In the last decades, many political theorists have explored the idea of deliberative democracy. The basic claim is that well-functioning democracies combine accountability with a commitment to reflection, information acquisition, multiple perspectives, and reason-giving. Does that claim illuminate actual practices? Much of the time, the executive branch of the United States has combined both democracy and deliberation, not least because it has placed a high premium on reason-giving and the acquisition of necessary information. It has also contained a high degree of internal diversity, encouraging debate and disagreement, not least through the public comment process. These claims are illustrated with concrete, if somewhat stylized, discussions of how the executive branch often operates.
In the last decades, a large number of political theorists have explored the idea of deliberative democracy.1 The basic claim is that well-functioning democracies combine accountability with a commitment to reflection and reason-giving. They do not merely respond to popular pressures and majority sentiment. They also try to “refine and enlarge the public view” through acquisition of relevant information, attention to multiple perspectives, and careful deliberation in the public sphere.2 Versions of this claim have been impressively elaborated by many people, including Joseph Bessette (who originally coined the term), Jürgen Habermas, Amartya Sen, Jane Mansbridge, James Fishkin, and the team of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.3
The idea of deliberative democracy might focus on the internal operation of government, with an emphasis on how the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches speak with one another. It could take more or less populist forms, focusing on deliberation among citizens themselves, or between citizens and public officials. And while citizen-centered conceptions focus on widespread participation, drawing on the idea of town meetings, we can also find concep- . . .
- 1See, for example, Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Mass.: The mit Press, 1998); and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
- 2See James Madison, “The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,” The Federalist Papers No. 10, November 23, 1787, accessed at https:// www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-10.
- 3See Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993); and Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy.