The European View on Space and Security
Compared with the United States, fewer space programs in Europe are devoted strictly to military purposes (that is, those possessing high-end military characteristics and performance). Those programs that do have a military purpose focus on information collection for strategic purposes — similar to the early U.S. military space programs — rather than on new tactical applications. This fundamental space capability is likely to remain a priority for Europe. For example, Helios, the French-led military reconnaissance program whose first satellite was launched in July 1995, is intended to provide continuous strategic information for the management of nuclear deterrence and for improved awareness of possible major events affecting French policy in nearby zones of interest.13 So far, however, Helios data remain modest in volume and are primarily used for strategic purposes. The Helios II series marks a clear evolution toward possibly making more use of space data for purely military purposes because its broader user capabilities are better adapted to theater requirements and would enable quicker and more efficient information collection processes for the military.14 This evolution was recently reaffirmed in the 2008 French defense and security white book,15 which proposed the creation of a new strategic function called “Knowledge and Anticipation,” highlighting the need, according to its authors, for better-informed intelligence and calling for the development of more efficient information tools. From the sometimes vivid debates over this issue, better use of modernized space systems has emerged as a key recommendation. Fully endorsed by the French president, this recommendation should lead to the allocation of larger budgets for follow-on Helios systems that will be developed within the framework of the Multinational Space-Based Imaging System (MUSIS). This system capitalizes on efforts begun in the 1990s by six European countries16 to define common needs and future systems, and will provide these countries with an unprecedented optical and radar intelligence capability. It is expected that this capability may also possibly be used by the EU at-large, through its common “Satellite Centre” based in Torrejón, Spain, near Madrid. However, priority uses and special exchanges between nationally owned systems will remain arranged under the control of signatory countries. The French white book also calls for space assets to be modernized with new electronic intelligence capabilities. Following its Essaim and Electronic Intelligence Satellite (ELISA) demonstrator programs, France plans to launch the Capacité de Renseignement Electromagnétique Spatial (CERES) satellite system in the middle of the next decade. France also plans to direct funds toward the development of an earlywarning satellite system, with an operational capability envisioned for 2019.
This evolution toward tactical uses of satellites is only a first step toward a better integration of space assets in the French armed forces. Such improvements must not be overstated and can hardly be judged as being precursors in Europe of so-called network-centric capabilities, in part because Europe is at an early stage in the integration of its members’ space programs. Neither the European spacefaring nations nor Europe as a whole has been eager or able to choose space as the new locus for their defense and security policy. Nevertheless, the desire for greater European integration may benefit space programs because they could be a powerful catalyst for the still nascent ESDP. The notion of strategic independence has remained at the heart of the most recent European national and collective decisions. For example, Germany’s and Italy’s efforts in civilian/military radar observation and the recent proposals for a collective space observation and monitoring system to be developed by ESA confirm that space programs are increasingly viewed in Europe as valuable tools for ensuring a minimal independence and strategic control in collecting and exploiting information. This viewpoint is gaining traction at a time when NATO/ESDP relationships are reshaping; for example, one result of NATO’s 2009 summit should be closer ties between France and the Alliance. Recent developments in space policy in Europe show that the parallel existence of ESDP and NATO is no longer considered a zero-sum game in which each side’s planning necessarily conflicts with the other’s. Instead, each side’s moves are coming to be seen as complementary, making room for a European desire for greater political autonomy and assertiveness in the field of defense. This progress was somewhat offset by the recent Bush administration’s proposal to deploy anti-missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. The classical unilateralist approach expressed by these efforts led some member states to resume their traditional divergences.
Europe, as a wealthy and willing political entity, could not stand by while non-European countries or regions became active in fields such as environmental monitoring. Furthermore, European successes in space created an increasing self-confidence in homegrown space technology and gradually led European institutions to consider striving for autonomy in several strategic areas. The GMES program and the Galileo satellite navigation program reflect this new political posture. The European states’ combined space capabilities can thus form the core of a basic integrated European strategic capability, especially considering that the U.S.-Russia military monopoly over space is diminishing as the number of national and commercial space programs grows. By basing its security policy on a collectively responsive network of assets rather than on exclusive national military capacity, Europe will offer a distinct perspective on achieving the common goal of making space secure for all.
