became ever more prominent. From religious charity to human rights campaigns to regulating the Internet, a range of organizations and networks worked across national boundaries. Versions of cosmopolitanism became a natural self-understanding of this work. This was not without ideological distortions. Business leaders attending the World Economic Forum at Davos and social movement activists attending the World Social Forum in Porto Allegre tended each to think they were the real cosmopolitans. And both tended to describe global civil society as more autonomous from states than it really was.
Precisely because the world is so intensively connected today, cosmopolitanism has become a crucial theme in politics and social science, not only ethics. But in an important way, these different discourses are all embedded in a larger cultural cosmopolitanism that is, among other things, a sort of class consciousness of frequent travelers. Each of us, we might say, has a duty to consider the implications of our actions for everyone. But thinking in terms of a set or category of human individuals misses part of what makes cosmopolitanism a compelling concern today: the extraordinary growth of connections among human beings and variously organized social groups – relationships mediated by markets and media, migrations and infectious diseases, but nonetheless social relationships.
The city’s celebrities had little in common but a taste for the westbound train. Katherine Hepburn left in 1928. Mark Twain came for twenty-one years and departed. Harriet Beecher Stowe came and went several times, spending twenty-four years in a house across the lawn from Twain’s. Sophie Tucker went west but returned to be buried in the Emanuel Synagogue Cemetery in nearby Wethersfield, on the same hill as my father’s parents. John Gregory Dunne and Dominick Dunne grew up in West Hartford. Norman Lear and my father attended Weaver High School together. The exception is Wallace Stevens, who arrived in 1916, to work for the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and never left.

Even with all this talent, the city has never become the object of a literary obsession. It’s not Joyce’s Dublin, Philip Roth’s Newark, or Walker Percy’s New Orleans, not only because no writer has made it so but because it is, as the local saying has it, a “land of steady habits,” steeped in reliable dullness and New England equanimity. The men in their gray flannel suits have helped keep a lid on local temperaments, it seems, since the insurance industry began there in 1794. Few words have been written about it by its most celebrated scribes and none for which the writers are known.

Those of us who left – I was three in 1958 when my Hartford-born parents moved away – don’t rage against the city or feel spellbound by it. Most are content to say simply: Lucky me, I got out. But in my quiet obsession with my abandoned hometown, I sometimes wonder who I might have become if my father hadn’t taken us to settle eventually, when I was eight, in the city of ambition, to a posh new building he could not afford on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. And who might my deracinated mother have been allowed to be if she hadn’t been forced into the role of sophisticate, with a negative bank balance and a mean, alcoholic husband?

It may only be that I am haunted by Hartford, by which I also mean West Hartford. Although we left when I was three, I am not a stranger there. We visit-
ed often when I was a kid, and as an adult, I am there frequently to see many of the same relatives and family friends. In recent years, I have passed through every few months, traveling between the two cities where I live, New York and Boston. Even if I have no plans to stop, when there is traffic on I-84, I sometimes take a shortcut across town to another interstate entrance and feel strangely soothed as I pass by shopping centers, cemeteries, familiar streets. Nothing spectacular, only an unaccustomed feeling of belonging. I have an identity there based on who my parents were and my grandparents, who came there a hundred years ago, give or take a decade, from Odessa, Lithuania, Palestine, and Perth Amboy, New Jersey.

I wonder about what might have been had we stayed, and about a shattering event that happened two months before my parents’ wedding in 1950: my mother’s brother, Louis Wolfson, was shot to death in a botched holdup in the liquor store he owned. He died two days later, leaving a wife, two young daughters, my heartbroken mother on the verge of her wedding, and a large, largely immigrant family. Joseph “Mad Dog” Taborsky, the man who killed Lou, went on to kill many more people and, in 1960, became the last man executed in the state, in all of New England, for forty-five years, until 2005. At the end of 2007, New Jersey became the fourteenth state in the country to abolish the death penalty, but prosecutors in the land of steady habits are seeking it again for two men accused of a brutal triple murder in a suburb of New Haven in the summer of 2007.

My parents first told me the story of Mad Dog Taborsky when I was eight or nine, but that pared-down child’s version was the only one I knew until recently, until both my parents were dead and I returned to Hartford to learn the adult version. I had a feeling that once I knew it, I would be able to understand more about having grown up in our haunted house, in the shadow of the murder and the full glare of my parents’ rage and sorrow.

It was mostly his rage and her sorrow. He was angry about the murder and its ghastly aftermath, and about much else, including my mother’s misery. When I tally up what she had to mourn by the time we moved to New York in 1962, when she was thirty-eight, my heart breaks for her: Her increasingly unhappy marriage to my father. The death of her twenty-year-old nephew, Kenny, in 1961, her sister’s only child. Another nephew, born with muscular dystrophy, who lived all his short life in a wheelchair. A brother, dropped on his head as an infant, who spent his life in an institution. Her inheritance of $1,000 from her father in 1960, while her remaining brother got $60,000. Her artistic talent swallowed up by family life and family loss. Her natural gift for painting and drawing earned her a scholarship to the Hartford Art School, during the war she worked in advertising as a graphic artist, and now she was a housewife. And always pressing on her nervous system must have been the brother she missed, the warm, funny father figure who was so unlike her real father, the aged temperamental Orthodox rabbi who killed chickens in the backyard to make them kosher, and brought feathers and blood-spattered clothes wherever he went.

My mother’s face lit up when she told stories of being at Lou’s apartment, her second home, with his wife and girls. He told jokes and they horsed around – an expression you don’t hear anymore – and they took car trips, my mother sitting in the backseat with her two adoring nieces. Where could they have gone
in 1948, 1949? Nowhere grand, I’m sure, nowhere fancy. The ride had to have been the thrill, the coziness of the car, the jokes, the horsing around. “He was such a mensch, he thought the gun that killed him was a toy,” she bragged to my sister and me. All of that goodness and good humor vanished in an instant, and days after my mother’s wedding, the devastated widow took her two girls to live with her relatives in Brooklyn, out by Coney Island, a bullet right through the heart of their happy family.

At eight years old, I could see the anguish of Lou’s being there for her and then not being there, though it’s impossible to say what it looked like or how it was conveyed. I knew that there were a lot of missing people in my mother’s life and that, at some level, my father wanted to be one of them. As I grew up, desperate that my life not be like hers, I did, too.

When Google came into our lives, I searched the name of Lou’s murderer several times but found no entries that drew me further into the story. I knew there had to be old newspaper articles, and I eventually found out that they were archived in the main branch of Hartford’s public library. For years I didn’t have the time or psychic room I needed to open the Pandora’s box of family pain, but one August afternoon in 2005, I drove to Hartford, in search of our buried history, hidden all these years in plain sight, on reels of microfilm. I was fifty years old and knew no more about my uncle’s murder than I had in fourth grade.

I was relieved when both my parents died in the last five years. They were long divorced, and each very sick and suffering, my father with lung cancer and my mother with Alzheimer’s. I had spent much of my adult life trying to summon affection for them that consisted of more than pity and guilt. They were not bad people but horribly wounded, brought down by hardship and penury. From the time I was in college, I thought of myself as someone without a family, and proceeded to create and collect surrogate families, until I had family of my own, including a stepson and then a stepdaughter. I would not wish on anyone the uneasy distance from their parents that I had almost always felt toward mine. But for all of this alienation, there was nothing that quite prepared me for the ways my parents came to life when I entered the library’s reference room and began to open the old wooden card catalogs.

When we left in 1958, Hartford was the only place where my father’s family had a presence, where people could spell our unusual last name – Neiditz – and where it stood for anything. My father’s three uncles and Ivy-educated first cousins were part of the city’s burgeoning Jewish bourgeoisie. My mother’s father, Rabbi Jacob Wolfson, has a listing in Hartford Jews (Connecticut Historical Society, 1970), and is described as “Dean of Orthodox rabbis,” though I know this was not an official title connected to a school. I grew up believing that if my father hadn’t been the black sheep of the family, we would have stayed. If he hadn’t been the ambitious, alcoholic malcontent who wanted to thumb his nose at all that small-town respectability, I would have grown up surrounded by dozens of solid families with lifelong connections to ours.

In one fantasy, this might have diluted the effects of my father’s toxic behavior on my sister and me. In another, being in her hometown might have given my mother the gumption and the support to leave him early on, instead of once so
much damage had been done. In any case, I would have grown up as “one of the Neiditzes,” whose name was plastered everywhere: on buildings owned and managed by my cousins and on the family’s furniture store on Farmington Avenue. Two of my father’s first cousins were state representatives. Others became lawyers, doctors, civic-minded businessmen.

It was as though my father had sprung from another family. He was restless, rough around the edges, often crude and rude, and wildly ambitious, desperate to make money. He studied electrical engineering for a year or two at Wentworth Institute in Boston but dropped out. Like his father the traveling salesman, like Willy Loman, he was a peddler at heart. He learned to sell insurance in Hartford, and when he told his company he wanted to move to New York, they sent him, in 1958, to Columbus, Ohio, to pay his dues. A year later, as they prepared to transfer him to New York, my mother’s nephew Kenny was diagnosed with terminal cancer, and instead of going straight to Manhattan, my parents moved to Westchester, to be near my aunt, uncle, and cousin, who died in 1961. His bereft parents fled New York for Florida, desperate to escape their memories. Bereft herself, my mother fell into a depression that lasted for months.

I was eight in 1962 when we arrived in the city of Frank Sinatra’s song: if my father could make it there, selling insurance and pension plans, he could make it anywhere. “How do you like my little island here?” he’d challenge visitors from Hartford, to whom our life seemed impossibly glamorous. We had doormen. Chet Huntley lived in a brownstone across the street from our luxury apartment. Our friends in the building included a fashion model, a CBS executive, and a former foreign correspondent for Newsweek. If he had stayed in Hartford, my father could have been a big fish in a small pond, but he didn’t want that. He wanted money the way a child wants a huge pile of toys, and it only mattered if he could have it in New York.

He sort of succeeded for a while, the way many people could in New York in the 1960s, when the rising tide lifted a lot of boats, when you could rent a swell apartment for a few hundred dollars a month and borrow money on occasion from relatives in Hartford, whom you otherwise scorned. In the ten years we lived there as a family, our lives were impossibly glamorous. One summer, my father’s friends lent him their 1959 black Silver Cloud Rolls Royce, which, because we had no car, was a great luxury, aside from being a jaw-dropping conversation piece everywhere we traveled. Our neighbors assumed we had hit the jackpot. The joke was that we were especially broke that summer. On weekend trips to New England, we sometimes stopped at McDonald’s in East Chester for a lunch we could afford.

