Multiple Modernities

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Johann P. Arnason, Dale F. Eickelman, S. N. Eisenstadt, Nilüfer Göle, Jürgen Heideking, Alex Inkeles, Bruce Kapferer, Sudipta Kaviraj, Renato Ortiz, Wolfgang Schluchter, Stanley J. Tambiah, Tu Weiming, Björn Wittrock
Preface to the Issue
“Multiple Modernities”

THE TERM “MULTIPLE MODERNITIES” is not one in common usage today. There is no way of knowing whether it will ever achieve the renown or instant recognition that certain other more hyperbolic phrases like “the end of history” and “the clash of civilizations” have managed to secure in these last years. Yet, as will be evident in the pages that follow, those who have written for this issue of Daedalus are criticizing many of the prevailing theories about the character of contemporary society while questioning whether traits commonly described as “modern” do in fact accurately and fully render the complexity of the contemporary world. In contrast to the words of scholars, politicians, and publicists who have eyes only for the “global village,” who prate constantly about the universal triumph of democracy and the free market—purportedly the most characteristic institutions of our day—this issue may be read as an effort to go beyond such superficial and simplistic formulations.

In effect, this study is intended to challenge many of the conventional notions of how the world has changed over time, in this century predominantly, but in earlier periods as well. In
reminding us of how much the political, social, and economic theories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, still persuasive until very recently, have lost credence in recent decades, it asks a more fundamental question about whether we are at all confident that we understand contemporary cultures. Do we, in fact, give sufficient attention to them? In abandoning the social scientific typologies, once so popular, that purported to tell us how societies differ, have we failed to replace them with others of equal persuasiveness? In short, one of the more characteristic pretensions of our time may be that we claim to understand and know the contemporary world when we are in fact largely ignorant of its complex character. In too many instances we appear to be extrapolating from what now exists to imagine what must inevitably be. If this is indeed our situation, it is imperative that we reconsider the character of modernity, recognizing that just as many of the bold theories about economic and political development, fashioned in the immediate post–World War II period, are now very justifiably discarded, so those that today command public attention may also soon be.

S. N. Eisenstadt, in many ways the principal architect of our study, opens the issue with the bold assertion that the idea of “multiple modernities” needs to be seen as a refutation of theories of modernization prevalent in the 1950s, which assumed that all industrial societies would one day converge, and that such convergence was already proceeding. The “classical” sociological analyses of Marx and Durkheim, and, to a certain extent, of Weber, all posited what Eisenstadt terms a “cultural program of modernity,” which had its origins in Europe but was expected in time to become universal. Yet as societies modernized in the immediate postwar period, Eisenstadt sees that the “homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of this Western program of modernity” were not realized. In many non-Western societies, all distinctively and undeniably modern, there was little disposition to imitate the West, or indeed to praise its qualities. In short, for Eisenstadt, “modernity” and “Westernization” are not identical; they were wrongly perceived as such in the years after the defeat of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.
Björn Wittrock, no less interested in describing the varieties of modernity, believes that the United States ought not to be taken as the measure that is used to determine the success or failure of other societies seeking to prove themselves modern, wishing to achieve what is still thought to be that enviable status. Today, when there appears to be an overwhelming wish to equate modernity with a liberal market economy, with free trade, it is important to recognize how rarely have such policies and practices been common. In the political sphere, Wittrock reminds us, virtually no European state before very recent times could claim to be democratic, as we now define that term. If modernity, then, is equated with phenomena of this sort, its history has been an exceedingly brief one. For Wittrock, European modernity was not simply “a package of technological and organizational developments”; it was intimately linked to a political revolution, to an equally important transformation of the nature of scholarly and scientific practices and institutions. As he explains, although philosophical and political groups might differ, they all acknowledged “the idea that agency, reflexivity, and historical consciousness might help construct a new set of institutions,” committed to new notions of citizenship, of the rights that inhered in such a new status.

Wittrock’s essay leads very naturally to a consideration of what may be the most significant event of our times—the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eclipse of Marxist Communism in many parts of the world. Johann Arnason, believing that Soviet Communism was unquestionably “modern,” that those who choose not to see it as such are mistaken, asks whether it may not be best understood as “a distinctive but ultimately self-destructive version of modernity, rather than a sustained deviation from the modernizing mainstream.” In short, the Soviet experiment needs to be seen as a “failed modernity,” and the reasons for its failure need to be understood. Those who habitually looked for signs of growing convergence between the capitalist and communist worlds, who imagined that they discovered significant data when they were able to point to comparable levels of industrialization, urbanization, and the spread of education in the Soviet Union, never considered how much any really successful modernity depends also on kinds of
self-questioning and self-defining that were never common in the Soviet experience.

If Arnason, like other of his colleagues in this *Dædalus* issue, is emphasizing the unique features of modernity in different institutional and intellectual settings, it becomes important to consider those who live outside the West who, in Nilüfer Göle’s words, “reflect on modernity from its edge, from a non-Western perspective.” In providing what she calls “snapshots of Islamic Modernities,” Göle is considering recent developments in Turkish society, where earlier in the century Kemal Attaturk appeared to have succeeded in converting its people to secular values and forms. The revival of Islam in Turkey, and indeed the growth of what may be called Islamism, is a subject of more than passing interest to the world’s mass media, but the phenomenon, as treated by those principally concerned with international affairs, is generally considered in purely political terms. Göle knows that its cultural significance may be no less great. In recognizing that Islamism must be seen as a repudiation of certain of the basic premises of Western modernity, not least the idea of inevitable progress and individual emancipation, Göle asks whether the Islamic movement, properly understood, does not really constitute a critical reevaluation of modernity.

Dale Eickelman’s essay on “Islam and the Languages of Modernity” reminds us that Western intellectuals habitually dismissed the possibility of a distinctive Muslim modernity, different from that of the West. Daniel Lerner, decades ago, saw the Middle Eastern societies as facing “the stark choice of ‘Mecca or mechanization.’” The two could not be married. The Islamic religion, for most observers outside the Muslim world, seemed to be one in which there was no chance of a “civil society” being created. Today, in Iran, particularly among the young, Eickelman tells us, new ideas are germinating, in which “politics and religion are subtly intertwined, and not always in ways anticipated by Iran’s established religious leaders.” The views held by Göle in respect to the changes in religious belief in Turkey are seen to be applicable also to what is happening in Iran, a very different kind of Muslim society. If, as Eickelman argues, personal autonomy for both men and women is growing, then the traditional, almost canonical idea of earlier devel-
development theorists, that religion is a barrier to certain kinds of beliefs, needs to be revised.

To move from a consideration of the predominantly Islamic world of the Middle East to the predominantly Hindu world of India—many forget that India has a Muslim population of over a hundred million, not to speak of the many who adhere to other religions—is to understand why the concept of multiple modernities is so compelling. India is incontestably modern, but as Sudipta Kaviraj makes very clear, that modernity is neither Western European nor American. While its religious diversity contributes to giving it features increasingly common in many parts of the world, and while India has a very large middle class—some estimate its size to be two hundred million or more in a population of over a billion—and while those privileged by wealth enjoy all the pleasures and comforts provided by material consumption, including frequent and extensive travel both in the country and abroad, these are not features of modernity that much concern Kaviraj. Nor was India’s modernity simply created at the moment of its independence, when it ceased to be part of the British Empire. The originality of Kaviraj’s argument lies in the emphasis he chooses to give to the importance of the colonial experience for India, a colonial experience very different from that common in other parts of Asia or Africa.

Stanley Tambiah, having been long interested in ethno-nationalist movements and ethnic conflicts, as well as transnational migrations, writes about the new diaspora of the twentieth century. His paper, which might have borne the title “Multiple Modernities in an Era of Globalization,” is concerned with three “flows”—the flow of people, capital, and information—which have done so much to change the character of nation-states and have exacerbated conflict in many societies. Providing a demographic portrait of the world today, Tambiah shows why the voluntary migration of individuals is so crucial to societies that would otherwise lack the labor necessary for their development. While involuntary migration—caused by political turmoil—figures in his account, as does migration within the so-called developing world, his major concern is with Europe and North America, regions that have absorbed tens of millions of migrants in recent decades. How,
then, have these migrants been incorporated? Tambiah contrasts what he calls the “assimilation, exclusion, and integration” practices of individual societies, but his chief concern is with multiculturalism. His purpose is to analyze and explain the cultural and political life of several of these diaspora communities.

Tu Weiming, in his study of the rise of “Confucian” East Asia, is concerned with the operation of traditions in the modernizing process and the relevance of non-Western civilizations to the self-understanding of the modern West. In his words, he is seeking “to move beyond three prevalent but outmoded exclusive dichotomies: the traditional/modern, the West/the rest, and the local/global.” Accepting that the overwhelming number of East Asian intellectuals knew that Confucianism, in its classical form, like the religious beliefs of other axial-age civilizations, was outmoded, he asks whether the ideas propagated by Hegel, Marx, and Weber about modernity still have resonance. Each of them believed that the modern West, for all of its shortcomings, was the only place where meaningful progress could be made, and took for granted that modernization would lead to “homogenization.” In such a world, cultural diversity could not possibly survive. For those who accepted these ideas, it seemed almost inconceivable that Confucianism or any other non-Western spiritual tradition would ever intervene to help in the modernizing process. Yet, in Tu’s view, that opinion proved to be mistaken, not least in East Asia.

Jürgen Heideking, in seeking to describe and analyze the pattern of American modernity that developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is in fact considering conditions much studied by American scholars preoccupied with the country’s colonial and early republican origins. How Americans became, almost overnight, in Gordon Wood’s words, “the most liberal, the most democratic, the most commercially minded, and the most modern people in the world,” and how this was accomplished “without urbanization, without railroads, without the aid of any of the great forces we usually invoke to explain ‘modernization,’” is what Heideking seeks to explain. Not surprisingly, he sees great significance in the American Revolution, but also in a “distinct pattern of modernity, rooted in the
The discourse with the mother country, with its accompanying criticism of many of Europe's institutions, reflected a desire to achieve an identity different from that of Europe, and came to be increasingly important.

However, North American modernity—particularly that of the United States—is defined, that of Latin America is very substantially different. Indeed, Renato Ortiz raises the question of whether it is possible to speak of a single Latin America; for him, the concept of Latin Americas is much more appealing. The colonial period of Latin American societies, like that which followed their independence early in the nineteenth century, cannot be compared with that of India or the states of the Middle East in this century or earlier. There are no "ageless" traditions in Latin America. Instead, we have a story of European conquest, followed by the disaggregation of indigenous societies, with miscegenation and religious syncretism becoming common. In Latin America, the ideas of the Enlightenment and the evolutionary thinking of August Comte were required to confront existing conservatism and traditional Catholicism. With the establishment of many nation-states, Spain and Portugal lost their preeminence, and other countries, France and England initially, the United States more recently, came to be important for them. While some in these new societies came to favor what they called the Americanization of Latin America, others preferred what they saw as the "spiritual" qualities of Europe, and argued for Europeanization. In the nineteenth century, while the great objective of many of these societies was to industrialize, that purpose was realized only in the twentieth century, and not everywhere. Today, globalization provides the rationale for much of Latin American development, but the consequences of the new international consumers' economy—created almost two centuries ago—are by no means clear for the states.

In this collection of essays, there is much that is intended to make us reflect on whether the contemporary world is being properly perceived, whether its diverse cultures are understood, whether a concentration on the superficial evidences of modernity, particularly as they reveal themselves in the more
conventional representations of urban life—surface impressions mostly—do not conceal major differences between societies that are indeed being transformed by globalization, but are in no sense becoming identical. The immediate post–World War II confidence that the West was providing the models that all societies that aspired to peace and prosperity would in time adopt has been eroded. If many of the essays in this *Daedalus* issue provide “snapshots” that refute the kinds of conventional wisdom that exists for those who see only the “global village,” whose concern is mostly with what the Internet is doing to change life, it will have served its purpose. The theories of the past about modernity require substantial revision, if only because the reality of the present is so different from what was prophesied, and indeed from what was imagined to be possible.

“Multiple Modernities” ought to be read in conjunction with the Summer 1998 issue of *Daedalus*, “Early Modernities.” Three scholars, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Björn Wittrock, and Wolfgang Schluchter, are again to be thanked for all that they did to make this study possible. A great debt is owed the institutions, Swedish, Israeli, German, Hungarian, and English—all named in the earlier issue—who helped in various ways to launch the study, to support it in its many phases. It is a pleasure now to express our gratitude also to the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities for its support of this project and especially for the help it gave in the publication of this issue. A meeting of the authors in Jerusalem last summer was made possible through the generosity of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the help given by Dr. Ilana Silver on that occasion. Finally, a very sincere thanks goes to Dr. Seng Tee Lee of Singapore. He provided the funds that allowed us to proceed when we were uncertain of securing other financial support.

S.R.G.
Multiple Modernities

S. N. Eisenstadt

The notion of “multiple modernities” denotes a certain view of the contemporary world—including the history and characteristics of the modern era—that goes against the views long prevalent in scholarly and general discourse. It goes against the view of the “classical” theories of modernization and of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s, and indeed against the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least in one reading of his work. They all assumed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world.

The reality that emerged after the so-called beginnings of modernity, and especially after World War II, failed to bear out these assumptions. The actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of this Western program of modernity. While a general trend toward structural differentiation developed across a wide range of institutions in most of these societies—in family life, economic and political structures, urbanization, modern education, mass communication, and individualistic orienta-

S. N. Eisenstadt is Rose Issacs Professor Emeritus of Sociology at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
tions—the ways in which these arenas were defined and organized varied greatly, in different periods of their development, giving rise to multiple institutional and ideological patterns. Significantly, these patterns did not constitute simple continuations in the modern era of the traditions of their respective societies. Such patterns were distinctively modern, though greatly influenced by specific cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences. All developed distinctly modern dynamics and modes of interpretation, for which the original Western project constituted the crucial (and usually ambivalent) reference point. Many of the movements that developed in non-Western societies articulated strong anti-Western or even antimodern themes, yet all were distinctively modern. This was true not only of the various nationalist and traditionalist movements that emerged in these societies from about the middle of the nineteenth century until after World War II, but also, as we shall note, of the more contemporary fundamentalist ones.

The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world—indeed to explain the history of modernity—is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs. These ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and ideological patterns are carried forward by specific social actors in close connection with social, political, and intellectual activists, and also by social movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different views on what makes societies modern. Through the engagement of these actors with broader sectors of their respective societies, unique expressions of modernity are realized. These activities have not been confined to any single society or state, though certain societies and states proved to be the major arenas where social activists were able to implement their programs and pursue their goals. Though distinct understandings of multiple modernity developed within different nation-states, and within different ethnic and cultural groupings, among communist, fascist, and fundamentalist movements, each, however different from the others, was in many respects international.

One of the most important implications of the term “multiple modernities” is that modernity and Westernization are not
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identical; Western patterns of modernity are not the only “authentic” modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others.

In acknowledging a multiplicity of continually evolving modernities, one confronts the problem of just what constitutes the common core of modernity. This problem is exacerbated and indeed transformed with the contemporary deconstruction or decomposition of many of the components of “classical” models of the nation and of revolutionary states, particularly as a consequence of globalization. Contemporary discourse has raised the possibility that the modern project, at least in terms of the classical formulation that held sway for the last two centuries, is exhausted. One contemporary view claims that such exhaustion is manifest in the “end of history.”2 The other view best represented is Huntington’s notion of a “clash of civilizations,” in which Western civilization—the seeming epitome of modernity—is confronted by a world in which traditional, fundamentalist, antimodern, and anti-Western civilizations—some (most notably, the Islamic and so-called Confucian groupings) viewing the West with animus or disdain—are predominant.3

II

The cultural and political program of modernity, as it developed first in Western and Central Europe, entailed, as Björn Wittrock notes, distinct ideological as well as institutional premises. The cultural program of modernity entailed some very distinct shifts in the conception of human agency, and of its place in the flow of time. It carried a conception of the future characterized by a number of possibilities realizable through autonomous human agency. The premises on which the social, ontological, and political order were based, and the legitimation of that order, were no longer taken for granted. An intensive reflexivity developed around the basic ontological premises of structures of social and political authority—a reflexivity shared even by modernity’s most radical critics, who in principle denied its validity. It was most successfully formulated by Weber. To follow James D. Faubian’s exposition of Weber’s conception of modernity:
Weber finds the existential threshold of modernity in a certain deconstruction: of what he speaks of as the “ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented cosmos. . . .”

. . . What Weber asserts—what in any event might be extrapolated from his assertions—is that the threshold of modernity may be marked precisely at the moment when the unquestioned legitimacy of a divinely preordained social order began its decline. Modernity emerges—or, more accurately, a range of possible modernities emerge—only when what had been seen as an unchanging cosmos ceases to be taken for granted. Countermoderns reject that reproach, believing that what is unchanging is not the social order, but the tasks that the construction and functioning of any social order must address. . . .

. . . One can extract two theses: Whatever else they may be, modernities in all their variety are responses to the same existential problematic. The second: whatever else they may be, modernities in all their variety are precisely those responses that leave the problematic in question intact, that formulate visions of life and practice neither beyond nor in denial of it but rather within it, even in deference to it. . . .

The degree of reflexivity characteristic of modernity went beyond what was crystallized in the axial civilizations. The reflexivity that developed in the modern program not only focused on the possibility of different interpretations of core transcendental visions and basic ontological conceptions prevalent in a particular society or civilization; it came to question the very givenness of such visions and the institutional patterns related to them. It gave rise to an awareness of the possibility of multiple visions that could, in fact, be contested.

Such awareness was closely connected with two central components of the modern project emphasized in early studies of modernization by both Daniel Lerner and Alex Inkeles. The first recognized among those either modern or becoming “modernized” the awareness of a great variety of roles existing beyond narrow, fixed, local, and familial ones. The second recognized the possibility of belonging to wider translocal, possibly changing, communities.
Central to this cultural program was an emphasis on the autonomy of man: his or her (in its initial formulation, certainly “his”) emancipation from the fetters of traditional political and cultural authority. In the continuous expansion of the realm of personal and institutional freedom and activity, such autonomy implied, first, reflexivity and exploration; second, active construction and mastery of nature, including human nature. This project of modernity entailed a very strong emphasis on the autonomous participation of members of society in the constitution of the social and political order, on the autonomous access of all members of the society to these orders and to their centers.

From the conjunctions of these different conceptions arose a belief in the possibility that society could be actively formed by conscious human activity. Two complementary but potentially contradictory tendencies developed within this program about the best ways in which social construction could take place. The first, crystallized above all in the Great Revolutions, gave rise, perhaps for the first time in history, to the belief in the possibility of bridging the gap between the transcendental and mundane orders—of realizing through conscious human agency, exercised in social life, major utopian and eschatological visions. The second emphasized a growing recognition of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests, as a consequence allowed for multiple interpretations of the common good.7

III

The modern program entailed also a radical transformation of the conceptions and premises of the political order, the constitution of the political arena, and the characteristics of the political process. Central to the modern idea was the breakdown of all traditional legitimations of the political order, and with it the opening up of different possibilities in the construction of a new order. These possibilities combined themes of rebellion, protest, and intellectual antinomianism, allowing for new center-formation and institution-building, giving rise to
movements of protest as a continual component of the political process. 8

These ideas, closely aligned with what were emerging as the defining characteristics of the modern political arena, emphasized the openness of this arena and of political processes, generally, together with a strong acceptance of active participation by the periphery of “society” in questions of political import. Strong tendencies toward the permeation of social peripheries by the centers, and the impingement of the peripheries on the centers, led, inevitably, to a blurring of the distinctions between center and periphery. This laid the foundation for a new and powerful combination of the “charismatization” of the center or centers with themes and symbols of protest; these, in turn, became the elemental components of modern transcendental visions. Themes and symbols of protest—equality and freedom, justice and autonomy, solidarity and identity—became central components of the modern project of the emancipation of man. It was indeed the incorporation of the periphery’s themes of protest into the center that heralded the radical transformation of various sectarian utopian visions into central elements of the political and cultural program.

From the ideology and premises of the political program of modernity and the core characteristics of modern political institutions, there emerged three central aspects of the modern political process: the restructuring of center-periphery relations as the principal focus of political dynamics in modern societies; a strong tendency toward politicizing the demands of various sectors of society, and the conflicts between them; and a continuing struggle over the definition of the realm of the political. Indeed, it is only with the coming of modernity that drawing the boundaries of the political becomes one of the major foci of open political contestation and struggle.

IV

Modernity entailed also a distinctive mode of constructing the boundaries of collectivities and collective identities. 9 New concrete definitions of the basic components of collective identities developed—civil, primordial and universalistic, transcendental
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or “sacred.” Strong tendencies developed toward framing these definitions in absolutist terms, emphasizing their civil components. At the same time, connections were drawn between the construction of political boundaries and those of cultural collectivities. This made inevitable an intensified emphasis on the territorial boundaries of such collectivities, creating continual tension between their territorial and/or particular components and those that were broader, more universalistic. In at least partial contrast to the axial civilizations, collective identities were no longer taken as given, preordained by some transcendent vision and authority, or sanctioned by perennial custom. They constituted foci of contestation and struggle, often couched in highly ideological terms.

V

As the civilization of modernity developed first in the West, it was from its beginnings beset by internal antinomies and contradictions, giving rise to continual critical discourse and political contestations. The basic antinomies of modernity constituted a radical transformation of those characteristics of the axial civilizations. Centered on questions unknown to that earlier time, they showed an awareness of a great range of transcendent visions and interpretations. In the modern program these were transformed into ideological conflicts between contending evaluations of the major dimensions of human experience (especially reason and emotions and their respective place in human life and society). There were new assertions about the necessity of actively constructing society; control and autonomy, discipline and freedom became burning issues.

Perhaps the most critical rift, in both ideological and political terms, was that which separated universal and pluralistic visions—between a view that accepted the existence of different values and rationalities and a view that conflated different values and, above all, rationalities in a totalistic way. This tension developed primarily with respect to the very concept of reason and its place in the constitution of human society. It was manifest, as Stephen Toulmin has shown in a somewhat exaggerated way, in the difference between the more pluralistic
conceptions of Montaigne or Erasmus as against the totalizing vision promulgated by Descartes. The most significant movement to universalize different rationalities—often identified as the major message of the Enlightenment—was that of the sovereignty of reason, which subsumed value-rationality (Wertrationalität), or substantive rationality, under instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität), transforming it into a totalizing moralistic utopian vision.

Cutting across these tensions, there developed within the program of modernity continual contradictions between the basic premises of its cultural and political dimensions and major institutional developments. Of particular importance—so strongly emphasized by Weber—was the creative dimension inherent in visions leading to the crystallization of modernity, and the flattening of these visions, the “disenchantment” of the world, inherent in growing routinization and bureaucratization. This was a conflict between an overreaching vision by which the modern world became meaningful and the fragmentation of such meaning by dint of an unyielding momentum toward autonomous development in all institutional arenas—economic, political, and cultural. This reflects the inherently modern tension between an emphasis on human autonomy and the restrictive controls inherent in the institutional realization of modern life: in Peter Wagner’s formulation, between freedom and control.

Within modern political discourse, these stresses have been manifest in the intractable contention between the legitimacy of myriad discrete individual and group interests, of different conceptions of the common good and moral order, and the totalistic ideologies that flatly denied the legitimacy of such pluralities. One major form of totalistic ideology emphasized the primacy of collectivities perceived as distinct ontological entities based on common primordial or spiritual attributes—principally a national collectivity. A second has been the Jacobin view, whose historical roots go back to medieval eschatological sources. Central to Jacobin thought was a belief in the primacy
of politics, in politics being able to reconstitute society, transforming society through the mobilization of participatory political action. Whatever the differences between these collectivist ideologies, they shared a deep suspicion of open, public discussion, political processes, and (especially) representative institutions. Not surprisingly, they shared strong autocratic tendencies.

These various stresses in the political program of modernity were closely related to those between the different modes of legitimation of modern regimes—between, on the one hand, procedural legitimation in terms of civil adherence to rules of the game, and, on the other, “substantive” modes of legitimation, relying above all, in Edward Shils’s terminology, on various primordial, “sacred,” religious, or secular-ideological components. Parallel contradictions developed around the construction of collective identities, promulgated by new kinds of activists—the national movements.

VII

Of special importance among these activists were social movements, often movements of protest. They transformed, in the modern setting, some of the major heterodoxies of the axial civilizations, especially those heterodoxies that sought to bring about, by political action and the reconstruction of the center, the realization of certain utopian visions. Most important among the movements that developed during the nineteenth century and the first six decades of the twentieth were the liberal, socialist, or communist movements; they were followed by two others, fascist and national-socialist, building on nationalist prejudices. These movements were international, even where their bases or roots lay in specific countries. The more successful among them crystallized in distinct ideological and institutional patterns that often became identified with a specific state or nation (as was the case with Revolutionary France and, later, with Soviet Russia), but their reach extended far beyond national frontiers.

The contestations between these movements and others—religious, cooperative, syndicalist, or anarchist—were not sim-
ply ideological. They all took place within the specific confines of the modern political arena; they were affected as well by the modern political process, especially the continuing struggle over the boundaries of the realm of the political.

Patterns of contention between these social actors developed in all modern societies around poles rooted in the antinomies inherent in the specific cultural and political programs of modernity. The first was the extent of the homogenization of major modern collectivities, significantly influenced by the extent to which the primordial, civil, and universalistic dimensions or components of collective identity became interwoven in these different societies. The second pole reflected a confrontation between pluralistic and universalizing orientations.

These clashes emerged in all modern collectivities and states, first in Europe, later in the Americas, and, in time, throughout the world. They were crucially important in shaping the varying patterns of modern societies, first within territorial and nation-states, generating within them differing definitions of the premises of political order. They defined the accountability of authority relations between state and civil society; they established patterns of collective identity, shaping the self-perceptions of individual societies, especially their self-perception as modern.

As these contestations emerged in Europe, the dominant pattern of the conflicts was rooted in specific European traditions, focused along the rifts between utopian and civil orientations. Principles of hierarchy and equality competed in the construction of political order and political centers. The state and civil society were seen as separate entities by some. Collective identity, very often couched in utopian terms, was differently defined. The variety of resulting societal outcomes can be illustrated by the different conceptions of state that developed on the continent and in England. There was the strong homogenizing “laicization of” France, or, in a different vein, of the Lutheran Scandinavian countries, as against the much more consociational and pluralistic arrangements common to Holland and Switzerland, and to a much smaller extent in Great Britain. The strong aristocratic semifeudal conception of authority in Brit-
ain contrasted with the more democratic, even populist, views in other European countries.14

In the twenties and thirties, indelibly marked by the tensions and antinomies of modernity as they developed in Europe, there emerged the first distinct, ideological, “alternative” modernities—the communist Soviet types, discussed in this issue by Johann Arnason, and the fascist/national-socialist type.15 The socialist and communist movements were fully set within the framework of the cultural program of modernity, and above all within the framework of the Enlightenment and of the major revolutions. Their criticism of the program of modern capitalist society revolved around their concept of the incompleteness of these modern programs. By contrast, the national or nationalistic movements, especially of the extreme fascist or national-socialist variety, aimed above all at reconfiguring the boundaries of modern collectivities. They sought to bring about a confrontation between the universalistic and the more particularistic, primordial components of the collective identities of modern regimes. Their criticism of the existing modern order denied the universalistic components of the cultural and political program of modernity, especially in its Enlightenment version. They showed less missionary zeal in transcending purely national boundaries. Yet, significantly, though they repudiated the universalistic components of the cultural and political program of modernity, they sought in some ways to transpose them into their own particularistic visions, attempting to present these visions in some semi-universalistic terms—of which, paradoxically, race might be one.

By the middle of the century, the continual development of multiple modernities in Europe testified to an ongoing evolution. As Nilüfer Göle observed, one of the most important characteristics of modernity is simply its potential capacity for continual self-correction. That quality, already manifest in the nineteenth century, in the encounter of modern societies with the many problems created by the industrial and democratic revolutions, could not, however, be taken for granted. The development of modernity bore within it destructive possibilities that were voiced, somewhat ironically, often by some of its most radical critics, who thought modernity to be a morally
destructive force, emphasizing the negative effects of certain of its core characteristics. The crystallization of European modernity and its later expansion was by no means peaceful. Contrary to the optimistic visions of modernity as inevitable progress, the crystallizations of modernities were continually interwoven with internal conflict and confrontation, rooted in the contradictions and tensions attendant on the development of the capitalist systems, and, in the political arena, on the growing demands for democratization. All these factors were compounded by international conflicts, exacerbated by the modern state and imperialist systems. War and genocide were scarcely new phenomena in history. But they became radically transformed, intensified, generating specifically modern modes of barbarism. The ideologization of violence, terror, and war—first and most vividly witnessed in the French Revolution—became the most important, indeed the exclusive, citizenship components of the continuation of modern states. The tendency to such ideologies of violence became closely related to the fact that the nation-state became the focus of symbols of collective identity. The Holocaust, which took place in the very center of modernity, was the extreme manifestation and became a symbol of its negative, destructive potential, of the barbarism lurking within its very core.

In the discourse on modernity, several themes developed, none more important than the one that stressed the continual confrontation between more “traditional” sectors of society and the so-called modern centers or sectors that developed within them. So, too, there was an inherent tension between the culture of modernity, the modern “rational” model of the Enlightenment that emerged as hegemonic in certain periods and places and others construed as reflecting the more “authentic” cultural traditions of specific societies. Among the bearers of ideologies of traditional authenticity, and within the more traditional sectors of certain societies, there developed also an enduring ambivalence to modern cultures and their putatively universalistic, exclusivist premises and symbols and a continual
oscillation between cosmopolitanism and localism. These themes developed first within Europe itself; they continued, though in a different vein, with the expansion of modernity to the Americas and (especially) to Asian and African countries.

IX

The first radical transformation of the premises of cultural and political order took place with the expansion of modernity in the Americas. There, distinctive modernities, reflecting novel patterns of institutional life, with new self-conceptions and new forms of collective consciousness, emerged. To say this is to emphasize that practically from the beginning of modernity’s expansion multiple modernities developed, all within what may be defined as the Western civilizational framework. It is important to note that such modernities, Western but significantly different from those in Europe, developed first not in Asia—Japan, China, or India—or in Muslim societies where they might have been attributed to the existence of distinct non-European traditions, but within the broad framework of Western civilizations. They reflected a radical transformation of European premises.

The crystallization of distinct patterns of modernity in the Americas took place, as Jürgen Heideking’s essay shows, through a confrontational discourse with Europe—especially with England and France. While it was not common to couch these arguments in terms of differing interpretations of modernity, they were indeed focused on the advantages and disadvantages of institutional patterns that developed in the United States, distinctly different from those in Europe. Moreover, in this discourse the major themes relating to the international dimension of modernity were clearly articulated. Such confrontations became characteristic of the ongoing discourse about modernity as it expanded through the world. While this was also true of Latin America, there were important differences between the Americas, especially between the United States and Latin America. In Latin America, “external”—even if often ambivalent—reference points remained crucial, as the essay by Renato Ortiz in this volume makes clear. The enduring importance of
these reference points, above all in Europe—Spain, France, and England—and later the United States, were critical to the self-conception of Latin American societies. Such considerations became gradually less important in the United States, which saw itself increasingly as the center of modernity.

The variability of modernities was accomplished above all through military and economic imperialism and colonialism, effected through superior economic, military, and communication technologies. Modernity first moved beyond the West into different Asian societies—Japan, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia—to the Middle Eastern countries, coming finally to Africa. By the end of the twentieth century, it encompassed nearly the entire world, the first true wave of globalization.

In all these societies the basic model of the territorial state and later of the nation-state was adopted, as were the basic premises and symbols of Western modernity. So, too, were the West’s modern institutions—representative, legal, and administrative. But at the same time the encounter of modernity with non-Western societies brought about far-reaching transformations in the premises, symbols, and institutions of modernity—with new problems arising as a consequence.

The attraction of many of modernity’s themes and institutional forms for many groups in these societies was caused first by the fact that it was the European (later the Western) pattern, developed and spread throughout the world by Western economic, technological, and military expansion, that undermined the cultural premises and institutional cores of these ancient societies. The appropriation of these themes and institutions permitted many in non-European societies—especially elites and intellectuals—to participate actively in the new modern universal (albeit initially Western) tradition, while selectively rejecting many of its aspects—most notably that which took for granted the hegemony of the Western formulations of the cultural program of modernity. The appropriation of themes of modernity made it possible for these groups to incorporate
some of the Western universalistic elements of modernity in the construction of their own new collective identities, without necessarily giving up specific components of their traditional identities (often couched, like the themes of Western modernity, in universalistic, especially religious terms). Nor did it abolish their negative or at least ambivalent attitudes toward the West. Modernity’s characteristic themes of protest, institution-building, and the redefinition of center and periphery served to encourage and accelerate the transposition of the modern project to non-European, non-Western settings. Although initially couched in Western terms, many of these themes found resonance in the political traditions of many of these societies. 17

The appropriation by non-Western societies of specific themes and institutional patterns of the original Western modern civilization societies entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation of these imported ideas. These brought about continual innovation, with new cultural and political programs emerging, exhibiting novel ideologies and institutional patterns. The cultural and institutional programs that unfolded in these societies were characterized particularly by a tension between conceptions of themselves as part of the modern world and ambivalent attitudes toward modernity in general and toward the West in particular.

In all these societies, far-reaching transformations took place. These transformations, shaped in each society by the combined impact of their respective historical traditions and the different ways in which they became incorporated into the new modern world system, are admirably interpreted in Sudipta Kaviraj’s essay. He analyzes the impact of Indian political traditions and of the colonial imperial experience in shaping the distinctive features of modernity as they crystallized in India. Similar analyses of China or Vietnam would indicate the specific modes allowing for “alternative,” revolutionary universalistic notions of the modern program of modernity to spring forth from their civilizational contexts. The case of Japan is different; there, the conflation of state and civil society, the weakness of utopian
orientations, the absence of principled confrontations with the state among the major movements of protest, and the relative significance of universal and particular components all contributed to the creation of a modern collective identity different from that of all other societies.  

The multiple and divergent instantiations of the “classical” age of modernity crystallized during the nineteenth century and above all in the first six or seven decades of the twentieth into very different territorial nation- and revolutionary states and social movements in Europe, the Americas, and, after World War II, in Asia. The institutional, symbolic, and ideological contours of modern national and revolutionary states, once thought to be the epitome of modernity, have changed dramatically with the recent intensification of forces of globalization. These trends, manifested especially in the growing autonomy of world financial and commercial flows, intensified international migrations and the concomitant development on an international scale of such social problems as the spread of diseases, prostitution, organized crime, and youth violence. All this has served to reduce the control of the nation-state over its own economic and political affairs, despite continuing efforts to strengthen technocratic, rational secular policies in various arenas. Nation-states have also lost a part of their monopoly on internal and international violence, which was always only a partial monopoly, to local and international groups of separatists or terrorists. Processes of globalization are evident also in the cultural arena, with the hegemonic expansion, through the major media in many countries, of what are seemingly uniform Western, above all American, cultural programs or visions.

The ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation-state, its position as the charismatic locus of the major components of the cultural program of modernity and collective identity, have been weakened; new political, social, and civilizational visions, new visions of collective identity, are being developed. These novel visions and identities were proclaimed by a variety of new social movements—all of which, however different, have
challenged the premises of the classical modern nation and its program of modernity, which had hitherto occupied the unchallenged center of political and cultural thinking.

The first such movements that developed in most Western countries—the women’s movement and the ecological movement—were both closely related to or rooted in the student and anti-Vietnam War movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. They were indicative of a more general shift in many countries, whether “capitalist” or communist: a shift away from movements oriented toward the state to movements with a more local scope and agenda. Instead of focusing on the reconstitution of nation-states, or resolving macroeconomic conflicts, these new forces—often presenting themselves as “postmodern” and “multicultural”—promulgated a cultural politics or a politics of identity often couched as multiculturalism and were oriented to the construction of new autonomous social, political, and cultural spaces.  

Fundamentalist movements emerged somewhat later within Muslim, Jewish, and Protestant Christian communities and have managed to occupy center stage in many national societies and, from time to time, on the international scene. Communal religious movements have similarly developed within Hindu and Buddhist cultures, generally sharing strong antimodern and/or anti-Western themes.  

A third major type of new movement that has gathered momentum, especially in the last two decades of the twentieth century, has been the particularistic “ethnic” movement. Witnessed initially in the former republics of the Soviet Union, it has emerged also in horrific ways in Africa and in parts of the Balkans, especially in former Yugoslavia. All these movements have developed in tandem with, and indeed accelerated, social transformations of the most important kind, serving to consolidate new social settings and frameworks. To mention just two of the most important, the world now sees new diasporas, especially of Muslims, Chinese, and Indians, some analyzed in this issue by Stanley J. Tambiah. Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russian minorities have emerged as vocal forces in many of the successor states of
the Soviet Union and in the former communist East European countries.

In these and many other settings, new types of collective identity emerged, going beyond the models of the nation- and revolutionary state and no longer focused on them. Many of these hitherto “subdued” identities—ethnic, local, regional, and transnational—moved, though in a highly reconstructed way, into the centers of their respective societies, and often into the international arena as well. They contested the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs, claiming their own autonomous place in central institutional arenas—educational programs, public communications, media outlets. They have been increasingly successful in positing far-reaching claims to the redefinition of citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it.

In these settings, local concerns and interests are often brought together in new ways, going beyond the model of the classical nation-state, choosing alliances with transnational organizations such as the European Union or with broad religious frameworks rooted in the great religions of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, or the Protestant branches of Christianity. Simultaneously, we see a continuing decomposition in the relatively compact image offered by belief systems concerning styles of life, defining the “civilized man”—all connected with the emergence and spread of the original program of modernity. No one can doubt that significant and enduring shifts are taking place in the relative position and influence of different centers of modernity—moving back and forth between West and East. This can only produce increased contention between such centers over their degree of influence in a globalizing world.

All these developments attest to the decomposition of the major structural characteristics and the weakening of the ideological hegemony of once-powerful nation-states. But do they signal the “end of history” and the end of the modern program, epitomized in the development of different so-called postmodernities and, above all, in a retreat from modernity in
the fundamentalist and the communal religious movements, often portrayed by themselves as diametrically opposed to the modern program?

A closer examination of these movements presents a much more complex picture. First, several of the extreme fundamentalist movements evince distinct characteristics of modern Jacobinism, even when combined with very strong anti-Western and anti-Enlightenment ideologies. Indeed, the distinct visions of fundamentalist movements have been formulated in terms common to the discourse of modernity; they have attempted to appropriate modernity on their own terms. While extreme fundamentalists promulgate elaborate, seemingly antimodern (or rather anti-Enlightenment) themes, they basically constitute modern Jacobin revolutionary movements, paradoxically sharing many characteristics (sometimes in a sort of mirror-image way) with communist movements of an earlier era.24 They share with communist movements the promulgation of totalistic visions entailing the transformation both of man and of society. Some claim to be concerned with the “cleansing” of both. It is the total reconstruction of personality, of individual and collective identities, by conscious human action, particularly political action, and the construction of new personal and collective identities entailing the total submergence of the individual in the community that they seek. Like communist movements they seek to establish a new social order, rooted in revolutionary, universalistic ideological tenets, in principle transcending all primordial, national, or ethnic units. In the case of earlier communist regimes, the proclaimed goals were to produce collectivities of “workers” and “intellectuals” that would embrace all mankind; in the case of Islamic fundamentalist regimes, the realm of Islam, as a new conception of the ummah, transcends any specific place, having broad and continually changing yet ideologically closed boundaries. Both the communist and the fundamentalist movements—mostly, but not only, the Muslim ones—are transnational, activated by intensive, continually reconstructed networks that facilitate the expansion of the social and cultural visions proclaimed by these groups. They are at the same time constantly confronted with competing visions. In all these ways, both their movements and
their programs constitute part and parcel of the modern political agenda.

There are, of course, radical differences in the respective visions of the two types of Jacobin (the communist and the fundamentalist) movements and regimes, above all in their attitudes to modernity and in their criticism. In their analysis of the basic antinomies of modernity, and in their interpretation and rejection of different components of the cultural and political programs of classical modernity, Muslim fundamentalists share, as Nilüfer Göle's essay shows, a preoccupation with modernity. It is their major frame of reference.²⁵

Attempts to appropriate and interpret modernity in one's own terms are not, however, confined to fundamentalist movements. They constitute part of a set of much wider developments that have taken place throughout the world, as Dale Eickelman's essay shows with respect to Muslim societies. Continuing the contestations between earlier reformist and traditional religious movements that developed in these communities, the tensions inherent in the new modern program, especially between pluralistic and universal values, are played out in new terms. Between utopian and more open and pragmatic attitudes, between multifaceted and closed identities, they all entail an important, even radical, shift in the discourse about the confrontation with modernity, in reframing the relationship between Western and non-Western civilizations, religions, and societies.²⁶

It is possible to identify significant parallels between these various religious movements, including fundamentalism, with their apparently extreme opposites—the various postmodern movements with which they often engage in contestation, arguing about hegemony among the different sectors of society. Thus, within many of these “postmodern” or “multicultural” movements, there have developed highly totalistic orientations manifest for instance in different programs of political correctness. Ironically, because of their great variety and their more pluralistic internal dynamics and pragmatic stance, we have
also seen certain “postmodern” themes emerge within fundamentalist movements. Beyond this paradox, these movements share an overarching concern about the relationship between the identities they promulgate and the universalistic themes promulgated by other hegemonic programs of modernity, above all the relationship between their purportedly authentic identities and the presumed Western, especially American cultural hegemony on the contemporary scene. Significantly, fear of the erosion of local cultures from the impact of globalization has led these movements to be suspicious of the emerging centers of a globalizing world, giving rise yet again to a continuous oscillation between cosmopolitanism and various “particularistic” tendencies.27

XV

The continuing salience of the tensions between pluralist and universalist programs, between multifaceted as against closed identities, and the continual ambivalence of new centers of modernity toward the major traditional centers of cultural hegemony attest to the fact that, while going beyond the model of the nation-state, these new movements have not gone beyond the basic problems of modernity. They are all deeply reflexive, aware that no answer to the tensions inherent in modernity is final—even if each in its own way seeks to provide final, incontestable answers to modernity’s irreducible dilemmas. They have reconstituted the problem of modernity in new historical contexts, in new ways. They aim for a worldwide reach and diffusion through various media. They are politicized, formulating their contestations in highly political and ideological terms. The problems they face, continually reconstructing their collective identities in reference to the new global context, are challenges of unprecedented proportions. The very pluralization of life spaces in the global framework endows them with highly ideological absolutizing ideas, and at the same time brings them into the central political arena. The debate in which they engage may indeed be described in “civilizational” terms, but these very terms—indeed the very term “civilization” as constructed in such a discourse—are already couched
in modernity’s new language, utilizing totalistic, essentialistic, and absolutizing terms. When such clashes in cultural debates intersect with political, military, or economic struggles, they can quickly become violent.

The reconstructions of the various political and cultural visions across the spectrum of collective identities on the contemporary scene entail a shift in the confrontation between Western and non-Western civilizations, between religions and societies, and also in the relationship of these confrontations to the Western cultural program of modernity. As against the seeming if highly ambivalent acceptance of modernity’s premises and their continual reinterpretation characteristic of the earlier reformist religious and national movements, most contemporary religious movements—including fundamentalist and most communal religious movements—seem to engage in a much more intensive selective denial of at least some of these premises. They take a markedly confrontational attitude to the West, indeed to anything conceived as Western, seeking to appropriate modernity and the global system on their own, often anti-Western, terms. Their confrontation with the West does not take the form of wishing to become incorporated into a new hegemonic civilization, but to appropriate the new international global scene and the modernity for themselves, celebrating their traditions and “civilizations.” These movements have attempted to dissociate Westernization from modernity, denying the Western monopoly on modernity, rejecting the Western cultural program as the epitome of modernity. Significantly, many of these same themes are also espoused, though in different idioms, by many “postmodern” movements.

The preceding analysis does not imply that the historical experience and cultural traditions of these societies are of no importance in the unfolding of their modern dynamics. The significance of their earlier traditions is manifest not least in the fact that among modern and contemporary societies, fundamentalist movements develop above all within the societies that took shape in the ecumene of monotheistic religion—Muslim, Jew-
ish, and Christian civilizations. In these contexts, the political system has been perceived as the major arena for the implementation of transcendental utopian visions. In contrast to this, the ideological reconstruction of the political center in a Jacobin mode has been much weaker in civilizations with “other-worldly” orientations—especially in India and, to a somewhat smaller extent, in Buddhist countries. There, the political order is not perceived as a forum for the implementation of a transcendental vision.  

It is a commonplace to observe that the distinct varieties of modern democracy in India or Japan, for example, may be attributed to the encounter between Western modernity and the cultural traditions and historical experiences of these societies. This, of course, was also true of different communist regimes. What is less well understood is that the same happened in the first instance of modernity—the European—deeply rooted in specific European civilizational premises and historical experience. But, as in the case of Europe, all these “historical” or “civilizational” influences did not simply perpetuate an old pattern of institutional life.

Nor is it happening on the contemporary scene, as if nothing more than a continuation of respective historical pasts and patterns is being perpetuated. Rather, these particular experiences influence the continual emergence of new movements and networks between different actors—judges, experts, parliamentarians, and others—cutting across any single society or civilization, maintaining a flow between them. The political dynamics in all these societies are closely interwoven with geopolitical realities, influenced by history, and shaped mostly by modern developments and confrontations. They make impossible any effort to construct “closed” entities.

Thus, the processes of globalization on the contemporary scene entail neither the “end of history”—in the sense of an end of ideological confrontational clashes between different cultural programs of modernity—nor a “clash of civilizations” engaging a secular West in confrontation with societies that appear to opt out of, or deny, the program of modernity. They do not even constitute a return to the problems of premodern axial civilizations, as though such a thing were possible. Rather,
the trends of globalization show nothing so clearly as the continual reinterpretation of the cultural program of modernity; the construction of multiple modernities; attempts by various groups and movements to reappropriate and redefine the discourse of modernity in their own new terms. At the same time, they are bringing about a repositioning of the major arenas of contestation in which new forms of modernity are shaped, away from the traditional forum of the nation-state to new areas in which different movements and societies continually interact.

Not only do multiple modernities continue to emerge—by now going beyond the premises of the nation-state—but within all societies, new questioning and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity are emerging. The undeniable trend at the end of the twentieth century is the growing diversification of the understanding of modernity, of the basic cultural agendas of different modern societies—far beyond the homogenic and hegemonic visions of modernity prevalent in the 1950s. Moreover, in all societies these attempts at interpreting modernity are continually changing under the impact of changing historical forces, giving rise to new movements that will come, in time, to reinterpret yet again the meaning of modernity.

While the common starting point was once the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West, more recent developments have seen a multiplicity of cultural and social formations going far beyond the very homogenizing aspects of the original version. All these developments do indeed attest to the continual development of multiple modernities, or of multiple interpretations of modernity—and, above all, to attempts at “de-Westernization,” depriving the West of its monopoly on modernity.

These considerations bear closely on the problems raised in the beginning of this essay, which constitute the central foci of the essays gathered in this issue of Daedalus. They all contend, from a variety of perspectives and through a great range of cases, with the core characteristics of modernity. At the same time,
the studies presented here attest to the continually expanding range of possibilities in ideological interpretations, in constructions of the meaning of modernity, in institutional patterns of political and social life. All of this makes plain, as Nilüfer Göle shows, that one of the most important characteristics of modernity is simply, but profoundly, its potential for self-correction, its ability to confront problems not even imagined in its original program. The most important new problems today are probably those relating to the environment, to gender, and to the new political and international contestations discussed above. In coping with these problems, different contemporary societies can draw in ever more varied ways, as Tu Weiming notes, on the cultural resources of their respective civilizational traditions.

At the same time these very developments—above all the tendency toward constant self-correction characteristic of modernity—make all the more pressing the great difficulty of how to answer the question about the limits of modernity. It is not that such limits do not exist, but the very posing of this question puts the question within the discourse of modernity.

Illuminating and describing the essentially modern character of new movements and collective identities, charting courses somewhere beyond the classical model of the territorial, national, or revolutionary state, does not necessarily lead us to take an optimistic view. On the contrary; the ramifications are such as to make evident the fragility and changeability of different modernities as well as the destructive forces inherent in certain of the modern programs, most fully in the ideologization of violence, terror, and war. These destructive forces—the “traumas” of modernity that brought into question its great promises—emerged clearly after World War I, became even more visible in World War II and in the Holocaust, and were generally ignored or set aside in the discourse of modernity in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Lately, they have reemerged in a frightening way—in the new “ethnic” conflict in parts of the Balkans (especially in the former Yugoslavia), in many of the former republics of the Soviet Union, in Sri Lanka, and in a terrible way in such African countries as Rwanda and Burundi. These are not outbursts of old “traditional” forces, but the
result of the ongoing dialogue between modern reconstruction and seemingly “traditional” forces. So, also, fundamentalist and religious communal movements developed within the framework of modernity, and cannot be fully understood except within this framework. Thus, modernity—to paraphrase Leszek Kołakowski’s felicitous and sanguine expression—is indeed “on endless trial.”

ENDNOTES


6Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).


Bruce A. Ackerman, We The People (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).


Shils, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,” 111–126.


S. N. Eisenstadt


6Marcus, ed., Perilous States.

Multiple Modernities


24Eisenstadt, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolutions.


26Eickelman, ed., Russia's Muslim Frontiers.

27Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process; Hannerz, Cultural Complexity; Marcus, ed., Perilous States; “The Road to 2050”; Smolcz, “Nation-States and Globalization from a Multicultural Perspective.”

28Eisenstadt, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolutions.


