Winter 2026 Bulletin

Opportunities and Challenges for U.S.-China Nuclear Arms Control and Risk Reduction

By
Kaitlin Peach
Project
Promoting Dialogue on Arms Control and Disarmament
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Graffiti painted on a stone wall that shows two hands shaking, with one sleeve featuring the U.S. flag and the other featuring the Chinese flag.
Image by iStock.com/ugurhan.

By Kaitlin Peach, Raymond Frankel Nuclear Security Policy Fellow

Across many dimensions, U.S.-China relations are under strain. Amid ongoing debates about tariffs, rare earth minerals, technology, and Taiwan, one challenge stands out: nuclear risk fueled by increasing nuclear competition and a lack of risk reduction mechanisms. China currently has an estimated six hundred nuclear warheads and that number is expected to reach one thousand by 2030.1 At the same time, global nuclear risks are rising as the arms control regime weakens, with countries withdrawing from treaties and the last remaining U.S.-Russia treaty set to expire in February 2026.2 Adding to the tension, in October 2025, President Donald Trump ordered the resumption of nuclear weapons testing prior to a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jingping.3 Without an arms control agreement or risk reduction measures between the United States and China, experts warn of a potential arms race and the risk that overreaction or crisis escalation could lead to nuclear conflict.4

One way to reduce these risks is through continued high-level strategic dialogue, such as “Track II” dialogues that allow nonstate actors–academics, former officials, and NGO leaders–to explore complex topics and discuss potential solutions outside of formal government channels.

From July 7–11, 2025, in partner­ship with Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom, the Academy and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences organized a Track II dialogue to explore U.S.-China relations and strategic stability. Following the dialogue, the Academy delegation, led by Academy member Steven Miller (Harvard University), participated in meetings in Beijing with several organizations and two universities. The delegation also met with staff at the U.S. Embassy while in Beijing and briefed officials from the Office of Strategic Stability and Extended Deterrence Affairs and the Office of China Coordination in the State Department upon return to the United States. The meetings explored the potential for a U.S.-China nuclear agreement and broader strategic stability issues, including economic relations and the implications for overall U.S.-China relations.

Participants agreed that U.S.-China relations are facing numerous challenges, both nuclear and nonnuclear, and that there is room for cooperation. They emphasized that although U.S.-China relations are tense right now, the relationship has historically had its highs and lows and both countries can work together to improve these relations. At the time of the dialogues, there was speculation that President Donald Trump and President Xi Jingping would hold a summit by the end of 2025. While participants acknowledged that any such meeting would likely focus on multiple dimensions of U.S.-China rela­tions, they were hopeful that the two leaders would discuss nuclear issues. The two leaders did not hold a summit; instead, they met during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in October 2025 where discussions focused on economic issues. A summit or additional meetings between the two leaders is likely in 2026.
 

Challenges to Cooperation
 

The U.S.-China relationship faces numerous challenges, and non­nuclear issues often hinder progress on nuclear negotiations. For instance, economic tensions can erode communication and deepen mistrust between the two countries. Without a foundation of trust and open dialogue, it becomes difficult to negotiate on nuclear issues, increasing the risk of misperception and overreaction.

At the Track II dialogues, delegates from the United States and China focused on the uncertainty and lack of clarity about the direction of both states’ nuclear strategies. This includes:

  1. China’s minimum deterrence strategy, no first use policy, and nuclear modernization program.5

  2. The United States’ modernization program, in particular, the proposed Golden Dome missile defense system, which aims to protect against all missile attacks.6 While Golden Dome is described as a defensive system, China is concerned about its offensive capabilities in space.7

  3. The United States’ and Israel’s strikes on Iran in response to proliferation concerns.

Participants agreed that uncertainty and mistrust could cause states to overreact to each other’s actions. Although the circumstances differ from the past, such overreactions could escalate into a Cold War–style arms race, conventional conflict, or even nuclear weapons use.

Since the start of its nuclear program, China has adhered to a strategy of minimum deterrence and a no first use policy. Minimum deterrence refers to maintaining only enough nuclear weapons to deter a first strike, though what constitutes “enough” is subjective. A no first use policy commits a state to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation for a nuclear attack. U.S. participants expressed concern about the uncertainty surrounding China’s modernization efforts and whether it would maintain its current policy and strategy. Chinese participants explained that the current perception is that their existing arsenal is insufficient for minimum deterrence, given security and proliferation concerns in the region.

At the same time, many Chinese participants expressed concern about U.S. modernization efforts, particularly Golden Dome and its impact on strategic stability. Golden Dome would utilize space-based interceptors, raising fears that these systems could also serve as anti-satellite weapons. U.S. participants acknowledged that Golden Dome could have destabilizing effects, but they emphasized that the program would be expensive, require significant time, and is unlikely to become operational before the end of President Trump’s term.8

Lastly, participants discussed proliferation concerns, particularly regarding Iran. U.S. participants expressed concern that the June 2025 Israeli and U.S. strikes might motivate Iran to build a nuclear weapon and seek assistance from North Korea. While the strikes were intended to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, they may have instead reinforced Iran’s perception that it needs a nuclear deterrent–thereby accelerating future nuclear weapons development. Chinese participants noted that the strikes took place amid ongoing negotiations and they voiced some concern that nuclear facilities used for peaceful uses, such as for energy production, could be targeted. They emphasized that attacks on nuclear energy facilities violate the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols because such actions endanger civilians.9 Participants also debated whether the targeted sites were intended for military or peaceful purposes.
 