Early on, our exotic New York neighbors offered hints of what I would later know to be the bittersweet, evanescent world of John Cheever’s early stories. As a child, I found it much easier to appreciate the city as the setting for certain sophisticated movies of the period: Come Blow Your Horn, Breakfast at Tiffany’s, The World of Henry Orient, and Broadway plays with titles that told me how bold our new life would be, titles like Stop the World, I Want to Get Off and How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying. Department stores delivered small purchases; the signs posted all over B. Altman’s seem now as quaint and poetic as quill pens: “The Packages You Take With You Get Home First.” Perhaps what I really understood was that we were not in Hartford anymore and that
my father was right: we’d escaped our dinky hometown and our small-minded relatives, who could barely fathom the grandeur of all they were missing.

As time went on, darker movies caught my attention, projecting more disturbing narratives of our life on the outer edges of the Upper East Side: *Days of Wine and Roses*, *Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* and *Butterfield 8*. At home things were difficult and dramatic in the way of alcoholic families: too much fighting, too many hangovers, a tendency toward reversals of fortune. Half a dozen times I found summonses on the front door, notices that we would be evicted for not paying the rent. Stop the world, we wanted to get off.

The hairdresser is blow-drying my hair. I’m in a place on Broadway I’ve never been, just back from Florida, too spent to do much. Tears are trickling down my cheeks. Not many, but enough so that he notices, and he’s startled.

“Are you all right?”

I nod. “My father died.”

He says that he’s sorry. He’s not one of the friends who says, when I make the announcement, “I’m not sure I knew your father was still alive.” He left my mother in my last year of high school and moved suddenly to Florida a year later, broke, broken, about to become a man who lives with rich women. For the rest of his life, I probably saw him fifteen or twenty times, and none of them was comfortable, none easy.

What makes me sad about his death is that I’m not sadder. What makes me sad is his sad life. At his own mother’s funeral, on the hill where Sophie Tucker is buried, he stood off alone; no cousins came near to comfort him because he had alienated them with bitterness. When he died, people were not afraid to come near me, but I wasn’t sure that I wanted them to. And if I had wanted them to, I’m not sure I would have known how to indicate it.

I could write the names of twenty people whose deaths would cause me to weep like a child, and I understand that’s because I’m not conflicted about loving them. Before she died, when she was as sick as she was, I often wondered if my mother was on this list of twenty. She was kindly, loving, had many friends. In the way of the powerless who are emotionally abused, when she lived with my father, she had the capacity to maintain her equilibrium for long periods, until she exploded in a shrill rage. She loved him abjectly for many years, but when she was willing to give up that desperate, clingy role, she saw the future clearly: if they split up, he would not take care of us, and so she stayed much longer than she should have. By the time it ended, she had been working full-time as a secretary, and she did that until she began to lose her mind, sometimes able to make time to pursue her art but never in the way that her talent deserved.

I was at best, I think, a dutiful daughter. I felt too sorry for her to want to be close to her; if I kept my distance, I wouldn’t become such a person myself. And if I took this feeling to an extreme, which I did, if I did not become a mother myself, there would be no one to witness, up close, whoever I became, the way I had to witness the woman she became during a lifetime of deprivation and struggle. I endured the service we held the day after she died by reminding myself what a gifted artist she had been, instead of what a difficult life she had lived. When she moved into the nursing home with Alzheimer’s, we went one day to the art room, where several women painted stick figures of people and flowers. I put out a basket of dried flowers, and with a few pastels, in thirty or
forty strokes, my mother—who sometimes put her underwear on her head—transformed the page. The crowd was dazzled. “Look at that!” they cried. “A real artist!”

The nurses were surprised one morning to see a drawing on her bathroom wall. Soon, there were more, made with colored pencil, watercolor, and pastel. Soon, the walls were covered. The images were colorful, intricate, somewhat distorted and bizarre. It seemed she would get up in the middle of the night and do them silently, and no one would look in on her. I was touched that the nursing home left the walls that way for many months, even after she moved upstairs to the unit for people who could not do anything for themselves.

In the first reel of microfilm, on March 27, 1950, the story is front-page news, right beneath the name of the paper in Old English lettering, as though Louis Wolfson were an important man, instead of just an unlucky one:

Wolfson Dies of Wound
In Store Holdup Shooting

Beneath the headline is a photograph of him, and I realize I have never seen one, except in group shots when he was a child. He could be my mother’s twin. In seconds, I am overcome. Until now, his death had only been a prominent entry in our encyclopedia of family tragedies, someone else’s pain, not my own.

For every listing in the old wooden catalogs, there turn out to be five or ten newspaper articles on microfilm in The Courant and the defunct Hartford Times. The story is always front-page news, above the fold, photographs and grisly headlines sandwiched between cold war revelations and Supreme Court rulings, the chilling phrases sometimes in seventy-two-point type splashed across eight columns. I read and copy all of them, blown back by the banner headlines and pulled forward as I squint at the faint print projected onto the screen, and I keep forgetting to breathe.

How is it that my ordinary family’s extraordinary tragedy is what propels these sensational headlines? Can it be that we’re famous for our suffering, our victimhood?

The stories go on for nearly a decade: 1950 to 1957. These were the newspapers my parents read at breakfast as newlyweds and for all the years until we left Hartford in 1958. The effect is dizzying, kaleidoscopic, as I superimpose the astonishing legal twists and turns over our family timeline.

Taborsky Gets Chair After Guilty Verdict
Execution Scheduled for Nov. – June 8, 1951

My parents had been married for a year when Joseph Taborsky was sentenced to death in June 1951, for the first time, for killing Lou—a crime he repeatedly denied having committed. But he wasn’t executed on schedule. He was still on death row when I was born three years later, in December 1954. Eight months later, he was granted a new trial on the original murder charge. His attorney argued that the only evidence against him, the testimony of his brother Albert, should be ‘nolled,’ or dropped, because Albert had a psychotic break soon after his confession. Albert admitted that the two men set out in their car to hold up some local merchants on the night of March 23, 1950. Albert, the more passive brother, drove the getaway car, while Joseph, the ringleader, by all accounts a textbook sociopath, confronted his victim in the liquor store he owned. Lou Wolfson didn’t believe the gun was real, didn’t believe the holdup was real,
and as he came toward Taborsky, perhaps to indicate he knew it was a joke, Taborsky panicked and shot him in the face. Lou lived for two days, conscious enough at one point to tell the police he’d thought the gun was a toy.

Once Albert Taborsky had his breakdown, his brother’s lawyer saw this as an opportunity to get his testimony dismissed – the unreliability of the word of a madman, the only evidence the state had. This thread of the drama took years to resolve. After Taborsky had spent four years on death row, the State Supreme Court agreed with Taborsky’s lawyer.

This heading is from the *Hartford Courant Magazine*, January 31, 1954:

The coming Taborsky decision – a fateful hour in the drama of . . .

The ‘Cain and Abel’ Case in which a convicted murderer is pitted against his mad brother – with death or freedom at stake . . .

From the daily paper, August 4, 1955:

New Trial Granted Taborsky In Murder – High Court Action May Free Convict – Finds Principal Witness Insane

In October 1955, when I was ten months old, Joseph Taborsky was released from his death row cell and freed from jail, without so much as parole. His brother, in the state hospital for the criminally insane, had received a life sentence in exchange for his testimony. From inside *The Courant*, December 14, 1955:

Taborsky Tells of Death Row Ordeal In Magazine Story on Sale Thursday

The story of Joseph L. Taborsky’s experiences during four and a half years in State Prison ‘death row’ is the featured article in this month’s *Headquarter Detective* magazine which will go on sale at Hartford newsstands Thursday.

“I was sentenced to die for a murder I did not commit. I prayed to God to help me and he did. Today I’m free,” said Taborsky in the story written for him by Reporter Gerald J. Demeusy of *The Courant*.

Shortly after my second birthday, Taborsky began killing again, with an accomplice named Arthur Culombe. But Taborsky was not suspected until many were dead; police were certain he had moved to New York City. At the height of the spree, with no clues to go on, the press dubbed the men “The Mad Dog Killers.” In early 1957, they shot six people to death in greater Hartford and left a dozen more for dead, always emptying their almost-empty cash registers. The victims were shopkeepers, gas station attendants, shoe-store customers, people like my uncle who had next to nothing and whose deaths left their families with less. In March 1957, after the men were captured, Taborsky was persuaded to confess after a visit “by his devoted mother,” says a front-page headline on March 2.

The same day, further down the page, I hit pay dirt, two articles about my family: “Also Admits Killing of Wolfson in 1950” and “Murdered Man’s Widow is Stunned by Confession,” which is filled with people I know, including my mother, Mrs. Lester Neiditz:

Reached at her Brooklyn N.Y. home, Mrs. Ethel Wolfson was stunned by the news that Joseph Taborsky had admitted the murder of her husband in his package store March 23, 1950.

“It’s ironic that they ever let that man go. How they ever gave that man a new trial, I don’t know,” the embittered widow said.
“This has hit me like a ton of bricks.” …
“Believe me, it’s a terrible ordeal to go through. I went to two sessions of his trial. I couldn’t take any more. It was too much,” she said. “I’m glad he’s finally caught.”

Mrs. Wolfson, whose husband died several days after the shooting, spoke bitterly of the long legal fight to free Taborsky after his brother, Albert, the state’s only witness, became insane at the State Prison.

“By the time Taborsky got out the whole Wolfson family felt like criminals. I loved Hartford but the people talking about us left a bad taste in my mouth,” she said.

“I wonder how those people feel now?” she asked.

“After a thing like that, your life can never be the same, whether you’re young or old. Your mind just becomes bitter, you can’t be sweet.” she said. Mrs. Wolfson now lives with a sister in the Seagate section of Brooklyn.

In Hartford, Saul Wolfson, brother of the murdered man, said he was glad Taborsky had confessed.

“This takes away every shadow of a doubt. When they let Taborsky out I was boiling mad. They had him for a holdup, why didn’t they try him for that?”

Mrs. Lester Neiditz, a sister of the murdered package store operator, commented:

“I never heard of anything so gruesome. We were talking tonight about whether we would ever know if my brother’s killer would be caught. We wanted to know that he wasn’t just walking the streets.”

“I feel sorry for all those other families that have to go through what we did,” she said. “It just about broke our hearts when Taborsky was set free.”