For several years now, I have tried to argue that modernity is historically a global and conjunctural phenomenon, not a virus that spreads from one place to another. It is located in a series of historical processes that brought hitherto relatively isolated societies into contact, and we must seek its roots in a set of diverse phenomena—the Mongol dream of world conquest, European voyages of exploration, activities of Indian textile traders in the diaspora, the “globalization of microbes” that historians of the 1960s were fond of discussing, and so on. However, these were uneven processes, and also processes that had strong local roots and colors. Our major errors have been two: identifying “modernization” with the growth of a certain type of uniformity, and associating modernity with prosperity. Any amateur anthropologist who has been to Paris or Manhattan, symbols of “modernity” for so long, would realize the profound error of both assumptions on just a little reflection. Having taken away so much from the societies of South Asia, it seems to be high time that social science at least gave them back what they had by the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries—their admittedly very ambiguous “early modernity.”

Sanjay Subrahmanyam

From “Hearing Voices: Vignettes of Early Modernity in South Asia, 1400–1750”

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When we speak of modernity and of modern societies, we seem to mean one of two things. First, we may speak as if we were giving an encompassing name to a whole epoch in world history, the modern age, as distinct from, say, the medieval age or classical antiquity. Such a terminology makes it legitimate to discuss questions as to when exactly the modern age may be said to have come into existence, what its origins may have been, or, indeed, if it has now come to an end. Second, we may speak as if we were actually characterizing distinct phenomena and processes in a given society at a given time. We may say that the technology used in some branch of industry of a country is modern but that patterns of family life are not. It is then an empirical question to determine to what extent different institutions and phenomena of a country may be described as modern.

The first perspective poses the problem of where to locate the beginning, and maybe the end, of the modern age. However, once this has been determined, the question of whether we live in one or many modernities becomes trivial. In this perspective, we all live in the age of modernity, and there is one such age, not many. However, there will of course be an infinite number of possible varieties in cultural patterns, beliefs, and commit-
ments as well as in institutional specificity within the framework of this encompassing epoch. We may then speak of different varieties of modernity, but the term *modernity* itself refers to those features that are common to the different varieties and that allow us to speak of a modern age in the first place.

This type of usage may be helpful in writing the history of the world backwards. However, if it is to carry any analytic weight, it has to rely on a delimitation of which institutions and practices are the defining ones when we use the term *modern* to characterize an epoch. Thus, it immediately leads into the second perspective; i.e., something substantive has to be asserted. We have to have an idea of which institutions and habits are modern and which are not. A society is modern only if some key defining institutions and types of behavior can be said to be modern. To the extent that there is a strong, and growing, coherence and correspondence between such defining institutional structures and behavioral patterns across different countries, hypotheses about the convergence of modern societies may be said to have received increased empirical support. Whatever other differences may or may not exist between different countries is irrelevant when we decide whether any two countries are modern to the same extent or not. Unfortunately, it is precisely at this point that advocates of some version of a theory of convergence, as well as their critics, tend to conflate conceptual and empirical questions.

These advocates, often inspired by the works of Talcott Parsons, tend to speak about all kinds of societal trends and changes of values as giving support for their hypothesis. However, they rarely succeed in defining the necessary conditions that characterize a modern society. Instead, they tend to delve endlessly into empirical questions, such as whether family patterns in the United States and Europe and other parts of the world evolve in a similar or dissimilar direction. This is often interesting, but unless the convergists have told us clearly what all this has to do with the concept of the modern, these empirical debates just blur the basic question about the unity or multiplicity of modern societies. The closest they come to a definition is to speak of certain broad trends such as “the industrial revolution,” “the democratic revolution,” and “the
eductional revolution.” In the course of the last two centuries, the evolution of these trends is supposed to have been sufficiently similar in at least some parts of the world, and ultimately in all parts of the world, to allow us to speak of a global modern age. The problem with this type of terminology is twofold.

First, the advocates of the theory of convergence, by and large, tend to take the development of one specific society—namely, the United States—as a kind of measuring rod to assess the success or failure of other societies to achieve a sufficient degree of modernity. To the extent that the measuring rod indicates that substantial differences remain in, say, value orientations, religious practices, or family relations, the advocates of this theory tend not to reject or revise the original hypothesis. Rather, they tend to say that it will be confirmed, albeit at a point in the future. In the long run, this is not a very satisfactory procedure.

Second, even if attention is limited to processes of industrialization and democratization in North America and Western Europe in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is quite clear that there have always been very substantial differences between countries. It is simply not true that all these countries have had roughly similar types of economic and political institutions in this historical period. If this were only a matter of some technical peculiarities and divergences, it need not concern the basic question of the convergence of all modern societies or, at the very least, of all modern Western societies. However, this is not the case. Throughout the last two centuries there have been deep differences between Western countries in the way a society, a market economy, and modern political forms are best organized.

To take but one example: most European countries have assigned a much more prominent role to the state in overseeing and indeed in shaping market interactions than has North America. In many of these countries the state has not been seen just as a form of rulership but, to paraphrase Hegel, as the embodiment of the idea of ethical life, with a specific task of shaping the framework for all other societal interactions, including the economy and the family. In this perspective, civil
society can only flourish if it occurs within this encompassing ethical framework, not in spite of it or in opposition to it. This may of course be discarded as just a sign of their lack of democratic maturity, a failure that will be remedied in due, if distant, course. Unfortunately, such an explanation will not do. Rather, it is precisely some of those countries in North-Western Europe that by any reasonable measure are among the most economically open and the most politically democratic that have the closest web of interactions between their economic, political, and family institutions. It is there, and not in authoritarian settings, that civil society and the state form a seamless web of mutually supporting institutional structures.

The economic order associated with the modern age is often seen to be that of a liberal market economy and free trade, the political order that of a nation-state or a constitutional republic. In order to qualify as modern democratic orders, these polities are assumed to have the institution of free elections that determine the composition of the executive of the polity. Even if we limit our attention to the European setting, we run into immediate problems if we take these forms of economic and political order to be necessary defining characteristics, the sine qua non, of the modern era. It is sometimes customary to speak of the late nineteenth century as a period of organized or interventionist modernity and capitalism as opposed to a previous period of more genuine and nonregulated forms of economic order. This is true for some countries, such as Britain. For many others there simply was no previous period of noninterventionist market interactions and free trade. In these countries, as already indicated, a state-oriented economic order was not a late aberration. It was constitutive of the economic order of modernity from its very inception. Of course, even in these countries there was a break with many previous forms of regulation via princely decrees and the operation of guilds, but their economy was always a far cry from an unregulated market with free international trade. Indeed, as late as the 1930s most Western countries were imposing drastic restrictions on imports with a concomitant sharp decline in world trade.

As to political order, the situation is even more problematic. Until the end of World War I, what was as the time called the
Great War, virtually no European country had the type of political order that theorists now define as emblematic of modernity, i.e., that of a democratic nation-state. The central and eastern part of Europe was composed of multinational imperial polities that were neither nation-states nor democracies, i.e., polities where electoral outcomes had a decisive effect on governance and the composition of the executive. Most of these polities were in a process of transition toward various forms of constitutional monarchy, often with some form of elected national assembly as a complement, or indeed a balance, to a government still more or less closely linked to the prerogatives of the monarch.

In the western part of Europe, at the turn of the nineteenth century, most countries were in a period of often slow and highly embattled transition from forms of constitutional monarchy to some form of parliamentary democracy. Some of these countries (such as Britain, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries) could draw on age-old traditions of parliamentary assemblies and local self-government. However, none of these countries could be said to have been full-blown parliamentary democracies by the turn of the nineteenth century. Even in the France of the Third Republic, suffrage was limited by gender and was not to be extended to women until after World War II. Paradoxically, Finland—still a grand duchy within the Russian empire—could in the first decade of the new century present maybe the most modern and democratic form of representation in Europe. Thus, the traditional national assembly, composed of the representatives of four estates, was transformed into one based on the principle of universal suffrage for women and men in a unicameral national assembly (where the socialists came to have 40 percent of the seats). This constitutional miracle occurred after the defeat of Russia in the war against Japan of 1904–1905. Not surprisingly, within the overall autocratic framework of the Russian empire, with its tendencies toward new forms of imperial nationalism, this reform did not lead to a wholesale transition to parliamentary democracy.
We have arrived at the conclusion that a temporal conception of modernity ultimately rests on a substantive one. However, as just outlined, a substantive conception—one that defines modernity in terms of the prevalence of a few key societal institutions of the political and economic order—seems to lead to the absurd result that modernity has a very short history, even in the European context. Modernity is suddenly reduced to a phenomenon that can be found in some parts of Western Europe during some periods of the twentieth century. Indeed, for modernity as a general phenomenon of Western Europe, the relevant time period would be that after World War II, and even shorter if all of Europe is considered. Modernity would barely have arrived in time to witness its own demise as heralded by the prophets of postmodernism. Given the facts of institutional history, this conclusion is hard to avoid. Yet it makes a mockery of innumerable literary, political, and scholarly debates throughout Europe in the course of the nineteenth century about the coming of the modern age. It would mean that we might have to ask whether there has ever been any truly modern society in Europe. Maybe European institutions were never as modern as social scientists have claimed. Maybe theories of modernity are little but an ideology of late-nineteenth-century social science.

There is some truth in an affirmative response to these hypotheses. As a general statement, however, it would be seriously misleading. There have, indeed, been profound qualitative changes in the institutional and intellectual landscape of Europe, but also of the world at large, in the course of the last two centuries. Unfortunately, social science has had great difficulties in providing a coherent account of these changes. A major reason is that such an account can only be provided if the cultural constitution of modernity is brought back in, and this is precisely the side of its own legacy that social science has tended to neglect. The institutional projects of modernity—be they a democratic nation-state, a liberal market economy, or a research-oriented university—cannot be understood unless their grounding in profound conceptual changes is recognized. Ulti-
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Eventually, these institutional projects were premised on new assumptions about human beings, their rights and agency. These conceptual changes entailed promissory notes that came to constitute new affiliations, identities, and, ultimately, institutional realities.

Promissory notes in this sense presuppose that six conditions are met. First, they point to desiderata that can be formulated as statements about a range of achievements that may be reached by the members of a given community. Thus, a promissory note is not just a vague desire or fleeting preference. It refers to a state of affairs that may be expressed in explicit terms. Second, this state of affairs refers to the situation not of an individual but of a community. Third, this state of affairs is not just something to be hoped for in general; it is something that may validly be expected and may be regarded as implied by deeply held values. Thus, it, fourth, depends for its assertability on the validity of claims about the nature and history of human beings as members of the posited community. In particular, as will be highlighted later on, the promissory notes of modernity depend on a range of new conceptualizations of human beings and their ability to act individually and collectively about their place in history as well as about the proper forms of polity and social belonging. Ultimately, these kinds of assumptions have been related to some of the most basic ideas of an ontological and cosmological nature inherent in a culture.

Fifth, at any given point in time, the prevalent political institutions of a society embody and give expression to a range of promissory notes. These institutions, in other words, imply the reasonableness of a set of expectations that members of the community of these institutions feel entitled to assume as valid and legitimate and which they take for granted as a matter of course.

It is important to see that any polity implies some such set. It is also important to see that any new set of promissory notes will be formulated against such a background. Thus, it will be articulated in the context of existing political macroinstitutions and the promissory notes that they officially proclaim as the legitimate ones. The new set will always be presented so that it either reaffirms and resurrects the original set or rejects and
transcends it. In periods of major cultural crystallization, the latter mode—of rejection and transcendence—will be the prevalent one.

Sixth, promissory notes are not just expressible in principle. They have to have been put forth in some public forum. In the age of modernity, these fora have been of a particular type, namely, public spheres. Public spheres are fora where common matters are the focus of debate and deliberation but where discourse is not only occurring about the rulers and form of rulership. It has to be a discourse to which access is in principle open and that is, furthermore, also directed at the rulers and often enough carried on with the objective of influencing or changing the polity and the sphere of officialdom.

If so, modernity cannot be identified just with a successful industrial and democratic revolution. It has to be understood in terms of promissory notes that served as ever more generalized reference points in debates and in the formation of affiliations and the creation of new institutional forms. The term generalized reference point means that the promissory notes serve not only as a point of departure for various projects and proposals to realize the ideas of the promissory notes. Precisely because they become generalized reference points, they also serve as points of departure for counter-proposals and for efforts to reinvigorate promissory notes contained in older institutional forms.

In this perspective the age of modernity is characterized by the fact that the opponents of emblematic modern institutions cannot but express their opposition, cannot but formulate their programs with reference to the ideas of modernity.

Thus, modernity may be understood as culturally constituted and institutionally entrenched. Promissory notes may serve as generalized reference points in debates and political confrontations. However, these generalized reference points not only become focal points in ideational confrontations; they also provide structuring principles behind the formation of new institutions. It is only in a perspective of this type that it makes sense to talk about modernity as having a European history extending across the past two centuries.
Modernity: One, None, or Many?

ORIGINS OF WESTERN MODERNITY

Despite important similarities to earlier periods of crystallization, the cultural constitution of a set of new macrosocietal institutions at the turn of the eighteenth century set the stage for a new era in world history. This is so not because of a triumphant breakthrough of reason and light. In fact, even if attention is restricted to just some areas of Western Europe, the notion of an actual realization of those institutional projects associated with modernity at a precise moment in time is highly misleading. Furthermore, the configuration of those institutional practices, e.g., the role of a civil society and a public sphere relative to state power, has always been quite different in different parts even of Western Europe.

Thus, a meaningful notion of modernity that does not involve a historicist misreading of complex processes and events will, as already emphasized, also have to bring in the relationship of various institutional projects to cultural and cognitive projects. This is so not merely because these institutions exhibit features that differ from those of previous periods. An equally important justification for the use of the term *modernity* has to do with the promissory notes of these new institutional projects and the extent to which they were based on radically new presuppositions about human agency, historical consciousness, and the role of reason in forging new societal institutions.

The modern world emerged out of processes of industrialization, urbanization, and political upheaval at the northwestern edge of the Eurasian landmass. They caused societal transformations across the world to become so deeply dislodged by European and North American preeminence as to almost remove from vision a whole range of earlier forms of political and cultural order. Far from being just “traditional,” these societies, as they were evolving in different parts of the world in the period of the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, often underwent rapid internal change. This is equally true of, to take but three examples, Ming China, Tokugawa Japan, and Mogul India.²

Yet the formation of modernity in the European context was a process that differed from developments elsewhere in the
world and in other epochs of European history. Of course, the European paths to the formation of distinctly modern societies in the course of the last two centuries have roots. Thus, it may be possible to speak of a type of early modernity already in the European context in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when four interconnected processes of deep transformation occurred. An important element was the emerging realization, in the wake of the so-called Papal Revolution, that the long-standing de facto separation of ecclesiastical and mundane power was likely not to be overcome but to remain a key feature of the ecumene of Western Christendom. Equally important was what has come to be termed the Feudal Revolution, involving an articulation of a variety of rights and obligations that could be claimed and upheld in various public fora.

The growth of urban life—the Urban Revolution—not only entailed a stimulus for trade and economic activities; it also tended to be associated with wide-ranging municipal self-government. In some parts of the Holy Roman Empire where effective imperial power had become greatly weakened, such as Northern Italy, new forms of city republican rule took shape. Sometimes modeled on an association for common trade purposes, city republican government came to exert a deep influence on notions of political rulership in Europe. In the same period, universities were formed as a particular type of self-governing corporation with at least partial autonomy from the Church. This set the stage for an intellectual revolution both in scholarly activities themselves and in the possibility of multiple fora for intellectual activities, nested in a multiplicity of political and institutional arenas across a Europe that yet formed part of one ecumenical order, that of Western Christendom. Similarly, the breakdown of this ecumenical order and the emergence of territorially delimited polities from the late fifteenth century onward created a set of unique preconditions.

It is possible to depict the formation of modernity in Europe as the result of a series of basically continuous processes where political, economic, and intellectual transformations mutually reinforced and conditioned each other. There is indeed a specific path of development that originated in those parts of the European continent that bordered on the Atlantic seaboard and
that had a plurality of intellectual and political fora as a key characteristic. It would be possible to trace the diffusion of analogous forms of societal organization in space and time. It would involve an analysis of Western Christendom, but also of parliamentary assemblies, urban self-government, and universities as sites of learning across the vast regions of Central and East-Central Europe. It would trace the impact of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, the establishment of a system of mutually balancing territorially delimited states, and the Enlightenment, but also a period of great revolutions ushering in the formation of new types of political order. It may seem unreasonable to impose artificial notions of different epochs or ages on the continuous flow of loosely structured events in historical time. Such an account would run a risk of just reproducing the inevitable complexities of historical changes without contributing to an understanding of them. In particular, it would underestimate the rupture that occurred in both institutional and intellectual terms in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The events involved did not emerge \textit{ex nihilo}, but they involved the appearance of a radically new configuration of phenomena, the formation of distinctly modern societies.

**THE CULTURAL CONSTITUTION OF MODERNITY**

There is, as argued throughout this essay, a need for a fundamental revision of a long-standing and predominant view among social scientists, as well as in lay debates, about the formation of modernity in terms of a conjunction of a technological and a political transformation—the industrial and the democratic revolutions, respectively. This traditional interpretation radically underestimates the deep-seated epistemic transformation that occurred at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There are reasons to examine the ways in which distinctively modern key concepts of an understanding of society emerged during the great transition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

One such shift pertains precisely to the concepts of society and history, and to the new awareness of the structural and
constraining nature of societal life beyond the domain of communicative interactions, in the political sphere proper. Thus, there is a transition to a social science that transcends the boundaries of the political sphere proper but also traces the implications and conditions of that sphere much further than the old political philosophy. Pierre Manent has put forward the notion that society is a “postrevolutionary discovery.”3 True enough, and as is convincingly demonstrated by Keith Baker, the term society undergoes a long conceptual development in the French context in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—with a dramatic increase in the utilization of the term in the mid-eighteenth century. It is also true that, in his critique of Louis Dumont’s analysis of Western individualism and holism, Marcel Gauchet argued that (this is Baker’s elegant summary):

Individualism was not simply a symptom of the dissolution of the primacy of the social whole, as that had been understood in traditional religious terms. It was also a necessary condition for what he once again called (following Karl Polanyi) the “discovery of society”—its discovery in strictly sociological terms, disengaged from the religious representations in which it had hitherto expressed its existence. Not until the ideological primacy of individual interests was postulated, he argued, could constraints upon these interests be discovered in the operation of an autonomous social order subject to its own laws.4

Johan Heilbron has pursued an inquiry into the constitution of individual interests.5 In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such interests were conceived as amenable to the constraints of various notions of sociability. In particular, given a human condition short of true religious virtue, was there a prospect for a human existence beyond the borders of a Leviathan-like imposition of absolute order that would involve socially acceptable outcomes of the pursuit of the self-interests of human beings? Such inquiries were pursued in various ways in the different parts of Europe throughout the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. However, Heilbron and many others today agree that, even if there is a long process of gestation of the modern concept of society, the unique event of revolutionary upheaval requires that discursive
controversy and political practice become joined in the formation of a distinctly modern era. Pierre Manent has elaborated a similar argument: “The Revolution offered the original spectacle of a political change of unheard-of scope, yet having no stable political effects, of a political upheaval impossible to settle, of an interminable and indeterminate event.”

This description of revolution as an irreversible and interminable process of fundamental change was formulated perhaps most clearly by one of the most well-known thinkers of the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville. In his memoirs, *Souvenirs*, written in the summer of 1850, he describes revolution as one long upheaval “that our fathers have seen the beginning of and which, in all likelihood, we shall not see the end of. Everything that remained of the old regime was destroyed forever.”

In fact, Reinhart Koselleck’s conception in his early work *Kritik und Krise* is quite similar. He also links the temporal duration of the process of upheaval to its spatial, and indeed worldwide, extension, as well as to its increasing intensity in terms of modernity as a process that affects all human beings, not just, say, those in central political institutions or certain major cities:

The eighteenth century witnessed the unfolding of bourgeois society, which saw itself as the new world, laying intellectual claim to the whole world and simultaneously denying the old. It grew out of the territories of the European states and, in dissolving this link, developed a progressive philosophy in line with the process. The subject of that philosophy was all mankind, to be unified from its European centre and led peacefully towards a better future.

Precisely because the eighteenth century witnessed the creation of a political project encompassing the whole world and at the same time shattering the existing absolutist order, the main agent of this change, the European bourgeoisie, opened up horizons of expectations that were previously unknown: “The eighteenth century can be seen as the antechamber to our present epoch, one whose tensions have been increasingly exacerbated since the French revolution, as the revolutionary process spread extensively around the globe and intensively to all mankind.” However, it is also this sense of openness and
contingency that serves as a forceful impetus to an examination of the structural conditions of the political body and entails a passage from political and moral philosophy to a social science.

This transition entails that five key problematics—which today are more acutely open to reinterpretation than they have been for decades, if not for a century—are being formulated or at least fundamentally reformulated and are entering into the new social-science discourse.

First, the whole role of historical inquiry becomes a crucial one. On the one hand, historical reasoning becomes an integral part of the intellectual transition, and even abstract reason itself becomes historicized in early-nineteenth-century philosophy. However, on the other hand, the moral and political sciences break up into a variety of new discourses that in the course of the nineteenth century coalesce and are reduced to a number of disciplines. This means that the stage is set for the divergence between a professionalized historical discipline and the other social and human sciences, a divergence that we still today experience as a major intellectual divide.

Second, interest in language and linguistic analysis enters into all domains of the human and social sciences as a key problematic. One outflow of this is the constitution of textual and hermeneutic modes of analysis. A second one—familiar from contemporary debates on linguistic analysis and poststructuralism—is the relationship between text, interpretation, and consciousness. A third one is the effort to historicize language and linguistic development itself. Thereby a crucial link was provided to various collective entities such as the historic construction of the notion of different peoples.

This leads to a third problematic: that of constituting new collective identities. Membership in a collectivity could no longer be taken for granted in the life experiences of the inhabitants of a certain village or region. Nor could a relationship of obligation and loyalty between the princely ruler and his subjects continue to constitute an unquestionable core of the body politic. That, however, meant that even the most basic categories of societal existence were open to doubt.

In the late eighteenth century, categories such as ruler and subject were by no means irrevocably superseded. They are,
however, open to doubt and, in the aftermath of the French
Revolution, to the necessity of reconstitution. This in turn meant
a deep challenge to those imperial-like political entities that
remained the dominant form of political order in the eastern
part of Europe until the end of World War I. In the western
part, categories such as “citizen” and “compatriot” capture
some of the results of these processes of reconstitution. Robert
Wokler, perhaps more clearly than anyone else, has issued a
strong warning against any hasty equating of the French revo-
lutionary notion of a nation-state with a commitment to a truly
universal conception of rights of human beings. 

Fourth, as repeatedly emphasized, the whole problematic of
the relationship between notions of polity, society, and civil
society was succinctly and acutely reformulated in this period
of transition. The fact that once again these notions are probed
and fundamentally reexamined should not conceal that they
were indeed in many ways not just reformulated in this period
but rather discovered or even invented.

Fifth, assumptions about what prompts human beings to act
and how to interpret their actions within a broader framework
are at the very core of any scholarly program in the social and
human sciences. At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the fundamental categories that we still by and large
draw upon were elaborated and proposed. Three or four such
fundamental categorical conceptualizations were propounded.
Each of them corresponded to a conceptualization of what
comprised “society.” These categories might be described as
follows:

(a) Economic-rationalistic, with a corresponding view of soci-
    ety as a form of compositional collective;
(b) Statistical-inductive, with a view of society as a systemic
    aggregate;
(c) Structural-constraining, with a view of society in terms of
    an organic totality; and
(d) Linguistic-interpretative, with a conceptualization of soci-
    ety as an emergent totality.

The transition from a discourse on moral and political phi-
losophy to a social science—analyzed, for example, by Robert
Wokler—in rudimentary form had already taken place in the mid- and late 1790s in France after the Revolution. It entails a decisive shift from an agential—some would say voluntaristic—view of society to one that emphasizes structural conditions. To some extent, a similar shift occurs in economic reasoning away from a broad concern about moral and political agency. In the course of the nineteenth century, “average economic man” instead becomes cast in a web of structural properties and dynamic regularities rather than in a moral universe of individual action.

Thus, fundamental categories of agency and society that came to be elaborated and refined during much of the rest of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be discerned in rudimentary form already during the great transition. So too, however, can some of the more or less tacit, explicit features that came to affect these endeavors.

One such tacit but crucial feature concerns the abandonment of the truly universal heritage of the Enlightenment project in favor of forms of representation and endowment of rights based on territoriality or membership in a linguistically and historically constituted and constructed community. Another feature was an emerging and growing chasm between moral discourse and other forms of reasoning about society. Thus, an earlier encompassing conception of the moral and political sciences was gradually replaced by social sciences that relegated moral reasoning to a marginal position or to a place within the specialized discipline of philosophy. Third, historical reasoning, which had been at the core of the intellectual transformation at the turn of the eighteenth century, also came to find a place as one separate discipline, and toward the end of the nineteenth century a permanent divide had emerged between history and the social sciences. This divide remains today but was unknown to the late-eighteenth-century moral and political philosophers.

We may summarize the previous argument by stating that modernity, as it took shape in Europe, was premised not just on “a package of technological and organizational developments.” Rather, it was the constitution of a set of institutional projects of a specific nature. Thus, the institutions were not just new, but they were to serve as vehicles for the enhancement of a
continuous process of innovation. At the same time, the institutional frameworks themselves were to be endowed with stability precisely because they were claimed to be premised on universalistic rather than on particularistic assumptions about human beings, human agency, and human societies.

Of course, there was a wide array of contesting philosophical schools and political groupings. However, across confrontations and divergences there existed a fundamental acknowledgment of the idea that agency, reflexivity, and historical consciousness might help construct a new set of institutions. Thus, there existed a limited number of thematic foci underlying the cultural constitution of a new set of societal macroinstitutions.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FORMATION OF MODERNITY

In the wake of the deep cultural shift at the turn of the eighteenth century, a distinctively new set of institutional projects emerged that became emblematic of the modern world at large. One such project concerned economic organization in the form of a liberal market economy rather than a regulated mercantilist economy. Similarly, political order came to be conceptualized as a modern nation-state of compatriots or as a constitutional republic of fellow citizens rather than in the form of an absolutistic monarchy with its distinction between ruler and subjects. In the realm of private interactions, new demands arose for a legally protected sphere where the state was only allowed to make interventions and undertake sanctions that were clearly specified and foreseeable.

The focus on the nature of the public sphere and political order was thus based on ontological assumptions of a new nature about human beings. For the first time the idea of ethical life was premised on a radical and irreversible stance about the principled equal rights of all human beings to participate in the macroinstitutions of the public sphere and of the state. In this sense, the formation of modernity in Europe was not just another period reminiscent of the axial age or of the early emergence of a bifurcation between secular and sacred power in Europe.
In the political sphere, the new institutions involved a conception of political order as constituted and legitimated in terms of not only silent tolerance but also some form of active acquiescence and participation. Thus, centuries-old ideas of representation in the form of estates and parliaments were complemented with demands for participation and even popular sovereignty. In the western part of Europe, the wave of demand associated with these ideas, what Parsons referred to as the Democratic Revolution, was a constant feature of political life from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century when they were finally victorious across the board. In political terms, it had entailed the gradual limitation of constitutional monarchical regimes and their eventual replacement by some form of parliamentary democracy. In the Central-Eastern part of Europe, the transition from absolutistic to constitutional monarchies was by no means complete in the wake of World War I.

In the private sphere, there were parallel developments: age-old demands that princely rulers abstain from acts of arbitrary intervention and violence were superseded by demands that there be a legal-rational basis for all actions of government. Thus, official acts are legitimate only if they are based on legal rules that are transparent and allow for consequences of actions to be predictable. Such transparency and predictability can become a reality only if the nature of political order accepts as a basic principle the rule of law rather than the volition of the princely ruler as its basic principle of operation. Such demands not only for legal protection but also for the universal application of legal order had long traditions in some—but by no means all—European countries. At the turn of the eighteenth century, however, they were voiced with increasing intensity. Furthermore, their urgency was reinforced by the demands of new commercial and industrial activities.

New public spheres also emerged outside of courts, academies, and salons, outside of the control and purview of royal sanction and control. Whether in scholarly, political, or artistic life, fora are created that are based on the idea that public discourse should not be subject to persecution or censorship but should rather enable the expression of opinion on all aspects of political and public life. One may say that these fora were
premised on the legitimate articulation of a discourse not only about but addressed to and critical of the official power of the state.

In what sense do these different institutional projects constitute a societal form that we may associate with the notion of modernity? Clearly it would be highly misleading to suggest that these projects became universally realized in the European context at the time of their intellectual conception. Nothing could be further from the truth. Instead, the new institutional projects remained embattled and highly controversial in practical affairs in Europe throughout the following century and a half. Even if our attention is limited to the western part of Europe, most European states in that region were still constitutional monarchies rather than parliamentary democracies by the end of the nineteenth century. In the eastern part, as already pointed out, the transition from absolutistic to constitutional monarchical forms of government was by no means complete by the turn of the nineteenth century.

Indeed, across Europe on the eve of World War I, radical conservatives spoke of the ideas of 1914 as finally putting an end to the detrimental effects of those of 1789. Even in Western Europe, a modern political order in terms of truly universal suffrage did not become a full institutional reality until the end of World War II. Despite these facts, it is still possible to speak in a meaningful way of modernity and its institutional projects as a societal reality in a specific sense of the word: namely, as a new set of promissory notes. These promissory notes, formulated and promulgated and even partially implemented, if for brief periods of time, at the turn of the eighteenth century, came to have global relevance. At their core were notions of self-reflexivity, agency, and historical consciousness. These institutional projects became the object of continuous discursive and institutional battles; they could never again be exorcised from the attention of such battles in the European context. This is what Tocqueville stated so clearly in his memoirs.

The Vienna Congress and the Holy Alliance were a comprehensive effort to unthink the consequences of the French Revolution and to restore the Old Regime and make Europe safe for tradition. It became almost immediately clear that this program
Björn Wittrock

was an unrealizable one in the French context. Even the political thought of the pro-resurrection forces found it impossible to return to the intellectual landscape of pre-Revolutionary France. Instead, France witnessed in the 1810s and 1820s not only the confrontation of such post-revolutionary reactionary thought with a strong tradition of radical political thought but also the unexpected rise of a live liberal discourse. Similarly, the period of fundamental, if centrally and state directed, reform efforts in Germany in a few years after the defeat of Prussia in its war of 1806 against Napoleon was a decisively brief one. Yet its implications became a permanent feature of intellectual and political life far beyond the borders of the German lands. Even in absolutist Russia, the Decembrist rising of 1825, easily put down by the regime, was not an isolated event, but the first in a long series of decisively modernist political projects, often enough of a desperate nature, throughout the following century.

The new institutional projects, whether they were adopted or, as was initially often the case, rejected, became inevitable reference points on a truly global scale. It is this feature that makes it possible to talk about modernity without unduly imposing a rigid and misleading institutional gridlock on an unwieldy and complex historical reality. Thus, modernity is not equivalent to universal acclaim of a small set of philosophical principles or the endorsement and implementation of a few crucial institutional projects. Such universal acclaim has never existed in any European country at any point in time. Universal adoption of a set of institutions did not exist until the very recent past, and then only in parts of Europe. Furthermore, even in those cases when these institutions became a societal reality early on, their internal relationships differed dramatically. Even more important, there is an urgent need to rethink the collapse of whole regimes of promissory notes.

GOOD-BYE TO ALL THOSE HOPES:
RETHINKING TWO FIN-DE-SIÈCLES

At the turn of the nineteenth century it seemed in the self-understanding of the intellectual, political, and cultural elite of
Europe and America alike as if the crisis of modernity were about to be overcome. Thus, the dangers of an unbridled market economy might be countered through well-informed social policies. The naive scientific determinism of a previous era might be overcome through an appreciation of the importance of volition and aesthetic judgment. Antiquated and inefficient bureaucracies—preoccupied, in Strindberg’s famous phrase, with administering the payment of their own salaries—might be replaced by a legal-rational bureaucracy appropriate for a modern constitutional polity. World exhibitions heralded the arrival of a new era of air and light. It was to be an era of industrial growth without pollution, of social change with an appreciation of traditional values and customs, of urban growth amidst garden cities and newly invented pastoral landscapes, of global communication and movement without friction, of social development without strife, of national competition without war. National assertiveness was to be contained in colonial endeavors and Olympic games. An increasingly nationally important science was to thrive amidst international conferences.

To liberals at the turn of the century, constitutional rule, property rights, and parliamentary democracy seemed to be within reach everywhere in the civilized world. Yes, even colonies might be elevated in due course to the status of dominions and equal partners once they had achieved the required level of maturity. It was possible to envisage a world of measured civility, personal self-control, and political home rule, with violence and uncontrolled impulses relegated to the outer fringes of the civilized world, whether distant deserts and mountains or the inaccessible interior of persons and continents, those hearts of darkness.

To the conservatives, it seemed as if the long nightmare of the Paris commune, of uprooted and enraged masses rising in armed rebellion, had subsided for good and that social order was as stable as can be. Conservative intellectuals even seemed to hold out the promise that the pernicious and divisive ideas of 1789 might be relegated to the ideological past. And the socialists, confident with a steady growth of parliamentary representation and membership in trade unions and the socialist party, and, with the Socialist International, a firm guarantee of per-
petual peace, proudly proclaimed that the new century was to become the century of socialism. And some utopians even spoke of the new century as the century of the child, if so the first in the history of humankind.

Today, at the end of a century, these expectations of a time long past cannot but evoke sadness. The tragedies of the twentieth century are of such scale that they evade our imagination even when we are cognitively aware of them. It is today almost unimaginable to consider the time when tens of thousands of soldiers were sent, with the consent of their governments and the blessing of public opinion in their home countries, each day to their deaths during the major battles of the Great War. It is unfathomable how socialists and pacifists could imagine that permanent peace and universal brotherhood were just around the corner when in fact the scale of bloodletting rapidly came to overtake even the horrors of the religious and civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The fear of revolution, the fear of the masses and of the revolt of the lower classes, had deeply and for long perturbed conservatives. However, it could never have presaged the ruthlessness and terror that the very same Bolshevists who had so eloquently condemned the Tsar for his policies of imprisonment and deportations would soon embark upon themselves, if on a vastly larger scale.

To read accounts today from World War I of how Jewish inhabitants of towns and cities in Eastern Europe warmly welcomed German and Austrian troops because in ousting the Russians they were seen to bring orderliness and safety is like reading an account from an unknown and unimaginable world. It is even difficult for us today to read Klaus Mann’s autobiographical notes, *The Turning Point*, and to realize that German high culture in Prague was by and large a Jewish culture. It is painful to learn that Kafka’s short stories, his tormented accounts of human trauma—and think about that most terrible story, “In the Penal Colony,” a story painfully difficult to read with the knowledge of the events of the 1930s and 1940s—when read aloud in literary salons in Prague in the 1920s, were met with laughter, as hilariously humorous accounts of the frail human condition.\(^{14}\)
When Friedrich Paulsen wrote his account for the great university exposition in Chicago in 1893, he did not doubt for a moment that German science and German higher education epitomized the highest achievements of scholarship. American scholars, in particular Abraham Flexner, by and large agreed. When reading Paulsen—later so much admired by educational scholars and teachers around the world, including Mao Tse-tung—or Weber, or Dilthey, or Husserl, or Meinecke, or Hintze, it is not possible to envisage that anywhere in their thinking was the notion that Germany, within a few decades, might be nothing but a heap of rubble, a devastated pariah nation, guilty of crimes beyond comprehension, that the high culture all these scholars so much admired and epitomized was but one step on the road to the German catastrophe.

To write about modernity today without rethinking these fundamental breaches of the promissory notes of modernity is simply not possible. They have forced processes of cultural reinterpretation that are yet to be completed.

MODERNITY: ONE OR MANY?

Modernity may thus be delineated in terms of a conjunction, with global implications, of a set of cultural, institutional, and cosmological shifts. In the contemporary discussion about the uniformity or diversity of modern societies, two positions have occupied a prominent place outside of academic discourse. First, there is a stance that might be labeled liberal historicism. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy and market economy, in the particular form that these institutional practices have come to exhibit in recent decades in parts of North America and Western Europe, are seen to provide the sole legitimate models of social organization. These forms will then come to be embraced, if with time lags, across the world. Needless to say, the adherents of this view are not so naive as to assume that this type of global diffusion would entail a development toward cultural, or even linguistic, homogeneity. It does, however, mean that there is no reason to expect any fundamental institutional innovation that would transcend these types of liberal institutional arrangements.
If such an innovation were to occur, it would be unreasonable in an almost Hegelian sense and would entail a departure from modernity, not its further development or variation. This sense has been nicely captured by the philosopher Richard Rorty: “More important, I think that contemporary liberal society already contains the institutions for its own improvement. . . . Indeed, my hunch is that Western social and political thought may have had the last conceptual revolution that it needs.” Other less sophisticated liberals have expressed beliefs in the coming emergence of a common global political and cultural order. It is ironic to observe that these views tend to exhibit as many features in common with the political culture of the home countries of the authors as Hegel’s views ever did with early-nineteenth-century Prussia. To that extent, these arguments are open to the same kinds of objections that have been taken up earlier in connection with the discussion about the thesis of convergence. They simply elevate the experiences of a single country to the status of a world historical yardstick. However, this position may be rejected while the notion of modernity as a common global condition may be retained.

Second, there is a position that focuses attention on the current array of cultural life forms and assigns each of them to a larger civilizational entity. These entities are seen to compose what almost amount to cultural tectonic plates that move and, sometimes violently, impinge upon each other, but rarely merge or blend into each other. At least since Toynbee, there has been what might constitute a kind of tradition in international-relations research that is based on a view of this type. Sometimes, as in the case of Toynbee and his followers, this view served as a basis of a plea for understanding, even respecting, a multiplicity of cultural forms. In other cases, the inferences have tended to be more hard-nosed, cautioning against allegedly naive hopes that “the others” might come to embrace the same “Western” values that the authors do.

To scholars, close to this or to analogous positions, it is natural to speak about a multiplicity of modernities. True enough, a set of technological, economic, and political institutions, with their origins in the context of Western Europe, have become diffused across the globe at least as ideals, sometimes also as
working realities. These processes of diffusion and adaptation, however, do not at all mean that deep-seated cultural and cosmological differences between, say, Western Europe, China, and Japan are about to disappear. It only means that these different cultural entities have to adapt to and refer to a set of globally diffused ideas and practices. In their core identities, these societies remain characterized by the form they acquired during much earlier periods of cultural crystallization, whether these periods are located in the axial age or in the tenth to thirteenth centuries. These core identities have, of course, always in themselves been undergoing processes of change and reinterpretation, but they have continued to structure the most profound cosmological and societal assumptions of their civilizations, and it would be exceedingly naive to believe that they are now suddenly about to disappear.

I think this is a valid critique of different convergence theories. However, it is not a valid critique of the conception of modernity that I have tried to outline above. Modernity in this sense is not so much a new unified civilization, global in its extensiveness, unparalleled in its intrusiveness and destructiveness. Rather, modernity is a set of promissory notes, i.e., a set of hopes and expectations that entail some minimal conditions of adequacy that may be demanded of macrosocietal institutions no matter how much these institutions may differ in other respects. In both cultural and institutional terms, modernity, from the very inception of its basic ideas in Europe, has been characterized by a high degree of variability in institutional forms and conceptual constructions. It has provided reference points that have become globally relevant and that have served as structuring principles behind institutional projects on a worldwide scale. Thus, we may look upon modernity as an age when certain structuring principles have come to define a common global condition. The existence of this common global condition does not mean that members of any single cultural community are about to relinquish their ontological and cosmological assumptions, much less their traditional institutions. It means, however, that the continuous interpretation, reinterpretation, and transformation of those commitments and institutional structures cannot but take account of the commonality of the global
condition of modernity. This basic characteristic of modernity has been an inherent feature even in the restricted context of the Western part of Europe. It is now a characteristic that is becoming apparent on a global scale.

MODERNITY AS A GLOBAL CONDITION

In all periods of fundamental cultural and institutional crystallization, a new sense of historical consciousness, a new sense of the place of the thinking and acting self, has emerged. Indeed, intense intellectual activities of a critical, historical, and reflexive nature are among the key defining features of periods of major cultural crystallization. This is true of the axial age in the middle of the first millennium B.C. It is also true of the period of assessment and renaissance of cultural ecumenes in many parts of the world in the period from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. These latter developments were manifested in a range of phenomena, from the Carolinian and Ottonian Empire in Western Europe and in the Western caliphate of Umayyad Spain to those of neo-Confucianism. Similarly, it is true of the cultural constitution of modernity in the European context of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

In all these other periods, such reflection has had the physical limits of personal finite existence as one of its foci, but in generalizable form it also brought out a discourse on ways to bridge the chasm between the mundane and the transcendental order. Consciousness of the existence of such a chasm were in all cases also linked to consciousness about institutional practices that might serve to transcend that chasm. The discourse about such transcendence might be religious and philosophical, as in the axial age, or ecclesiastically ecumenical, as in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Europe. In the formation of modernity in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophical reflection was, however, explicitly political.

For the first time in world history, such critical reflexivity about fundamental matters located the public and political sphere, rather than, say, a religious or ecclesiastical sphere, as
the locale necessary for transcendental reflection to be institutionally efficacious in manifesting an idea of ethical life.

However, it is important to see that already in this respect, there were dramatic differences between different European societies. Thus, in a number of countries, and France is maybe the most noticeable case, the formation of a modern political order involved a strongly anticlerical stance. In some periods, this anticlericalism involved not only a rejection of the chasm between a mundane and a transcendental realm; it involved a transposition of the linearity of a temporal conception in the transcendental sphere to the mundane sphere.

Endowing political order with a millenarian telos has sometimes been described as Jacobinism, signaling the origins of totalitarian democracy, to paraphrase the title of J. L. Talmon’s famous book. However, it may also be described as the continuation of a medieval tradition of millenarian, not to say Gnostic, thought. As a consequence of such thought, the telos of political order becomes that of serving as a tool for the forces of light in an inescapable and uncompromising struggle against the forces of darkness and evil.

However, in many parts of Europe, neither an antireligious stance nor a Jacobin-Gnostic one was ever very prominent. This clearly goes for Britain. In the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and Prussia, a widely diffused and state-supported Protestant ethic, sometimes of a pietistic nature, had in the seventeenth century served to bolster not so much the spirit of capitalism as the spirit of the early modern territorial state. In these countries such religious sentiments remained a vital force in societal life.

In Prussia and some other German states, this ethic tended to be linked to a notion of service to royal prerogative, if in a state greatly reformed in the early nineteenth century. In Scandinavia, on the other hand, reform and opposition movements sprang up from within the Lutheran state churches and sometimes also manifested themselves in the formation of Protestant sects and so-called Free Churches. In many cases, they came to form a backbone of democratic opposition to royal power in the course of the nineteenth century.

Thus, it would be deeply misleading to describe the formation of modernity as involving a uniform process of secularization.
Rather, it meant that a previous chasm between a mundane and a transcendental sphere came to be differentially reinterpreted in different European societies.

The formation of modernity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is the first major period of cultural crystallization when transformations in different parts of the world are directly interconnected. For other epochal transformations, in particular those associated with the concept of the so-called axial age in the middle of the first millennium B.C. and the profound transformations in many parts of the world in the tenth to thirteenth centuries, there are striking temporal co-occurrences. However, in the first case there are no demonstrable linkages to account for developments of an apparently similar nature in different parts of the world. In the second case, some hypotheses about historical connectedness have been proposed, but they remain suggestive rather than substantiated.

In the formation of modernity, a series of developments came together and jointly constituted a crystallization of a new type of societal order. This occurred in the period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but it was not limited in its consequences to this specific context. It had direct and immediate repercussions for events and civilizations across the globe. Of course, discourses about language, history, agency, and societal institutions at the turn of the eighteenth century involved contesting positions.

There were, as already emphasized, wide differences not only between proponents and adversaries of political reform, but between the advocates of different philosophical schools, and there were significantly different intellectual and institutional traditions in different European countries. Thus, there was never one single homogenous conception of modernity. There was never homogeneity of societal institutions, even in the most restricted European setting. There was, from the very origins of modern societal institutions, an empirically undeniable and easily observable variety of institutional and cultural forms, even in the context of Western and Central Europe. This became even more obvious once the institutional projects that had been originally conceptualized in Europe were spread to other regions of the world. This multiformity means that we
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may still speak of a variety of different civilizations in the sense that origins of institutions and roots of cosmological thinking are highly different in different parts of the world. There is no reason to assume that all these differences will just fade away and be replaced by an encompassing, worldwide civilization. However, modernity is a global condition that now affects all our actions, interpretations, and habits, across nations and irrespective of which civilizational roots we may have or lay claim to. In this sense, it is a common condition on a global scale that we live in and with, engage in dialogue about, and that we have to reach out to grasp.

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ENDNOTES

1The distinction between temporal and substantive conceptions of modernity is taken from Bernard Yack, The Fetishism of Modernities: Epochal Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Social and Political Thought (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998). While I share Yack’s basic epistemological critique, I disagree with his argument that it is not possible and meaningful to analyze modernity as the conjunction of a set of societal and cultural transformations.

2This theme was explored in the Summer 1998 issue of Daedalus on “Early Modernities.”


60  Björn Wittrock

Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, 82.


Ibid., 6.


I am grateful to Professor Ion Ianosi in Bucharest for pointing this out to me in a conversation during the time in 1996–1997 when we were both Fellows of the Collegium Budapest.


THE COMMUNIST EPISODE, central to the historical experience of the twentieth century but brought to an abrupt end by unforeseen developments, is now widely dismissed as a failed revolt against modernity. For the victors of the Cold War and for the emerging post-Communist elites, the most convenient way to close the book on Communism is to insist on its pre-, anti-, or pseudo-modern character. The issues this ideological stance excludes from consideration become more visible if we allow for the possibility that the defunct model might—for all its disastrous flaws and irrationalities—have been a distinctive but ultimately self-destructive version of modernity, rather than a sustained deviation from the modernizing mainstream. If Communism can be located within the spectrum of multiple modernities, the crisis and collapse of the Soviet empire may have some bearing on the question of more general crisis tendencies inherent in modernity. At a more practical level, the problems of post-Communist transition take on a new complexion when they are seen as the legacy of a disintegrating mode of modernization: the promise of “shock therapy” could only be taken seriously by those who mistook Communism for a total rejection of modernity, followed by a total collapse. In short, the refusal to grasp the Communist experience as an offshoot of a global modernizing process may be an obstacle to further exploration of the new horizons opened up by its unexpected finale.

Johann P. Arnason is professor of sociology at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia.
But approaches to Communism as a modern phenomenon depend on basic assumptions about ways and means to theorize modernity as such, and rival frameworks of interpretation are bound to be reflected in equally diverse accounts of the case that concerns us here. Before moving on to discuss the historical dynamics of Communist regimes, I will therefore focus on a more general background. My line of argument is hermeneutical in the sense that it locates itself within a tradition and takes its bearings from there, but in doing so, it also tackles the problems of inbuilt disagreements and evolving terms of debate. Three main conclusions may be drawn from the record of analyses and controversies in the field, and they will serve as guidelines for a more specific agenda. The tradition in question—the upshot of attempts to theorize modernity and modernization—has firmly anchored its ongoing interpretive work in a historical context, which remains essential to further reflection. This shared thematic core is, however, no guarantee of theoretical consensus: the historical field of modernity is open to conflicting perspectives, and their distinctive features find expression in enduring paradigms of social theory. It can nevertheless be argued (this last point is of particular importance to the idea of multiple modernities) that the overall problematic has evolved toward increasingly complex images of modernity, and that this trend has—more specifically—brought the questions of cultural modernity to the forefront.

INTERPRETING MODERNITY

An inventory of defining features of modern societies would not serve our purposes; the record of such attempts does not hold out much hope for agreement on contents or criteria. It seems more advisable to accept that a tradition of analyses and debates has established a threefold context of reference for the notion of modernity. First, in historical terms we speak of a modern period, marked by innovations and transformations that took a radical turn in the eighteenth century but can be traced back to earlier beginnings whose chronology remains a matter of debate (both twelfth-century antecedents and sixteenth-century breakthroughs have figured prominently in re-
cent interpretations). Second, at the same time the idea of modernity has retained a regional focus, however controversial it may now have become: Western Europe and its overseas offshoots experienced the most visible, pioneering, and momentous transitions to modernity, but it is easier to note this fact than to theorize about it without foreclosing other lines of inquiry. The particular importance of the Western path to modernity can be acknowledged without denying parallel (even if more partial) developments in other regions and with due allowance for distinctive versions of patterns first invented but not unilaterally imposed by the West; this balanced perspective is, however, still being translated into a conceptual framework. Finally (and most importantly), the structural aspects in question have to do with a set of salient and durable traits. The expanding and incessantly self-transforming capitalist economy is an integral part of the modern constellation, but so are the efforts to adapt capitalist development to strategies of state-building. On the political level, no account of modernity can bypass the nation-state and its combination of new modes of identity with new mechanisms of control, but the picture also includes the democratic transformations that unfold within the boundaries of the nation-state and give rise to aspirations that go beyond them. Also, the preeminently modern pursuit of scientific knowledge is accompanied by countercurrents that cast doubt on its claims to represent a triumph of rationality and an end to the mirage of a meaningful world. The conflicts between Enlightenment and Romanticism—and the recurrent attempts to overcome them—are at the center of cultural modernity.

But if we can easily identify some key points of reference, the meaning of the overall pattern—its presuppositions, implications, and possible variations—remains more controversial. Theories of modernity approach the field from different angles, and no plausible case has yet been made for a general convergence. The most promising line to take would seem to be one that accepts the complexity and ambiguity of its subject matter, not only as an enduring challenge to inherited and oversimplifying ideas but also as a source of alternative views that will continue to fuel debate. Recent developments in sociological
theory have brought about a clear—but certainly not uncontested—shift toward such a position. More precisely, changing views of the relationship between unity and diversity in the modern world have opened up new perspectives at a more basic analytical level; a better grasp of multiple configurations (the different national, regional, and potentially global patterns of modernity) reflects—and is reflected in—a clearer understanding of the multiple levels and components involved in the formation of modern societies. The variety of versions presupposes a plurality of constitutive parts and of the ways to combine them.