The European Political Construction Process
The European political construction process is key to understanding the European perspective on security debates. Motivated by the desire to avoid the conflicts that dominated the European scene from the end of the nineteenth to the first half of the twentieth century, the European community was structured around the need to find new common ground and the desire to share certain national resources. The economic common ground rapidly proved to be the preferred playground,17 one on which no “hard” political decisions would be removed from the nation-states’ prerogative. The economic, social, and scientific life of European citizens would be handled (within certain limits) by the European Commission, demonstrated, for example, in the progression to a single European currency. Defense policies, long considered the heart of national sovereignty, have remained under the control of more traditional intergovernmental processes: they are legally outside the mandate of the European Commission and are managed by the European Council, which comprises the heads of state of the various EU members and is intended to represent the interests of the member states’ national governments.
The European decision-making process for space is unique in that some issues are handled through intergovernmental processes while others are addressed through the so-called communitary processes.18 Because of this political construction, no real ESDP or even a CFSP has emerged that would subsume national defense and security policies. Both by design and because of the diverse political views among the twenty-seven EU countries, such a stand-alone policy is unlikely to emerge in the near future.
Since 2004, attempts have been under way to “fix” these difficulties. The 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was designed to provide Europe with a “shared competence” to develop a European space policy using the European Commission’s Framework Programme for Research and Development. Although not endorsed by member states that did not ratify the TCE,19 this “shared competence” was confirmed in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon.20 Calling for a “European Space Policy,”21 the Treaty of Lisbon represents a further step in integrating space efforts, even if (because of the moderate enthusiasm of some EU member states) it does limit the harmonization of laws and regulations and places clear limits on any defense- and security-related aspects.
European Space as a Symbol of the Dominant “Communitary” Model
By and large, space policies in Europe have followed an evolutionary path that reflects their dominant scientific nature, as represented by ESA. In contrast to the two superpowers, space activity in Europe began with purely scientific endeavors in the satellite area, initially federated by the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO). A civilian sister organization, the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), initially addressed launch technology. The merger of these two institutions confirmed the scientific orientation of Europe’s space activity and led to the creation of ESA in 1975. Comprising eighteen states as of the end of 2008, including some states that are not members of the EU, such as Norway and Switzerland, ESA is mandated to focus on “peaceful” activities and has not been allowed to take the lead on any military-purpose space programs, although efforts are under way to grant ESA more flexibility. The only military-oriented European cooperative space institution is the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) in Torrejón, Spain, near Madrid. Formerly affiliated with the Western European Union, EUSC has been a military agency of the European Council since 2001.
Some European countries have devoted part of the resources for their national space programs to military applications, although these countries are still far from reaching the levels of military activity deployed in both the United States and the former USSR. France, which remains the leading European country for military space activity, has maintained low expenditure levels, reflecting enduring debates on the relevance of such spendings, coupled with relatively limited first-order political involvement.
As of 2009, no Europe-wide organization is capable of coordinating the various nationally driven military-oriented space programs. Attempts such as the Franco-German Helios-Horus22 cooperation planned during the 1990s failed because of contradictory political and industrial interests in the two countries.23 The same situation was repeated in the field of military communications satellites. Several initiatives started in the 1990s to integrate the U.K. Skynet 5 program into an interoperable satellite communications architecture with the French Syracuse 3 satellites as well as with some U.S. satellites also failed, halted by the United Kingdom in 1998 for a range of national motivations and constraints. A commercial joint venture including the United Kingdom’s Skynet, France’s Syracuse 3, and Italy’s Sistema Italiano per Comunicazioni Riservate ed Allarmi (SICRAL) was successfully established some years later for equipping NATO, but this initiative cannot be considered a deliberate European governmental initiative. The inability to compromise on such projects is often cited as an example of the enduring difficulties of thinking in European terms.