Reading this piece of microfilm just about breaks mine. Now I see that the story – the violence, the terror, the injustice – went on for years. Lou’s death was never allowed to die. The family’s mourning kept getting interrupted with more death, more mourning, and the outrage of Taborsky’s release from jail. Boiling mad. I had known a tiny fragment of this information but not the wing-scan of the dates, the way the story echoed over a decade. Now I understood why, when my parents first told me about it in the early 1960s, it had seemed like such a fresh wound. And perhaps I had a new understanding of why my father had wanted to leave Hartford. I had always thought it was to escape family pressure. But how could he not have wanted to run from the endless crimes, the remorseless criminals, the blaring headlines, and the burden of my mother’s shattered family? In Hartford there seemed to be only one story, but in the naked city where he yearned to be, there were eight million stories, more than enough to drown out the years of anguished cries.

We leave Hartford – July 1958.
“State Puts Taborsky To Death – Mass Killer Calm to Last” – May 18, 1960.
We move to Manhattan – October 1962.

It takes three trips to go through all the microfilm. On the last of the trips, my father’s wealthy cousin and his wife invite me to dinner at one of the splurgy, stylish restaurants that now pervade West Hartford, and I realize that I love being with them, my stable, prosperous relatives. I might even belong with them. It was my father who was the odd man out, the misfit, not me. When he died, these relatives sent me the briefest, most awkward condolence letter, suggesting that they could not find a kind word to say about him. Midway through dinner,
my enchantment flickers, and I remember what my father did. He spared us growing up there. His taking us to New York was his finest move, insane though it was: no money, drinking, debting, philandering, living beyond his means, flaming out and having to leave for Florida penniless in 1973. It didn’t turn out the way he had planned, but he knew that there was something in the bright lights and tall buildings that truly mattered; something on Wall Street and Broadway and at Carnegie Hall and the Carnegie Deli; something in our proximity to all that talent, ambition, raw nerve, and very refined nerve; and of course he was right.

That night I drive back to Boston drenched in Hartford, light-years closer to my parents’ memories of their time as newlyweds and young married people. Soon after, I return to look for the liquor store, the scene of the crime. The building is no longer there, the store with the apartment above it where my Aunt Fanny had lived. She was the oldest sibling among the rabbi’s six children—my mother the youngest—and it was she who went downstairs for the newspaper and found her brother on his back with a hole in his face. Lou’s eleven-year-old daughter, Brenda, visiting while her father worked, was the next one down the stairs. “We had a very happy family before my father died,” Brenda told me recently. “My mother said that he had a wicked sense of humor, but I don’t remember it.”

For months as I struggle to write what I think is the story, I’m transfixed by old photographs, microfilm copies, a beautiful colored-pencil drawing my mother did of herself when she was seventeen and radiantly happy. I find a self-published true crime book about Taborsky that came out in 2002: Ten Weeks of Terror: A Chronicle in the Making of a Killer, by Gerald Demeusy, who covered the case for the Courant. It tells the story of Lou’s murder—and all the others—from Taborsky’s point of view. It describes his brother’s psychosis, and the character of the accomplice, Arthur Culombe, who had an IQ of 51 and could not read or tell time.

When I talk to people about what I’m trying to write, I come to enjoy the flicker of shock on their faces when I say, “My mother’s brother was murdered two months before my parents got married.” There has to be a story there, in all that violence and grief, all those headlines that made us famous for our suffering, doesn’t there? For months, I gnaw at the story and the story gnaws at me. I read Wallace Stevens poems, looking for insights into Hartford. I write the story from every angle, every point of view, obsessed but uncertain how to tell it. The material swirls around me like sludge, looking for a way out. I remember a single line my mother told me when I was in my twenties, when she was trying to understand her marriage: “I didn’t postpone the wedding after Lou’s death because I wanted your father to comfort me.” Where does this go? I would like it to go away and not burden me with its heartache and its not fitting neatly into the narrative, whose through line is already complicated enough.

But with every failed draft I write, there is a miniscule shift, a slight diminishment of my own unbearable grief, hauled around for a lifetime, attached to a story whose impact I felt but whose details I barely knew, and for that I feel grateful, lighter every day. Yet I am still the cat chasing its tail, and I decide, after dozens of drafts, to give up, to walk away. Faces haunt me: Lou’s, Brenda’s at eleven, the acquaintances at cocktail parties who are intrigued by the story of the murder.
The gun was a .22 caliber handgun. Small. Quiet. Brenda, upstairs with Aunt Fanny, told me recently that they didn’t hear the shots. Lou had thought the holdup was a prank, so Lou approached him, as though to say, Hey, cut it out, which probably cost him his life. He was forty-one years old, a high school graduate, half-owner in the liquor store with a brother-in-law. Kind, exuberant, crazy about his wife and kids, and about his baby sister, the adoring girl who would become my mother. I know what the laughter must have sounded like, the horsing around, the days as sweet as summer afternoons.

After the murder, my parents went ahead with their wedding, went ahead with their unhappy marriage. It would have been a relief to learn in the reels of microfilm, reading between the lines and the headlines, that the murder had played a role in their misery, that had it not been for madness of Mad Dog Taborsky, they would have been happy and prosperous in Hartford. But I don’t think that was in the cards, though maybe this is: that I’m so drawn to this story because the grief in it is easy to explain; it’s a stand-in for all the other grief that is not easy to explain. Without the murder, there is nothing simple to say about my family, no bright, breezy stories, and none I like to tell, except about the Rolls Royce. About how the server one day at McDonald’s saw the car and made a snide remark when my sister asked for extra ketchup, a crack about how rich people like us always got whatever we wanted. The Rolls brought us together, because we knew it was an elaborate charade when everyone else thought it was for real, thought we had become as rich as my father always wanted to be. For once, it was us against the world instead of us against one another.

When I return to my manuscript and my frustrations, I wonder if I have been playing solitaire with these cards too long. Have I let myself – and the story – be defined more by my mother’s sadness than by her art? And by my father’s bitterness and failure than by his ambition and nerve? It was my father, after all, who took us with him when he fled the land of steady habits, taking his cues from Katherine Hepburn, Norman Lear, and the Dunne brothers, my father who had the audacity to take us in a horse-drawn carriage through Central Park, on our way to breakfast at Tiffany’s.
Paradise

Perfection is the mote in the maker’s eye.
The ape believes he’s meant for a better place
Than this our prison of shadows – that is why

Dante could stare at the sun in Paradise:
“There, many things are granted to be done
That here on Earth are beyond our faculties,

For Paradise was designed for humankind.”
Unlike this world. So Dante stared at the sun
For a long while, and it did not make him blind.

He took his time and studied that fire of fire
Brighter than molten iron, he says. In his mind
Day had been added to day, as though the Power

That made one sun had added a second one –
And that doubled sun, redoubling itself, consumed
Our shadows forever, and our one doomed sun.


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Fiction by Alix Ohlin

The Teacher

On Doug and Carol’s wedding day, murder was committed in their small town, which they steadfastly refused to take as a bad sign. They were that much in love. They spent their first married night in the Newport hotel wrapped in each other’s arms, gazing into each other’s eyes and so on, but after they’d had sex twice there was only so much more gazing that could happen, and Carol turned on CNN while Doug took a shower.

“Oh, my God,” he heard her say as he toweled off. She was sitting at the foot of the king-sized bed, the coverlet loosely bunched around her skinny frame, exposing the delicate bumps of her spine. She was transfixed. A young man had killed his wife and child, and he was on the run; cameras were holding steady on a blue SUV driving on a strangely empty freeway, headed for the coast.

“I don’t know why you watch this stuff,” Doug said. He sat down beside her and kissed her bare shoulder. She smelled like candy.

“She went to my high school,” Carol said, her eyes wide and round. “Younger though. So young. And the baby. Did you know them?”

“I don’t think so.”

On the screen now was a photograph of the young couple on their own wedding day, red-eyed from camera flash and booze. Carol was a preschool teacher and spent all day long singing songs about bunnies and cows. Sometimes they bumped into her students in the grocery store, and the kids were so freaked out to see her outside of school that they ran away. Other times, to be fair, they got excited and seemed like they were going to pee their pants. In any case, she came home from being with the kids all day, from playing with their brightly colored blocks and vocabulary building cards, and she liked, by way of contrast, to watch violent television – crime dramas or breaking news about murders, kidnappings, disappearances. She was an expert on bullets and DNA evidence. She supported the death penalty and often, just before falling asleep, would shake her head and say things like, “He should rot in hell for

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what he’s done.” In Jamaica, he’d booked a room without a TV; it was called the “Serenity Suite” and was more expensive than a normal room.

Once the honeymoon began, she mellowed, as he’d hoped. For three days they ate conch fritters and took naps on the beach, their skin burnishing. They held hands as they walked on the sand at sunset and were lulled to sleep by the sound of waves crashing on the beach, a soundtrack piped into the Serenity Suite’s wall-mounted speakers. But Carol hadn’t forgotten the story.

“We probably saw them at the mall,” she said one day over lunch. “At the movie theater. Do you think they got married at the same church?”

All day long she kept this up, and her fascination started to get on Doug’s nerves. When she asked if they could find a TV that night, he snapped at her, and she pouted, and they ate dinner separately – he on the beach, she inside the Serenity Suite – until he came back and they made up and had sex again and gazed into each other’s eyes. By the sixth day of conches and tanning, he’d gone over to her side. At a bar they persuaded some people from Chicago to let go of the baseball game they were watching by buying them drinks. As they sat there, CNN cycled through world disasters and weather forecasts before turning to the case that interested them. And in fact, the young woman and her baby were being memorialized in the very church where Doug and Carol’s wedding had taken place.

“Oh, my God,” Carol said.

The camera lingered outside the familiar steps of St. Anthony’s, mourners emerging sadly, single file, hunched in their black suits and dresses.

“That’s where we had our picture taken,” Carol said. “That’s where I tripped on my hem and almost fell. That’s where the car pulled up.”

The young man had been apprehended and was out on bail. His parents gave a press conference in which they expressed their sympathy for the wife and baby’s family. It seemed like they’d already given up on him.

“Let’s stop watching this,” Doug said, but Carol didn’t hear him, and he didn’t bother to repeat it, because they were showing the main street of town; they were interviewing the guy who worked at the hardware store – where Doug himself bought nails and plywood – about the murders.

“They were just like any other couple,” the hardware guy said. “They had grout issues in their bathroom.”

Doug wrapped his arms around Carol and told her that he loved her.