Early versions of modernization theory tended to single out a key factor or process, supposedly central to the whole dynamic of societal change; modernization could thus be explained as a global effect of the growth and diffusion of technically applicable knowledge, or defined in terms of the industrial transformation, its preconditions and its consequences. The trends most extensively analyzed from this angle—industrialization, urbanization, and the spread of education, as well as the increasing scale and scope of organization and communication—have to do with the infrastructural aspects of modernity. Such views were conducive to visions of a unified world emerging from the global modernizing process and were a priori unreceptive to the very idea of significant divergences from the common pattern. But their leveling logic proved difficult to reconcile with historical evidence and experience. Single-factor explanations gave way to systemic models, more attuned to the complexity of modernizing processes and more capable of theorizing institutional frameworks. Talcott Parsons’s analysis of modern societies exemplifies both the merits and the limits of this approach: his account of modernity as a systemic pattern reflects a strong commitment to normative models of its key institutions (a capitalist economy tempered by state intervention, a nation-state fully adaptable to the demands of the democratic revolution, and an individualist ethic complemented by free associations). But interest in underlying patterns, initially taken for granted by those who concentrated on modernizing processes, could—in the longer run—lead to a new understanding of modernity as a loosely structured constellation rather than a system, and to a stronger emphasis on the role of cultural
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premises and orientations in the formation of different versions within a flexible but not amorphous framework. The cultural factors thus brought into focus can include alternative versions of modern themes as well as selective appropriations of premodern civilizational legacies. S. N. Eisenstadt’s work is the most representative example of theorizing in this vein. It links the problematic of multiple modernities (in the sense of varying overall configurations) to the theme of divergent trends and possibilities built into the shared background.

One of the most important—but not yet fully explored—implications of this culturalist and pluralist turn has to do with the recognition of conflict as inherent and essential to modernity. Such views have found expression in seminal works, but they long remained marginal to the sociological tradition (and particularly alien to mainstream modernizing theory). The conflicts in question have been defined in different ways; most versions of the argument can, however, be understood as diagnoses of a problematic relationship between capitalism and democracy, both seen in the context of broader cultural horizons. The most sustained and interesting variation on this theme—pioneered by Max Weber and developed most recently by Cornelius Castoriadis and Alain Touraine—stresses the conflict between two equally basic cultural premises: on the one hand, the vision of infinitely expanding rational mastery; on the other hand, the individual and collective aspiration to autonomy and creativity. Here the case for a connection with the problematic of multiple modernities becomes obvious: both trends are open to varying interpretations, which tend to channel them in different directions, and the concrete outcomes depend on historical contexts.

On this view, the cultural orientations characteristic of modernity are embodied in institutions, but not reducible to them: the horizons of meaning (or imaginary significations, as Castoriadis called them) that come into play at the cultural level are mutable enough to translate into different institutional patterns, and at the same time sufficiently autonomous to transcend all existing institutions and allow the construction of critical alternatives as well as utopian projections. The vision of ever-expanding rational mastery lends meaning and moment-
tum to new forms of the accumulation of wealth and power, with varying definitions of both their goals and the relationship between them. The main institutional frameworks of these innovations—the capitalist economy and the bureaucratic state—build on the results of long-term processes to which they give a more reflexive and dynamic turn, but their cultural underpinnings are a continuous source of both rationalizing projects and imaginary alternatives. As for the other main current of modern culture, variously interpreted as a vision of autonomy or a self-affirmation of subjectivity, it may be useful to begin with a less emphatic description: the historical dynamic of modernity involves an unprecedented development of self-defining, self-questioning, and self-transformative capacities. This process can give rise to projects of self-determination that contest the power structures geared to the expansion of rational mastery. But the subversive potential of such countertrends can—to a greater or lesser extent—be neutralized by leveling models of instrumental rationality, whose logic subordinates the heightened reflexivity of modern culture to a generalized pursuit of power. More complex ideological constructs claim to have found a formula for reconciling the aspirations to progress through mastery with those of individual and collective subjects in quest of liberation (as we shall see, such ambitions are crucial to the Communist project of modernity).  

ACHIEVEMENTS AND INHIBITIONS

Having outlined the main themes explored and the major turns taken by theorists of modernity, we can now go on to discuss Communism in that context. Several interrelated aspects will be considered; in each case, the analysis will focus on a distinctive constellation of modern forces and principles as well as a structural space for further differentiation within that context.

The most obvious starting point—in view of the historical record as well as of the themes highlighted by modernization theory during the first phase mentioned above—is the modernizing dynamic of Communist regimes. Key modernizing processes were continued or initiated, but they were structured in a way that obstructed or deflected their long-term developmen-
tal logic. Rapid industrialization was one of the most important strategic goals of Communist regimes (and seemed at first to be one of the most easily achievable), but critical analysts have also singled out the dependence on obsolete industrial models as one of the most conspicuous causes of decline and crisis. This was not simply a matter of historical inertia or passive traditionalization of the early stages of industrial growth; rather, the industrializing strategy was embedded in an ideological projection of past developmental patterns (the Bolshevik appropriation of Taylorism exemplifies a more general attitude). A streamlined image of past developments became an obstacle to innovation.

In the political domain, Communist regimes pursued some of the primary goals of modern state-building—i.e., the organizational and technological upgrading of state power. In most cases, they succeeded or imposed themselves on states that had been markedly less capable of control and mobilization. But the rival centers of the Communist world—the Soviet Union and China—subordinated their modernizing strategies to the rebuiling of imperial structures that had collapsed under the strain of competition with more advanced Western powers. Imperial modernization gave rise to economic, political, and cultural patterns that obstructed reform but were at the same time conducive to forming overstretched and self-defeating ambitions (the Soviet version of this scenario has run its course, while the Chinese one is still going through inconclusive changes). The extension of the model beyond imperial borders led to more or less explicit modifications, which can be subsumed under two main types. On the one hand, the mechanisms and institutions that had served to reconstruct imperial power on a new basis were used—on a more limited scale—to maintain control over and impose conformity on a dependent periphery (the Soviet Union established such an outer empire in Eastern Europe, but failed to achieve the same kind of supremacy over Asian Communism and overreached itself in later attempts to compete for hegemony in the Third World; the Chinese bid to match this aspect of Soviet strategy was erratic and abortive). On the other hand, the Soviet model was in some cases adapted to autonomous strategies of states that escaped or evaded
Soviet hegemony. The often loosely defined term “national Communism” may be used to describe this variant, but in retrospect, it seems clear that the reliance on models of imperial origin was—in various ways—a derationalizing factor: it served to justify excessive ambitions and aberrant visions of power. Albania, Romania, and North Korea are obvious cases in point.  

Finally, the modernization of education was often seen as one of the most genuine achievements of Communist regimes. But the obverse of their record in this field is no less familiar. Educational and scientific institutions were, in principle, subordinated to the guidelines of an ideology that claimed to represent a scientific world view but was—more convincingly—defined by critical observers as a secular religion. Its claims to authority over the natural sciences were limited in theory and even more muted in practice, but the effects were by no means negligible. With regard to the human sciences, the ideological framework was of much greater importance: whole disciplines were delegitimized, authoritative paradigms were imposed, and subversive lines of inquiry were outlawed. In a more general and practical sense, the impact of a comprehensive and binding ideology (even if it never penetrated society to the same extent as historical religions) limited the role of reflexivity in social life: the ability to confront problematic aspects and consequences of modernizing processes was undermined by a priori restrictions.

FROM MARX TO BOLSHEVISM AND BEYOND

The ambiguous results of Communist modernization raise the question of underlying aims and perspectives: can the above-mentioned imbalances and blockages be explained in terms of a distinctively Communist project of modernity? Those who posit such a connection have to consider the following: The project can be traced back to basic principles of the socialist (more specifically, Marxist) tradition, or to the more marginal Bolshevik version of that source; if the latter factor is emphasized, the links to the Russian tradition are by the same token seen as a crucial part of the background, but it can still be debated whether the implicit Russian premises of the project
were more important than the historical, civilizational, and geopolitical context to which the revolutionary legatees of the Russian empire had to adapt.

The Marxian project of a postcapitalist modernity can—for present purposes—be summed up in a few basic points. Marx envisaged a future where the “free association of the producers” would render both state and market superfluous. Existing versions of economic and political modernity were thus to be superseded, but the proposed alternative was not defined in institutional terms. On the cultural level, communist society (Marx refers to it as the “resolved riddle of history”) is expected to bring about a radical reorientation: differentiated cultural spheres are—in retrospect—reduced to expressions of a human essence, and a more balanced, conscious, and shared development of this essence is to be established as a supreme cultural value. On closer examination, Marx’s line of argument may be seen as a traditionalist critique of modernity, transfigured into a utopian vision: the “free association of the producers” would have very little content without tacit references to traditional notions of community and communal control of work, and Marx’s anthropology of culture rests on a normative image of man, unmistakably affiliated with the classical sources of the European tradition.

But here we are less concerned with the Marxian project than with its Bolshevik transformation. Bolshevik strategy took the Marxian critique and the proposed abolition of the market for granted (without an adequate understanding of its theoretical background); this goal could moreover be translated into more concrete terms in light of the apparent turn from market to state coordination in connection with World War I. Although historians now seem to agree that the war economies of the Western powers were more effective than the German one, the German visions of a mobilized economy coordinated by the state were more striking and often mistaken—not least on the Left—for realized or realistic projects. The lessons drawn from that impression were, of course, interpreted on the basis of the Russian record of imperial state-centered modernization. But the Marxist premises excluded any overtly statist turn. The Bolsheviks therefore had to rely on the ideological device of a
universal super-state (the party), capable of supervising the self-abolition of the mundane state. This imaginary construct (rooted in a long history of searching for a model of revolutionary leadership, capable of challenging and outperforming the imperial center) proved eminently adaptable to the practical policies of a reconstituted empire with a universalist ideology. The mirage of the party-state, programmed to become—over a flexibly defined period of time—all party and no state was rationalized with the help of a scientific twist to the Marxian mode of thought: the anthropology that Marx had seen as a key to history and culture was replaced with a supposedly definitive scientific account of the human condition and its transformations, which was in turn expected to lay the foundations for an all-around scientific planning of social and cultural development.

The Bolshevik project was, in short, a mixture of Marxian ideas and less articulate borrowings from the Russian tradition; it acquired a more pointed meaning when it mutated into a practical alternative to the existing Western version of modernity (this was a contingent outcome of global processes in interaction with regional structures, but the revolutionaries in power rationalized it as a result of the systemic logic that Marx had expected to culminate in the transition to a higher modernity). The new society, now supposedly under construction, had to be defined in relation to the key institutional features of its Western opponent. In that sense, the analysis of the project links up with the second level of theorizing about modernity, as defined previously. A brief outline of Soviet responses to capitalism, democracy, and science will help to clarify the issues. In all cases, the claim to transcend Western modernity combined a critique of established patterns with an imaginary projection of their potential beyond present limits, but each of the three core components had to be dealt with in a distinctive way. The capitalist economic system was rejected in principle and replaced with a command economy, but elements of capitalist organization (beginning with generalized wage labor and fragmented but far-from-irrelevant markets) were retained in practice and tacitly accepted as indispensable to a growth-oriented economy; at the same time, the economic and technological
dynamism of capitalist regimes was to be outdone by means of rational planning. As for democracy, the Soviet model rejected the institutional framework that had developed in the West, but did so in the name of a supposedly more genuine unity of popular will and state power, made possible by the abolition of class privilege. The attempt to appropriate and redefine the idea of democracy (in contrast to the explicitly anticapitalist vision of economic modernity) was, however, bound to entail formal concessions—surface trappings of constitutional and representative government that could be put to effective use by oppositional forces when the whole model faced a crisis. Finally, the ambition to outflank the West by improving on shared ideas of modernity was most pronounced in relation to science: the official doctrine presented itself as a comprehensive scientific world view that would at the same time ensure all-around scientific progress, obstructed in the bourgeois world by vested interests and regressive ideologies.

INTEGRATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

As noted above, the question of Russian sources of the Soviet model (prior to its diffusion and therefore more constitutive than any later effects of local factors) also has to do with the adaptive process that took place after the seizure of power. The problems, constraints, and potentials of the imperial legacy, together with the dynamics of global rivalry with more advanced societies, affected the resultant pattern of modernity that became the common denominator of Communist regimes. The original project, discussed above, played a key role in the formation of this pattern, but the latter cannot be seen as a straightforward embodiment of the former. The logic of the project interacted with the dynamics of multiple historical constellations, and the results are irreducible to either side. As we shall see, the cultural aspects of this development are of particular importance. The cultural component is not reducible to explicit and institutionalized ideology; in the economic and political domains, half-articulated but operative cultural definitions of goals and directions play a key role—not as program-
ming principles, but as crucial elements of a complex combination.

In the context of comparative approaches to modern societies, it seems convenient to analyze the Soviet model in terms of distinctive forms of differentiation and integration. From that point of view, the Communist pattern might seem to represent an extreme case of the primacy of integration, often seen as characteristic of modernizing latecomers. But on closer examination, the integrative mechanisms turn out to differ from non-Communist cases in kind rather than degree. The most salient feature of the Soviet model was a fusion of economic, political, and ideological power, embodied in an apparatus that aimed at comprehensive control over all areas of social life. The concentration of power found its institutional expression in the party-state, but it seems clear that the imperial imaginary—a vision of superior authority and sovereignty that went far beyond practical control—facilitated the formation of the new power structure, even if the results could be applied to states without imperial traditions. The attempted totalization of control was, however, not the only strategy of integration. When critical analysts of Communist regimes spoke of the “myth of the plan” or “the cult of the plan,” left untouched by official campaigns against the “cult of personality,” they were not merely referring to fictitious statistics; rather, the culturally embedded phantasm of a shortcut to affluence through total social mobilization—within the framework of an economy geared to ever-increasing satisfaction of needs—was an integral part of the model and an intermittent source of reforming or revolutionizing projects. Similarly, the myth of a scientific world view sustained visions of scientific organization that could also be translated into blueprints for further rationalization of the model as a whole. In short, the imaginary institution at the core of the Communist pattern of modernity was oriented toward an integrated accumulation of wealth, power, and knowledge, with the inbuilt possibility of focusing on one component or another as the mainspring of progress. But inasmuch as power was exercised, projects implemented, and control maintained through the political center, we can speak of a primacy of the political;
and the specific form it took in the context of the Soviet model was totalitarian.\(^7\)

This is, however, only one side of the picture; the other has to do with the question of differentiation. It is often argued that the fatal flaw of the Soviet model—and the main reason why it could not survive competition with the West—was a blockage of differentiation. Communist regimes were, in this view, incapable of adapting to the universal functional logic of modern society. But the constellation we are dealing with is perhaps better described as a mixture of over-integration and ultra-differentiation (in the sense that the differentiating dynamics unfolded beyond the level of definite institutional forms).

To clarify this point, the three interconnected principles of organization—command economy, party-state, and ideological orthodoxy—should be reconsidered from another angle. Each of them followed a distinctive logic that tended to crystallize into self-contained and self-perpetuating forms. The envisioned goals were, in all cases, meant to combine control and mobilization: central planning was to be reconciled with unfettered technological progress, party sovereignty with active but guided participation, and immutable doctrinal principles with unlimited growth of scientific knowledge. These institutionalized phantasms were—in different ways—adapted to the contexts and dynamics of their respective domains. In the economic sphere, a comprehensive blueprint (including, as we have seen, a dogmatized model of industrial development) was part and parcel of the Communist developmental design, but the resultant configuration of unevenly institutionalized economic practices was a changing blend of command mechanisms, market elements, and more-or-less unofficial networks. Both the structures imposed from above and the adaptive strategies that made them viable developed a staying power that obstructed reforms of any kind, and the ideological image grafted onto a simultaneously over-regulated and under-institutionalized economy was an additional barrier to change. Analogously, the construction of a binding orthodoxy for the purpose of broad cultural control had unintended effects of a more constraining kind. The ideological framework of the Soviet model drew on traditions in various and often opaque ways (Marxian ideas...
were combined with less easily identifiable inputs from other sources, Russian and Western), but the very artificiality of the synthesis made it all the more imperative to maintain a facade of coherence. Although the uses of ideology in Soviet-type societies suggest changing mixtures of commitment and manipulation, the need to preserve a complete and exclusive world view as the only public frame of reference imposed conditions that restricted perception, learning, and innovation in all areas of social life. Finally, the specific logic of the political sphere differed from economic and ideological trends in that it gave rise to alternative versions of the party-state: the charismatic variant culminated in autocracy, whereas a more rationalized one strengthened oligarchic control over the apparatus (it should be noted that both charisma and rationality acquired specific meanings in the context of the Soviet model; their common denominator was a claim to authoritative knowledge and a mandate to program society on that basis). The ramifications of these intraregime alternatives affected the whole institutional framework of the societies in question. The transition from autocracy to oligarchy in the Soviet Union after 1953 is the obvious case in point; by contrast, the Chinese reforms after the demise of Maoism proved both more dependent on the principle of paramount leadership and less capable of containing change within systemic limits. Here, initial moves away from autocracy coincided with the beginnings of a long, drawn-out shift toward capitalist patterns of development.

To complete the picture, we should note the importance of the three separate spheres—defined in terms of structural foundations and inbuilt possibilities—in attempting to reform or revolutionize the Soviet model from within. The planned economy, seen as an embodiment of principles left untouched by bureaucratic “betrayal” at the political level, was invoked by a revolutionary opposition that did not want to sever all links with the regime, but the belief that this keystone of the whole Communist project was being reaffirmed after a temporary loss of bearings also helped to mobilize support for Stalin’s revolution from above. More importantly, however, visions of economic breakthrough as a key to internal revival and international success were central to Khrushchev’s reformist rule between
1956 and 1964. At other turning points, efforts to overhaul or redesign the whole model were guided by revisions of the ideological framework, but innovations of that kind could take very different directions: if Mao’s cultural revolution exemplifies one end of the spectrum, the other may be seen in the intellectual projects of the Prague Spring. As for the projects and implications of political change beyond the above-mentioned options of the party-state, two cases stand out: the 1968 Czechoslovak attempt to redefine the leading role of the party, and Gorbachev’s proposal to “split the top” (to quote Luhmann’s minimalist definition of democracy) by upgrading representative state institutions alongside the party hierarchy. It was the latter move, less radical but more fateful because aimed at the very center of the Soviet imperial order, that spiraled into a general and terminal crisis.

In short, the internal dynamic of the Soviet model was more complex than the conventional wisdom would suggest. Although the model of functional differentiation is certainly not applicable (it is, in fact, open to more general criticisms, which we cannot discuss here), we can speak of a distinctive pattern of differentiation. The main spheres of social life were structured around specific patterns of imaginary meaning and mechanisms of adjustment to practical constraints; the resultant compromise formations, particular to each sphere, obstructed further development but could also—in more unsettled situations—serve to focus visions of renewal.

PERMANENT CRISIS

In light of the above discussion, we can now consider the question of distinctive crisis dynamics inherent in—or generated by—the Communist version of modernity. After the collapse of most Communist regimes and the more protracted but unmistakable mutation of the Chinese one, it is no longer in doubt that they had imposed their constitutive patterns on their respective societies without achieving the in-depth and comprehensive transformation to which they had aspired. The levels of partial conversion and mutual adaptation varied from case to case, but it seems appropriate to speak of an enduring and
pervasive tension between regime and society. Theorists of totalitarianism saw this state of things as a civil war *sui generis*, interrupted by periodic truces; in a less apocalyptic vein, a historian of Soviet Russia refers to a “74-year-long regime of crisis management” that never grew into a genuinely stable order.

Our analysis of the Soviet model suggests a more specific notion of crisis management. The regime in question was not simply unable to strike a lasting balance between aims and conditions; the crisis it faced was the inescapable obverse of its claims to have overcome another crisis, and the ongoing search for an answer to this predicament affected the course of history in significant ways, although it did not result in viable alternatives to the dominant pattern. As has been shown, the project that developed into the Soviet model was rationalized as a response to the perceived structural crisis of Western modernity. Contradictions and dysfunctionalities, rooted in the dynamics of capitalism but reflected in all other dimensions of modernizing societies, were to be eliminated by restructuring the whole process around a coherent set of goals and an effective coordinating center. But the pattern that grew out of the project—in interaction with a broader historical context—reproduced modern crisis tendencies in a more acute form. Its main components—command economy, party-state, and totalizing ideology—were doubly conducive to dysfunctional trends: their institutional closure obstructed learning and change, while their inbuilt imaginary aims gave rise to unbalanced projects. Furthermore, both aspects militated against adaptive relationships between regime and society.

From this point of view, the Soviet model can be seen as inherently and permanently crisis-prone, although the impact and direction of the disruptive factors depended on historical circumstances. There was, however, another side to this problem. The structure of the Soviet model set specific and massive limits on reflexivity but did not wholly neutralize it; the ideological self-interpretations of Communist regimes responded to crisis symptoms, and this led to the elaboration of remedial strategies that did not always follow the same course. On the one hand, the structural *hubris* of the model generated visions
of revolutionary mobilization and rectification from above; Stalin’s change of course at the end of the 1920s and Mao’s cultural revolution are the classic examples. On the other hand, the Soviet shift from autocracy to oligarchy after 1953 put the question of reform on the agenda but left its meaning open to some genuine disagreement as well as to strategic manipulation. The much-debated moves to boost the role of market mechanisms within the framework of overall planning were not the only conceivable option; those who opposed marketization were in some cases attracted to technocratic versions of reform (this trend was for some time particularly pronounced in East Germany), and even the official redefinition of socialism as a relatively long phase of gradual development (in contrast to earlier visions of an accelerated transition to full communism) can be construed as a justification for minimalist policies of reform.

CHANGES FROM WITHIN

As noted above, attempts to redirect or accelerate development within Communist regimes were often linked to preferences for a particular sphere as the most promising starting point for broader structural change. But in more general terms, the search for remedies was a recurrent and more or less articulate response to the crisis symptoms, and it could be pursued along reformist or revolutionary lines. To note this point is to raise a further question: did the more far-reaching initiatives of this kind overstep the limits of strategic remodeling and open up perspectives of less controlled change? With regard to revolutions from above, the evidence seems inconclusive. Stalin’s “second revolution,” which began at the end of the 1920s and took a decade to complete, shaped the Soviet model but took a manifestly pathological turn that has never been adequately explained in structural or strategic terms; however, attempts to portray the great purge of 1936–1938 as a result of social conflicts spinning out of control are not convincing. As for the Maoist version, it might seem to have damaged Chinese Communism beyond repair: there was no complete restoration of the Soviet model after Deng Xiaoping’s return to power in the
late 1970s, and the economic reforms that accompanied the re-institutionalization of party rule can now be seen as the beginning of the Chinese transition to post-Communism. But it is not clear that this failure to recover was wholly due to the internal dynamics of the Chinese regime. The changing global and regional context was obviously of some importance; in particular, the availability of alternative strategies of state-guided development—exemplified by neighboring East Asian states—must have been an incentive to move away from the Soviet model.

A more plausible case can be made for reformist efforts going beyond their original frame of reference. The prime example is the Czechoslovak reform movement of the 1960s, culminating in the Prague Spring of 1968; this was by far the most serious and articulate attempt to redefine the Communist paradigm of modernity in a way that would make it both more viable at home and more attractive abroad. It can be analyzed from various angles. The project the reformers were still trying to implement when the Soviet invasion destroyed them is perhaps best described as a multiple attempt to square the circle. The genuine and far-reaching steps taken to democratize the political system were to be coordinated with a redefined but by no means purely nominal “leading role of the party.” A radical reform, bound to be perceived as a fundamental challenge to the Soviet model, was to be realized without any significant changes to the geopolitical power structures. Closer to home, the reformers launched changes that inevitably reactivated questions about the relationships between the two nations sharing the state. And although the movement was marked by growing intellectual pluralism, one of the strongest currents was attracted to the vision of a “scientific-technical revolution,” a new phase of technological progress seen as a world-historical chance to redeem and restructure a model that was already showing clear signs of having failed to match the self-transforming dynamism of Western industrial societies. But during the most active phase of the movement (and especially during the brief interlude of reformist rule in 1968), these incompatible aspirations sparked public debates that represent by far the most significant self-reflexive effort undertaken within
the framework of a Communist regime and suggest a transformative potential that exceeded the limits of controlled reform. Moreover, the process that unfolded as a result of reformist initiatives seems to have reached a point of no return: the pressures for pluralization and opening were so strong that the course of events could hardly have been reversed without foreign intervention. 10

The project that did result in radical and irreversible change—Gorbachev’s attempt to restructure the Soviet empire—is perhaps best understood as a mixture of reformist and revolutionary elements. Its goal was a comprehensive structural reform, achieved with nonviolent methods and without disruption of the existing institutional order, but it resembled a revolution from above in that the new policies were launched by an activist leadership in search of a social basis rather than as a result of interaction between a divided center and a broader reform movement (the latter mode of change was perhaps most clearly evident in Czechoslovakia). The outcome of this ambiguous strategy will be discussed below in connection with other questions relating to the end and aftermath of Communism.

COMMUNISM IN THE GLOBAL ARENA

If the Soviet model is to be analyzed as an alternative form of modernity, its global impact and self-presentation must be taken into account. It did not simply exist and function alongside other patterns; rather, its claim to universal validity and world-historical legitimacy was built into institutional as well as ideological principles, and the involvement of Communist regimes in international affairs affected other aspects of their history—both the domestic power structures and the official self-images—in various ways. These connections were most important (and most decisive for the whole Communist world) in the case of the Soviet Union. Here a vision of world revolution had been central to a strategy that in fact led to the rebuilding of an empire; the imperial dimensions of the postrevolutionary state then made it easier to revise the founding myth and adopt a project of self-sufficient transformation ("socialism in one coun-
But the adjusted ideology retained a universalistic thrust that enhanced both the ambitions and the visibility of the Soviet state as a world power. At a later stage, the combination of imperial and ideological credentials served to legitimize the role of a superpower in a bipolar world and to dispel doubts about the ability of the Soviet regime to sustain that level of global mobilization.

Global dynamics and internal developments interacted in complex and changing ways. The global presence and prestige of the Soviet regime were clearly of major importance to its legitimizing efforts at home; this was due not only to the post-1945 status of a superpower, but—in varying measures at different moments in time—also to the claim to embody a universal model and control an international movement. Soviet hegemony was, however, vulnerable to open contestation within the expanding Communist world. Conflicts with the Soviet center served to legitimize regimes that took a nationalist turn (although this factor proved to be less effective than many observers had assumed). But the most serious challenge came from the only country that could aspire to become an alternative ideological and geopolitical center: the Maoist heresy threatened to develop into the rival orthodoxy of another superpower, and although it failed to achieve this aim, its subversive effect on the very idea of Communism as a unifying project should not be underestimated. At the same time, the Sino-Soviet split aggravated a more general problem, inherent in the combination of empire and party-state. The strong ideological component of Soviet strategy added to the discrepancy between ambitions and resources that had already been characteristic of the prerevolutionary Russian empire, and although it would be very misleading to describe the trajectory of Soviet power as one sustained expansionist drive, we can speak of a permanent overstretch (evident in a military buildup even when not visible at the level of active policies) that compounded the crisis tendencies of the institutional core. This is not to suggest that the responses to problems of global strategy were uniformly irrational: there are good reasons to believe that Khrushchev’s reforms and Gorbachev’s perestroika were to a large extent motivated by the perceived need to rationalize foreign policy.
Communism and Modernity

But the limited success of the former project paved the way for a longer phase of unbalanced quest for hegemony, whereas the latter mutated into a self-dismantling process.

There is, however, another side to the question of Communism in a global context; it has to do with perceptions, projections, and interpretations of the Communist experience beyond its primary domain and their impact on patterns of thought and action in the non-Communist world. Communism in its capacity as an international movement was not simply an offshoot or an agency of Communism in power. Its ultimate subordination to the Soviet center did not prevent the formation of Communist subcultures in various settings; some of them were stronger and more distinctive than others, and inasmuch as they responded—in different ways—to the problems, tensions, and transformations of modernizing societies, they merit at least a passing mention in the context of our reflections on Communism and modernity. Conflicts between the strategy of Communism as a regime and the aspirations of Communism as a movement led to the secession of a radical fringe; this alternative version of Communism—the revolutionary opposition, centered on the Trotskyist movement—never became more than a sect, but its enduring presence and its contribution to critical reflection on the Soviet phenomenon (often continued along new lines by those who broke ranks) gained it a place in the history of twentieth-century political thought. On the other hand, receptivity to the Soviet model and efforts to learn from it were not limited to those who fully identified with its ideological premises, and power struggles could pit the champions of different lessons against each other (the first and most momentous conflict of that kind broke out between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communists in the 1920s). At a later stage, postcolonial elites were attracted to Soviet techniques of control and mobilization. The proliferation of partial imitations—such as the various “Afro-Marxist” regimes—made the prospect of sustained Soviet expansion seem more plausible than it now appears to have been, but a changing global constellation forced the states in question to change course and seek survival by other means.
The broader spectrum of Western visions of the Soviet model—as well as their historical consequences—has some bearing on our topic. The Communist alternative emerged in the aftermath of a disastrous breakdown of Western modernity (World War I); it took a more structured shape and achieved an apparent breakthrough when the Western world underwent a global crisis that released new destructive forces within advanced societies; and it seemed for some time to pose a serious challenge to a reconstructed Western bloc. All these reasons led Western observers to exaggerate the scope and potential of the rival version of modernity. To put it another way, the Soviet model became a civilizational mirage. Only some interpretations in this vein were explicitly based on the notion of a new or distinctive civilization, but the term seems pertinent to an underlying perspective that allowed for positive as well as negative judgments. For those who took the most favorable view of Communism’s civilizational achievements, the crucial point was its presumed ability to reconcile the aspirations to rational mastery through applied science and to positive liberty through participation, often taken—as noted above—to represent conflicting aspects of modernity. The appeal of this mythical image of integral modernity depended on local and historical circumstances, but it often had a significant impact beyond the limits of strictly orthodox subcultures and thus added another dimension to the global presence of Communism. On the other hand, those who rejected a regime that they saw as a project of modernity without freedom often emphasized the distinctive, comprehensive, and self-perpetuating logic at work in its institutions but did not agree as to its sources. Some linked the Soviet model to techniques of surveillance and bureaucratic control, omnipresent in modern societies but taken to extreme lengths by the party-state and converted into a system of total power. Others coined the concept of ideocracy to describe a new type of domination, aiming at the total subordination of society and history to an ideological construct (the most speculative versions of this argument traced the origins of Communism to gnostic undercurrents of the Western religious tradition).
Despite such disagreements, the theories in question tended to converge on the level of strategic assessment: they shared—and helped to spread—a tendency to view the Communist power structure as more monolithic and sustainable than it proved to be. In retrospect, it seems difficult to deny that perceptions of Communism as a threatening alternative led to overestimations of its strength: this applies to its apparent ideological momentum during the first phase of the Cold War (a classic example is Jules Monnerot’s description of Communism as the Islam of the twentieth century), its widely overrated prospects for economic growth after Khrushchev’s change of course, and its military strength during the last two decades of its history.

**COLLAPSE AND TRANSITION: COMMUNIST TRAJECTORIES IN RETROSPECT**

The last question to be raised has to do with the *global collapse* that put an end to the Soviet model as a functioning pattern of modernity (although it did not *ipso facto* set the course for the sequel). Two misleading accounts of this major historical upheaval have gained some currency after the event. Exaggerated views of the role played by popular movements are still defended in some quarters, although no detailed examination of the evidence is needed to show that the self-destructive dynamics of regimes in crisis were incomparably more important. The latter aspect is, however, oversimplified by another school of thought: here the Soviet model appears as a fundamentally irrational economic system whose bankruptcy became obvious when the possibilities of economic and political diversions were exhausted. This overly streamlined account invites both empirical and theoretical objections. Although the economies of all Communist regimes faced cumulative structural problems, conditions in that regard varied too widely for the contagious implosion between 1989 and 1991 to be easily explicable in such terms. Moreover, the Chinese transition—which has now indubitably gone beyond the limits of the Soviet model—was characterized by an adaptive transformation of economic structures, markedly different from the more familiar (but never...
fully implemented) projects of instant and total alignment with a supposedly uniform Western model. In general terms, the economic flaws of the Soviet model must be analyzed with regard to the specific fields and phases where it failed to match the performance of advanced capitalist regimes, rather than as a matter of dysfunctionality *in abstracto*.

The interpretation proposed above does not minimize the self-destructive potential of the Soviet model. But it should also be clear that the institutional patterns in question allowed for neutralizing, compensating, and deflecting strategies that enabled Communist regimes to cope with recurrent crises. Some chronic structural weaknesses (such as those of an economy no more conducive to innovation than it was responsive to consumer demand) were long overshadowed by the successful pursuit of more prominent strategic goals; partial concessions could (especially after 1956) serve to rebalance or routinize the relationship between state and society and defuse the threat of overt conflict; and the strategic combination of geopolitical activism with a gradual raising of living standards (characteristic of the earlier part of the Brezhnev era) may be seen as an effort to avoid open confrontation with more fundamental structural problems. The final slide beyond a point of no return can therefore only be understood in the context of historical conditions that aggravated structural problems and imposed new solutions with unintended consequences. Moreover, the two-fold character of the collapse—internal to each regime and unfolding in a global context—must be taken into account. Here we can do no more than outline the general direction of further analysis along these lines. Briefly, it seems useful to distinguish between five patterns of demise and transition. The most spectacular and decisive case was the self-liquidation of the Soviet imperial center. Here, a project of political reform, designed to rationalize and civilize the imperial power structure, triggered a disintegrative process, which soon escalated out of control; the strategy of systemic adaptation was undermined by insensitivity to some problems (such as the dynamics of nations and nationalisms) and an inconsistent approach to others (especially in the economic domain). The acceleration of change in the Soviet Union and the visible weakening of impe-
rial control paved the way for a more rapid transition in Eastern Europe, where the structural weakness of subordinate regimes turned the first moves to demonopolize power into a swift and total collapse; in conjunction with the centrifugal strategies of political elites in various Soviet republics, this geopolitical setback was a serious blow to the legitimacy as well as the self-image of the Soviet center, and thus hastened its demise. The Chinese transition followed a pattern of its own: in retrospect, it seems clear that a Soviet-type combination of party-state and command economy could not be reimposed after the demise of Maoism in the late 1970s. We can thus speak of a more prolonged, self-contained, and in many ways still incomplete exit from Communism. In that context, the Soviet example was seen as a double lesson: it highlighted the need to preserve the party monopoly of power as well as to invent an alternative economic strategy. The fourth category comprises smaller states, outside the orbit of direct Soviet or Chinese control but inevitably affected by the crises that unfolded on a global scale. Both the tempo and the mode of transition vary widely (the cases in point include Albania, Vietnam, and North Korea, as well as “Afro-Marxist” regimes); a common denominator can only be found in the strategies and dynamics of local power elites and structures, adjusting to a wholesale historical breakdown in a relatively controlled fashion. Finally, Yugoslavia should be seen as a case apart. A highly anomalous offshoot of the Soviet model, long believed to be more adaptable than the others, collapsed in a particularly violent fashion, and national conflicts overshadowed all other issues.

But if we accept that the exits from Communism are not all of the same kind, and that the outcome so far is more ambiguous in some cases than in others (more so in Russia than in Eastern Europe, and more so in China than in Russia), it must also be admitted that retrospective accounts of the Communist experience cannot be as final as some of the most influential ones have tried to be. Our view of the historical roads to, through, and beyond Communism will depend on paths and perspectives opened up by the sequel, and more comparison of different trajectories may highlight new aspects of the problems.
Johann P. Arnason

at hand. There is no denying that interpretations of Communism as a world-historical phenomenon (the present writer’s not excepted) have hitherto drawn primarily on the examples most visible from a Western angle (i.e., the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); the Chinese part of the story is less well known and much less reflected in theoretical approaches. This is not simply a matter of intellectual lag or Eurocentric bias. Fundamental questions about the meaning and direction of the Chinese transformation remain open, and they are not unrelated to more general issues. Even more important, the received image of modern Chinese history—including its Communist past—is still being revised in ways that point to a more balanced view of the unique pattern of interaction between transformative processes within the Chinese empire, the impact of Western expansion on the East Asian region, and the spread of Western ideological alternatives. And at the most fundamental level, it would still seem true that the long-term civilizational dynamic of the Chinese world poses one of the most formidable challenges to Western theory and historiography. In short, a brief glance in this direction is enough to alert us to the limits of our interpretive frameworks.

Further exploration of East Asian issues is beyond the scope of this essay. It may be more useful to add some final comments on the more complete and much better known Russian or Russia-centered parts of the story, seen against the background of the uncertain prospects of the Chinese transformation. The history of Bolshevism before 1917 can be seen as a distinctive project in the making, and the seizure of power represented a major step toward a new identity, although the main protagonists avoided the issue by insisting on the link to an imaginary world revolution; the subsequent shift to a more explicit affirmation of a separate project (“socialism in one country”) was accompanied by the formation of power structures perceived as a partial and vulnerable embodiment of the project. The renewal of the project as a revolution from above at the end of the 1920s was meant to complete the structural and institutional transformation that had previously been blocked by an adverse balance of power, but the outcome was—as argued above—a
complex pattern characterized by tensions and imbalances and therefore irreducible to ideological or ideocratic constructs.

From a broader historical perspective, the ruptures and mutations that transformed the Bolshevik subculture into a new social regime can also be understood as turning points in the long-term process of interaction between Russia and the West. As a result of intensified contacts and more extensive borrowing, Russia’s relationship to the European world took on the dimensions of a civilizational encounter and a civilizational conflict (among the interwar pioneers of critical analysis, Franz Borkenau seems to have grasped the relevance of this background to Bolshevism better than anybody else). Imperial rulers imposed more or less radical strategies of Westernization from above, but their transformative projects were always partial and therefore dependent on the perpetuation or even strengthening of some traditional structures; this ambiguity was reflected in intermittent traditionalist turns. Although Bolshevism first emerged within this field of divergent traditions, its metamorphoses after the breakdown of the old regime in 1917 culminated in a model that incorporated—in a selective fashion—the legacy of imperial transformation from above as well as that of revolutionary visions of a new order. This fusion of opposites transcended traditional divisions on both sides, and the social bearers of rival ideologies were destroyed in the course of the revolutionary upheaval. Both the heritage of revolution from above as a state-building strategy and the utopia of radical revolution as a road to freedom were translated into new ideological models that laid claim to universal, exclusive, and definitive truth; in that capacity, the reunified and rearticulated tradition served—as has been shown—to structure a specific version of modernity. From that point of view, the Russian experience is another reminder of the complex relationship between civilizations and modernities (the East Asian connection has already been noted). A comparative analysis of the civilizational elements in multiple modernities is thus—in the final instance—no less relevant to the Communist experience than to more overtly tradition-bound cases, even if the present discussion can only signpost this line of inquiry.
ENDNOTES

1It should be noted that this view is open to variations: the Communist project may appear as an attempt to reimpose the premodern primacy of Gemeinschaft, to program social change in isolation from world society, or to maintain a degree of central control that proved incompatible with modern imperatives of differentiation. For an interpretation that makes some use of all these lines of argument, cf. Pierre Clermont, Le communisme à contre-modernité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1993).

2Other conflicts may affect or overlie the ones mentioned above. In particular, recent work on cultural modernity has thrown new light on the tensions and interconnections between Enlightenment and Romanticism and has shown that a very broad definition of the Romantic current (in contrast to the more conventional focus on specific episodes) is needed to make sense of its impact on modern culture. In this comprehensive sense, Romanticism may be best understood as a search for new sources of meaning, in response to a perceived destruction of meaning by the power-centered rationality of the Enlightenment and with particular emphasis on the notion of inner and outer nature as such a source (Charles Taylor’s work, arguably the most seminal contribution to the debate, has dealt extensively with the latter theme). This problematic is undoubtedly less relevant to our main topic than the internal divisions of the Enlightenment, such as the permanent tension and potential conflict between expansion of rational control and aspirations to autonomy; the Soviet model would seem to exemplify the use of a supposedly all-embracing and conflict-free version of the Enlightenment project to defuse or marginalize the Romantic challenge. But some symptoms of underlying problems in this domain—worthy of interest, but beyond the scope of the present essay—should be briefly noted. If Marxism attempted to “combine scientistic materialism with the aspiration to expressive wholeness” (Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989], 409–410), this original synthesizing ambition could not be wholly neutralized by the more one-sidedly materialistic Soviet version of Marxist thought. Expressive wholeness became a key theme of Western Marxism, whose critique of Soviet theory and practice always presupposed a shared but misused or misunderstood legacy (cf. Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984]). Similar ideas of human self-realization were essential to the Marxist dissent that developed on the Western periphery of the Soviet empire and had some influence on ideological constructs of reform Communism. In a much less explicit way, Romantic connections had something to do with the global resonance (and to some extent the self-images) of political turns perceived as attempts to reinvigorate revolutionary subjectivity (Castroism and Maoism are obvious cases in point).

Communism and Modernity

tween the first and second phase of modernization theory (as defined above): as Parsons sees it, the unbalanced character of Soviet modernization is due to the development of infrastructural aspects without the proper institutional framework. The main post-Parsonian contributions to the theory of modernity (exemplified by the writings of Jürgen Habermas and Anthony Giddens) did not add much to our understanding of the Communist experience. Conversely, the schools of thought that at the same time dominated—and disputed—the field of Soviet studies tended to neglect the question of the Soviet model as a version of modernity. Neither the theorists of totalitarianism nor the advocates of social history saw this as a central problem.


"Yugoslavia, long mistaken for a case of national Communism, represents a much more anomalous line of development. There was, to begin with, an imperial background, albeit not of the same kind as in Russia and China. The Yugoslav state, reconstituted by a victorious Communist movement in 1945, was made up of fragments of two defunct empires. This quasi-imperial dimension of the project may help to explain the original Soviet-Yugoslav split. There was, at first, no ideological schism: rather, the Yugoslav leadership tended to reproduce the Soviet model in a way that became too ambitious and self-confident for the Soviet center. After the break, the Yugoslav leadership had to redefine its project and consolidate its domestic basis. The result was a unique combination of controls and concessions, characterized by a party monopoly of political power but much less orthodox arrangements in the economic and cultural domain. At a later stage, the disintegrative potential of this pattern was compounded by a redistribution of power among rival political centers. In brief, the modernizing processes that took place in this setting were doubly fragmented: along institutional as well as regional lines.


"There can be no conclusive proof of this, but the most detailed analyses of the Prague Spring suggest that the reform process had become unstoppable from
within; cf. especially H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Much has been written on the Czechoslovak reform movement, but less on the Czechoslovak case in general. It is, however, of particular interest to the comparative study of Communist regimes and experiences. This was the most advanced Western society that came under Communist rule, but there was nevertheless an exceptionally strong domestic basis for the takeover, and the subsequent social transformation was marked by a particularly rigid and subaltern version of the Soviet model. The resultant crisis gave rise to the most serious project of reform Communism, but this search for an alternative was—as we have seen—thwarted by external forces before its internal problems became fully visible and its defeat led to a final delegitimation of reformist visions. Finally, the restoration of a regime without domestic rationale or legitimacy resulted in far-reaching social and cultural paralysis, but in spite of this, a particularly swift and smooth exit from Communism proved possible when the geopolitical context changed and the pseudo-realistic utopia of a return to “normal” Western forms of modernity could—for some time—appear more plausible than elsewhere in the post-Communist world.


As I have tried to show, the illusions that accompanied the rise and spread of Communism were due to inbuilt phantasms as well as to perceptions from outside. In retrospect, they loom even larger because of the abrupt collapse, and this has tempted many analysts to treat them as the master key to the whole story. The complex interconnections of economic, political, and ideological factors are thus overshadowed by the apparent logic of a utopian construct, unfolding from triumph to disaster. The two most representative works in this vein are François Furet, *Le passé d’une illusion: essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle* (Paris: Robert Laffont/Calmann-Lévy, 1995), and Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy* (New York: The Free Press, 1994)—although they differ in that Furet is primarily interested in the international impact of the illusion, whereas Malia deals with the history of its main testing ground. For a judicious and convincing critique of both books, cf. Claude Lefort, *La complication: Retour sur le communisme* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

For a good sample of debates on post-Communist reform in China (and an illustration of the fundamental theoretical disagreements involved), cf. the special issue of *The China Quarterly* (144) (December 1995) and more recent contributions by Thomas Rawski and Wen-Thye Woo in *The China Journal* 41 (January 1999).
Snapshots of Islamic Modernities

The project of multiple modernities presents a challenge to the monocivilizational narratives of “Western modernity.” It attempts to reintroduce some of the pluralistic features of Western modernity that were repressed, marginalized, or simply forgotten on the side paths of modernity’s historical and intellectual trajectory. It also attempts to open up readings of the modernization of other civilizations and cultures. Modernity, as it is currently reappropriated, rejected, distorted, or simply reshaped and produced in a plurality of contexts other than the Western one, becomes both a historical and an intellectual challenge to established norms of analysis. Decentralizing the West and reflecting on modernity from its edge, from a non-Western perspective—and an Islamic one at that—can spell out the limits of modernity, generate new conceptualizations, and raise questions concerning modernity.

First, the multiple-modernities project puts the emphasis on the inclusionary dynamic of modernity, on borrowing, blending, and cross-fertilization rather than on the logic of exclusionary divergence, binary oppositions (between traditional and moderns), or the clash of civilizations (between Islam and the West). But, at the other extreme, an all-encompassing concept of modernity can lead to its self-erosion, to a collapse of its boundaries and hence to its loss of meaning.

Second, introducing multiplicity into the model of modernity inevitably brings forth a relativistic conceptualization as be-
tween different experiences. But not every cultural distinctness is justified. Two questions, one historical, the other normative, are linked together: Can there be a plurality of culturally different modernities? Can we create a normatively superior modernity? An ethical question is intrinsic to the intellectual effort of understanding the limits of modernity, the conditions for its transcendence, and the discovery of the sources of creativity in cultural difference.

Third, the multiple-modernities perspective increases our capacity to see and read diverse trajectories and distinct patterns neglected by our social scientific language. It aims to analyze the specific characteristics of civilizations, not only in terms of their approximations to the West, but also in their own terms. Furthermore, it implies the possibility of different experiences existing, significant divergences capable of changing and transforming the practice of modernity. It raises the question of whether there can be “alternative” higher forms of modernity. Yet the search for alternatives and the affirmation of authenticity can also easily lead to self-retreat from globalized competition, to the establishment of authoritarian political regimes with a nationalist and fundamentalist rhetoric.

Hence, there is a constant oscillation between affirmation of authenticity and globalization of modernity. The tensions between identity and modernity are more salient and dramatic in the non-Western contexts of modernity. There, where traditions and memory are a source of social drama rather than cultural innovation, the process of coming to terms with the past needs to be reflected on. Can there be a creative tension between the affirmation of specificity and the general principles of modernity, without one annihilating the other? How are we to grasp the dialectical juxtapositions between modern temporality and the quest for ever-same? Islamism as a contemporary protest movement invites us to revisit these questions.

Islamism can indeed be read as a divergence from the basic premises of Western modernity, namely, the idea of future-oriented progress and individual emancipation. In some respects, contemporary Islamist movements join the “new social movements” of the West in their criticism of the Enlightenment tradition and of industrial values. However, new social move-
ments are civil, societal, and nonrevolutionary and raise a critique from within—that is, from the very centers of modernity. Islamism carries the ideal of changing the society as a whole—of Islamization of all spheres of life, ranging from faith to gender relations, private/public boundaries, scientific knowledge, and governance principles. Furthermore, it rests on the historical memory of a civilizational antagonism. As it seeks past-oriented change, hierarchical conceptions of gender relations, and submission of self to religious precepts, Islamism rejects the dominant features of modernity.

Paradoxically, contemporary Islamist movements endow Muslims with a collective identity that works critically against both traditional subjugation of Muslim identity and monocivilizational impositions of Western modernity. As such, Islamism can be thought of as a critical introduction of Muslim agency into the modern arenas of social life. In return, the presence of an Islamic idiom, of voices and practices in everyday life, in urban spaces, in public debate, and in the marketplace, throws new challenges at classical premises of the modernist project—basically, those of secularism and Western-boundedness. In this essay, modernity is reexamined from the edge, from its margins (margins referring both to distance—that is, non-Western contexts—and to the affirmation of difference through the Islamist project). More precisely, I will try to highlight some of the patterns that carry a potentiality through which modernity is not simply rejected or readopted but critically and creatively reappropriated by new religious discursive and social practices in non-Western contexts.

POST-ISLAMISM

Contemporary Islamist movements have undergone major changes during the last two decades. The actors of Islamism acquired professional profiles, increased their diversity and their public visibility. This was true not only of the militants and politicians, but also of the engineers, lawyers, intellectuals, novelists, and journalists; all contributed to the production, transmission, and dissemination of Islamic values and discourse. In addition to political activism, forms of artistic and intellectual expression
Nilüfer Göle entered into the domain of Islamic cultural criticism with the publication and circulation of newspapers, periodicals, novels, films, and music. Islamization of the ways of life led to the emergence of Islamic arenas of communication (Islamic radio and television stations), banking (without interest), and new patterns of consumption (including fashion and tourism). In other words, Islamism is concomitant with the formation of new middle classes and is on the way to creating its own intellectual, political, and entrepreneurial elites, drawing on their increasing public visibility and commercial success. We can speak of a post-Islamist stage in which Islamism is losing its political and revolutionary fervor but steadily infiltrating social and cultural everyday life practices. Islamism, which made its appearance with the headscarf issue in the secular bastions of modernity on university campuses at the beginning of the 1980s, is today expanded to many spheres of public and cultural life. As can be observed in the Turkish context, not only are Islamists using the latest model of Macintosh computers, writing best-selling books, becoming part of the political and cultural elite, winning elections, and establishing private universities, but they are also carving out new public spaces, affirming new public visibilities, and inventing new Muslim lifestyles and subjectivities.