A New Path toward the Stars: Space for Security
Some recent developments show that Europe feels mature enough to contribute to its own security despite its intrinsic inability to build a unique ESDP. Several important texts have been approved since 1990 that show an increasing need to organize Europe in the fields of security and defense. One is the Western European Union declaration of June 1992, which set up the Petersberg tasks permitting Europe to intervene militarily in low- and mid-intensity conflicts on its borders.24 Another is the Helsinki European Council, which in December 1999 issued the “headline goals” that led to the creation of a European military staff and, in 2003, a rapid reaction force. This paved the way for the yet-to-be ratified European Constitution, which calls for a European capacity for peacekeeping missions, conflict prevention, and strengthened security in accordance with the UN Charter. This new political stance was endorsed by both the European Council in Brussels in December 200325 and by the European Commission, which in 2004 launched a “Preparatory Action for Security Research,” based on the Research for a Secure Europe report,26 with the goal of initiating more-active research and development programs in the security field starting in 2007.27 These developments show that the broadly defined issue of security has joined economic policy in becoming a new playground for the European construction process, allowing the EU to reinforce its political identity while leaving purely military aspects to be resolved by member states. A resolution of the European Parliament issued on July 10, 2008, provides a good example of the careful handling of the issue of “European security.” The resolution underlines the need for space assets so that the political and diplomatic activities of the EU may be based on independent, reliable, and complete information in support of its policies for conflict prevention, crisis management operations, and global security, especially the monitoring of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of transportation and verification of international treaties, the transnational smuggling of light weapons and small arms, the protection of critical infrastructure and of the EU’s borders, and civil protection in the event of natural and man-made disasters and crises.
The resolution also notes that “the crisis management operations within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) suffer from a lack of interoperability between space assets operated by EU Member States” and calls for “the promotion of equal access for all EU Member States to operational data gathered using space assets under a reinforced ESDP framework.”28
The recent European decisions to launch and support security-oriented programs, such as the European Galileo navigation satellite program and the future GMES program, must be interpreted in the context of an enhanced political interest for security in Europe. Today, space programs are an important collective endeavor helping Europe to develop its expertise and industrial base. But, as programs that originated under clear civilian and European control and then evolved to include security and even defense aspects, they are also perfect symbols of Europe’s new security policy.
Europe can take collective steps toward using space for security purposes only if those steps are based on a broad definition of security and the development of dual-use programs and applications. If Europe wants to remain an independent actor in the space arena, it will also have to find ways to protect its civilian and dual-use space programs without relying on military options that have never been attractive to its member states and that have been deliberately precluded at the communitary level.
The Illustrative Case of Galileo
The Galileo project has been a perfect example of this path. Since its inception, this European endeavor has relied on civilian management to take care of security issues. Conceived in 1999 and confirmed in 2002, Galileo rapidly emerged as a strategic program for Europe. Europeans realized years earlier that satellite navigation and time-synchronization programs would play a central role in modern societies. The first such program Europe developed, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) — which comprises three geostationary satellites and a network of ground stations — is intended to augment on a regional scale (including Europe, North Africa, and the Near East) the performance and signal integrity of global navigation satellite systems, including the Global Positioning System (GPS) and, eventually, Galileo. Building an improved global system that would provide more elaborate services and possibly create new commercial markets was consistent with the traditional European approach. A number of studies had predicted that a potentially huge commercial market was at stake. But the studies also predicted that concerns would arise over potentially degraded data coming from a single system controlled by one country’s ministry of defense. Even after the United States ended its “selective availability” policy on GPS signals in 2000, this concern was seen as a potential showstopper for serious investment. In European eyes, the U.S. GPS constituted an unacceptable monopoly given the then-expected spin-offs of satellite navigation technology.
When conceived in 1999, Galileo was the first program of its kind to be dealt with at the communitary level without involving the usual national security and defense actors. The involvement of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy and Transport — besides ESA, the other important contributor to Galileo — demonstrated the EU’s ability to manage a project of such strategic importance by itself. Galileo also symbolized the progress made by the EU in building its own political legitimacy while respecting national sovereignty in related domains. The need to raise funds from industry through a public-private partnership (“concession”) approach and the challenge of including broad European participation were widely viewed as tasks that would prove the usefulness of European civilian institutions.
The circumstances of Galileo’s origin also partly explain why the services it will provide have been structured according to the quality of the service provided instead of according to the nature of the user (that is, civilian or military), as is the case for GPS. In particular, the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) will provide signals for users, mainly governmental, who require service continuity and completely secure access. This does not mean that the service will be reserved only for military users, however; that would contravene EU policy. By the same token, the relatively open nature of PRS does not preclude Galileo from being used in a military-controlled manner when necessary. However, the uses made by any military user of Galileo or GMES must be consistent with the principle that Galileo and GMES are civil systems under civil control, and consequently that any change to this principle would require examination in the framework of, Title V of the Treaty of the EU, in particular, Articles 17 and 23, as well as in the framework of the ESA convention. 29 Although somewhat ambiguous, this official wording makes clear that military uses of Galileo (or GMES) are possible.