On the plane back to Rhode Island, burnt skin peeling off their noses and backs, they held hands. They landed in a dense, chilly New England downpour. Debbie, Carol’s best friend and maid of honor, met them at the airport. Doug could tell just by looking at her that she was dying to share the news about the murders, and she did a poor job hiding her disappointment when Carol brought it up first. All the way home, Debbie driving erratically in her SUV – she had adult ADD, Carol had always said – they chattered back and forth about it, not even discussing the honeymoon at all. Debbie wasn’t so much a bad driver as a bad multitasker; she’d light cigarettes and rummage around the front seat for stuff and only ever look up at the last second, swerving or braking with sudden jerks.

“And my little brother’s ex-girlfriend’s sister was in the Girl Scouts with her,” Debbie said.

“Really,” Carol said.
“She said that she was the sweetest person. I mean like seriously the sweetest person you ever met in your life.”

“Oh, my God,” Carol said.

In the backseat Doug, having had two Jack and Cokes on the plane, dozed as the women’s bright, excited voices filled the air. He was glad for the rain; there was such a thing as too much sun. Debbie’s squeaking voice squeaked higher, and suddenly it was joined by an extra squeak and squeal of tires, and he jolted awake in time to see the road rise up, like a wave, to meet the side windows, and the last thing he heard before impact was Carol’s voice screaming his name.

In the hospital, he woke up alone, and that was the scariest thing. There was only the sound of machines beeping and no voices. The door to his room was closed. After a while, Debbie came in. She was wearing a hospital gown and had bandages on her arms and hands and face. “Oh, Douggie,” she said to him, as if he were her child. She tried to stroke his arm with one of her bandaged hands, clumsy and paw-like. She was an animal, and he hated her. He tried to scream, but his voice didn’t come out. Then he went under again. This happened over and over, it felt like. A week passed, maybe more; he was never sure. They waited until he was out of the hospital to have the funeral, again at St. Anthony’s.

The year that followed held pain like he’d never known existed. He didn’t have words to describe it, not to other people, not even inside his own head. It was a lot more like physical pain than he ever would have expected, the ache and stab of it. It was like a broken leg, but no medicine or cast existed to mend it. Sometimes he drank a lot and that helped, but only barely and for a couple of hours at a time, and he’d wake up in the middle of the night, sobbing.

He had this house full of wedding gifts. Appliances. Wine glasses. Monogrammed napkin holders, their initials intertwined.

For a year he went to work and came home, went to work and came home. As he began to come out of his haze, he understood what a totally crappy job he’d been doing for months, and he apologized to his boss, Victor.

“It’s okay, man,” Victor said, wincing, which was an expression he used to convey understanding. “What you’ve been through, nobody should have to survive.”

“I think I’m doing better,” Doug said.

“Hey, man, that’s awesome. That is so great,” Victor said, wincing harder. “You know what? Let’s go out. Let’s get some of the guys together and celebrate your return to the world.”

It didn’t sound bad to Doug. He’d let his friendships slide over the past year, ignoring phone calls from his best man, couples they’d socialized with, repeated ones from Debbie. He preferred the company of his TV, watching all the shows Carol liked. After months of incarceration and investigation, the guy who’d murdered his wife and child was now on trial. The news story kept him connected to her, her lust for punishment and retribution. The murderer looked different now; he’d changed his hair and lost weight. He looked younger and sickly and therefore more innocent. Who cares?

He could hear Carol saying in his mind, her voice vibrant with anger. He deserves whatever he gets.

“What you deserve, buddy,” Victor said – as if eavesdropping inside Doug’s mind – “is a little bit of distraction. That’s what you deserve.”

That night, they went out with a couple other guys to a martini bar in a hotel
around the corner from the office. He’d never been there before – they used to go to a brewpub, since closed – and for this he was glad. They settled into a black leather booth in the corner. A couple of people were drinking alone at the bar. The waitress, a sweet-looking blonde woman in her twenties, dropped off the bar menu. There were seventeen kinds of martinis.

In the past year his tolerance for liquor had ballooned, so it took a few rounds for him to feel any effect, and only after the third could he relax and pay attention to the conversation. His workmates were talking about the waitress’s ass. It was a nice-looking ass. She caught them looking and wiggled it at them a little. There was another woman they were discussing, also pretty, sitting at the bar. She was wearing a pink blouse and matching skirt and had long, dark, brown hair. She saw the waitress giving them a show and rolled her eyes, but nicely, as if she saw the humor of it. Doug’s friends noticed him checking her out.

“Go talk to her, man,” Victor said.
“She’s hot.”
“Smokin’,” said Wayne from Technology Services.
“Who says smokin’ anymore?” Victor said.
“I’m just saying she’s hot.”
“Smokin’,” Victor said, wincing for real. “Give me a break.”

Doug was starting to feel drunk, and grateful for it, and he nodded vacantly through all of this. He hardly noticed when Victor and Wayne went to the bar to chat up the dark-haired woman. Gales of laughter peeled from the group over there. He ordered another martini from the blonde waitress and when it came, she said, “This one is compliments of the girl at the bar.”
“Seriously?”

“I think she likes you,” the waitress said.

From the bar, Victor gave him a thumbs up. Doug tried to grin, but it looked like a grimace, he knew. His smiling muscles were stiff from lack of use. He drank down half the martini and ate his olives, and by the time he finished chewing the guys were trailing back to the table.

“You’re never going to believe this, man,” Victor said, “but she gave me this for you.” He opened his palm and showed Victor a key card in an envelope, on which the room number was written in blue pen.

“She thinks you’re hot,” Wayne said.
“Maybe even smokin’,” Victor said. He elbowed Wayne good-naturedly, and they both laughed.

Doug could feel the vodka now.
“That’s crazy,” he said, the words running together. “We haven’t exchanged a single word.”

“So what?” Victor said. “She likes the look of you.”

He drained his martini. When he looked over at the bar again, the woman was gone. Victor and the other guys walked him to the elevator, pressed the button for him, and left him alone. He could see his own drunk face reflected back at him in the elevator’s reflective glass. Leering at himself, he couldn’t feel the muscles move, like after the dentist. The elevator stopped.

He found her room and inserted the key. Nothing happened. He tried again. Was she in there listening to him fumble as he tried to stick it in? Not such a good advertisement for anything that might happen later. On the third try, the light turned green, and he turned the handle and stepped inside.

She was sitting on the bed, wearing a black lace negligee, watching CNN, a sound so profoundly reassuring to him.
that his knees felt weak. She was thin and olive-skinned, and her shoulders were pointy. Her clothes were folded on the chair, a neat pink pile. It was only when he saw her with her clothes already off that he understood his friends had paid for her company.

“Hi, Doug,” she said, and turned off the TV.

“You can leave it on,” he said.

She pressed the remote again and a voice said, “Next up, the story of a lost dog traveling hundreds of miles all by itself to find its way home.”

He sat down next to her, unsure what to say or do. He’d never been in this situation before. “I had some trouble getting in.”

“Well, you’re here now,” she said, and patted his hand. “Are you okay?”

“I’m a little dizzy,” he admitted.

Patting his hand again, she stood up and fetched him some water from the bathroom. On her way back she turned down the volume on the TV.

“Who are you?” he said.

“My name’s Violet.”

“Where are you from?”

“New Hampshire.”

“I don’t know why I’m here,” he said. He felt close to tears. This wasn’t his thing. It wasn’t going to help.

“Your friends thought you needed some company.”

“I do need company,” he admitted. “I do.”

“Okay, then,” Violet said.

He put his head in her lap. But she was bony and her silky negligee was slippery–Carol always wore cotton–and the whole setup wasn’t very comfortable, so he lay next to her in bed instead, his heavy head propped up by pillows.

“My wife died,” he said. “She was a teacher.”

“I wanted to be a teacher,” Violet said. They were holding hands. Her hair smelled good, not quite like candy, more like flowers. “I always liked reading.”

“You should do it,” he said. “You should be a teacher.”

“It’s kind of late,” Violet said.

“It’s not even midnight,” he said, and passed out to the sound of her laugh.

When he woke up, the room was dark and silent. It reminded him of the time he woke up in the hospital, and he was scared and sad, and his head hurt, and he said, “Violet?” and his voice sounded like a child’s. Her voice came from the other side of the room. In the darkness he could just see that she was dressed in her pink outfit, from the bar.

“I’m here, honey,” she said.

“Please don’t leave.”

“Okay,” she said.

In the morning, she was still there, and they ordered breakfast from room service. Violet ate a waffle, licking syrup off her fingers. Without her makeup and in a sober light she looked less pretty than she had, even younger actually but somehow more tired.

“You had a nightmare,” she said. “You were talking, but I couldn’t understand what you said.”

“I dreamed I was back in fifth grade and the other kids in school tried to kill me,” he said. They both laughed. “Pretty weird, huh.”

“Maybe I shouldn’t be a teacher, if kids are that violent,” she said. “Maybe what I’m doing now is safer.” She smiled at him, then bit her lip. “You seem like a nice guy,” she said. “I’m sorry about your wife.”

“Thank you,” he said.

“My real name is Jane.”

“My real name is Martin. Martin Douglas Robinson. I thought Martin was a sissy name when I was a kid so I use my middle name instead.”
They shook hands formally, politely. He thought about kissing her, but she wasn’t really attractive to him. That part of him was dead or almost dead; he took care of its occasional remaining needs by himself in the shower, quick and efficient, a system that worked fine in his opinion.

“I guess I better go,” he said.

She shrugged, sweetly. In that moment he liked her about as well as he could like anyone, and he leaned over and kissed her cheek. She touched his shoulder, a faint, barely-there caress, like the first drop before you’re sure it’s raining. She put a card into his palm and folded his fingers over it.

“Call me,” she said.

At work that day, Victor and Wayne grinned with accomplishment. They kept walking around slapping him on the back and announcing loudly that they knew something other people didn’t. Hung over, Doug didn’t say much, a silence taken for gentlemanly discretion. A lot of women came by to check on him, stopping by his office with lame excuses about confirming meeting times or having run out of toner and needing to use his printer. Suddenly there was an aura around him; he was back on the market. He wasn’t sure how to feel about this, and he left the office early, looking forward to a night at home in front of the TV.

When he pulled up, he saw a girl sitting on his front step. It was Violet, or rather, Jane. She was wearing jeans and a pink cardigan sweater and white running shoes. He stood in the driveway for a second, not knowing what to say.

“You’re in the book,” she said again. She was standing up now, with her hands plunging in the pockets of her jeans, and she looked innocent and vulnerable, or like a person who was trying to look innocent and vulnerable. The year he and Carol started going out, he remembered, she’d been obsessed with a hooker who was blackmailing an alderman in Ohio and had amassed thousands of dollars that his wife thought was safely gathering interest in their kid’s college fund. What a scumbag, Carol had said of the alderman. He should have kept it in his pants.