The question that needs to be asked is not whether Islam is compatible with modernity but how Islam and modernity interact with each other, transform one another, reveal each other's limits. Neither Islam nor modernity can be taken as a static project; on the contrary, they are ongoing processes scrutinized continuously by human interpretation and agency. Instead of focusing on the political discourse, the textualized ideal, and the collective will of the actors, my purpose is to observe the unintended consequences of the Islamist movements, capturing them, following Simmel's advice, in “momentary images,” in snapshots (momentbilder). In these fragments of social reality, we are able to glimpse the meaning of the whole. The cultural significance of contemporary radical Islamism greatly outweighs its political program. Paradoxical though this may seem, its radicalism conveys both a resistance to religious conservativism and a criticism of modernity. Islamic
mental strategies may be said to be modernity-oriented. Religion is reappropriated, reinterpreted selectively in the light of problems facing the individual and the modern way of life in a non-Western context. The difficulty of grasping Islamism stems from the very ambiguous conception of time and self that it both cultivates and experiences. On the one hand, it carries a sense of mythical continuity with the past and claims an immutable and timeless concept of religion and puritan self; on the other, Islamism is a new, contemporary phenomenon, instigating a discontinuity with time, traditions, and the past, blending with modern experiences and identities.

My argument is that the agency of women, self-reflexivity, individuation, mass media, market forces, and public spaces are transformative forces, underpinning the cross-fertilization of Islam and modernity. I see the illustrations of Islamic experiences of modernity not simply as adaptations to consumption patterns or market rationality but as self-reflexive “individually lived experiences” (Erlebnis). Hence, the claims of covered Islamist women who are challenging the secularist premises of a public sphere, the autobiographical novel written by a young Islamist that presents a criticism of political Islam, the sexual abuse in an Islamic sect that triggers a public debate on religious marriages, the luxury hotels for Islamic vacationers, and the critical self-examination of an Islamist sociology student are among my “snapshots.”

RADICAL ISLAMISM: HOW TO DEAL WITH MODERNITY WITH A SENSE OF ETERNITY?

The new actors of Islamism, both the leaders and the followers in almost all Muslim countries, including Egypt, Iran, and Turkey, come from recently urbanized and modern educated social groups. They often become “Islamist” by following a common path: after moving from their small provincial towns to cities, they encounter, during their years in high school and university, the works of authors who set up the landmarks of contemporary Islamist ideology. These include the Pakistani Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, the Iranian Ali Shariati, and, more particularly for Turkey, Ali Bulaç and Ismet Ozel.
One common feature of these authors is their effort to redefine Islamic “authenticity” in a manner that is no longer apologetic before Western modernity. This new critical stand in relation to Western modernity marks the principal difference between the new generation of Islamists and those of the nineteenth century, including Muhammed Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida, all of whom tried to accommodate Islamic values with modernity.

If traditionalism implies conservatism, the conservation of traditions, and continuity with the past, Islamist movements are radical in that they aim at revolutionary change, a rupture with the chains of social evolution. Rather than seeking to preserve traditions, the existing religious establishment, or popular religious practice, Islamism aims at changing them in the light of “true Islam.” The golden age of Islam, or asri saadet, that is, the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate companions, provides a model ideal community, demonstrating the ways to apply revelation to human society. The call for a return to the fundamentals of Islam and an idealized past reaffirms the authenticity and historicity of Islam as a basic source of scriptural guidance. The process of restoration and renewal (tajdid and islah are the two concepts of Islamic resurgence encapsulating both the regeneration of the authentic Islamic spirit and the righteous reform) is inspired by the example of a past experience rather than impelled by self-conscious innovation or by a hope for a future utopia. Islamism does not propagate a progressive utopia, as is the case of socialist revolutionary movements that posit an advanced stage of society that will be reached in the future, never having existed before. Furthermore, the task of restoring the disrupted past order is seen as the primary responsibility of believers, whose purpose is to increase the righteousness of the people, to fulfill God’s will, and not to be concerned with human practicality, efficiency, or prosperity. Islamist movements are revolutionary, yet past-oriented; they are moral religious movements.

The time concept is absolutely crucial for any understanding of the radicalism of new Islamist movements. The desire to restore the Islamic faith, to make society conform to the mythic model of the formative years of Islam, goes hand in hand with
the dismissal of centuries-old historical forms of the Islamic state. Transferring the concept of *jahiliya*, which originally meant the pre-Islamic period, to contemporary Muslim societies, Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb posited a historical break, made legitimate by the religious idiom. The obliteration of centuries of historical Islamic experience frees the contemporary Islamic actors from the historical chains of continuity, enabling them to imagine the blueprint of an alternative society. The desire to make a *tabula rasa* characterizes present interpretations and practices of Islam—it is a nonconservative orientation; it expresses the radicalism of Islamist movements.

Islamism is radical in its desire for a rupture with historical continuity, in its criticism of traditional interpretations and interpreters of Islam, and in its political mode (Islamic revolution) and its conception of change (total Islamization). The goal of radical change legitimated by political opposition, to be attained by the seizure of state power, is a feature of modern politics, especially that shaped by socialist revolutionary movements. Denial of the past, the priority given to political action, and the will for a systemic change characterize all modern revolutionary movements. But Islamist movements are distinguished from revolutionary political movements by the paradoxical relation they cultivate with the Islamic past. For Muslims, the historical existence of an ideal Islamic society in the past does not require any validation by the progressive forces of history. The Islamic golden age is not a utopia from the perspective of a Muslim; it has existed in both time and space. Therefore, the leap backwards endows Muslims with a sense of mythical continuity with the past, with an immutable and timeless concept of religion. By the same token, such a revivalism of an initial, authentic Islam bestows contemporary Islamist actors with a critical sense of earlier traditions.

As contemporary Islamist movements offer a radical critique of the classical tradition and of the *ulema*, that is, those who hold religious authority and legitimacy because of their knowledge of religious texts, they open up a space for the interpretive process. In a paradoxical way, radical Islamism instigates democratization of religious knowledge; various actors can lay a claim to the interpretation of Islam. The detailed issues of
personal, social, and political life, such as the veiling of women (hijab), the penalty of adultery (rajm, stoning to death), questions of taxation (faiz), criminal laws, and religious marriage are no longer issues settled under the monopoly of religious ulema but become subjects of controversy between competing political actors, including female Islamists. Contemporary Islamist women are not only the subjects of controversy but also very active participants in the process of public debate. As new actors of Islamism are endowed with two sources of educational capital—religious and secular—they communicate Islamic idiom to the public debate. New actors of Islamism regain authority through the use they make of religious knowledge, but also through their criticism of modernity as a cultural program. Rather than being a simple return to religious resources and a withdrawal from modernity, Islamism is an attempt to cross-fertilize the two.

In sum, Islamism introduces modern times to the world of Islam, but also spells out the limits of the present time and the ephemeral nature of modernity. It reminds all of the everlast- ingness of religion and the otherworldly sense of eternity. Instead of a future-oriented utopia, fundamentalist religious movements call for the rediscovery of memory, of a golden age, an uncontaminated model of society that promises a new resource of social imagination for Muslims. Islamic fundamentalism, far from being a withdrawal from the modern world, enables Muslims to participate collectively and critically in worldly affairs. There is a different time orientation in the Islamist project. The ideal is not conceived in the future-oriented terms requiring validation by the progressive forces of history, but anchored in the past. The ideal society exists for Muslims: it is a “realized utopia,” an eternal model to be emulated.

ISLAMIC WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: “THE FORBIDDEN MODERN”

The radicalization of Islamism (in the sense of a return to the fundamental sources of Islam and a refusal to take an apologetic attitude in the face of modernity) engenders a process in which the relations between tradition and modernity are con-
stantly redrawn and blurred. The place of women in contemporary Islamism begets a constant challenge that necessitates the redefinition of the frontiers between modernity and identity, between political ideology and social practices. In their traditionally defined roles, women are confined by a “natural life cycle”: the woman as a young girl, wife, mother, and grandmother follows her life cycle, and she obtains social status by accommodating herself to traditional values of chastity, fertility, and respectability. Women, as they succeed in education and come to participate in public life, acquire an independent personal life-space and distance themselves from the socially expected roles of spouse and mother. Similarly, through engagement in politics and education, Islamist women break away from the confinement of the interior space and develop personal strategies of education and professional life. In other words, women’s participation in Islamist movements has had undesired consequences. Islamic politics enables Muslim women to participate in public life, to organize meetings, to publish articles, to establish associations, to abandon the private domestic sphere and its traditionally defined roles. Islamism serves as the legitimization of their public participation both in practice and in ideology. In practice, it justifies women’s visibility in politics and public life through their devotion and contribution to the “Islamic cause” (recalling the similarity to modern secular women whose public roles are justified by the nation-building project). To a certain extent, Islamism provides ideological legitimacy for women’s newly acquired public roles. Women active in education, commerce, and politics during the time of the Prophet are constantly mentioned by those who refer to the fundamental sources of Islam and criticize those traditional popular interpretations that are held responsible for women’s seclusion in interior spaces. These were some of the hypotheses developed in my book, The Forbidden Modern, which analyzed the rise of Islamist women. The title in Turkish, Modern Mahrem, suggests a hybridization, to which both the secularists and the Islamists strongly object.

The more that Islamist women gain public visibility, finding a realm for the realization of their educational and professional ambitions, the more they find themselves called upon to criti-
cize traditions or interpretations that prescribe maternal and marital duties as their foremost moral obligations. Interestingly, some Islamist women in Turkey, but also in other Muslim contexts, break away from the moralizing definition of woman in Islam by referring to Western feminism. They maintain that patriarchal oppression is a phenomenon independent of the capitalist system; it exists in all societies, including Islamic society. They refuse to share the deprecating views that Islamic male leaders hold of Western feminism. They argue: “Feminism urges women to revolt against the oppression of men in the family, in work settings, and in the street. What is there to fear in this?” These women reject the role assigned to them as “mother and wife in the house” and assert that “this role serves only to reassure the Muslim man of his identity.” “The pseudoprotection of women,” one of them writes, “is a need of men and a source of oppression for women.” They criticize the sublimation of maternal love, and, inspired by the feminist literature, one characteristically writes: “A woman who remains confined to her role as mother and wife and does not realize herself individually and socially develops a neurotic fixation either on her child or on cleanliness.” As these quotations suggest, Islamist women claim the right to leave this sequestered space to affirm their personalities without relying on men.

In doing so they break a taboo of Islam, claiming the right to exit from the private/interior sphere and work. This indicates an individuation of the Muslim woman who demands “a private life” independent of her husband and child. These women identify the source of women’s oppression neither at the level of Western values nor at that of an Islam contaminated by tradition, but at the level of Muslim men. By their individualistic affirmation, they create a “disorder” in the Muslim community, which reminds them not of their individual rights but of their religious tasks or maternal duties. They risk turning the categories of “inside” and “outside” upside-down and subsequently disrupting gender relations within the community.

In their own words, they would say “no to femininity, yes to personality,” acquiescing to the values of modesty while simultaneously opening up an autonomous sphere for their individual
self-definitions and life-strategies, independent of their roles as wives and mothers, but also as militants of a collective movement. Feminism would serve as an intellectual source in the building of a distinct consciousness of women’s identity within the Islamic movement. It would form a demarcation line between perspectives of men and women but also between groups of women themselves: between those who acquiesce to the ascribed traditional gender roles and Islamic militancy without question and those who develop a criticism of these roles from within, forging new self-definitions. The latter will refer to feminist sources just as they claim the same right as men to interpret religious sources. This dual reference to secular and religious sources of knowledge endows these new female figures with intellectual and social recognition.

Against the utopia of the “Islamization of the whole society,” women develop their own subjectivity and personal life strategies, breaking the preestablished boundaries of the all-encompassing category of the “generalized Muslim other.” Adopting the categories of self used by Seyla Benhabib, we can say that Islamist women criticize the “generalized universal” Muslim identity that projects the male point of view, and seek to be recognized as the “concrete other.” They are “unique individuals with certain life histories,” thereby emphasizing their differences, wholly disregarded by holistic Islamism.

Women acquire legitimacy and visibility for their individual aspirations through their participation in higher education and Islamic politics. Yet there is a covert tension, a paradox in this mode of empowerment through Islamism. Women abandon traditional “life cycles,” making their personal lives a matter of choice (for a professional and/or political career), but women in Islamist politics acquiesce in the Islamic way of life, Islamic morality, and Islamic community. Women as boundary markers of Islamic difference are of paramount importance for Islamic visibility. Hence, Islamism calls for women’s agency and engenders their individuation, yet it also restrains them. Islamism provides women with access to public life, but this is an access limited by contributions to the good of the community. The politicization of the “Islamic way of life” carries the potential to hinder women’s individual choices of life, professional strat-
egies, and personal expressions. Islamism offers modern life to Muslim women, but it is a forbidden form of modernity.

Consequently, *The Forbidden Modern* points to this critical encounter of Muslim women with modernity that is taking place in practice, but “forbidden” in principle by Islamism—and also by secularism. Islamic women’s increasing public visibility engenders a subversive dynamic within the Islamist movements but also provokes a far-reaching public controversy and political struggle between Islamists and secularists. The “headscarf dispute” gained a new dimension after the last general elections (April 18, 1999) in Turkey. A thirty-one-year-old computer engineer, Merve Kavakci, the first woman ever to be elected a deputy from the Islamist Virtue Party, became the first woman to show up—albeit for a few hours—in the secular parliament of Turkey wearing a headscarf. The secularist tradition in Turkey is well anchored among the civil and military elites, but is also internalized by the urban, educated middle classes and vigilantly defended by women’s associations. So, any Islamic symbol making its way to universities or the parliament is considered a threat and is consequently banned. Thus, the questions raised by the Islamic eruption in the secular bastions of modernity go well beyond the Muslim non-Western contexts and join the general question of how to combine the prerequisites of a common public space with multicultural demands.

In sum, the presence of Islamic women in the public sphere that I have labeled as “the forbidden modern” conveys several meanings. *Forbidden* refers to the gendered construct of the private sphere (*mahrem*) in Islamic cultural contexts. That is, the interior space is women’s space, and the moral psychology of the domestic sphere depends on women’s controlled sexuality. Women’s corporal and behavioral modesty (therefore veiling) and the social regulation of the encounters between sexes (therefore sexual segregation) are guarantees of the moral-social order. Veiling invokes modesty, thus controls and contains women’s corporal expansion (of visibility and voices) in the public eye. On the other hand, an encounter of women and modernity is taking place. Women, through Islamism, acquire public forms of visibility, sharing with men the same urban,
political, and educational territories. Under the veil a new profile of Muslim women is emerging, which in turn constitutes a threat to the moral psychology of gender identifications. As the forbidden Islamic women become modern, that modernness is forbidden, or at least contained by boundary maintenance. Veiling, segregation of the sexes, and hierarchical gendered separations of private/public spaces all aim at boundary maintenance of Islamic societal difference. Furthermore, Islamism tacitly spells out the limits of the cultural program of modernity. Submission of self and body to religious faith, modesty, and the moral guidance of the community rather than the individual “conscience”—these are signs of difference, hinting silently but visually to religious conceptions of self and society in contradistinction to the public exposure of self, the confessional culture, and the quest for transparency and secular conceptions of the body.

SNAPSHOTS

Islamic Male Subjectivity and Love and Intimacy as Resistance

A novel written by a young Islamist writer may be offered as an example of a more self-reflexive approach to changing Muslim subjectivities. The change is treated as part of the unfolding process of political Islamism. The novel written by Mehmet Efe can be considered autobiographical, a participant’s account of the Islamism of his generation. The writer, in his twenties, tells the story of the Islamist generation during the post-1980 period through the voice of an “Islamist” male student of his own age. Irfan (meaning knowledge, and described as the pillar of the civilizations of the East) is a student in the history department of Istanbul University. He belongs to Islamist movements, defines himself as “a Muslim, religious, Islamist, radical revolutionary, fundamentalist, pro-Iranian, Sufi, etc. . . . somebody among all these.” A typical representative student in the Islamist movements of the post-1980s, he is from a provincial town, of a lower-middle-class family, with a traditional religious family background. He becomes an Islamist at the university when he arrives in the large urban center of Istanbul.
itinerary is one of upward social mobility; he is the first in his family to have access to high education and urban life.) As a student, political Islamist, and activist, he goes to collective prayers at the mosque, followed by political demonstrations against Israel and the United States; he attends panels, visits Islamic bookstores, and sits on religious trials. This is his familiar universe. In the university corridors and in the streets of Istanbul he acts as an Islamist revolutionary: “We were actors, heroes of the images in our dreams incited by the Iranian revolution.”  

Acquiring political consciousness empowers him in his relation to girls as well:

Before when a girl asked me a question, I was so perplexed, not knowing what to do . . . afterwards, that is with acquiring political consciousness . . . finding myself among those people who believe in liberation, salvation through Islam, girls didn’t appear to me so important, to be taken seriously . . . and those who were covered [read Islamist], were my sisters (bacim). They were the pioneers, mothers of the society that I was dreaming of and struggling for.  

This narrative of an Islamist student is almost the exact mirror-image of a revolutionary leftist student in the 1970s in Turkey. Both have a dream of an ideal society, a utopia for liberation and salvation. For both, this implies a radical, holistic revolutionary transformation of society. In both cases, the life of a revolutionary requires giving up pleasures or necessities of daily life (as a male, as a student) now considered trivial. In other words, for the sake of public ideals and political revolution, private, intimate identities and relations are given up. Ironically, male actors of leftism and Islamism empower themselves politically by repressing their male identities, reproducing the dominant values of a communitarian morality that tolerates male-female socialization only within the accepted boundaries of sisterhood, motherhood, or comradeship.

The young Islamist character of the novel is not able radically to change society, but he himself goes through a radical change when he falls in love with an Islamist female student. The girl is an idealized profile of the new Muslim woman, and the love he develops for her constitutes a constant challenge to his political convictions and his collective commitments. Being
in love with her plays the role of catharsis in his personal change, in his emerging new Muslim self.

This autobiographical novel follows but also exceeds the latent dynamics depicted in The Forbidden Modern, but with a significant difference. It renders the change from the point of view of a male protagonist of Islamism. A narrative of a young male Islamist student who encounters an assertive and educated young Islamic girl, it brilliantly illustrates the role of Islamist women as generators of change and not simply as passive adherents to the logic of the movement.

The girl represents those female actors of contemporary Islamism who are assertive, yearning for educational success. They meet on the day of registration; Islamists are protesting the prohibitions on veiling, and he asks her to participate in the boycott. She responds by advancing her individual identity—preferring to go on with her registration—using feminist irony and criticism. She does not accept that men should speak and act on behalf of women: “Did you ask my opinion for the action? You men would make speeches, would satisfy yourself exhibiting heroic actions and we would be the decor, ha?”

Furthermore, she mocks the male activists of Islamism: “Protesting became a fixation for you. . . . You feel an inferiority complex with leftists? That is why you impatiently took up our headscarves?”

Falling in love with one of those Islamic girls (“it would have been so much simpler with a traditional, docile girl from a village,” he later complains) is a catharsis in his questioning of revolutionary political Islamism. She is an intellectual pioneer in her criticism. We read her words, taken from her diary:

Such an absurdity! The majority of us start taking seriously the roles we want to play. . . . They are walking in the corridors as if they were going to realize the revolution tomorrow. . . . Some among us even say things such as “Muslim men are too passive.” Everyone is rapidly on the way to “masculinization” [erkeksilesiyor]. . . . They also gave me books. Books with phrases which put on my shoulders the obligation to be a warrior, a guerrilla, to take the responsibility of a war which would change everything and the world fundamentally. . . . I am small. I am weak. I am a girl. I am a girl. . . . GIRL. . . .
As she reappropriates her identity as a young girl, she resists political and collective roles ascribed to her. In an ironic way her “weakness,” her withdrawal to the intimate, small life and identitarian boundaries, constitutes a new source of power to criticize the Islamic ambitions of radical change.

Irfan, the male character finding an echo in her words, writes, at the end of his journey for change, of his desire to distance himself from political militant Islamism: “I want to take off this militant uniform (*parka*)...I want to exist not with my enmities but with my friendships...I want to satisfy myself with small things. I can not bear universal things any longer.” Rediscovering the private “small” life will provide an anchor to limit the totalizing nature of the Islamist project. Love will reintroduce desire, intimacy, and privacy. Already “falling in love” with a woman is problematic for an Islamist, because, in the words of Irfan, “a Muslim does not fall in love with a woman, but only with Allah.” For the first time, he starts to share with his friends, to his own surprise, a “personal” subject: his love for this woman. At the end of the novel, he starts searching for a job and dreams of their happiness together as a married couple, imagining himself buying her a colorful dress and a silk headscarf, sharing daily life, cooking together, reading, and the like.

Interpreting this novel, which became quite popular among Islamic youth, solely as a criticism of Islamism from within would be an over-simplification. In my view, the novel testifies and contributes to the unfolding process of the militants’ evolution from collectivist political Islamism toward an emerging Muslim subjectivity. The writer, using a modern tool of self-reflexivity—the quintessential character of the novel as a literary genre—gives voice to and subjectivizes the “Muslim.” To do this, he needs to overcome the repressiveness of the collective definitions of Islamic identity. Therein lies the paradox. On the one hand, political Islamism empowers Muslim actors and shapes their identity; on the other, it becomes a hindrance to their self-expression, to their own subjectivities. The novel takes a step forward in the Islamic movement’s story. The author presents an emerging Muslim subject who at first owes his existence to the collective political movement, but who no
longer needs confrontational politics for his identity. This may be read as the “normalization” of Muslim identity. The novel is the narrative of a young Islamist transformed by the relationship of love with the “other” sex. The revolutionary role of love in the construction of subject is decisive. As Alain Touraine writes:

> It is because self-consciousness cannot reveal the subject that the emergence of the subject within an individual is so closely bound up with relations with the other. . . . The love relationship does away with social determinism, and gives the individual a desire to be an actor, to invent a situation, rather than to conform to one. . . . It is thanks to the relationship with the other as subject that individuals cease to be functional elements of the social system and become their own creators and the producers of society.26

Hence, our male character, as he criticizes political Islamism and gives up antisystemic resistance, is not simply conforming to given values of modernity. He is reappropriating modernity, blending it with Islam, and trying to harmonize self and modernity.27

The novel, both as an expression of self-reflexivity and as exposure of the self in public, is not separable from the birth of the modern individual. Self-reflexivity and self-exposure in public are not common traits in societies where communitarian values of modesty prevail. Farzaneh Milani argues that the absence in Persian literature (evident in Turkish literature as well) of autobiography as a literary genre demonstrates the “reluctance to talk publicly and freely about the self,” a condition not only confined to women who are “privatized” but also seen in men who are expected to be “self-contained.”28 This autobiographical novel unveils the newly emerging Muslim male-female subjectivities in the public sphere, which constitute a challenge to the Islamist movement.29 Against the totalizing ideal of Islamism, the novel carves up a space for intimacy and privacy, resisting the monitoring of the personal by the public. Therefore, it expresses the “self-limiting radicalism”30 of Islamism and constitutes a countervailing force against the totalitarian tendencies embedded in Islamist politics. In other terms, the frontiers of the forbidden Islamic public sphere are challenged
from within by the intrusion of Muslim male-female intimacies. Love constitutes a resistance to the suppression of male-female subjectivities and to the puritanization of the public sphere.

A Sex Scandal and the Lost Honor of Religious Marriages

Political Islam is challenged not only by critical subjectivities and romantic love but also by the misuse of religious marriages. Libidinal impulses and promiscuous relations among the newly urbanized and educated youth, along with exhibitionist drives confused with recently acquainted individualism, added to the voyeurism of the public intensified by the rating wars among private television channels, create an explosive mixture for religious moral claims. A sex scandal in a “religious” order that occupied the public’s agenda in January of 1997 through intense mass media coverage brought the taboo subject of religious marriages to the public’s attention.

One of the Aczmendi sect leaders, notorious for his criticisms of secularism and Kemalism, was arrested by the police in an apartment building in Istanbul for committing adultery with an attractive young university student, a follower, Fadime Sahin. He claimed, in front of the television cameras present in the bedroom shooting the postadultery moment “en direct,” that they had a religious marriage. By so doing he first implied that there was nothing illicit between him and the girl (as men have the right to polygamous marriages according to Islamic law). Second, he broke a taboo and sought to legitimate in public the Islamic law and religious marriages, which are outlawed in secular Turkey.

In the most unexpected way—since this was a question of the “lost honor” of a young girl expected to show shame and disappear from the public eye—the girl decided to speak up for herself, denying the existence of a religious marriage. She revealed that she was abused by another sect leader as well, whom she had trusted as a “religious savior” or “father.” Appearing almost every day on a different television channel in her Islamic outfit—a headscarf covering her hair and a long gown hiding her shape—she exposed herself as the victim of religious sects. Very assertive and aggressive in debating male Islamists, she blended religious and modern symbols and re-
ferred constantly to her two sources of cultural capital: as a university student, she mastered modern critical argumentative logic; as a religious disciple, she was familiar with the Islamic moralist rhetoric. The public was amazed by her shameless confessions, self-exposure, attractive looks, and especially by her theatrical performance, ranging from tears to outbursts of anger.

The scandal, apart from indicating once more the subversive forces of women, their sexuality, and their self-exposure in public, highlighted several issues: the displacement of the frontiers between the licit and the illicit, between tradition and modernity, between privacy and publicity, between agency and victimization. But most important of all, with this scandal, polygamy and religious marriages as hitherto suppressed topics made their way into the public realm. Religious marriage became a divisive issue not only between secularists and Islamists, but among Islamists themselves. Traditional religious leaders were perplexed about the ways in which religious marriage reappeared in a modern autonomous context to cover permissive, promiscuous relations in contrast to its social function in a traditional context where it preserves socially recognized gender roles. Not only traditional religious leaders but also political Islamists were constrained to spell out their positions and argued against religious marriages justifying free sexual relations. Secular feminists also participated in the debate, taking the case as confirming their secularist criticisms against Islamist movements, namely, the “abuse” of women. Islamist women were themselves fiercely engaged in the debate, through both panels and newspaper articles. Some Islamist female writers took a very critical position and blamed Muslim males who instrumentalized polygamy and religious marriages in their political struggle against the secular regime. One of the writers claimed sardonically that when men chose a second wife, she was always younger, more beautiful, and better educated (the mark of upward social mobility in Islamist circles) than the first one. This writer reminded her audience also that polygamy in Islamic religion was justifiable only in the case of orphans, widows, or elderly women in need. Islamist women’s associations warned young girls not to accept religious marriages in
secret and to secure a civil marriage, the only lawful one, first. Religious marriages, part of traditional practices, were turned into an issue for political Islamists in their opposition to the secularist social order; they were critically discussed by secularists, religious leaders, Islamist politicians, and by women themselves. This debate destroyed the unspoken alliance between radical Islamists and religious people and created new alliances between Islamist and feminist women. Surprisingly, civil marriage, imposed by the secularist republican elites in 1926, became an individual choice principally for Islamic women themselves. Islamism, with a surprising twist, helped consolidate the indigenization of modern egalitarian values.

Public Space Battles Public Sphere: An Islamic Way of Life

Cultural liberalism, along with economic liberalism, changes the everyday life of secular Turks but even more dramatically of those yearning for an Islamic way of life. The establishment of the Islamic mass media—television channels, radios, and newspapers—makes for the spread of Islamic cultural entertainment, whether in films, novels, music, or theater. An Islamic service sector offers luxury hotels that advertise facilities for an Islamic way of vacationing; they feature separate beaches and nonalcoholic beverages. Islamic dress and fashion shows, Islamic civil societal associations, Islamic pious foundations, associations of Islamic entrepreneurs, and Islamic women’s platforms all attest to a vibrant and rigorous social presence. These examples show the coming of age of the new Islamist middle classes and their upward social mobility through the appropriation of political avenues, cultural communication networks, the service sector, and new consumption patterns.

The popularity of the new and luxurious “Caprice Hotel” (note that the name is written in French and that the word itself is quite alien to Islamic puritanism), located on the western coast of Turkey and owned by a devout entrepreneur, is a case in point. It illustrates the formation of new pious middle classes, attempting to carve their own alternative space, not one that counters the “official” secular one. The Caprice offers summer vacations in conformity with “Islamic” rules: hours of praying are respected and only nonalcoholic beverages are served at
the “bar” of the hotel. There are separate beaches and swimming pools for men and women; one “common beach,” open to all, implies that it is reserved for families only. Swimwear for both sexes can be purchased at the “boutique” of the hotel.

The hotel suggests that Islamists are not immune to the seductive powers of consumption, pleasure, commodity, and property acquisition—the patterns dictated by global and local trends in the market economy. It underscores the transformative power of the market system in which leisure is “Islamicized.” But at the same time that “lifestyle” is more than just a reflection of trends of fashion, the Caprice acquires a significance well beyond the submission to market forces.

First, this lifestyle provokes a public debate among Islamist intellectuals who criticize it and consider such integrative and conformist strategies a contamination of the Islamist movement by Western lifestyle values of consumption. Yet for many members of the newly formed middle classes, “vacation” is a natural need following “working”; neither can be given up just because of its Western character. Secularist public opinion, on the other hand, is mobilized to intervene to outlaw such an Islamic assault on “public” beaches.

Second, the Islamic participation in different national public spheres almost everywhere problematizes the questions of veiling and spatial segregation. Educational institutions, public transportation, places of recreation and sports, arts and culture, and mass media become the sites where the boundaries between the licit and the illicit, between private and visible, are problematized by Islamism.

Third, Islamism challenges, in both Muslim and European contexts, the idea of the public sphere as a homogeneous, secular, and liberal democratic site of communication between free citizens. The construction of an Islamic public sphere(s) can imply pluralism but can also lead to a fragmentation of the larger public sphere that may cause it to lose its binding character. Or, it can reinforce the integrative, national, but limited participatory order of the public sphere by authoritarian means—Islamist, nationalist, or secularist. In any case, democracy depends on finding ways of cohabitation and sharing spaces—
Finally, the concept of public space in contradistinction from that of public sphere is particularly helpful for understanding Islamist politics because the Islamization of self, body, and everyday life requires a space rhythmmed, separated, and regulated according to Islamic precepts. Claiming universalism, becoming global, and using modern technological tools and communication networks are not in themselves signs of a propensity to share open conceptions of politics and society. Islamists use electronics, establish global networks, and chat in cyberspace. But Islamic morality matters in visual physical spaces where gendered socialization takes place rather than in virtual spaces. Rather than abstract citizenship rights, it is the visual, audible, corporal presence of women that determines the limits of freedom and democracy.

A Modern Muslim: From an Islamization of Sociology to the Sociology of Islam

An article written by an Islamist, entitled “On the State of Mind and Soul of an Islamist Sociologist,” published in an Islamist daily newspaper, offers a critical examination of changing self-conceptualizations of modernity and Islam.31

The author tells us about his personal trajectory, which starts with him as a political Islamist and ends up with his becoming a sociologist. The article, an account of the ambiguous relations of Islamists and the relation of an individual with modernity, deals with the complications of daily life, both in professional aspirations and in the self-definition that a total rejection of modernity in the name of political Islam or religion creates.

This article is built around the debate that The Forbidden Modern has fostered among Islamist intellectuals. A well-known Islamist intellectual, Ali Bulaç, has written a review article in which he has fiercely refuted the thesis of the critical interaction and hybridization between Islamists and modernity. To make clear the absolute separation between the two worlds, Bulaç has proposed to change the title of the book to The Forbidden and the Modern. In his view, such a separation of Islamist women from modernity would give a more accurate
account of what is permissible in Islam and in Islam’s encounter with modernity. At first, the young Islamist writer tried to follow his advice. But he was also torn between his Islamist ideal, which called for purity, and what he observed around him and in his own life practice. Perplexed by Islamic fashion shows, by his own interest in films and theater, and by his newly acquired taste for summer vacations, he came to the conclusion that there are many things that Muslims can no longer explain to themselves. Once a “candidate to change the world,” he now praises “thought as the strongest action” and makes a call in his article for “self-criticism.” He tells us that he is no longer frightened by the word *modernity*, does not believe in either the radicalism of the revolution or in the possibility of total withdrawal as a Sufi. He writes of his “loss of purity” as he “interacts with so many diverse people and worlds.” Instead of “Islamizing sociology,” he finds himself “sociologizing Islam”: “My modern profession blends into my identity. I confess that I am a crossbreed; I am a Muslim sociologist—who does not use the word “and” to demarcate between Islam and modernity.”

**CONCLUSION**

Politicized Islam endows Muslims with collective agency, enabling them to use a modern political idiom, invade urban and public spaces of modernity, and appropriate tools of communication. Islamism, especially in its inclusionary contexts, where there is access to educational opportunities, market economy, and private mass media, creates its own middle classes, professional elites, entrepreneurs, and critical intellectuals, who in turn operate within a pluralistic and open society. However, Islamist politics calls for boundary maintenance, trying to set limits to this participatory process. How will the dynamics between boundary maintenance and participatory logic work out?

The process of distancing from Islamic traditions, participation in modern society, and the individuation of Islamist actors may engender a dilution of the movement within democratic and market structures, consequently putting an end to the alter-
native claims of the Islamist project. On the other hand, the affirmation of Islamic difference and purity and the maintenance of boundaries may lead to the rejection of modernity and the establishment of autocratic regimes. Are there ways of turning these practices into processes of cohabitation, hybridization, and reciprocal borrowing that may open the way for a reflection on alternative trajectories and modernities? Are there any indicators that there is an exchange—cross-fertilization, for instance—between Western and Islamic conceptions of self and modernity, modesty and truth, faith and secularism, community and individualism, conservatism and consumerism? Can these two different civilizational appropriations of modernity talk to each other, interact, learn from each other? Criticisms of modernity spell out the limits of modernity, which in turn can provide new cultural sources to reinvigorate it. Alain Touraine criticizes modernity as a divided, fragmented state between subjectivization and rationalization, between a society identified with a market and social actors reduced to drives or traditions. The failure of a combination leads easily to technocratic power or cultural fundamentalism. Modernity has had a self-correcting mechanism that assured its reproduction and innovation from its centers. What is the story at the margins? Are non-Western modernizing societies fated to choose between subjugation to global market forces and native fundamentalism?

The snapshots chosen in this essay bear witness to the critical reappropriations of modernity at its margins—margins in relation to the Western centers of modernity but also in relation to the Islamic movement itself. These snapshots may indeed be considered as marginal, not representative of the Islamist movement. Stories about veiled students, the Islamic writer, the sex scandal in a religious order, an Islamic hotel for summer vacations, the Muslim sociologist—all may at first sight seem trivial. But it is precisely with these seemingly insignificant and unconnected threads that we intend to weave a new vision. These snapshots reveal the critical issues for Islamist politics and its encounter with modernity—women’s veiling as a marker of Islamic difference but also as a criticism of modern transparencies; intimacy between men and women as a catharsis for self-
limiting radicalism; religious marriages as a disintegrative force of the Islamic consensus; visual public spaces as new sites for communitarian control or tolerant pluralism; self-reflexivity of Islamic intellectuals witnessing the difficult question of participatory logic versus boundary maintenance. Political pluralism, market rationality, public debate, and communication networks create an interactive medium with secular programs of modernity in which Islamic agencies develop new subjectivities, life strategies, and public spaces. Islamism as a dynamic social movement, in its interaction with secular actors and its blending with modernity, transforms itself, albeit unintentionally, and our images of modernity as well.

Islamism, in its pursuit of the establishment of religious boundaries, gives priority to the visual, corporal, moral regulation of social relations. The presecular public sphere in the West was also concerned with the uneasy relations between the seen and the unseen and with the regiments of body in time and place. In that sense, Islamism is a manifest assault on the secular definition of the public sphere and an attempt to recuperate that element of corporal regulation. Snapshots are a methodological gateway for reproducing the significance of the ocular and the corporal, telling a different version of a story on Islamism and its asymmetrical reproductions of modernity.

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ENDNOTES


Here Islamism and Islam are used interchangeably to refer to Islamic social movements in the contemporary world that endow Muslims with a collective and conflictual identity in respect both to traditional definitions of Muslim identity and to the cultural program of modernity.


Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 50–82.


Ibid., 33.


Ibid., 78.

Ibid., 16.

Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 32.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 50–51.

Ibid., 170–173.
Ibid., 19.


27 The author recently married an American woman whom he “dated” on the Internet.


29 On how to read, analyze, and interpret contemporary “autobiographical voices” as an ethnographical material, as constructions of self and community, as revelations of traditions, as recollections of disseminated identities, and as cultural criticism, see Michael M. J. Fischer, “Autobiographical Voices (1, 2, 3) and Mosaic Memory: Experimental Sondages in the (Post) Modern World,” in *Autobiography and Postmodernism*, ed. Kathleen Ashley, Leigh Gilmore, and Gerald Peters (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994).


32 Touraine, *Critique of Modernity*.

In the early centuries of the second millennium, wide areas of Eurasia, and most dramatically India and Europe, witnessed a transformation in cultural practice, social-identity formation, and political order with far-reaching and enduring consequences. I call this transformation vernacularization, a process of change by which the universalistic orders, formations, and practices of the preceding millennium were supplemented and gradually replaced by localized forms. The local worlds created by vernacularization, which took on ever sharper definition over time, are now giving way under the pressure of another and more powerful universalizing process, one of whose consequences has been to make us more aware of the very historicity of these local worlds.

Sheldon Pollock

From “India in the Vernacular Millennium: Literary Culture and Polity, 1000–1500”
_Dædalus_ 127 (3) (Summer 1998)
The secular bias of modernization theory has had a significant role in deflecting attention away from the role of religious practices and values in contemporary societies, particularly in the Muslim majority world. In the early 1960s, a leading public intellectual saw the Muslim world as facing an unpalatable choice: either a “neo-Islamic totalitarianism” intent on “resurrecting the past,” or a “reformist Islam” that would open “the sluice gates and [be] swamped by the deluge.” Another suggested that Middle Eastern societies faced the stark choice of “Mecca or mechanization.” At the least, such views suggested an intensely negative assessment of the possibilities of evolution in Muslim societies and an inherent preference for militantly secularizing reformers such as Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) and the Pahlavi Shahs of Iran, Reza Shah (1878–1944) and his son, Mohammed Reza Shah (1919–1980).

Although such views were first expressed in the 1960s, they remained prevalent in the 1990s. In 1994, for example, Ernest Gellner reiterated the view that “Muslim society” remained the exception to the pervasive trend toward a shared culture of nationalism with its ensuing fruit of modernity—commonly educated, mutually substitutable, atomized individuals with the potential for participating in a “civil society.” Gellner argued
that civil society precludes the “ideological monopoly” that Islam supposedly enjoins.\(^3\)

In such formulations, Islam is viewed as a particularly salient example of the diminishing or obstructive role of religion and of religious thinkers in achieving a modern society in which individuals negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options not necessarily congruent with collective religious sentiments.\(^4\)

Open societies claim to respect religion and religious worship. At the same time, however, in the words of philosopher Richard Rorty, religion usually functions as a “conversation-stopper” outside of circles of believers.\(^5\)

Rorty’s observation points to a second underlying continuity in the view of most modernization theories concerning the contemporary role of religious intellectuals. Writing in the heyday of modernization theory in the 1960s, Edward Shils observed that “intellectual” work originally arose from religious occupations, but that religious orientations in modern times attract “a diminishing share of the creative capacities of the oncoming intellectual elite.” In Shils’s view, “the tradition of distrust of secular and ecclesiastical authority—and in fact of tradition as such—has become the chief secondary tradition of the intellectuals.”\(^6\) The notion of the sacred had shifted, in his view, from religious concerns to a focus on and mastery of the technological, organizational, and political skills most useful in forging a modern state. The present thus belongs to the liberals and the technocrats, found primarily in the differentiated “modern” class. Shils argues that only intellectuals attached to these “modern” values have the vision to rise above parochial identities and to attach themselves to the notion of a modern nation-state. “Religious” intellectuals are thus implicitly marginalized.

Common to all variants of modernization theory is the assumption of a declining role for religion, except as a private matter. To move toward modernity, political leaders must displace the authority of religious leaders and devalue the importance of traditional religious institutions. “Modernity” is seen as an “enlargement of human freedoms” and an “enhancement of the range of choices” as people begin to “take charge” of themselves.\(^7\) Religion can retain its influence only by conforming to such norms as “rationality” and relativism, accepting
secularization, and making compromises with science, economic concerns, and the state.

Recent history offers formidable challenges to modernization theory. Of all the countries of the Third World, Iran was a society that had undergone enormous modernization prior to 1978–1979. Nonetheless, the state’s greatest challenge emanated from the growing urban middle classes, those who had benefited the most from modernization. Revolution, not political stability, was the result. Moreover, it was religious sentiment and leadership, not the secular intelligentsia, that gave the revolution its coherence and force.

Writing from the perspective of the late 1990s, an Iranian political scientist, Fariba Adelkhah, goes further. She argues that the real Iranian revolution is taking place only now, with the coming of age of a new generation of Iranians who were not even born at the time of the 1978–1979 revolution. This new generation is creating and participating in an Iranian “religious public sphere” (*espace public confessionel*) in which politics and religion are subtly intertwined, and not always in ways anticipated by Iran’s established religious leaders. The emergence of this public sphere has also been accompanied by a greater sense of personal autonomy for both women and men.⁸

Latin America also offers contrary examples to the conventional wisdom of modernization theory. In Peru and Guatemala, new networks of trust, confidence, and organizational capacities have arisen with religious change as groups of clergy, including progressive Catholics in Peru and evangelicals in Guatemala, create a social capital in which “‘stability’ is created from below, not imposed from above.”⁹ The United States might serve as a further example, in which religious congregations, hierarchies, and religious special interests contribute significantly to ongoing debates over collective values.¹⁰

How disconcerting to the view of modernity and modernization as excluding religion from the public sphere and the nation-state to see no less a committed political leader than Václav Havel write that “human rights, human freedoms, and human dignity have their deepest roots outside the perceptible world.” On the state and its probable role in the future, Havel writes that “while the state is a human creation, human beings are the
creation of God.” Havel considers modern thought, “based on the premise that the world is objectively knowable, and that the knowledge so obtained can be absolutely generalized,” to have reached a “final” crisis. The way out, he concludes, is for the politician of the future to trust in “soul, individual spirituality,” and, above all, “in his own subjectivity as his principal link with the subjectivity of the world.” Labeled by some as a contemporary “Romanic Rebel,” Havel’s ideas nonetheless influenced U.S. debates over funding for basic science research in the mid-1990s.

Havel notwithstanding, it is primarily in the Muslim world that—in Gilles Kepel’s evocative phrase—we are faced with the “revenge of God.” In a globalized McWorld, only the “green menace” of “Jihad” offers resistance to the advance of modernization and the Enlightenment. Or does it?

THE RETURN OF RELIGION

It is easy to be critical of Samuel Huntington’s “West versus the Rest” argument, but he was one of the first political scientists to spur other political scientists as well as international relations theorists to encourage colleagues and policymakers to reemphasize the role of culture and “tradition” in political and international relations. Decades before Huntington’s “West versus the Rest” argument, other writers, notably Edward Shils, vigorously argued that “tradition” is not a residual concept that can uniformly describe the “pre-modern” values of all civilizations and cultures. For the premodern era as for today, it is difficult to see civilizations and cultures as sharply demarcated and closed. “Traditions” are clusters of cultural concepts, shared understandings, and practices that make political and social life possible. Such pervasive cultural understandings play a crucial element in constituting what we now recognize as “multiple modernities.” They coexist with and shape the experience of modernity. In this sense, ethnicity, caste, and clientelism can be as distinctly modern as the idea of individual choice.

A principal difficulty with Huntington’s “West versus the Rest” formulation is that, having reintroduced culture and
religion to thinking about politics, he overstated their coherence and force, in addition to treating the Muslim world as a monolithic bloc. Culture became an independent variable. The view of religion as a stark alternative—either an independent or a dependent variable—can be avoided by adopting an approach to understanding politics that goes beyond power relations and interests alone. Approaching these issues in a more effective way also requires incorporating an understanding of the shared, often implicit, ideas of what is right, just, or religiously ordained—ideas upon which individuals in a society or from different societies base cooperative relations. Such background understandings are common to adherents of religion, be it Islam, Christianity, or Hinduism. Evolving doctrinal considerations are only one factor among many that contribute to the creation of frameworks of practices and understandings, and adherents to religious traditions are far from monolithic in their use of these frameworks.

Politics is also a struggle over people’s imaginations, a competition over the meanings of symbols. It encompasses the interpretation of symbols and the control of institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them. This interpretation is played out against a backdrop of values and practices embedded in a “social imaginary”—the implicit understandings against which the beliefs and practices in any given society are formulated. More broadly, politics can be conceived as cooperation in and contest over symbolic production and control of the institutions—formal and informal—that serve as the symbolic arbiters of society. Politics as Leviathan is thus decisively abandoned in favor of politics as symbolmaker.

The role of symbolic politics in general, or of “Muslim politics”—in the sense of a field for debate and not a bloc of uniform belief and practice—can be seen as less exceptional if the European experience with secularism is kept in mind. Historian Dominique Colas argues that religious discourse was a basic precondition for the rise of the early modern public sphere in Europe. To this day, strong “background” understandings of Christianity remain in such matters as blasphemy laws, religious holidays, and public prayers. Indeed, contemporary defenders of secularism often exaggerate the durability and
open-mindedness of thoroughly secular institutions, be they in
the United States, in Turkey, or in India. In the context of the
Muslim-majority Middle East, the militant secularism of some
governing elites—the Turkish officer corps, for example—is
associated with authoritarianism and intolerance rather than
with “enlightenment” values.

Because the Muslim-majority world remains feared by those
who regard it as the last outpost of the antimodern, the role of
religious intellectuals in contributing to an emerging public
sphere is often overlooked. This public sphere is rapidly ex-
panding because of the growth of higher education, the increas-
ing ease of travel, and the proliferation of media and means of
communication.

In country after country since the 1950s, access to higher
education has rapidly expanded. Morocco, for instance, com-
mited itself to universal schooling after gaining independence
from France in 1956. Though in 1957 only 13,000 secondary-
school degrees were awarded and university enrollments re-
mained low, by 1965 there were more than 200,000 students in
secondary schools and some 20,000 in universities. By 1992,
secondary-school enrollment topped 1.5 million and university
students numbered 240,000. While illiteracy rates in the gen-
eral populace remain high—38 percent for men and 62 percent
for women—there is now a critical mass of educated people
who are able to read and think for themselves, without relying
on state and religious authorities.23

The situation in Oman is more dramatic, because the trans-
formation has taken place in a much shorter period. In 1975–
1976, a mere 22 students attended secondary school. Little
more than a decade later, in 1987–1988, 13,500 did. In 1997,
there were 77,000, and there are more than 8,000 students in
post-secondary institutions, including the national university,
which opened in 1986.24

Elsewhere the story is much the same, although the starting
dates and levels of achievement differ. In Turkey, Indonesia,
and Malaysia, mass education has reached every city, town,
and village. In Turkey, for instance, adult illiteracy rates as of
1995 were 8 percent for males and 28 percent for females,
down from 65 percent and 85 percent, respectively, four de-
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cades earlier. Secondary schools are now ubiquitous, and both private and public universities have proliferated. In Indonesia, university enrollment, only 50,000 in 1960, reached 2.3 million in 1996.25

Even where educational expansion has not kept up with population growth, large numbers of citizens now speak a common language. In Arabic, for example, there often is a great divide between the colloquial speech of everyday use and the formal, standard language of newspapers, radio, and public speech. Education, especially higher education, in the “public” language of formal, literary Arabic allows people to “talk back” to religious and political authorities in this public language. Education, like mass communications, also makes people more conscious of their beliefs and practices and encourages thinking of them as a system, allowing for comparison with other ideas and practices. Education and the greater ease of communication also erode intellectual and physical boundaries and enable connections to be made across formerly impenetrable barriers of class, locality, language, and ethnic group.

Both mass education and mass communications, particularly the proliferation of media, profoundly influence how people think about the language of religious and political authority throughout the Muslim world. We are still in the early stages of understanding how different media—print, television, radio, music, and the Internet—influence groups and individuals, encouraging unity in some contexts and fragmentation in others.

Although rivaled by other media, the printed word remains a privileged cultural vehicle for shaping religious beliefs and practices throughout the Muslim world. Books and pamphlets, including banned ones, are discussed and invoked in sermons, lectures, reviews, and conversations. In seeking to ban and confiscate them, censors only draw attention to their existence and increase their circulation.26

At the high end of this transformation is the rise to significance of books such as *al-Kitab wa-l-Qur’an: Qira’a mu’asira* (The Book and the Qur’an: A Contemporary Interpretation), an eight-hundred-page work first published in 1990 by the Syrian civil engineer Muhammad Shahrur. He has subsequently published books and pamphlets elaborating his views on the role of
the state, civil society, and democracy in Qur’anic thought.27 The first book has sold tens of thousands of copies throughout the Arab world in both authorized (in Damascus and Beirut) and pirate (in Cairo) editions and is widely distributed in photocopies in countries such as Saudi Arabia, where its circulation has been banned or discouraged. Books such as Shahrur’s could not have been imagined before large numbers of people could read and understand its advocacy of the need to reinterpret ideas of religious authority and tradition and to apply Islamic precepts to contemporary society.