The transatlantic controversy over the real nature of the program (that is, civilian or military) that culminated in 2001 helped make Europeans more aware of the security implications attendant on the use of Galileo-provided services and reinforced Europeans’ support for the program. The United States was skeptical about the ability of Galileo’s civilian management structure to deal as seriously with security matters as did GPS’s overseers — the U.S. military. U.S. pressure on Europe to establish some degree of military control over Galileo was largely viewed in Europe as an attempt to undermine the collective effort by linking Galileo to politically sensitive defense decisions that had deliberately been placed out of the European Commission’s reach. The EU nonetheless recognized the U.S. concerns as legitimate and tried to end nascent tensions by creating a structure to manage Europe’s satellite radio-navigation program. In July 2004, a European Council regulation created a special EU agency, the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Supervisory Authority, to take charge of all security issues related to program building and exploitation and to manage the relationship between the European public authority and the private concessionaire that will run the program. A System Safety and Security Committee composed of national representatives will “assist the Authority on all aspects relating to the system’s safety and security,” including protective measures to prevent any hostile or unauthorized use of Galileo.30 The GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) will:
[…]
(ii) define the security specifications of the system and its components, and
the standards of security for information techniques; (iii) define the cryptography
which requires governmental approval; (iv) ensure that the European GNSS Signal/Services
are controlled in compliance with security criteria [. . .]; (v) be the European
GNSS security accreditation authority, initiate and monitor the implementation of
security procedures and perform system security audits;
[. . .]
(vii) enforce and
verify compliance by the concession holder with international rules and agreements
(Wassenaar, Missile Technology Control Regime, International Agreements, . . .)
(viii) implement the relevant provisions for the exchange, handling and storage
of classified information; (ix) develop coordination and consultation procedures
on securityrelated matters with the Secretary-General of the Council of the European
Union, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (SG/HR) (x)
identify and inform the Council of possible measures that could be taken by the
Council in the event of a threat to the security of the European Union or of a Member
State arising from the operation or use of the system, or in the event of a threat
to the operation of the system, in particular as the result of an international
crisis;
[. . .]
(xii) give advice on security policy issues in international agreements
related to the European GNSS programmes.31
With the establishment of the GSA, the political legitimacy of Galileo as a security-oriented program was sealed. The fact that all tasks related to the security of both the program and its services are entrusted to an EU agency demonstrates a commitment to addressing a broad spectrum of military and security issues without prejudice to civilian users. As the main technical point of contact, the GSA has been playing a central role in the management of the envisioned structure and uses of the future Galileo signal. The necessity to reboost the program in 2007 because of the financial failure of the initially envisioned public-private partnership scheme has resulted in a new, deliberately government-oriented approach in Europe. Since 2008, questions have been posed, especially among members of the European Parliament, about the future of the GSA and whether management of the public-private partnership should remain considered. Whatever the fate of the GSA, a more intergovernmental approach would ease security procedures.
Confronted with military-oriented space activities in the United States, China, and Russia, Europe, with no such projects of its own, has had no alternative but to help increase the security of the space environment, to ensure the security of the programs it does have. More convincing measures regarding the management structure of Galileo, as well as a compromise reached with the U.S. government to prevent the Galileo and GPS systems from using the same frequencies, helped to reduce U.S. security concerns about Galileo. In June 2004, GPS and Galileo representatives reached an agreement on the complementary use of the two systems that allowed the construction of Galileo to proceed.
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security: A Further Security Step
The GMES project has also acquired a reputation as a strategic space element and a security-oriented tool for Europe. The root of this idea can be traced to the European environmental protection policy that provides GMES with its political legitimacy. On May 19, 1998, reflecting environmental concerns expressed a year earlier in the Kyoto Protocol, a number of European national organizations and the European Commission published the so-called Baveno manifesto32 inviting Europe to organize a global Earth observation and environmental monitoring capability using all possible technical means, with a particular role given to satellites. The deeply federative character of GMES quickly gave it a political dimension beyond the traditional impact of classical infrastructure or information-technology programs.