“I was just on my way out,” he said to Jane. “Now’s not a good time.” Quickly he got back in the car, and drove to a theater and saw two movies back to back, and when he returned home it was midnight and she was gone. She probably had to go to work, back at the hotel bar. He breathed out a deep sigh. Inside, he checked his messages.

“This is Jane Eckman calling,” her voice said. “That’s my name. Jane Audrey Eckman. I really am from New Hampshire. I’m not a creep or a crazy person. I just wanted to call and tell you that. I’m sorry I freaked you out today. I just didn’t know if you’d remember my name, I mean if I called you I thought you might not know who I was, so I thought I’d just stop by. I just thought you seemed like a nice person, and so I thought I would just stop by. I’m in the phone book, too, if you want to call me back. Or also you have my card. That’s all. Okay. Bye.”

Alone in his house, he exhaled. He hadn’t even realized he’d been holding his breath. In the pocket of his pants, hanging in his closet, he found her card (Friends for all Occasions, it said, with a phone number, next to which she had written, in blue ballpoint and bubbled letters, Violet/Jane) and tore it into small
pieces, which he flushed down the toilet.

The next night, she called again. He wasn’t picking up the phone, just in case, and she left another message. This time, her voice trembled a little.

“Martin, this is Jane,” she said. “I know this is making me sound crazy, but I’m actually not crazy, I swear. I just. Listen. I don’t know a lot of people here. And I don’t meet a lot of people either, because where would I meet them? And if I did meet them and they asked me what I do, what would I say? So I guess I just thought, I mean, in your case, you already know from the start. I guess I just thought, I’m kind of lonely, and you seem kind of lonely, too, so maybe it would be okay. Anyway, I just wanted to explain that. You have my card. That’s all. Okay. Bye.”

The next day, she didn’t call. He’d expected her to – but of course he was glad she didn’t. He went out for a beer with Victor and Wayne, to a sports bar, not the hotel, and when he got home he was even a little disappointed not to get the message, but of course not really disappointed, but a little let down. She was just a lonely person and that was all, and now she was leaving him alone and he was glad. He’d been through enough.

A few days passed. Life went back to its routine, such as it was. He cleaned his office, cleaned his house. No calls.

Then the verdict came down on the man who killed his wife and child. He was guilty. Absent the death penalty in Rhode Island, he’d probably get life in prison. There were protesters outside the prison, saying he should be killed. The parents of the dead woman were interviewed and declined to press this issue one way or another, saying only that no matter what happened, their daughter and grandson weren’t coming back, and given that, there could be no justice. Punishment, but not justice. Doug turned off the TV and sat by himself on the couch, his hands shaking.

A week later, when he pulled up to the house after work, Jane Eckman was waiting on his front step again. This time the weather was warm, and she was wearing a pink flowered sundress, like a girl on her way to church. It looked like an outfit her mother would have bought her. For the first time he wondered how old she was. He almost reversed out of the driveway, but didn’t. He got out of the car and faced her.

“Hi, Martin,” Jane said. She swallowed visibly. “I’m sorry about those phone calls.”

“It’s okay,” he said.

“I came here to ask you out,” she said.

“What?”

“On a date,” she said.

To this he said nothing; just looked at her.

“People say sometimes men are dense so you have to be clear. So I’m here, being clear. I like you. You seem like a nice man. You told me I should go ahead and try to be a teacher. It made me feel good; do you know what I mean? I meet a lot of men, and most of them don’t seem very nice. So I was wondering if you’d like to have dinner with me tonight?”

“Jane,” he said.

“If you say no, I’ll leave now and I won’t ever bother you again.”

“No.”

“Okay, then,” she said. She pulled a cell phone out of her purse. “I’ll just have to call a cab. It’s okay if I wait out here, isn’t it? Sorry. This isn’t a very good exit.”

In the living room, he watched her stand in the driveway until the cab took her away. He couldn’t see, from where he was, whether she was crying or not.
He thought that was the end of it, but she kept calling. She didn’t leave messages, though. She’d just call and hang up, every few days. It was ridiculous, like high school or something. After a couple weeks of it he made up his mind. He went to the hotel bar, but she wasn’t there. This went on for another few days, her calling and hanging up, him looking for her at the hotel bar at night after work. Finally he saw her, sitting at the hotel bar, nursing a cocktail. He had two thousand dollars in his pocket, in a small manila envelope. It was money he and Carol had saved for a down payment on a new car. Jane smiled when she saw him.

“Buy me a drink?” she said hopefully. “I can’t stay,” he said. He looked around the bar, eyeing it the way he thought she would, for prospective marks. Was that what she would call them, marks? He didn’t know. “I came to bring you something.”

Jane smiled again, and he saw she was blushing. She thought he’d come around to ask her out. He put the envelope on the bar. “Be a teacher,” he said.

Her smile was gone, but the blush was still there. She didn’t touch the envelope. She curled both hands around her glass, holding it tightly.

“My wife and I were saving it,” he said, “but I don’t need it. Take it and go back to New Hampshire. Go back to school and be a teacher. Meet a nice man and have children.” His voice was cracking. The bartender was eyeing him, but he didn’t care. “Start a new life.”

Jane pushed the envelope back at him and stood up. “Is that what you think I want from you? Fuck you.” Her voice rose to a shout. “Seriously, Martin. Fuck you.” She got up and ran out of the bar, her high heels clicking spastically in her rush out.

The bartender shrugged. “Women,” he said.

Picking up the envelope, Doug left the bar, went home, and took a shower. While he was in there, the phone rang. Jane, he thought, I’ll never get away from her. After he got dressed, he saw there was a message, and he poured himself a drink and steeled himself to listen to it.

But it wasn’t Jane. It was Debbie, Carol’s best friend, the one who’d been driving on the night of the accident. She’d called him every few months since the crash, but he’d never called her back. It wasn’t that he hated her; he just couldn’t stand the sound of her voice.

“Douggie,” she said, in her high, squeaky voice, and immediately he was back in the hospital, back in the embrace of her awful bandaged paws. “I know we haven’t really talked since . . . . Maybe you don’t want to hear from me. But I was watching the news about that guy and how he’s going to jail forever now, and I was thinking about you.” Her voice trailed off, and he guessed she was drinking, or on the verge of crying, or both. “I was . . .” She hung up.

Debbie was divorced and lived by herself, ten minutes away, in a condo in a development called Lantern Hills. Every time she told people where she lived she’d say, “We do have some lanterns, but the land is actually flat,” and laugh. He’d always found her annoying, but now, all of a sudden, he felt like he’d missed her.

He rang the doorbell, and she answered the door in jeans and a college T-shirt, no bra it looked like, bare feet. Her hair was down, uncombed.

“I got your message,” he said. “Come in,” she said.

They sat down on the couch, and she brought him a beer. She held the bottle funny, and he noticed two of her fingers
didn’t bend. There were scars on the backs of her hands.

Seeing him looking, she waved her stiff hands at him, almost apologetically. “They’re full of pins,” she said.

“That guy,” Doug said, “the one who killed his wife and kids. Carol would have said, *Too bad we don’t have the death penalty in Rhode Island.*”

“That’s true, that’s so exactly what she would have said,” Debbie agreed.

There was a silence.

“I met this girl,” Doug said, “She was a hooker. But she wanted to be a teacher.”

“What?”

He told her everything, from start to finish, but he left out the very end, the part where Jane didn’t want the money. He just talked about giving her the envelope and telling her to start over, and Debbie nodded and listened with her scarred hands awkwardly semi-folded in her lap. With the ludicrous, almost lurid story in the air between them, he felt closer to her than he had to anyone in a very long time. He felt a tenderness gurgle inside him and gasp for air, and as he spoke and gestured he let his hand brush over hers.
About three decades ago, it was reported that a correlation existed between wet winters in San Francisco and episodes of air pollution the following summer. Wet winters, it was hypothesized, led to greater plant growth, with an associated rise in natural, or biogenic, emissions. These biogenic emissions, it was held, caused the increase in air pollution.

This hypothesis generated many headlines and cartoons along the lines of “Forests unsafe to walk in!” and “Trees are the source of air pollution.” The idea that natural emissions were at fault for air pollution flew in the face of abundant evidence that human activities, particularly fossil-fuel combustion, are the source of air pollution.

The combustion of fossil fuels generates nitrogen oxides ($NO_x$) – which include nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide ($NO_2$) – as well as particles, organic compounds, and sulfur dioxide ($SO_2$). Amounts produced vary, depending on the nature of the particular fuel and the combustion conditions. While these initial emissions, or primary pollutants, are harmful, the greater threat comes from the chemical transformations that the primary pollutants undergo in air. These reactions form pollutants that are often more toxic than are primary pollutants, and certainly more wide-ranging in their impacts. These ‘secondary pollutants’ include ozone ($O_3$), acids such as nitric and sulfuric acids, and new aerosol particles.

Ozone damages agricultural products, weakens ecosystems, and causes materials such as those made of rubber to deteriorate. In fact, in the past, one way of measuring ozone was to count the number and depth of cracks formed per hour in a stretched rubber band suspended in air. The damage ozone inflicts on health has been particularly well documented. As a result, air quality standards (AQS) for ozone, set to protect public health, have become more stringent, as evidence of the harmful effects of ozone at lower atmospheric levels has accumulated.

The current U.S. federal AQS for ozone is 80 parts per billion (ppb) over eight hours.

Particulate matter, especially those particles with a diameter of 2.5 microns...
and smaller (PM2.5), is of particular concern because it penetrates deep into the respiratory system. Epidemiological studies show PM2.5 increases mortality, despite the extremely small size of the particles, whose diameters are less than about 1 percent of the diameter of a human hair. Moreover, a recent study showed that PM2.5 had negative effects on lung development in children living in Southern California.

Nitric and sulfuric acids are also major secondary pollutants, and nitric acid has a negative correlation with lung development in children as well. These acids, furthermore, are responsible for acid rain and can be taken up into fogs and clouds. Indeed, the fog in Southern California some years ago was found to have an acid concentration about ten thousand times higher than unpolluted rainwater or fog.

How do these secondary pollutants originate? Nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds (VOC) drive the formation of a whole host of secondary pollutants – including ozone, acids, and PM2.5 – through a complex set of chemical reactions in air that require sunlight. In the course of this chemistry, reactive intermediates are generated that also convert sulfur dioxide to sulfuric acid and sulfate particles. These are sufficiently long-lived to be distributed over a large geographical area, thus having not only local and regional impacts, but global ones as well.