Shahrur draws an analogy between the Copernican revolution and Qur’anic interpretation, which he says has been shackle-d for centuries by the conventions of medieval jurists and those willing to follow in their tradition:

People believed for a long time that the sun revolved around the earth, but they were unable to explain some phenomena derived from this assumption until one person, human like themselves, said, “The opposite is true: The earth revolves around the sun.” . . . After a quarter of a century of study and reflection, it dawned on me that we Muslims are shackled by prejudices (musallimat), some of which are completely opposite from the [correct perspective].28

On issues ranging from the role of women in society to rekindling a “creative interaction” with non-Muslim philosophies, Shahrur argues that Muslims should reinterpret sacred texts anew and apply them to contemporary social and moral issues: “If Islam is sound [salih] for all times and places,” then we must not neglect historical developments and the interaction of different generations. We must act as if “the Prophet just . . . informed us of this Book.”29

Shahrur’s ideas directly challenge the authoritative tradition of Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir) and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). The subtitle of his first book—A Contemporary Interpretation—uses the term qira’a, which can mean either reading or interpretation, rather than the term tafsir, which directly evokes the established conventions of traditional Islamic learning from which Shahrur advocates a decisive break. Shahrur argues that traditional disciplines of learning such as tafsir have implicitly acquired an authority equal to that of the Qur’an itself, except
that the juridical tradition says little about tyranny, absolutism, and democracy.\textsuperscript{30} Such ideas are at the center of an emerging global debate in which all Muslims—argue thinkers such as Shahrur—have a personal obligation to participate.

Because Shahrur’s ideas pose such basic challenges to established religious authority, he has been attacked in Friday sermons in Damascus and elsewhere, even though one leading legal scholar, Wael Hallaq, recently wrote that Shahrur’s efforts to reformulate Islamic jurisprudence are the “most convincing” of those of all contemporary thinkers.\textsuperscript{31}

The vigorous discussion his ideas have provoked is all the more noteworthy because his notion of disseminating his ideas is almost as formally rigorous as Kant’s notion of “public” contained in his essay on the Enlightenment. For Kant, the idea of “public” is the words of a writer appearing before readers without the help of authoritative intermediaries such as preachers, judges, and rulers. With the exception of a small study circle in Damascus composed mostly of engineers, Shahrur’s primary means of communication is the book, an unadorned means of persuasion that appeals to a growing educated middle class and continues to represent the pinnacle of knowledge to others. His public appearances are infrequent and he has never appeared on radio or television in the Arab world.

Shahrur is only one of many public intellectuals in the Muslim world who implicitly attack both conventional religious wisdom and the intolerant certainties of religious radicals, and he argues instead for a constant and open reinterpretation of how sacred texts apply to social and political life. Another Syrian thinker, the secularist Sadiq Jalal al-‘Azm, does the same. A debate between al-‘Azm and Shaykh Yusif al-Qaradawi, a conservative religious intellectual, was broadcast on al-Jazira satellite television (Qatar) on May 27, 1997. For the first time in the memory of many viewers, the religious conservative came across as the weaker, more defensive voice. A similar debate took place in December of 1997 on the same program, between Nasir Hamid Abu Zayd and the Egyptian religious thinker Muhammad ‘Imara. Such discussions are unlikely to be rebroadcast on state-controlled television in most Arab nations, where programming on religious and political themes is gener-
ally cautious. Nevertheless, satellite technology and videotape render traditional censorship ineffective. Tapes of these broadcasts circulate from hand to hand in Morocco, Oman, Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere. 32

Other voices also advocate reform. Fethullah Gülen, Turkey’s answer to media-savvy American evangelist Billy Graham, appeals to a wide spectrum of religiously minded Turks, both in Turkey and elsewhere in the world. In televised chat shows, interviews, and occasional sermons, Gülen speaks about Islam and science, democracy, modernity, religious and ideological tolerance, the importance of education, and current events. 33 Religious movements such as Turkey’s Risale-i Nur appeal increasingly to religious moderates, and the link between Islam, reason, science, and modernity, and the lack of inherent clash between “East” and “West,” promote education at all levels and appeal to growing numbers of educated Turks. One need not visit Turkey to learn more about the movement; its web site is available in English and Turkish. 34

Iran’s Abdukarim Soroush argues that a proper understanding of Islam enjoins dialogue, a willingness to understand the opinions of others, adaptation, and civility. Indonesian and Malaysian moderates make similar arguments. 35 To the annoyance of more conservative clerics, Soroush has captured the religious imagination of Persian speakers in Iran and abroad, and his work, in printed translation and on the Internet in several languages including Turkish, Arabic, and English, has a reach far beyond Iran.

Not all influential religious books are aimed at highbrows. Mass schooling has created a wide audience of people who read but are not literary sophisticates, and there has been an explosive growth in what a French colleague of mine, Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, calls generic “Islamic books”—inexpensive, attractively printed mass-market texts. 36 Some of these books address practical questions of how to live as a Muslim in the modern world and the perils of neglecting Islamic obligations, and not all appeal to reason and moderation. Many have bold, eye-catching covers and sensational titles such as The Terrors of the Grave, or What Follows Death. 37 Other, more subdued works—usually written by men—offer advice to young women
on how to live as Muslims today. Often based on the sermons of popular preachers, Islamic books are written in a breezy, colloquial style rather than the cadences of traditional literary Arabic and are sold on sidewalks and outside mosques rather than in bookstores. While Egyptian Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz is considered successful if he sells five thousand copies of one of his novels in a year in his own country, Islamic books often have sales in six figures.

As a result of direct and broad access to the printed, broadcast, and electronically recorded word, more and more Muslims take it upon themselves to interpret the textual sources—classical or modern—of Islam. Much has been made of the “opening up” (infitah) of the economies of many Muslim-majority countries, allowing “market forces” to reshape economies, no matter how painful the consequences in the short run. In Bangladesh, women’s romance novels, once a popular specialty distributed in secular bookstores, now have Islamic counterparts distributed through Islamic bookstores, making it difficult to distinguish between “Muslim” romance novels and “secular” ones.38

In a way analogous to economic market forces, intellectual market forces support some forms of religious innovation and activity over others, and in all cases support—or in the most negative instances must appear to support—reasoned public discussion and debate. The result is a collapse of earlier, hierarchical notions of religious authority based on claims to the mastery of fixed bodies of religious texts. Even when there are state-appointed religious authorities—as in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Malaysia, and some of the Central Asian republics—there no longer is any guarantee that their word will be heeded, or even that they themselves will follow the lead of the regime.

RELIGIOUS INTELLECTUALS IN THE EMERGING PUBLIC SPHERE

Thinkers such as Muhammad Shahrur are redrawing the boundaries of public and religious life in the Muslim-majority world by challenging conventional religious authority. The replacement they suggest implies a constructive fragmentation. With
the advent of mass higher education has come an objectification of Islamic tradition in the eyes of many believers. Questions such as “What is Islam?” “How does it apply to the conduct of my life?” and “What are the principles of faith?” increasingly are foregrounded in the consciousness of many believers and are explicitly discussed. These objectified understandings have irrevocably transformed the Muslim relationship to sacred authority. Of crucial importance in this process has been a “democratization” of the politics of religious authority and the development of a standardized language infused and disseminated by mass higher education, the mass media, travel, and labor migration. This has led to an opening up of the political process and heightened competition for the mantles of political and religious authority. Without fanfare, the notion of Islam as dialogue and civil debate is gaining ground.

A new sense of publicness is emerging throughout Muslim-majority states and Muslim communities elsewhere. It is shaped by increasingly open contests over the use of the symbolic language of Islam. New and accessible modes of communication have made these contests more global, so that even local issues take on transnational dimensions. Muslims, of course, act not just as Muslims but according to class interests, out of a sense of nationalism, on behalf of tribal or family networks, and out of all the diverse motives that characterize human endeavor. Increasingly, however, large numbers of Muslims explain their goals in terms of the normative, globalized language of Islam. Muslim identity issues are not unitary or identical, but such issues have become a significant force. It is in this sense that one can speak of an emerging Muslim public sphere and a reconsideration of the role of religion in “modern” societies elsewhere.

This distinctly public sphere exists at the intersections of religious, political, and social life and contributes to the creation of civil society. With access to contemporary forms of communication that range from the press and broadcast media to fax machines, audiocassettes, and videocassettes, from the telephone to the Internet, Muslims, like Christians, Hindus, Jews, Sikhs, and others, have more rapid and flexible ways of building and sustaining contact with constituencies than was
available in earlier decades. The asymmetries of the earlier
mass-media revolution are being reversed by new media in new
hands. This combination of new media and new contributors to
religious and political debates fosters an awareness on the part
of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic
values can be created. It feeds into new senses of a public space
that is discursive, performative, and participative, and not con-
fined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities.

Just as there are multiple paths to modernity, there is a
growing practical awareness throughout the Muslim majority
world of multiple claimants to the task of articulating how
Islamic virtues should relate to public and political life. In this
respect, print and other media direct consciousness to and craft
certain models of civility, membership within a community, and
citizenship within a nation, all resting on more or less mutual
packages of commitments and expectations. As in Hinduism
and Christianity, the real “clash of civilizations” in the modern
era is not, as Robert Hefner says, “between the West and some
homogeneous ‘other’ but between rival carriers of tradition
within the same nations and civilizations.”

Publicly shared ideas of community, identity, and leadership
take new shapes in such engagements, even as many communi-
ties and authorities claim an unchanged continuity with the
past. Mass education, so important in the development of na-
tionalism in an earlier era, and a proliferation of media and
means of communication have multiplied the possibilities for
creating communities and networks between them, dissolving
prior barriers of space and distance and opening new grounds
for interaction and mutual recognition.

Two cautions, however, are in order. The first is that an
expanding public sphere need not necessarily indicate more
favorable prospects for democracy, any more than “civil soci-
ety” necessarily entails democracy (although it is a precondi-
tion of such). Authoritarian regimes are also compatible with
an expanding public sphere. They may claim to speak for the
“people,” although multiple and alternative forms of commu-
nication, as well as shared knowledge and ways of thought in the
modern world, offer wider avenues for awareness of competing
and alternative forms of religious and political authority.
The proliferation of communication and education in today’s global society is increasing the power of religious intellectuals in much of the Muslim-majority world. Increasingly, these intellectuals have become a transnational elite. Acquiring such a global presence may diminish the importance of cultural traditions, but it increases disparities of class. Mobility increases for a small segment of the elite with globalization, but polarities increase in the more localized remainder. As a consequence, religious intellectuals like Iran’s Abdokarim Soroush become more in tune with Edward Said, but at the risk of losing touch with the local majority.

In the present era, to paraphrase the Sorbonne-educated Sudanese religious intellectual Hasan Turabi, an ‘alim, or religious intellectual, is as likely to be an engineer or doctor as a religious scholar. Even the idea of Islamic law, the shari’a, once a matter entrusted to specialists, now involves large numbers of people—and not just a scholastically trained religious elite—who debate its meaning and application. Just as the new media have blurred the line between public and private, so has the modern era blurred the assumed hard-and-fast line between religion and politics.

The prevailing secularist bias of many current theories of society has alternately marginalized and demonized religious forces and religious intellectuals. I have emphasized trends in the Muslim world because they have been characterized as especially resistant to “modernity.” Yet the Muslim majority world is as open as that of any other civilizational domain. We live in a world in which an Islamic leader such as Fethullah Gülen meets popes and patriarchs, advocating diversity and tolerance in the public sphere more than many of those who are secular. Far from compromising the public sphere, religious movements and religious intellectuals in the Muslim-majority world can advocate compromise and a mutual agreement to persuade by words rather than by force. Religious intellectuals may claim strong links with the past, but their practice in the present conveys significantly different ideas of person, authority, and responsibility.
ENDNOTES


134  Dale F. Eickelman


28Shahrur, al-Kitab wa-l-Qur’an, 29.

29Shahrur, Dirasat Islamiya, 23. As popular as Shahrur’s views are in some circles, some conservative Muslims argue that he underestimates the ability of madrasa-trained religious scholars to adapt their version of authoritative religious learning to new contexts. However, most observers agree that madrasa-trained scholars are losing their audience and former authority.

30Ibid.
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China two hundred years ago was an uninterrupted land empire of three hundred million people living in entirely preindustrial circumstances within a rational, internally consistent political framework; no such polity has ever existed in Western history. It was not only stranger than any Western theorist might think, it was also slightly stranger than we can imagine, using the motley language of state formation that we get from centuries of a much more politically fragmented European experience. Our situation is a little like that of the sixteenth-century European explorers in the Americas who first struggled to find the words to describe the astonishing biodiversity of Brazil for home audiences who had never seen it. (The explorers at least could paint pictures.) We need to construct a more historically “open” language of social and political analysis than the one we have. With respect to China, Korea, and Vietnam, such a language would not necessarily accommodate only Confucianism. A Chinese economist told the readers of China’s leading economics journal in 1997 that Taoist theories of noninterference are as valuable as the “invisible hand” of Western economics in thinking about contemporary state-society relations. This suggests that a slightly less Westernized language of analysis—one that saw political systems as embodiments of intuitive knowledge as well as of rational-legal principles—might be the means by which postcolonial Max Webers could emerge.

Alexander Woodside

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Sudipta Kaviraj

Modernity and Politics in India

This essay is in two parts. The first part suggests that conventional theoretical models about the structure of modernity and its historical extension across the world are faulty; to understand the historical unfolding of modernity, especially in the non-Western world, these theories need some revision. The second part tries to illustrate this point by analyzing the role of “the political” in India’s modernity.

Theories of Modernity

Most influential theories of modernity in Western social theory, like the ones developed by Marx and Weber, contain two central ideas. The first is that what we describe as modernity is a single, homogeneous process and can be traced to a single causal principle. In the case of Marx, it is the rise of capitalist commodity production; for Weber, a more abstract principle of rationalization of the world. It is acknowledged that modernity has various distinct aspects: the rise of a capitalist industrial economy, the growth of modern state institutions and resultant transformations in the nature of social power, the emergence of democracy, the decline of the community and the rise of strong individualistic social conduct, the decline of religion and the secularization of ethics. Still, these are all part of a historical structure animated by a single principle. This thesis comes in...
two versions. The first sees these as subsets of what is a single process of rationalization of the social world. A slightly different version would acknowledge that these processes are distinct and historically can emerge quite independently. But it would still claim that these processes are functionally connected to each other in such a way that the historical emergence of any one tends to create conditions for all others. Social individuation, for instance, is a prior condition for the successful operation of a capitalist economy. All these processes of modernity either stand or fall together.

A second idea usually accompanies this functionalist model of modernity. It is widely believed that as modernity spreads from the Western centers of economic and political power to other parts of the world, it tends to produce societies similar to those of the modern West. A corollary of this belief is that when we come across societies different from Western models, this is because they are not sufficiently modernized; they remain traditional. Modernity replicates Western social forms in other parts of the world; wherever it goes it produces a uniform “modernity.” Both these theses appear to me to need some revision.

There are at least three different reasons why we should expect modernity not to be homogeneous, not to result in the same kind of social process and reconstitution of institutions in all historical and cultural contexts.

First, the coming of modernity is a massive alteration of social practices. Modern practices are not always historically unprecedented in the sense that the society was entirely unfamiliar with that kind of practice earlier. Most of the significant social practices transformed by modernity seem to fall into the spheres of political power (state), economic production, education, science, even religion. It is true that modernity often introduces a radical rupture in the way these social affairs are conducted. In all cases, the modern way of doing things is not written on a “clean slate.” Practices are worked by social individuals who come from appropriate types of practical contexts, and these social actors have to undergo a process of coercive or elective willed transformation into a different way of doing things. What actually happens when such modernizing...
individuals learn new things can be suggestively likened to learning a language. Like the accents from our native languages that always stick to and embarrass our English, working from within or underneath, pulling our speech in the direction of a different speech, the background skills of earlier practices work inside and through the new ones to bend them into unfamiliar shapes. To take a simple example, one of the most startling cultural changes in nineteenth-century Bengal was the complete transformation of educational structures. The modern Bengali’s conversion to Western educational ideals was so complete that traditional systems of instructions and the schools that imparted them disappeared within a very short time and were replaced by a modern educational system that, in its formal pedagogic doctrine, emphasized critical reasoning and extolled the virtues of extreme skepticism in the face of authority. Yet actual pedagogic practice retained the traditional emphasis on memory. Soon, more careful observers felt that one system of unquestioned authority had been replaced by another, and the reverence shown toward modern Western theories seemed particularly paradoxical.

The second reason lies in the plurality of the processes that constitute modernity by their historical combination. In modern social theory, there are various intellectual strategies that try to reduce this diversity into a homogeneous process or outcome. Some of them offer a theory of intellectual origin claiming that an intellectual principle like rationality expresses itself in and takes control of all spheres of modern life. So, the transformations in science, religion (secularization), political disciplines, industrialization, and commodification can all be seen as extensions of the single principle of rationality to these various spheres. Alternatively, some other theories suggest a functional connection among various spheres of modern social life, which often take a causally primacist form. Functionalist Marxism claims that the causal primacy of the capitalist relations of production transform other sectors of the economy, and subsequently other spheres of social life like politics and culture, to produce eventually a capitalist social formation. Alexis de Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy appears to make a comparable primacist claim about the causal powers of the demo-
cratic principle. Historical accounts, however, show that the actual history of modernity does not manifest such strong functional characteristics. On the basis of historical evidence, it seems possible to make the opposite case. Not only is one process insufficient for the production of others, but the precise sequence in which these processes occur and the precise manner in which they are interconnected have a strong bearing on the form that modernity takes. Thus, to consider only the two most relevant to the Indian case—the temporal relation of capitalism and democracy—the absence of democracy might have assisted great spurts of capitalist growth in some East Asian societies, but under Indian conditions, when democracy is an established political practice, it seriously affects the actual structure and historical path of capitalist development. Similarly, if secular state institutions are subjected to determination by democratic decision-making processes, the outcome might be quite different from what an unworried theory of secularization might expect.

Third, the history of modernity is marked by a principle of reflexivity in two forms. Modern societies are constantly engaged in devising more effective and expanded forms of collective agency. The growth of modern political “disciplines,” like a bureaucratic administration, the training of modern armies, and states of collective consciousness such as nationalism, all contribute to this obsessive search for forms of deliberate and well-directed collective action. The evolution of modern democratic mechanisms provides these societies with a new technique of collective will formation. When all these processes come together, it becomes possible to say that a government acts on behalf of the society, if only to translate its collective intentions into policy. These processes are reflexive in two senses. First, many of these modern devices of collective will and agency are directed not only toward “others”—i.e., other states in wars, or subjected territories in colonial empires—but also, in crucial cases, toward the society itself. They are reflexive in the second sense in that these techniques require constant monitoring of their own effectiveness and are regularly reformed in response to perceived failures or in search of more effective solutions. This implies that concern for the rationality of systems and institutions generates a constantly recursive
consideration of options open to societies and groups for arranging their own structures; societies, consequently, learn from an analysis of their own and others’ experience. Because of the existence of this kind of recursive rationality at the heart of modern institutional forms, it is unpractical to expect that later societies would blindly repeat the experiences of the West. The initial conditions of their modernity are different, and therefore they cannot imitate the West. In other respects, these societies may not wish to emulate the West since the experience of Western modernity is diverse and not uniformly attractive.

I shall now follow the story of political modernity in India through its three most significant aspects: the modern state, nationalism, and democracy. My argument will be that all three introduce distinctively modern ideas and institutions, but in each case these institutions or movements have evolved in ways that are different from recognized Western equivalents.

COLONIALISM AND THE STATE

The state is utterly central to the story of modernity in India. It is not merely one of the institutions that modernity brings with it, for all institutions in a sense come through the state and its selective mediation. However, some peculiarities of the entry of colonialism into Indian society ought to be noted because they make this history quite different from the principal narratives of state formation in the West. Curiously, British commercial enterprise initially entered India without a serious confrontation with the Mughal imperial authority. This happened because of the peculiar way social power was organized under the caste system. Everyday caste practice disciplined social conduct without frequent direct recourse to the power of the state; rather, the holders of political authority were themselves governed by the rules of caste order and barred by its regulations from exercising legislative power over the productive arrangements of society. Royal authority is explicitly entrusted with the responsibility of upholding caste arrangements, which includes punishing infringement and restoring society to its normal form. But political authorities lacked the jurisdiction to alter individuals’ caste membership or the ritual hierarchy be-
tween caste groups. In traditional Indian social order, political power is often distributed between several layers of legitimate authority stretching from the village or locality at the micro level, through regional kingdoms, to immense empires like the ones set up by the Mauryas or the Mughals. Historically, in India’s political history constant shifts of power occurred from one level to another. With the emergence of empires, kingdoms were either overwhelmed or subsumed into their control, only to reemerge as real centers of authority once the empires, usually rather short-lived, began to decline. The relation between these levels of authority is better described as one of subsumption or subsidiarity rather than sovereignty, as the powers of even the highest centers of power were circumscribed in two ways: the caste system set aside certain fundamentally important parts of social conduct from its legitimate field, and its relations with lower levels were often arranged in a way that was closer to modern federal arrangements than to the indivisibility implied by the Austinian definition of state sovereignty.

This explains the peculiarly stealthy entrance of British power in India. The British finally dispensed with the titular authority of the Mughal emperors only after the revolt of 1857. Control over the province of Bengal, which functioned as the indispensable platform for British imperial expansion into other regions, was achieved without formal assumption of “sovereign” authority. Because traditional Indian society was not organized around the power of the state, the British administration in Bengal could start as a revenue-raising body and gradually extend its control over most other spheres of social life without overcoming or controlling the explicitly political authority of the Mughal empire.

In a paradoxical way, once they settled down in India, the British introduced two rather different types of ideas and practices: the first, the idea of state sovereignty; the second, which in part runs contrary to the absolutist demands of sovereignty, the idea of “spheres” of social life, only one of which was in the narrow sense “political.” Both of these ideas were fundamentally different from the conceptual schema governing traditional Indian social life. After British power was consolidated,
it was forcefully used to create a replica of the kind of state authority that by this time dominated Europe. But here again we observe significant differences. This was a process of state formation in the entirely literal sense of the term: i.e., the complex of institutional mechanisms that we call the “state” was in fact “formed,” literally brought into existence. This does not mean that earlier Indian society did not know social stratification or intricate organization of social power. It surely did. But this points to a central fact that is being demonstrated by trends toward globalization. The regulative functions that are now exclusively invested in the modern state, to the extent that we cannot easily imagine any other institution performing them, need not be concentrated in that manner under all circumstances.

This condensation of functions was a phenomenon of modern history—started by European absolutist states, carried forward at each stage by techniques of “disciplinary power” and the rise of nationalism, democracy, and the welfare state. Although these processes are very different and are caused and sustained by enormously different circumstances, they led to a secular tendency toward a concentration of all regulatory functions in the instruments of the state. But, in principle, these regulatory functions can exist without being concentrated in a single institutional complex. Before modernity, such strange distributions were possible, as British title to the Dewani of Bengal showed: even such important state functions as the collection of revenue could be handed over to a commercial body run by a group of foreigners. Colonialism does not come to India as one state invading or making demands on another. It presents itself and is taken seriously as a corporation, the East India Company. But the East India Company had to perform functions that were, in my sense, state functions—the collection of revenue, the introduction of statewide accountancy, and the production of statistics and cognitive registers like mapping, through which the territory could be made familiar to its foreign administrators. After a lapse of a century, these state processes, introduced piecemeal, at different times, combine to create in a real sense a “colonial state.” As a next step in our argument, it is
necessary to compare the colonial state to the contemporary Western form.

The colonial state gradually instituted an enormous discursive project—an attempt to grasp cognitively this alien society and bring it under intellectual control. This knowledge was crucial in making use of the vast potentialities of this country in the economic and military fields. There is evidence of the introduction of disciplinary techniques in the bureaucracy, the military, and the colonial prison system. But this tendency is cut through and counteracted by an opposite one. Cognitive Orientalism, the development of a large body of cognitively disciplined material that documented what the nature of this land was like, often created a powerful intellectual tendency in the opposite direction. Orientalist knowledge might, inside the West, create prejudices against the Orient and make it appear inferior; but Edward Said’s suggestion that it tended to show the Orient systematically as an object, passive and tractable, to be molded by Western initiative is certainly partial and misleading.5

On the contrary, the Orientalist knowledge about India quite often bore the opposite implication for policy-making. The more systematic knowledge was gathered about social conduct and forms of consciousness, the more edgy and anxious administrative opinion became about the amenability of this society to standard Western ruling practices. What is important is not the general point that Indian society was radically different, but the more specific question of how this difference was read, what this difference was seen to consist of. By this time, Western societies were significantly secularized; the central question of political life was class conflict. In Indian society, by contrast, religion provided the basis of primary and all-consuming group identities. Western societies were also regarded as broadly culturally homogeneous, unified by single languages and common cultures; Indian society was bewildering in its cultural and linguistic diversity. It was commonly argued that since Indian society was so fundamentally unlike Western society, none of the presuppositions of Western state practices applied there; policies that could be justified on abstract rational grounds, or by reference to sociological arguments in the West, were un-
likely to work in India. Surely, the expression of this sense of intractable difference was usually in the form of regarding Indian society or its practices, including its art, as irrational and inferior; but the political point was that administrative and governing rules, in order to be effective, must be appropriate to social conditions. Colonial power was thus influenced by a very complex, occasionally contradictory set of ruling ideas: some showed the characteristic universalism of Enlightenment thought; others considered this hasty and uninformed. In these circumstances, the colonial structure of political power eventually came to be modeled upon the British state only in some respects; in others it developed according to a substantially different logic. It was assumed that The Permanent Settlement Act, for example, introduced by Cornwallis in 1793, would encourage the growth of a class of progressive landowners and improve agriculture, a line of argument drawn directly from Adam Smith. Yet this experiment was extended to other parts of India. This produced a social class entirely loyal to British rule, but the economic results were disappointing. Appreciation of the “differences” of Indian society often stopped the colonial authorities from getting too deeply involved in the “internal” matters of the society they now controlled; the objectives of colonialism were fulfilled by keeping control over the political sphere and allowing the traditional structure of subsidiarity to continue.

In the comparative study of colonialism, one striking fact is the different manner in which local religions responded to the colonial presence. European colonialism obviously invaded ideological structures of the societies they came to control. Certainly, British creators of new structures of knowledge based their work on the support of highly skilled, and at times unbelievably arrogant, native informants. Still, colonialism triggered an immense intellectual assault on the culture of traditional societies. It undermined traditional knowledge about the world, not merely in natural science, but also about how society was conceived, in particular how to determine which social practices were just or unjust. Yet the results of the European intellectual impact were extremely variable across colonial societies. In Latin America and subsequently in Africa, indig-
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Enous religious structures collapsed and were replaced by Christianity, although it is often argued that there was subtle creolization of Christian beliefs with earlier religious practices. In India, remarkably, despite very energetic Christian missionary activity, the two major religions stood their ground. Hinduism and Islam remained largely undestroyed by colonialism, partly because English colonial rule was vastly different from the brutal excesses of Spanish conquests in Latin America.

The presence of Christianity, however, caused enormous internal transformations within Indian religious life. In Hinduism, it gave rise to at least two different trends with far-reaching consequences. First, by drawing Hindu intellectuals into religious and doctrinal debates on rationalist terms with Protestant missionaries, it forced Hindu doctrinal justifications to change their character, leading to attempts to harmonize religion with a rationalist picture of the world. Consequently, it was difficult to tell whether the fundamental concession to rationalism was more significant than the defense of Hindu doctrines. Hindu society changed in fundamental ways. For instance, caste practices, clearly essential to traditional Hinduism, were seen by Hindu reformers as morally repugnant and doctrinally dispensable. Attacks on caste practice, which initially came only from outside Hindu society—from missionaries or from the small section of intellectual atheists—by the turn of the century came from figures who were in various ways quite central to the Hindu discourse: Vivekananda, Gandhi, and Tagore. The most significant fact was that indigenous religion, on which the entire intellectual life of society depended, did not decline, but rather restructured itself by using the European critique. The impact of Western civilization—not its power structures, but its immense intellectual presence—was tackled with a surprising degree of intellectual sophistication and confidence. Within thirty years of the introduction of this utterly new civilization, Bengali society produced an intellectual class that had acquired sufficient mastery not merely of the foreign language, but also of the entirely unprecedented conceptual language of rationalism, to engage in an uproarious discussion about what to take and what to reject of the proposals of Western modernity. This, incidentally, shows the inapplicability to Bengal and later to
India of Said’s unguarded assertion that Orientalism reduced colonized societies to intellectual submission and silence. In any case, there were many reasons why the introduction of Western state practices to the Indian colony could not lead to an exact duplication of Western state-formation processes. First, the conditions in which processes were introduced in India and in the West were quite different. Absolutism in Europe had introduced a form of internal sovereignty dissolving all competing claims to political authority, the like of which Indian society had never seen. Second, the colonial state itself refracted its initiatives through Orientalist conceptions of Indian society, which emphasized the fact that the environment was basically different; therefore the colonial rulers withheld certain Western practices and modified others. Finally, even in those aspects of state practices under colonialism where Western patterns were introduced—in the judicial system, for instance—something like an accent-shift took place, especially if the practices relied heavily on Indian personnel, taking the functioning away from their European models.

THE PECULIARITY OF INDIAN NATIONALISM

Interestingly, some of the intellectual and organizational techniques of modern disciplinary power were enthusiastically embraced by the new Indian elites. Traditional elites regarded these techniques with a sullen hostility. Yet the new elite created through modern education started taking an interest in disciplinary techniques almost immediately. There was an interest in instilling discipline into the human body through exercise, daily routine, and school curricula. Similarly, there were efforts to bring more discipline into the family and the lives of children through a science of domesticity. There was an urge to turn everything into discourse. Western educated intellectualism produces a written world; it seems particularly important to write the social world down, to pin every practice down on paper, to give it a reliable image, a fixity required for subsequent reflection. Reflexivity on the part of the society, its capacity for acting upon its own structures for greater and more effective use (sociological reflexivity), seems to depend on
that social world being written down and being capable of cognitive recall.

A new ontology, based on the distinction between economy, polity, and society as three separate domains that had internally specific laws, appropriate to the intrinsic nature of each sphere, was introduced by the self-limiting impulses of the colonial state, justifying its claim that it could not be responsible for everything in that vast and complex society. The state’s proper domain was the sphere of the political. Slowly, emergent nationalists came to appreciate the huge enticement of this distinction, to claim and mark out a sphere from which they could exclude the colonial regime’s authority by using its own arguments. The colonial administration applied this ontology of distinct spheres through their distinction between political and social activity, the latter indicating those aspects of social conduct that did not affect the state and were therefore outside its legitimate province. Indians, on their part, viewed this distinction as an extension of a traditional conceptual dichotomy between an “inside” and the “outside” and claimed that religious activity or social reform fell within the internal affairs of Hindu society. The practical consequences of the distinctions were convergent and, for a time, convenient to both sides. Orientalism—the idea that Indian society was irreducibly different from the modern West, intractable to modern incentives and pressures, indeed in some senses incapable of modernity—gradually established the intellectual preconditions of early nationalism by enabling Indians to claim a kind of social autonomy within political colonialism. Such ideas led to a series of catachreses, slowly creating a sphere of subsidiary quasi-sovereignty over society within a colonial order in which political sovereignty was still firmly lodged in the British empire.

But this only created the space in which nationalism was to emerge; it did not determine the exact form that Indian nationalism would take, or, to put it more exactly, which one out of its several configurations would eventually emerge dominant. The nationalism that emerged shows that all the clashing hypotheses of imposition, dissemination, emulation, and differentiation have significant points to contribute to its understanding. The first stirrings of nationalism are both emulative and
oppositional. The modern elite naturally asked why India had become colonized. Eventually, the explanation of colonization is traced to three complex causes. The first, the most significant but also the most elusive, was the evident superiority of Western science, the West’s cognitive grasp of the world through science and rationalist thinking. This meant that they could undertake and accomplish socially necessary things with greater deliberation and efficiency. But rationalist cognitive processes in themselves do not explain political mastery over the whole world. It is explained through a set of institutional structures of collective action, mostly associated with the state and its subsidiary organizations—particularly, modern techniques of political “discipline.” However, quite distinct from the institutions themselves, Indian writers obsessively emphasized, there was a collective spirit of nationhood that animated Western political life. It is this spirit that helped the British to act with cohesion and come through the worst military and political calamities, while Indians started bickering at the slightest pretext and lacked, to use a common phrase, a “public spirit.” Indians must, if they wish to flourish in the modern world in competition with modern European nations, develop these three things in their society: the control of modern knowledge, the techniques of creating and working modern institutions, and a spirit of collective cohesion called nationalism.

The Paradoxical Politics of Reform

The entrenchment of British rule gave rise to a strong associationism among modernizing elites. In traditional arrangements of power, demands or requests by individuals were usually made to the royal authority, and their justice was decided on the basis of various criteria of fairness and expediency. The British colonial authority, it became clear early on, acted on different principles. First, it carried with it an ideological affirmation of “the rule of law,” although high officials of the Company often slipped conveniently closer to autocracy when Parliament was not looking. Yet the trials of senior officials like Clive or Hastings showed the significance of the procedural ideology. Second, it became clear that numbers were treated with a kind of occult respect by the colonial administration, and
demands or complaints were taken more seriously if they were made on behalf of communities rather than individuals. Modern educated elites thus constituted themselves into associational groups of a peculiar kind. Educated members of caste communities sought to convert them into unified pressure groups of which they could claim to be the natural leaders and representatives. Thus, British rule brought in a logic of associationism that at first sight appears close to the creation of a kind of colonial “civil society.”

Closer examination reveals that these groups lacked one important feature of modern associationism: membership or entry was segmentary, not universal. Only Kayasthas, for instance, could become members of the Kayastha Sabhas; only Brahmos could benefit from opportunities given to the Brahmo Samaj. This associationism was therefore a peculiar but not historically incomprehensible mixture of universal and particularistic principles. It was not possible to welcome all men into them, but once the criterion of membership was specified, these groups were expected to embrace every possible member. Clearly, this curiously mixed logic of collective behavior was to have enormous consequences for modern politics. From the colonial period, representative government, either the restricted colonial variety or democratic rule after independence, would have to cope with two types of group dynamics: groups based on interests and those based on identities. This also put a rather strange spin on traditional liberal principles like equality of treatment by the state. To take only the most contentious example, it was possible to argue that equality of treatment before the colonial state could imply the state’s disregard for individuals’ religious affiliation, i.e., being blind to their being Hindu or Muslim. Alternatively, and plausibly, as some early advocates of Muslim power argued, it must mean treating the two communities as equal communities, and thus giving them equal importance irrespective of the numerical weight of their membership. British administrators eventually adopted policies swayed by both types of considerations, as the community-equality argument could also be translated into one for the protection of minorities. Early reforms by British administrators inclined toward a solution that accepted a part of the
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second argument and offered Muslims and others separate electorates, flouting liberal tenets of universalism and leading to accusations of “divide and rule.”

Nationalism is about fashioning self-representations. There are at least three stages of a complex evolution of self-identification. At the first stage, there is a spontaneous identification of people as Hindus or Mohammedans, as there are no other recognizable principles of collective identity. Soon it becomes clear that these traditional collective identities are being asserted in the context of a fundamentally different modern form of governance, and this generates an incongruous relation between the universality of the institutions and the particularism of the communities. A third stage is marked by a widespread dissatisfaction against this state of affairs and the conscious creation of a nationalist ideology that posits a stark dichotomy between nationalism and “communalism.”

The Process of Imagining the Nation

To nationalist Indians, the combination of instrumentality and emotion in the modern nation-state had always appeared to be the secret of British power, and it was essential to understand and replicate it. Yet there was a major problem with the nationalist imaginaire when transposed to Indian conditions. With the emergence of modern vernacular languages there was a growth of regional patriotisms. Under colonialism, because of the unifying structure of the British colonial administration, sentiments of patriotism took a strange turn. Alongside regional patriotisms, a pattern of bilingual communication evolved, producing a political diglossia of vernaculars and English, by means of which elites from all regional cultures could form a political coalition within the Indian National Congress. Initially, a nationalist imaginaire was produced by a modern elite thinly spread over the urban space across British India. By the first decade of the twentieth century, however, the attraction of nationalism was pulling large masses of petit bourgeois and peasant elements into its fold who were primarily monolingual and whose cognitive political horizons never extended much beyond their region and its relatively local excitements. The great surprise of the story of Indian nationalism is how its
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internal ideological struggle went in favor of a most complex and non-Western construction.

Nationalism: Replication or Improvisation

Indian nationalism needed a form of identity and ideology that was based on inclusivist and universal unifying principles, instead of the segmentation of traditional society. Two types of skepticism were expressed against the possibility of an Indian nationalism. European observers emphasized the fact that nothing seemed to hold India’s immense social diversity together except the external frame of colonial power. The history of European nationalism, which modern Indians read avidly, seemed to suggest some preconditions for the establishment of successful nation-states: particularly, homogeneous cultures based on single languages and predominant religious communities. Hence, those who thought modernity had a single, uniform logic did not expect India would be able to solve this problem of finding a sufficiently single basis for its putative political community.

One of the major internal debates within Indian nationalism took place over a long time on precisely this question of India’s unmanageable diversity and the difficulty it constituted for a modern nation-state.

In the twentieth century, Indian nationalists developed two powerful but entirely opposed arguments to counteract this skeptical objection. It was inevitable that there would be an increasingly strong impression that successful emulation of the Western model of the nation-state must try to replicate all the conditions of the European experience as closely as possible. In India, this idea could have only two implications. The first idea, unattractive and unacceptable to nationalists, was that India as a whole could not form a nation-state; only its various linguistic regions could. A “replication” argument asserted instead that despite India’s cultural and religious diversity, if it wanted to be a modern nation-state, it must start to acknowledge the primacy of a single culture based on a majority religion and language. As independence drew near, this argument took clearer shape, partly encouraged by the suggestion from the early 1940s that Muslims needed a separate state of Pakistan. Not unusually, demand for a minority state for Muslims, by impli-
cation, seemed to turn the rump of India into a Hindu state with a distinctive culture, although the claim of linguistic majority for Hindi was distinctly less plausible. Hindi was still forming into a standardized language and was fraught with internal rivalries between regions and the central conflict between a bazaar Hindusthani in which people of north India actually communicated and a highly artificial Sanskritized Hindi that Hindu chauvinists sought to fashion out of political enthusiasm. In this view, an Indian nation-state could be securely based on a single culture of Hinduism, and the usual corollary of this was that Hindi of a particularly Sanskritized variety should be given precedence over other vernaculars as India’s national language.

Remarkably, most of the leading intellectuals of Indian nationalism—Gandhi, Tagore, and Nehru—rejected this argument of replication. What they offered passionately against it could be regarded as an argument of “improvisation,” but in two substantially different forms. Gandhi and Tagore advanced an idea more consistent with the first type mentioned in my introductory section, asserting that proper functioning of modern institutions depended on their chiming with traditional social understandings. Only that could make modern institutions intelligible. Also, in their view, modernity’s irrational bias toward pointless novelty was to be mistrusted: institutions and social conduct ought to be changed only if rational argument showed they needed to be, not for the sake of change or in emulation of the West. Tagore defiantly declared that it was the principle of autonomy of judgment that constituted modernity, not mere imitation of European practice. Autonomy of judgment about sociopolitical institutions might lead to the considered decision that some forms of traditional institutions suited Indian social life better than importing Western forms. If such practices were retained out of choice, it would be the result of a modern decision.

Nehru offered an argument based on modern principles of the reflexive constitution of society. For Nehru, imposition of a homogenizing Western model of the nation-state was likely to fuel apprehensions of assimilation among religious and regional minorities. Imposition of a homogenizing form of Indian nation-
alism was therefore likely to disrupt a nation-state instead of cementing its cultural basis. In his political writings, Nehru absorbed a typical Tagorean idea that it was a mistake, following colonial thinking, to consider India’s diversity a disadvantage: a diverse economy was less prone to scarcities, breakdowns, and foreign pressures; a diverse culture offered greater imaginative and intellectual resources. Despite their differences, the Gandhi-Tagore and Nehru arguments converged to offer a powerful refutation of the replication thesis that called for a homogeneous Indian nationalism.

The practical consequences of this ideological disputation were enormous. Despite the creation of Pakistan, which raised fears of a quick balkanization, Indian nationalism retained its complex form over the singular and homogenizing one. It retained its confidence in the idea that identity and patriotism were necessarily a complex and multilayered affair and that there was no way of being an Indian without first being a Tamil or Maratha or Bengali. Indian nationalism was therefore a second-order identity, but not something insubstantial, fraudulent, or artificial. Thus, three processes were involved in the making of modern political India: a reasoned attention to the historical preconditions out of which modernity has to be created, the specific sequence of processes, and in particular the idea that modernization was not a blind imitation of Western history or institutions but a self-conscious process of reflexive construction of society that should rationally assess principles from all sources and improvise institutions suitable for particular societies.

DEMOCRACY AND INDIA’S MODERNITY

After independence, the central question of Indian politics was the construction not of nationalism but of democracy. The idea of social reflexivity is central to the politics of democracy. Political modernity consists of two parallel movements. On one side is the sociological fact of the plasticity of social orders, based on the increasingly widespread idea that the relations within which people are obliged to live out their lives can be radically altered by collective reflexive action. This sociologi-
cal tendency, which explains the frequency of revolutions and large-scale Jacobinism in modern politics, runs parallel to normative principles of autonomy extended from individuals to political communities, the moral justification of democratic rule.

Democracy is obviously the incontrovertibly modern feature of India’s political life. In at least three different aspects, the evolution of democracy in India has shown the general tendency of modernity toward gradual differentiation. These aspects are 1) the lack of social individuation and the resultant tendency toward democracy being more focused on political equality of groups rather than individuals, 2) an assertion of electoral power by rural groups because of the specific sequence of economic modernization, and 3) the increasing conflicts of secular state principles as the idea of secularism is being subjected to a democratic-electoral ratification. The “strangeness” of Indian democracy is due, in my view, to the different sequence of historical events in India.

At the time of independence, political institutions were chosen with explicit care, even including the rationalistic, autonomist idea that a people “choose” and “give to themselves” their constitution. This involved a neglect of that other, more plausible idea that most people lived under political regimes out of habitual and historical compulsions. The idea of a deliberative adoption of structures of legitimate power was given a theatrical realization in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly. In individuals like Ambedkar (the author of many of the technical solutions in India’s constitution) and Nehru, the Assembly had a rare combination of political experience, intellectual skills, and openness to international comparisons to provide at times startlingly innovative solutions to problems of political construction. But it seems in retrospect that Nehru and Ambedkar were wrong to disregard tradition entirely, taking the typical Enlightenment view of treating those ideas and practices as “erroneous.” They also wrongly believed that to rescue people from tradition, their intellectual and practical habitus, all that was needed was simply to present a modern option; peoples’ inherent rationality would do the rest.
I have argued elsewhere that this is based on the common but mistaken belief that traditions endured for long historical spans by simple obstinacy in the face of historical challenge, and once faced with the light of reason, they would disappear. This ignored an equally plausible view that traditions were complex mechanisms that survived for long periods precisely because they could change insidiously. In another view, traditions, when faced with the challenge of entirely new structures like industrialism or electoral democracy, might seek to adapt to these, altering both the internal operation of traditional structures like caste or religious community and the elective institutions themselves. Actual political experience in India followed the more complex trajectories of the second type rather than the clear-cut oppositions of the first. Thus, instead of dying obediently with the introduction of elective mechanisms, caste groups simply adapted to new demands, turning caste itself into the basis of a search for majorities. Initially, the constitution produced an enormous innovation by affording the former untouchable castes a legal status as Scheduled Castes and making them beneficiaries of some legal advantages of reverse discrimination. Upper caste groups, which were in control of the modern professions and understood the electoral significance of social solidarity, were unified by their modern loyalties and clearer perception of common interest. By the 1970s the “intermediate castes”—those in between these two strata—recognized that by carrying on the traditional segmentary logic of the caste system, they were proving incapable of exercising suitable leverage on the electoral system. Their response was to weld their parallel-status caste groups into vast electoral coalitions across the whole of north India—altering the nature of elective democracy and its operative logic unrecognizably.

During Nehru’s time, Indian democratic politics resembled politics as it was practiced in the West, where the fundamental political identifications were on either class or ideological lines (which were internally connected). But, contrary to all historical scripts, as democratic awareness spread to the lower strata of society and formerly excluded groups began to voice their expectations, the outcomes began to grow “strange.” Since these groups interpreted their disadvantage and indignity in
caste terms, social antagonism and competition for state benefits expressed themselves increasingly in the form of intense caste rivalries. The dominance of caste politics in India is thus a direct result of modern politics, not a throwback to traditional behavior. It appears strangely disorienting, as this kind of caste action is impossible to classify as either traditional or modern, leading to dark murmurings about the inexplicability of Indian history.

However, it is neither inexplicable nor indeed very surprising to accept that modernity is historically diversifying. Democratic institutions arrived in Western societies in their full form only at the start of this century, long after the corrosive effects of individualism on community loyalties had done their work. Democratic politics had to contend quite often in the classical cases of European democracy with collective demands of various classes, particularly the early proletariat, but the logic of numbers on which democracy operates did not get tangled with a reassertion of communal groups. The logic of modern structures of electoral democracy does not automatically erase traditional forms of conduct, but manages to subsume them, or subordinate them to its own operations—changing them and changing its own character in the process. In fact, this is accompanied by a surprising fact. Precisely because the new elites who emerge into political power are quite often without the education that the colonial elite enjoyed, their understanding of the precedents of European modernity is tenuous, if not entirely absent. As they try to improvise and act reflexively on these institutions, their character is likely to change even further in uncharted and unexpected ways. They do not have the imposing script of European history before them when they are making their own. As a consequence, in trying to understand the current complexities and future prospects of Indian democracy, looking toward European precedents is not enough. Instead, it is necessary to understand the historical logic internal to this process.

Such changes forcing the structure and tendencies of modern institutions in an unprecedented direction have not occurred only in politics. Briefly, I will point to two other fields with similar trends. Recent work on political economy has suggested
that the trajectory of agrarian power in the context of Indian democracy is vastly different from the “classic” European cases. In European modernity, by the time democratic voting was established, the process of industrialization had shrunk the agricultural sector into a secondary force. This resulted in two significant political effects in the West. First, since the rural interests were numerically and strategically weak, their impact on democratic politics was not dominant. The industrial proletariat and the professional middle classes wielded much greater electoral power and consequently had the capacity to dominate the political agenda. In purely economic terms, this difference in size made it possible for European economies to subsidize the agrarian sector, since this involved a resource transfer from a dominant sector to a smaller one. In India, by contrast, electoral democracy has arrived at a time when the agricultural sector is statistically, and in terms of its voting weight, enormous. Therefore, agrarian interests have the capacity to force state policies to concede to their demands. Yet in purely economic terms, the vastness of the agricultural sector makes it difficult for the state to force other sectors of the economy to subsidize the rural sector. Democratic politics thus creates a huge contradiction in state policy toward the economy: electoral constraints make it impossible for the state, or whichever party is in office, to ignore demands for agricultural subsidy; yet the size of the agricultural sector in comparison to others makes them increasingly difficult to sustain. Trying to learn from actual policies followed by Western democracies in these respects is unlikely to produce serious results, since the structure of the problem is historically unprecedented and requires new kinds of solutions.

A second case can be found in the politics of secularism. It has been plausibly argued that secular institutions in India have experienced increasing difficulty because they function in a society that is not secularized. State secularism, it is argued, was an ideal intelligible only to the modernist elite, and it was because of the complete dominance of Congress modernists during constitution-making that secular principles were introduced without challenge. Yet on this point too, careful observation shows interesting historical complexities. Undoubtedly,
modernist authors of the constitution like Nehru and Ambedkar wished to establish institutional forms closely modeled on Western liberal democracies. But since they were practical politicians, they decided to acknowledge two types of constraints arising out of initial circumstances, tempering their extreme constructivism. The constraints emerged from the immense uncertainty faced by Muslims who decided to remain in India after the partition riots and the need to reassure them that the constitution would protect their cultural identity. This conjunctural requirement to reassure Muslim minorities forced the framers of the constitution to improvise and to institute rights that individuals could enjoy only by virtue of their membership in communities.

In recent years, some liberal political theorists have sought to make room for cultural rights of communities within general liberal principles, but in the late 1940s, this was a considerable innovation. I wish to make the historical-sociological case that the assertion of the distinctively modern right to form political institutions led framers of the Indian constitution to produce a legal system that diverged significantly from standard Western liberal-individualist precedents. The primary reason for this again seems to be the differential historical sequence. In the West, institutions of the secular state were devised by a collective process of social thinking and institutional experimentation in response to the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and these arrangements for religious tolerance were unquestionably established long before democratic government arose in the twentieth century. In addition, by this time, secularization of social conduct had made the question of religion and politics a rather minor affair for most Western states. In India, a secular state and democratic politics were introduced at the same time through a single constitutional settlement. As in democratic polities, eventually all significant questions of social life are either directly or by default ratified by the democratic reflexive process; the question of the secular state and its precise character thus becomes inevitably subjected to democratic decision processes. This opens up the intriguing possibility of a potential conflict between principles
of secularism and a strongly majoritarian interpretation of democratic politics.