Possibilities for Cooperation
 

Despite these ongoing challenges, participants agreed that cooperation between the United States and China is both necessary and possible. Their past collaboration on nonproliferation, such as through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Six Party Talks, offers a foundation for future efforts.10 Although a bilateral arms control agreement may not be imminent, there are opportunities for risk reduction measures. In 2024, Presidents Biden and Xi reached a nonbinding agreement that nuclear weapons use should remain under human control.11 While nonbinding agreements lack the legal weight of treaties, they can still advance risk reduction, foster dialogue, and build mutual trust.

Participants agreed that advancing nonproliferation serves the interests of both the United States and China, even if they do not agree on specific mechanisms for doing so. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and ensuring its long-term resilience.12 There was extensive discussion about encouraging Iran to put their nuclear materials back under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Earlier in 2025, the IAEA reported some difficulties in monitoring Iran’s program, and following the U.S.-Israeli strikes, Iran ceased cooperating with the IAEA.

A U.S.-China arms control agreement remains a long-term goal that will require sustained effort. In the meantime, both countries can make meaningful progress on risk reduction that can decrease the likelihood of a nuclear incident and build the foundation for future agreements. Participants emphasized that increased communication on nuclear issues, including military-to-military dialogue, is essential. Suggestions included 1) discussions on managing sea and space incidents to reduce the risk of conventional conflicts or crises escalating to nuclear use; 2) missile launch notifications to improve transparency and prevent misunderstandings; 3) continued Track II dialogues to allow experts to develop and share recommendations; and 4) engagement on the responsible use of emerging technologies relevant to strategic stability.
 

Conclusion
 

The dialogue underscored the importance of continued and increased communication between the United States and China at this critical moment for nuclear issues, both through official diplomatic channels and unofficial, nongovernmental exchanges. Such dialogues can generate the innovative ideas needed to address both immediate and long-term nuclear challenges, while building a foundation of trust that supports future cooperation and helps prevent crises or conventional conflicts from escalating to nuclear use.

 

For more information about the Promoting Dialogue on Arms Control and Disarmament project, please visit the Academy’s website.

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Endnotes

  • 1Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2024: A “Significant Expansion” (Federation of American Scientists, 2024).
  • 2Arms control aims to place limits on the development, production, testing, deployment, or use of weapons, in this case nuclear weapons. These agreements can be based on numbers (such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] between the United States and Russia), or characteristics of the weapons. Nonproliferation refers to preventing a country from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Examples of the weakening of arms control include New START, the last remaining treaty between the United States and Russia, which is set to expire without a replacement or extension. Russia and the United States have withdrawn or suspended participation in several treaties. Iran’s parliament was considering a withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in June 2025.
  • 3“Trump Suggests the U.S. Will Resume Testing Nuclear Weapons,” Associated Press, October 30, 2025.
  • 4The United States is currently modernizing all three legs of its nuclear triad. However, it is facing cost and schedule challenges that call into question its ability to keep pace in an arms race.
  • 5Minimum deterrence strategy is when a state possesses the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to deter another country from attacking it. China’s no first use policy refers to China committing not to use a nuclear weapon first in a conflict. Nuclear modernization involves updating and replacing elements of the nuclear arsenal, including delivery systems (like intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines, and bombers), warheads, nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), and infrastructure. Modernization ensures the arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable, while maintaining credible deterrence. In China’s case, it includes expanding its nuclear forces.
  • 6Golden Dome includes proposals for space-, sea-, and land-based missile interceptors. It is often compared to the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, also called “Star Wars.”
  • 7There is not always a clear distinction between offensive and defensive systems. In this case, China is concerned that the space-based interceptors could be used as anti-satellite weapons.
  • 8

    Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Fact Sheet: Golden Dome.”

  • 9Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted June 8, 1977, entry into force December 7, 1979, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner.
  • 10The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is also known as the Iran nuclear deal. The P5, or the five nuclear weapons states defined by the NPT, and the European Union came to an agreement with Iran to put limits on its nuclear activities and prevent proliferation. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. The Six Party Talks were discussions held between the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia after North Korea withdrew from the NPT in an effort to resolve security concerns in the region. The talks took place between 2003 and 2007.
  • 11Jarret Renshaw and Trevor Hunnicutt, “Biden, Xi Agree that Humans, not AI, Should Control Nuclear Arms,” Reuters, November 16, 2024.
  • 12

    The NPT aims to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.” The treaty also defines states as nuclear or nonnuclear by those who built and tested a nuclear weapon before 1967. See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.