The VOC category encompasses literally thousands of compounds. These include anthropogenic emissions – such as those from incomplete fossil-fuel combustion, solvent use, etc. – and biogenic emissions from plants. The rate with which each compound participates in the chemical cycles with nitrogen oxides in air depends on its particular chemical structure, and can vary many orders of magnitude from one compound to another. As it happens, many of the biogenic species are not only volatile but also highly reactive. For example, pinene, which gives pine forests their wonderful odor, reacts quickly in sunlit air when nitrogen oxides are present (and they usually are) to generate ozone and associated air pollutants. Many of the biogenics then react further with the ozone itself to generate additional gaseous and particulate air pollutants. It is this chemistry that led to the hypothesis of a connection between wet winters and summer air pollution many years ago.

So, are plants responsible for smog? Absolutely not. The critical ingredient is nitrogen oxides, which is formed when air is heated during fuel combustion. At these high temperatures, nitrogen, which makes up the majority of molecules in air, reacts with oxygen to form nitric oxide and smaller amounts of nitrogen dioxide. Once emitted into the environment, nitric oxide is converted to form more nitrogen dioxide (this is where the VOCs come in), which then absorbs sunlight and reacts further with oxygen to generate ozone. Without the nitrogen oxides, then, there is no significant anthropogenic source of ozone, and VOC chemistry slows down dramatically. This connection between biogenic and anthropogenic emissions is intriguing – and, as it turns out, not at all uncommon.

Measurements of ozone in the lower atmosphere, taken in a number of locations around the world, dramatically illustrate the nitrogen dioxide-ozone connection. Around about 1850, when measurements began to be taken, ozone levels were typically 10 to 15 ppb. Today, ozone levels, even in the remotest regions of the Earth, are 30 to 40 ppb, a factor of three to four higher. This dra-
matic change has been attributed to the increase in nitrogen oxide emissions resulting from ever-increasing fossil-fuel combustion.

Ozone also contributes significantly to climate change. While the focus of the public debate on climate warming has been on carbon dioxide (CO$_2$), the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report estimates that ozone’s contribution to climate change is about 20 percent of carbon dioxide’s. Particles are another major player in climate change. They have a direct effect in scattering incoming sunlight, and an indirect effect in changing cloud properties such as the frequency of cloud formation and their lifetimes, both of which affect the amount of sunlight reflected from clouds. Their net effect is cooling, counteracting in part the warming by carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases.

Ironically, this cooling may have partially masked global warming over the past decades. Updated observations of the Earth’s climate suggest warming is taking place faster than expected based on models and previous measurements. One hypothesis is that the increase in combustion of high-sulfur fossil fuels after World War II led to a global increase in sulfate particles in air, which through their light-scattering properties and impact on cloud formation led to the cooling of the Earth’s surface. At the same time, this combustion increased carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases such as ozone, which led to warming. Without the partial counterbalancing of sulfate particles, global warming over the past century would have been significantly larger than observed. And the fact that climate change now seems to be happening more rapidly than expected may be due to the diminishing counterbalancing effect of particles. Of course, this is not an argument for increased sulfur dioxide emissions, since controls that have been instituted have significantly reduced the impact of air pollution on health and the environment.

Another contributor to particle formation in air is the reaction of some highly reactive biogenic emissions with ozone. These reactions produce less volatile compounds, which either coalesce to form new particles or end up as deposits on existing particles to make them larger. The particles formed by oxidation of such organic gaseous precursors are known as secondary organic aerosols (SOA). It has been said that the Smoky Mountains were so named because of a persistent haze that may have been due to light scattering by SOA from ozone-biogenics reactions.

The formation of particles in urban and regional pollution episodes is clearly associated with areas of high fossil-fuel combustion and anthropogenic emissions. However, measurements of the carbon isotopes in SOA typically reveal that about 75 percent of the carbon is not derived from fossil fuels. In addition, the amounts of SOA measured in a number of studies are as much as an order of magnitude larger than predicted based on measurements of the known gas-phase precursors to particle formation. It seems likely that biogenic VOC must be involved in resolving discrepancies. This again illustrates the close interactions between anthropogenic and natural emissions. The involvement of VOC in ozone and particulate air pollution has led to significant controls on anthropogenic VOC. However, nitrogen oxides are the only anthropogenic source of ozone and ultimately keep the air pollution cycle moving, which suggests that even stricter control of nitrogen oxide emissions will be required to meet
Air quality standards for ozone and PM2.5.

A third example of the intertwining of natural and anthropogenic emissions is the role of sea salt in the air quality of coastal marine areas. Sea salt is mainly sodium chloride (NaCl), with smaller amounts of other species such as sodium bromide (NaBr). Wave action generates small (typically micron-sized) droplets of seawater that become airborne and are carried inland. While most of them are sufficiently large that they settle by gravity not too far from the source, many sea salt particles remain suspended for prolonged times and have been measured as far as five hundred kilometers inland. Salt particles are also generated from salt lakes such as the Dead Sea in Israel and the Great Salt Lake in Utah.

It is well known from the Nobel Prize–winning work of F. Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina that chlorine atoms from chlorofluorocarbons destroy ozone in the upper atmosphere, thus diminishing the shield against ultraviolet radiation. In the lower atmosphere, however, chlorine atoms actually increase ozone levels under most conditions by interacting with the VOC-nitrogen oxide chemistry. Briefly, nitrogen oxides and nitric acid react with sea salt particles to generate gases containing chlorine, which then react in the presence of sunlight to produce highly reactive chlorine atoms. These initiate the VOC oxidation that leads to the nitric oxide to nitrogen dioxide to ozone conversion, and does so much faster than in the absence of chlorine atoms. Models suggest that sea salt could be responsible for as much as an additional 12 ppb in the peak ozone concentrations in coastal urban areas. Given that the preindustrial global concentrations of ozone were about 10 to 15 ppb, and current levels in remote areas are about 30 to 40 ppb, this is a significant contribution.

So, does sea salt cause smog, as some newspaper headlines trumpet when reporting on this research? Anthropogenically produced nitrogen oxides are again the critical ingredient. However, as is the case for the interaction of biogenic VOC with anthropogenic emissions, many of the details of this interaction between sea salt and fossil-fuel combustion remain obscure, and is the subject of current laboratory and field studies as well as computer kinetics modeling.

Air pollution and climate change are intimately intertwined and must be treated comprehensively. As part of such assessments, both the anthropogenic and natural contributions and their interactions must be measured and taken into account. It is certainly clear, however, that one cannot attribute air pollution and climate change to natural sources as an excuse to forgo controls on emissions from human activities. Indeed, once the close interrelationships between human activities and natural cycles are well understood, the result may well be that even greater control of anthropogenic emissions will be required to minimize the significant harmful effects of air pollution as well as global climate change.
In North America and in Europe, the past three decades have seen an unprecedented expansion of higher education and, in the most recent time, efforts at reform and restructuring. My own university, Harvard, has overhauled its undergraduate curriculum in a comprehensive fashion for the first time in thirty years. European universities have witnessed even more thoroughgoing changes in the structure of undergraduate education. But perhaps nowhere on earth have recent decades seen more revolutionary change in higher education than in the People’s Republic of China. Thirty years ago, Chinese universities were just reopening after the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution. Today they are poised for positions of international leadership in research and education.

The case of Wuhan University, arguably China’s oldest modern university, illustrates the dramatic changes the Chinese system of higher education has undergone in the past century. Wuhan and the surrounding province of Hubei have long been important centers of commerce, scholarship, and political leadership. It was the great reforming Governor-General Zhang Zhidong, who founded in 1893—five years before Peking University began—the “Self-Strengthening Institute” that would become Wuhan University. That university would be a witness to central events of China’s twentieth century: it was in Wuhan that the revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1912 began; Wuhan hosted one of the two contending Nationalist governments in 1927, and the retreating government of Chiang Kaishek in 1938. In the early People’s Republic, Wuhan became a great industrial sector. Today, western Hubei, upriver from Wuhan, is home to the largest engineering project in world history, the Three Gorges Dam (and even a “Three Gorges Dam University”).

Wuhan University had a strong history of growth before 1949. It was then nearly destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.
tion. Today it is a great, comprehensive university, with a faculty of nearly 3,500, teaching a student body of 30,000 undergraduates and 17,000 graduate students; it confers doctoral degrees in 143 subjects – more than Harvard University offers.

Wuhan University’s renewal and expansion is part of a much larger story of contemporary higher education in China. For China is experiencing a revolution in mass higher education that dwarfs that of the United States in the 1950s and that of Europe in the 1970s. This is a revolution that began in the final years of the twentieth century and is still gathering strength.

This is not the first educational revolution in modern China. A little more than a century ago, China underwent a similar, perhaps even more seismic shift in educational institutions, when, with the end of the old examination system, the existing structure of local schools, academies, and directorates of study – all linked to the civil service exams – was displaced by a new system of public and private institutions.

At that time, China developed one of the more dynamic systems of higher education in the world, with strong, state-run institutions (Peking University, Jiao Tong University, National Central University, and at the apogee of research, the Academia Sinica), accompanied by a creative set of private colleges and universities (Yenching University, St. John’s University, and Peking Union Medical College, to name but a few). Sadly, all this would be swept away in the late 1950s and 1960s, yet the traditions and memories of excellence remained, and they have helped to fuel more recent efforts.

Simply in terms of numbers of students educated, the more recent changes are more dramatic than even the great postwar expansion in the United States or the growth of mass-enrollment universities in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1978, after a decade of mostly closed universities, Chinese universities enrolled approximately 860,000 students. This number increased very gradually until 1996, with enrollment then of about one million. In the late 1990s the government decided to accelerate greatly the pace of expansion, and by the year 2000 as many as six million students were enrolled in Chinese universities.

In the seven years since then, the overall official numbers – counting all kinds of institutions – have risen dramatically. According to the ambitious Eleventh Five-Year Plan of the Ministry of Education, higher-education enrollment was scheduled to reach twenty-three million by 2005 and thirty million by 2010. There are at present more than twenty-six million students in institutions of higher learning. By contrast, the United States had approximately thirteen million undergraduate and two million graduate and professional students in 2000, with undergraduates projected to rise to perhaps fifteen million by 2010.

China clearly is moving toward mass higher education. The gross enrollment ratio of eighteen to twenty-one year olds is presently set to be at 15 percent, having been in the low single digits for most of the history of the People’s Republic. By 2020, China aims to enroll as much as 40 percent of young adults in colleges or universities.