CONCLUSION

If we reject both a purely intellectualist teleological construction of modernity and a purely functionalist model and consider it—more realistically, in my view—as internally plural, this logic of plurality should be seen as intrinsic to the structure of modern civilization rather than as an exception to the historical rule. I would like to suggest that this is precisely what we find in the history of European modernity: in the expanding panorama of modern transformations, the elements of industrialization, \( \text{étatisation} \), individuation, and secularization are invariably present as constituent processes leading to a modern society. But their mutual articulation and combined effects, and, consequently, the structure of social life they produce through their combination, is vastly different between European societies. As European societies come under the deepening influence of these pressures, the political life of England-France, of Germany-Italy, and of Russia-Eastern Europe get transformed, but in significantly different ways. What creates the misleading sense of similarity about political forms is a strange amnesia about imperial conflicts and wars. At the turn of the century, a comparison of European nations would have presented a vast spectacle of variation in the invention of modern life, from spheres of culture like painting and poetry to spheres of political experience. Indeed, some of the great conflicts of modern times happened precisely because modern politics gave rise to democratic and totalitarian forms of organizing the capacities of the state, and these opposing political forms came to a direct confrontation. It is difficult to accept that liberal democracy came to Germany by some kind of delayed spontaneous combustion in 1945 caused by underlying functional causes rather than by the simpler external fact of the war. Thus, the logic of modernity shows a diversifying and pluralizing tendency in Europe itself. How can its extension to different cultures and historical circumstances produce obediently uniform historical results?
ENDNOTES

1. Although societies may have possessed these capacities in earlier periods, they are greatly enhanced under modern conditions. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash suggest that this kind of sociological reflexivity is a mark of contemporary societies—see Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1995)—and this transforms the nature of “risk.” See Beck, *The Risk Society* (London: Sage Publications, 1992). I think, however, that this was always one of the major distinguishing characteristics of modern societies and can be seen, as Michel Foucault’s later work suggested, in political disciplines of the eighteenth century. See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979); *The Order of Things* (London: Tavistock, 1974).

2. If colonial empires provided a significant part of the capital required for industrialization, this is a condition that late modernizing societies cannot replicate—although some recent scholarship has sought to question the connection between colonialism and the early accumulation of capital.

3. The experience of Western modernity appears attractive now if we adopt a resolutely short-sighted view and refuse to look beyond 1945. On a longer view, the rise of aggressive nationalism, militarism, fascism, death camps, and repeated failures of democracy were essential parts of the modernity on offer, and, not surprisingly, Indian writers like Tagore and Gandhi had a deeply ambivalent and critical attitude toward its claims to provide a form of good life unquestionably superior to traditional ones.


6. Within colonial ruling groups, often there was bitter conflict between missionaries and colonial officials. Officials at times found the missionary universalism and enthusiasm for conversion troublesome. Missionaries accused administrators of turning their backs on both Christian and rationalist ideals.


8. I am most familiar with the modern history of Hinduism, but this does not imply that such changes did not happen in other faiths.


12. Tagore’s famous novel *The Home and the World* (Ghare Baire) played on this distinction.
B. R. Ambedkar, one of the most interesting figures of the nationalist movement in its last phase, came from an untouchable caste, was Western-educated, became a prominent lawyer, and eventually played a preeminent role in the drafting of India’s constitution.

Christianity survived for two millennia precisely because it changed its form and content quite radically: from early Christianity to its adoption by Rome; the adaptation after the discovery of Greek classical texts, especially Aristotle; Protestantism; and adaptation to a rationalist culture in modern times. My suggestion is, in the case of traditions, that this the rule, not the exception.

This does not at all mean falling over into indigenism. Indigenous traditions in India were utterly unfamiliar with democracy and cannot offer productive conceptual tools without much creative elaboration. Some parts of Western theory, evident in authors like Alexis de Tocqueville, remain particularly relevant in understanding the complexities of Indian democracy.


Eisenstadt, “The Jacobin Component in Fundamentalist Movement.”
Transnational Movements, Diaspora, and Multiple Modernities

TRANSMATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

A development that beckons increasing attention in our era of globalization concerns the enormous transnational movements of people for various reasons: in search of employment in the more prosperous industrialized or industrializing countries as guest workers or as immigrants, and as a result of forced displacements of people owing to civil wars and the pogroms of ethnic cleansing and genocide. There is an intensification in the creation of diverse diaspora populations in many locations, who are engaged in complex interpersonal and intercultural relationships with both their host societies and their societies of origin. Rather than being deterritorialized, they in fact experience and live in dual locations and manifest dual consciousness.

Under the label “transnational movements” I should ideally deal with three flows: the flow of people through transnational migrations; the flow of capital in our present time of multinational capitalism; and the flow of information over vast distances in the context of modern developments in communication. I should like to state at the outset that these phenomena are by no means new and that historically there have been large-scale occurrences of these flows, with momentous consequences. Nevertheless, I support the view that in recent decades

Stanley J. Tambiah is Esther and Sidney Rabb Professor of Anthropology at Harvard University.

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the three flows of people, capital, and information, dynamically related and interwoven, together are generating some intensified effects that are said to be distinctive of our so-called postmodern world. In combination they test and breach the autonomy, sovereignty, and territorial boundaries of extant nation-states hitherto considered as the primary units of collective sociopolitical identity and existence. They also intensify and sharpen sociocultural diversity in what are called plural societies, which are becoming a common global condition, and pose for them the challenges of multicultural coexistence, tolerance, and accommodation.

It is striking that the last twenty-five to thirty years or so have witnessed an unprecedented movement of people between countries, from south to north and east to west. Certain expansionary, even explosive, economic developments in parts of the world and recent upheavals of other kinds have caused two kinds of population movements. First, there is voluntary migration of people carrying with them a variety of occupational skills and cultural practices, leaving their locations of origin or present residences in search of better economic opportunities and life chances, and with a view to permanent or temporary settlement. Second, there is the involuntary displacement caused by political turmoil and civil war or by natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, and drought) of people who are referred to as refugees and asylum seekers and are relocated in camps and safe havens or are accepted for resettlement by willing host countries. The majority of contemporary political refugees are victims of violent circumstances associated with ethnonationalist politics that push them out of their settlements. They may well have productive skills, but in the short term they are considered burdens in need of “relief” from their own governments and from their foreign hosts.

Both voluntary migrants and displaced refugees who make transnational passages and are relocated in other countries may be labeled as forming diaspora communities, and the dynamics and patterns of their involvement in transnational experiences and interactions are the main subject of this essay.
The Distribution of Populations in the World

UN reports on population divide the world today into three broad regions: the “developed,” the “developing” or “less developed,” and the “least developed” regions. Although these categories are subject to criticism on many grounds, I consider them useful insofar as they relate to indices such as gross national product, per capita income, adult literacy, life expectancy at birth, access to health services, transportation, electricity, safe water, and sanitation.

About 79 percent (4.5 billion) of the world population in 1994 was living in the so-called less developed regions. In global terms, the three largest zones of population density in 1994 in order of size were Asia (3.4 billion), Africa (708 million), and Latin America (474 million). Between the years 1950 to 1994, in terms of the rate of population growth, Africa came first (at 2.7 percent), and Latin America second (at 2.4 percent). But in terms of the sheer size of the population increase during the same period, Asia’s increase exceeded Africa’s by a factor of two, with India and China being the major contributors.

But, note this striking contrast: in global terms Europe has been the major region with the slowest growth rate (of under 1 percent per year). It is in the so-called richest industrialized nations and in a few developing countries, then, that population growth has slowed, reached stasis, or even declined as a result of rapidly dropping fertility rates. It is projected that by 2050 the population of the more developed regions will decline and that their net population increments will be accounted for by the migration of people from the less developed regions.

The critical significance of these trends has been recognized by demographers who have warned that if more and more of the world’s most highly industrialized and economically productive countries do not replenish their numbers, their role as engines of economic growth and as producers, consumers, and donors is put in jeopardy. It is claimed that the world economy will be severely affected if their economies shrink. These gloomy warnings are mitigated by certain counter-currents of population movements. Western Europe, particularly Germany, has shown in recent years a rising growth rate mainly because of
the increasing numbers of migrants who have entered the region, especially from Eastern Europe, which has stimulated large-scale outmigration because of its recent political turmoil. This is a case of east-to-west migration within Europe. In 1997, roughly 7.1 million of Germany’s population of 82 million, or almost 9 percent, were foreigners, the highest proportion in Europe, far ahead of the continental average of 5 percent and well above that of such countries as France (5.7 percent) and Britain (3.8 percent). Among other highly industrialized countries, the United States, Canada, and Japan have attracted migrants because of their affluence and job opportunities. Similarly, certain other quickly industrializing countries in East Asia (such as South Korea and Taiwan), in Southeast Asia (especially Malaysia), and in the oil producing Gulf states appear inviting to migrant labor whether migrants are encouraged to enter or not. The developing or less developed regions of the world in parts of South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America are bulging with growing populations. Contrary to the hostile official propaganda and prejudices of the receiving countries, the inescapable conclusion is that the industrially most developed countries facing demographic stasis and prospects of future declines require infusions of migrant populations in order to maintain their productivity, affluence, and power. It is against this demographic backdrop that the magnitudes and sociopolitical significances of the current intensification of transnational flows of people should be gauged.

Transnational Flows of People

A 1995 UN report on the world situation stated that “Over the past decade international migration has been the demographic process most clearly affected by the momentous changes in the world order,” such as the dismantling of the former Soviet Union and its reconfiguration, the disintegration of former totalitarian states such as Yugoslavia, and the political turmoil in many of the postcolonial nation-states of Africa and South Asia. These disintegrations or fragmentations and the ensuing political violence stemming from civil war, regional ethnonationalist claims for autonomy, or even secession have led to precipitous, dramatic, and wrenching flows of refugees,
asylum seekers, and displaced persons that have brought migration issues to the forefront of the international agenda. The office of the UN High Commissioner for Relief estimated that in 1994 refugees numbered some 16.4 million (excluding the 2.5 million Palestine refugees under the Mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency).

During the period from 1965–1985, the size of the population of international migrants, proportionately to their total populations, was of much larger significance to the developed countries than to the developing ones. It is notable that “By 1985, Europe and Northern America were hosting the largest concentrations of international migrants, amounting to 23 million and 20 million respectively. In Northern America, the United States alone hosted 16.5 million migrants.” The same trends were confirmed a decade later and continue unabated.

There are, of course, other prominent cases of international migration not solely confined to the developed countries. In the same period (1965–1985) there was a rapid increase of international migrants to and between certain countries designated as developing. For example, in South Asia there occurred a major outflow of 4.4 million persons from Afghanistan into the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan after the Russian invasion in 1979; in Western Asia there was a major inflow to the oil-producing countries by migrant workers from North Africa and South and Southeast Asia.

Stages and Forms of Incorporation

Integral to the viability of plural societies are the policies and institutional arrangements by which immigrants are variably incorporated into the host country. It is possible to distinguish three broad types of migrant incorporation that can also serve as measures or yardsticks. They are assimilation, exclusion, and integration. A fourth category is multiculturalism, which intersects with integration but highlights issues relating to the recognition of difference within plural societies while holding them together as viable polities.

Assimilation may be regarded as a largely one-sided process by which the migrants are expected to take the initiative of adapting themselves to the host society with the aim of becom-
ing indistinguishable from the majority of society. It is consistent with policies by which the state leaves outcomes largely to market forces. The most famous example of this is the U.S. ideology of the melting pot.

Exclusion involves the participation in or incorporation of migrants only into selected and marked-off sectors of the host society. Migrants are denied access to other areas, mainly through legal mechanisms. The Gulf States and Japan (which, according to a UN report, is the archetypal closed society) are striking examples. Exclusion in a negative sense favors the formation of enclaves of ethnic groups experiencing a deep sense of discrimination and liminal existence.

Integration, the third type of incorporation, involves positive two-way processes of mutual accommodation between migrants and their host society. Successful integration in liberal countries has been enabled by active state policies in the areas of housing, employment, education and language training, and access to health and social services, and by equal-opportunity and affirmative-action legislation. Successful integration and incorporation is, of course, not instantaneous but is achieved over time and usually becomes evident only with the second generation. In terms of timing, three stages could be distinguished: first, participation in the economic or labor market areas; followed by access to social services, education, and housing; and, finally, a fuller social and cultural incorporation, climaxed by access to citizenship.

The concept of multiculturalism is much commented upon these days. It is becoming increasingly evident that a number of present-day diasporic communities, even while becoming economically and educationally integrated, may strive to maintain their social and religious distinctiveness. Thus, multiculturalism as a project and goal is intimately related to what are termed “identity politics” and, in Charles Taylor’s language, “politics of recognition” and “politics of difference.” A distinctive feature of our present “postmodern” times is that, in many quarters, these particular issues have become more intense than in earlier times and are marked by reflexivity and debate at both the introspective individual and the interpersonal collective levels.
The term “diaspora” seems to be in high fashion these days, and its popularity courts the danger of inordinately stretching it. James Clifford has appropriately called it “a traveling term, in changing global conditions.” Diaspora in earlier times “described Jewish, Greek, and Armenian dispersion [but] now shares meanings with a large semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community.”

In the face of these multiple as well as fluid connotations it would be wise not to strive toward a tight, inclusive definition embracing general criteria. William Safran has attempted a kind of “ideal-type” representation of diaspora as expatriate minority communities, dispersed from an original “center” to at least two “peripheral” places. They maintain a memory or myth about their original homeland; they believe they are not, and perhaps cannot, be fully accepted by their host country; and they see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return and a place to maintain or restore. The collective identities of these diaspora communities are defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland.

Clifford appropriately remarks that the most questionable feature of this ideal-type construction is the thesis of a strong attachment to and a desire for a literal return to a well-preserved homeland—a requirement that does not accord with large segments of even the Jewish historical experience, let alone other well-known diaspora communities.

The philosopher Charles Taylor’s plea for the recognition of the worth of multiculturalism in our time is informed by this modern, or, if you prefer, postmodern, condition: that all societies are becoming increasingly multicultural while at the same time becoming more porous. Their porosity means that they are more open to multinational migration; more of their numbers live the life of diaspora, “whose center is elsewhere.”

By this expression “whose center is elsewhere,” Taylor presumably is suggesting that diaspora communities, although located abroad, still have their primary concerns turned toward their “home countries.” Such primary orientation may apply to
some diaspora, but there are many for whom such a strong imputation may not apply. Some theorists even go so far as to assert that diaspora communities find themselves in a “deterritorialized” situation and state of mind. These characteristics are truer of diaspora communities in their earlier stages of existence than in their later stages, especially in those contexts in which the host societies permit them to stay for long periods with chances for alien resident status and eligibility for access to the social, educational, and other services available to regular citizens.

Many diaspora populations that are variably on the path of integration and not in a state of exclusion, temporary residence, and deterritorialization may actually cope with “dual territorialization” or “dual location” that encompasses both their host societies and societies of origin; they may participate in three networks of relationships and experience three forms of consciousness regarding their existential circumstances. Vertical networks concern the relations and negotiations through which immigrants attempt to secure their existence in host societies. There are two orders of lateral networks: one is concerned with maintaining, reinforcing, and extending relationships with immigrants’ communities of origin (“home communities”); the other maps the networking that transcends the borders of both the countries and states of origin and resettlement, and I label it the transnational global network.

**Vertical Networks**

We need to know better than we do today how diaspora communities placed in different host environments voluntarily form, or are constrained to form, spatial and social enclave communities; how they coalesce to resist discrimination and prejudice when they face it; how they develop their economic niches and specialize in the businesses and services in which they are competitive; and how in time they become effective voting banks when they become eligible to participate in local, state, and national politics and generate their own politicians, mediators, and political bosses.

In studying these dynamics, it is pertinent to note that, for any diasporic community, the host society in question is not a
single homogeneous entity but is itself segmented and stratified according to social class and other criteria; it also contains other immigrant communities that are involved in the politics of finding and negotiating their niches in the vertical framework. This vertical frame thus deals with the exchanges and exclusions between these various segments, consisting of resistances and rejections as well as cooperation and incorporations, fights against discrimination, and eagerness to take advantage of opportunities.

**Lateral Networks between Host Society and Society of Origin**

While they are developing their milieu in the host society, there is evidence that diaspora communities have a considerable interaction with their communities of origin—sending remittances as well as seeking investment capital, returning to marry homeland brides or husbands, sponsoring new migrants, making periodic returns home to build new or refurbish old family seats and alleged ancestral homes, sponsoring and financing local festivals, making pilgrimages and conspicuous, pious, merit-making gifts. And in turn they may invite cultural groups, musical and dramatic ensembles and troupes, and charismatic holy men and women to visit their settlements abroad so as to authenticate their cultural and ethnic identity and pride and to exhibit the high culture of their home countries from which they are spatially distanced.

A matter of much contemporary concern is the direct participation in effervescent, effectively charged ethnonationalist movements, religious revivals, and fundamentalist causes that are erupting in migrants’ home countries. Such participation has been labeled as nationalism or ethnonationalism at a “distance.” But this “distance” is only a partial truth, and to explain the immediacy of this participation we have to consider the implications of the modern information and communication revolutions.

Two features are pertinent in characterizing this long-distance nationalism or ethnonationalism. Many, perhaps most, voluntary immigrant groups come in search of better economic opportunities and in fact earn incomes that make it possible for them, in addition to sending remittances, to afford the frequent...
use of devices of the modern information revolution that enable speedy long-distance communication. Moreover, the majority of immigrants are, more than ever in the post–World War II and postindependence epoch, self-conscious members of nationalist-minded states (whether in support of them or as dissident minorities resisting them), and these groups, insofar as they come with preconstituted political conceptions and loyalties and become actively involved in long-distance politics, are likely to be considered and labeled as “ethnic minorities” in their host societies.

Lateral Transnational Global Networks

Another major feature of diasporic communities is that although they are associated with a “homeland” (country or region within a country) of origin and are situated in another country of migration, these two frames—country and state of origin and host country and state—do not by any means cover or exhaust another aspect of the lives of diaspora groups. Migrants and immigrants of similar origins are distributed and situated in many diasporic locations, such that they are interconnected especially by modern media and travel in a transnational transactional arena focused on their own preoccupations and interests. The actors in this arena, be they individuals, families, groups, or business enterprises, for whom national and state boundaries as such are irrelevant or secondary for certain purposes, constitute crisscrossing and intersecting networks that Ulf Hannerz has dubbed “the global ecumene.” Thus, the ability and incentive to circulate between these sites, to exchange money, goods, and information, and to conclude marriage contracts and exchanges pose for anthropologists the task of mapping this extended, sprawling, and yet connected social world. Thus, transnational connections linking diaspora need not be articulated primarily through a real or symbolic homeland. Decentered, lateral connections may be as important as those formed around a teleology of return. Given the multiplicity and variety of diaspora throughout the world, it is not possible to postulate general ordering principles regarding their orientations. However, it may be possible to suggest
certain positionings between which most contemporary diaspora have to negotiate and operate.

On the one hand, many modern diaspora groups—be they Sikhs in Vancouver, Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto, or Blacks in London balancing their Caribbean and Afro-American backgrounds with British affiliations—do not by and large expect to return for good to their societies of origin, although they may have strong connections with events and people there. They usually harbor nationalistic or patriotic longings and sentiments at a distance and may materially support home causes from a distance.

On the other hand, these same groups, to use James Clifford’s words, “may wax and wane in diasporism, depending on changing possibilities—obstacles, openings, antagonisms, and connections—in their host countries and transnationally.” Many migrant groups such as Blacks, Hispanics, Turks, and Algerians stereotyped in negative terms by large segments of the host societies will inevitably have to struggle to be accepted by their hosts, and therefore in turn will always pose issues of accommodation and incorporation with, and resistance to, the hegemonic and discriminatory attitudes and policies of their hosts.

But beyond the two positionings mentioned above, there is the third imperative of diaspora communities to reproduce and maintain themselves over time, through effecting marriages between persons located elsewhere in other diaspora communities or in their societies of origin, through sharing cultural knowledge and receiving visiting priests, artists, and public figures, and through sharing and fusing assets to extend their businesses and professional interests. These transnational lateral links and networks between diaspora that have little to do with state affiliation have been greatly facilitated by modern transformations in communication technology.

*The Participation of all Three Networks by Indian Diaspora in the United States*

Especially since the mid-1980s, the limelight in Indian politics has fallen on the movement called “Hindu nationalism,” whose clarion call is for the revitalized formation of the Hindu nation. Historically, the focal parent organization connected with the
project of Hindu nationalism was the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sengh (RSS), founded in 1925 in Nagpur, India. Around it in succeeding years a family (parivar) of front organizations arose, most notably the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, or World Activist Hindu Council), formed in 1965 as a quasi-militant activist body, which figured prominently in the Ayodhya controversy culminating in the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992, and which has an important presence among overseas Indian diaspora; and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, or Indian People’s Party), which was constituted as a political party in April of 1980, its predecessor being the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. It has progressively mounted a successful electoral challenge to the Indian National Congress on the grounds that the Congress is wedded to a “pseudo-secularism” that is insensitive to the reality of Indian life deeply grounded in Hindu culture and that it unduly favors the followers of “foreign” religions such as Islam and Christianity.  

The increasing electoral success of the BJP, and the mounting challenge it presents to the Indian National Congress’s dominance as India’s major party, has been the big story in the 1990s. A brief sketch of the fortunes of the BJP begins with its first notable electoral success in 1991 when it won 22 percent of the national vote, secured 119 seats, and became the country’s largest opposition party. Although it suffered a slump in 1993 in the aftermath of the Ayodhya dispute and the demolition of the Babri mosque and the ensuing riots, it began to recover and make a strong showing in the 1995 State Assembly elections. In 1998, it successfully outshone the Congress in the National Assembly elections, and the coalition it formed assumed the governance of the country. Although the BJP (and its coalition partners) were forced to resign in 1999, they quickly returned to power when Sonia Gandhi and the Congress failed to put together an alternative coalition government. The recent defiant demonstration of nuclear power by India, combined with the successful expulsion of Pakistani intruders into Kashmir territory held by India on the mountain tops of Karghil, has intensified Indian patriotism at home and abroad and boosted the reputation of Vajpayee as the leader of the hour. As a result of the elections that took place in September of 1999, the BJP
led by Vajpayee has become the undisputed dominant partner in the present coalition government.

Anita Khandelwal provides an informative account of the manner in which Indian “diaspora nationalism” is propagated and enacted, particularly with the aid of the Internet. She illustrates how each of the vertical and lateral networks described previously is simultaneously used to promote and enact “different kinds of nationalism,” which she identifies as diaspora nationalism, transnational nationalism, and transnationism.

Khandelwal remarks that “Many right-wing Hindu groups, both within India and throughout the diaspora, have web sites, most of which are linked to one another.” For example, the web page for the Arya Samaj in America offers a link to the VHP of America (the overseas arm of the VHP), which links to the Hindu Swayansevak Sangh (HSS), The Hindu Student’s Council (HSC), the Student Wing of the VHP of America, and so on. While access to the Internet is limited in India, “it is of the utmost importance in diasporic nationalisms.”

Diasporic nationalism describes the situation of those immigrant communities that are intact in the countries to which they have migrated but have lost or are losing connection with their homelands, although they are involved in the “imagining” of their countries of origin. Most significantly, diaspora nationalism is involved with a new hyphenated identity, such as the “Indian-American,” and is largely concerned with the politics of accommodation, integration, and assimilation, as well as with winning equal rights.

Within the United States, it is the VHP with its various branches that is foremost in the diffusion of the doctrines and precepts of Hindu nationalism, especially among the youth in universities and high schools. One task of these agencies is counseling and instructing youths (and adults) in how to deal with the problems of being Hindu in America and how to define what is involved in sustaining a Hindu-American hyphenated identity.

At the same time, the VHP of America seeks to Americanize itself, to establish its legitimacy by claiming its own U.S. constitution and the status of a registered organization while also seeking tax-exempt status. It claims to have forty different
chapters with membership running into the thousands. Its promotion of an Indian-American identity involves the incorporation of popular American political rhetoric regarding “family values” and “patriotic zeal” so as to bring Indian-Americans closer to the reality of the “American dream of a kinder, gentler nation.” Also, apparently following alleged U.S. role models, the VHP encourages “assertiveness and aggressiveness in Hindu youth to counter the image of an effeminate ‘model minority’ which involves passive resistance and a marked lack of organized resistance.”

In the context of advocating the espousal by Indian youth of certain American values, the VHP organization in America strongly appeals to the rights of minorities and to the need to resist discriminatory “racism.” The liberal posture is all to the good except that other connected parivar organizations such as the Overseas Friends of the BJP (OFBJP) preach the primacy of Hindu identity in India and the nonacceptance of Muslims as followers of a foreign religion, and disseminate anti-Muslim attitudes. Thus we note the operation of a divided morality among the organs of Hindu nationalism that supports minority rights in the United States while insisting on majority hegemony in India.

Transnational nationalism is about the Indian diaspora’s involvement in long-distance politics back home in India. It is aimed at maintaining and reinforcing the Hindu-Indian hyphenated identity of diasporic Indians. Various political parties in India solicit funds from their overseas diaspora and many members are affluent enough to make significant contributions. The overseas branches of sangh parivar have been successful in garnering funds, and it has been remarked that the Ayodhya campaign culminating in the demolition of the Babri mosque benefited greatly from such overseas financing.

It seems that at the present time it is the OFBJP that is the chief organ dedicated to propagating long-distance nationalism by promoting the political program of the ruling BJP, raising funds for that party, and reporting political events in India. Khandelwal reports that its web page foregrounds an image of “the Indian flag with three atomic mushroom clouds superimposed on top” with an accompanying caption in Devanagari
The third transnational global network—Khandelwal’s coinage *transnationism*—is concerned with the forging of lateral links across states and countries, thereby transcending spatial boundaries, and with instilling a sense of the global unity of all dispersed Hindu-Indians, who originated in India and possess a common cultural identity grounded in the “timeless” Hindu *dharma*. Of all the branches of the *sangh parivar*, it is the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS) that is devoted to promoting the unity of Hindus everywhere, to maintaining their Hinduness, and to recognizing their unity, even though separated by localities, by observing similar rituals such as saluting the saffron flag, their symbol of the enduring history and culture of the motherland. The HSS has organizations in some fifty countries, including the United States, England, South Africa, and various countries throughout Asia and Western Europe. Its web page, as well as the web pages of the country branches, foregrounds the common saffron flag and displays as their major exemplar an etching of Swami Vivekananda, who is alleged to have introduced Hinduism to the West. The globally dispersed branches tend to replicate the same activities, such as training camps, and use similar indoctrinating educational materials. 

**GLOBALISM AND MULTIPLE MODERNITIES**

The perspective I have outlined that focuses on diasporic communities in terms of three frameworks—their evolving relations with their host societies, their continuing relations with their societies of origin, and their interconnecting global relations with other spatially dispersed diaspora communities of their own kind—now has to come to terms with certain cultural processes.

Examples include “hybridization,” “creolization,” “detrimentalization,” and “eclecticism.” These labels aspire to
characterize the ways in which we and our contemporaries, facing increasing exposure to transnational influences, selectively incorporate and synthesize them with our varied roots of origin, senses of our past, distinctive migration histories, preexisting practices, and new encounters in our places of destination, both short-term and long-term.

The term “hybridization” we may attribute to Salman Rushdie, who characterized one of his famous novels thus: “The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the pure. Mélange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world.” Homi Bhabha approvingly remarks that The Satanic Verses suggests “that there is no such whole as the nation, the culture, or even the self. . . . Salman Rushdie sees the emergence of doubt, questioning or even confusion as being part of the cultural ‘excess’ that facilitates the formation . . . of emergent, hybrid forms of cultural identity.”

The condition of “deterritorialization” is described by certain writers as follows: “The rapidly expanding and quickening mobility of people combined with the refusal of cultural products and practices to ‘stay put’ [engenders] a profound sense of a loss of territorial roots, [and] of an erosion of the cultural distinctiveness of places.”

According to some other commentators, the multiplicity of choice and the rich variety of diverse experiences that run together in simultaneity is a postmodern condition in general. Jean-Francois Lyotard echoes this sentiment when he remarks: “Eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald’s food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and ‘retro’ clothes in Hong Kong.”

As colorful as is the term “hybridization,” flashy the term “eclecticism,” and demoralizing the term “deterritorialization,” and despite their contributions to discerning some features of the postmodern condition, they do not help us adequately to answer what a persistent anthropologist will ask: in these cultural mixings and exchanges, what ingredients, what mecha-
nisms, what valuations are the dominant strands that produce the distinctively local flavor, the distinctively local syncretic patterning and social orderings, as well as the creative innovations?

To some extent Ulf Hannerz takes us further in formulating this question in his explication of what he calls the process of “creolization.” Inspired by some formulations in sociolinguistics concerning the interactions of languages, Hannerz adopts the term “creolization” to “grasp the character of those contemporary cultures which have been thoroughly shaped by the coming together of historically separate cultures, under circumstances of inequality in center-periphery relations.” The reshaping of impacting global forces is done especially through the agency of societal elites and counterelites, and the local social formations manifest interactive cultural and social complexity. Creolization “has connotations of creativity and richness of expression, and at the core of creole culture...is a combination of diversity, interconnectedness, and innovation...”

My qualms regarding such a suggestive use of the term “creolization” is that while it is employed in a rigorous and systematic manner in strictly linguistic analysis (to trace grammatical, syntactical, lexical, and phonological interactions between two usually asymmetrically positioned languages), it is in danger of being loosely analogized to postulate a “creole culture” without precise formulations of the interactive process and syncretic cultural outcomes. Diaspora communities of different origins, backgrounds, and orientations will inevitably vary in their accommodative and innovative responses, and I submit that substantive ethnographic accounts of some depth are preferable to fragmentary illustrations served up in some current programmatic writings.

A theoretically interesting formulation that can be illustrated ethnographically can be entitled, following Shmuel Eisenstadt, “multiple modernities in an age of globalization.” The classical theories of modernization developed in the 1950s tended to view the following components of Western civilizational experience as constituting a single interrelated package of universal relevance: industrialization, urbanization, and technically ad-
advanced communication media; capitalist market economy; the formation of modern nation-states and national collectivities; and an accompanying cultural program and patterning. It was assumed that these institutional and value constellations would “naturally” and inevitably take root in all modernizing societies.

Today we know that the assumption that the convergence of these components would create a uniform world has not been borne out. We know that these and other components can meet and combine in different ways in different societies during different phases of their transformations. Granted that some form of economic development, the creation of greater wealth and its redistribution, with accompanying technological linkage, is a common program and aspiration in most contemporary societies, it is quite evident that these societies can and do engender multiple civilizational patterns on the basis of selective choices, while sharing certain common modernizing goals. In sum, we should explore the possibility of “multiple modernities” not frozen but in process, manifesting convergences and divergences, that can bloom in our time of intensified transnational processes, and I shall now provide some strikingly different vignettes to substantiate this proposal.

The Significance of Temple Building by South Asian Diaspora in the United States

My first vignette describes the religious orientations and activities of certain South Asian Indian suburbanites of primarily middle-class status living in the United States, who are not only quite at home with the English language but also fully in control of Western scientific and modern commercial skills. Overseas Indian communities in the United States—and probably in Britain as well—are not so much concerned with their roots in a particular territory in India and with eventual return to their homeland (although they do make visits to their home regions frequently to find their marriage partners, and they have a lively sense of dual location) as with recreating the religious and cultural bases of their lives in their new locations by means of negotiations with the local authorities.
This sketch, which derives from Diana Eck’s Pluralism Project at Harvard University, is primarily concerned with the wider significance of temple building by Hindus in the United States. Many American Hindu communities have grown in the United States since the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act. As Eck says, “For many Hindu immigrants to America, the process of building a temple is simultaneously the process of building a community.” Men, women, children, and elders are drawn into creative participation in the life of the new temple, and, moreover, frequently Hindus originating in different regions of India—be they Tamils, Bengalis, or Gujaratis—have now become proximate urban dwellers and in collaborating in temple projects enter into the negotiation of their common Hindu identity.

There are today some four hundred Hindu temples in the United States; perhaps as many as thirty have been built from the ground up, while most are located in quarters transformed from other uses. “The most visible markers of a new Hindu presence in the U.S. are the newly built Hindu Temples.” Eck’s description of the work demonstrates a dual creative effort mounted and achieved on U.S. soil. To build temples, Hindu immigrants had to collaborate and negotiate with one another; at the same time they had to negotiate with American authorities and businesses and conform to American stipulations and expectations. The Hindu communities had to learn to launch fund-raising campaigns and to incorporate as nonprofit religious organizations, with the requisite boards of directors and membership, and keep records and accounts lists required by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for tax-free contributions. The Hindu temple builders thus engage in a fruitful encounter with American voluntarism and associationism.

Finally, one of the acts that Hindus perform in “recreating” their religious sites and culture in the United States is to actively and creatively superimpose their sacred geographies in India on the landscape and ecology of the United States: the rivers and streams and hills around the newly constructed temples are christened with the alternate names of rivers and hills back home, thus transplanting the regional sacred geographies of Tamil Nadu or of Braj and so on to the equally historicized landscape of America.
Now compare the activity of Hindus in America focused on creating community life around temple building to their high deities to the quite different proclivities of another famous array of diaspora communities populated by overseas Chinese. This second sketch concerns the remarkable trajectory of a single Cantonese lineage called Man, whose members have been tracked for thirty years by James (Woody) Watson, now at Harvard.37 I must underscore the point that this lineage is a special case and by no means represents other Chinese lineages in diaspora, although there are some affinities.38 The members of the Man lineage claim descent from a founding ancestor who settled on the south China coast over six centuries ago. The Man expanded rapidly and built a single lineage community called San Tin (“New Fields”), which was later absorbed into the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

By the late 1950s, San Tin’s rice fields, owned by lineage trusts, were no longer capable of supporting local families. San Tin and its lands were located in the New Territories, the border zone separating the Communist regime of mainland China from the British colony of Hong Kong—an in-between zone marked off by barbed-wire fences, inhospitable and undeveloped, patrolled by Gurkha and Black Watch regiments, and the home for a politically innocuous bird sanctuary. But the Man lineage members found their escape from their impoverished circumstances by using their status as British subjects to engage in international migration.

Watson has traced members of five generations of Man lineage: the first generation of migrants in the 1920s and 1930s worked as sailors on freighters, then jumped ship in Liverpool, London, Amsterdam, and elsewhere and set up take-out food shops and small restaurants serving chop suey with chips (a distinctive Sino-British amalgam) and also laundries. The major takeoff happened in the postwar 1950s and 1960s when the lineage members forged a framework for international emigration (by sponsoring chain migration) combined with entrepreneurial activity. They succeeded in establishing more elaborate restaurants in better locations in major cities in England, Hol-
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land, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, and Canada, and these were exclusively run and serviced by members of the Man lineage from San Tin.39

The Commonwealth Immigration Act of July 1, 1962, was a major cutoff point: those lineage members already in England were able to bring over agnates on labor vouchers, and this strengthened and revivified lineage bonds. By the mid-1970s, the Man lineage, now including the third generation of migrants and containing some 3,500 members in all, owned over four hundred restaurants in Europe alone.

Since the late 1970s, the Man have settled as citizens or permanent residents in, to mention only their most prominent locations, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and the United States. And their children have branched out beyond the catering trade to become lawyers, teachers, accountants, real-estate agents, and shop owners. Today, says Watson, the Chinese minority in England are the most educated of any ethnic group, including the English and the Scots. Members of some sub-branches have become spectacularly wealthy and cosmopolitan, while others, also affluent, mainly operate within the confines of “Chinatowns.”

In the 1990s, the members of the Man lineage are not only a worldwide diaspora, but many in the fifth generation do not speak Chinese, let alone read it, and know little about Chinese rituals; some have married non-Chinese and can speak four or five European languages. The spectacular part of this narrative, however, is that the majority of Man still perceive themselves as members of a unique group, different from other Chinese neighbors and colleagues; they continue to depend on lineage mates in preference to friends or affines, and they go to great extremes to keep in contact with each other by telephone, fax, and, more recently, e-mail. They have also established Man Clan Associations, housed in their own buildings, in London, Amsterdam, and Canada.

And, most importantly, many lineage members, especially in recent times, have made annual returns to their villages and lands of origin in the New Territories, renovated their ancestral tombs, reconstructed and embellished their five ancestral halls (two of which have been designated historical monuments), and
attended the rituals in commemoration of their ancestors conducted by the resident priests, who try to explain to the young visitors the meaning of those exotic ritual operations.

What is the key factor in this globally dispersed lineage members’ show of loyal and filial piety and annual returns to their ancestors’ tombs and halls? What is a major factor in their continuing exclusivist bonding? Especially now with the transfer of Hong Kong to mainland China, the previously abandoned marginal rice fields and other lands of San Tin, much of which continued to be owned by the apical ancestor, constitute corporate property held in lineage trusts in which every agnatic descendant today has a share (by successive per stripes inheritance). They are worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars and await capitalist development and new incalculable profits by the owners, who enjoy the double privilege and possibility of wheeling and dealing with both the PRC authorities and entrepreneurs in Beijing and the millionaires of Hong Kong, who are now figuring out the post-1997 future. To some extent, we are witnessing a “retraditionalization” driven by enhanced material fortunes in a time of globalization and localization.

* Mexican Americans: Dual Location and Loosening American Axioms

Historically, the United States has been a very open society, a country peopled by waves of migrants from different parent countries, and a nation-state that has preached and aspired to a form of distinctive incorporation called “the melting pot” and “assimilation, American style.” We know, of course, that the European streams—Scandinavian, German, Italian, Greek, Irish, and so on—did not fuse, and to varying degrees maintained ethnic identities and associations. But there was a significant sense in which there was a traditional “assimilationist contract” that was viewed as a compass for all immigrants and entailed the adoption of English as the national language, of liberal democratic principles, and of the so-called Protestant work ethic. Increasingly today it is not the “assimilationist” rhetoric that is in the air but that of “multiculturalism,” “bilingualism,” “dual citizenship,” and “affirmative action,” as evidenced by a recent spate of books and by political debate now
being voiced in California as a result of intensified waves of migration of people from across the southern border.

My last vignette concerns Mexican Americans in California, who are the focus of some major issues looming large in the United States, especially in California and other states of the Southwest. Certain special features of their migration may be noted. Because Mexico and the United States are contiguous countries, despite attempts by the latter to police the border, the border is in fact porous, characterized by breachings and relatively easy crossing back and forth by Mexican migrants.

A good part of this mobility is aided by the fact that cheap Mexican labor is vital to the Californian economy irrespective of whether the workers come as legal migrants with identity cards. In fact, the United States has little need to worry about the low birth rates of its white population so long as immigrants can fill the ranks of workers.

In recent decades, the single largest stream of migrants into the United States has been the Spanish-speaking Mexicans (also less acceptably referred to as Chicanos) from across the southern border. The labels Hispanic and Latino, as well as the label Black, are recently coined American ethnic terms. The stark fact is that not counting migrant workers, there were about 16.7 million Mexican-born people living in the United States in 1996. Mexicans are now America’s largest immigrant group by far, constituting about 28 percent of the foreign-born population. Additionally, the seasonal migrant workers are estimated to be roughly 2 million, their numbers accelerating since 1994 owing to the monetary crisis in their country. People of Hispanic origin and language affiliation—predominantly “Mexican Americans”—are expected in the early years of the next century to comprise half (or more) of the population of the state of California, especially in its largest cities.

Three political and social issues are looming large in California (and have relevance for other states of the Southwest). They are symptomatic of the fact that the increasing presence of new migrant and diasporic communities in the United States challenges and tests the hitherto hegemonic assimilationist contract and the prevalent view of modernity that it supported. Insofar as this thrust generates political debate, contestation,
and revision of earlier premises, the Californian demographic
and pluralist situation may be the forerunner within the United
States of a new form of coexistence and integration of plural
societies and the acceptance of an enriching civilizational vari-
ety.

The first issue is related to the concern, especially on the part
of right-wing Republicans, that illegal immigration must be
stemmed and affirmative action on behalf of these immigrants
be blocked. In 1994 Governor Wilson successfully campaigned
for Proposition 187, which sought to cut off public services to
illegal immigrants and their children, in order to solidify his
base among whites at a time of economic downturn. This
became one of the most contentious political issues in California’s
history. However, this measure was blocked in the federal
court, which found much of the proposition unconstitutional. In
July of 1999, Governor Davis agreed to drop an appeal of the
court’s ruling; in turn, the opponents of the proposition agreed
to drop their lawsuits against the state.

But while many of California’s conservative politicians unre-
alistically threaten to close the corridors of entry and inferiorize
the newcomers, Mexican migrant workers are no longer con-
fined to the Southwest but are adventurously crisscrossing the
United States, even finding their way to its far corners lured by
opportunities and responding to demands for cheap labor that
others decline.

A second issue that has stirred up much emotional partisans-
ship in the state of California regards the pros and cons of
bilingual education (in Spanish and English) for Hispanic immi-
grants and residents as opposed to education solely in English.
The bilingual program in place in the state of California, until
it was rejected in July of 1998 by a state-wide ballot on a
measure called Proposition 227, sought to educate non-English-
speaking children by teaching them in their native language
until they were confident enough to learn exclusively in English.
In California, the majority of children in question were the
children of Mexican immigrants.

The contested politics of bilingual education reveals the com-
plexities of arriving at a solution in an increasingly plural
society in California within the larger U.S. context, in which the
old “assimilationist” ideal, especially regarding the adoption of the English language, is still powerfully at work.

A third issue has been revived recently that seems to indicate that the anti-affirmative-action lobby in California is extending its reach into new areas of restriction directed at Mexican Americans and Blacks. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 209, which terminated affirmative-action programs in public college admissions, government contracts, and job hiring practices. The argument was that minorities should not enjoy special preferences but should instead compete on an equal footing with others.

A new lawsuit brought against California by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) charges that students at Black and Hispanic high schools have little opportunity to take advanced-placement courses that are designed to give students exposure to college-level work while still in high school. These courses end with an examination administered by the College Board, and elite universities in California take the scores into account in their admissions formulas. The ACLU suit was filed on behalf of Black and Hispanic students whose schools offer meager advanced-placement courses, in stark comparison with schools that are predominantly white in composition.

“Meanwhile,” said a New York Times article in August of 1999, “the anti-affirmative action camp in California is trying to twist the meaning of Proposition 209 to ban outreach and recruitment efforts that merely encourage minorities and women to compete for jobs, contracts and college slots.” If successful, this move “would take away crucial remaining tools to remedy the lingering effects of racial and gender discrimination. . . . Until now, opponents of affirmative action have tended to attack quotas and set-asides, not outreach efforts. Efforts such as community campaigns to increase awareness of college or job opportunities do not give minorities any advantage in the final selection process or in any way lower objective standards. They only aim to broaden the applicant pools.”

No doubt California will continue to debate the alleged opposed principles of affirmative action for underprivileged individuals versus general fairness for all, but significant political implications for the future shape and constitution of U.S. soci-
ety are being generated as a part of its present condition, which must accept, as well as integrate, its proliferating diverse immigrant and diasporic communities.

Let me now develop the theme that Mexican immigrants lead lives of double locations and that they subjectively experience and enact a double consciousness of identity and interpersonal relations between the United States and Mexico. Their dual location is evidenced by their frequent travels back and forth between their hometowns and communities in Mexico and their work sites and residences in the United States. They are concerned to make it in the United States, to enable their children to be educated there, and to become green-card holders and, if possible, U.S. citizens. They are involved in recreating certain of their forms of life in the United States while at the same time becoming American in other ways. They maintain and intensify their ties with their hometowns in Mexico, investing their savings in improving their houses there, redecorating and rebuilding their churches there, conducting elaborate fiestas for their patron saints and thereby also bettering their hometown civic status, and compensating for their low status in California. They are also sponsors of development schemes back home, collecting money for potable water projects and better health facilities. They are simultaneously both “here” in Mexico and “there” in the United States, and this is signified by their wanting dual citizenship. I would suggest that this form of life lived by Mexicans, not only in California but also in other parts of the United States, constitutes a distinct form of modernity; parallel and intertwined with this process is the active presence of plural diasporic communities within the United States softening the regnant American expectation that immigrants fully subscribe to the terms of the assimilation contract, and thus opening the way to a changed modernity.

The fact of double location is strengthened by recent Mexican legislation recognizing dual citizenship, a concession the United States is bound to tolerate even if unofficially. Opponents of dual citizenship fear that it will slow down assimilation if significant numbers maintain loyalties to two separate countries, yet as Peggy Levitt notes, supporters say that it “only formalizes and facilitates the global economic and social lives
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so many individuals already live.” And the immigrants might have their distinctive political preferences and inclinations that could affect the future politics of California.

The increasing demand for dual citizenship not only by Mexican Americans but also by many diasporic communities elsewhere, and the corresponding pressure put on unwilling host states to recognize it, can be considered a significant thrust toward a change in the notion of the exclusive sovereignty of nation-states.

I hope I have illustrated that today there are multiple modernities that are evolving, and that such complex processes cannot be grasped by a general theory of modernity at large or encompassed by blanket terms such as hybridization, eclecticism, creolization, deterritorialization, and so on. Such terms tell us something but not enough.

CONCLUSION

I would like to think that my discussion of transnational processes and multiple modernities that powerfully engender pluralist interactions of peoples and cultures may serve as a corrective formulation to Samuel Huntington’s gothic vision of a world bifurcated by a clash of exclusivist civilizations. Huntington, and some other conspicuous political prophets of doom in the United States, have asserted that the end of the Cold War will inexorably be succeeded by a new “clash of civilizations” divided by primordial deep faults of culture, language, and religion, and that the Western bloc, led by the United States and Western Europe, should retreat into isolationism to protect its interests.

There has been a distinct shift in and an intensification of the waves of migration into the United States in the final decades of the twentieth century that have altered the demographic and social profile of the country. For more than a century most of the new arrivals came from Europe, and these waves of migration were followed by a forty-year period of restricted entry. Thereafter, the shift of U.S. national policy since the 1960s permitted flows of immigrants from the rest of the world, especially from Third World countries. If the immigrant tide
continues, the U.S. population will rise to 392 million by the middle of the next century. It is even possible, as Martha Farnsworth, director of policy studies at Washington’s Population Research Bureau, observes, that during the second half of the twenty-first century “the descendants of white Europeans, the arbiters of the core national culture for most of its existence, are likely to slip into minority status.” In any event, this challenging statement is worth contemplating: “Without fully realizing it we have left the time when the nonwhite, non-Western part of our population could be expected to assimilate to the dominant majority. In the future, the white, Western majority will have to do some assimilation of its own.”

As Diana Eck has pointed out in riposte to Huntington, the plurality of religious traditions and cultures challenges people in every part of the world today, including the United States, which is now the most religiously diverse country on earth. “Today, the Islamic world is no longer somewhere else, in some other part of the world; instead Chicago, with its 50 mosques and nearly half a million Muslims, is part of the Islamic world. . . . The map of the world in which we live now cannot be color-coded as to its Christian, Muslim or Hindu identity, but each part is marbled with the colors and textures of the whole.” It is precisely the intensified interpenetration of civilizations and cultures that is the hallmark of the late twentieth century.

As another writer has put it: “The Third World is in the First World, and the First World in the Third; the North is in the South, and the South is in the North; the center is in the periphery, and the periphery is in the center.” True, provided we also remember that the First World continues asymmetrically to dominate the Third World, and the North the South, and that reality is not likely to change in the near future, to say the least.

During the expansionary phase of global capitalism, together with its unequal and uneven effects, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, it made sense to say that many parts of the globe were becoming porous and interactive as a result of massive population movements, large movements of capital, and accelerated exchanges of information, and thereby also becoming more
pluralistic and multicultural. The current economic downturn and contraction—let us hope that it will not last long—is also a grim reminder of the magnitude of that interrelatedness and the deadly effects of reversing it and reverting to exclusivism and nationalistic chauvinism.

ENDNOTES

1 At the same time there also has been unprecedented movement of people within developing countries, especially from rural to urban and industrial centers. Additionally, ethnonationalist conflicts have displaced refugees within countries.

2 *The Human Development Report, 1996*, published for the United Nations Development Program (New York: New York University Press, 1996), uses indicators such as these and divides the world into three categories: industrial countries, developing countries, and least developed countries. Developed industrial countries include Western European countries, the United States, Canada, many countries of the former Soviet Union, and current Eastern European countries. Developing countries include India, China, Sri Lanka, Korea, Hong Kong, Pakistan, most Latin American countries, and West African countries such as Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria. Least developed countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and many African states south of the Sahara such as Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Sudan.


4 It is projected that the population of Africa will increase by more than 200 percent between 1994 and 2050, while that of Latin America and the Caribbean is projected to increase by 77 percent, the population of Asia by 69 percent, and of North America by 34 percent. Ibid. Slightly different figures, which confirm the same magnitude of differences between the continents, are to be found in My T. Vu, Ernest Massich, and Rodolfo A. Bulatao, *World Population Projections: 1994–1995* (New York: United Nations, 1995).

5 The increased emigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to the former Federal Republic of Germany where they had rights to citizenship accounted for a major portion of that gain.

6 *Concise Report, 31.*

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 According to the 1985 estimates, international migrants within the developing countries made up 1.6 percent of their total population, while in the developed countries they constituted 4.1 percent of the total. *Concise Report, 32.*

10 Ibid., 34. This number for the United States included the majority of the nearly three million undocumented migrants whose status was later regularized by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

“In the developing world, Southern Asia had 19 million migrants as of 1985, followed by Northern Africa and Western Asia, with 13 million, and by sub-Saharan Africa with 11 million.” *Concise Report*, 34.


James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 244.


Taylor et al., *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, 63.


Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*.


I am grateful to Anita Khandelwal for permission to cite parts of her unpublished essay, “Nationalism on the Net: An Analysis of the Internet in the Creation of Diaspora Nationalism,” Harvard University, 1999.

Ibid.


Hindu nationalists . . . in the Indian diaspora, particularly in America, have promoted . . . their ideologies in a number of ways . . . through Hindu ‘Sunday School’ types of classes which offer introductory courses in Hindu religion and history, and in Sanskrit; through summer ‘heritage’ camps which offer more intensive courses . . . through comic book histories of Hindu India (Amar Chitra Katha); and through yearly conferences on topics related to Hinduism and India, etc.” Khandelwal, “Nationalism on the Net.” The web page of VHP of America claims that over five thousand youths born and raised in America have participated in VHP organized camps in America.
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21Khandelwal, “Nationalism on the Net.”


23The HSS web site is <http://www.hssworld.org/>. Khandelwal also reports that the Free India web site, <http://www.freeindia.org/>, set up to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Indian independence, apart from relaying postcard images of India (“India at a glance”), invites discussion of the “Myth of Aryan Invasion,” the links of Sikhism to Hinduism, and the “horrors” committed during Muslim rule in India, among other things.