The underlying principles of GMES are to promote a convergence between the political (even social) demand for technology and the supply of that technology. This convergence was already visible in other Earth-observation programs, such as the “Vegetation” instruments aboard the SPOT 4 and SPOT 5 satellites or ESA’s Envisat satellite equipped with an array of sensors. GMES is also representative of a growing awareness of the importance of collectively carrying out some environmental monitoring. This idea was shaped within the international framework set up by the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) and resulted in the Integrated Global Observing Strategy (IGOS) in 1995, which became the IGOS Partnership (IGOS-P) in 1998 with the goal of networking the relevant space assets. The Baveno manifesto was shaped along these lines, taking advantage of both a strong political movement and a long-standing technical effort.
From “Environmental Security” to “Environment and Security.” The title of the Baveno manifesto, Global Monitoring for Environmental Security: A Manifesto for a New European Initiative, at first referred to a notion of security that was radically oriented toward the monitoring and protection of the environment. One year later, this environment-only concept began to change. In a 1999 document submitted to the Space Advisory Group (SAG), the program was renamed Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, the scope was expanded to all security-related issues, and the possibility was raised of linking GMES with the nascent ESDP. The document underscored the environment-security link, stating, “Environmental problems can lead to such serious difficulties that they may, firstly, endanger the security of both individuals and nations and, secondly, lead to international conflict.”33
GMES can also be seen as a symbol of a more mature and consistent “political Europe” in the aftermath of the conflicts in Central Europe and the Balkans during the 1990s. These conflicts sounded an alarm to many supporters of the European idea who could not help but realize how much Europe was proving impotent in the defense and security fields, even near its own borders. The expanded GMES concept built on growing European awareness of its defense and security responsibilities and gave Europe a chance to respond with existing and planned capabilities.
GMES is well suited to deal with a wide array of security aspects because of its dual (civilian and military) character. Many programs and techniques used to monitor the environment also have security applications. The dual-use capabilities of GMES have been taken into account in a number of documents produced by the European Commission and ESA. For example, the “Joint Task Force Report,” which covers the whole array of European space policy, explicitly mentions the central role of the Petersberg tasks. The document specifies that the “security and dual-use dimensions of GMES have not been adequately investigated so far” and recommends the “establish[ment of] an appropriate dialogue on security and dual use issues between the Directorate General of the Commission, the Secretariat of the European CFSP, ESA, and relevant authorities in Member States.”34
Refined Security Concepts for GMES. A consensus on mixing the traditionally well-accepted civil security with support of the CFSP builds upon some level of ambiguity because the CFSP is still “under construction.” Paradoxically, the low profile of the CFSP has allowed GMES to gradually tackle these supplementary issues more boldly. While the design of GMES was still under study, the representatives of eleven countries created an ad hoc working group on October 18, 2002, to address how GMES could carry out some security functions. Instead of defining what kind of space-security policy the European Council should adopt, the ad hoc group chose to consider how GMES might remain flexible enough to implement several of the security policies envisioned in Europe. The group identified four security domains: 1) environmental and technological crisis prevention and rapid reaction; 2) conflict prevention and treaty verification; 3) support for the Petersberg tasks; and 4) European border surveillance.
This combination of missions creates a nebula of security missions with direct links to the more defense-oriented aspects of security. From the European Commission’s perspective, this reflects the extension of so-called civil security missions to an enlarged security concept, which was at the heart of the research and development budget preparation starting in 2007. The European Commission has supported this extension by accenting key areas, such as the security of the European citizen, critical infrastructures, protection of supply chains (goods, energy, food), and civil-security force cooperation35 on consensual issues such as maritime pollution, major disasters monitoring, and educational activities.36 Another use consistent with these priorities involves “risk mapping”: using GMES to document a wealth of geographic elements that are linked to natural events or human activities. This capability can be used for humanitarian aid in a crisis, but also has monitoring and detection applications that are more continuous. A September 2003 position paper notes that GMES would have supplementary missions related to the threat of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons “where military assets and expertise has its place alongside civilian and response mechanisms.”37 The paper summarized the security missions to which GMES should directly contribute, such as treaty verification and crisis management; aircraft and missile identification; and peacekeeping and enforcement efforts.
“Besoin Opérationnel Commun”: Toward a “Dual-Use” Space Security Concept for Europe?