A once-small teachers’ college in Shantung province, Lin Yi Normal University had 3,500 students in the year 2000. It now has 35,000. This growth is clear not only in public universities but in the rapidly growing number of private universities. Outside the ancient city of Xi’an, Xi’an International University
Xi’an waishi xueyuan did not exist fifteen years ago; today it has 36,000 students. To put it in another light, that of physical space, the ‘square meterage’ of Chinese universities has more than tripled in the past seven years. In the realm of graduate study, China now turns out, annually, more PhDs than any other country in the world.

Unlike the American expansion of the 1950s and the European growth of the 1970s, this growth has elements that are also self-consciously elitist, with the aim of building a significant number of world-class universities. These are defined in China as being cradles of high-level, creative researchers; frontiers of scientific research; forces capable of transforming research and innovation into higher productivity; and bridges for international and cultural exchange. To that end the Chinese government and many other sources are providing enormous revenues to the leading institutions. Individual winners of recent competitions among universities have been each given several hundred million dollars to expend over the next five years; and runners-up have received funds equivalent to those given to winners in recent European competitions.

Beyond this, the leading Chinese universities have tapped private, philanthropic, and foundation sources for substantial streams of income. Like leading American state universities, such as the University of California at Berkeley, or the University of Michigan, the most prominent Chinese universities know that they will soon be in a position where only a quarter or less of their budget will come from the state; the rest will have to be raised elsewhere. However these budgets are put together, it seems certain that within ten years the research budgets of China’s leading universities will approach those of leading American and European universities, and that in the realms of engineering and science, Chinese universities will be among the world’s leaders.

This is a welcome challenge to American universities – a challenge for both competition and cooperation. Although in the latter part of the twentieth century, American universities were, as a group, among the strongest in the world, there is no reason to imagine that this is a permanent condition. After all, about a century ago – just when China was abandoning the ancient examination system that as late as the eighteenth century had helped to make China (at least in the West) an ideal of educated, enlightened leadership – almost all of the leading universities in the world were German, based on the great nineteenth-century reforms of German higher education. Yet, now, at least according to a recent ranking of universities worldwide by Shanghai Jiao Tong University – a ranking taken seriously by deans and presidents the world over – German universities do not dominate. Indeed, according to the Shanghai rankings, not one of the top fifty was German.

There is a real silliness to this rankings game. What is ranked often has little to do with education, as distinct from research. One criterion, citation indexes, varies in value depending on the discipline: they are extremely important in economics and much less useful in history; helpful in chemistry and chemical biology, and without any merit whatsoever in Celtic. All of the international rankings also focus on research prizes, such as the Nobel Prize, and universities glory in having on their faculty Nobel laureates, taking credit, in these rankings, for these noble scholars, even though the work that gained them a Nobel Prize may have been given for work done decades earlier, and at another uni-
versity. Even those who try to measure the quality of undergraduate education often use student/teacher ratio, which is an inadequate way of assessing comparatively successful teaching.

But the broader point in this discussion of rankings is that nothing is permanent in the world of learning. All of us have progressed by learning from one another. Take again the case of Harvard. Harvard was founded in 1636, that is, in the late Ming dynasty. It is a measure of Harvard’s parochialism that no one in Cambridge, Massachusetts, knew that. Harvard was founded in a cultural and economic backwater of a Europe that was itself ‘underdeveloped’ in comparison to either the Ming or early Qing. Harvard became a decent college by copying the norms of British institutions, but even those could hardly compare with the sophisticated Confucian learning of the great Donglin Academy and other institutions of the late Ming and early Qing. It grew to become a university worthy of the name only in the late nineteenth century by copying the policies and priorities of the great German research universities.

Today, particularly in an era of mass higher education, American and European universities share with our Chinese colleagues many of the same challenges:

• How do we extend the promise of higher education while maintaining quality?

• How do we keep institutions from replicating themselves in academic appointments, and how do we ensure that they will be open to talent and ideas from all sources?

• How do we value teaching as well as research in an era in which almost all of the rewards, professionally, are in research? In fact, teaching can be beneficial to research: places with good students, who are empowered to learn and to challenge the best faculty, consistently outperform stand-alone think tanks and academies of advanced study.

• How do we promote opportunity, by recruiting and funding the very best students from all financial, geographic, and ethnic backgrounds; and how do we ensure greater levels of access and fairness in the admissions process?

• How do we ensure that colleges and universities have the capacity to engage in what in China would be called self-criticism: to question their organization and their curriculum? It is important that in every generation we review what and how we teach; and that every generation of faculty have the opportunity to define what it believes students need to know in our time.

• How do we ensure that – even though our universities will still be based in a home country, with national responsibilities – we also fulfill our international responsibilities, training students who will be citizens of the world?

Finally, beyond these concerns, we need always to ask: Why do we have higher education at all? Here our debate goes back minimally to those of the nineteenth century between proponents of the Humboldtian ideal of Bildung (the education of the whole person) as distinct from Übung (more practical training), differences that we might phrase in Chinese as being between a broad conception of jiaoyu and a narrower, repetitive one of xunlian.

There is no one right answer for every time and place, but one American tradition has been a commitment to the idea.
of liberal education: educating the whole person, and not just training the specialist. We want to ensure that our graduates are curious, reflective, and skeptical learners: people with the capacity for lifelong learning (as their first job will surely not be their last); who can develop multiple perspectives on themselves and the world; and of whom we can say, when they graduate, that they are truly independent of mind. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this ideal, which is of German origin, has become a distinctive goal of an American undergraduate education.

We at Harvard have just renewed our commitment to this cornerstone of undergraduate education. In the spring of 2007, the Harvard faculty approved a new General Education curriculum for Harvard College, after several years of drafting and seemingly endless discussion. When it passed with near-unanimity, I reminded my colleagues of that 1924 debate in the Chinese Communist Party about joining the Nationalists in the first United Front. The minutes of that meeting were recorded thus: “The resolution passed unanimously, even though many comrades were opposed.” (I was also reminded of a conversation with the president of a leading Chinese university. When I asked how his faculty would vote on a set of proposed reforms, he responded: “Vote?”)

Even if decisions are taken in different ways, if activities at Harvard and at leading Chinese universities are any guide, one commitment we share is something that is counterintuitive in an age increasingly dominated by science and technology and by pressures for ever-earlier and ever-greater specialization. That is, our commitment, or recommitment, to a general as well as a specialized education, and to the humanities as part of the core of an undergraduate education.

It is worth noting that European universities appear to be adopting some of the formal structures of perceived international models, such as the U.S. baccalaureate. Many of the ideals of what has become known as the Bologna Process have the promise in time of making higher education in Europe a continental-wide enterprise, with mobility not only of students but also of faculty and staff. That will be critical in competing, and in cooperating, with continental-sized systems of higher education in the United States and in China.

But while there is some emulation of the current American concept of the baccalaureate, European universities appear less interested as yet in the educational values that have defined the B.A. in many American colleges, which stress a broad undergraduate education in the liberal arts and sciences. If one looks at the documents of the Bologna, Prague, Berlin, Bergen, and other meetings, there is enormous attention paid to research, to funding, and to math, science, and technology, and precious little to teaching, to citizenship, and to valuing the broad and deep education of the next generation of Europe’s citizens. The “key competences” for lifelong learning recommended by the European Parliament in 2006 quite appropriately include language learning; information and communication technologies; and math, science, and technology. But where are the humanities? Where is the multidisciplinary study of other cultures and religions? Where is education in moral reasoning and philosophy? Where, even, are the ‘harder’ social sciences?

There will be many further discussions of these issues, because the quality of education is not one simply to be measured in technical or vocational courses, nor in incomes earned in euros,
dollars, or renminbi. It is measured in people, and their ultimate contribution to society.

What is encouraging about Chinese higher education today is the independent understanding that the general education of China’s students – in the arts and humanities as well as the sciences and social sciences – will be as important to their, and all of our, futures, as will be their specialized, professional training. ‘General education’ (tongshi jiaoyu) is now the cornerstone of curricular reform in leading universities throughout the People’s Republic, as well as in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thus, today, all Peking University students, even in the Guanghua School of Management, have to take a selection of courses that may include literature, philosophy, and history. In addition, a focused liberal arts curriculum has been established in the new Yuanpei Program, named for Peking University’s famous German-educated chancellor in the early twentieth century, the philosopher Cai Yuanpei, who was an admirer of Wilhelm von Humboldt.

Chinese educational leaders, at least in the elite institutions, believe that they need to do this, in part because, in China, as in the United States, all the pressures are in the opposite direction: on the part of students, who too single-mindedly pursue their careers, and on the part of faculty, whose careers and interests are ever more specialized – leading to a situation in which students and faculty interact on ever narrower ground.

It would be nice, as Henry Rosovsky, one of my predecessors as dean of Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences once declared, if it were true that precisely what the faculty wanted to teach was exactly what the students needed to learn. But that has never been the case, and it is the job of universities to ensure that our students learn broadly, from the best faculty, how to think, reflect, and analyze, and that they become the critical thinkers and problem solvers of the next generation.

For this, a study of the humanities is essential. China’s educational leaders increasingly share this view. Perhaps this is because they know, better than anyone else, what life can be like in the absence of the humanities, and in the absence of a liberal education. For that is part of the history of China’s twentieth century.

What happened in China in the past century is all the more remarkable because China is the world’s longest continuous civilization, with the longest continuing sets of philosophical and literary traditions. The study of that tradition defined not only what it meant to be a scholar, but also what it meant to be powerful. The Qing educational and examination system brought the most learned men in the realm into the service of the state – not because they had been trained in statecraft or tax collection, but because they had deeply studied what we would today call the ‘humanities’: because they had studied, memorized, chanted, and metaphorically consumed the classics, and they would, in office, act according to the principles of human behavior that the Analects, Mencius, and other great works set out.

There has seldom been a higher academic ideal: good people embarking on the living study of great books in order to do good work in society. (In the United States we sometimes have trouble imagining a society where the best people go into government.)

This was the ideal, of course never fully realized in practice, and the ordeal of studying to be a scholar-official was a tortuous one. And there were limits to this system: the absence of the study
of mathematics, of science, of practical affairs, did not mean that the Empire was thereby better governed. Their absence arguably contributed to the Empire’s feeble capacity, in the nineteenth century, to respond to a militarized, industrialized, and otherwise energized West, in a series of humiliations that would spell the end of a two-thousand-year-old imperial tradition.

The Qing fell in 1911, but for our purposes the more important date is 1905, when the ancient examination system was ended overnight, and not replaced. From that date–and particularly under Republican and Communist regimes–China would be governed not by a civil service chosen for its proven capacities in moral reasoning, but largely by exemplars of that most dominant and successful Western export–the modern, professional military–in the direct service of another Western export that would not be particularly sympathetic to humanist discourse–the Leninist state.