27See, for example, David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

28Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 76.

29Hannerz, Transnational Connections, 10.

30Ibid., 6–67.


32These include temples in Houston; Chicago’s western suburbs; Albany; Detroit; Los Angeles; Lanham, Maryland; Livermore, California; Liberty, Ohio; and Flint, Michigan.

33This sketch is based on oral information Woody Watson gave me in an interview, and on a written summary of his continuing and future research. I have incorporated parts of the written summary verbatim.

34However, other overseas Chinese communities have recently intensified their transnational connections with mainland China and are involved in processes parallel to those I am describing. For example, Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini, eds., Underground Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism (London: Routledge 1997), discuss the interactions of the overseas Chinese communities with their traditionally defined “center,” the PRC, and how the global practices of modern flexible-accumulation-style capitalism have helped to create new concepts of Chinese modernity. Also Helen Siu’s essay, “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Difference in South China,” in China in Transformation, ed. Tu Wei-ming (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, [1993] 1994), deals with the shifting national and
regional identity of the coastal region of Southeast China in the context of tightening economic links between this area and overseas Chinese.

39 This phase of the Man lineage’s fortunes was documented in James Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

40 The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 legalized the status of more than two million Mexicans who had been working in the United States without documents.


42 Peggy Levitt, “Forms of Transnational Community and their Implications for Immigrant Incorporation: Preliminary Findings,” unpublished essay.

43 It is relevant to note in this context that Germany, which has previously resisted giving citizenship to immigrants of non-German descent, has very recently recognized that Turkish guest workers could become eligible for German citizenship.


45 Quoted in “The New Face of America,” *Time*, special issue (Fall 1993): 5.

46 Eck, “Negotiating Faiths,” 44.

FOR MORE THAN TWO DECADES, I have been engaged in a transtemporal, cross-cultural, and interdisciplinary discussion on the modern significance of Confucian humanism. As an evolving axial-age civilization, the Confucian tradition has undergone significant transformations. The difference between Classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism is arguably more pronounced than the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism, and, mainly because of the impact of the West, the rupture between Neo-Confucianism and the New Confucianism of the twentieth century is perhaps more radical than that between traditional Christology and the contemporary “God is dead” theology. As scholars in cultural China conventionally do nowadays, we can roughly periodize more than two thousand years of Confucian history into three epochs: Classical Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, and twentieth-century New Confucianism. Classical Confucianism began with Confucius (551–472 B.C.), and, since Confucius described himself as the transmitter of an ancient scholarly tradition, its origins could be several centuries earlier; it ended with the disintegration of the Han empire in the third century.

Neo-Confucianism, initiated by the Confucian Revival in the Song dynasty (960–1279), was marked by the spread of its ideas and practices to Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. Prior to the sudden appearance of the Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century, East Asian polity, society, and culture had been
so much seasoned in the Confucian persuasion that political governance, social ethics, and even the habits of the heart in China, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan were characteristically Confucian in word and deed. The flexibility and adaptability of the Confucian teaching to different styles of leadership, education, and organization, including the family, enabled it to maintain a coherent world view under divergent circumstances. Yet Confucianism has been so much an integral part of East Asia and so salient a feature of the Sinic world that, unlike Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, it is often perceived as a regional phenomenon rather than a world religion.

However, when we examine the Confucian phenomenon from a variety of academic disciplines, we are impressed by the universal implications of the problematic it evokes. In other words, this historically and culturally specific form of life offers insights into perennial intellectual and spiritual concerns that address the human condition of the emergent global community.¹

In our joint venture to explore modernity as both a historical reality and a conceptual framework, Confucian East Asia helps to identify three sets of issues: (1) traditions in the modernizing process, (2) the relevance of non-Western civilizations to the self-understanding of the modern West, and (3) the global significance of local knowledge. While each one of these issues is immensely complex, and the interactions between them layer the picture with ambiguities, a discussion of them together may show new possibilities emerging in this creative confusion and demonstrate that we are at a critical juncture to move beyond three prevalent but outmoded exclusive dichotomies: the traditional/modern, the West/the rest, and the local/global. Our effort to transcend these dichotomies has far-reaching implications for facilitating dialogues between civilizations in the global community. I would, therefore, like to focus my attention on the rise of East Asia as an exemplification of this mode of nondichotomous thinking.

Whether or not Hegel’s philosophy of history signaled a critical turn in which Confucianism, together with other spiritual traditions in the non-Western world, was relegated to the “dawn of the Spirit” (signifying the beginning of human self-
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consciousness), the common practice in cultural China of defining the Confucian ethic as “feudal” is predicated on the strong thesis of historical inevitability implicit in the Hegelian vision. We need to unpack this highly condensed version of “Confucian China and its Modern Fate.” It is too easy to relegate it to the background as a blatant assertion of Eurocentrism. After all, the overwhelming majority of East Asian intellectuals accepted the judgment that Confucianism, like other axial-age civilizations, was outmoded. The enduring power of the Hegelian persuasion that, in the last analysis, the burden of history must be borne by the reflective minds of the modern West, if not by the Prussian thinker who, for the first time in human history, philosophized as a world philosopher, is manifested in the current debate on the “end of history.”

The irony is that the entire Enlightenment project as captured by the epoch-making Kantian question “What is Enlightenment?” was, in its initial stage of formulation, an affirmation that cultural traditions outside the West, notably Confucian China, were well ordered without the benefit of revelatory religion. What happened in the nineteenth century when the dynamics of the modern West engulfed the world in a restless march toward material progress was definitely not the result of a straightforward working out of the Enlightenment project. On the contrary, it was thoroughly undermined by the unbound Prometheus, an unmitigated quest for complete liberation. While, in the eyes of the East Asian admirers, the demands for liberation from all boundaries of authority and dogma characterized the dynamic transformation of the modern West, we need not be either postimperialist social critics or postcolonial cultural critics to acknowledge that the modern West also symbolizes conquest, hegemony, and enslavement. This background is indispensable in understanding Habermas’s concerted effort to continue the unfinished business of the Enlightenment project.

Hegel, Marx, and Weber shared the ethos that, despite all its shortcomings, the modern West was the only arena where meaningful progress in the world could be made. The unfolding of the Spirit, the process of historical inevitability, and the “iron cage” of modernity were essentially European predicaments. Confucian East Asia, the Islamic Middle East, Hindu India, and
Buddhist Southeast Asia were on the receiving end of this Western modernizing process. Eventually, modernization as homogenization would make cultural diversity inoperative, if not totally meaningless. It was inconceivable that Confucianism or, for that matter, any other non-Western spiritual traditions could help shape the modernizing process. The development from tradition to modernity was inevitable and irreversible.

In the global context, what some of the most brilliant minds in the modern West assumed to be self-evidently true has turned out to be parochial, a form of local knowledge that has, significantly, lost much of its universal appeal. In both the Western and the non-Western worlds, the projected transition from tradition to modernity never occurred. As a norm, traditions continue in modernity. Indeed, the modernizing process itself is constantly shaped by a variety of cultural forms rooted in distinct traditions. The Enlightenment thinkers’ recognition of the relevance of radical otherness (such as Confucian humanism) to one’s own understanding of the eighteenth century seems more applicable to the current situation in the global community than does the inattention to any challenges to the Western mind-set of the modern age. As we near the twenty-first century, the openness of the eighteenth century may provide a better guide for the dialogue of civilizations than the exclusivity of the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century.

In the fields of Asian and comparative religion, it has long been established that, since religious pluralism is inevitable, interreligious dialogue is both necessary and desirable. Indeed, all major studies of human spirituality, inspired by cultural diversity as a pervasive phenomenon in urban centers, take an ecumenical approach to world religions. Long before Samuel Huntington’s controversial hypothesis of the “coming clash of civilizations,” numerous attempts had been made to explore the possibilities of communication, negotiation, accommodation, and fusion between and within different faith communities. Huntington’s warning against major fault lines in international politics further enhances the urgency for civilizational dialogues and for exploring a global ethic. Implicit in this sense
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of urgency is the increasing awareness that the anticipated emergence of the “global village,” far from being an integrated fiduciary community, signals difference, differentiation, and outright discrimination.

Fraternity, the functional equivalent of community, has attracted scanty attention in modern political thought among the Enlightenment values advocated in the French Revolution. The preoccupation with defining the relationship between the individual and the state since Locke’s treatises on government is, of course, not the full picture of modern political thought, but it is undeniable that communities, notably the family, have been ignored as irrelevant in the main stream of Western academic discourse. Hegel’s fascination with the “civil society” that exists beyond the family and below the state was mainly prompted by the dynamics of the bourgeoisie, a distinct urban phenomenon threatening to all traditional communities. It was a prophetic view toward the future rather than an acknowledgment of the value of community. The transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft was thought to have been a major rupture. As a result, Weber referred to “universal brotherhood” as an outmoded medieval myth unrealizable in the disenchanted modern secular world.

The recent North American upsurge of interest in community may have been stimulated by a sense of crisis that social disintegration is a serious threat to the well-being of the Republic, but the local conditions in the United States and Canada, precipitated by ethnic and linguistic conflicts, are generalizable throughout the highly industrialized, if not postmodern, First World. The advent of the “global village” intensifies perceived and actual inequalities in wealth, power, influence, and accessibility to goods, ideas, and information. The conflict between globalizing trends—including trade, finance, information, migration, and tourism—and localism rooted in ethnicity, language, land, class, and religious faith seems unresolvable.

The Confucian insistence on the importance of equality rather than freedom, sympathy rather than rationality, civility rather than law, duty rather than rights, and human-relatedness rather than individualism may appear to be diametrically opposed to the value-orientation of the Enlightenment. It is unsurprising
that the “Asian values” advocated by political leaders such as Lee Kwang Yew and Mahatir often provoke strong cynical reactions in the West. From the perspective of the human-rights communities in North America and Western Europe, the Asian values' rhetoric smacks of pernicious justification for exercising undemocratic authoritarian mechanisms of control. Nevertheless, in light of the danger of social disintegration at all levels, from family to nation, the worldwide need for social justice, reciprocal empathy, mutual understanding, responsibility, and a sense of togetherness is obvious. As Louise Henkin emphatically notes, these so-called Asian or Confucian values, like Enlightenment values, are universal too.

Industrial East Asia since the 1960s and socialist East Asia since the 1980s have experienced a revival of Confucian teaching as political ideology, intellectual discourse, merchant ethics, family values, or the spirit of protest. This is the combination of many factors. Despite tension and conflict rooted in primordial ties, the overall life pattern in East Asia involves consensus formation based on values significantly different from the modern Western emphasis on contractual relationships. Yet East Asian intellectuals have been devoted students of Western learning for more than a century. In the case of Japan, from Dutch, British, French, German, and, since World War II, American learning, the samurai-bureaucrats learned the superior knowledge of Western science, technology, manufacturing industries, and political institutions. Similarly, the Chinese scholar-officials, the Korean yangban, and the Vietnamese literati acquired knowledge from the West to rebuild their societies anew. Their commitment to substantial, comprehensive, or even wholesale Westernization was remarkable. Through their perceptions and firsthand experiences of the modus operandi of the modern West, they thoroughly transformed their economies, polities, education systems, and societies. Such positive identification with the West and active participation in a fundamental restructurin of their “lifeworlds” enabled them to emulate the West with marvelous success. In this process of massive cultural absorption, East Asian countries deliberately relegated their own rich spiritual resources to the background. However, this enhanced their need to appeal, often inadvertently, to
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native patterns to reshape what they had acquired from the West. This model of creative adaptation helped them to position themselves strategically in forging a new synthesis of Enlightenment rationality and Confucian humanism.

It is interesting to note that, more than a hundred years prior to the Western impact on China in the mid-nineteenth century, intellectuals in France, England, Italy, and Germany had become aware of the humanistic splendor of Chinese civilization through missionary reports of the Jesuits. Voltaire, Quesnay, Diderot, and the physiocrats were fascinated by the Chinese world view, cosmological thinking, benevolent autocracy, and secular ethics. While the vogue for things Chinese that overwhelmed eighteenth-century European aristocracy was merely a craze for chinoiserie, Confucian China provided an intellectual challenge to the self-reflexivity of a small coterie of the most creative Western minds. Ironically, the outcome of European rationalism, dispirited and denatured, was a far cry from the organismic vision of Confucian humanism.

The modern West’s dichotomous world view (spirit/matter, mind/body, physical/mental, sacred/profane, creator/creature, God/man, subject/object) is diametrically opposed to the Chinese holistic mode of thinking. Arguably, it is also a significant departure from ancient Greek, Judaic, and early Christian spiritual traditions. Informed by Bacon’s knowledge as power and Darwin’s survival through competitiveness, the Enlightenment mentality is so radically different from any style of thought familiar to the Chinese mind that it challenges all dimensions of the Sinic world. While the Enlightenment faith in instrumental rationality fueled by the Faustian drive to explore, know, and subdue nature spurred spectacular progress in science and technology, it also became a justification for imperialist domination and colonial exploitation. As the international rules of the game, defined in terms of wealth and power, were superimposed on China by gunboat diplomacy, Chinese intellectuals accepted the inevitability of Westernization as a necessary strategy for survival.

The deliberate choice of the May Fourth (1919) intellectuals to engage in an iconoclastic attack on the rich cultural resources of the Confucian tradition and to embark on a materi-
alist path to save the nation was predicated on a rational calculation: the shortcut to modernization was wholesale Westernization. The demand for effective action and demonstrable results was so compelling that there was little room for reflection, let alone meditative thinking. As a consequence, respect for the life of the mind was marginalized. For philosophy and religion, the outcome was disastrous. The anticipated “shortcut” became a tortuous road to revolutionary romanticism and populist scientism and, for several generations of intellectuals, serfdom. Unlike their Indian counterparts who maintained their native spirituality during centuries of colonization, Chinese intellectuals were prompted by their semicolonial status to reject all the spiritual traditions that defined China’s soul. We have only just begun to see indications that Chinese thinkers are recovering from this externally imposed yet self-inflicted malaise.

With all of its boundless energy and creative impulse, the Enlightenment was, at best, a mixed blessing. Despite its enduring legacy of liberating the human spirit from religious dogmatism, its anthropocentric self-assertion, like the destructive will, was detrimental to human flourishing. In light of the ecological crisis and the grave danger of social disintegration, the need to retrieve the Greek wisdom of self-knowledge, the Judaic sense of awe, and the Christian feeling of reverence is widely acknowledged in the Western scholarly community today.

By contrast, it is intriguing to observe that the Enlightenment mentality is alive and well in China. Surely the overwhelming majority of Chinese scholars reject the characterization of human beings as rational animals endowed with inalienable rights and motivated by their self-interest to maximize profit in the marketplace. Yet market economy, democratic polity, and individualism, Talcott Parsons’s three inseparable dimensions of modernity, loom large in China’s intellectual discussion. Several recent heated debates in Beijing were focused on Friedrich von Hayek’s idea of the market, Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation of liberty, and John Rawls’s theory of justice. Many young scholars strongly believe that the basic intellectual problem in the tragic history of China’s modernization is that national sentiments to save the nation overshadowed the need for a deep
understanding of the Enlightenment. This partly explained the lamentable outcome of China’s march toward modernity.

The assumption is that the burning desire for national survival frustrated the concerted effort to learn from the West. As a result, the time was too short and the psychology too anxious for Enlightenment ideas such as liberty, equality, rationality, and due process of law to grow and flourish in Chinese intellectual soil. It may have taken centuries for science and democracy to become fully established in Western Europe and North America, but the Asian Westernizers and, by implication, the modernizers felt they had only a few decades to employ science and democracy to save China from political and social disintegration.

Nevertheless, in a deeper sense, the difficulty lies in the ambiguity of the Enlightenment legacy itself. The Chinese Westernizers who unabashedly identified themselves as modernizers were committed political activists with a passion to save China from the dark history of backwardness, its own feudal past. They unquestioningly embraced the Enlightenment mentality as the only road to ensure China’s survival. It is unfortunate that they failed to realize the transformative potential of the Confucian tradition. For example, they could have learned from the Japanese Meiji Restoration, a well-known case in which indigenous recourses were mobilized for modernization. As a result, Confucianism as political governance, social organization, and moral education flourished in Meiji Japan. Despite Japan’s conscientious attempt to reject the Sinic model and join the West, she did not opt for iconoclasm as a way out.

The Confucian tradition, marginalized as a distant echo of the feudal past, is forever severed from its imperial institutional base, but has yet kept its grounding in an agriculture-based economy, family-centered social structure, and paternalistic polity. Needless to say, as a response to the Western impact, all of these have been thoroughly reconfigured in a new constellation. Confucian political ideology has provided great symbolic resources for the development states of Japan and the four Mini-Dragons (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore). It is evident in the political processes of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Vietnam. As the
demarcation between capitalist and socialist East Asia begins
to blur, the shared ethical norms that cut across the great divide
can very well be interpreted in Confucian terms. Economic
culture, family values, and merchant ethics in East Asia and in
China (including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) have also
expressed themselves in Confucian vocabulary. We may, of
course, reject such an explanation as a postmortem justifica-
tion. Yet, even if we agree that the Confucian articulation is but
an afterthought, the pervasiveness of ideas such as network
capitalism, soft authoritarianism, group spirit, and consensual
politics throughout the East Asian economy, polity, and society
suggests the continuous relevance of Confucian traditions in
East Asian modernity.

To put the issue in historical context, it seems fitting to quote
from Edwin Reischauer’s prophetic statement made in 1973
and subsequently published as “The Sinic World in Perspective”
in *Foreign Affairs*:

The peoples in East Asia share certain key traits, such as group
solidarity, an emphasis on the political unit, great organizational
skills, a strong work ethic, and a tremendous drive for education.
It is because of such traits that the Japanese could rise with
unprecedented speed from being a small underdeveloped nation in
the mid-nineteenth century to being a major imperial power in the
early twentieth—and an economic superpower today. . . . And now
her record is being paralleled by all the other East Asian units that
are unencumbered by war or the economically blighting pall of
communism—namely, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore, which, like Hong Kong, is essentially a Chinese city-
state.

Throughout the non-East Asian countries of Southeast Asia,
Chinese minorities remain so economically and educationally
dominant as to cause serious political and social problems. One
cannot but wonder what economic growth might be in store for
Vietnam, if peace is ever achieved here, and for China and North
Korea if their policies change enough to afford room for the
economic drive of which their people are undoubtedly capable.⁶

Resichauer, with amazing brevity, outlined the trajectory of the
rise of Confucian East Asia, based on his penetrating insight
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into the underlying values shared by both industrial East Asia (Japan and the four Mini-Dragons) and socialist East Asia (mainland China, North Korea, and, for cultural reasons, Vietnam).

Specifically, East Asian modernity under the influence of Confucian traditions presents a coherent social vision with at least six salient features:

1. Government leadership in a market economy is not only necessary but desirable. The government is perceived, in principle, as a positive force for social stability rather than as a necessary evil. Even if the market by itself can provide an “invisible hand” for ordering society, the need for an outside regulatory and distributive agency overseeing economic activities is beyond dispute.

There are many styles of governance in East Asia, ranging from Singapore’s direct involvement to Hong Kong’s “active noninterference.” But the consensus is also strong: a government that is responsive to public needs, responsible for the welfare of its people, and accountable to society at large is vitally important for the creation and maintenance of order. Furthermore, virtually all East Asian countries subscribe to the Confucian principle that the government is charged not only with maintaining law and order and providing the basic necessities of life, but with offering educational opportunities for its citizens.

2. Although law is the essential minimum requirement for social stability, “organic solidarity” can only result from humane rites of interaction. The civilized mode of conduct can never be coerced. Exemplary teaching as a standard of inspiration invites voluntary participation. Law alone cannot generate a sense of shame to guide civilized behavior; it is the ritual act that encourages people to live up to their own aspirations. Law may provide the minimum condition for social stability, but only the cultivation of virtue through the practice of rites can create the cultural space for human flourishing.

3. Family as the basic unit of society is the locus from which core values are transmitted. The dyadic relationships within the family, differentiated by age, gender, authority, status, and hierarchy, provide a richly textured natural environment for
learning the proper way of being human. The principle of reciprocity in human interaction defines all forms of human relatedness in the family. Age and gender, potentially two of the most serious gaps in the primordial environment of the human habitat, are brought into a continuous flow of intimate sentiments of human care. Concern for the unintended negative effects of abusive familial relationships compels Confucian societies often to acknowledge family affairs as public interests rather than private matters.

(4) Civil society flourishes not because it is an autonomous arena above the family and beyond the state. Its inner strength lies in its dynamic interplay between family and state. The image of the family as a microcosm of the state and the ideal of the state as an enlargement of the family indicate that family stability is vitally important for the body politic and that the state should strive to ensure the organic solidarity of the family. Civil society provides a variety of mediating cultural institutions that allow a fruitful articulation between family and state. The dynamic interaction between private and public enables civil society to offer diverse and enriching resources for human flourishing.

(5) Education ought to be the civil religion of society. The primary purpose of education is character building. Intent on the cultivation of the full person, education should emphasize ethical as well as cognitive intelligence. Schools should teach the art of accumulating "social capital" through communication. In addition to providing for the acquisition of knowledge and skills, schooling must be congenial to the development of cultural competence and appreciation of spiritual values.

(6) Since self-cultivation is the common root of the regulation of family, the governance of state, and peace under Heaven, the quality of life of a particular society depends on the level of self-cultivation of its members. A society that encourages self-cultivation as a necessary condition for human flourishing is a society that cherishes virtue-centered political leadership, mutual exhortation as a communal way of self-realization, family as the home for learning to be human, civility as the normal pattern of human interaction, and education as character building.
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Of course, these societal ideals are not fully realized in East Asia. East Asian societies often exhibit totally un-Confucian behavior and attitude, a clear case of the seemingly unbridgeable gap between ideation and actuality. Indeed, partly due to the humiliating experience of imperialism and colonialism, the rise of East Asia blatantly displays some of the most negative aspects of Western modernism: exploitation, mercantilism, consumerism, materialism, greed, egoism, and brutal competitiveness. However, as it was the first non-Western region to become modernized, the cultural implications of the rise of “Confucian” East Asia are far-reaching. The modern West provided the initial impetus for worldwide social transformation. The historical impetus for the modernizing process in Western Europe and North America is not necessarily a structural component of modernity. Surely Enlightenment values such as instrumental rationality, liberty, rights-consciousness, due process of law, privacy, and individualism are all universalizable modern values, but, as the Confucian example suggests, “Asian values” such as sympathy, distributive justice, duty-consciousness, ritual, public-spiritedness, and group orientation are also universalizable modern values. Just as the former ought to be incorporated into East Asian modernity, the latter may turn out to be critical and timely references for the modern Western way of life.

Confucian modernity demonstrates that modernization is not, in essence, Westernization or Americanization. Does this mean that the rise of East Asia symbolizes the replacement of an old paradigm with a new one? No. But it does point to the need for the West, especially the United States, to transform itself into a learning as well as a teaching civilization. What East Asian modernity signifies is pluralism rather than alternative monism. The success of Confucian East Asia in becoming fully modernized without being thoroughly Westernized clearly indicates that modernization may assume different cultural forms.

It is thus conceivable that Southeast Asia may become modernized in its own way without being either Westernized or East Asianized. The very fact that Confucian East Asia has provided an alternative model of modernization for Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia signifies that Buddhist and Islamic and, by implication, Hindu forms of modernity are not only
possible but highly probable. There is no reason to doubt that Latin America, Central Asia, Africa, and indigenous traditions throughout the world all have the potential to develop their own alternatives to Western modernism. While many alternatives to Western modernism, such as Maoism and militant religious fundamentalisms, have been disastrous for the imagined global community, the emergence of a plurality of modern forms of life is a cause for celebration.

I am acutely aware that the neat conclusion, as the result of our commitment to pluralism, may have been reached prematurely. Any indication that this is likely to happen, a sort of historical inevitability, betrays simple-minded wishful thinking. We do not have to be tough-minded realists to know the likelihood of this scenario occurring. If the “First World” insists upon its privilege to overdevelop, if industrial East Asia forges ahead with its accelerated growth, if the PRC immerses herself in the “four modernizations” at all costs, what shape will the world be fifty years from now? Is East Asian modernity a promise or a nightmare? One wonders.

The current financial crisis notwithstanding, Confucian East Asia’s transformation in the last four decades, from a warworn wasteland to the most vibrant economy the world has ever witnessed, is undeniable. Japan’s metamorphosis from an obedient student under American tutelage to the single most powerful challenger to U.S. economic supremacy compels us to reflect upon this profoundly modern and significantly non-Western form of modernity. The “reform and open” policy of the PRC since 1979 has propelled her to become a full-fledged development state. The Tiananmen tragedy of 1989 seriously damaged the credibility and legitimacy of the Beijing government. Yet its comprehensive program of systematic integration into the global community continued to function well. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union signaled the end of international communism as a failed experiment, but socialist East Asia seems to be in the process of reinventing itself in reality, if not in name.

It may seem reasonable to assume that since China has been humiliated by the imperialist West for more than a century, revenge is her principal motive for restructuring world order.
Memories of the Pacific theater of World War II and the Korean War, not to mention the Vietnam War, give credence to the myth of the Yellow Peril. The emigration of wealthy Chinese from Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to North America, Australia, and New Zealand further enhances the impression that there is a Chinese conspiracy to rearrange power relationships and control precious financial resources in the global community. These commonly held assumptions, myths, and impressions construct a grossly distorted picture of China’s integration into the global community as a deliberate strategy of modernization. With thousands of political dissidents in the West, worldwide support for an independent Tibet, and Taipei’s effective lobbying of Capitol Hill, China’s radical otherness is perceived in the American mass media as a threat to international peace. The popular demonization of China as a pariah state, replacing the former Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire,” may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, a topic well worth the attention of public intellectuals in the government and society at large. The need to take a global, rather than a highly politicized local, perspective on a sustainable Sino-American relationship is more urgent than ever.

While the rise of Confucian East Asia signals that modernization may take on diverse cultural forms, it does not indicate that Western modernism is being eroded by, let alone replaced by, an East Asian alternative. The claim that Asian values, rather than Western Enlightenment values, are more congenial to current Asian conditions and, by implication, to the emergent global community in the twenty-first century is simple-minded, if not pernicious. The task ahead is the expansion of a global civilizational dialogue as a prerequisite for a peaceful world order. The perceived clash of civilizations makes the dialogue imperative. The real challenge, then, is to have not only the willingness and courage to understand the “radical otherness” rooted in different axial-age civilizations, but the wisdom to transform a teaching culture into a learning culture as a way to elevate our self-knowledge from local to global concerns. Paradoxically, since the primordial ties defining each concrete living community are undeniable realities of our daily existence, we learn to become global citizens by working through rather than
departing from our ethnicity, gender, language, land, age, and faith. Fruitful mutuality is built upon basic trust that commitments to the well-being of our roots need not be xenophobic or exclusive. Indeed, it is the global significance of local knowledge that compels us to be engaged in the dialogue of civilizations.

As the East Asian example implies, although all traditions have been fundamentally restructured as a result of modernization, they continue to shape modernity in a variety of directions and, in a substantial way, define the meaning of being modern. If that is accepted, what happens to the claim that modernity must be conceived in terms of three inseparable dimensions: market economy, democratic polity, and individualism?

Surely market economy is a powerful engine of globalization. Yet the market force, as it has been released in East Asia, demands vigilant political attention. Effective governmental participation in the smooth running of the market mechanism is not an impossibility. Often political leadership provides necessary regulatory leverage for a stable market. In both domestic and foreign competition, economically sophisticated government agents can be instrumental in creating an environment for healthy growth. Collaboration between officialdom and the business community is common in East Asian societies. Actually, a defining characteristic of the East Asian political economy is the constant interplay between what are designated in the West as the public and private domains. Government’s participation in the economic sphere may take different forms—direct management (Singapore), active leadership (South Korea), informed guidance (Japan), selective interference (Taiwan), or positive noninterference (Hong Kong)—but the presence of the central government in all weighty economic decisions is not only expected but also desired by the business community and the general public. The message is clear: globalization as dictated by the market force is urgently in need of an efficient and reliable transnational mechanism for governance. This fact alone demands pluralistic thinking and collaborative spirit.

The trend toward democratization seems unstoppable, but, in practical terms, democracy as a form of life is more than the electoral culture. The East Asian manifestations of the demo-
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The democratic idea strongly suggest that democratization as an evolving process is compatible with bureaucratic meritocracy, educational elitism, and particularistic social networking. The democratic experience in England has been significantly shaped by traditions of pragmatism, empiricism, skepticism, and gradualism, whereas in France, anti-clericalism, rationalism, culturalism, and the revolutionary spirit feature prominently. Furthermore, German democracy has been characterized by romanticism, nationalism, and ethnic pride, and the continuous presence of a strong civil society is uniquely American. The Confucian faith in the betterment of the human condition through self-effort, commitment to family as the basic unit of society and to family ethics as the foundation of social stability, trust in the intrinsic value of moral education, self-reliance, work, mutual aid, and a sense of an organic unity with an ever-extending network of relationships provides rich cultural resources for East Asian democracies to develop their own distinctive styles.

It is true that the Confucian rhetoric, in a discussion of Asian values, may be used as a framework for criticizing the indiscriminate imposition of Western ideas on the rest of the world. The new agenda to broaden human rights from exclusive emphasis on political and civil rights to include economic, social, and cultural rights may very well be perceived as a strategic maneuver by Asian leaders to divert attention from blatant human-rights violations in East Asia. While the need for East Asian societies to free themselves from nepotism, authoritarianism, and male chauvinism is obvious, democracy with Confucian characteristics is not only imaginable but may also be practicable.

This is not to undermine the explicit claims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the international community is obligated to take a stand against a government depriving its people of basic political rights. Violation of human rights under the disguise of internal security should not be condoned. For example, the denial of freedom of speech under the pretext of social solidarity is not at all justifiable in Confucian terms. While governments such as India may choose to list nonjudiciable rights (such as job security and universal education) in the constitution, the substitution of economic rights (sufficient food) for political rights is unacceptable as a Confucian idea.
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East Asian intellectuals have begun to probe the spiritual resources of Confucian tradition for economic development, nation-building, social stability, and cultural identity. But having been overwhelmed by the scientism, materialism, and utilitarianism of the modern age, many of them have become numb to the broad humanistic spirit of the Confucian tradition. Those who are attuned to the Confucian message inevitably discover that Confucian personality ideals (the authentic person, the worthy, or the sage) can be realized more fully in a liberal democratic society than in either a traditional imperial dictatorship or a modern authoritarian regime. They are also critically aware that Confucian ethics must creatively transform itself in light of Enlightenment values before it can serve as an effective critique of the excessive individualism, pernicious competitiveness, and vicious litigiousness of the modern West. Similarly, the current Western confidence verging on arrogance—"our" present is necessarily the rest of humanity's future—is not only distasteful but seriously misplaced. Even if we can demonstrate empirically that the material things an average American takes for granted as the basic necessities of life are the aspirations of all developing societies, we Americans are woefully inept in defining the wholeness of life for them and, for all practical purposes, for ourselves.

To reiterate an earlier point, intellectuals in the Confucian world have been devoted students of Western learning for more than a hundred years. As they became seasoned in the universal Enlightenment values of the modern West, they began to retrieve values from their own indigenous spiritual traditions. The transvaluation of Confucian values as a creative response to the hegemonic discourses of Western Europe and North America seems a natural outcome of this intercultural communication. Since cultural China is no longer merely an agrarian society with its vast majority statically wedded to the land, and as it is also one of the most dynamic migrant communities in the world, the habits of the Chinese populace as well as the corporate consciousness of the Chinese intelligentsia provide a brand-new context for the modern transformation of the Confucian tradition.

The estimate of thirty-six million ethnic Chinese overseas clearly indicates that the sons and daughters of the Yellow
Emperor encompass not only the largest farming population but also one of the most enterprising merchant classes in the emerging global community. If we assume that Confucian culture still matters and that its values are still cherished, or at least unconsciously upheld by the Chinese people, the form of modernity that the Confucian tradition helps to shape should be relevant to the rest of the world in understanding the human condition. On the contrary, if Confucian ethics can no longer provide guidance for action in Chinese society and if Confucian values are neither relevant nor crucial to Chinese economic behavior, there is an urgent need to inquire what ethical thinking can provide a strong enough moral basis for the Chinese to take an active part in the global stewardship so essential to world peace.

The matter is immensely complicated by the decision of the political leadership of the PRC to envision modernization exclusively in terms of science, technology, economic development, and military hardware. Through the “reform and open” policy, China has joined the restless march toward wealth and power. Already, an internal migration of more than one hundred million people has occurred, mainly from the countryside to the cities, especially along the southeastern coast where economic development has been most vibrant. Tidal waves of commercialization have overwhelmed all major Chinese cities. The pressure to define the good life in Western material terms has seriously affected government, labor, the military, the professions, and the academic community. The Chinese population curve is expected to grow to 1.6 billion before it begins to level off well into the twenty-first century. The one-child policy has produced a new generation of “little emperors” with the unintended negative consequence of gender imbalance and accelerated aging. Above all, environmental degradation has created major problems of air and water pollution, flooding, soil loss, and deforestation. The issue of sustainable growth or even survivability has been raised and widely discussed in the mass media. Given the gravity of the situation, the appeal of Buddhist vegetarianism and Daoist asceticism as well as the Confucian ethic of moderation is widespread.

Whether or not China will successfully muddle through this critical transition is vitally important for the global community.
We need to remind ourselves, at this juncture, that since the Opium War (1939), China has endured many calamities. Prior to 1949, the Chinese people experienced a major man-made disaster each decade, and imperialism was the main culprit. Furthermore, since the founding of the PRC, the society has suffered continual upheaval, experiencing a fundamental restructure almost every five years because of erratic leadership and faulty policies. Although millions of Chinese died, the neighboring countries were not seriously affected, and the outside world was, by and large, oblivious to what actually happened. Since 1979, China has been rapidly becoming an integral part of the international economic system. More than 30 percent of the Chinese economy is tied to international trade. Village-township enterprises, a combination of private entrepreneurial initiatives and public ownership, have been a dynamic engine for development. Natural economic territories have emerged between Hong Kong and Quanzhou, Fujian and Taiwan, Shandong and South Korea. European, Japanese, and American as well as Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and overseas Chinese investments are present in virtually all provinces in the PRC. The return of Hong Kong to China, the conflict across the Taiwan Straits, the economic and cultural interchange between overseas Chinese communities and between them and the motherland, the intraregional communication in East Asia, the political and economic integration of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, and the rise of the Asia-Pacific region will all have a substantial impact on our shrinking global community.

If we broaden our scope to include Cultural China, a second migration, as contrasted with the first migration of millions of Chinese from the Guangdong and Fujian provinces to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, is underway. In the last two decades, Chinese with substantial financial resources in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have begun to emigrate to Australia, Canada, and the United States for reasons of political security, economic opportunity, cultural expression, or education for their children. In the United States, newly arrived ethnic Chinese from South Vietnam and students from the PRC have literally altered the landscapes of Chinatowns and international student communities throughout the country. On the
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other hand, it should be noted that there has been a steady flow of highly qualified Asian professionals in science and engineering leaving North America and returning to industrial East Asia. If we further broaden our scope to include both industrial and socialist East Asia, the presence of Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese communities throughout the world further enhances the need to understand the dialogue of civilizations as a dynamic process. Is it still meaningful to talk about Confucian East Asia?

The designation of East Asia as “Confucian” in the ethicoreligious sense is comparable to the validity and limitation of employing “Christian,” “Islamic,” “Hindu,” and “Buddhist” in identifying geopolitical regions such as Europe, the Middle East, India, or Southeast Asia. The religious pluralism of “Confucian” East Asia deserves our special attention. It is not at all difficult to imagine that Shintoist or Buddhist Japan, shamanist, Buddhist, or Christian Korea, and Daoist or Buddhist China are all constitutive parts of the East Asian spiritual landscape. As a result, the term “Confucian” can be used as an adjective to describe some Buddhists, Daoists, Christians, and Muslims in East Asia, or, for that matter, in other parts of the world. Needless to say, Confucian ethics so conceived is not a simple representation of Classical Confucian or Neo-Confucian teaching. Rather, it is a new way of conceptualizing the form of life, the habits of the heart, or the social praxis of those societies that have been under the influence of Confucian education for centuries.

As we are confronted with the issue of a new world order replacing the exclusive dichotomy (capitalism and socialism) imposed by the super powers, we are tempted to come up with facile generalizations: “the end of history,” “the clash of civilizations,” or “the Pacific century.” The much more difficult and, hopefully, much more significant line of inquiry is to address truly fundamental ethical issues confronting the global community: Are we isolated individuals, or centers of interpersonal relationships? Can we afford to cut ourselves off from the spiritual moorings of our cultures? How can we transmit the values we cherish to our children if we do not try to embody them in our own lives? How can we expect others to respect
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our way of life if we have no desire or curiosity to understand what they regard as meaningful and worthwhile? Can our society endure and prosper without developing a basic sense of duty and responsibility? Should our pluralistic society deliberately cultivate shared values and a common ground for human understanding for the sake of unity? As we become acutely aware of our earth’s vulnerability and increasingly wary of social disintegration, what direction must we take for the sake of our survival?

The revitalization of the Confucian discourse may contribute to a much needed communal critical self-consciousness among East Asian intellectuals. We may very well be witnessing the very beginning of global history rather than the end of history. And, from a comparative cultural perspective, this new beginning must take as its point of departure the dialogue of civilizations. Our awareness of the danger of civilizational conflicts rooted in ethnicity, language, land, and religion makes the necessity of dialogue particularly compelling. A plurality of models of sustainable development emphasizing the ethical and spiritual dimensions of human flourishing must be sought.

The time is long overdue to move beyond a mind-set shaped by modernization as a unilinear progression. As the politics of domination fades, we welcome the dawning of an age of communication, networking, negotiation, interaction, interfacing, and collaboration. Even if we strongly believe that the United States alone can exert hegemonic influence in the global community, the real American strength lies in “soft power” (moral persuasion) rather than military might. This is the reason we hope that East Asian leaders, inspired by the Confucian spirit of self-cultivation, family cohesiveness, social solidarity, benevolent governance, and universal peace, will practice an ethic of responsibility in managing their domestic affairs. We also hope that as Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese emigrate to other parts of the world, they bring along their rich cultural heritage for sharing. In the last analysis, whether or not we celebrate cultural diversity without falling into the trap of pernicious relativism is profoundly meaningful for global stewardship.
As Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Wolfgang Schluchter observe in the *Dædalus* issue on “Early Modernities”:

Theories of modernization and of modernity, as formulated in the fifties and sixties, were based on the assumption of convergence. It was believed that modernization would wipe out cultural, institutional, structural, and mental differences and, if unimpeded, would lead to a uniform modern world. While minor differences would remain, according to these theories, primarily due to the persistence of premodern factors, in the long run they would fade away.  

In the 1980s, when the economic dynamism of East Asia was exceptionally strong, the thesis of reverse convergence was either clearly articulated or strongly implied by several theoreticians of modernization. The ideas of “Asian values,” “network capitalism,” and the “Asia-Pacific century” were in vogue for more than a decade. The financial crisis of the summer of 1997 prompted a new discourse. Since authoritarianism and crony capitalism were identified as the main reasons that the Asian financial institutions had suffered from lack of transparency, public accountability, and fair competitiveness, the arguments for reverse convergence have lost much of their persuasive power. As the economies of Japan and Korea begin to recover, East Asia will probably reemerge as an important reference for Western Europe and North America again. Since, as Björn Wittrock notes, “the multiplicity of modern societies around the globe is obvious” and “the claims to cultural supremacy of any single one of them may appear only a demonstration of arrogance,” mutual referencing among societies is inevitable and the dialogue of civilizations is both desirable and necessary.

The rise of Confucian East Asia suggests that traditions are present as active agents in modernity, and, by implication, the modernizing process can assume different cultural forms. Notwithstanding the established fact that modernization as the most dynamic economic, political, and social force for transforming the world in human history originated in Western Europe, it was in its inception a mixture of conflictual and even contradictory orientations. If we have conceptual difficulty generalizing about British, French, and German modernities,
American modernity must be treated as a separate case. We can, therefore, characterize the story of modernization as a master narrative containing a variety of globally significant local knowledge. Precisely because an overwhelming majority of cases of local knowledge that are globally significant are Western (Western European and North American) in origin, the phenomenon of East Asian modernity is particularly intriguing.

With a view toward the future, it seems reasonable to expect that an increasing number of cases of normal or even exemplary modernity will come from the non-Western world. Already, fruitful comparisons have been made across geographic, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious boundaries. As “mutual referencing” progresses, East Asia can benefit from civilizational dialogues with South Asia and the Islamic world as well. I have been advocating in Beijing as well as in other centers of learning in East Asia that if China takes India seriously as a reference society, she will significantly enhance her symbolic resources in understanding her own past and in appreciating Tibet as the modern manifestation of a venerable cultural heritage. A significant lesson we learn from multiple modernities is that we can be authentically modern without being obsessed with wealth and power.

ENDNOTES

1See Tu Weiming’s chapter on Confucianism in Alvind Sharma, ed., Our Religions (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1993).
Jürgen Heideking

The Pattern of American Modernity from the Revolution to the Civil War

Against the backdrop of the United States’ reassertion of global leadership, the past decade has witnessed renewed interest by historians and social scientists in the American contribution to the emergence of the modern world and the development of modernity. In 1992, Gordon S. Wood argued in his provocatively titled book *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* that at the turn of the nineteenth century Americans had become, almost overnight, the most liberal, the most democratic, the most commercially minded, and the most modern people in the world. And this astonishing transformation took place without industrialization, without urbanization, without railroads, without the aid of any of the great forces we usually invoke to explain “modernization.” It was the Revolution that was crucial to this transformation. It was the Revolution, more than any other single event, that made America into the most liberal, democratic, and modern nation in the world.¹

In *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, also published in 1992, Liah Greenfeld distinguished American nationalism from other forms of nationalism to prove that “America is not a nation as all the others”: “The uniqueness of the American nation consists in that in the course of its long existence . . . it remained faithful to the original idea of the nation, and came closest to the realization of the principles of individualistic, civic nationalism.”² At about the same time, Charles G. Sellers’s book on Jacksonian America initiated a debate over the capital-

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¹ Jürgen Heideking is director of the Institute of Anglo-American History at the University of Cologne in Germany.

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ist “market revolution” in the early Republic, which affected and transformed all aspects of life from production to consumption, family relations, and popular culture. More recently, Seymour Martin Lipset revived the concept of “American exceptionalism” in a study comparing the United States with Canada, several European nations, and Japan. According to Lipset, the nature of this exceptionalism lies in enduring values—most importantly liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire—which made the United States “the most anti-statist, legalistic, and rights-oriented nation.” An outgrowth of the founding principles and institutions of the United States, this “American Creed” had its dark side, too, because it promoted not only “personal responsibility, independent initiative, and voluntarism” but also “self-serving behavior, atomism, and a disregard for communal good.” Nevertheless, as a collection of beliefs, values, and principles the “American Creed” was instrumental in producing and reproducing a uniquely successful political and economic system.

This essay starts from the assumption that the concept of “multiple modernities” can be used in a fruitful way to place the historical experience of the American people in a broader, interdisciplinary, and comparative context, and to better identify the similarities and differences in the various Western “paths to modernity.” The general thesis is that a distinct pattern of modernity, rooted in the colonial past and influenced by European Enlightenment thought, emerged during the American Revolution and the early national period. It was the product of a continuous political discourse and a confrontation with what was perceived as the European, especially British, model of state- and nation-building. The majority of Americans who participated in the founding discourse emphasized discontinuity from European origins and past. This new “project of American modernity” was of crucial importance because it shaped the specific institutional features that developed in the United States.

THE ATLANTIC BACKGROUND

The establishment of a new system of government for the United States and the ensuing process of nation-building must
be seen in the context of the Atlantic system, which grew out of European colonization. That Western European societies underwent rapid change much earlier than was usually assumed has recently been shown by English historians such as John Brewer, Linda Colley, Paul Langford, and Timothy H. Breen. According to this view, an “impressive fiscal-military state” had already emerged in England during the eighteenth century. In order to be able to compete with the continental European powers and to expand overseas, the English elites built up a modern money and banking system, a complex government bureaucracy and legal system, and a strong military establishment. At the same time, the political decision-making process was centralized in the Westminster parliament, which aimed at unitary sovereignty over the British Isles and the colonial possessions. This went hand in hand with the rise of a commercially minded and politically articulate middle class, an intensification of English patriotism, and the formation of a “British” national identity. From a stable “mixed and balanced government,” as had been described by Montesquieu, Great Britain evolved under the leadership of Robert Walpole and William Pitt into a parliamentary monarchy, a dynamic nation-state, and a powerful colonial empire. The French monarchy also aimed at administrative centralization of military and fiscal power, but encountered strong resistance from aristocratic intermediary institutions such as the regional parliaments. Further to the east, advocates of enlightened absolutism undertook modernizing reforms in order to keep pace with their Western European rivals. While the realities of power varied from country to country, a passion for assimilation and homogenization and the desire of ruling elites and reformers to overcome the traditional structures that diffused power and limited central authority pervaded the whole of eighteenth-century Europe.

The settlers in the North American colonies were not unaffected by this centralizing trend, but their response was highly ambivalent. When the British government, after the French and Indian War, tried to reorganize its overseas empire to render it more rational and efficient, it failed on the North American continent except in newly acquired Canada. From this perspective, the American Revolution can be understood as a revolt of
parts of the colonial periphery against forced modernization attempted by the metropolitan center in London. There was considerable opposition in eighteenth-century England itself to the rapid change brought about by the politics of the governing Whigs (or “Court Party”), generated by groups ranging from conservative aristocrats to radical intellectuals and spokesmen of the urban lower classes. For their part, the American “patriots” were less impressed by the economic and military progress of the mother country—although the colonies in general profited from the rise of British power—than they were influenced by oppositional pamphlets and tracts lamenting corruption, loss of virtue, degeneration, and moral decline. After 1765, these arguments of the English opposition (appearing under various party labels such as Country, Old Whigs, Commonwealthmen, and Radicals) became part of American patriotic propaganda directed against the loyalists and the colonial authorities.

The War of Independence certainly heightened the colonists’ aversion to the British model of a centralized fiscal-military state. But when the imperial ties were finally severed, a growing number of Americans began to compare their own state of affairs under the Articles of Confederation in a more unbiased and realistic way with the powerful empire reaching to their northern borders and into the Caribbean. The question as to what degree the United States should emulate the “British example” became an integral part of the constitutional debate of the late 1780s and early 1790s. While Alexander Hamilton and some other Federalists pushed in the direction of a centralized fiscal-military state, most Americans retained a cautious attitude toward European-style progress. Apart from a brief period of cosmopolitan enthusiasm in 1789–1792 this cautious approach also applied to France, where the revolutionaries, and then Napoleon, endeavored to install a powerful, centrally governed and administered nation-state. In London, the defeat at the hands of the American “rebels” did not change the course of foreign policy; on the contrary, Britain expanded in Asia, reasserted its power in the Atlantic, and retained the dominant position in the trade with its former colonies. To Americans this meant that, from 1793 on, the danger of war with Britain or France was constantly on the political agenda. Under these
circumstances, the attitude of ambivalence continued: respect for the economic and military prowess of the advanced European nations was accompanied by deep suspicion and skepticism about the political and moral implications of European state formation. These tensions lessened only after the second war against Great Britain in 1812–1814, when Americans became more confident of their own identity, and when public attention was increasingly absorbed by the westward, continental expansion of the United States.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN MODERNITY

Since independence Americans have been engaged in a continuous discourse over the meaning and realization of their “great experiment” in republican self-government. A defining moment of this struggle was the debate over the United States Constitution in 1787–1788, when Alexander Hamilton remarked in The Federalist that Americans, for the first time in history, could “decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflexion and choice.” From this debate emerged two of the most important characteristics of American modernity: a written constitution based on the principle of popular sovereignty, and a system of federalism, both adaptable to the needs of a growing nation.

The concept of a written constitution was already embedded in American colonial history: each colony possessed a “frame of government” as part of its charter, and in most cases the settlers complemented these documents with a declaration of rights. During the Revolution a tension developed between the principle of popular sovereignty, on which the demand for independence was founded, and the supremacy of the constitution and constitutional law. The radical-republican concept of popular sovereignty became enshrined in some of the first state constitutions, especially in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. This concept favored direct participation of citizens devoted to the republican cause, strict majority rule, and the preponderance of a unicameral legislature in a “simple” system of government. The Articles of Confederation of 1777 were in har-
mony with this approach, accepting the sovereignty of the states and establishing only a relatively weak coordinating body in the form of the Confederation Congress. One of the most persistent complaints during the “critical period” of the 1780s was directed at the tendency of majorities in the state legislatures to disregard constitutional provisions, thereby violating the rights of minorities as well as their obligations to Congress. In order to remedy this situation, the United States Constitution of 1787 established the principles of “checks and balances,” of limited and representative government, and the rule of law guaranteed by an independent judiciary. The new Constitution resembled more closely Montesquieu’s ideal of a “mixed and balanced government” than the British system of parliamentary monarchy. In particular, it strengthened the central government at the expense of the states. On the other hand, as the founders never tired of asserting, the Constitution remained true to the principle of popular sovereignty since all government officers and representatives were—directly or indirectly—elected by the people.