The rapid evolution of proposed GMES services reflects the simultaneous emergence — independent of the GMES project itself — of dual-purpose Earth-observation space systems in Europe. The Franco-Italian Pléiades-COSMO program, a cooperative program built under the terms of the Torino Agreement signed by France and Italy on January 29, 2001, will combine optical and radar satellites for Earth observation, and is a significant example of a dualuse European space system.
In January 2003, the European Commission suggested that the GMES initiative could complement the Besoin Opérationnel Commun (Common Operational Need; or, BOC), an effort among six countries’ ministries of defense.38 Initially a Franco-German initiative, the BOC aims to start, even if only in the limited field of Earth observation, a high-level cooperative process designed to solidify, and possibly guarantee, longer-term multilateral military space cooperation. The goal is to go beyond simple cooperative financing agreements and set common objectives and operational requirements prior to determining the technical developments next-generation satellites will need. The BOC was an initial effort that reflects some of the hard lessons European countries learned during difficult joint ventures in the field39 and could be a first building block of a new “bottom-up” approach for Europe.40 Although such an effort cannot guarantee better use or interoperability of existing or currently planned systems — such as the French Helios II satellite series, the German military radar satellite program SAR-Lupe, or even the French-Italian Pléiades-COSMO dual-use observation system — it does prepare the ground for common planning of next-generation systems that will go into effect after 2015.
From both a multilateral cooperative point of view and a more technical point of view, the BOC and GMES share several significant points of intersection. The technical capabilities of the satellite platforms could be used at least partially in a complementary manner to satisfy both security and environmental needs. For example, because GMES covers a wide range of missions that have something to do with low-level military missions as defined in the Petersberg tasks, it can serve some functions envisaged by the BOC. Still, a number of difficulties must be overcome. For example, any system of military interest must be able to provide imagery nearly in real-time and in a totally protected and discreet fashion, yet the GMES promoters usually plead for a multiplication of widely disseminated products and services to meet the needs of nonmilitary users as well.
Two experts from the EU Satellite Centre near Madrid described three requirements for any BOC system: 1) protection from hostile access; 2) confidentiality surrounding the tasking of the system; and 3) confidentiality surrounding the performance of the system.41 If the first two requirements apply to both military and civilian systems like GMES, the third requirement may not be fulfilled by GMES, as dual-use systems usually multiply the levels of authorized users, making a complete dual-use structure extremely difficult to manage, especially at the ground-segment level. In this respect, GMES cannot be considered a military-civilian system, but merely a civilian system that may complement military capabilities. The experts depicted GMES as a global system for Earth observation, environment and security monitoring, and data dissemination — all activities destined to coexist with parallel military activities without totally replacing them.
GMES Possible Data Policy as Perceived in 2003. Adapted from I. Shepherd and B. Routledge, GMES and the BOC (Torrejón, Spain: JRC and EU Satellite Centre, November 13, 2003).
Although GMES has the potential to be used in ways that go far beyond its initial environmental-monitoring objectives, security-oriented communities of users have not yet expressed clear requirements for such expanded capabilities. Still, GMES shows how Europe is starting to progress toward more security-oriented space applications without confronting the usual difficulties related to the building of a genuine collective defense and military policy. This security-oriented evolution does not reflect a rational political decision-making process at the level of the European governments. Instead, GMES is the perfect example of a slow but logical process that is constrained by a number of national and collective rules that must stay within the agreed conception of “security” to keep moving forward.
19. French voters rejected the TCE in late May 2005; Dutch voters followed suit a few days later.
27. The so-called Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technology Development.
28. European Parliament Resolution of 10 July 2008 on Space and Security, 2008/2030(INI), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6- TA-2008-0365
29. European Space Agency and European Commission, “Resolution on the European Space Policy,” ESA BR 269 22.05.07, May 22, 2007, http://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/BR/ESA_BR_269_22-05-07.pdf.
33. European Commission, “Global Monitoring for Environment and Security,” SAG/99/3, July 12, 1999.
34. Joint Task Force Report, Draft Version 2.5, September 2001.
35. As previously decided in the European Council meeting in Feira, Portugal, in June 2000. See Santa Maria Da Feira, European Council, June 19 and 20, 2000, Conclusions of the Presidency, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm.
36. This effort was initiated by the so-called Report of the Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research, Research for a Secure Europe, European Communities, 2004; see http://www.src09.se/upload/External%20Documents/gop_en.pdf.