From 1905, for understandable reasons, Chinese education at all levels would begin to drift strongly toward the study of those subjects that would bring about a return to *fu qiang* (‘wealth and power’)–primarily mathematics, science, and engineering. Within a decade of that date, the moral foundation of both Chinese government and culture, Confucianism, would come under a withering attack, leaving a void in the realm of human and social values. By 1949, when the mainland fell to the Communists, less than 10 percent of graduates of Chinese public universities graduated with degrees in humanistic disciplines. The Communists then took that number to the vanishing point.

In the absence of the humanities, there were arguably two dominant themes in education. One, by no means limited to China, was the belief that in an age of science one could quite literally engineer a bright future, a new people. This was the dream of Chinese leaders from Sun Yatsen onward: a government of technocratic expertise, capable of ‘reconstructing’ China with roads, railroads, and dams–a government of huge ambition, as seen in the Three Gorges Dam project, first conceived by Sun Yatsen in the 1920s, and now built by the governments of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Today, every recent member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the People’s Republic of China–the nine or more men who run the country–has training in engineering. The term, ‘technocracy’ has been translated into Chinese as ‘the dictatorship of the engineers.’ There is perhaps no more fitting description of the contemporary government of the People’s Republic. Of all the world’s governments in the early twenty-first century, only China’s has the engineering imagination, political will, and financial resources to complete a project of this scale and to relocate inhabitants in its way. This and other great infrastructure projects–highways, subways, airports, and more, on a scale unmatched anywhere–are the result of an engineering state unleashed and unchecked.

A second belief of the twentieth century was that ‘culture’ and the arts were to be firmly subordinated to the purposes of the developmental state. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s New Life Movement and Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, the humanities were mobilized for the purposes of the state. As Mao Zedong put it, literature and art were to be defined as “the artistic crystallization of the political aspirations of the Communist party.” (As the twentieth-century writer Lu Xun once observed: all art may be propaganda, but not all propaganda is art.)
Chinese history in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century shows what dislocation can ensue when a civilization loses its cultural foundations, its moral compass, on a relentless quest for wealth and power. In that quest, China imported all sorts of Western ‘isms’: scientism, militarism, Leninism, chief among them; and it denigrated nearly every aspect of a civilization that, just a century earlier, was the most sophisticated and accomplished on Earth.

Today, a more self-confident China is beginning to explore its past and make that past part of its modern education. There are many signs of a new cultural pluralism in contemporary China, and of a willingness to imagine and build institutions of learning that are at the forefront of science and technology and yet also honor and promote the humanities. Surely it is a positive sign that statues of Confucius are replacing statues of Mao – even though their works may still be equally unread.

Perhaps the most important revolution in Chinese higher education today will not be its size and scope, but the fact that, even under the leadership of engineers, leading institutions have come to understand that an education without the humanities is incomplete. This is a recognition that in an age still, perhaps necessarily, consumed with ‘wealth and power,’ that as countries vie for power and individuals seek to accumulate wealth, an education that stresses the values that make for a strong, and even harmonious, human community are more important than ever.

Just weeks before he was assassinated, President John F. Kennedy captured the essence of the humanities in a speech at Amherst College. He spoke about poetry, but his idea applies to all the creative disciplines:

When power leads man toward arrogance, poetry reminds him of his limitations. When power narrows the areas of man’s concerns, poetry reminds him of the richness and diversity of his existence. When power corrupts, poetry cleanses, for art establishes the basic human truths which must serve as the touchstone of our judgment.

In addressing the challenges facing higher education in China, Europe, and the United States in this era of reform and renewal, I mean to speak of our collective human experience. After all, as the Chinese phrase shu tu tong gui reminds us: “We have myriad paths, but our ends are one.”
In the spirit of trying to make our academic research more socially engaging, my colleagues and I have supported the construction or rehabilitation of small, community-based archaeological and ethnographic museums in Bolivia and Peru over the last twenty years. These museums are run by local institutions at the village or town level, and serve as a focal point for cultural pride and sense of ownership over their history. In spite of their modest size and scope, these site museums function like their larger counterparts in the United States and Europe.

Natural history or anthropological museums, both large and small, are some of the most important but overlooked and misunderstood institutions in contemporary society. From an academic perspective, museums can be viewed as a space where social scientific theory must confront the tangible. From the late 1960s into the early 1990s, however, many observers declared that museums were becoming an anachronistic form of communication or education. Others argued that an increased focus on ‘heritage’ was a sign of social decline, a kind of desperate secular revitalization movement. The postmodern critique in anthropology was perhaps the most serious, arguing that museums essentialized non-Western peoples and were nothing more than colonialist narratives given institutional form.

Yet, in spite of all the distractions afforded by modern life on one side, and the academic critiques that museums generate on the other, museums are flourishing throughout the world, both industrialized and emerging. We can safely conclude that museums are not historically transient phenomena confined to the West. There is indeed no substitute for a physical space where people can congregate to look at, and occasionally touch, objects of cultural, historical, and personal meaning. The nature of these museums varies enormously from culture to culture and from place to place. But since at least the beginning of urban life several millennia ago, in both the eastern and western hemispheres, people have created spaces to house meaningful objects that serve to materialize shared histories and group identities. Simply put, museums and museum-like spaces are central to our lives as social beings; they will never disappear, and as such, must be embraced by social scientists as fundamental ad-
juncts to our research, not naively dismissed as colonial legacies of a bygone age.

Today, large art and natural history museums dominate the cultural landscape of the West as well as richer non-Western countries, like India and China. However, these countries and the rest of the world are also full of very small and medium-sized museums that in the aggregate have a much greater effect on people’s lives. For example, the United States alone has almost 1,500 ‘official’ museums, as listed on a website of the International Council of Museums. But it also has thousands of other smaller museums – some just one or two rooms with a humble library and/or some exhibits – that are dedicated to virtually any aspect of the human condition.

Museums are never politically or culturally neutral. Lurking behind every exhibit is an ideology, the result of many conscious or unconscious acts of selecting what to include and what to exclude. In anthropological terms, museums are highly contested institutions that reflect the social and political biases of the people in those societies that create museums. By contested, I mean that the ones who form these institutions often have different, and oftentimes competing, aspirations and goals. Those conflicting interests are reflected in the museum exhibit and collections. To the uninitiated, small ethnic museums are quaint expressions of the parochial aspirations of a relatively small group of people. However, to those who are aware of the deeper cultural meanings reflected in these places, the humble exhibit and weathered label copy oftentimes reflect the turbulent social tensions lying just under the surface.

Why do we promote small museums in Latin America? As in other places around the world, the postcolonial peoples of Latin America developed museums as a source of national pride in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The large museums were based on European models, beginning first as private collections of the elite and then later as great national institutions supported by the state or church. These national institutions reflected the ideologies of the political elites, stressing both nationalism and independence from their colonial past, but also creating a gulf between a ‘primitive’ indigenous people and a ‘civilized’ European-derived elite culture.

This same distinction was found in the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century museums in Europe and America. The great art museums housed the work of Euro-American artists, while the art of indigenous peoples were housed in natural history museums. Even the academic divisions in the natural history museums – anthropology, botany, geology, and zoology – imparted a not-so-subtle ideological perspective that placed the accomplishments of the indigenous peoples in a ‘state of nature.’ Primitive nature – embodied by exhibits of animals, plants, minerals, and indigenous peoples – was separated from Western civilization – embodied by great art, usually European masters. When art museums did indeed begin to collect indigenous art, the exhibits, collections, and curatorial staffs were housed in separate departments usually known as ‘primitive art.’

In the last thirty years or so, this ideology has changed in at least North America, Australia, and most countries in Europe. In the exhibit halls of the great natural history museums, European cultures are commingled with non-European ones, and the exhibits have broken down the nineteenth-century crypto-racist frameworks. Many art museums
now appropriately exhibit non-Western art alongside Western art, and do not separate it as some primitive precursor to the rest of the exhibits. The wealthier Latin American countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Brazil have likewise reformed their museum exhibits to reflect these new social realities stressing indigenous pedigrees in past national movements of independence as well as the present role of indigenous peoples in their societies.

In our work in Latin America, we scholars have become much more aware of the power of small, community-based museums to affect peoples’ daily lives positively. In the past two decades or so, ‘site museums’ (those focused on a narrow geographical and topical theme, such as an archaeological site or region) have emerged as one of the principal means by which indigenous peoples and their descendants have resisted many of the negative cultural effects of globalization. These museums are small, but they are powerful. Site museums give people one more tool to maintain their often-precarious cultural identity in the face of increased cultural homogenization. When successful, they create new identities crafted not by outsiders or a distant political elite, but by local people themselves.

It may seem incredible that a 1,500-square-foot exhibit space in a remote village can be so socially engaging and relevant. But it is. On the Island of the Sun in the southern side of Lake Titicaca, our archaeological team collaborated with a community to build a center for tourism, lodging, and ethnographic exhibits. This center was built with private contributions from anonymous North American donors and the volunteer labor of the community. Students from the main university in La Paz who call this village their home created the architectural design. The museum is now in the guidebooks. It is a true success story: the people of this community on this island are able to present their culture in the way they want to the thousands of foreigners who visit each year.

A second museum was built in the municipal building in the town of Taraco in the northern Titicaca Basin. Funded again by North American donors, and conceived and executed by my colleagues Cecilia Chávez and Edmundo de la Vega, the museum is run by the local mayor’s office as a public service. Exquisitely carved stone stela over two thousand years old are now preserved in the small building. School groups and other civic organizations regularly use the museum. It, too, is emerging as a significant component of municipal life in the area.

Finally, many of my colleagues have collaborated with the local Ministry of Education officials to rehabilitate existing museums in the municipality of Pukara. By promoting local site museums, social scientists can help to create spaces where ethnographic and archaeological objects can be properly housed locally and controlled by the people whose ancestors made them. We are a modest component in a larger process of people around the world reclaiming and controlling their own proud past.
Inside back cover: Spectators forming flags at the 1984 Olympics held in Los Angeles. See Pheng Cheah on What is a world? On world literature as world-making activity, pages 26–38: According to Goethe, the ethical end of cosmopolitanism “is not uniformity . . . but mutual understanding and tolerance between nations, through the revelation of universal humanity: ‘The idea is not that nations shall think alike, but that they shall learn how to understand each other, and, if they do not care to love one another, at least that they will learn to tolerate one another.’” Photograph © Duomo/Corbis.
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Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Summer 2008

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