The outcome of the constitutional debate of 1787–1788 favored the Federalists’ more commercial, liberal, and individualistic vision over the Antifederalists’ more agrarian and egalitarian, partly conservative, and partly radical-republican vision. In the Federalists’ view, the complex system of government assured a steady, energetic, and just administration, while at the same time sheltering propertyed and other minorities against the dangers of unchecked majority rule. The Constitution not only curbed the sovereignty of the states; it also circumscribed the federal government’s sphere of action. The first ten constitutional amendments—or Bill of Rights—added in 1791 in order to integrate the remaining opposition into the constitutional consensus affirmed this tendency. The role of the judiciary as guarantor of the rule of law and final arbiter in constitutional disputes pointed in the same direction, although the U.S. Supreme Court only slowly moved into this powerful position. The basic tenets of the constitutional order were soon accepted by most citizens, and the more radical state constitutions were brought in line with the new principles. From then on, the interpretation of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights was an
important part of the public discourse, causing controversies and party divisions. The acceptance of the basic constitutional framework did not diminish the strong suspicion of those in authority, and political conflict and constitutional consensus therefore became two sides of the same coin. The ability to amend the Constitution was another important innovation that reminded the American people of the experimental nature of their common project.15

Constitutionalism, the idea that a written constitution spells out the “supreme law of the land” and sets limits on the ruling authorities—including the legislatures elected by the people—must be seen from our present perspective as one of the most important elements of American modernity. Neither in Great Britain, with its tendency toward unitary parliamentary sovereignty, nor in revolutionary France, with its often changing constitutions, did a similar combination of the principles of popular sovereignty and the rule of law evolve. For British elites in the 1790s a limited and balanced government was a thing of the past, and the French revolutionaries certainly considered themselves more advanced than the Americans when they set out to create a unitary nation-state based on the “general will” of the people.16 In the United States, the Constitution became the locus and symbol of the “general will.” American ideas on the limitation of power, and the constant scrutiny and strict accountability of government officials, stood in contrast to the desire of European rulers, reformers, and revolutionaries alike to create strong, efficient systems of government.

For Europeans, political, economic, and cultural progress meant first of all the centralization of state power to overcome the various traditionalist and particularist forces of the Old Regime. In late eighteenth-century Europe, republican city-states like Venice, Florence, and Genoa or republican confederations such as Switzerland and the United Netherlands were considered by most people to be relics of the past, not future-oriented models. According to Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois, a large or “extended” republic could only exist as a loose confederation of independent states. Internally, the small sovereign republics would guarantee participation and political
liberty to their citizens, while externally the confederation would preserve the peace and defend the common interests. In America, such a “Swiss” solution was favored by leading Antifederalists such as Patrick Henry, but James Madison strongly disagreed with both Montesquieu and the radical republicans at home:

The uniform conclusion drawn from a review of ancient and modern confederacies is, that instead of promoting the public happiness, or securing public tranquillity, they have, in every instance, been productive of anarchy and confusion; ineffectual for the preservation of harmony, and a prey to their own dissentions and foreign invasions . . . I most earnestly pray that America . . . may escape a similar fate by avoiding the causes from which their infelicity sprung.17

The other extreme, however—the concentration of all power in a national government—was even less attractive to the majority of Americans. In some of his letters and speeches Alexander Hamilton came close to proposing such a “consolidated system,” but at the Philadelphia Convention there was general agreement that it would never be accepted by the states or by the people in free elections.18 Consequently, the Constitution established neither a loose confederacy nor a unitary nation-state but, as Madison called it in The Federalist, a “partly federal, and partly national” government.19 European observers had great difficulty seeing anything progressive in this solution, and even many Americans regarded the new system as irregular, if not as a “monstrosity” or a “heterogeneous phantom.”20

In contemporary understanding, sovereignty had to be firmly placed in one hand or in a single institution, and could not be divided between a national government and several state governments. During the ratification debate in 1787–1788 some writers predicted that the federal government would in time “swallow up” the state governments, while others foresaw that the states would soon reduce the central government to a mere shadow. In typical European fashion, French Ambassador Louis Guillaume Otto commented in 1790 that “the individual legislatures, so jealous of their independence and even their sovereignty, will stop the [federal] government from making the
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progress, that without them, she would not fail to make in a few years.” Like many Americans, Otto failed to grasp the innovative quality and advantages of a system that dispersed sovereignty over several levels of government while reserving the final authority for the people at large as citizens and voters. No other solution could have better accommodated the enormous regional differences in the United States and stilled the desire for local self-government and individual autonomy. In the context of the “project of modernity,” federalism constituted not only a technical, institutional arrangement but must first of all be understood as a dynamic principle that generated additional energies. Moreover, the principle of federalism also facilitated the creation of new states in the West and their admission to the Union on equal terms. In this way, Americans could set out to fulfill their dream of a continental “empire of liberty,” albeit with disastrous consequences for Native Americans. So, too, federalism, as a sectional compromise, guaranteed the continued existence of slavery in the Southern states and its eventual spread to the Southwest. The avoidance of a clear-cut decision on national sovereignty may also have contributed to the temporary dissolution of the Union in the Civil War. However, it is difficult in any case to imagine that the issue of slavery could have been solved without severely testing the existence of the Union.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN MODERNITY

The constitutional decisions taken in 1787–1791 established the framework and set the parameters of a national political discourse that transformed the American Revolution into a permanent process of change and growth. The various “languages of politics,” which Isaac Kramnick discerned in the ratification debate, continued to compete in a lively dialogue during the following decades. At the core of this discourse were tensions between a radical, egalitarian, community-centered world view and a more liberal, elitist, and individualistic paradigm. In practical politics, the situation was characterized by an amalgam of republican, liberal, and religious ideas in the minds of individuals “whose thinking changed as they attempted to as-
similate and manage new phenomena and new events.” Despite its occasionally shrill nature, this public discourse attested to the growing potential of self-reflexivity in American society.

Earlier than most European countries, the United States came to terms with the vigorous defense of a wide variety of material, political, and religious interests. During the Revolution, this development collided with a general republican belief in the harmony of interests and in the necessity of a virtuous people to work together for the common good. The radical concept of a homogeneous, harmonious polity inspired even efforts to exclude all “non-patriots” from political participation by way of test oaths and pledges of allegiance, or to expel them from the community as “Tories” and “traitors.” In the late 1780s, however, the diversity of interests manifested itself again, and became even more pronounced as a result of the rapid growth of newspapers as well as a widely shared belief in the vital importance of “public opinion” in a republican society. While most Americans remained ideologically committed to the vision of republican virtue, consensus, and harmony, the postwar political and economic reality was characterized by a diversity of interests and by political competition on the local and state levels. The desire to contain this dangerous “party spirit” was one of the motives behind the Philadelphia Convention.

During the ratification debate, however, more and more voices publicly defended partisan activities, thereby moving closer to a pluralist view of politics. In The Federalist, James Madison recognized the diversity of interests as an essential element of republican freedom. Instead of eliminating this diversity, the new Constitution was designed to put it in the service of the common good: “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of Government.” In Madison’s view, a well-designed constitution would hold contrasting interests in a state of balance and prevent the dangerous escalation of party conflict. A few years later, when the new federal government had demonstrated its power, Madison took a more discerning view of the relationship between public opinion and government: “Public opinion sets bounds to every
Government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.” Nevertheless, he believed that government could play a role in shaping opinion: “As there are cases where the public opinion must be obeyed by the Government, so there are cases, where, not being fixed, it may be influenced by the Government.” The goal was a government “deriving its energy from the will of the society, and operating by the reason of its measures, on the understanding and interest of the society.” Madison’s collaboration with Thomas Jefferson began on the basis of these philosophical and ideological suppositions.

The American “project of modernity,” therefore, resulted from struggles and compromises between different ideas, concepts, and visions advanced by various factions, interest groups, and parties. Legislative, administrative, and judicial decisions were discussed by a growing body of citizens who attended town and county meetings, many of whom were—due to this society’s astonishingly high rate of literacy—avid readers of newspapers and pamphlets. Freedom of speech and the press were almost taken for granted, and efforts to curb these basic rights encountered strong resistance, even when the government—as was the case during the “Quasi War” with France in 1798–1799—pointed to a threat to national security to justify such measures. Thus in the earliest stages of national existence the political struggle between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans brought out all the tensions, contradictions, and antinomies implicit in the American experiment of republican government and constitutional democracy. This struggle also contributed to a better understanding of the role and function of a “legitimate opposition” in a republican system of government. A good example had already been set by Antifederalist minorities in several ratification conventions, who had publicly accepted the majority decision and promised to reconcile their constituents with the Constitution. The “classical” transfer of power occurred in 1801 when Thomas Jefferson, the leader of the Republican opposition, took over the reins of power from President John Adams. The federal structure may have contributed to the peaceful solution to this crisis, as the Federalists retained a strong position in the New England states whence they could hope to regain national power.
Two important areas in which the American political discourse shaped specific institutional features are the military and the economy. During George Washington’s presidency, the Federalists succeeded in laying the foundations for a modern nation-state and a market economy by implementing Hamilton’s financial and monetary program. In many instances, however, their centralizing efforts were checked by the traditional distrust of governmental power. For Americans the fear of “standing armies” was part of their colonial heritage and republican credo. Advocates of a strong national military establishment, again led by Hamilton, were unable to overcome completely the strong resistance mounted by the defenders of the system of state militias. The Federalists therefore had to settle for a compromise that allowed the build-up of a small professional army and the construction of a few modern warships, but left the militias almost completely under the authority of the state governments. During the “Quasi War,” Hamilton and his friends again pushed for a larger national army; but President John Adams, who was deeply suspicious of Hamilton’s schemes (Abigail Adams compared the New York politician with Napoleon Bonaparte) decided to end the crisis in a peaceful way. Most experts on both sides of the Atlantic considered the American military system antiquated and inefficient, and they were surprised that it even survived the War of 1812–1814.

The reasons for preserving the state militias were more political than military. First, the militias symbolized the continued existence of the states as separate and independent centers of power in the federal system; and second, most Americans regarded the militias as the concrete expression of their right to bear arms, guaranteed in the Second Amendment to the Constitution. This right, in turn, limited the coercive power of the central government—which, from a European point of view, was one of the preconditions for modern state-building. Americans consciously decided against a strong military establishment, and even against strong police forces on the state level. This lack of coercive and police power, together with the easy availability of weapons, had serious disadvantages and sometimes even created a climate of violence and vigilantism. On the other hand, the fragility of state authority strengthened the
efforts at spontaneous self-organization and self-regulation on the local level, and the absence of a powerful standing army and an influential officer corps consolidated the supremacy of the political leadership. This supremacy has never been seriously challenged, although the United States’ military power has grown dramatically since the turn of the nineteenth century.

Public debate over the best way to promote economic prosperity was even more vigorous than the argument over internal and external security. While the Federalists succeeded in funding the debt and establishing a national bank, Congress rejected Hamilton’s “Report on Manufactures” issued in December of 1791, which advocated protective tariffs to stimulate the growth of domestic industries. Hamilton’s admission that his proposal had been influenced by the British model obviously did not help to mobilize legislative majorities. Consequently, the federal government’s sphere of activities remained circumscribed, its financial resources were limited, and its bureaucratic, military, and diplomatic apparatus small compared to European governments of the time. This tendency became even more pronounced during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, when the Jeffersonian Republicans dominated the national government and tried to realize their more egalitarian vision of American society. Once in office, the Jefferson administration set itself to the task of reducing taxes and paying off the national debt (an achievement largely undone by the War of 1812–1814). The necessity of distancing the United States ideologically and politically as far as possible from the states of the “Old World” became a constant theme in Jefferson’s writings.

Although the distrust of “party spirit” lingered on, a vigorous public sphere where the clash or “collusion” of different opinions could strike out “sparks of truth” was one of the most important legacies of the Revolution. In the United States, party competition intensified in the nineteenth century as a consequence of the widening of the franchise toward white male suffrage, and the growth of voter participation. During the Jacksonian era from the late 1820s to the 1840s, Whigs and Democrats mobilized millions of voters by means of party platforms, propaganda campaigns, conventions, and parades.
The various elements of “electioneering” became expressions of a distinct American popular culture.

Politically and economically, this period was marked by competition between two concepts: a national development program championed by Henry Clay and the Whig party in the form of the “American System”; and a kind of state-by-state mercantilism preferred by many small entrepreneurs and speculators as well as state politicians interested in strengthening their power base. This contest was decided in favor of President Andrew Jackson and the Democrats, as a result of which “internal improvements”—roads, canals, railways—were mainly planned, financed, and executed by private corporations holding charters from state legislatures. These corporations raised money by selling bonds at home and in European countries where investors had confidence in the growth potential of the American market. Jackson’s successful political “war” against the Second Bank of the United States confirmed the tendency toward economic and financial decentralization. For a long period of time, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall acted as the only “nationalizing” force in the economic sphere. American governments understood themselves more as arbiters of free-market forces than as agents of change.

Under these circumstances, a “state” in the metaphysical European—or at least continental European—sense of the word could not develop. Instead, Jackson’s policies vitalized the private sector by encouraging the establishment of hundreds of business corporations, interest groups, and other “voluntary associations” whose effectiveness was vividly described by Alexis de Tocqueville in *De la démocratie en Amérique*. National parties became the epitome of the private-public association, which Tocqueville praised as a dynamic element as well as a stabilizing factor of American democracy. The federal government concentrated its attention on relatively few national issues, avoiding excessive bureaucratization and keeping expenses and taxes low. In this way, it strengthened the energy and independence of local and state governments while fostering the individualism and self-reliance of the people. A centralized “American System” might have improved the regularity and steadiness of the financial and economic development, but...
The combination of state initiative and private enterprise obviously provided a solid base for a capitalist market economy and an independent, largely self-regulating “civil society.”

In this transformative phase from the republicanism of the founding generation to full-fledged democracy, many traditional ties began to loosen—which meant that national parties and the market economy were almost the only forces holding American civil society together. The dangers of this situation became evident when, around the middle of the century, the rapid territorial and demographic expansion and the sectional conflict over slavery led to the collapse of the national party system, which in turn accelerated the escalation toward the Civil War. At first, this war seemed to confirm the conviction of some Europeans, and the fears of others, that the American democratic system was inherently unstable and doomed to failure. In reality, however, the course and outcome of the war proved that, in the United States, there was no viable alternative to constitutional government, political pluralism, and party democracy—crucial elements of American modernity.

THE RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN MODERNITY

Retrospectively, the Civil War revealed the fragility of American nation-building in the early Republic. This should not obscure, however, the originality with which Americans addressed the central questions of social integration and the construction of collective identities. In this respect, ethnicity and religion played a more profound role there than in Europe, where class conflicts predominated. As it turned out, the Civil War did not terminate the “American experiment,” but opened a new phase of the struggle for inclusion in this common project.

Since independence the political process had been accompanied by changes in the understanding of the concept of citizenship in a republic. Although at the end of the colonial period the majority of white males could already vote (in comparison with less than 10 percent in England), the American patriots started with a relatively narrow notion of republican citizenship. The first state constitutions defined citizenship as a privilege to
which only those members of the community who had achieved sufficient economic independence and contributed actively to the public good were entitled. This republican exclusiveness continued after the Revolution, albeit in a more moderate form, when Federalists praised the “natural aristocracy” as the chosen leaders of the people, and when Southern planters tried to preserve their elitist, paternalistic rule. Nevertheless, the nineteenth century witnessed a continuous move in the direction of democratic universality. State after state instituted white male suffrage, and even the wave of nativism directed against Roman Catholic immigrants from Europe in the 1840s and 1850s did not reverse the trend toward liberal naturalization laws. At the Seneca Falls convention of 1848, American women publicly claimed the right to vote for the first time, basing their demand on a new reading of the Declaration of Independence. In the end, they had to wait longer than black men, who were officially granted citizenship and voting rights after the Civil War by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The violent reaction to these measures in the Southern states and the preservation of “white supremacy” in the post-reconstruction South, however, reversed most of the legal advantages of emancipation and continued the “American dilemma” into the twentieth century. 39

The legal and political battles over citizenship rights were only part of the effort to construct a collective identity that could provide criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of various groups of the population. Extremely important in this respect was the development of an integrative ideology in the form of “civil religion.” This concept was rooted in the Puritan past with its utopian vision of the colonies as the “new Jerusalem” and the settlers as a “chosen people” playing a central role in God’s order of salvation. The Revolution led to the separation of church and state but, as has often been observed, not to the separation of religion from politics. The nationwide celebrations on the occasion of the adoption of the Constitution in 1788 and President Washington’s first inaugural address of 1789 illustrate that the integrative and “nationalizing” potential of civil religion was immediately recognized by political and intellectual leaders of the founding generation. 40 The symbols, ritu-
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als, and ceremonies of civil religion helped to “sanctify” and legitimize the new political order and commit the American people to its basic principles and values. From the very beginning, this republican order was represented and interpreted as a contrast to the conditions in Europe. When Benjamin Rush enthusiastically described Philadelphia’s Federal Procession on the Fourth of July, 1788, he claimed that the active participation of the citizens distinguished it from the processions in Europe, which are commonly instituted in honor of single persons. The military alone partake of the splendor of such exhibitions. Farmers and Tradesmen are either deemed unworthy of such connections, or are introduced like horses or buildings, only to add to the strength or length of the procession. Such is the difference between the effects of a republican and a monarchical government upon the minds of men!

Rush goes on to explain the connection “between religion and good government”: Pains were taken to connect Ministers of the most dissimilar religious principles together, thereby to show the influence of a free government in promoting Christian charity. The Rabbi of the Jews, locked in the arms of two ministers of the gospel, was a most delightful sight. There could not have been a more happy emblem contrived, of that section of the constitution, which opens all its power and offices alike, not only to every sect of Christians, but to worthy men of every religion. 41

President Washington professed in his inaugural address deep gratitude for the recurrent intervention of divine providence in American affairs: “No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than those of the United States. Every step by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency.” 42

In this way, the founders succeeded in establishing a secular political order without alienating the people from the religious sources of their common historical experience. Civil religion did not, of course, remain unaffected by political controversies and conflicts. The public celebrations of the 1790s reflected two
versions of American festive culture that somewhat problematically coexisted in the public sphere. Under the impact of the French Revolution, Federalists began to cultivate a more conservative style by depicting the Constitution as a symbol of social order and by adding Washington’s birthday to the national festive calendar; whereas Jeffersonian Republicans used the Fourth of July to commemorate the radical legacy of the Declaration of Independence.

Both versions of republican festive culture included only the “respectable part” of the population, relegating women to a mere decorative role. In addition, Americans preserved their regional identities, especially in New England and the South. After the turn of the century, the situation became even more complex as artisans, laborers, and blacks organized their own celebrations, and when groups of immigrants—Germans, Irish, Scandinavians—began to define and publicly display their ethnic identities. Against this changing backdrop, American civil religion transformed the original Puritan vision into the republican “founding myth” of a virtuous, freedom-loving, egalitarian, self-governing people. Thus a utopian, transcendental dimension was created that constantly demanded, as Robert Bellah has called it, “an understanding of the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal reality.” In the nineteenth century, civil religion proved to be adaptable by integrating such ideological constructs as manifest destiny and mission. Like all other unifying forces, civil religion could not avert the Civil War; but the war itself reawakened the religious consciousness of the American people by introducing themes of suffering, sacrifice, and rebirth into the political discourse. Despite the ever-present danger of propagandistic abuse, the construction and continuous reshaping of civil religion must be seen as an original response to the needs of an immigrant society that lacked a common ethnic and linguistic identity. Combining the modern, universalistic components of collective identity with older, religious ones, civil religion served as a substitute for the lacking primordial dimension of the American existence.

Another important aspect of the cultural dimension of American modernity was the phenomenal growth of religious denomi-
nations, especially Baptists and Methodists, in the aftermath of the Revolution. The European situation was characterized either by the complete domination of an established church, or by constant friction and conflict between church and state. In contrast to both European varieties, religious life in the United States seemed to follow a “market model” that was driven by the forces of competition and the laws of supply and demand. All denominations had to vie for members on an equal basis, in the process becoming just another form of “voluntary association” enriching (and sometimes troubling) the life of civil society. Such circumstances fostered awakenings and mass revivals that spread from the east coast to the western parts of the country, and brought forth numerous social- and moral-reform movements. The marked presence of women in these religious movements has often been noted as another distinctive feature of American society in the nineteenth century. Most important, however, was the language with which the reformers tried to justify their various projects, from public education to temperance, relief of the poor, and abolitionism. Almost without exception, they appealed to a utopian vision of American community that, in their view, had been expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Instead of attacking the founding myth, they confirmed it by demanding a “purification” of society and a return to the pristine origins of the American experiment. This example was followed by most of the later reform and protest movements, which did not aim at a negation of the past or at offering completely new paradigms, but contented themselves with redefining the basic premises of the common ideology. Usually, governments and society responded in a flexible way so that at least some of the complaints were addressed and the symbols of protest could be incorporated and legitimized.

The revolutionary decision for a separation of church and state and the equality of religious denominations promised the acceptance of even greater ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. Yet American nationalism was not immune to various forms of racism and an obsession with homogeneity and conformity, which could only be achieved through the exclusion or repression of minorities. For a long time, African-Americans
and Native Americans remained on the margins of the civil society, Catholic newcomers from Europe encountered suspicion and nativist hatred, and Asians remained isolated or were altogether denied entry into the United States. Nevertheless, the high degree of religious freedom achieved during the Revolution and the peaceful incorporation of dissent and protest in the early nineteenth century demonstrate that the American project of modernity contained the seeds of—or at least the potential for—a multiethnic and multicultural society.  

CONCLUSION: THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN PROJECT OF MODERNITY

A young aristocratic visitor from France, Alexis de Tocqueville, was the first European who, in the early 1830s, grasped the potentialities of the American constitutional-democratic system. Many of his observations are still relevant today, even if the “triumph of egalitarian democracy” produced a much more complex society than he could have envisaged. That Tocqueville’s worst fears of social and cultural conformity did not materialize is certainly due to the peculiar quality of American modernity. Two generations later, German sociologist Max Weber probably came closer than any other European observer to an understanding of the relationship between religion, politics, and economics in the United States. Reflecting on the differences between European and American patterns of modernity, Weber asserted in an article published in 1906 that secularization had not yet penetrated American society as deeply as most European societies, although he believed the United States was in a process of “rapid Europeanization” that would push back the “genuine Americanism” of the past. Weber was only partially right, for he did not take into account that this “Americanism” resulted to a large extent from a deeply ingrained suspicion against institutions, values, and norms that many Europeans considered the essence of progress. In something of a reversal of the pattern Weber observed, Europeans have often tried to appropriate American methods of economic and technological efficiency in the course of the twentieth century—while lamenting the political immaturity and cultural
backwardness of the United States. Americans, for their part, have vacillated between upholding the “exceptionalism” of their historical experience and offering the United States as a model of modernity to Europe and the rest of the world. The present debate over the “Americanization” of Germany and Europe demonstrates that this transatlantic interplay of perceptions of “the other” continues as part of the global discourse on modernity.52

Developments during the past 150 years—such as industrialization and urbanization, mass immigration and internal migration, two world wars and the Cold War—have greatly transformed the United States, and Americans have continuously reconstituted their society. Nevertheless, the revolutionary project left a deep mark on the history of the United States, and is still visible in the ways Americans deal with contemporary problems. On the institutional level, the role of the judiciary (and especially the Supreme Court) in expounding the basic principles of the Constitution is even stronger today than it was for most of the nineteenth century. The central place of constitutional issues in political discourse was underlined by the intense controversy over the “original intent” of the framers in the context of the Bicentennial of the Constitution.53 Other examples are the problem of “affirmative action” and the dispute over the meaning of the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms, which gains fresh impetus from each successive violent incident in the United States. Tocqueville had already commented on the general inclination of Americans to transform political questions into legal arguments, a tendency confirmed by the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton. Europeans still have difficulties comprehending this constitutionalist frame of mind and what they regard as the American “worship” of the Constitution. In recent decades, however, the idea of the supremacy of constitutional law has received growing support in many European countries, and the integrative force of constitutionalism is much better appreciated today than before World War II. On both sides of the Atlantic, the tensions between the concept of popular sovereignty and the principle of representative democracy have resurfaced with the advent of new communication technologies. Several European
countries have strengthened the elements of direct democracy in their constitutions, whereas in the United States, referenda and other forms of direct participation are still confined to the local and state levels.

The two world wars and the Great Depression have changed the federal balance of power in favor of the national government and a growing central bureaucracy. Yet American federalism still is much more than a mere technical or institutional arrangement. In general, the states have responded creatively to the “new federalism” proclaimed and partially implemented by conservative administrations since the 1970s. A recent example of this is the readiness of the states to assume from the federal government a greater share of responsibility for the welfare system. The principle of federalism continues to shape institutions and mentalities, and federalism remains a vital, dynamic element that helps to check the homogenizing tendencies in American society. Over time, Americans have been more successful in preserving the “federal balance” of concentration versus dispersion of power and sovereignty than the framers of the Constitution themselves expected and predicted.

In the political and legal sphere, the inclusive potentialities of the “American project” meanwhile have been progressively realized. From this point of view, the civil rights movement of the 1960s can be seen as the quintessential American protest movement. Under the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., it legitimized the demands of black people for political and social equality by appealing to the basic principles and symbols on which the United States was founded. This proved to be the most effective and successful way of raising the moral awareness of the population and promoting social change. The annual celebrations of “Martin Luther King Day” since the 1980s illustrate how political protest, after having redefined the political realm and the public sphere, becomes symbolically integrated into the new center. This “sacralization” of the movement’s leader also indicates that civil religion still constitutes the core of American collective identity. At the same time, however, the expansion of civil rights did not create a more harmonious society. Instead, it served to open the political process further and to intensify the party competition for black
votes. As broad coalitions of interest groups without a sharp ideological profile, parties still define the American political nation.

Since the 1980s, the content of the public discourse has shifted from the political and economic realm to a kind of cultural battleground. Ideologically, the liberal individualism that dominated the post–World War II era has come under increasing pressure both from religious fundamentalism and from republican communitarianism. The first emphasizes public and private morality as well as “family values”; the second tries to re-awaken civic virtue and commitment to the public good. The American civil society, which has become even more diverse and fragmented due to immigration from all parts of the world, provides fertile ground for clashes of opinion in such matters as abortion, sexual identities and gender relations, and public education and collective memory. This tendency toward acrimonious and highly moralistic “culture wars,” coupled with growing social inequality and an alarming decrease in voter participation, represents a new challenge to the American political system. Technological progress and economic success provide stability, but they do not guarantee the continuous cohesion of a civil society. The question is whether the various groups and distinct identities of a “multicultural” society can be kept within the basic parameters of the American political and constitutional discourse. The historical record of the United States justifies the optimistic prognosis that in the future, as in the past, adequate means and mechanisms of integration will be available to meet this challenge.

ENDNOTES


3This term is taken from the sociological discourse. The author does not suggest that the framers of the Constitution consciously set out to create a “modern” system of government and society or a different kind of “modernity” from the European one. Although James Madison, for example, used the word “modern” in some of his speeches and “Publius” essays, the founders generally aimed at a stable, safe, and effective republican government. The following contribution represents an effort to unite the historical and the sociological perspectives.


5Although, in reality, a complete “nationalization” of the peoples of the British Isles did not occur, the claim to unified parliamentary sovereignty was upheld and widely accepted. See the AHA Forum, “The New British History in Atlantic Perspective,” American Historical Review 104 (1999): 426–500.


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15“A constitutional mode of altering the constitution itself is, perhaps, what has never been known among mankind before,” James Iredell told the delegates of the North Carolina ratifying convention in Hillsborough in August of 1788. Quoted from Heideking, Verfassung vor dem Richterstuhl, 789.
18According to Isaac Kramnick, Hamilton spoke “the state-centered language of power,” and “his zeal to push aside any intermediary bodies between the state and individuals . . . [was] also heavily influenced by his perceptive reading of the patterns of state-building in Europe.” “The ‘Great National Discussion’:
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21 Otto to Montmorin, New York, June 1, 1790; quoted from Heideking, *Verfassung vor dem Richterstuhl*, 704. In Otto’s view, the Americans should have made “a new division of their territory at the beginning of the revolution, a measure so happily taken and executed in France in order to destroy the little tyrants and local prejudices of the different districts.” Despite this critical observation, Otto praised the Federalists for having established “a government of three well organized branches whose powers are clearly defined by a written constitution, which gives it a great superiority over the English one.”


24 A committee of New York Antifederalists stated in March of 1789 that “diversity of opinions do not injure good government, it tends to bring truth to light, to keep the minds of the people in exercise, and make them acquainted with, and watchful of their rights—indeed party spirit itself, in some measure, contributes to this end.” Quoted from Heideking, *Verfassung vor dem Richterstuhl*, 374. Jefferson wrote in 1798 to John Taylor of Caroline: “In every free and deliberating society, there must, from the nature of man, be opposite parties, and violent dissensions and discords . . . Perhaps this party division is necessary to induce each to watch and relate to the people the proceedings of the other.” Quoted from Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780–1840*, 4th ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1975), 115.


28 Heideking, *Verfassung vor dem Richterstuhl*, 638.

29 Michael Lienesch states emphatically: “With the election of Thomas Jefferson, America had become a modern nation.” He qualifies this judgment, however, with the remark that “decline and degeneration have been every bit as prevalent as progress in modern American politics.” *New Order of the Ages*, 204–205.

30 Hamilton’s vision of a strong commercial state militated against a reliance on citizen-soldiers: “The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuit of gain and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those [ancient Greek] republics.” “Publius” No. 24, quoted from Kramnick, “The ‘Great National Discussion,’” 9.


32 Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis of “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (1893) has its place in this interpretation. However, Turner’s claim that the frontier experience was decisive for the formation of American democracy and the shaping of a “national character” is no longer tenable.


34 In 1802, Jefferson outlined the basic principle of this policy to Gallatin: “If we can prevent the government from wasting the labors of the people, under the pretense of taking care of them, they must become happy.” Gallatin’s vision included the development of commerce and manufactures on a small scale: “No law exists here, directly or indirectly, confining man to a particular occupation or place. Industry is, in every effect, perfectly free and unfettered; every species of trade, commerce, art, profession, being equally opened to all . . . Hence the progress of America has not been confined to her agriculture.” Quoted from Norman K. Risjord, *Thomas Jefferson* (Madison, Wis.: Madison House, 1994), 132.

35 According to Risjord, Jefferson saw the War of 1812 as “a war to free the New World from European regulations and tyranny . . . the second weaning from British principles, British attachments, British manners and manufactures will be salutary, and will form an epoch of the spirit of nationalism and of consequent prosperity, which would never have resulted from a continued subordination to the interests and influence of England.” Ibid., 177.

36 As early as 1786, Benjamin Franklin had reminded his readers that there would always be parties wherever there was freedom: “By the collusion of different
sentiments, sparks of truth are struck out, and political light is obtained. The different factions, which at present divide us, aim all at the public good; the differences are only about various modes of promoting it.” Quoted from Verner W. Crane, “Franklin’s ‘The Internal State of America 1786,’” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., 15 (1958): 226.

30On Hegel’s inability to identify in the United States anything resembling the established European states, see Kramnick, “The ‘Great National Discussion,’” 25.


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47 The radicalism of William Lloyd Garrison, who condemned the Constitution as a “covenant with death” and recommended a separation of the Northern states from the slaveholding South, was just as much an exception as the religious fanaticism and violence of John Brown and his associates.


49 Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity.


The third transition, finally, is the upheaval that marks the break with traditional society and the creation, if in rudimentary form, of those macrosocietal institutions that have come to be associated with the era of high modernity in the course of the last two hundred years. Thus in the wake of the French and American Revolutions a modern state took form in which older conceptions of relationships between a princely ruler and his subjects were replaced by collective notions of citizens and compatriots, whereby the nation-state and the constitutional democracy emerged as the archetypal form of modern political order. Similarly, a constrained mercantilist economy was replaced with the idea, and increasingly the reality, of a free market and free trade. In the area of culture and scholarship, royal patronage was replaced in the nineteenth century by activity in a genuinely open public sphere, in which universities rather than royal academies and aristocratic salons became the proper home of intellectual activity, first in Europe and eventually in all other industrializing parts of the world from California in the West to Japan in the East. In turn, research-oriented universities and polytechnics became in the latter half of the nineteenth century ever more important for economic and technological innovation and economic growth, and ever more closely reviewed and generously supported by national governments.

Björn Wittrock

From “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”
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Renato Ortiz

From Incomplete Modernity to World Modernity

It is impossible to speak of Latin America as a unity; it is more prudent to speak of Latin Americas. Their colonial experiences were different, and not only as between the areas controlled by Portugal and Spain. The indigenous peoples were different. How can one compare the nomadic peoples of the Brazilian jungle with the structured civilizations of Aztec Mexico or of Incan Peru? In the debate on modernity, however, it is possible, at least in generic terms, to talk about features common to Latin American countries.

If modernity refers to the technological progress of cities, to their organization and management, it is also a discourse, a “language” through which Latin Americans become aware of these changes. It is a narrative, telling us how urbanization, technology, science, and industrialization are understood by these societies.

In Latin America, unlike Southeast Asia, India, or the Middle East, there is no heritage modeled by “universal” religions of the kind we find in Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, or Islam. There is no religion that will lay the foundations for a relatively unified territorial state, as in Imperial China where Confucianism triumphed. Nor is there a blossoming of a high culture, cultivated by specialists, capable of producing philosophical reflection of a religious nature. There are no “ageless” traditions that last into the colonial period in Latin America.

Renato Ortiz is a professor in the department of sociology at the University of Campinas (Unicamp) in São Paulo, Brazil.
The conquest of Latin America by Europeans led to the disaggregation of indigenous societies. Indigenous populations declined. In Brazil, for example, it is estimated that there may have been two to four million people at the time of the conquest; that number is now about two hundred thousand. In Mexico, the decline may have been even greater, from an estimated twenty-five million to one million today.

Miscegenation was common in Latin America where the races coexisted. It was only accentuated with the arrival of African slaves. Miscegenation needs to be seen as more than a racial matter; it touches belief, behavior, and institutions. Religious syncretism is common in Latin America where Haitian Voodoo, Cuban Santeria, and Brazilian Condomblé are religious forms that emerged from the union of collective African memory and popular Catholicism. Catholic divinities are incorporated with Exu (in Brazil) and Legba (in Haiti); both are associated with the devil. We must think also of Iemanjá united with Our Lady; Oxalá with Jesus; Oxun with St. Barbara; Ogun with St. George. But what is syncretism? Roger Bastide defines it as “uniting pieces of the mythical history of two different traditions in one that continued to be ordered by a single system.” It is, therefore, a mix, allowing Indians or Africans to translate elements of the dominant culture into their own language. The process of miscegenation is crucial to these societies and has little to do with the flexibility of capitalism or the decline of high culture, which other societies may properly wish to emphasize in thinking about themselves.

Colonialism attributed a different position of power to the diverse cultures it encountered. Thus, there was a clear hierarchy separating the colonizer, the Indian, and the Black. Latin America was profoundly marked in its history by the institutions of slavery and servitude, but also by discrimination made legitimate and blessed by the Catholic religion. Catholicism served as an ideological cement for the colonial social order.

The nativist movements and those that worked for independence at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries reoriented the social and cultural models sanctioned by colonialism. The ideas of the Enlightenment, including liberalism and the evolutionary thinking of August
Comte, confronted and challenged the prevailing conservatism and traditional Catholicism of the day. Bolívar (1783–1830) and Sarmiento (1811–1888) are representative figures of a perspective very different from what had previously existed. Bolívar believed that man “was created for liberty” and that the state, in order to guarantee this freedom, must be reformed according to the principles of the French Revolution. Sarmiento argued that only the education of the masses could lead to an effective transformation of Latin American societies. His criticism of the oligarchic republic is also an indictment of any kind of slavery. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity are the values that fuel the anticolonialist passions of those calling for a new kind of Latin America.

The reform of the state, the construction of primary schools, the distribution of land, and the transformation of existing agricultural practices through the use of new technologies, like the construction of railroads, are conceived as providing the elements of a new political agenda. Yet these reforms are not easily achieved. While the Declaration of the Rights of Man is incorporated in the Brazilian Constitution of 1824, the oligarchic reality and the slave society are not extinguished by fiat. Roberto Schwarz, a Brazilian intellectual, claims that liberalism is an “idea out of place” in Brazil; it simply acts as a legitimating element of the oligarchic rule. Both the state and the judicial system restrict political and economic participation to a dominant elite; the servile relations formed in the colonial period are preserved.

Bolívar wished to unite Spanish America, but the interests of the local sectors prevailed, and his dream was never realized. The new states no longer made Spain or Portugal their models. They looked principally to Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, particularly to Britain and France, to the United States at the end of the century. The urban reforms of Rio and Buenos Aires reflected the “francophile tendency,” inspired by the reforms of Baron Haussmann. Latin America was looking to incorporate the aesthetics and ideals of the Belle Epoque. As for the United States, its “materialist” and “pragmatic” values were much admired in certain quarters. Sarmiento, for example, wanted to transform Argentina into the “United
States of South America." Latin American intellectuals argued vehemently at the turn of the century about the relative values of Europeanization and Americanization, as if it were necessary to choose one or the other. Some, like Rodó, thought that the Americanization of Latin America would compromise what he considered to be the “spiritual” principles of European civilization.8

But we should not be misled by this discussion. What is at stake is not an eventual Americanization or Europeanization of Latin American societies. Europe and the United States are seen as alternative models of modernity. That is why the urban reforms of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires with Paris as the point of reference were thought to be important. Paris was seen as a place of “modernity” because of its experiments with new social relations.9 Those who wished to imitate Paris imagined that this was a way to promote modern urbanism. Portugal and Spain were disdained at this time, seen as peripheral by those who sought to prove themselves modern. Latin Americans dreamed of the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, but began to achieve it only in the twentieth. In Latin America, there was always the fear of falling back from civilization into barbarism. Carnival, for example, if it followed the Venetian model, was applauded, but there was no equal regard for the popular Carnival, the potential source of disturbances.10 Journalists saw in the European way of celebrating festivities a valuable didactic element, a way to educate the masses. “Carnival, uniting the common people, teaching them elegance of manners and of speech, the rule of politeness, awakening in them the desire to know the personalities that it brings to life, year after year, will continue developing and taking advantage of all the circumstances that can contribute to its victory.”11 It is fitting, therefore, for a governing elite to play the civilizing role of taking the masses out of their secular obscurity. Did Sarmiento not hold that education was the only way we would get out of the Middle Ages, “substituting Indian blood with modern ideas”? The Argentine intellectual Carlos Octávio Bunge said: “we can never change our history, our blood, nor our climate, but we can Europeanize our ideas, sentiments, and passions.”12
From Incomplete Modernity to World Modernity

The imitation of Europe was unconvincing. Modern institutions did not take root in Latin America. Political life, legal institutions, and the capitalist economy were seen as incompatible with Latin America’s traditional legacy. There was, inevitably, a certain pessimism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century about the possibility of achieving modernity. In these circumstances, racial interpretations came to flourish. In Brazil, Silvio Romero, Nina Rodrigues, and Euclides da Cunha—all forerunners of Brazilian social sciences—sought to define the Brazilian as a mixture of three races: the Black, the Indian, and the White. Combining “racial theories” with the influence of the environment—geographic determinism was very popular at that time—they believed that their theories captured the essence of Brazilian reality. Climate and race were made to explain the Brazilian—his incapacity to act prudently and rationally, the timidity and insecurity of the intellectual elites, the passionate lyricism of the poets, the unrestrained sexuality of the mulatto. Other parts of Hispanic Latin America also adopted versions of these theories. The white world saw itself as diminished, threatened by “inferior races,” Black and Indian. Racial inbreeding and miscegenation were no longer seen as a virtue; they were thought to contribute to the degeneration of white civilization. Out of this fear came the wish to promote European immigration, principally German and Italian. Civilization and progress could only be achieved, by this reckoning, when there was a “whitening” of the society as a whole.

These racial theories—in truth, racist—allowed each Latin American state to imagine its own specific national identity. The abundance of rivers, the influence of being land-locked, the existence of pampas, even tropical climate were all cited as creating a particular people. The ideas of Gobineau and Social Darwinism, increasingly influential, made traditional ideas of modernity seem incongruous. Such negative visions began to change in the early twentieth century. The concepts of the “cosmic race,” as developed by the Mexican philosopher Vasconcelos, and of “racial democracy,” as conceived by Gilberto Freye in Brazil, began to make headway. If their interpretations were fanciful, they were appealing precisely because they gave
promise of a harmonious society, where ethnic and social conflicts would be eliminated.

Their theories made headway at a time of profound transformations in the economies of certain of the Latin American states. Agrarian reform, as proclaimed by the Mexican Revolution, together with urbanization, the rationalization of the state system, and the redefinition of the value of work all contributed to make the questions of land reform and political rights absolutely central. While the reforms and revolutions failed in countries like Guatemala, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Cuba, they attested to the widespread existence of a powerful movement for change. Octávio Ianni, the Brazilian sociologist, has written of “the metamorphosis of a population into a people.” Economic development is now seen as a goal to be achieved. Raul Prebisch argued that developments could be “deliberately conducted” through state planning.

The notion of development broke with the pessimism that had previously existed. Manifestations of popular culture, once seen as barbaric, were now redefined as “roots,” valued as potential symbols in the construction of a national identity. So, the Samba, once considered the music of the Blacks, is now made to be an essential element in Brazilian identity. The tango, once associated with the urban lower classes, is made the very symbol of Argentina. Specific melodramas, soap operas, and films are gradually elevated to be the quintessential expressions of particular nations, particular peoples.

How, in these circumstances, are Latin Americans to realize their modernity? For them, modernity is always a project, something to be achieved in the future. Latin American modernism is very different from what it was in Europe, where Impressionism and Art Nouveau corresponded to a social reality that enveloped them. European artists translated the materiality of modern life (with its electric lights, streetcars, railroads, automobiles, and cultural effervescence) into new art forms. In Latin America, modernism existed without modernization. Latin American artists wished to be modern, but it was only a project, something to be achieved in the future. Mexican muralists, like Brazilian painters and writers, were more than ready to join the political process, to help construct a national identity. The
iconographic work of Siqueiros, Rivera, and Orozco used the experimental advances of the European vanguard, but only to integrate elements of popular national culture, designs inspired by the Maya and Aztec cultures or found in rural tradition. The weaving in of these popular elements was not an anachronism, incompatible with the notion of modernity. It was one possible answer to Mexican modernity, which at the time existed only as a project by a state determined to create a national identity. The call to tradition was a social requirement. The recuperation of popular culture was the way to express vanguard ideals and to advance the project of national construction. It was in the political sphere that the artist found his inspiration. L’Art pour l’art, Flaubert’s ideal, was not one that commended itself to Latin American artists. They saw themselves as “engaged” intellectuals.

Developmental theory, very popular in the 1950s, was a modernization project that existed at a time of conspicuous and massive underdevelopment. The modern was conceived as having intrinsic value, a goal to be reached. Those who criticized modernity were always the traditional intellectuals, if one uses the Gramscian category to define that term. Gilberto Freyre was one such intellectual. For him, Brazilian history was based on the great house (casa-grande), which reflects a master-class attitude, with a broader meaning when juxtaposed with the industrial order implanted in Brazil in the decade of the 1930s. Freyre sees a traditional/modern polarity and clearly values the oligarchic order. He contrasts São Paulo and the Northeast. São Paulo is represented as “locomotive,” “city,” “bourgeoisie,” and “industrialization.” There, the taste for work predominates, and technical activity flourishes. The Northeast is the “land,” the “countryside”; there, inhabitants preserve their roots, though these are threatened by modernity. In this period, modernity became a value in and of itself; it is simultaneously a source of identity and an obstacle to be overcome. Tradition is the matrix of national culture, in which the particular culture of every people takes root. Yet as tradition is contaminated by popular culture, it is up to “progress” to redefine it.

Many observers detect a dualism in Latin America and pay attention to what they conceive to be its populism. The so-
called popular classes, reconstituted during the urbanization process, do not yet have the psychosocial conditions or cultural vision compatible with democratic behavior. The urban-industrial society does not have the political institutions capable of incorporating the masses within the framework of representative democracy. Populism becomes a compromise solution, a phenomenon best described as one of “transition.” Transition to what? To something in the future! In these circumstances it is not surprising that modernization theory, as elaborated in American universities in the 1950s and 1960s, had great appeal in Latin America. Walt Rostow, for example, in a reductionist manner, nourished a teleological vision of history in which every human society necessarily has to pass through several stages, defined as traditional, take-off, maturity, and, lastly, the era of mass consumption. This perspective favored an ideology that prophesied the Americanization of the world, since the United States was the only mass society considered as the model.

Such a representation of Latin American possibilities was not simply adopted by all. If Latin American reality is not to be seen simply as a detour, a lag, but, as Martin Barbero argues, “a difference that is not summed up in backwardness,” the notion of modernity must be reconsidered. The gradual abandoning of the concept of modernization and its replacement with the concept of modernity was not fortuitous. Modernization implied an action directed to a specific place where attention was given to origins, reference points, and the final destination. It is this destination or direction that is now in question. Europe (or the West) can no longer be thought the only example of modernity. Europe may be the first chronologically to become modern, but it is not the only one to do so nor are its forms necessarily the best. Given such thinking, the theme of “backwardness” is seen in a quite new way.

If in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s modernity was still a project to be constructed, during the 1970s and 1980s many complained that it had already been achieved. The impact of the First and Second Industrial Revolutions was detected in a number of Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, where the creation of national markets of
considerable dimension was given great prominence. Nestor Garcia Canclini, the Mexican anthropologist, saw structural changes in Latin America, reflected in more widespread and diversified economic development, based on industrial growth and the use of more advanced technologies. The increase in the markets for cultural goods, above all in the large urban agglomerations where increases in schooling at all levels, from primary to university, helped create an appetite for new communication technologies, particularly television, witnessed the advance also of progressive political movements. In management, public and private, a new type of mentality—best described as rationalizing—became more common. New kinds of business administrators arose to replace the old “captains of industry,” whose commitment to status and favoritism was abandoned in favor of one that emphasized market efficiency. The national consumption of goods produced by cultural industries grew to unprecedented heights, with the record industry, television, advertising, and magazines achieving sales levels never previously known or imagined. Television was particularly important in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, where it covered virtually all the national territory and reached all social classes.

The notion of popular culture was fundamentally modified. In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s popular culture was intimately associated with the idea of local roots, national or regional. Popular culture signified tradition. With the industrialization of consumer goods, the notion of modernity is fundamentally altered. If Televisa (Mexico) and Globo (Brazil) are able to take over their national markets and become the soap operas of much of Latin America, competing even with North American series, it is because there is a new understanding that the national product can be marketed elsewhere if the right marketing strategies are adopted. These cultural industries introduce new lifestyles; they legitimate new patterns of sociability. They compete with other influences, including the family, the churches, and rural traditions. Because schooling in Latin America is still so uncommon, particularly when compared with Europe and the United States, and because illiteracy rates are still high, schools cannot begin to compete with cultural industries in
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influencing the young. The cultural industries, in redefining Latin America, represent it as modern—no longer rural, oligarchic, backward.

Tradition, normally seen in Latin America as an extolling of the past, and, therefore, by definition an exclusion of the new—identified as modern—is being replaced in this century by a new concept of tradition, accepting of modernity. We can now say that a “tradition of modernity” is constructed in Latin America.23

In truth, when speaking of tradition we normally think of things from the past, preserved in memory and practice. Immediately what comes to mind are terms like folklore and historical patrimony, as if these expressions conserve the marks of an older time that extends to the present. Tradition and past are identified and seem to radically exclude the new, labeled as modern. Rarely do we think of the traditional as a set of institutions and values that, even though they are products of recent history, are imposed on us as a modern tradition, a way of being. As anthropology teaches us, tradition is everything that is inserted in daily culture. In this sense, throughout the twentieth century a tradition of modernity is constructed in Latin America; in it are the patterns and references, technical and social, that orient individual conduct and aspirations. Modernity became, therefore, something present, an imperative of our times, and no longer a promise dislocated in time. Problematic modernity, controversial but without doubt an integral part of day-to-day life (television sets, automobiles, airports, shopping centers, restaurants, cable television, advertising, etc.), comes into view. This is now seen as the universal imperative and no longer regarded simply as a promise for the future.

In this new context, in conflict with local traditions, there is a new preoccupation with globalization, seen as something more than national identity, conceived of as world modernity. There is a new interest in deterritorialized identities—the universe of consumerism. Anthony Giddens, in his definition of lifestyles, considers how this concept carries with it the idea of deterritorialization.24 “Youth,” “the childless couple,” “the elderly,” and “middle-aged working women” are seen to be universal categories, separate from any specific country.
In Latin America, identity is no longer simply equated with the nation-state. Indeed, it is now possible to be modern without being national. Now that modernity and national have become disjunctive terms, the very idea of a “national project” becomes somewhat problematic; indeed, the term is itself in “crisis.” How are differences to be preserved and defined in a globalized world? Indeed, if the very idea of nation is now in crisis, what does this mean for Latin America?

ENDNOTES

4For a history of Latin American ideas, see Leopoldo Zea, El Pensamiento Latinoamericano (Mexico: Editorial Pormaca, 1965).
6In his writings about the “American question,” Sarmiento is a critic of slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States. See León Pomer, ed., Sarmiento (São Paulo: Atica, 1983).
8José Enrique Rodó (1871–1917) synthesizes the Europeanization and Americanization debate in Ariel (Campinas: Editorial Unicamp, 1991).
12In Jorge Larraín Ibáñez, Modernidad Razon e Identidad en America Latina (Santiado de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1996), 149.
13See Renato Ortiz, Cultura Brasileira e Identidade Nacional (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985).
14Ibáñez, Modernidad Razon e Identidad en America Latina.
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13 Gilberto Freyre, Interpretação do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1947).
15 J. Martin Barbero, De los Medios a las Mediaciones (Bogota: Convenio Andres Bello, 1998).
16 Nestor Garcia Canclini, Culturas Hibridas (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1989).
17 Regarding the transformation of the managerial mentality, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Empresário Industrial e Desenvolvimento Econômico no Brasil (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1972).
21 In these countries, television reaches more than 85 percent of households. See L’Amérique Latine et ses Télévisions (Paris: Anthropos, 1995).
22 See Renato Ortiz, A Moderna Tradição Brasileira (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1988).